Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 187107               January 31, 2012

UNITED CLAIMANTS ASSOCIATION OF NEA (UNICAN), represented by its representative

BIENVENIDO R. LEAL, in his official capacity as its President and in his own individual
capacity, EDUARDO R. LACSON, ORENCIO F. VENIDA, JR., THELMA V. OGENA, BOBBY M.
CARANTO, MARILOU B. DE JESUS, EDNA G. RAÑA, and ZENAIDA P. OLIQUINO, in their own
capacities and in behalf of all those similarly situated officials and employees of the National
Electrification Administration, Petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION (NEA), NEA BOARD OF ADMINISTRATORS
(NEA BOARD), ANGELO T. REYES as Chairman of the NEA Board of Administrators, EDITHA
S. BUENO, Ex-Officio Member and NEA Administrator, and WILFRED L. BILLENA, JOSPEPH
D. KHONGHUN, and FR. JOSE VICTOR E. LOBRIGO, Members, NEA Board, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

This is an original action for Injunction to restrain and/or prevent the implementation of Resolution
Nos. 46 and 59, dated July 10, 2003 and September 3, 2003, respectively, otherwise known as the
National Electrification Administration (NEA) Termination Pay Plan, issued by respondent NEA
Board of Administrators (NEA Board).

The Facts

Petitioners are former employees of NEA who were terminated from their employment with the
implementation of the assailed resolutions.

Respondent NEA is a government-owned and/or controlled corporation created in accordance with

Presidential Decree No. (PD) 269 issued on August 6, 1973. Under PD 269, Section 5(a)(5), the
NEA Board is empowered to organize or reorganize NEA’s staffing structure, as follows:

Section 5. National Electrification Administration; Board of Administrators; Administrator.

(a) For the purpose of administering the provisions of this Decree, there is hereby established a
public corporation to be known as the National Electrification Administration. All of the powers of the
corporation shall be vested in and exercised by a Board of Administrators, which shall be composed
of a Chairman and four (4) members, one of whom shall be the Administrator as ex-officio member.
The Chairman and the three other members shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines to
serve for a term of six years. x x x

xxxx
The Board shall, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, have the following specific powers
and duties.

1. To implement the provisions and purposes of this Decree;

xxxx

5. To establish policies and guidelines for employment on the basis of merit, technical competence
and moral character, and, upon the recommendation of the Administrator to organize or reorganize
NEA’s staffing structure, to fix the salaries of personnel and to define their powers and duties.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Thereafter, in order to enhance and accelerate the electrification of the whole country, including the
privatization of the National Power Corporation, Republic Act No. (RA) 9136, otherwise known as the
Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA Law), was enacted, taking effect on June 26,
2001. The law imposed upon NEA additional mandates in relation to the promotion of the role of
rural electric cooperatives to achieve national electrification. Correlatively, Sec. 3 of the law provides:

Section 3. Scope. - This Act shall provide a framework for the restructuring of the electric power
industry, including the privatization of the assets of NPC, the transition to the desired competitive
structure, and the definition of the responsibilities of the various government agencies and private
entities. (Emphasis supplied.)

Sec. 77 of RA 9136 also provides:

Section 77. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The DOE shall, in consultation with the electric
power industry participants and end-users, promulgate the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) of this Act within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act, subject to the approval by the
Power Commission.

Thus, the Rules and Regulations to implement RA 9136 were issued on February 27, 2002. Under
Sec. 3(b)(ii), Rule 33 of the Rules and Regulations, all the NEA employees and officers are
considered terminated and the 965 plantilla positions of NEA vacant, to wit:

Section 3. Separation and Other Benefits.

(a) x x x

(b) The following shall govern the application of Section 3(a) of this Rule:

xxxx

(ii) With respect to NEA officials and employees, they shall be considered legally terminated and
shall be entitled to the benefits or separation pay provided in Section 3(a) herein when a
restructuring of NEA is implemented pursuant to a law enacted by Congress or pursuant to Section
5(a)(5) of Presidential Decree No. 269. (Emphasis supplied.)

Meanwhile, on August 28, 2002, former President Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo issued Executive Order
No. 119 directing the NEA Board to submit a reorganization plan. Thus, the NEA Board issued the
assailed resolutions.
On September 17, 2003, the Department of Budget and Management approved the NEA
Termination Pay Plan.

Thereafter, the NEA implemented an early retirement program denominated as the "Early Leavers
Program," giving incentives to those who availed of it and left NEA before the effectivity of the
reorganization plan. The other employees of NEA were terminated effective December 31, 2003.

Hence, We have this petition.

The Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues:

1. The NEA Board has no power to terminate all the NEA employees;

2. Executive Order No. 119 did not grant the NEA Board the power to terminate all NEA
employees; and

3. Resolution Nos. 46 and 59 were carried out in bad faith.

On the other hand, respondents argue in their Comment dated August 20, 2009 that:

1. The Court has no jurisdiction over the petition;

2. Injunction is improper in this case given that the assailed resolutions of the NEA Board
have long been implemented; and

3. The assailed NEA Board resolutions were issued in good faith.

The Court’s Ruling

This petition must be dismissed.

The procedural issues raised by respondents shall first be discussed.

This Court Has Jurisdiction over the Case

Respondents essentially argue that petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts, pursuant
to which the instant petition should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court first rather than with
this Court directly.

We explained the principle of hierarchy of courts in Mendoza v. Villas, stating:

1 

In Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, a petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 was dismissed for having been filed directly with
the Court, violating the principle of hierarchy of courts, to wit:

Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court
forum. In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, citing People v. Cuaresma, this Court made the
following pronouncements:

This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court
with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming
regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court,
and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a
policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the
Court’s docket. (Emphasis supplied.)

Evidently, the instant petition should have been filed with the RTC. However, as an exception to this
general rule, the principle of hierarchy of courts may be set aside for special and important reasons.
Such reason exists in the instant case involving as it does the employment of the entire plantilla of
NEA, more than 700 employees all told, who were effectively dismissed from employment in one
swift stroke. This to the mind of the Court entails its attention.

Moreover, the Court has made a similar ruling in National Power Corporation Drivers and Mechanics
Association (NPC-DAMA) v. National Power Corporation (NPC). In that case, the NPC-DAMA also
2 

filed a petition for injunction directly with this Court assailing NPC Board Resolution Nos. 2002-124
and 2002-125, both dated November 18, 2002, directing the termination of all employees of the NPC
on January 31, 2003. Despite such apparent disregard of the principle of hierarchy of courts, the
petition was given due course. We perceive no compelling reason to treat the instant case
differently.

The Remedy of Injunction Is still Available

Respondents allege that the remedy of injunction is no longer available to petitioners inasmuch as
the assailed NEA Board resolutions have long been implemented.

Taking respondents’ above posture as an argument on the untenability of the petition on the ground
of mootness, petitioners contend that the principle of mootness is subject to exceptions, such as
when the case is of transcendental importance.

In Funa v. Executive Secretary, the Court passed upon the seeming moot issue of the appointment
3 

of Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Maritime Industry Authority
(MARINA) while concurrently serving as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications. There, even though Bautista later on was appointed as Administrator of MARINA,
the Court ruled that the case was an exception to the principle of mootness and that the remedy of
injunction was still available, explaining thus:

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally,
courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. However, as we held
in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot
prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. Even in
cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did not hesitate to resolve the
legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and
public.

As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done. However, as an exception to
the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet
evading review. (Emphasis supplied.)

Similarly, in the instant case, while the assailed resolutions of the NEA Board may have long been
implemented, such acts of the NEA Board may well be repeated by other government agencies in
the reorganization of their offices. Petitioners have not lost their remedy of injunction.

The Power to Reorganize Includes the Power to Terminate

The meat of the controversy in the instant case is the issue of whether the NEA Board had the
power to pass Resolution Nos. 46 and 59 terminating all of its employees.

This must be answered in the affirmative.

Under Rule 33, Section 3(b)(ii) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the EPIRA Law, all
NEA employees shall be considered legally terminated with the implementation of a reorganization
program pursuant to a law enacted by Congress or pursuant to Sec. 5(a)(5) of PD 269 through
which the reorganization was carried out, viz:

Section 5. National Electrification Administration; Board of Administrators; Administrator.

(a) For the purpose of administering the provisions of this Decree, there is hereby established a
public corporation to be known as the National Electrification Administration. x x x

xxxx

The Board shall, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, have the following specific powers
and duties.

xxxx

5. To establish policies and guidelines for employment on the basis of merit, technical competence
and moral character, and, upon the recommendation of the Administrator to organize or reorganize
NEA’s staffing structure, to fix the salaries of personnel and to define their powers and duties.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, petitioners argue that the power granted unto the NEA Board to organize or reorganize does
not include the power to terminate employees but only to reduce NEA’s manpower complement.

Such contention is erroneous.

In Betoy v. The Board of Directors, National Power Corporation, the Court upheld the dismissal of all
4 

the employees of the NPC pursuant to the EPIRA Law. In ruling that the power of reorganization
includes the power of removal, the Court explained:
[R]eorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by
reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It could result in the loss of one’s position through
removal or abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization for the purpose of economy or to
make the bureaucracy more efficient to be valid, it must pass the test of good faith; otherwise, it is
void ab initio. (Emphasis supplied.)

Evidently, the termination of all the employees of NEA was within the NEA Board’s powers and may
not successfully be impugned absent proof of bad faith.

Petitioners Failed to Prove that the NEA Board Acted in Bad Faith

Next, petitioners challenge the reorganization claiming bad faith on the part of the NEA Board.

Congress itself laid down the indicators of bad faith in the reorganization of government offices in
Sec. 2 of RA 6656, an Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees
in the Implementation of Government Reorganization, to wit:

Section 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause
and after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide
reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a need to merge,
divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes
allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may
be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of reorganization, giving
rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party:

(a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern
of the department or agency concerned;

(b) Where an office is abolished and other performing substantially the same functions is
created;

(c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment,
performance and merit;

(d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and
the reclassified offices perform substantially the same function as the original offices;

(e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof.
(Emphasis supplied.)

It must be noted that the burden of proving bad faith rests on the one alleging it. As the Court ruled
in Culili v. Eastern Telecommunications, Inc., "According to jurisprudence, ‘basic is the principle that
5 

good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same.’ " Moreover, in
Spouses Palada v. Solidbank Corporation, the Court stated, "Allegations of bad faith and fraud must
6 

be proved by clear and convincing evidence."

Here, petitioners have failed to discharge such burden of proof.

In alleging bad faith, petitioners cite RA 6656, particularly its Sec. 2, subparagraphs (b) and
(c).  Petitioners have the burden to show that: (1) the abolished offices were replaced by
1âwphi1
substantially the same units performing the same functions; and (2) incumbents are replaced by less
qualified personnel.

Petitioners failed to prove such facts. Mere allegations without hard evidence cannot be considered
as clear and convincing proof.

Next, petitioners state that the NEA Board should not have abolished all the offices of NEA and
instead made a selective termination of its employees while retaining the other employees.

Petitioners argue that for the reorganization to be valid, it is necessary to only abolish the offices or
terminate the employees that would not be retained and the retention of the employees that were
tasked to carry out the continuing mandate of NEA. Petitioners argue in their Memorandum dated
July 27, 2010:

A valid reorganization, pursued in good faith, would have resulted to: (1) the abolition of old positions
in the NEA’s table of organization that pertain to the granting of franchises and rate fixing functions
as these were all abolished by Congress (2) the creation of new positions that pertain to the
additional mandates of the EPIRA Law and (3) maintaining the old positions that were not affected
by the EPIRA Law.

The Court already had the occasion to pass upon the validity of the similar reorganization in the
NPC. In the aforecited case of Betoy, the Court upheld the policy of the Executive to terminate all
7 

the employees of the office before rehiring those necessary for its operation. We ruled in Betoy that
such policy is not tainted with bad faith:

It is undisputed that NPC was in financial distress and the solution found by Congress was to pursue
a policy towards its privatization. The privatization of NPC necessarily demanded the restructuring of
its operations. To carry out the purpose, there was a need to terminate employees and re-hire some
depending on the manpower requirements of the privatized companies. The privatization and
restructuring of the NPC was, therefore, done in good faith as its primary purpose was for economy
and to make the bureaucracy more efficient. (Emphasis supplied.)

Evidently, the fact that the NEA Board resorted to terminating all the incumbent employees of NPC
and, later on, rehiring some of them, cannot, on that ground alone, vitiate the bona fides of the
reorganization.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Resolution Nos. 46 and 59, dated July 10,
2003 and September 3, 2003, respectively, issued by the NEA Board of Directors are hereby
UPHELD.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 203974               April 22, 2014

AURELIO M. UMALI, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JULIUS CESAR V. VERGARA, and THE CITY GOVERNMENT
OF CABANATUAN, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204371

J.V. BAUTISTA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Before the Court is the consolidated case for Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for
injunctive relief, docket as G.R. No. 203974, assailing Minute Resolution No. 12-0797  and Minute
1

Resolution No. 12-0925  dated September 11, 2012 and October 16, 2012, respectively, both
2

promulgated by public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and Petition for

Mandamus, docketed G.R. No. 204371, seeking to compel public respondent to implement the
same.

The Facts

On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution No. 183-
2011, requesting the President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city
of the province of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to the request, the
President issued Presidential Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012, proclaiming the City of
Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to "ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as
provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991."

Respondent COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued the assailed Minute Resolution No. 12-
0797 which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that for purposes of the
plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from component city to highly-urbanized city, only
those registered residents of Cabanatuan City should participate in the said plebiscite.

The COMELEC based this resolution on Sec. 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC),
citing conversion cases involving Puerto Princesa City in Palawan, Tacloban City in Southern Leyte,
and Lapu-Lapu City in Cebu, where only the residents of the city proposed to be converted were
allowed to vote in the corresponding plebiscite.

In due time, petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed a Verified Motion for
Reconsideration, maintaining that the proposed conversion in question will necessarily and directly
affect the mother province of Nueva Ecija. His main argument is that Section 453 of the LGC should
be interpreted in conjunction with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. He argues that while the
conversion in question does not involve the creation of a new or the dissolution of an existing city,
the spirit of the Constitutional provision calls for the people of the local government unit (LGU)
directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and
responsibilities. The phrase "qualified voters therein" used in Sec. 453 of the LGC should then be
interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of the units directly affected by the conversion and not just
those in the component city proposed to be upgraded. Petitioner Umali justified his position by
enumerating the various adverse effects of the Cabanatuan City’s conversion and how it will cause
material change not only in the political and economic rights of the city and its residents but also of
the province as a whole.

To the Verified Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent Julius Cesar Vergara, city mayor of
Cabanatuan, interposed an opposition on the ground that Sec. 10, Art. X does not apply to
conversions, which is the meat of the matter. He likewise argues that a specific provision of the LGC,
Sec. 453, as couched, allows only the qualified voters of Cabanatuan City to vote in the plebiscite.
Lastly, private respondent pointed out that when Santiago City was converted in 1994 from a
municipality to an independent component city pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 7720, the
plebiscite held was limited to the registered voters of the then municipality of Santiago.

Following a hearing conducted on October 4, 2012,  the COMELEC En Banc on October 16, 2012,
3

in E.M No. 12-045 (PLEB), by a vote of 5-2  ruled in favor of respondent Vergara through the
4

assailed Minute Resolution 12-0925. The dispositive portion reads:

The Commission, taking into consideration the arguments of counsels including the Reply-
memorandum of Oppositor, after due deliberation, RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, as follows:

1) To DENY the Motion for Reconsideration of oppositor Governor Aurelio M. Umali; and

2) To SCHEDULE the conduct of Plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from
component city into highly-urbanized city with registered residents only of Cabanatuan City
to participate in said plebiscite.

Let the Deputy Executive Director for Operations implement this resolution.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief, docketed as G.R. No. 203974, on
substantially the same arguments earlier taken by petitioner Umali before the poll body. On the other
hand, public respondent COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, maintained in its
Comment that Cabanatuan City is merely being converted from a component city into an HUC and
that the political unit directly affected by the conversion will only be the city itself. It argues that in this
instance, no political unit will be created, merged with another, or will be removed from another LGU,
and that no boundaries will be altered. The conversion would merely reinforce the powers and
prerogatives already being exercised by the city, with the political unit’s probable elevation to that of
an HUC as demanded by its compliance with the criteria established under the LGC. Thus, the
participation of the voters of the entire province in the plebiscite will not be necessary.
Private respondent will later manifest that it is adopting the Comment of the COMELEC.

Meanwhile, on October 25, 2012, respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9543, which
adopted a calendar of activities and periods of prohibited acts in connection with the conversion of
Cabanatuan City into an HUC. The Resolution set the conduct of the plebiscite on December 1,
2012. Thereafter, a certain Dr. Rodolfo B. Punzalan filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief which was
raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40 in Palayan City. In the said case, Punzalan
prayed that Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 be declared unconstitutional, that the trial court decree
that all qualified voters of the province of Nueva Ecija be included in the plebiscite, and that a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued enjoining public respondent from implementing the
questioned resolution. On October 19, 2012, the RTC granted the prayer for a TRO.

On November 6, 2012, public respondent through Minute Resolution No. 12-0989 suspended the
preparations for the event in view of the TRO issued by the RTC. On November 27, 2012, the
plebiscite was once again rescheduled to give way to the May 13, 2013 national, local and ARMM
regional elections as per Resolution No. 9563.

After this development, petitioner J.V. Bautista, on December 3, 2012, filed a case before this Court
for Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 204371, praying that public respondent be ordered to
schedule the plebiscite either on December 15 or 22, 2012. Petitioner Bautista argued that since the
TRO issued by the RTC has already expired, the duty of the public respondent to hold the plebiscite
has become mandatory and ministerial. Petitioner Bautista also alleged that the delay in holding the
plebiscite is inexcusable given the requirement that it should be held within a period of 120 days
form the date of the President’s declaration.

In its Comment to the Bautista petition, public respondent justified its position by arguing that
mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute. With all the legal conflicts
surrounding the case, it cannot be said that there is a clear showing of petitioner Bautista’s
entitlement to the relief sought. Respondent COMELEC likewise relied on Sec. 5 of the Omnibus
Election Code to justify the postponements, citing incidents of violence that ensued in the locality
during the plebiscite period.

After the conclusion of the 2013 elections, public respondent issued Resolution No. 1353 scheduling
the plebiscite to January 25, 2014. However, a TRO was issued by this Court on January 15, 2014 in
G.R. No. 203974 to suspend the conduct of the plebiscite for Cabanatuan City’s conversion. Given
the intertwining factual milieu of the two petitions before the Court, both cases were consolidated on
March 18, 2014.

The Issue

The bone of contention in the present controversy boils down to whether the qualified registered
voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija or only those in Cabanatuan City can participate in the
plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city into an HUC.

Resolving the Petition for Certiorari either way will necessarily render the Petition for Mandamus
moot and academic for ultimately, the public respondent will be ordered to hold the plebiscite. The
only variation will be as regards its participants.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition for Certiorari is meritorious.

Sec. 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in accordance with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution

Petitioner Umali asseverates that Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution should be the basis for
determining the qualified voters who will participate in the plebiscite to resolve the issue. Sec. 10,
Art. X reads:

Section 10, Article X. – No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner Umali elucidates that the phrase "political units directly affected" necessarily encompasses
not only Cabanatuan City but the entire province of Nueva Ecija. Hence, all the registered voters in
the province are qualified to cast their votes in resolving the proposed conversion of Cabanatuan
City.

On the other hand, respondents invoke Sec. 453 of the LGC to support their claim that only the City
of Cabanatuan should be allowed to take part in the voting. Sec. 453 states:

Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. – It shall be the duty of the President to
declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum
requirements prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and
ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein. (emphasis supplied)

Respondents take the phrase "registered voters therein" in Sec. 453 as referring only to the
registered voters in the city being converted, excluding in the process the voters in the remaining
towns and cities of Nueva Ecija.

Before proceeding to unravel the seeming conflict between the two provisions, it is but proper that
we ascertain first the relationship between Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution and Sec. 453 of the
LGC.

First of all, we have to restate the general principle that legislative power cannot be delegated.
Nonetheless, the general rule barring delegation is subject to certain exceptions allowed in the
Constitution, namely:

(1) Delegation by Congress to the President of the power to fix "tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the Government" under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution; and

(2) Delegation of emergency powers by Congress to the President "to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy" in times of war and other
national emergency under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution.

The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of provinces, cities,
municipalities or barangays, which is pertinent in the case at bar, is essentially legislative in
nature.  The framers of the Constitution have, however, allowed for the delegation of such power in
5

Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution as long as (1) the criteria prescribed in the LGC is met and (2) the
creation, division, merger, abolition or the substantial alteration of the boundaries is subject to the
approval by a majority vote in a plebiscite.
True enough, Congress delegated such power to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang
Panlungsod to create barangays pursuant to Sec. 6 of the LGC, which provides:

Section 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. - A local government unit may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by
Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision, or by
ordinance passed by the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned in the
case of a barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and
requirements prescribed in this Code." (emphasis supplied)

The guidelines for the exercise of this authority have sufficiently been outlined by the various LGC
provisions detailing the requirements for the creation of barangays , municipalities , cities , and
6 7 8

provinces . Moreover, compliance with the plebiscite requirement under the Constitution has also
9

been directed by the LGC under its Sec. 10, which reads:

Section 10. Plebiscite Requirement. – No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial

alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected."
(emphasis supplied)

With the twin criteria of standard and plebiscite satisfied, the delegation to LGUs of the power to
create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries has become a recognized exception
to the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative powers.

Likewise, legislative power was delegated to the President under Sec. 453 of the LGC quoted
earlier, which states:

Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. – It shall be the duty of the President to
declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum
requirements prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and
ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein.

In this case, the provision merely authorized the President to make a determination on whether or
not the requirements under Sec. 452  of the LGC are complied with. The provision makes it
10

ministerial for the President, upon proper application, to declare a component city as highly
urbanized once the minimum requirements, which are based on certifiable and measurable indices
under Sec. 452, are satisfied. The mandatory language "shall" used in the provision leaves the
President with no room for discretion.

In so doing, Sec. 453, in effect, automatically calls for the conduct of a plebiscite for purposes of
conversions once the requirements are met. No further legislation is necessary before the city
proposed to be converted becomes eligible to become an HUC through ratification, as the basis for
the delegation of the legislative authority is the very LGC.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes that the source of the delegation of
power to the LGUs under Sec. 6 of the LGC and to the President under Sec. 453 of the same code
is none other than Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.

Respondents, however, posit that Sec. 453 of the LGC is actually outside the ambit of Sec. 10, Art.
X of the Constitution, considering that the conversion of a component city to an HUC is not "creation,
division, merge, abolition or substantial alternation of boundaries" encompassed by the said
constitutional provision.

This proposition is bereft of merit.

First, the Court’s pronouncement in Miranda vs. Aguirre  is apropos and may be applied by analogy.
11

While Miranda involves the downgrading, instead of upgrading, as here, of an independent

component city into a component city, its application to the case at bar is nonetheless material in
ascertaining the proper treatment of conversions. In that seminal case, the Court held that the
downgrading of an independent component city into a component city comes within the purview of
Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.

In Miranda, the rationale behind the afore-quoted constitutional provision and its application to cases
of conversion were discussed thusly:

A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common
denominator - - - material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units
directly affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution
requires the approval of the people "in the political units directly affected." It is not difficult to
appreciate the rationale of this constitutional requirement. The 1987 Constitution, more than any of
our previous Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of our people for it was borne out of
the people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable
practice in the past whereby local government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on
the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the consent of the
people of the local government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism
to any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries
of local government units. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a
matter that affects them - - - direct democracy of the people as opposed to democracy thru people’s
representatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitution
granting more autonomy to local government units. 12

It was determined in the case that the changes that will result from the conversion are too substantial
that there is a necessity for the plurality of those that will be affected to approve it. Similar to the
enumerated acts in the constitutional provision, conversions were found to result in material changes
in the economic and political rights of the people and LGUs affected. Given the far-reaching
ramifications of converting the status of a city, we held that the plebiscite requirement under the
constitutional provision should equally apply to conversions as well. Thus, RA 8528  was declared
13

unconstitutional in Miranda on the ground that the law downgraded Santiago City in Isabela without
submitting it for ratification in a plebiscite, in contravention of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.

Second, while conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution
we nevertheless observe that the conversion of a component city into an HUC is substantial
alteration of boundaries.

As the phrase implies, "substantial alteration of boundaries" involves and necessarily entails a
change in the geographical configuration of a local government unit or units. However, the phrase
"boundaries" should not be limited to the mere physical one, referring to the metes and bounds of
the LGU, but also to its political boundaries. It also connotes a modification of the demarcation lines
between political subdivisions, where the LGU’s exercise of corporate power ends and that of the
other begins. And as a qualifier, the alteration must be "substantial" for it to be within the ambit of the
constitutional provision.
Pertinent is Art. 12(c) of the LGC’s Implementing Rules and Regulations, which reads:

Art. 12. Conversion of a Component City into a Highly Urbanized City. –

xxxx

(c) Effect of Conversion – The conversion of a component city into a highly-urbanized city shall make
it independent of the province where it is geographically located. (emphasis added)

Verily, the upward conversion of a component city, in this case Cabanatuan City, into an HUC will
come at a steep price. It can be gleaned from the above-cited rule that the province will inevitably
suffer a corresponding decrease in territory brought about by Cabanatuan City’s gain of
independence. With the city’s newfound autonomy, it will be free from the oversight powers of the
province, which, in effect, reduces the territorial jurisdiction of the latter. What once formed part of
Nueva Ecija will no longer be subject to supervision by the province. In more concrete terms, Nueva
Ecija stands to lose 282.75 sq. km. of its territorial jurisdiction with Cabanatuan City’s severance
from its mother province. This is equivalent to carving out almost 5% of Nueva Ecija’s 5,751.3 sq.
km. area. This sufficiently satisfies the requirement that the alteration be "substantial."

Needless to stress, the alteration of boundaries would necessarily follow Cabanatuan City’s
conversion in the same way that creations, divisions, mergers, and abolitions generally cannot take
place without entailing the alteration. The enumerated acts, after all, are not mutually exclusive, and
more often than not, a combination of these acts attends the reconfiguration of LGUs.

In light of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court rules that conversion to an HUC is substantial
alternation of boundaries governed by Sec. 10, Art. X and resultantly, said provision applies, governs
and prevails over Sec. 453 of the LGC.

Moreover, the rules of statutory construction dictate that a particular provision should be interpreted
with the other relevant provisions in the law The Court finds that it is actually Sec. 10 of the LGC
which is undeniably the applicable provision on the conduct of plebiscites. The title of the provision
itself, "Plebiscite Requirement", makes this obvious. It requires a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. On the other hand, Sec.
453 of the LGC, entitled "Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status", is only on the duty to declare a
city as highly urbanized. It mandates the Office of the President to make the declaration after the city
has met the requirements under Sec. 452, and upon proper application and ratification in a
plebiscite. The conduct of a plebiscite is then a requirement before a declaration can be made. Thus,
the Court finds that Sec. 10 of the LGC prevails over Sec. 453 of the LGC on the plebiscite
requirement.

We now take the bull by the horns and resolve the issue whether Sec. 453 of the LGC trenches on
Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.

Hornbook doctrine is that neither the legislative, the executive, nor the judiciary has the power to act
beyond the Constitution’s mandate. The Constitution is supreme; any exercise of power beyond
what is circumscribed by the Constitution is ultra vires and a nullity. As elucidated by former Chief
Justice Enrique Fernando in Fernandez v. Cuerva: 14

Where the assailed legislative or executive act is found by the judiciary to be contrary to the
Constitution, it is null and void. As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern." Administrative
or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or
the Constitution. The above provision of the civil Code reflects the orthodox view that an
unconstitutional act, whether legislative or executive, is not a law, confers no rights, imposes no
duties, and affords no protection. x x x

Applying this orthodox view, a law should be construed in harmony with and not in violation of the
Constitution.  In a long line of cases, the cardinal principle of construction established is that a
15

statute should be interpreted to assure its being in consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any
constitutional command or prescription.  If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the
16

legislative, if the words or provisions are obscure or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or
more constitution, that interpretation which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality will be adopted,
even though it may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or apparent import of
the language used. 17

Pursuant to established jurisprudence, the phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453
should be construed in a manner that will avoid conflict with the Constitution. If one takes the plain
meaning of the phrase in relation to the declaration by the President that a city is an HUC, then, Sec.
453 of the LGC will clash with the explicit provision under Sec. 10, Art. X that the voters in the
"political units directly affected" shall participate in the plebiscite. Such construction should be
avoided in view of the supremacy of the Constitution. Thus, the Court treats the phrase "by the
qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453 to mean the qualified voters not only in the city proposed to be
converted to an HUC but also the voters of the political units directly affected by such conversion in
order to harmonize Sec. 453 with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.

The Court finds that respondents are mistaken in construing Sec. 453 in a vacuum. Their
interpretation of Sec. 453 of the LGC runs afoul of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution which explicitly
requires that all residents in the "political units directly affected" should be made to vote.

Respondents make much of the plebiscites conducted in connection with the conversion of Puerto
Princesa City, Tacloban City and Lapu-Lapu City where the ratification was made by the registered
voters in said cities alone. It is clear, however, that the issue of who are entitled to vote in said
plebiscites was not properly raised or brought up in an actual controversy. The issue on who will
vote in a plebiscite involving a conversion into an HUC is a novel issue, and this is the first time that
the Court is asked to resolve the question. As such, the past plebiscites in the aforementioned cities
have no materiality or relevance to the instant petition. Suffice it to say that conversion of said cities
prior to this judicial declaration will not be affected or prejudiced in any manner following the
operative fact doctrine―that “the actual existence of a statute prior to such a determination is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration.”18

The entire province of Nueva Ecija will be directly

affected by Cabanatuan City’s conversion

After the Court has resolved the seeming irreconcilability of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution and
Sec. 453 of the LGC, it is now time to elucidate the meaning of the phrase "political units directly
affected" under Sec. 10, Art. X.

a. "Political units directly affected" defined

In identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the plebiscite, what should
primarily be determined is whether or not the unit or units that desire to participate will be "directly
affected" by the change. To interpret the phrase, Tan v. COMELEC  and Padilla v. COMELEC  are
19 20

worth revisiting.

We have ruled in Tan, involving the division of Negros Occidental for the creation of the new
province of Negros del Norte, that the LGUs whose boundaries are to be altered and whose
economy would be affected are entitled to participate in the plebiscite. As held:

It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative that there be
first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected"
whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the
boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing province of Negros
Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in
order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple
logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected.

The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be
substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted
from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte. 21

xxxx

To form the new province of Negros del Norte no less than three cities and eight municipalities will
be subtracted from the parent province of Negros Occidental. This will result in the removal of
approximately 2,768.4 square kilometers from the land area of an existing province whose
boundaries will be consequently substantially altered. It becomes easy to realize that the consequent
effects of the division of the parent province necessarily will affect all the people living in the
separate areas of Negros Occidental and the proposed province of Negros del Norte. The economy
of the parent province as well as that of the new province will be inevitably affected, either for the
better or for the worse. Whatever be the case, either or both of these political groups will be affected
and they are, therefore, the unit or units referred to in Section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution which
must be included in the plebiscite contemplated therein.  (emphasis added)
22

Sec. 3, Art. XI of the 1973 Constitution, as invoked in Tan, states:

SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or
units affected. (emphasis added)

Despite the change in phraseology compared to what is now Sec. 10, Art. X, we affirmed our ruling
in Tan in the latter case of Padilla. As held, the removal of the phrase "unit or" only served to sustain
the earlier finding that what is contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected" is the
plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite. As reflected in the journal of the
Constitutional Commission: 23

Mr. Maambong: While we have already approved the deletion of "unit or," I would like to inform the
Committee that under the formulation in the present Local Government Code, the words used are
actually "political unit or units." However, I do not know the implication of the use of these words.
Maybe there will be no substantial difference, but I just want to inform the Committee about this.
Mr. Nolledo: Can we not adhere to the original "unit or units"? Will there be no objection on the part
of the two Gentlemen from the floor?

Mr. Davide: I would object. I precisely asked for the deletion of the words "unit or" because in the
plebiscite to be conducted, it must involve all the units affected. If it is the creation of a barangay
plebiscite because it is affected. It would mean a loss of a territory. (emphasis added)

The same sentiment was shared by the Senate during its deliberations on Senate Bill No. 155––the
predecessor of the LGC––thus:

Senator Guingona. Can we make that clearer by example? Let us assume that a province has
municipalities and there is a merger of two municipalities. Would this therefore mean that the
plebiscite will be conducted within the two merged municipalities and not in the eight other
municipalities?

Senator Pimentel. The whole province, Mr. President, will be affected, and that is the reason we
probably have to involve the entire province.

Senator Guingona. So the plebiscite will not be held only in the two municipalities which are being
merged, but the entire province will now have to undergo.

Senator Pimentel. I suppose that was the ruling in the Negros del Norte case.

Senator Guingona. Supposing it refers to barangays, will the entire municipality have to vote? There
are two barangays being merged, say, out of 100 barangays. Would the entire municipality have to
participate in the plebiscite?

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President, because the municipality is affected directly by the merger of
two of its barangay.

Senator Guingona. And, if, out of 100 barangay, 51 are being merged, abolished, whatever, would
the rest of the municipality not participate in the plebiscite?

Senator Pimentel. Do all the 51 barangay that the Gentleman mentioned, Mr. President, belong to
one municipality?

Senator Guingona. Yes.

Senator Pimentel. Then it will only involve the municipality where the 51 barangays belong.

Senator Guingona. Yes. So, the entire municipality will now have to undergo a plebiscite.

Senator Pimentel. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Guingona. In the earlier example, if it is only a merger of two municipalities, let us say, in a
province with 10 municipalities – the entire province – will the other municipalities although not
affected also have to participate in the plebiscite?

Senator Pimentel. Yes. The reason is that the municipalities are within the territorial boundaries of
the province itself, it will have to be altered as a result of the two municipalities that the Gentleman
mentioned. 24
In the more recent case of Miranda, the interpretation in Tan and Padilla was modified to include not
only changes in economic but also political rights in the criteria for determining whether or not an
LGU shall be considered "directly affected." Nevertheless, the requirement that the plebiscite be
participated in by the plurality of political units directly affected remained.

b. Impact on Economic Rights

To recall, it was held in Miranda that the changes that will result in the downgrading of an LGU from
an independent component city to a component city cannot be categorized as insubstantial, thereby
necessitating the conduct of a plebiscite for its ratification. In a similar fashion, herein petitioner
Umali itemized the adverse effects of Cabanatuan City’s conversion to the province of Nueva Ecija
to justify the province’s participation in the plebiscite to be conducted.

Often raised is that Cabanatuan City’s conversion into an HUC and its severance from Nueva Ecija
will result in the reduction of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) to the province based on Sec. 285
of the LGC. The law states:

Section 285. Allocation to Local Government Units. - The share of local government units in the
internal revenue allotment shall be collected in the following manner:

(a) Provinces - Twenty-three percent (23%);

(b) Cities - Twenty-three percent (23%);

(c) Municipalities - Thirty-four percent (34%); and

(d) Barangays - Twenty percent (20%)

Provided, however, That the share of each province, city, and municipality shall be determined on
the basis of the following formula:

(a) Population - Fifty percent (50%);

(b) Land Area - Twenty-five percent (25%); and

(c) Equal sharing - Twenty-five percent (25%)

In our earlier disquisitions, we have explained that the conversion into an HUC carries the accessory
of substantial alteration of boundaries and that the province of Nueva Ecija will, without a doubt,
suffer a reduction in territory because of the severance of Cabanatuan City. The residents of the city
will cease to be political constituencies of the province, effectively reducing the latter’s population.
Taking this decrease in territory and population in connection with the above formula, it is conceded
that Nueva Ecija will indeed suffer a reduction in IRA given the decrease of its multipliers’ values. As
assessed by the Regional Director of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) for Region
III:
25

Basis for IRA Province of Cabanatuan Province of

Computation Nueva Ecija City Nueva Ecija Net
of Cabanatuan
City
 No. of Population 1,843,853 259,267 259,267
CY 2007 Census
Land Area 5,751.33 282.75 5,468.58
(sq. km.)

IRA Share of Actual IRA Estimated IRA Reduction

Nueva Ecija Share share excluding
Cabanatuan
City
Based on ₱800,772,618.45 ₱688,174,751.66 ₱112,597,866.79
Population
Based on Land ₱263,470,472.62 ₱250,517,594.56 P 12,952,878.06
Area
Total ₱125,550,744.85

Clear as crystal is that the province of Nueva Ecija will suffer a substantial reduction of its share in
IRA once Cabanatuan City attains autonomy. In view of the economic impact of Cabanatuan City’s
conversion, petitioner Umali’s contention, that its effect on the province is not only direct but also
adverse, deserves merit.

Moreover, his claim that the province will lose shares in provincial taxes imposed in Cabanatuan City
is well-founded. This is based on Sec. 151 of the LGC, which states:

SECTION 151. Scope of Taxing Powers. – Except as otherwise provided in this Code, the city, may
levy the taxes, fees, and charges which the province or municipality may impose: Provided,
however, That the taxes, fees and charges levied and collected by highly urbanized and
independent component cities shall accrue to them and distributed in accordance with the provisions
of this Code. (emphasis added)

Once converted, the taxes imposed by the HUC will accrue to itself. Prior to this, the province enjoys
the prerogative to impose and collect taxes such as those on sand, gravel and other quarry
resources,  professional taxes,  and amusement taxes  over the component city. While, it may be
26 27 28

argued that this is not a derogation of the province’s taxing power because it is in no way deprived of
its right to collect the mentioned taxes from the rest of its territory, the conversion will still reduce the
province’s taxing jurisdiction, and corollary to this, it will experience a corresponding decrease in
shares in local tax collections. This reduction in both taxing jurisdiction and shares poses a material
and substantial change to the province’s economic rights, warranting its participation in the
plebiscite.

To further exemplify the impact of these changes, a perusal of Secs. 452(a) and 461(a) of the LGC
is in order, viz:

Section 452. Highly Urbanized Cities.

(a) Cities with a minimum population of two hundred thousand (200,000) inhabitants as
certified by the National Statistics Office, and within the latest annual income of at least Fifty
Million Pesos (₱50,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the city
treasurer, shall be classified as highly urbanized cities.
Section 461. Requisites for Creation.

(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (₱20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and
either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by
the Lands Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified
by the National Statistics Office:

Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the
original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed
herein.

A component city’s conversion into an HUC and its resultant autonomy from the province is a threat
to the latter’s economic viability. Noteworthy is that the income criterion for a component city to be
converted into an HUC is higher than the income requirement for the creation of a province. The
ensuing reduction in income upon separation would clearly leave a crippling effect on the province’s
operations as there would be less funding to finance infrastructure projects and to defray overhead
costs. Moreover, the quality of services being offered by the province may suffer because of looming
austerity measures. These are but a few of the social costs of the decline in the province’s economic
performance, which Nueva Ecija is bound to experience once its most progressive city of
Cabanatuan attains independence.

c. Impact on Political Rights

Aside from the alteration of economic rights, the political rights of Nueva Ecija and those of its
residents will also be affected by Cabanatuan’s conversion into an HUC. Notably, the administrative
supervision of the province over the city will effectively be revoked upon conversion. Secs. 4 and 12,
Art. X of the Constitution read:

Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments.
Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with
respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the
scope of their prescribed powers and functions.

Sec 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters
prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province.
The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall
not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.

Duties, privileges and obligations appertaining to HUCs will attach to Cabanatuan City if it is
converted into an HUC. This includes the right to be outside the general supervision of the province
and be under the direct supervision of the President. An HUC is not subject to provincial oversight
because the complex and varied problems in an HUC due to a bigger population and greater
economic activity require greater autonomy.  The provincial government stands to lose the power to
29

ensure that the local government officials of Cabanatuan City act within the scope of its prescribed
powers and functions,  to review executive orders issued by the city mayor, and to approve
30

resolutions and ordinances enacted by the city council.  The province will also be divested of
31
jurisdiction over disciplinary cases concerning the elected city officials of the new HUC, and the
appeal process for administrative case decisions against barangay officials of the city will also be
modified accordingly.  Likewise, the registered voters of the city will no longer be entitled to vote for
32

and be voted upon as provincial officials. 33

In cutting the umbilical cord between Cabanatuan City and the province of Nueva Ecija, the city will
be separated from the territorial jurisdiction of the province, as earlier explained. The provincial
government will no longer be responsible for delivering basic services for the city residents’ benefit.
Ordinances and resolutions passed by the provincial council will no longer cover the city. Projects
queued by the provincial government to be executed in the city will also be suspended if not
scrapped to prevent the LGU from performing functions outside the bounds of its territorial
jurisdiction, and from expending its limited resources for ventures that do not cater to its
constituents.1âwphi1

In view of these changes in the economic and political rights of the province of Nueva Ecija and its
residents, the entire province certainly stands to be directly affected by the conversion of
Cabanatuan City into an HUC. Following the doctrines in Tan and Padilla, all the qualified registered
voters of Nueva Ecija should then be allowed to participate in the plebiscite called for that purpose.

Respondents’ apprehension that requiring the entire province to participate in the plebiscite will set a
dangerous precedent leading to the failure of cities to convert is unfounded. Their fear that provinces
will always be expected to oppose the conversion in order to retain the city’s dependence is
speculative at best. In any event, any vote of disapproval cast by those directly affected by the
conversion is a valid exercise of their right to suffrage, and our democratic processes are designed
to uphold the decision of the majority, regardless of the motive behind the vote. It is unfathomable
how the province can be deprived of the opportunity to exercise the right of suffrage in a matter that
is potentially deleterious to its economic viability and could diminish the rights of its constituents. To
limit the plebiscite to only the voters of the areas to be partitioned and seceded from the province is
as absurd and illogical as allowing only the secessionists to vote for the secession that they
demanded against the wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule. 34

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 203974, is
hereby GRANTED. COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 dated September 11, 2012 and
Minute Resolution No. 12-0925 dated October 16, 2012 are hereby declared NULL and VOID. Public
respondent COMELEC is hereby enjoined from implementing the said Resolutions. Additionally,
COMELEC is hereby ordered to conduct a plebiscite for the purpose of converting Cabanatuan City
into a Highly Urbanized City to be participated in by the qualified registered voters of Nueva Ecij a
within 120 days from the finality of this Decision. The Petition for Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No.
204371, is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 211356               September 29, 2014

CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO, Petitioner,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN, represented by HON. MAYOR JOHN P. YAP,
SANGGUNIANG BA YAN OF MALAY, AKLAN, represented by HON. EZEL FLORES, DANTE
PASUGUIRON, ROWEN AGUIRRE, WILBEC GELITO, JUPITER GALLENERO, OFFICE OF THE
MUNICIPAL ENGINEER, OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, BORACAY PNP CHIEF,
BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC., represented by NENETTE GRAF, MUNICIPAL AUXILIARY
POLICE, and JOHN and JANE DOES, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Nature of the Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the Decision  and the Resolution
1

of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 120042 dated August 13, 2013 and February 3,
2014, respectively. The assailed rulings denied Crisostomo Aquino's Petition for Certiorari for not
being the proper remedy to question the issuance and implementation of Executive Order No. 10,
Series of 2011 (EO 10), ordering the demolition of his hotel establishment.

The Facts

Petitioner is the president and chief executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove Management
Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West Cove). On January 7, 2010, the company applied for a zoning
compliance with the municipal government of Malay, Aklan.  While the company was already
2

operating a resort in the area, the application sought the issuance of a building permit covering the
construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land measuring 998 sqm. located in Sitio
Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan,which is covered by a Forest Land Use
Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) in favor of Boracay West Cove.

Through a Decision on Zoning dated January 20, 2010, the Municipal Zoning Administrator denied
petitioner’s application on the ground that the proposed construction site was withinthe "no build
zone" demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131 (Ordinance).  As provided in the Ordinance:
3

SECTION 2. – Definition of Terms. Asused in this Ordinance, the following words, terms and
phrases shall mean as follows:

xxxx
(b) No Build Zone – the space twenty-five (25) meters from the edge of the mean high water mark
measured inland;

xxxx

SECTION 3. – No building or structure of any kind whether temporary or permanent shall be allowed
to be set up, erected or constructed on the beaches around the Island of Boracay and in its offshore
waters. During the conduct of special activities or special events, the Sangguniang Bayan may,
through a Resolution, authorize the Office of the Mayor to issue Special Permits for construction of
temporary structures on the beach for the duration of the special activity as embodied in the
Resolution.

In due time, petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor on February 1, 2010. On
May 13, 2010, petitioner followed up his appeal through a letter but no action was ever taken by the
respondent mayor. On April 5, 2011, however, a Notice of Assessment was sent to petitioner asking
for the settlement of Boracay West Cove’s unpaid taxes and other liabilities under pain of a
recommendation for closure in view of its continuous commercial operation since 2009 sans the
necessaryzoning clearance, building permit, and business and mayor’s permit. In reply, petitioner
expressed willingness to settle the company’s obligations, butthe municipal treasurer refused to
accept the tendered payment. Meanwhile, petitioner continued with the construction, expansion, and
operation of the resort hotel.

Subsequently, on March 28, 2011, a Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal
government, enjoining the expansion of the resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of
Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West
Cove’s hotel.

EO 10 was partially implemented on June 10, 2011. Thereafter, two more instances followed
wherein respondents demolished the improvements introduced by Boracay West Cove, the most
recent of which was made in February 2014.

Alleging that the order was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion, petitioner filed a
Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA. He argued that judicial proceedings
should first be conducted before the respondent mayor could order the demolition of the company’s
establishment; that Boracay West Cove was granted a FLAgT by the DENR, which bestowed the
company the right to construct permanent improvements on the area in question; thatsince the area
is a forestland, it is the DENR—and not the municipality of Malay, or any other local government unit
for that matter—that has primary jurisdiction over the area, and that the Regional Executive Director
of DENR-Region 6 had officially issued an opinion regarding the legal issues involved in the present
case; that the Ordinance admits of exceptions; and lastly, that it is the mayor who should be blamed
for not issuing the necessary clearances in the company’s favor.

In rebuttal, respondents contended that the FLAgT does not excuse the company from complying
with the Ordinance and Presidential Decree No. 1096 (PD 1096), otherwise known as the National
Building Code of the Philippines. Respondents also argued that the demolition needed no court
order because the municipal mayor has the express power under the Local Government Code
(LGC) to order the removal of illegally constructed buildings.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its assailed Decision dated August 13, 2013, the CA dismissed the petition solely on procedural
ground, i.e., the special writ of certiorari can only be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions and since the issuance of EO 10 was done in the
exercise of executive functions, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions, certiorari will not lie.
Instead, the proper remedy for the petitioner, according to the CA, is to file a petition for declaratory
relief with the Regional Trial Court.

Petitioner sought reconsideration but this was denied by the CA on February 3, 2014 through the
challenged Resolution. Hence, the instant petition raising arguments on both procedure and
substance.

The Issues

Stripped to the essentials, the pivotal issues in the extant case are as follows:

1. The propriety under the premises ofthe filing of a petition for certiorari instead of a petition
for declaratory relief;

a. Whether or not declaratory reliefis still available to petitioner;

b. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the respondent mayor was performing
neither a judicial nor quasi-judicial function when he ordered the closure and
demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel;

2. Whether or not respondent mayor committed grave abuse of discretion when he issued
EO 10;

a. Whether or not petitioner’s right to due process was violated when the respondent
mayor ordered the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel without first
conducting judicial proceedings;

b. Whether or not the LGU’s refusal to issue petitioner the necessary building permit
and clearances was justified;

c. Whether or not petitioner’s rights under the FLAgT prevail over the municipal
ordinance providing for a no-build zone; and

d. Whether or not the DENR has primary jurisdiction over the controversy, not the
LGU.

The Court’s Ruling

We deny the petition.

Certiorari, not declaratory relief, is the proper remedy

a. Declaratory relief no longer viable

Resolving first the procedural aspect of the case, We find merit in petitioner’s contention that the
special writ of certiorari, and not declaratory relief, is the proper remedy for assailing EO 10. As
provided under Sec. 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance or
any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for
a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. x x x (emphasis added)

An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments
involved or of the rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to
secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or
contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle
issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained before the breach or violation of
the statute, deed or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical
remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is immediately
available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they
lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs. 4

In the case at bar, the petition for declaratory relief became unavailable by EO 10’s enforcement and
implementation. The closure and demolition of the hotel rendered futile any possible guidelines that
may be issued by the trial court for carrying outthe directives in the challenged EO 10. Indubitably,
the CA erred when it ruled that declaratory relief is the proper remedy given such a situation.

b. Petitioner correctly resorted to certiorari

On the propriety of filing a petition for certiorari, Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require. x x x

For certiorari to prosper, the petitioner must establish the concurrence of the following requisites,
namely:

1. The writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions;

2. Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and

3. There is no appeal or any plain speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.5

Guilty of reiteration, the CA immediately dismissed the Petition for Certiorari upon determining that
the first element is wanting—that respondent mayor was allegedly not exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions when he issued EO 10.

We are not persuaded.

The CA fell into a trapwhen it ruled that a mayor, an officer from the executive department, exercises
an executive function whenever he issues an Executive Order. This is tad too presumptive for it is
the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the office,board, or body which performs it, that
determines whether or not a particular act is a discharge of judicial or quasijudicial functions. The
first requirement for certiorari is satisfied if the officers act judicially in making their decision,
whatever may be their public character. 6

It is not essential that the challenged proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial, in the
sense in which that word is used when applied to courts of justice, but it issufficient if they are quasi-
judicial.  To contrast, a party is said to be exercising ajudicial function where he has the power to
7

determine what the law is and what legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine
these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties, whereas quasi-judicial functionis "a
term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies x x x
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions
from themas a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature." 8

In the case at bench, the assailed EO 10 was issued upon the respondent mayor’s finding that
Boracay West Cove’s construction, expansion, and operation of its hotel inMalay, Aklan is illegal.
Such a finding of illegality required the respondent mayor’s exercise of quasijudicial functions,
against which the special writ of certiorari may lie. Apropos hereto is Our ruling in City Engineer of
Baguio v. Baniqued: 9

There is no gainsaying that a city mayor is an executive official nor is the matter of issuing demolition
notices or orders not a ministerial one. In determining whether or not a structure is illegal or it should
be demolished, property rights are involved thereby needing notices and opportunity to be heard as
provided for in the constitutionally guaranteed right of due process. In pursuit of these functions, the
city mayor has to exercise quasi-judicial powers.

With the foregoing discussion, the CA erred in ruling that the respondent mayor was merely
exercising his executive functions, for clearly, the first requisite for the special writ has been
satisfied.

Aside from the first requisite, We likewise hold that the third element, i.e., the unavailability of a plain,
speedy,or adequate remedy, is also present herein. While it may be argued that, under the LGC,
Executive Orders issued by mayors are subject to review by provincial governors,  this cannot be
10

considered as an adequate remedy given the exigencies of petitioner’s predicament. In a litany of

cases, We have held that it is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the
danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari. A
remedy is plain, speedy and adequate ifit will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects
of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency. It is understood, then, that a
litigant need not mark time by resorting to the less speedy remedy of appeal in order to have an
order annulled and set aside for being patently void for failureof the trial court to comply with the
Rules of Court. 11

Before applying this doctrine, it must first be borne in mind that respondents in this case have
already taken measures towards implementing EO 10. In fact, substantial segments of the hotel
have already been demolished pursuant to the mayor’s directive. It is then understandable why
petitioner prayed for the issuance ofan injunctive writ––a provisional remedy that would otherwise
have been unavailable had he sought a reversal from the office of the provincial governor of Aklan.
Evidently, petitioner correctly saw the urgent need for judicial intervention via certiorari.
In light of the foregoing, the CA should have proceeded to grab the bull by its horns and determine
the existence of the second element of certiorari––whether or not there was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondents.

Upon Our finding that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the appropriate remedy, We will
proceed to resolve the core issues in view of the urgency of the reliefs prayed for in the petition.
Respondents did not commit grave abuse of discretion

a. The hotel’s classification as a nuisance

Article 694 of the Civil Code defines "nuisance" as any act, omission, establishment, business,
condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2)
annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or
interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders
or impairs the use of property.12

In establishing a no build zone through local legislation, the LGU effectively made a determination
that constructions therein, without first securing exemptions from the local council, qualify as
nuisances for they pose a threat to public safety. No buildzones are intended for the protection of the
public because the stability ofthe ground’s foundation is adversely affected by the nearby body of
water. The ever present threat of high rising storm surges also justifies the ban on permanent
constructions near the shoreline. Indeed, the area’s exposure to potential geo-hazards cannot be
ignored and ample protection to the residents of Malay, Aklan should be afforded.

Challenging the validity of the public respondents’ actuations, petitioner posits that the hotel cannot
summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per se, given the hundred million peso-worth of
capital infused in the venture. Citing Asilo, Jr. v. People,  petitioner also argues that respondents
13

should have first secured a court order before proceeding with the demolition. Preliminarily, We
agree with petitioner’s posture that the property involved cannot be classified as a nuisance per se,
but not for the reason he so offers. Property valuation, after all, is not the litmus test for such a
determination. More controlling is the property’s nature and conditions, which should be evaluated to
see if it qualifies as a nuisance as defined under the law.

As jurisprudence elucidates, nuisances are of two kinds: nuisanceper se and nuisanceper accidens.
The first is recognized as a nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it constitutes a
direct menace to public health or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated summarily under the
undefined law of necessity. The second is thatwhich depends upon certain conditions and
circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing
thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance. 14

In the case at bar, the hotel, in itself, cannot be considered as a nuisance per sesince this type of
nuisance is generally defined as an act, occupation, or structure, which is a nuisance at all timesand
under any circumstances, regardless of locationor surrounding.  Here, it is merely the hotel’s
15

particular incident––its location––and not its inherent qualities that rendered it a nuisance. Otherwise
stated, had it not been constructed in the no build zone, Boracay West Cove could have secured the
necessary permits without issue. As such, petitioner is correct that the hotel is not a nuisance per se,
but to Our mind, it is still a nuisance per accidens.

b. Respondent mayor has the power to order the demolition of

illegal constructions
Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is a
nuisance per se.  So it was held in AC Enterprises v. Frabelle Properties Corp:
16 17

We agree with petitioner’s contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered to enact
ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears stressing,
however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and
order its condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a
nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial
condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such.
Those things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law.If a thing, be in fact, a
nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere
resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan. (emphasis supplied)

Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, We still find in this case that
the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the exercise of
police power and the general welfare clause,  property rights of individuals may be subjected to
18

restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of the government.

Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty,
property, lawfulbusinesses and occupations to promote the general welfare. 19

One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal governments, acting
through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. Under existing laws, the office of the
mayor is given powers not only relative to its function asthe executive official of the town; it has also
been endowed with authorityto hear issues involving property rights of individuals and to come out
with an effective order or resolution thereon.  Pertinent herein is Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC,
20

which empowered the mayor to order the closure and removal of illegally constructed establishments
for failing tosecure the necessary permits, to wit:

Section 444.The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. –

xxxx

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of
the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal mayor shall:

xxxx

(3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the
implementation of development plans, program objectives and priorities as provided for under
Section 18 of this Code, particularly those resources and revenues programmed for agro-industrial
development and country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:

xxxx

(vi) Require owners of illegally constructed houses, buildings or other structures to obtain the
necessary permit, subject to such fines and penalties as may be imposed by law or ordinance, or to
make necessary changes in the construction of the same when said construction violates any law or
ordinance, or to order the demolition or removal of said house, building or structure within the period
prescribed by law or ordinance. (emphasis supplied)
c. Requirements for the exercise of the power are present

i. Illegality of structures

In the case at bar, petitioner admittedly failed to secure the necessary permits, clearances, and
exemptions before the construction, expansion, and operation of Boracay Wet Cove’s hotel in Malay,
Aklan. To recall, petitioner declared that the application for zoning compliance was still pending with
the office of the mayor even though construction and operation were already ongoing at the same
time. As such, it could no longer be denied that petitioner openly violated Municipal Ordinance 2000-
131, which provides:

SECTION 9. – Permits and Clearances.

(a) No building or structure shall beallowed to start construction unless a Building Permit therefore
has been duly issued by the Office of the Municipal Engineer.Once issued, the building owner or any
person in charge of the construction shall display on the lot or on the building undergoing
construction a placard containing the Building Permit Number and the date of its issue. The office of
the Municipal Engineer shall not issue any building permit unless:

1. The proposed construction has been duly issued a Zoning Clearance by the Office of the
Municipal Zoning Officer;

2. The proposed construction has been duly endorsed by the Sangguniang Bayan through a
Letter of Endorsement.

(b) Only buildings/structures which has complied with all the requirements for its
construction asverified to by the Building Inspector and the Sangguniang Bayan shall
be issued a Certificate of Occupancy by the Office of the Municipal Engineer.

(c) No Business or Mayor’s Permit shall be issued to businesses being undertaken

on buildings or structures which were not issued a certificate of Occupancy beginning
January 2001 and thereafter.

xxxx

SECTION 10. – Penalties.

xxxx

(e) Any building, structure, or contraption erected in any public place within the Municipality
of Malay such as but not limited to streets, thoroughfares, sidewalks, plazas, beachesor in
any other public place are hereby declared as nuisance and illegal structure.Such building
structure or contraption shall be demolished by the owner thereof or any of his authorized
representative within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice to demolish. Failure or refusal
on the part of the owner or any of his authorized representative to demolish the illegal
structure within the period here inabove specified shall automatically authorize the
government of the Municipality of Malay to demolish the same, gather and keep the
construction materials of the demolished structure. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner cannot justify his position by passing the blame onto the respondent mayor and the latter’s
failure to act on his appeal for this does not, in any way, imply that petitioner can proceed with his
infrastructure projects. On the contrary,this only means that the decision of the zoning administrator
denying theapplication still stands and that petitioner acquired no right to construct on the no build
zone. The illegality of the construction cannot be cured by merely tendering payment for the
necessary fees and permits since the LGU’s refusal rests on valid grounds.

Instead of taking the law into his own hands, petitioner could have filed, as an alternative, a petition
for mandamus to compel the respondent mayor to exercise discretion and resolve the controversy
pending before his office. There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment
and discretion are beyond the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel
action in those matters, when refused. Whether or not the decision would be for or against petitioner
would be for the respondent mayor to decide, for while mandamus may be invoked to compel the
exercise of discretion, it cannot compel such discretion to be exercised in a particular way.  What
21

would have been important was for the respondent mayor to immediately resolve the case for
petitioner to be able to go through the motions that the zoning clearance application process
entailed.

Alas, petitioner opted to defy the zoning administrator’s ruling. He consciously chose to violate not
only the Ordinance but also Sec. 301 of PD 1096, laying down the requirement of building permits,
which provides:

Section 301. Building Permits. No person, firm or corporation, including any agency or
instrumentality of the government shall erect, construct, alter, repair, move, convert or demolish any
building or structure or cause the same to be done without first obtaining a building permit therefor
from the Building Official assigned in the place where the subject building is located or the building
work is to be done.

This twin violation of law and ordinance warranted the LGU’s invocation of Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the
LGC, which power is separate and distinct from the power to summarily abate nuisances per se.
Under the law, insofar as illegal constructions are concerned, the mayor can, after satisfying the
requirement of due notice and hearing, order their closure and demolition.

ii. Observance of procedural due process rights

In the case at bench, the due process requirement is deemed to have been sufficiently complied
with. First, basic is the rule that public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance
of their duties.  The burden is on the petitioner herein to prove that Boracay West Cove was
22

deprived of the opportunity to beheard before EO 10 was issued. Regrettably, copies of the Cease
and Desist Order issued by the LGU and of the assailed EO 10 itself were never attached to the
petition before this Court, which documents could have readily shed light on whether or not petitioner
has been accorded the 10-day grace period provided in Section 10 of the Ordinance. In view of this
fact, the presumption of regularity must be sustained. Second, as quoted by petitioner in his petition
before the CA, the assailed EO 10 states that petitioner received notices from the municipality
government on March 7 and 28, 2011, requiring Boracay West Cove to comply with the zoning
ordinance and yet it failed to do so.  If such was the case, the grace period can be deemed
23

observed and the establishment was already ripe for closure and demolition by the time EO 10 was
issued in June. Third, the observance of the 10-day allowance for the owner to demolish the hotel
was never questioned by petitioner so there is no need to discuss the same. Verily, the only grounds
invoked by petitioner in crying due process violation are (1) the absence of a court order prior to
demolition and (2) the municipal government’s exercise of jurisdiction over the controversy instead of
the DENR. Therefore, it can no longer be belatedly argued that the 10-day grace period was not
observed because to entertain the same would result in the violation of the respondents’ own due
process rights. Given the presence of the requirements under Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC,
whether the building constituted a nuisance per seor a nuisance per accidensbecomes immaterial.
The hotelwas demolished not exactly because it is a nuisance but because it failed to comply with
the legal requirements prior to construction. It justso happened that, in the case at bar, the hotel’s
incident that qualified it as a nuisance per accidens––its being constructed within the no build
zone––further resulted in the non-issuance of the necessary permits and clearances, which is a
ground for demolition under the LGC. Under the premises, a court order that is required under
normal circumstances is hereby dispensed with.

d. The FLAgT cannot prevail over the municipal ordinance and PD 1096

Petitioner next directs our attention to the following FLAgT provision:

VII. The SECOND PARTY may construct permanent and/or temporary improvements or
infrastructure in the FLAgT Area necessary and appropriate for its development for tourism purposes
pursuant to the approved SMP. "Permanent Improvements" refer to access roads, and buildings or
structures which adhere to the ground in a fixed and permanent manner. On the other hand,
"Temporary Improvements" include those which are detachablefrom the foundation or the ground
introduced by the SECOND PARTY inthe FLAgT Area and which the SECOND PARTY may remove
or dismantle upon expiration or cancellation of this AGREEMENT x x x. 24

Taken in conjunction with the exceptions laid down in Sections 6 and 8 of the Ordinance, petitioner
argues that Boracay West Cove is exempted from securing permits from the LGU. Said exceptions
read:

SECTION 6. – No building or structure shall be allowed to be constructed on a slope Twenty Five

Percent (25%) or higher unless provided with soil erosion protective structures and authorized by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources.

xxxx

SECTION 8. – No building or structure shall be allowed to be constructed on a swamp or other

water-clogged areas unless authorized by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.

According to petitioner, the fact that it was issued a FLAgT constitutes sufficient authorization from
the DENR to proceed with the construction of the three-storey hotel.

The argument does not persuade.

The rights granted to petitioner under the FLAgT are not unbridled. Forestlands, although under the
management of the DENR, are not exempt from the territorial application of municipal laws, for local
government units legitimately exercise their powers of government over their defined territorial
jurisdiction.

Furthermore, the conditions set forth in the FLAgT and the limitations circumscribed in the ordinance
are not mutually exclusive and are, in fact, cumulative. As sourced from Sec. 447 (a)(5)(i) of the
LGC:

Section 447.Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. –

(a) The sangguniang bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality, shall enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
 municipalityand its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise
of the corporate powers of the municipality as provided for under Section 22 of this Code,
and shall:

xxxx

(5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic
services and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said
services and facilities, shall:

(i) Provide for the establishment, maintenance, protection, and conservation of communal
forests and watersheds, tree parks,greenbelts, mangroves, and other similar forest
development projectsx x x. (emphasis added)

Thus, aside from complying with the provisions in the FLAgT granted by the DENR, it was incumbent
on petitioner to likewise comply with the no build zone restriction under Municipal Ordinance 2000-
131, which was already in force even before the FLAgT was entered into. On this point, it is well to
stress that Sections 6 and 8 of the Ordinance do not exempt petitioner from complying with the
restrictions since these provisions adverted to grant exemptions from the ban on constructions on
slopes and swamps, not on the no build zone.

Additionally, the FLAgT does not excuse petitioner from complying with PD 1096. As correctly
pointed out by respondents, the agreement cannot and will not amend or change the law because a
legislative act cannot be altered by mere contractual agreement. Hence, petitioner has no valid
reason for its failure to secure a building permit pursuant to Sec. 301 of the National Building Code.

e. The DENR does not have primary jurisdiction over the controversy

Lastly, in ascribing grave abuse ofdiscretion on the part of the respondent mayor, petitioner argued
that the hotel site is a forestland under the primary jurisdiction of the DENR. Assuch, the merits of
the case should have been passed upon by the agency and not by the LGU. In the alternative,
petitioner explains that even if jurisdiction over the matter has been devolved in favor of the LGU, the
DENR still has the power of review and supervision over the former’s rulings. As cited by the
petitioner, the LGC reads:

Section 17.Basic Services and Facilities. –

xxxx

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the following:

xxxx

(2) For a Municipality:

xxxx

(ii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR,
implementation of community-based forestry projects which include integrated social forestry
programs and similar projects; management and control of communal forests with an area not
exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers; establishment of tree parks, greenbelts, and similar forest
development projects. (emphasis added)

Petitioner has made much of the fact that in line with this provision, the DENR Region 6 had issued
anopinion favourable to petitioner.  To petitioner, the adverted opinion effectively reversed the
25

findings of the respondent mayor that the structure introduced was illegally constructed.

We disagree.

In alleging that the case concernsthe development and the proper use of the country’s environment
and natural resources, petitioner is skirting the principal issue, which is Boracay West Cove's non-
compliance with the permit, clearance, and zoning requirements for building constructions under
national and municipal laws. He downplays Boracay West Cove's omission in a bid to justify ousting
the LGU of jurisdiction over the case and transferring the same to the DENR. He attempts to blow
the issue out of proportion when it all boils down to whether or not the construction of the three-
storey hotel was supported by the necessary documentary requirements.

Based on law and jurisprudence, the office of the mayor has quasijudicial powers to order the
closing and demolition of establishments.  This power granted by the LGC, as earlier explained, We
1âwphi1

believe, is not the same power devolved in favor of the LGU under Sec. 17 (b )(2)(ii), as
abovequoted, which is subject to review by the DENR. The fact that the building to be demolished is
located within a forestland under the administration of the DENR is of no moment, for what is
involved herein, strictly speaking, is not an issue on environmental protection, conservation of
natural resources, and the maintenance of ecological balance, but the legality or illegality of the
structure.  Rather than treating this as an environmental issue then, focus should not be diverted
1âwphi1

from the root cause of this debacle-compliance.

Ultimately, the purported power of review by a regional office of the DENR over respondents' actions
exercised through an instrumentality of an ex-parte opinion, in this case, finds no sufficient basis. At
best, the legal opinion rendered, though perhaps informative, is not conclusive on the courts and
should be taken with a grain of salt.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 120042 dated August 13,
2013 and February 3, 2014, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 169913               June 8, 2011

HEIRS OF DR. JOSE DELESTE, namely: JOSEFA DELESTE, JOSE RAY DELESTE, RAUL
HECTOR DELESTE, and RUBEN ALEX DELESTE, Petitioners,
vs.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (LBP), as represented by its Manager, LAND VALUATION
OFFICE OF LBP COTABATO CITY; THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR - REGION 12 OF COTABATO
CITY, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM; THE REGIONAL
DIRECTOR OF REGION X - CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, represented by MCMILLAN LUCMAN, in
his capacity as Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of DAR Lanao del Norte; LIZA
BALBERONA, in her capacity as DAR Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO); REYNALDO
BAGUIO, in his capacity as the Register of Deeds of Iligan City as nominal party; the
emancipation patent holders: FELIPE D. MANREAL, CUSTUDIO M. RICO, HEIRS OF
DOMINGO V. RICO, HEIRS OF ABDON T. MANREAL, MACARIO M. VELORIA, ALICIA B.
MANREAL, PABLO RICO, SALVACION MANREAL, HEIRS OF TRANQUILIANA MANREAL,
HEIRS OF ANGELA VELORIA, HEIRS OF NECIFURO CABALUNA, HEIRS OF CLEMENTE
RICO, HEIRS OF MANTILLANO OBISO, HEIRS OF HERCULANO BALORIO, and TITO
BALER, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to reverse and set aside the
October 28, 2004 Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its September 13, 2005
Resolution2 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

The spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and Hilaria Tabuclin (Hilaria) were the owners of a
parcel of agricultural land located in Tambo, Iligan City, consisting of 34.7 hectares (subject
property). Said spouses were childless, but Gregorio had a son named Virgilio Nanaman (Virgilio) by
another woman. Virgilio had been raised by the couple since he was two years old. Gregorio also
had two daughters, Esperanza and Caridad, by still another woman. 3

When Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria and Virgilio administered the subject property. 4 On February 16,
1954, Hilaria and Virgilio sold the subject property to Dr. Jose Deleste (Deleste) for PhP
16,000.5 The deed of sale was notarized on February 17, 1954 and registered on March 2, 1954.
Also, the tax declaration in the name of Virgilio was canceled and a new tax declaration was issued
in the name of Deleste. The arrears in the payment of taxes from 1952 had been updated by Deleste
and from then on, he paid the taxes on the property.6
On May 15, 1954, Hilaria died. 7 Gregorio’s brother, Juan Nanaman, was appointed as special
administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses. Subsequently, Edilberto Noel (Noel) was
appointed as the regular administrator of the joint estate. 8

On April 30, 1963, Noel, as the administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased spouses, filed
before the Court of First Instance, Branch II, Lanao del Norte an action against Deleste for the
reversion of title over the subject property, docketed as Civil Case No. 698.9 Said case went up to
this Court in Noel v. CA, where We rendered a Decision10 on January 11, 1995, affirming the ruling of
the CA that the subject property was the conjugal property of the late spouses Gregorio and Hilaria
and that the latter could only sell her one-half (1/2) share of the subject property to Deleste. As a
result, Deleste, who died in 1992, and the intestate estate of Gregorio were held to be the co-owners
of the subject property, each with a one-half (1/2) interest in it.11

Notably, while Civil Case No. 698 was still pending before the CFI, particularly on October 21, 1972,
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 was issued. This law mandates that tenanted rice and corn lands
be brought under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries.
Thus, the subject property was placed under the said program. 12 However, only the heirs of Gregorio
were identified by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as the landowners. Concomitantly, the
notices and processes relative to the coverage were sent to these heirs. 13

In 1975, the City of Iligan passed City Ordinance No. 1313, known as the "Zoning Regulation of
Iligan City," reclassifying the subject property as commercial/residential. 14

Eventually, on February 12, 1984, DAR issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) in favor of
private respondents who were tenants and actual cultivators of the subject property. 15 The CLTs
were registered on July 15, 1986.16

In 1991, the subject property was surveyed.17 The survey of a portion of the land consisting of
20.2611 hectares, designated as Lot No. 1407, was approved on January 8, 1999. 18 The claim folder
for Lot No. 1407 was submitted to the LBP which issued a Memorandum of Valuation and a
Certificate of Cash Deposit on May 21, 2001 and September 12, 2001, respectively. Thereafter,
Emancipation Patents (EPs) and Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) were issued on August 1, 2001
and October 1, 2001, respectively, in favor of private respondents over their respective portions of
Lot No. 1407.19

Meanwhile, on November 22, 1999, the City of Iligan filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 4 in Iligan City for the expropriation of a 5.4686-hectare portion of Lot No. 1407,
docketed as Special Civil Action No. 4979. On December 11, 2000, the RTC issued a Decision
granting the expropriation. Considering that the real owner of the expropriated portion could not be
determined, as the subject property had not yet been partitioned and distributed to any of the heirs of
Gregorio and Deleste, the just compensation for the expropriated portion of the subject property in
the amount of PhP 27,343,000 was deposited with the Development Bank of the Philippines in Iligan
City, in trust for the RTC in Iligan City.20

On February 28, 2002, the heirs of Deleste, petitioners herein, filed with the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a petition seeking to nullify private respondents’ EPs.21 This
was docketed as Reg. Case No. X-471-LN-2002.

On July 21, 2003, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) rendered a
Decision22 declaring that the EPs were null and void in view of the pending issues of ownership, the
subsequent reclassification of the subject property into a residential/commercial land, and the
violation of petitioners’ constitutional right to due process of law.
Dissatisfied, private respondents immediately filed their Notice of Appeal on July 22, 2003.
Notwithstanding it, on July 24, 2003, petitioners filed a Motion for a Writ of Execution pursuant to
Section 2, Rule XII of the Revised Rules of Procedure, which was granted in an Order dated August
4, 2003 despite strong opposition from private respondents. 23 On January 28, 2004, the DARAB
nullified the Order dated August 4, 2003 granting the writ of execution. 24

Subsequently, the DARAB, in DARAB Case No. 12486, reversed the ruling of the PARAD in its
Decision25 dated March 15, 2004. It held, among others, that the EPs were valid as it was the heirs of
Deleste who should have informed the DAR of the pendency of Civil Case No. 698 at the time the
subject property was placed under the coverage of the OLT Program considering that DAR was not
a party to the said case. Further, it stated that the record is bereft of any evidence that the city
ordinance has been approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), as
mandated by DAR Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 1990, and held that whether the subject
property is indeed exempt from the OLT Program is an administrative determination, the jurisdiction
of which lies exclusively with the DAR Secretary or the latter’s authorized representative. Petitioners’
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the DARAB in its Resolution 26 dated July 8, 2004.

Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85471,
challenging the Decision and Resolution in DARAB Case No. 12486. This was denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated October 28, 2004 for petitioners’ failure to attach the writ of execution, the order
nullifying the writ of execution, and such material portions of the record referred to in the petition and
other supporting papers, as required under Sec. 6 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners’
motion for reconsideration was also denied by the appellate court in a Resolution dated September
13, 2005 for being pro forma.

On November 18, 2005, petitioners filed a petition for review with this Court. In Our
Resolution27 dated February 4, 2008, We resolved to deny the said petition for failure to show
sufficiently any reversible error in the assailed judgment to warrant the exercise by the Court of its
discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case.

On March 19, 2008, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration.28 On April 11, 2008, they also filed
a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration. 29

In Our Resolution30 dated August 20, 2008, this Court resolved to grant petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration and give due course to the petition, requiring the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.

The Issues

I. [WHETHER THE CA WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING] OUTRIGHT THE PETITION FOR

REVIEW OF PETITIONERS X X X.

II. [WHETHER] THE OUTRIGHT DENIAL OF PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION BASED ON A MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS IS JUSTIFIED; AND
[WHETHER THE] OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION IS JUST CONSIDERING
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES RAISED THEREIN.

XXXX
 III. [WHETHER PETITIONERS’ LAND IS] COVERED BY AGRARIAN REFORM GIVEN
THAT THE CITY OF ILIGAN PASSED [CITY] ORDINANCE NO. 1313 RECLASSIFYING
THE AREA INTO A STRICTLY RESIDENTIAL AREA IN 1975.

IV. [WHETHER THE LAND] THAT HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY AND PARTIALLY
EXPROPRIATED BY A CITY GOVERNMENT [MAY] STILL BE SUBJECT[ED] TO
AGRARIAN REFORM.

V. [WHETHER DAR VIOLATED] THE RIGHTS OF PETITIONERS TO PROCEDURAL DUE

PROCESS.

VI. [WHETHER] THE COMPENSATION DETERMINED BY DAR AND LBP IS CORRECT

GIVEN THAT THE FORMULA USED HAD BEEN REPEALED.

VII. [WHETHER] THE ISSUANCE OF EMANCIPATION PATENTS [IS] LEGAL GIVEN THAT
THEY WERE FRUITS OF AN ILLEGAL PROCEEDING.

VIII. [WHETHER] THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE [ARE] VALID GIVEN THAT THEY WERE
DIRECTLY ISSUED TO THE FARMER-BENEFICIARIES IN GROSS VIOLATION OF
SECTION 16(E) OF R.A. 6657 X X X.31

Our Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Effect of non-compliance with the requirements

under Sec. 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court

In filing a petition for review as an appeal from awards, judgments, final orders, or

resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions, it is required under Sec. 6(c), Rule 43 of the Rules of Court that it be accompanied by
a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order, or
resolution appealed from, with certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to
in the petition and other supporting papers. As stated:

Sec. 6. Contents of the petition. – The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the parties
to the case, without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b)
contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the
review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the
award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies
of such material portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting papers; and
(d) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section
2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the
period fixed herein. (Emphasis supplied.)

Non-compliance with any of the above-mentioned requirements concerning the contents of the
petition, as well as the documents that should accompany the petition, shall be sufficient ground for
its dismissal as stated in Sec. 7, Rule 43 of the Rules:

Sec. 7. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. – The failure of the petitioner to comply with
any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the
deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which
should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. (Emphasis
supplied.)

In the instant case, the CA dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 85471 for petitioners’ failure to
attach the writ of execution, the order nullifying the writ of execution, and such material portions of
the record referred to in the petition and other supporting papers. 32

A perusal of the issues raised before the CA would, however, show that the foregoing documents
required by the appellate court are not necessary for the proper disposition of the case. Specifically:

Is [Lot No. 1407] within the ambit of the [Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program]?

Can the OLT by DAR over the subject land validly proceed without notice to the landowner?

Can the OLT be validly completed without a certification of deposit by Land Bank?

[I]s the landowner barred from exercising his right of retention x x x [considering that EPs were
already issued on the basis of CLTs]?

Are the EPs over the subject land x x x valid x x x?33

Petitioners complied with the requirement under Sec. 6(c), Rule 43 of the Rules of Court when they
appended to the petition filed before the CA certified true copies of the following documents: (1) the
challenged resolution dated July 8, 2004 issued by the DARAB denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration; (2) the duplicate original copy of petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration dated April
6, 2005; (3) the assailed decision dated March 15, 2004 issued by the DARAB reversing on appeal
the decision of the PARAD and nullifying with finality the order of execution pending appeal; (4) the
Order dated December 8, 2003 issued by the PARAD reinstating the writ of execution earlier issued;
and (5) the Decision dated July 21, 2003 issued by the PARAD in the original proceedings for the
cancellation of the EPs.34 The CA, therefore, erred when it dismissed the petition based on such
technical ground.

Even assuming that the omitted documents were material to the appeal, the appellate court, instead
of dismissing outright the petition, could have just required petitioners to submit the necessary
documents. In Spouses Espejo v. Ito,35 the Court held that "under Section 3 (d), Rule 3 of the
Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals,36 the Court of Appeals is with authority to require the
parties to submit additional documents as may be necessary to promote the interests of substantial
justice."

Moreover, petitioners’ subsequent submission of the documents required by the CA with the motion
for reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with Section 6(c), Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court.37 In Jaro v. CA, this Court held that subsequent and substantial compliance may call for the
relaxation of the rules of procedure. Particularly:

The amended petition no longer contained the fatal defects that the original petition had but the
Court of Appeals still saw it fit to dismiss the amended petition. The Court of Appeals reasoned that
"non-compliance in the original petition is admittedly attributable to the petitioner and that no highly
justifiable and compelling reason has been advanced" to the court for it to depart from the mandatory
requirements of Administrative Circular No. 3-96. The hard stance taken by the Court of Appeals in
this case is unjustified under the circumstances.
There is ample jurisprudence holding that the subsequent and substantial compliance of an
appellant may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. In Cusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz and
Piglas-Kamao vs. National Labor Relations Commission, we ruled that the subsequent
submission of the missing documents with the motion for reconsideration amounts to
substantial compliance. The reasons behind the failure of the petitioners in these two cases to
comply with the required attachments were no longer scrutinized. What we found noteworthy in each
case was the fact that the petitioners therein substantially complied with the formal requirements.
We ordered the remand of the petitions in these cases to the Court of Appeals, stressing the ruling
that by precipitately dismissing the petitions "the appellate court clearly put a premium on
technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case." 38 (Citations omitted; emphasis
supplied.)1avvphi1

Time and again, this Court has held that a strict and rigid application of technicalities must be
avoided if it tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. 39 As held in Sta. Ana v.
Spouses Carpo:40

Rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. If the
application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it is always
within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from their operation. Law
and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with the procedural
rules, even the most mandatory in character, mindful of the duty to reconcile the need to put
an end to litigation speedily and the parties’ right to an opportunity to be heard.

Our recent ruling in Tanenglian v. Lorenzo is instructive:

We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal
application of the Rules, allowing us, depending on the circumstances, to set aside technical
infirmities and give due course to the appeal. In cases where we dispense with the technicalities, we
do not mean to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. In those rare cases
where we did not stringently apply the procedural rules, there always existed a clear need to prevent
the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain
a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every
litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause. (Citations
omitted; emphasis supplied.)

Clearly, the dismissal of the petition by the CA on mere technicality is unwarranted in the instant
case.

On the coverage of the subject property by the agrarian reform program

Petitioners contend that the subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, is outside the coverage of
the agrarian reform program in view of the enactment of City Ordinance No. 1313 by the City of
Iligan reclassifying the area into a residential/commercial land. 41

Unconvinced, the DARAB, in its Decision, noted that the record is bereft of any evidence that the city
ordinance has been approved by the HLURB, thereby allegedly casting doubt on the validity of the
reclassification over the subject property.42 It further noted that whether the subject property is
exempt from the OLT Program is an administrative determination, the jurisdiction of which lies
exclusively with the DAR Secretary, not with the DARAB.

Indeed, it is the Office of the DAR Secretary which is vested with the primary and exclusive
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program. 43 However,
this will not prevent the Court from assuming jurisdiction over the petition considering that the issues
raised in it may already be resolved on the basis of the records before Us. Besides, to allow the
matter to remain with the Office of the DAR Secretary would only cause unnecessary delay and
undue hardship on the parties. Applicable, by analogy, is Our ruling in the recent Bagong
Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa ng Triumph International v. Department of Labor and Employment
Secretary,44 where We held:

But as the CA did, we similarly recognize that undue hardship, to the point of injustice, would result if
a remand would be ordered under a situation where we are in the position to resolve the case based
on the records before us. As we said in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals:

[w]e have laid down the rule that the remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of
evidence is not necessary where the Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the
records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and for the expeditious
administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them to the trial
court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice, would not be subserved by the
remand of the case.

Thus, we shall directly rule on the dismissal issue. And while we rule that the CA could not validly
rule on the merits of this issue, we shall not hesitate to refer back to its dismissal ruling, where
appropriate. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

Pertinently, after an assiduous study of the records of the case, We agree with petitioners that the
subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program in
view of the enactment by the City of Iligan of its local zoning ordinance, City Ordinance No. 1313.

It is undeniable that the local government has the power to reclassify agricultural into non-
agricultural lands. In Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. CA,45 this Court held that
pursuant to Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. (RA) 2264, amending the Local Government Code, municipal
and/or city councils are empowered to "adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations in
consultation with the National Planning Commission." It was also emphasized therein that "[t]he
power of the local government to convert or reclassify lands [from agricultural to non-agricultural
lands prior to the passage of RA 6657] is not subject to the approval of the [DAR]." 46

Likewise, it is not controverted that City Ordinance No. 1313, which was enacted by the City of Iligan
in 1975, reclassified the subject property into a commercial/residential area. DARAB, however,
believes that the approval of HLURB is necessary in order for the reclassification to be valid.

We differ. As previously mentioned, City Ordinance No. 1313 was enacted by the City of Iligan in
1975. Significantly, there was still no HLURB to speak of during that time. It was the Task Force on
Human Settlements, the earliest predecessor of HLURB, which was already in existence at that
time, having been created on September 19, 1973 pursuant to Executive Order No. 419. It should be
noted, however, that the Task Force was not empowered to review and approve zoning ordinances
and regulations. As a matter of fact, it was only on August 9, 1978, with the issuance of Letter of
Instructions No. 729, that local governments were required to submit their existing land use plans,
zoning ordinances, enforcement systems and procedures to the Ministry of Human Settlements for
review and ratification. The Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) was the regulatory
arm of the Ministry of Human Settlements.47

Significantly, accompanying the Certification48 dated October 8, 1999 issued by Gil R. Balondo,

Deputy Zoning Administrator of the City Planning and Development Office, Iligan City, and the
letter49 dated October 8, 1999 issued by Ayunan B. Rajah, Regional Officer of the HLURB, is the
Certificate of Approval issued by Imelda Romualdez Marcos, then Minister of Human Settlements
and Chairperson of the HSRC, showing that the local zoning ordinance was, indeed, approved on
September 21, 1978. This leads to no other conclusion than that City Ordinance No. 1313 enacted
by the City of Iligan was approved by the HSRC, the predecessor of HLURB. The validity of said
local zoning ordinance is, therefore, beyond question.

Since the subject property had been reclassified as residential/commercial land with the enactment
of City Ordinance No. 1313 in 1975, it can no longer be considered as an "agricultural land" within
the ambit of RA 6657. As this Court held in Buklod nang Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v.
E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc.,50 "To be exempt from CARP, all that is needed is one valid
reclassification of the land from agricultural to non-agricultural by a duly authorized government
agency before June 15, 1988, when the CARL took effect."

Despite the foregoing ruling, respondents allege that the subsequent reclassification by the local
zoning ordinance cannot free the land from the legal effects of PD 27 which deems the land to be
already taken as of October 21, 1972, when said law took effect. Concomitantly, they assert that the
rights which accrued from said date must be respected. They also maintain that the reclassification
of the subject property did not alter its agricultural nature, much less its actual use. 51

Verily, vested rights which have already accrued cannot just be taken away by the expedience of
issuing a local zoning ordinance reclassifying an agricultural land into a residential/commercial area.
As this Court extensively discussed in Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. CA:52

In the main, REMMAN hinges its application for exemption on the ground that the subject lands had
ceased to be agricultural lands by virtue of the zoning classification by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Dasmariñas, Cavite, and approved by the HSRC, specifying them as residential.

In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, this Court resolved the issue of whether lands
already classified for residential, commercial or industrial use, as approved by the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its precursor agencies, i.e., National Housing Authority and
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, prior to 15 June 1988, are covered by Republic Act
No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. We answered in
the negative, thus:

We now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides
that the CARL shall "cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public
and private agricultural lands." As to what constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to as "land
devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land." The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this
limitation. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands"
and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential land."

x x x           x x x          x x x

Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These include
lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government
agencies other than respondent DAR. In its Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion
of Private Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses, DAR itself defined "agricultural land" thus —

. . . Agricultural lands refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and not
classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as approved
by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities
prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use.

Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, respondent DAR is bound by such
conversion. . . . .

However, Natalia should be cautiously applied in light of Administrative Order 04, Series of 2003,
which outlines the rules on the Exemption on Lands from CARP Coverage under Section (3) of
Republic Act No. 6657, and Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990. It reads:

I. Prefatory Statement

Republic Act (RA) 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), Section 3, Paragraph
(c) defines "agricultural land" as referring to "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this
Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land."

Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, (or "DOJ Opinion 44-1990" for brevity) and
the case of Natalia Realty versus Department of Agrarian Reform (12 August 2993, 225 SCRA 278)
opines that with respect to the conversion of agricultural land covered by RA 6657 to non-agricultural
uses, the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to approve such conversion may be
exercised from the date of its effectivity, on 15 June 1988. Thus, all lands that are already classified
as commercial, industrial or residential before 15 June 1988 no longer need any conversion
clearance.

However, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural uses shall not operate to divest
tenant[-]farmers of their rights over lands covered by Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, which
have been vested prior to 15 June 1988.

As emphasized, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural cannot be applied to defeat

vested rights of tenant-farmers under Presidential Decree No. 27.

Indeed, in the recent case of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante, where the Court
was confronted with the issue of whether the contentious property therein is agricultural in nature on
the ground that the same had been classified as "park" since 1979 under the Zoning Ordinance of
Cabuyao, as approved by the HLURB, the Court said:

The Court recognizes the power of a local government to reclassify and convert lands through local
ordinance, especially if said ordinance is approved by the HLURB. Municipal Ordinance No. 110-54
dated November 3, 1979, enacted by the Municipality of Cabuyao, divided the municipality into
residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural and institutional districts, and districts and parks for
open spaces. It did not convert, however, existing agricultural lands into residential, commercial,
industrial, or institutional. While it classified Barangay Casile into a municipal park, as shown in its
permitted uses of land map, the ordinance did not provide for the retroactivity of its classification. In
Co vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, it was held that an ordinance converting agricultural lands
into residential or light industrial should be given prospective application only, and should
not change the nature of existing agricultural lands in the area or the legal relationships
existing over such land. . . . .

A reading of Metro Manila Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01, series of 1981, does not disclose any
provision converting existing agricultural lands in the covered area into residential or light industrial.
While it declared that after the passage of the measure, the subject area shall be used only for
residential or light industrial purposes, it is not provided therein that it shall have retroactive effect so
as to discontinue all rights previously acquired over lands located within the zone which are neither
residential nor light industrial in nature. This simply means that, if we apply the general rule, as
we must, the ordinance should be given prospective operation only. The further implication
is that it should not change the nature of existing agricultural lands in the area or the legal
relationships existing over such lands. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

This, however, raises the issue of whether vested rights have actually accrued in the instant case. In
this respect, We reckon that under PD 27, tenant-farmers of rice and corn lands were "deemed
owners" of the land they till as of October 21, 1972. This policy, intended to emancipate the tenant-
farmers from the bondage of the soil, is given effect by the following provision of the law:

The tenant farmer, whether in land classified as landed estate or not, shall be deemed owner of a
portion constituting a family size farm of five (5) hectares if not irrigated and three (3) hectares if
irrigated. (Emphasis supplied.)

It should be clarified that even if under PD 27, tenant-farmers are "deemed owners" as of October
21, 1972, this is not to be construed as automatically vesting upon these tenant-farmers absolute
ownership over the land they were tilling. Certain requirements must also be complied with, such as
payment of just compensation, before full ownership is vested upon the tenant-farmers. This was
elucidated by the Court in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of
Agrarian Reform:53

It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972
and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized
farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until
he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers’ cooperative." It was
understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first,
conformably to the constitutional requirement.

When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:

All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land
they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27.

it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof
of full-fledged membership in the farmers’ cooperatives and full payment of just
compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that
the "lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending
transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as advance
payment for the land."

The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the
government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of
the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains
with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either. (Citations
omitted; emphasis supplied.)

Prior to compliance with the prescribed requirements, tenant-farmers have, at most, an inchoate
right over the land they were tilling. In recognition of this, a CLT is issued to a tenant-farmer to serve
as a "provisional title of ownership over the landholding while the lot owner is awaiting full payment
of [just compensation] or for as long as the [tenant-farmer] is an ‘amortizing owner’." 54 This certificate
"proves inchoate ownership of an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn production. It is
issued in order for the tenant-farmer to acquire the land" 55 he was tilling.

Concomitantly, with respect to the LBP and the government, tenant-farmers cannot be considered
as full owners of the land they are tilling unless they have fully paid the amortizations due them. This
is because it is only upon such full payment of the amortizations that EPs may be issued in their
favor.

In Del Castillo v. Orciga, We explained that land transfer under PD 27 is effected in two (2) stages.
The first stage is the issuance of a CLT to a farmer-beneficiary as soon as the DAR transfers the
landholding to the farmer-beneficiary in recognition that said person is its "deemed owner." And the
second stage is the issuance of an EP as proof of full ownership of the landholding upon full
payment of the annual amortizations or lease rentals by the farmer-beneficiary. 56

In the case at bar, the CLTs were issued in 1984. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, it
was only in 1984 that private respondents, as farmer-beneficiaries, were recognized to have
an inchoate right over the subject property prior to compliance with the prescribed
requirements. Considering that the local zoning ordinance was enacted in 1975, and
subsequently approved by the HSRC in 1978, private respondents still had no vested rights
to speak of during this period, as it was only in 1984 that private respondents were issued the
CLTs and were "deemed owners."

The same holds true even if EPs and OCTs were issued in 2001, since reclassification had
taken place twenty-six (26) years prior to their issuance. Undeniably, no vested rights
accrued prior to reclassification and its approval. Consequently, the subject property,
particularly Lot No. 1407, is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program.

On the violation of petitioners’ right to due process of law

Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting the subject property under the
coverage of the agrarian reform program; hence, their right to due process of law was
violated.57 Citing De Chavez v. Zobel,58 both the DAR and the private respondents claim that the
enactment of PD 27 is a statutory notice to all owners of agricultural lands devoted to rice and/or
corn production,59 implying that there was no need for an actual notice.

We agree with petitioners. The importance of an actual notice in subjecting a property under the
agrarian reform program cannot be underrated, as non-compliance with it trods roughshod with the
essential requirements of administrative due process of law. 60 Our ruling in Heirs of Jugalbot v.
CA61 is particularly instructive:

Firstly, the taking of subject property was done in violation of constitutional due process. The Court
of Appeals was correct in pointing out that Virginia A. Roa was denied due process because the
DAR failed to send notice of the impending land reform coverage to the proper party. The records
show that notices were erroneously addressed and sent in the name of Pedro N. Roa who was not
the owner, hence, not the proper party in the instant case. The ownership of the property, as can be
gleaned from the records, pertains to Virginia A. Roa. Notice should have been therefore served on
her, and not Pedro N. Roa.

xxxx
In addition, the defective notice sent to Pedro N. Roa was followed by a DAR certification signed by
team leader Eduardo Maandig on January 8, 1988 stating that the subject property was tenanted as
of October 21, 1972 and primarily devoted to rice and corn despite the fact that there was no ocular
inspection or any on-site fact-finding investigation and report to verify the truth of the allegations of
Nicolas Jugalbot that he was a tenant of the property. The absence of such ocular inspection or on-
site fact-finding investigation and report likewise deprives Virginia A. Roa of her right to property
through the denial of due process.

By analogy, Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals applies to the case at bar since there was likewise
a violation of due process in the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law when
the petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection and investigation to be conducted by the DAR
before acquisition of the property was to be undertaken. Neither was there proof that petitioner was
given the opportunity to at least choose and identify its retention area in those portions to be
acquired. Both in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and Presidential Decree No. 27, the right
of retention and how this right is exercised, is guaranteed by law.

Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27 and the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law govern the extraordinary method of expropriating private property, the law must be
strictly construed. Faithful compliance with legal provisions, especially those which relate to the
procedure for acquisition of expropriated lands should therefore be observed. In the instant case, no
proper notice was given to Virginia A. Roa by the DAR. Neither did the DAR conduct an ocular
inspection and investigation. Hence, any act committed by the DAR or any of its agencies that
results from its failure to comply with the proper procedure for expropriation of land is a violation of
constitutional due process and should be deemed arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

Markedly, a reading of De Chavez invoked by both the DAR and private respondents does not show
that this Court ever made mention that actual notice may be dispensed with under PD 27, its
enactment being a purported "statutory notice" to all owners of agricultural lands devoted to rice
and/or corn production that their lands are subjected to the OLT program.

Quite contrarily, in Sta. Monica Industrial & Dev’t. Corp. v. DAR,62 this Court underscored the
significance of notice in implementing the agrarian reform program when it stated that "notice is part
of the constitutional right to due process of law. It informs the landowner of the State’s intention to
acquire a private land upon payment of just compensation and gives him the opportunity to present
evidence that his landholding is not covered or is otherwise excused from the agrarian law."

The Court, therefore, finds interest in the holding of the DARAB that petitioners were not denied the
right to due process despite the fact that only the Nanamans were identified as the owners.
Particularly:

Fourthly, the PARAD also ruled that the petitioners were denied the right to be given the notice since
only the Nanamans were identified as the owners. The fault lies with petitioners who did not present
the tax declaration in the name of Dr. Deleste as of October 21, 1972. It was only in 1995 that Civil
Case No. 698 was finally decided by the Supreme Court dividing the 34.7 hectares between the
Delestes and the Nanamans. Note that Dr. Deleste died in 1992 after PD 27 was promulgated,
hence, the subject land or his ½ share was considered in his name only (see Art. 777, New Civil
Code). Even then, it must be borne in mind that on September 26, 1972, PD No. 2 was issued by
President Marcos proclaiming the whole country as a land reform area, this was followed by PD 27.
This should have alarmed them more so when private respondents are in actual possession and
cultivation of the subject property.
But it was incumbent upon the DAR to notify Deleste, being the landowner of the subject property. It
should be noted that the deed of sale executed by Hilaria in favor of Deleste was registered on
March 2, 1954, and such registration serves as a constructive notice to the whole world that the
subject property was already owned by Deleste by virtue of the said deed of sale. In Naval v. CA,
this Court held:

Applying the law, we held in Bautista v. Fule that the registration of an instrument involving
unregistered land in the Registry of Deeds creates constructive notice and binds third person who
may subsequently deal with the same property.63 x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

It bears stressing that the principal purpose of registration is "to notify other persons not parties to a
contract that a transaction involving the property has been entered into." 64 There was, therefore, no
reason for DAR to feign ignorance of the transfer of ownership over the subject property.

Moreover, that DAR should have sent the notice to Deleste, and not to the Nanamans, is bolstered
by the fact that the tax declaration in the name of Virgilio was already canceled and a new one
issued in the name of Deleste.65 Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, they are nonetheless "good indicia of possession in the concept
of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual
or, at least, constructive possession."66

Petitioners’ right to due process of law was, indeed, violated when the DAR failed to notify them that
it is subjecting the subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program.

On this note, We take exception to our ruling in Roxas & Co., Inc. v. CA, 67 where, despite a finding
that there was a violation of due process in the implementation of the comprehensive agrarian
reform program when the petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection and investigation to be
conducted by the DAR before acquiring the property, thereby effectively depriving petitioner the
opportunity to at least choose and identify its retention area in those portions to be acquired, 68 this
Court nonetheless ruled that such violation does not give the Court the power to nullify the
certificates of land ownership award (CLOAs) already issued to the farmer-beneficiaries, since the
DAR must be given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings.

Manifesting her disagreement that this Court cannot nullify illegally issued CLOAs and should first
ask the DAR to reverse and correct itself, Justice Ynares-Santiago, in her Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion,69 stated that "[i]f the acts of DAR are patently illegal and the rights of Roxas & Co. violated,
the wrong decisions of DAR should be reversed and set aside. It follows that the fruits of the
wrongful acts, in this case the illegally issued CLOAs, must be declared null and void." She also
noted that "[i]f CLOAs can under the DAR’s own order be cancelled administratively, with more
reason can the courts, especially the Supreme Court, do so when the matter is clearly in issue."

In the same vein, if the illegality in the issuance of the CLTs is patent, the Court must immediately
take action and declare the issuance as null and void. There being no question that the CLTs in the
instant case were "improperly issued, for which reason, their cancellation is warranted." 70 The same
holds true with respect to the EPs and certificates of title issued by virtue of the void CLTs, as there
can be no valid transfer of title should the CLTs on which they were grounded are
void.71 Cancellation of the EPs and OCTs are clearly warranted in the instant case since, aside from
the violation of petitioners’ right to due process of law, the subject property is outside the coverage of
the agrarian reform program.

Issue of Validity of EPs Not Barred by Res Judicata

The LBP maintains that the issue of the EPs’ validity has already been settled by this Court in Heirs
of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 72 where We held that the EPs and OCTs
issued in 2001 had already become indefeasible and incontrovertible by the time the petitioners
therein instituted the case in 2005; hence, their issuance may no longer be reviewed. 73

In effect, the LBP raises the defense of res judicata in order to preclude a "relitigation" of the issue
concerning the validity of the EPs issued to private respondents.

Notably, the doctrine of res judicata has two aspects, namely: (1) "bar by prior judgment," 74 wherein
the judgment in a prior case bars the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand,
or cause of action;75 and (2) "conclusiveness of judgment,"76 which precludes relitigation of a
particular fact or issue in another action between the same parties on a different claim or cause of
action.77

Citing Agustin v. Delos Santos,78 this Court, in Spouses Antonio v. Sayman, 79 expounded on the
difference between the two aspects of res judicata:

The principle of res judicata is applicable by way of (1) "bar by prior judgment" and (2)
"conclusiveness of judgment." This Court had occasion to explain the difference between these two
aspects of res judicata as follows:

There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered
and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the
second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the
merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a
new action or suit involving the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal.

But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes
of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly
controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the
concept of res judicata known as "conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently, any right,
fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action
before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not
the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same. (Citations omitted;
emphasis supplied.)

To be sure, conclusiveness of judgment merits application "when a fact or question has been
squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent
jurisdiction."80 Elucidating further on this second aspect of res judicata, the Court, in Spouses
Antonio, stated:

x x x The fact or question settled by final judgment or order binds the parties to that action (and
persons in privity with them or their successors-in-interest), and continues to bind them while the
judgment or order remains standing and unreversed by proper authority on a timely motion or
petition; the conclusively-settled fact or question cannot again be litigated in any future or other
action between the same parties or their privies and successors-in-interest, in the same or in any
other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of action. Thus,
only the identities of parties and issues are required for the operation of the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment.81 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Applying the above statement of the Court to the case at bar, We find that LBP’s contention that this
Court’s ruling in Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy that the EPs and OCTs issued in 2001 had already
become indefeasible and incontrovertible precludes a "relitigation" of the issue concerning the
validity of the EPs issued to private respondents does not hold water.

In the first place, there is no identity of parties in Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy and the instant
case. Arguably, the respondents in these two cases are similar. However, the petitioners are totally
different. In Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy, the petitioners are the more than 120 individuals who
claim to be descendants of Fulgencio Nanaman, Gregorio’s brother, and who collectively assert their
right to a share in Gregorio’s estate, arguing that they were deprived of their inheritance by virtue of
the improper issuance of the EPs to private respondents without notice to them. On the other hand,
in the instant case, petitioners are the heirs of Deleste who seek nullification of the EPs issued to
private respondents on grounds of violation of due process of law, disregard of landowner’s right of
retention, improvident issuance of EPs and OCTs, and non-coverage of the agrarian reform
program, among others. Evidently, there is even no privity among the petitioners in these two cases.

And in the second place, the issues are also dissimilar. In Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy, the issue
was whether the filing of a petition for prohibition was the proper remedy for the petitioners therein,
considering that the EPs and OCTs had already been issued in 2001, four (4) years prior to the filing
of said petition in 2005. In the instant case, however, the issue is whether the EPs and OCTs issued
in favor of private respondents are void, thus warranting their cancellation.

In addition, the factual circumstances in these two cases are different such that the necessity of
applying the rule on indefeasibility of title in one is wanting in the other. In Heirs of Sofia Nanaman
Lonoy, the petition for prohibition was filed by the petitioners therein in 2005, notwithstanding the fact
that the EPs and OCTs had already been issued in 2001. For that reason, apart from making a ruling
that "[p]rohibition, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli," it becomes
incumbent upon this Court to hold that:

x x x Considering that such EPs and OCTs were issued in 2001, they had become indefeasible
and incontrovertible by the time petitioners instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 00365 in 2005, and may
no longer be judicially reviewed.82 (Emphasis supplied.)

On the contrary, in the instant case, the petition for nullification of private respondents’ EPs and
OCTs was filed on February 28, 2002. Taking into account that the EPs and OCTs were issued on
August 1, 2001 and October 1, 2001, respectively, the filing of the petition was well within the
prescribed one year period, thus, barring the defense of indefeasibility and incontrovertibility. Even if
the petition was filed before the DARAB, and not the Regional Trial Court as mandated by Sec. 32 of
the Property Registration Decree,83 this should necessarily have the same effect, considering that
DARAB’s jurisdiction extends to cases involving the cancellation of CLOAs, EPs, and even of
certificates of title issued by virtue of a void EP. As this Court held in Gabriel v. Jamias: 84

It is well-settled that the DAR, through its adjudication arm, i.e., the DARAB and its regional and
provincial adjudication boards, exercises quasi-judicial functions and jurisdiction on all matters
pertaining to an agrarian dispute or controversy and the implementation of agrarian reform laws.
Pertinently, it is provided in the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure that the DARAB has primary
and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian
disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and
related agrarian reform laws. Such jurisdiction shall extend to cases involving the issuance,
correction and cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation
Patents which are registered with the Land Registration Authority.
This Court has had the occasion to rule that the mere issuance of an emancipation patent does not
put the ownership of the agrarian reform beneficiary beyond attack and scrutiny. Emancipation
patents may be cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations. Section 12 (g) of P.D.
No. 946 (issued on June 17, 1976) vested the then Court of Agrarian Relations with jurisdiction over
cases involving the cancellation of emancipation patents issued under P.D. No. 266. Exclusive
jurisdiction over such cases was later lodged with the DARAB under Section 1 of Rule II of the
DARAB Rules of Procedure.

For sure, the jurisdiction of the DARAB cannot be deemed to disappear the moment a certificate of
title is issued, for, such certificates are not modes of transfer of property but merely evidence of such
transfer, and there can be no valid transfer of title should the CLOA, on which it was grounded, be
void. The same holds true in the case of a certificate of title issued by virtue of a void emancipation
patent.

From the foregoing, it is therefore undeniable that it is the DARAB and not the regular courts which
has jurisdiction herein, this notwithstanding the issuance of Torrens titles in the names of the
petitioners. For, it is a fact that the petitioners’ Torrens titles emanated from the emancipation
patents previously issued to them by virtue of being the farmer-beneficiaries identified by the DAR
under the OLT of the government. The DAR ruling that the said emancipation patents were
erroneously issued for failing to consider the valid retention rights of respondents had already
attained finality. Considering that the action filed by respondents with the DARAB was precisely to
annul the emancipation patents issued to the petitioners, the case squarely, therefore, falls within the
jurisdiction of the DARAB. x x x (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

Inevitably, this leads to no other conclusion than that Our ruling in Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy
concerning the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of the EPs and OCTs issued in 2001 does not
bar Us from making a finding in the instant case that the EPs and OCTs issued to private
respondents are, indeed, void.

With the foregoing disquisition, it becomes unnecessary to dwell on the other issues raised by the
parties.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the CA’s October
28, 2004 and September 13, 2005 Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 85471. The Emancipation
Patents and Original Certificates of Title covering the subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407,
issued in favor of private respondents are hereby declared NULL and VOID.

The DAR is ordered to CANCEL the aforementioned Emancipation Patents and Original Certificates
of Title erroneously issued in favor of private respondents.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 181528               October 2, 2009

HECTOR T. HIPE, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MA. CRISTINA L. VICENCIO, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the
Rules of Court seeking to nullify and enjoin the implementation of the January 30, 2008
Resolution1 issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc, which affirmed the July
11, 2007 Resolution2 issued by its Second Division.

The Facts

Petitioner Hector T. Hipe and respondent Ma. Cristina L. Vicencio were candidates for the mayoralty
post in Catubig, Northern Samar in the May 14, 2007 elections. During the canvass proceedings of
the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Catubig, Northern Samar (MBOC), Vicencio petitioned for the
exclusion of seven election returns of Precinct Nos. 0037B, 0052A, 0053A, 0058A, 0080A, 0081A
and 0082A on the grounds that they were prepared under duress, threats, intimidation or coercion;
and that the election was marred by massive vote buying, widespread coercion, terrorism, threats,
and intimidation, preventing voters from voting, so that the said returns did not reflect the will of the
electorate.3 In support of the said petition for exclusion, Vicencio presented affidavits of some of the
members of the Board of Election Inspectors, a sample ballot and an ISO Assessment. 4

On May 19, 2007, the MBOC ruled in favor of Vicencio and excluded the seven election returns
adverted to. On the same day, petitioner Hipe filed a notice of appeal. Thereafter, on May 29, 2007,
petitioner Hipe filed his Verified Appeal with the COMELEC, docketed as SPC No. 07-206 entitled
"In the Matter of the Petitions to Exclude Election Returns, Hector T. Hipe vs. Ma. Cristina L.
Vicencio," arguing that the written petition to exclude the election returns was filed out of time, and
that the grounds used to exclude the questioned returns were not proper for a pre-proclamation
controversy, were not supported by credible evidence, and were beyond the jurisdiction of the
MBOC.5

In a July 11, 2007 Resolution, 6 the Second Division of COMELEC dismissed the appeal for being
filed out of time. As stated in the dispositive portion of the said Resolution:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Verified Appeal is hereby dismissed for being filed
out of time.
SO ORDERED.7

Subsequently, on July 17, 2007, petitioner Hipe filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 8 On even date,
respondent Vicencio was proclaimed as the mayor. 9 On January 30, 2008, the COMELEC En Banc
resolved to deny petitioner Hipe’s Motion for Reconsideration. 10

In the challenged Resolution, 11 the COMELEC En Banc held that the ruling of the MBOC had already
attained finality considering that the filing of the Verified Appeal with the COMELEC was five days
late. It stated that the filing of the Verified Appeal should have been made within the inextendible
period of five days from the filing of the written and verified notice of appeal with the MBOC, with
which petitioner Hipe failed to comply. Further, the COMELEC En Banc held that it was already
deprived of proper jurisdiction to entertain the instant case since the case should no longer be
considered as a pre-proclamation controversy, but should rather be ventilated in an election protest.
In addition, the COMELEC En Banc stated that the ruling of the MBOC was amply supported by the
affidavits of the Members of the Board of Election Inspectors, and that the MBOC retained sufficient
discretion to avail itself of all available means to ascertain the results of the elections through
witnesses, as well as through an examination of the election returns themselves.

The dispositive portion of the January 30, 2008 Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (En Banc) RESOLVED as it hereby

RESOLVES, to deny the instant Motion for Reconsideration filed by Appellant-Movant Hector Hipe.
The questioned Resolution dated July 11, 2007, issued by the Second Division of the Commission
on Elections for the exclusion of seven (7) election returns in favor of the appellee, Maria Cristina L.
Vicencio, therefore, stands and remains valid.

SO ORDERED.12

Aggrieved, Hipe filed this petition.

The Issue

Whether or not the COMELEC En Banc acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its challenged Resolution dated
January 30, 2008, which affirmed the Resolution dated July 11, 2007 issued by its Second Division
dismissing petitioner Hipe’s appeal for being filed out of time.

Our Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

Appeal Should Be Given Due Course

In its En Banc Resolution, the COMELEC held that the ruling of the MBOC had already become final
and executory; and thus, its Second Division had not acquired appellate jurisdiction to act on Hipe’s
verified appeal. In support of its ruling, the COMELEC En Banc relied on the Certification issued by
Renato I. Madronio, Acting Election Officer II, Catubig, Northern Samar, attesting that hard or printed
copies of the MBOC’s ruling to exclude the seven contested election returns were received by Atty.
V.B. Desales, counsel for the KAMPI-Liberal Party Coalition, at 10:37 p.m. on May 19, 2007 at the
provincial Election Supervisor’s Office.13 On this basis, the COMELEC En Banc opined that when
petitioner Hipe filed the Verified Appeal on May 29, 2009, said filing was already five days late and
should no longer be entertained.

We disagree. Indeed, there is a disputable presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed;14 and that, corollary thereto, it is presumed that in its disposition of the contested election
returns, the MBOC has regularly performed its official duty of issuing a written ruling on the
prescribed form, authenticated by the signatures of its members as required under Section 20(d) of
Republic Act No. 7166.15 In fact, the alleged issuance and service upon the supposed counsel of
petitioner Hipe of the written ruling of MBOC was even supported by the aforementioned
Certification of the Chairperson of the MBOC.

The records would, however, reveal that Atty. Venerando B. Desales, the counsel who was
supposedly furnished the alleged written ruling of the MBOC, has denied under oath that he ever
received a copy of the alleged written ruling.16 He even categorically denied in his Affidavit that he
was the counsel of petitioner Hipe.17

Notably, nothing in the Status of Canvass Report 18 or in the Minutes of the Proceedings of the MBOC
on May 19, 200719 showed that a written ruling on the petition for exclusion has been rendered by
the MBOC or received by petitioner Hipe.

On the contrary, a perusal of the Minutes of the Proceedings of the MBOC on May 19, 2007 would
reveal that Election Officer Madronio even notified the counsels of petitioner Hipe that, as of that
time, the Municipal COMELEC Office still did not have the prescribed form of the ruling, and that
they would still have to get the prescribed forms in Catarman. 20 This militates against Madronio’s
statement in his Certification that hard or printed copies of the ruling of the MBOC were furnished to
Atty. Desales on that same day.

When a plaintiff’s case depends upon the establishment of a negative fact, and the means of proving
the fact are equally within the control of each party, then the burden of proof is upon the party
averring the negative fact.21

In the case at bar, petitioner Hipe asserted the negative fact, that is, that no copy of the written ruling
of the MBOC was sent to him or his counsel. Thus, petitioner Hipe has the burden of proof to show
that he was not furnished with a copy of the written ruling of the MBOC, which he was able to
successfully prove in the instant case. Be that as it may, it then becomes incumbent upon
respondent Vicencio to prove otherwise. This is because the burden of evidence is shifted if the
party upon whom it is lodged was able to adduce preponderant evidence to prove its claim. 22

Significantly, other than Madronio’s statement in his Certification that hard or printed copies of the
ruling of the MBOC were furnished to Atty. Desales on May 19, 2007, no other evidence was
adduced by respondent Vicencio to support her claim. If indeed such written ruling exists and was
indeed furnished to petitioner Hipe or his alleged counsel, it would have been very easy for
respondent Vicencio to produce a copy of the written ruling with the signature of petitioner Hipe or
his counsel, which she failed to do in the instant case. 1avvph!1

Furthermore, the COMELEC has the discretion to construe its rules liberally and, at the same time,
suspend the rules or any of their portions in the interest of justice. 23 As aptly stated by Commissioner
Rene V. Sarmiento in his Dissenting Opinion: 24

It is well settled that election laws should be reasonably and liberally construed to achieve their
purpose – to effectuate and safeguard the will of the electorate in the choice of their representatives.
The courts frown upon any interpretation that would hinder in any way not only the free and
intelligent casting of votes in any election but also the correct ascertainment of the results thereof.

Disputes in the outcome of elections involve public interest. Technicalities and procedural barriers
should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of
the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. Laws governing such disputes must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated
by mere technicalities. Hence, it is submitted that there is a need to suspend the procedural rules
and resolve the merits of the case to promote justice and safeguard the will of the electorate of
Catubig, Northern Samar.

Accordingly, the COMELEC should have not dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner Hipe on the
ground of belated filing.

The Exclusion of the Seven Election Returns

Was Amply Supported by Evidence

Nevertheless, even if we entertain petitioner Hipe’s appeal from the decision of the MBOC on the
questioned election returns, the Court still rules in favor of respondent Vicencio.

Petitioner Hipe claims that no proof was presented nor was there any showing that the seven
election returns in question were defective.25 Such contention is not persuasive.

The COMELEC, after a judicious evaluation of the documents on record, upheld the findings of the
MBOC to exclude the subject election returns on the basis of the affidavits of the members of the
Board of Election Inspectors. What exactly these documents and evidence are upon which the
COMELEC based its resolution, and how they have been appreciated in respect of their sufficiency,
are beyond this Court’s scrutiny.26 The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not be
disturbed by courts of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence
in support of such findings should be applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as
the framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC—created and explicitly made
independent by the Constitution itself—on a level higher than statutory administrative organs. 27 The
factual finding of the COMELEC is, therefore, binding on the Court. As found by the COMELEC En
Banc:

Besides, we do not agree that the exclusion of the seven (7) election returns in question were not
supported by any iota of evidence. This is amply supported by the affidavits of the Members of the
Board of Election Inspectors; they were all made in clear and unequivocal language by public
officers who are presumed to have performed such duties in the ordinary and regular execution
thereof. A careful re-examination of the evidence on record reveals that there is sufficient justification
to uphold the MBOC ruling to exclude the subject election returns. The MBOC retains sufficient
discretion to avail itself of all available means to ascertain the results of the elections through
witnesses as well as examination of the election returns themselves. Where there is no abuse of
discretion the MBOC is presumed to have acted within its powers and its decision should be treated
with some amount of respect.28

This is especially true in the instant case considering that, as noted by the COMELEC En Banc in its
questioned Resolution, one of the witnesses petitioner Hipe previously presented later on recanted
her testimony and admitted that she had made her previous statement as to the regularity of the
conduct of the May 14, 1007 elections only out of fear due to threats upon her person. 29 As correctly
observed by the COMELEC En Banc:
We also note that even one of the witnesses presented by the appellant, Melanie Robion, Chairman
of the BEI for precinct No. 0037B, later on recanted her testimony. This spells doom to the
appellant’s cause as it even impacts on the veracity and truthfulness of the other affidavits that the
appellant submitted. We are reminded of the legal principle that a falsity in one is a falsity in all,
"Falsus in Onum, Falsus in Omnibus" and would now be more inclined to believe the assertions
made by the appellee instead of those presented by the appellant, who has now been unmasked to
have been less than truthful at one time or another. 30

Considering the foregoing discussion, there is ample evidence to support the findings of the
COMELEC that the seven election returns in question should be excluded. The contention of
petitioner Hipe that said election returns were excluded from the canvass merely on the basis of
pure procedural technicalities is, therefore, unfounded.

Respondent Vicencio Substantially Complied with the

Requirement that Objections Be Made in Writing

Petitioner Hipe contends that the written petition to exclude the election returns was filed beyond the
prescribed time or almost 24 hours after the oral petition to exclude was manifested by the counsels
of respondent Vicencio; hence, the latter’s objections were raised out of time. 31

This contention is without merit.

While the records reveal that respondent Vicencio manifested her oral objections on May 15, 2007 at
around 7:00 p.m.,32 filed the written objections on May 16, 2007 at 6:40 p.m., and submitted the
documentary evidence in support of the protest at 2:45 p.m. only on the following day, the Court
nevertheless considers the foregoing acts of Vicencio as substantial compliance with the
requirement that objections be reduced into writing.

In Marabur v. COMELEC,33 we held that while respondent failed to submit his written objections,
respondent’s submission of his formal offer of evidence, including the evidence itself, within the
prescribed period constituted substantial compliance with the requirement that objections be
reduced into writing.

Notably, the relaxation of the rules becomes all the more necessary in the instant case, considering
that respondent Vicencio has even filed his written objections within the prescribed period; and soon
thereafter, the documentary evidence in support of the written objections.

Technicalities and procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand in the way if they constitute an
obstacle to the determination of the electorate’s true will in the choice of its elective officials. 34

It should be borne in mind that the object of the canvass is to determine the result of the elections
based on the official election returns. In order that the result of the canvass would reflect the true
expression of the people’s will in the choice of their elective officials, the canvass must be based on
true, genuine, correct––nay, untampered––election returns. 35 It is in these proceedings that the
COMELEC exercises its supervisory and administrative power in the enforcement of laws relative to
the conduct of elections, by seeing to it that the canvass is based on the election returns as actually
certified by the members of the board of inspectors. 36

Taking into consideration the findings of the COMELEC En Banc that there was ample evidence to
support the exclusion of the seven election returns in question based on the grounds raised by
respondent Vicencio, this should suffice in upholding the latter’s proclamation, absent a finding of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC En Banc, in order not to frustrate the
electorate’s will.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 30, 2008 COMELEC En Banc
Resolution and the July 11, 2007 COMELEC Second Division Resolution are hereby SET
ASIDE insofar as they dismissed petitioner Hipe’s appeal. The January 30, 2008 COMELEC En
Banc Resolution is, however, AFFIRMED insofar as it declared the exclusion of the seven election
returns of Precinct Nos. 0037B, 0052A, 0053A, 0058A, 0080A, 0081A and 0082A to be valid.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 150640             March 22, 2007

BARANGAY SINDALAN, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, rep. by BARANGAY CAPTAIN

ISMAEL GUTIERREZ, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE MAGTOTO III, and PATRICIA SINDAYAN, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Expropriation, if misused or abused, would trench on the property rights of individuals without due
process of law.

The Case

For review before the Court in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 are the May 30, 2001
Decision1 and October 26, 2001 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), reversing and setting
aside the August 2, 1990 Order3 of the San Fernando, Pampanga Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 43. The CA Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the May 30, 2001
Decision and in effect, the appellate court dismissed petitioner’s Complaint for eminent domain.

The Facts

On April 8, 1983, pursuant to a resolution passed by the barangay council, petitioner Barangay
Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga, represented by Barangay Captain Ismael Gutierrez, filed a
Complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses Jose Magtoto III and Patricia Sindayan,
the registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 117674-R. The
Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 6756 and raffled to the San Fernando, Pampanga RTC,
Branch 43. Petitioner sought to convert a portion of respondents’ land into Barangay Sindalan’s
feeder road. The alleged public purposes sought to be served by the expropriation were stated in
Barangay Resolution No. 6, as follows:

WHEREAS, said parcels of land shall be used, when acquired, as a barangay feeder road for the
agricultural and other products of the residents, and just as inlet for their basic needs;

WHEREAS, presently, residents have to take a long circuitous dirt road before they can reach the
concrete provincial road, entailing so much time, effort and money, not to mention possible damage
and/or spilage [sic] on the products consigned to or coming from, the market outside the barangay;
and

WHEREAS, said lots, used as outlet or inlet road, shall contribute greatly to the general welfare of
the people residing therein social, cultural and health among other things, beside economic. 4
Petitioner claimed that respondents’ property was the most practical and nearest way to the
municipal road. Pending the resolution of the case at the trial court, petitioner deposited an amount
equivalent to the fair market value of the property. 5

On the other hand, respondents stated that they owned the 27,000- square meter property, a portion
of which is the subject of this case. In their Memorandum,6 they alleged that their lot is adjacent to
Davsan II Subdivision privately owned by Dr. Felix David and his wife. Prior to the filing of the
expropriation case, said subdivision was linked to MacArthur Highway through a pathway across the
land of a certain Torres family. Long before the passage of the barangay resolution, the wives of the
subdivision owner and the barangay captain, who were known to be agents of the subdivision, had
proposed buying a right-of-way for the subdivision across a portion of respondents’ property. These
prospective buyers, however, never returned after learning of the price which the respondents
ascribed to their property.

Respondents alleged that the expropriation of their property was for private use, that is, for the
benefit of the homeowners of Davsan II Subdivision. They contended that petitioner deliberately
omitted the name of Davsan II Subdivision and, instead, stated that the expropriation was for the
benefit of the residents of Sitio Paraiso in order to conceal the fact that the access road being
proposed to be built across the respondents’ land was to serve a privately owned subdivision and
those who would purchase the lots of said subdivision. They also pointed out that under Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 957, it is the subdivision owner who is obliged to provide a feeder road to the
subdivision residents.7

After trial, the court a quo ruled, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises duly considered, the herein plaintiff is hereby
declared as having a lawful right to take the property hereinabove described and sought to be
condemned for the public purpose or use as aforestated, upon payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the Complaint in this [sic] expropriation proceedings.

Upon the entry of this Order of Condemnation, let three (3) competent and disinterested persons be
appointed as Commissioners to ascertain and report to the Court the just compensation for the
property condemned.8

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Upon respondents’ appeal, the CA held:

We are convinced that it is the duty of the subdivision owner to provide the right of way needed by
residents of Davsan II Subdivision as provided for in Section 29 of P.D. 957. Records show that
Purok Paraiso, which is supposed to benefit from this [sic] expropriation proceedings is in reality
Davsan II Subdivision as per the testimony of Ruben Palo, plaintiff’s own witness (TSN, p. 12,
December 115, 1986) [sic]. Appellants correctly stated that:

"The act of Bo. Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga, in effect relieved the owners of Davsan II
Subdivision of spending their own private funds for acquiring a right of way and constructing the
required access road to the subdivision. It spent public funds for such private purpose and deprived
herein defendants-appellants of their property for an ostensible public purpose x x x."

xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the Complaint for Eminent Domain is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.9

The Issues

Petitioner imputes errors to the CA for (1) allegedly violating its power of eminent domain, (2) finding
that the expropriation of the property is not for public use but for a privately owned subdivision, (3)
finding that there was no payment of just compensation, and (4) failing to accord respect to the
findings of the trial court. Stated briefly, the main issue in this case is whether the proposed exercise
of the power of eminent domain would be for a public purpose. 1awphi1.nét

The Court’s Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

In general, eminent domain is defined as "the power of the nation or a sovereign state to take, or to
authorize the taking of, private property for a public use without the owner’s consent, conditioned
upon payment of just compensation." 10 It is acknowledged as "an inherent political right, founded on
a common necessity and interest of appropriating the property of individual members of the
community to the great necessities of the whole community." 11 1ªvvphi1.nét

The exercise of the power of eminent domain is constrained by two constitutional provisions: (1) that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation under Article III (Bill of
Rights), Section 9 and (2) that no person shall be deprived of his/her life, liberty, or property without
due process of law under Art. III, Sec. 1.

However, there is no precise meaning of "public use" and the term is susceptible of myriad
meanings depending on diverse situations. The limited meaning attached to "public use" is "use by
the public" or "public employment," that "a duty must devolve on the person or corporation holding
property appropriated by right of eminent domain to furnish the public with the use intended, and that
there must be a right on the part of the public, or some portion of it, or some public or quasi-public
agency on behalf of the public, to use the property after it is condemned." 12 The more generally
accepted view sees "public use" as "public advantage, convenience, or benefit, and that anything
which tends to enlarge the resources, increase the industrial energies, and promote the productive
power of any considerable number of the inhabitants of a section of the state, or which leads to the
growth of towns and the creation of new resources for the employment of capital and labor, [which]
contributes to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community." 13 In this jurisdiction,
"public use" is defined as "whatever is beneficially employed for the community." 14

It is settled that the public nature of the prospective exercise of expropriation cannot depend on the
"numerical count of those to be served or the smallness or largeness of the community to be
benefited."15 The number of people is not determinative of whether or not it constitutes public use,
provided the use is exercisable in common and is not limited to particular individuals. 16 Thus, the first
essential requirement for a valid exercise of eminent domain is for the expropriator to prove that the
expropriation is for a public use. In Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, this Court explicated that
expropriation ends with an order of condemnation declaring "that the plaintiff has a lawful right to
take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint,
upon the payment of just compensation." 17
Another vital requisite for a valid condemnation is the payment of just compensation to the property
owner. In the recent case of APO Fruits Corporation v. The Honorable Court of Appeals,18 just
compensation has been defined as "the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner
by the expropriator," and that the gauge for computation is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss.
In order for the payment to be "just," it must be real, substantial, full, and ample. Not only must the
payment be fair and correctly determined, but also, the Court in Estate of Salud Jimenez v.
Philippine Export Processing Zone stressed that the payment should be made within a "reasonable
time" from the taking of the property.19 It succinctly explained that without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer
the consequences of being immediately deprived of the land while being made to wait for a decade
or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with the loss. Thus, once just
compensation is finally determined, the expropriator must immediately pay the amount to the lot
owner. In Reyes v. National Housing Authority, it was ruled that 12% interest per annum shall be
imposed on the final compensation until paid.20 Thus, any further delay in the payment will result in
the imposition of 12% interest per annum. However, in the recent case of Republic v. Lim, the Court
enunciated the rule that "where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years
from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have
the right to recover possession of their property." 21

Since the individual stands to lose the property by compulsion of the law, the expropriation authority
should not further prejudice the owner’s rights by delaying payment of just compensation. To obviate
any possibility of delay in the payment, the expropriator should already make available, at the time of
the filing of the expropriation complaint, the amount equal to the BIR zonal valuation or the fair
market value of the property per tax declaration whichever is higher.

The delayed payment of just compensation in numerous cases results from lack of funds or the time
spent in the determination of the legality of the expropriation and/or the fair valuation of the property,
and could result in dismay, disappointment, bitterness, and even rancor on the part of the lot owners.
It is not uncommon for the expropriator to take possession of the condemned property upon deposit
of a small amount equal to the assessed value of the land per tax declaration and then challenge the
valuation fixed by the trial court resulting in an "expropriate now, pay later" situation. In the event the
expropriating agency questions the reasonability of the compensation fixed by the trial court before
the appellate court, then the latter may, upon motion, use its sound discretion to order the payment
to the lot owner of the amount equal to the valuation of the property, as proposed by the condemnor
during the proceedings before the commissioners under Sec. 6, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court,
subject to the final valuation of the land. This way, the damage and prejudice to the property owner
would be considerably pared down.

On due process, it is likewise basic under the Constitution that the property owner must be afforded
a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the issues of public use and just compensation and to
present objections to and claims on them.22 It is settled that taking of property for a private use or
without just compensation is a deprivation of property without due process of law. 23 Moreover, it has
to be emphasized that taking of private property without filing any complaint before a court of law
under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or existing laws is patently felonious, confiscatory, and
unconstitutional. Judicial notice can be taken of some instances wherein some government agencies
or corporations peremptorily took possession of private properties and usurped the owner’s real
rights for their immediate use without first instituting the required court action. Running roughshod
over the property rights of individuals is a clear and gross breach of the constitutional guarantee of
due process, which should not be countenanced in a society where the rule of law holds sway.

In the case at bar, petitioner harps on eminent domain as an inherent power of sovereignty similar to
police power and taxation. As a basic political unit, its Sangguniang Barangay is clothed with the
authority to provide barangay roads and other facilities for public use and welfare. Petitioner relied
on the following cases which held a liberal view of the term "public use" in recognition of the evolving
concept of the power of eminent domain: Seña v. Manila Railroad Co.; Philippine Columbian
Association v. Panis; Sumulong v. Guerrero; Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals;
and Manosca v. Court of Appeals.24

Petitioner’s delegated power to expropriate is not at issue. The legal question in this petition,
however, is whether the taking of the land was for a public purpose or use. In the exercise of the
power of eminent domain, it is basic that the taking of private property must be for a public purpose.
A corollary issue is whether private property can be taken by law from one person and given to
another in the guise of public purpose.

In this regard, the petition must fail.

Petitioner alleges that there are at least 80 houses in the place and about 400 persons will be
benefited with the use of a barangay road. The trial court believed that the expropriation "will not
benefit only the residents of the subdivision, but also the residents of Sitio or Purok Paraiso and the
residents of the entire Barangay of Sindalan x x x."25 The trial court held that the subdivision is
covered by Sitio or Purok Paraiso which is a part or parcel of Barangay Sindalan. However, this
finding was not supported by evidence. On the contrary, it is Sitio Paraiso which is within Davsan II
Subdivision based on the testimony of petitioner’s own witness, Ruben Palo, as follows:

Atty. Mangiliman: Mr. Palo, you said that you have been residing at Sitio Paraiso since 1973, is this
Sitio Paraiso within the Davson [sic] Subdivision?

Witness: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Atty. Mangiliman: And before you purchased that or at the time you purchased it in 1972, I am
referring to the lot where you are now residing, the Davson [sic] Subdivision did not provide for a
road linking from the subdivision to the barrio road, am I correct?

Witness: None, sir.

Atty. Mangiliman: And despite [sic] of that you purchased a lot inside Davson [sic] Subdivision?

Witness: Yes, sir.

Atty. Mangiliman: Did you not demand from the developer of Davson [sic] Subdivision that he should
provide a road linking from the subdivision to the barrio road of Sindalan?

Witness: No, sir, because I know they will provide for the road.

Atty. Mangiliman: And when you said that they will provide for that road, you mean to tell us that it is
the developer of Davson [sic] Subdivision who will provide a road linking from the subdivision to the
barrio road of Sindalan?

Witness: Yes, sir.

Atty. Mangiliman: Now, Mr. Witness, you will agree with me that the proposed road which will
connect from Davson [sic] Subdivision to the barrio road of Sindalan would benefit mainly the lot
buyers and home owners of Davson [sic] Subdivision?

Witness: Yes, sir.

Atty. Mangiliman: And you also agree with me that there is no portion of Davson [sic] Subdivision
which is devoted to the production of agricultural products?

Witness: None, sir.

Atty. Mangiliman: When the road which is the subject of this case and sought to be expropriated has
not yet been opened and before a Writ of Possession was issued by the Court to place the plaintiff in
this case in possession, the residents of Davson [sic] Subdivision have other way in going to the
barrio road?

Witness: None, sir.

Atty. Mangiliman: In that case Mr. Witness, how do you negotiate or go out of the subdivision in
going to the barrio?

Witness: We passed to the lot own [sic] by Mr. Torres which is near the subdivision in going to the
barrio road, sir.

Atty. Mangiliman: Did you not complain to the owner/developer of the subdivision that he should
provide for a road linking to [sic] his subdivision to the barrio road because there is no available exit
from the said subdivision to the barrio road?

Witness: We have been telling that and he was promising that there will be a road, sir. 26

Firstly, based on the foregoing transcript, the intended feeder road sought to serve the residents of
the subdivision only. It has not been shown that the other residents of Barangay Sindalan, San
Fernando, Pampanga will be benefited by the contemplated road to be constructed on the lot of
respondents spouses Jose Magtoto III and Patricia Sindayan. While the number of people who use
or can use the property is not determinative of whether or not it constitutes public use or purpose,
the factual milieu of the case reveals that the intended use of respondents’ lot is confined solely to
the Davsan II Subdivision residents and is not exercisable in common.27 Worse, the expropriation will
actually benefit the subdivision’s owner who will be able to circumvent his commitment to provide
road access to the subdivision in conjunction with his development permit and license to sell from
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, and also be relieved of spending his own funds for a
right-of-way. In this factual setting, the Davsan II Subdivision homeowners are able to go to the
barrio road by passing through the lot of a certain Torres family. Thus, the inescapable conclusion is
that the expropriation of respondents’ lot is for the actual benefit of the Davsan II Subdivision owner,
with incidental benefit to the subdivision homeowners.

The intended expropriation of private property for the benefit of a private individual is clearly
proscribed by the Constitution, declaring that it should be for public use or purpose. In Charles River
Bridge v. Warren, the limitation on expropriation was underscored, hence:

Although the sovereign power in free government may appropriate all property, public as well as
private, for public purposes, making compensation therefore; yet it has never been understood, at
least never in our republic, that the sovereign power can take the private property of A and give it to
B by the right of eminent domain; or that it can take it at all, except for public purposes; or that it can
take it for public purposes, without the duty and responsibility of ordering compensation for the
sacrifice of the private property of one, for the good of the whole (11 Pet. at 642) (emphasis
supplied).28

US case law also points out that a member of the public cannot acquire a certain private easement
by means of expropriation for being unconstitutional, because "even if every member of the public
should acquire the easement, it would remain a bundle of private easements." 29

Secondly, a compelling reason for the rejection of the expropriation is expressed in Section 29, PD
957, which provides:

Sec. 29. Right of Way to Public Road.—The owner or developer of a subdivision without access to
any existing public road or street must secure a right of way to a public road or street and such right
of way must be developed and maintained according to the requirement of the government
authorities concerned.

Considering that the residents who need a feeder road are all subdivision lot owners, it is the
obligation of the Davsan II Subdivision owner to acquire a right-of-way for them. However, the failure
of the subdivision owner to provide an access road does not shift the burden to petitioner. To deprive
respondents of their property instead of compelling the subdivision owner to comply with his
obligation under the law is an abuse of the power of eminent domain and is patently illegal. Without
doubt, expropriation cannot be justified on the basis of an unlawful purpose.

Thirdly, public funds can be used only for a public purpose. In this proposed condemnation,
government funds would be employed for the benefit of a private individual without any legal
mooring. In criminal law, this would constitute malversation.

Lastly, the facts tend to show that the petitioner’s proper remedy is to require the Davsan II
Subdivision owner to file a complaint for establishment of the easement of right-of-way under Articles
649 to 656 of the Civil Code. Respondents must be granted the opportunity to show that their lot is
not a servient estate. Plainly, petitioner’s resort to expropriation is an improper cause of action.

One last word: the power of eminent domain can only be exercised for public use and with just
compensation. Taking an individual’s private property is a deprivation which can only be justified by
a higher good—which is public use—and can only be counterbalanced by just compensation.
Without these safeguards, the taking of property would not only be unlawful, immoral, and null and
void, but would also constitute a gross and condemnable transgression of an individual’s basic right
to property as well.

For this reason, courts should be more vigilant in protecting the rights of the property owner and
must perform a more thorough and diligent scrutiny of the alleged public purpose behind the
expropriation. Extreme caution is called for in resolving complaints for condemnation, such that
when a serious doubt arises regarding the supposed public use of property, the doubt should be
resolved in favor of the property owner and against the State.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the May 30, 2001 Decision and the October 26, 2001 Resolution of the
CA, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 164785               April 29, 2009

ELISEO F. SORIANO, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, in her capacity as Chairperson of the Movie and Television
Review and Classification Board, MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION
BOARD, JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M. DELA CRUZ, MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L.
LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA, JR., MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL, and
ROLDAN A. GAVINO, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 165636               April 29, 2009

ELISEO F. SORIANO Petitioner,
vs.
MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, ZOSIMO G. ALEGRE,
JACKIE AQUINO-GAVINO, NOEL R. DEL PRADO, EMMANUEL BORLAZA, JOSE E. ROMERO
IV, and FLORIMONDO C. ROUS, in their capacity as members of the Hearing and Adjudication
Committee of the MTRCB, JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M. DELA CRUZ, MANUEL M.
HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA, JR., MICHAEL M.
SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A. GAVINO, in their capacity as complainants before the
MTRCB Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In these two petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano seeks
to nullify and set aside an order and a decision of the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB) in connection with certain utterances he made in his television show,
Ang Dating Daan.

Facts of the Case

On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan,
aired on UNTV 37, made the following remarks:

Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;

Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang
gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol
pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang
kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.1 x x x
Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged
by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo
(INC),2 against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval,
who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the
TV program Ang Tamang Daan.3 Forthwith, the MTRCB sent petitioner a notice of the hearing on
August 16, 2004 in relation to the alleged use of some cuss words in the August 10, 2004 episode of
Ang Dating Daan.4

After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, by Order of August 16,
2004, preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in accordance
with Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3,
Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII
of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure. 5 The same order also set the case for preliminary investigation.

The following day, petitioner sought reconsideration of the preventive suspension order, praying that
Chairperson Consoliza P. Laguardia and two other members of the adjudication board recuse
themselves from hearing the case.6 Two days after, however, petitioner sought to withdraw 7 his
motion for reconsideration, followed by the filing with this Court of a petition for certiorari and
prohibition,8 docketed as G.R. No. 164785, to nullify the preventive suspension order thus issued.

On September 27, 2004, in Adm. Case No. 01-04, the MTRCB issued a decision, disposing as
follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, a Decision is hereby rendered, finding respondent
Soriano liable for his utterances and thereby imposing on him a penalty of three (3) months
suspension from his program, "Ang Dating Daan".

Co-respondents Joselito Mallari, Luzviminda Cruz and UNTV Channel 37 and its owner, PBC, are
hereby exonerated for lack of evidence.

SO ORDERED.9

Petitioner then filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief, docketed
as G.R. No. 165636.

In a Resolution dated April 4, 2005, the Court consolidated G.R. No. 164785 with G.R. No. 165636.

In G.R. No. 164785, petitioner raises the following issues:

THE ORDER OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION PROMULGATED BY RESPONDENT [MTRCB]

DATED 16 AUGUST 2004 AGAINST THE TELEVISION PROGRAM ANG DATING DAAN x x x
IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION

(A) BY REASON THAT THE [IRR] IS INVALID INSOFAR AS IT PROVIDES FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ORDERS;

(B) BY REASON OF LACK OF DUE HEARING IN THE CASE AT BENCH;

(C) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW;

 (D) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION; AND

(E) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION.10

In G.R. No. 165636, petitioner relies on the following grounds:

SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986, IS PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ENACTED WITHOUT

OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION x x x CONSIDERING THAT:

SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986, AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER, UNDULY INFRINGES ON THE

CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION, SPEECH, AND EXPRESSION
AS IT PARTAKES OF THE NATURE OF A SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT CURTAILING THE
SAME; CONSEQUENTLY, THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS, RULES OF
PROCEDURE, AND OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE MTRCB PURSUANT THERETO, I.E. DECISION
DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND ORDER DATED 19 OCTOBER 2004, ARE LIKEWISE
CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH;

II

SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986, AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER, UNDULY INFRINGES ON THE

CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION
UNDER THE LAW; CONSEQUENTLY, THE [IRR], RULES OF PROCEDURE, AND OFFICIAL
ACTS OF THE MTRCB PURSUANT THERETO, I.E., DECISION DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004
AND ORDER DATED 19 OCTOBER 2004, ARE LIKEWISE CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS
APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH; AND

III

[PD] 1986 IS NOT COMPLETE IN ITSELF AND DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR A SUFFICIENT
STANDARD FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION THEREBY RESULTING IN AN UNDUE DELEGATION
OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY REASON THAT IT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR THE PENALTIES
FOR VIOLATIONS OF ITS PROVISIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, THE [IRR], RULES OF
PROCEDURE, AND OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE MTRCB PURSUANT THERETO, I.E. DECISION
DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND ORDER DATED 19 OCTOBER 2004, ARE LIKEWISE
CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH11

G.R. No. 164785

We shall first dispose of the issues in G.R. No. 164785, regarding the assailed order of preventive
suspension, although its implementability had already been overtaken and veritably been rendered
moot by the equally assailed September 27, 2004 decision.

It is petitioner’s threshold posture that the preventive suspension imposed against him and the
relevant IRR provision authorizing it are invalid inasmuch as PD 1986 does not expressly authorize
the MTRCB to issue preventive suspension.

Petitioner’s contention is untenable.

Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative, investigatory,
regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as may be conferred by the
Constitution or by statute.12 They have in fine only such powers or authority as are granted or
delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law.13 And in determining whether an agency has certain
powers, the inquiry should be from the law itself. But once ascertained as existing, the authority
given should be liberally construed. 14

A perusal of the MTRCB’s basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency of
the authority, albeit impliedly, to issue the challenged order of preventive suspension. And this
authority stems naturally from, and is necessary for the exercise of, its power of regulation and
supervision.

Sec. 3 of PD 1986 pertinently provides the following:

Section 3. Powers and Functions.—The BOARD shall have the following functions, powers and
duties:

xxxx

c) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions from and/or prohibit the x x x production,
x x x exhibition and/or television broadcast of the motion pictures, television programs and publicity
materials subject of the preceding paragraph, which, in the judgment of the board applying
contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, are objectionable for being immoral, indecent,
contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its
people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of wrong or crime
such as but not limited to:

xxxx

vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good name and reputation of any person, whether
living or dead;

xxxx

(d) To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the x x x production, copying,
distribution, sale, lease, exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television
programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are
determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x
produced, copied, reproduced, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited and/or broadcast by television;

xxxx

k) To exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of the
purposes and objectives of this Act x x x. (Emphasis added.)

The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the MTRCB’s authority and
functions expressly set forth in PD 1986, more particularly under its Sec. 3(d), as quoted above,
which empowers the MTRCB to "supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the x x x
exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and publicity
materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are determined by the
BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x exhibited and/or
broadcast by television."

Surely, the power to issue preventive suspension forms part of the MTRCB’s express regulatory and
supervisory statutory mandate and its investigatory and disciplinary authority subsumed in or implied
from such mandate. Any other construal would render its power to regulate, supervise, or discipline
illusory.

Preventive suspension, it ought to be noted, is not a penalty by itself, being merely a preliminary
step in an administrative investigation. 15 And the power to discipline and impose penalties, if granted,
carries with it the power to investigate administrative complaints and, during such investigation, to
preventively suspend the person subject of the complaint. 16

To reiterate, preventive suspension authority of the MTRCB springs from its powers conferred under
PD 1986. The MTRCB did not, as petitioner insinuates, empower itself to impose preventive
suspension through the medium of the IRR of PD 1986. It is true that the matter of imposing
preventive suspension is embodied only in the IRR of PD 1986. Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the IRR
provides:

Sec. 3. PREVENTION SUSPENSION ORDER.––Any time during the pendency of the case, and in
order to prevent or stop further violations or for the interest and welfare of the public, the Chairman
of the Board may issue a Preventive Suspension Order mandating the preventive x x x suspension
of the permit/permits involved, and/or closure of the x x x television network, cable TV station x x x
provided that the temporary/preventive order thus issued shall have a life of not more than twenty
(20) days from the date of issuance.

But the mere absence of a provision on preventive suspension in PD 1986, without more, would not
work to deprive the MTRCB a basic disciplinary tool, such as preventive suspension. Recall that the
MTRCB is expressly empowered by statute to regulate and supervise television programs to obviate
the exhibition or broadcast of, among others, indecent or immoral materials and to impose sanctions
for violations and, corollarily, to prevent further violations as it investigates. Contrary to petitioner’s
assertion, the aforequoted Sec. 3 of the IRR neither amended PD 1986 nor extended the effect of
the law. Neither did the MTRCB, by imposing the assailed preventive suspension, outrun its
authority under the law. Far from it. The preventive suspension was actually done in furtherance of
the law, imposed pursuant, to repeat, to the MTRCB’s duty of regulating or supervising television
programs, pending a determination of whether or not there has actually been a violation. In the final
analysis, Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 IRR merely formalized a power which PD 1986 bestowed,
albeit impliedly, on MTRCB.

Sec. 3(c) and (d) of PD 1986 finds application to the present case, sufficient to authorize the
MTRCB’s assailed action. Petitioner’s restrictive reading of PD 1986, limiting the MTRCB to
functions within the literal confines of the law, would give the agency little leeway to operate, stifling
and rendering it inutile, when Sec. 3(k) of PD 1986 clearly intends to grant the MTRCB a wide room
for flexibility in its operation. Sec. 3(k), we reiterate, provides, "To exercise such powers and
functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of the purposes and objectives of this
Act x x x." Indeed, the power to impose preventive suspension is one of the implied powers of
MTRCB. As distinguished from express powers, implied powers are those that can be inferred or are
implicit in the wordings or conferred by necessary or fair implication of the enabling act. 17 As we held
in Angara v. Electoral Commission, when a general grant of power is conferred or a duty enjoined,
every particular power necessary for the exercise of one or the performance of the other is also
conferred by necessary implication.18 Clearly, the power to impose preventive suspension pending
investigation is one of the implied or inherent powers of MTRCB.
We cannot agree with petitioner’s assertion that the aforequoted IRR provision on preventive
suspension is applicable only to motion pictures and publicity materials. The scope of the MTRCB’s
authority extends beyond motion pictures. What the acronym MTRCB stands for would suggest as
much. And while the law makes specific reference to the closure of a television network, the
suspension of a television program is a far less punitive measure that can be undertaken, with the
purpose of stopping further violations of PD 1986. Again, the MTRCB would regretfully be rendered
ineffective should it be subject to the restrictions petitioner envisages.

Just as untenable is petitioner’s argument on the nullity of the preventive suspension order on the
ground of lack of hearing. As it were, the MTRCB handed out the assailed order after petitioner, in
response to a written notice, appeared before that Board for a hearing on private respondents’
complaint. No less than petitioner admitted that the order was issued after the adjournment of the
hearing,19 proving that he had already appeared before the MTRCB. Under Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of
the IRR of PD 1986, preventive suspension shall issue "[a]ny time during the pendency of the case."
In this particular case, it was done after MTRCB duly apprised petitioner of his having possibly
violated PD 198620 and of administrative complaints that had been filed against him for such
violation.21

At any event, that preventive suspension can validly be meted out even without a hearing. 22

Petitioner next faults the MTRCB for denying him his right to the equal protection of the law, arguing
that, owing to the preventive suspension order, he was unable to answer the criticisms coming from
the INC ministers.

Petitioner’s position does not persuade. The equal protection clause demands that "all persons
subject to legislation should be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both in the
privileges conferred and liabilities imposed." 23 It guards against undue favor and individual privilege
as well as hostile discrimination. 24 Surely, petitioner cannot, under the premises, place himself in the
same shoes as the INC ministers, who, for one, are not facing administrative complaints before the
MTRCB. For another, he offers no proof that the said ministers, in their TV programs, use language
similar to that which he used in his own, necessitating the MTRCB’s disciplinary action. If the
immediate result of the preventive suspension order is that petitioner remains temporarily gagged
and is unable to answer his critics, this does not become a deprivation of the equal protection
guarantee. The Court need not belabor the fact that the circumstances of petitioner, as host of Ang
Dating Daan, on one hand, and the INC ministers, as hosts of Ang Tamang Daan, on the other, are,
within the purview of this case, simply too different to even consider whether or not there is a prima
facie indication of oppressive inequality.

Petitioner next injects the notion of religious freedom, submitting that what he uttered was religious
speech, adding that words like "putang babae" were said in exercise of his religious freedom.

The argument has no merit.

The Court is at a loss to understand how petitioner’s utterances in question can come within the pale
of Sec. 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution on religious freedom. The section reads as follows:

No law shall be made respecting the establishment of a religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination
or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.
There is nothing in petitioner’s statements subject of the complaints expressing any particular
religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with his
statements in a televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them the character
of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to
the status of religious speech. Even petitioner’s attempts to place his words in context show that he
was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction. His claim,
assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his statements respecting amounts Ang
Dating Daan owed to a TV station does not convert the foul language used in retaliation as religious
speech. We cannot accept that petitioner made his statements in defense of his reputation and
religion, as they constitute no intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a
rival religious group. They simply illustrate that petitioner had descended to the level of name-calling
and foul-language discourse. Petitioner could have chosen to contradict and disprove his detractors,
but opted for the low road.

Petitioner, as a final point in G.R. No. 164785, would have the Court nullify the 20-day preventive
suspension order, being, as insisted, an unconstitutional abridgement of the freedom of speech and
expression and an impermissible prior restraint. The main issue tendered respecting the adverted
violation and the arguments holding such issue dovetails with those challenging the three-month
suspension imposed under the assailed September 27, 2004 MTRCB decision subject of review
under G.R. No. 165636. Both overlapping issues and arguments shall be jointly addressed.

G.R. No. 165636

Petitioner urges the striking down of the decision suspending him from hosting Ang Dating Daan for
three months on the main ground that the decision violates, apart from his religious freedom, his
freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Sec. 4, Art. III of the Constitution, which reads:

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievance.

He would also have the Court declare PD 1986, its Sec. 3(c) in particular, unconstitutional for
reasons articulated in this petition.

We are not persuaded as shall be explained shortly. But first, we restate certain general concepts
and principles underlying the freedom of speech and expression.

It is settled that expressions by means of newspapers, radio, television, and motion pictures come
within the broad protection of the free speech and expression clause. 25 Each method though,
because of its dissimilar presence in the lives of people and accessibility to children, tends to
present its own problems in the area of free speech protection, with broadcast media, of all forms of
communication, enjoying a lesser degree of protection. 26 Just as settled is the rule that restrictions,
be it in the form of prior restraint, e.g., judicial injunction against publication or threat of cancellation
of license/franchise, or subsequent liability, whether in libel and damage suits, prosecution for
sedition, or contempt proceedings, are anathema to the freedom of expression. Prior restraint means
official government restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual
publication or dissemination.27 The freedom of expression, as with the other freedoms encased in the
Bill of Rights, is, however, not absolute. It may be regulated to some extent to serve important public
interests, some forms of speech not being protected. As has been held, the limits of the freedom of
expression are reached when the expression touches upon matters of essentially private
concern.28 In the oft-quoted expression of Justice Holmes, the constitutional guarantee "obviously
was not intended to give immunity for every possible use of language." 29 From Lucas v. Royo comes
this line: "[T]he freedom to express one’s sentiments and belief does not grant one the license to
vilify in public the honor and integrity of another. Any sentiments must be expressed within the
proper forum and with proper regard for the rights of others." 30

Indeed, as noted in Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire,31 "there are certain well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech that are harmful, the prevention and punishment of which has
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problems." In net effect, some forms of speech are
not protected by the Constitution, meaning that restrictions on unprotected speech may be decreed
without running afoul of the freedom of speech clause.32 A speech would fall under the unprotected
type if the utterances involved are "no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step of truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality." 33 Being of little or no value, there is, in dealing with or
regulating them, no imperative call for the application of the clear and present danger rule or the
balancing-of-interest test, they being essentially modes of weighing competing values, 34 or, with like
effect, determining which of the clashing interests should be advanced.

Petitioner asserts that his utterance in question is a protected form of speech.

The Court rules otherwise. It has been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected speech or low-
value expression refers to libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or misleading
advertisement, insulting or "fighting words", i.e., those which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression endangering national security.

The Court finds that petitioner’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the
average child. Hence, it is, in that context, unprotected speech. In Fernando v. Court of Appeals, the
Court expressed difficulty in formulating a definition of obscenity that would apply to all cases, but
nonetheless stated the ensuing observations on the matter:

There is no perfect definition of "obscenity" but the latest word is that of Miller v. California which
established basic guidelines, to wit: (a) whether to the average person, applying contemporary
standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. But, it would be a serious misreading of Miller to conclude that the trier of
facts has the unbridled discretion in determining what is "patently offensive." x x x What remains
clear is that obscenity is an issue proper for judicial determination and should be treated on a case
to case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion. 35

Following the contextual lessons of the cited case of Miller v. California, 36 a patently offensive
utterance would come within the pale of the term obscenity should it appeal to the prurient interest of
an average listener applying contemporary standards.

A cursory examination of the utterances complained of and the circumstances of the case reveal that
to an average adult, the utterances "Gago ka talaga x x x, masahol ka pa sa putang babae x x x.
Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang
itaas, o di ba!" may not constitute obscene but merely indecent utterances. They can be viewed as
figures of speech or merely a play on words. In the context they were used, they may not appeal to
the prurient interests of an adult. The problem with the challenged statements is that they were
uttered in a TV program that is rated "G" or for general viewership, and in a time slot that would likely
reach even the eyes and ears of children.

While adults may have understood that the terms thus used were not to be taken literally, children
could hardly be expected to have the same discernment. Without parental guidance, the unbridled
use of such language as that of petitioner in a television broadcast could corrupt impressionable
young minds. The term "putang babae" means "a female prostitute," a term wholly inappropriate for
children, who could look it up in a dictionary and just get the literal meaning, missing the context
within which it was used. Petitioner further used the terms, "ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba,"
making reference to the female sexual organ and how a female prostitute uses it in her trade, then
stating that Sandoval was worse than that by using his mouth in a similar manner. Children could be
motivated by curiosity and ask the meaning of what petitioner said, also without placing the phrase in
context. They may be inquisitive as to why Sandoval is different from a female prostitute and the
reasons for the dissimilarity. And upon learning the meanings of the words used, young minds,
without the guidance of an adult, may, from their end, view this kind of indecent speech as obscene,
if they take these words literally and use them in their own speech or form their own ideas on the
matter. In this particular case, where children had the opportunity to hear petitioner’s words, when
speaking of the average person in the test for obscenity, we are speaking of the average child, not
the average adult. The average child may not have the adult’s grasp of figures of speech, and may
lack the understanding that language may be colorful, and words may convey more than the literal
meaning. Undeniably the subject speech is very suggestive of a female sexual organ and its function
as such. In this sense, we find petitioner’s utterances obscene and not entitled to protection under
the umbrella of freedom of speech.

Even if we concede that petitioner’s remarks are not obscene but merely indecent speech, still the
Court rules that petitioner cannot avail himself of the constitutional protection of free speech. Said
statements were made in a medium easily accessible to children. With respect to the young minds,
said utterances are to be treated as unprotected speech.

No doubt what petitioner said constitutes indecent or offensive utterances. But while a jurisprudential
pattern involving certain offensive utterances conveyed in different mediums has emerged, this case
is veritably one of first impression, it being the first time that indecent speech communicated via
television and the applicable norm for its regulation are, in this jurisdiction, made the focal
point. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) v. Pacifica Foundation,37 a 1978 American
landmark case cited in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation v. Dans, Jr.38 and Chavez v. Gonzales,39 is
a rich source of persuasive lessons. Foremost of these relates to indecent speech without prurient
appeal component coming under the category of protected speech depending on the context within
which it was made, irresistibly suggesting that, within a particular context, such indecent speech may
validly be categorized as unprotected, ergo, susceptible to restriction.

In FCC, seven of what were considered "filthy" words40 earlier recorded in a monologue by a satiric
humorist later aired in the afternoon over a radio station owned by Pacifica Foundation. Upon the
complaint of a man who heard the pre-recorded monologue while driving with his son, FCC declared
the language used as "patently offensive" and "indecent" under a prohibiting law, though not
necessarily obscene. FCC added, however, that its declaratory order was issued in a "special factual
context," referring, in gist, to an afternoon radio broadcast when children were undoubtedly in the
audience. Acting on the question of whether the FCC could regulate the subject utterance, the US
Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative, owing to two special features of the broadcast medium, to
wit: (1) radio is a pervasive medium and (2) broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. The US
Court, however, hastened to add that the monologue would be protected speech in other contexts,
albeit it did not expound and identify a compelling state interest in putting FCC’s content-based
regulatory action under scrutiny.

The Court in Chavez41 elucidated on the distinction between regulation or restriction of protected

speech that is content-based and that which is content-neutral. A content-based restraint is aimed at
the contents or idea of the expression, whereas a content-neutral restraint intends to regulate the
time, place, and manner of the expression under well-defined standards tailored to serve a
compelling state interest, without restraint on the message of the expression. Courts subject content-
based restraint to strict scrutiny.

With the view we take of the case, the suspension MTRCB imposed under the premises was, in one
perspective, permissible restriction. We make this disposition against the backdrop of the following
interplaying factors: First, the indecent speech was made via television, a pervasive medium that, to
borrow from Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak,42 easily "reaches every home where there is a set [and
where] [c]hildren will likely be among the avid viewers of the programs therein shown"; second, the
broadcast was aired at the time of the day when there was a reasonable risk that children might be
in the audience; and third, petitioner uttered his speech on a "G" or "for general patronage" rated
program. Under Sec. 2(A) of Chapter IV of the IRR of the MTRCB, a show for general patronage is
"[s]uitable for all ages," meaning that the "material for television x x x in the judgment of the BOARD,
does not contain anything unsuitable for children and minors, and may be viewed without adult
guidance or supervision." The words petitioner used were, by any civilized norm, clearly not suitable
for children. Where a language is categorized as indecent, as in petitioner’s utterances on a general-
patronage rated TV program, it may be readily proscribed as unprotected speech.

A view has been advanced that unprotected speech refers only to pornography, 43 false or misleading
advertisement,44 advocacy of imminent lawless action, and expression endangering national security.
But this list is not, as some members of the Court would submit, exclusive or carved in stone.
Without going into specifics, it may be stated without fear of contradiction that US decisional law
goes beyond the aforesaid general exceptions. As the Court has been impelled to recognize
exceptions to the rule against censorship in the past, this particular case constitutes yet another
exception, another instance of unprotected speech, created by the necessity of protecting the
welfare of our children. As unprotected speech, petitioner’s utterances can be subjected to restraint
or regulation.

Despite the settled ruling in FCC which has remained undisturbed since 1978, petitioner asserts that
his utterances must present a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantive evil the State
has a right and duty to prevent and such danger must be grave and imminent. 45

Petitioner’s invocation of the clear and present danger doctrine, arguably the most permissive of
speech tests, would not avail him any relief, for the application of said test is uncalled for under the
premises. The doctrine, first formulated by Justice Holmes, accords protection for utterances so that
the printed or spoken words may not be subject to prior restraint or subsequent punishment unless
its expression creates a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantial evil which the
government has the power to prohibit.46 Under the doctrine, freedom of speech and of press is
susceptible of restriction when and only when necessary to prevent grave and immediate danger to
interests which the government may lawfully protect. As it were, said doctrine evolved in the context
of prosecutions for rebellion and other crimes involving the overthrow of government. 47 It was
originally designed to determine the latitude which should be given to speech that espouses anti-
government action, or to have serious and substantial deleterious consequences on the security and
public order of the community.48 The clear and present danger rule has been applied to this
jurisdiction.49 As a standard of limitation on free speech and press, however, the clear and present
danger test is not a magic incantation that wipes out all problems and does away with analysis and
judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech and which compels a court to
release a defendant from liability the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of imminent
catastrophic disaster.50 As we observed in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation, the clear and present
danger test "does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation applicable to all
utterances in all forums."51
To be sure, the clear and present danger doctrine is not the only test which has been applied by the
courts. Generally, said doctrine is applied to cases involving the overthrow of the government and
even other evils which do not clearly undermine national security. Since not all evils can be
measured in terms of "proximity and degree" the Court, however, in several cases—Ayer
Productions v. Capulong52 and Gonzales v. COMELEC,53 applied the balancing of interests test.
Former Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in Gonzales v. COMELEC, elucidated in his Separate
Opinion that "where the legislation under constitutional attack interferes with the freedom of speech
and assembly in a more generalized way and where the effect of the speech and assembly in terms
of the probability of realization of a specific danger is not susceptible even of impressionistic
calculation,"54 then the "balancing of interests" test can be applied.

The Court explained also in Gonzales v. COMELEC the "balancing of interests" test:

When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the regulation results in an
indirect, conditional, partial abridgment of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which of the
two conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the particular circumstances
presented. x x x We must, therefore, undertake the "delicate and difficult task x x x to weigh the
circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the
regulation of the free enjoyment of rights x x x.

In enunciating standard premised on a judicial balancing of the conflicting social values and
individual interests competing for ascendancy in legislation which restricts expression, the court in
Douds laid the basis for what has been called the "balancing-of-interests" test which has found
application in more recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. Briefly stated, the "balancing" test
requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable
in a given situation or type of situation.

xxxx

Although the urgency of the public interest sought to be secured by Congressional power restricting
the individual’s freedom, and the social importance and value of the freedom so restricted, "are to be
judged in the concrete, not on the basis of abstractions," a wide range of factors are necessarily
relevant in ascertaining the point or line of equilibrium. Among these are (a) the social value and
importance of the specific aspect of the particular freedom restricted by the legislation; (b) the
specific thrust of the restriction, i.e., whether the restriction is direct or indirect, whether or not the
persons affected are few; (c) the value and importance of the public interest sought to be secured by
the legislation––the reference here is to the nature and gravity of the evil which Congress seeks to
prevent; (d) whether the specific restriction decreed by Congress is reasonably appropriate and
necessary for the protection of such public interest; and (e) whether the necessary safeguarding of
the public interest involved may be achieved by some other measure less restrictive of the protected
freedom.55

This balancing of interest test, to borrow from Professor Kauper, 56 rests on the theory that it is the
court’s function in a case before it when it finds public interests served by legislation, on the one
hand, and the free expression clause affected by it, on the other, to balance one against the other
and arrive at a judgment where the greater weight shall be placed. If, on balance, it appears that the
public interest served by restrictive legislation is of such nature that it outweighs the abridgment of
freedom, then the court will find the legislation valid. In short, the balance-of-interests theory rests on
the basis that constitutional freedoms are not absolute, not even those stated in the free speech and
expression clause, and that they may be abridged to some extent to serve appropriate and important
interests.57 To the mind of the Court, the balancing of interest doctrine is the more appropriate test to
follow.
In the case at bar, petitioner used indecent and obscene language and a three (3)-month
suspension was slapped on him for breach of MTRCB rules. In this setting, the assertion by
petitioner of his enjoyment of his freedom of speech is ranged against the duty of the government to
protect and promote the development and welfare of the youth.

After a careful examination of the factual milieu and the arguments raised by petitioner in support of
his claim to free speech, the Court rules that the government’s interest to protect and promote the
interests and welfare of the children adequately buttresses the reasonable curtailment and valid
restraint on petitioner’s prayer to continue as program host of Ang Dating Daan during the
suspension period.

No doubt, one of the fundamental and most vital rights granted to citizens of a State is the freedom
of speech or expression, for without the enjoyment of such right, a free, stable, effective, and
progressive democratic state would be difficult to attain. Arrayed against the freedom of speech is
the right of the youth to their moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social being which the State is
constitutionally tasked to promote and protect. Moreover, the State is also mandated to recognize
and support the vital role of the youth in nation building as laid down in Sec. 13, Art. II of the 1987
Constitution.

The Constitution has, therefore, imposed the sacred obligation and responsibility on the State to
provide protection to the youth against illegal or improper activities which may prejudice their general
well-being. The Article on youth, approved on second reading by the Constitutional Commission,
explained that the State shall "extend social protection to minors against all forms of neglect, cruelty,
exploitation, immorality, and practices which may foster racial, religious or other forms of
discrimination."58

Indisputably, the State has a compelling interest in extending social protection to minors against all
forms of neglect, exploitation, and immorality which may pollute innocent minds. It has a compelling
interest in helping parents, through regulatory mechanisms, protect their children’s minds from
exposure to undesirable materials and corrupting experiences. The Constitution, no less, in fact
enjoins the State, as earlier indicated, to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual, and social well-being of the youth to better prepare them fulfill their role in the field of
nation-building.59 In the same way, the State is mandated to support parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character. 60

Petitioner’s offensive and obscene language uttered in a television broadcast, without doubt, was
easily accessible to the children. His statements could have exposed children to a language that is
unacceptable in everyday use. As such, the welfare of children and the State’s mandate to protect
and care for them, as parens patriae, 61 constitute a substantial and compelling government interest
in regulating petitioner’s utterances in TV broadcast as provided in PD 1986.

FCC explains the duty of the government to act as parens patriae to protect the children who,
because of age or interest capacity, are susceptible of being corrupted or prejudiced by offensive
language, thus:

[B]roadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read. Although Cohen’s
written message, ["Fuck the Draft"], might have been incomprehensible to a first grader, Pacifica’s
broadcast could have enlarged a child’s vocabulary in an instant. Other forms of offensive
expression may be withheld from the young without restricting the expression at its source.
Bookstores and motion picture theaters, for example, may be prohibited from making indecent
material available to children. We held in Ginsberg v. New York that the government’s interest in the
"well-being of its youth" and in supporting "parents’ claim to authority in their own household"
justified the regulation of otherwise protected expression. The ease with which children may obtain
access to broadcast material, coupled with the concerns recognized in Ginsberg, amply justify
special treatment of indecent broadcasting.

Moreover, Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak likewise stressed the duty of the State to attend to the
welfare of the young:

x x x It is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned, a less liberal approach calls
for observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way,
television reaches every home where there is a set. Children then will likely will be among the avid
viewers of the programs therein shown. As was observed by Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Jerome
Frank, it is hardly the concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult population. It
cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of
caring for the welfare of the young.62

The compelling need to protect the young impels us to sustain the regulatory action MTRCB took in
the narrow confines of the case. To reiterate, FCC justified the restraint on the TV broadcast
grounded on the following considerations: (1) the use of television with its unique accessibility to
children, as a medium of broadcast of a patently offensive speech; (2) the time of broadcast; and (3)
the "G" rating of the Ang Dating Daan program. And in agreeing with MTRCB, the court takes stock
of and cites with approval the following excerpts from FCC:

It is appropriate, in conclusion, to emphasize the narrowness of our holding. This case does not
involve a two-way radio conversation between a cab driver and a dispatcher, or a telecast of an
Elizabethan comedy. We have not decided that an occasional expletive in either setting would justify
any sanction. x x x The [FFC’s] decision rested entirely on a nuisance rationale under which context
is all important. The concept requires consideration of a host of variables. The time of day was
emphasized by the [FFC]. The content of the program in which the language is used will affect the
composition of the audience x x x. As Mr. Justice Sutherland wrote a ‘nuisance may be merely a
right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.’ We simply hold that
when the [FCC] finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does not
depend on proof that the pig is obscene. (Citation omitted.)

There can be no quibbling that the remarks in question petitioner uttered on prime-time television are
blatantly indecent if not outright obscene. It is the kind of speech that PD 1986 proscribes
necessitating the exercise by MTRCB of statutory disciplinary powers. It is the kind of speech that
the State has the inherent prerogative, nay duty, to regulate and prevent should such action served
and further compelling state interests. One who utters indecent, insulting, or offensive words on
television when unsuspecting children are in the audience is, in the graphic language of FCC, a "pig
in the parlor." Public interest would be served if the "pig" is reasonably restrained or even removed
from the "parlor."

Ergo, petitioner’s offensive and indecent language can be subjected to prior restraint.

Petitioner theorizes that the three (3)-month suspension is either prior restraint or subsequent
punishment that, however, includes prior restraint, albeit indirectly.

After a review of the facts, the Court finds that what MTRCB imposed on petitioner is an
administrative sanction or subsequent punishment for his offensive and obscene language in Ang
Dating Daan.
To clarify, statutes imposing prior restraints on speech are generally illegal and presumed
unconstitutional breaches of the freedom of speech. The exceptions to prior restraint are movies,
television, and radio broadcast censorship in view of its access to numerous people, including the
young who must be insulated from the prejudicial effects of unprotected speech. PD 1986 was
passed creating the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television (now MTRCB) and which
requires prior permit or license before showing a motion picture or broadcasting a TV program. The
Board can classify movies and television programs and can cancel permits for exhibition of films or
television broadcast.lavvphi1.net

The power of MTRCB to regulate and even impose some prior restraint on radio and television
shows, even religious programs, was upheld in Iglesia Ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals. Speaking
through Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, the Court wrote:

We thus reject petitioner’s postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review by the
respondent Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of
internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court
iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring
about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to
prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or
public welfare. x x x

xxxx

While the thesis has a lot to commend itself, we are not ready to hold that [PD 1986] is
unconstitutional for Congress to grant an administrative body quasi-judicial power to preview and
classify TV programs and enforce its decision subject to review by our courts. As far back as 1921,
we upheld this setup in Sotto vs. Ruiz, viz:

"The use of the mails by private persons is in the nature of a privilege which can be regulated in
order to avoid its abuse. Persons possess no absolute right to put into the mail anything they please,
regardless of its character."63

Bernas adds:

Under the decree a movie classification board is made the arbiter of what movies and television
programs or parts of either are fit for public consumption. It decides what movies are "immoral,
indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the
Philippines or its people," and what "tend to incite subversion, insurrection, rebellion or sedition," or
"tend to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government and/or duly constituted
authorities," etc. Moreover, its decisions are executory unless stopped by a court. 64

Moreover, in MTRCB v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, 65 it was held that the power of review
and prior approval of MTRCB extends to all television programs and is valid despite the freedom of
speech guaranteed by the Constitution. Thus, all broadcast networks are regulated by the MTRCB
since they are required to get a permit before they air their television programs. Consequently, their
right to enjoy their freedom of speech is subject to that requirement. As lucidly explained by Justice
Dante O. Tinga, government regulations through the MTRCB became "a necessary evil" with the
government taking the role of assigning bandwidth to individual broadcasters. The stations explicitly
agreed to this regulatory scheme; otherwise, chaos would result in the television broadcast industry
as competing broadcasters will interfere or co-opt each other’s signals. In this scheme, station
owners and broadcasters in effect waived their right to the full enjoyment of their right to freedom of
speech in radio and television programs and impliedly agreed that said right may be subject to prior
restraint—denial of permit or subsequent punishment, like suspension or cancellation of permit,
among others.

The three (3) months suspension in this case is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner to
continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issued to him by MTRCB
for such broadcast. Rather, the suspension is in the form of permissible administrative sanction or
subsequent punishment for the offensive and obscene remarks he uttered on the evening of August
10, 2004 in his television program, Ang Dating Daan. It is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly
impose under its charter without running afoul of the free speech clause. And the imposition is
separate and distinct from the criminal action the Board may take pursuant to Sec. 3(i) of PD 1986
and the remedies that may be availed of by the aggrieved private party under the provisions on libel
or tort, if applicable. As FCC teaches, the imposition of sanctions on broadcasters who indulge in
profane or indecent broadcasting does not constitute forbidden censorship. Lest it be overlooked,
the sanction imposed is not per se for petitioner’s exercise of his freedom of speech via television,
but for the indecent contents of his utterances in a "G" rated TV program.

More importantly, petitioner is deemed to have yielded his right to his full enjoyment of his freedom
of speech to regulation under PD 1986 and its IRR as television station owners, program producers,
and hosts have impliedly accepted the power of MTRCB to regulate the broadcast industry.

Neither can petitioner’s virtual inability to speak in his program during the period of suspension be
plausibly treated as prior restraint on future speech. For viewed in its proper perspective, the
suspension is in the nature of an intermediate penalty for uttering an unprotected form of speech. It
is definitely a lesser punishment than the permissible cancellation of exhibition or broadcast permit
or license. In fine, the suspension meted was simply part of the duties of the MTRCB in the
enforcement and administration of the law which it is tasked to implement. Viewed in its proper
context, the suspension sought to penalize past speech made on prime-time "G" rated TV program;
it does not bar future speech of petitioner in other television programs; it is a permissible subsequent
administrative sanction; it should not be confused with a prior restraint on speech. While not on all
fours, the Court, in MTRCB,66 sustained the power of the MTRCB to penalize a broadcast company
for exhibiting/airing a pre-taped TV episode without Board authorization in violation of Sec. 7 of PD
1986.

Any simplistic suggestion, however, that the MTRCB would be crossing the limits of its authority
were it to regulate and even restrain the prime-time television broadcast of indecent or obscene
speech in a "G" rated program is not acceptable. As made clear in Eastern Broadcasting
Corporation, "the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the
freedom accorded to newspaper and print media." The MTRCB, as a regulatory agency, must have
the wherewithal to enforce its mandate, which would not be effective if its punitive actions would be
limited to mere fines. Television broadcasts should be subject to some form of regulation,
considering the ease with which they can be accessed, and violations of the regulations must be met
with appropriate and proportional disciplinary action. The suspension of a violating television
program would be a sufficient punishment and serve as a deterrent for those responsible. The
prevention of the broadcast of petitioner’s television program is justified, and does not constitute
prohibited prior restraint. It behooves the Court to respond to the needs of the changing times, and
craft jurisprudence to reflect these times.

Petitioner, in questioning the three-month suspension, also tags as unconstitutional the very law
creating the MTRCB, arguing that PD 1986, as applied to him, infringes also upon his freedom of
religion. The Court has earlier adequately explained why petitioner’s undue reliance on the religious
freedom cannot lend justification, let alone an exempting dimension to his licentious utterances in his
program. The Court sees no need to address anew the repetitive arguments on religious freedom.
As earlier discussed in the disposition of the petition in G.R. No. 164785, what was uttered was in no
way a religious speech. Parenthetically, petitioner’s attempt to characterize his speech as a
legitimate defense of his religion fails miserably. He tries to place his words in perspective, arguing
evidently as an afterthought that this was his method of refuting the alleged distortion of his
statements by the INC hosts of Ang Tamang Daan. But on the night he uttered them in his television
program, the word simply came out as profane language, without any warning or guidance for
undiscerning ears.

As to petitioner’s other argument about having been denied due process and equal protection of the
law, suffice it to state that we have at length debunked similar arguments in G.R. No. 164785. There
is no need to further delve into the fact that petitioner was afforded due process when he attended
the hearing of the MTRCB, and that he was unable to demonstrate that he was unjustly
discriminated against in the MTRCB proceedings.

Finally, petitioner argues that there has been undue delegation of legislative power, as PD 1986
does not provide for the range of imposable penalties that may be applied with respect to violations
of the provisions of the law.

The argument is without merit.

In Edu v. Ericta, the Court discussed the matter of undue delegation of legislative power in the
following wise:

It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not
delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception
that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is
the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the
completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature.
To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be
directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its
functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his
authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which the legislative process
can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make laws
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done,
and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law, to which no valid objection can be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as
denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least
that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy.
Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the
criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative
office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and
regulations.67

Based on the foregoing pronouncements and analyzing the law in question, petitioner’s protestation
about undue delegation of legislative power for the sole reason that PD 1986 does not provide for a
range of penalties for violation of the law is untenable. His thesis is that MTRCB, in promulgating the
IRR of PD 1986, prescribing a schedule of penalties for violation of the provisions of the decree,
went beyond the terms of the law.
Petitioner’s posture is flawed by the erroneous assumptions holding it together, the first assumption
being that PD 1986 does not prescribe the imposition of, or authorize the MTRCB to impose,
penalties for violators of PD 1986. As earlier indicated, however, the MTRCB, by express and direct
conferment of power and functions, is charged with supervising and regulating, granting, denying, or
canceling permits for the exhibition and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television
programs, and publicity materials to the end that no such objectionable pictures, programs, and
materials shall be exhibited and/or broadcast by television. Complementing this provision is Sec.
3(k) of the decree authorizing the MTRCB "to exercise such powers and functions as may be
necessary or incidental to the attainment of the purpose and objectives of [the law]." As earlier
explained, the investiture of supervisory, regulatory, and disciplinary power would surely be a
meaningless grant if it did not carry with it the power to penalize the supervised or the regulated as
may be proportionate to the offense committed, charged, and proved. As the Court said in Chavez v.
National Housing Authority:

x x x [W]hen a general grant of power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power
necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. x x x [W]hen
the statute does not specify the particular method to be followed or used by a government agency in
the exercise of the power vested in it by law, said agency has the authority to adopt any reasonable
method to carry out its function.68

Given the foregoing perspective, it stands to reason that the power of the MTRCB to regulate and
supervise the exhibition of TV programs carries with it or necessarily implies the authority to take
effective punitive action for violation of the law sought to be enforced. And would it not be logical too
to say that the power to deny or cancel a permit for the exhibition of a TV program or broadcast
necessarily includes the lesser power to suspend?

The MTRCB promulgated the IRR of PD 1986 in accordance with Sec. 3(a) which, for reference,
provides that agency with the power "[to] promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary or
proper for the implementation of this Act, and the accomplishment of its purposes and objectives x x
x." And Chapter XIII, Sec. 1 of the IRR providing:

Section 1. VIOLATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS.––Without prejudice to the

immediate filing of the appropriate criminal action and the immediate seizure of the pertinent articles
pursuant to Section 13, any violation of PD 1986 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
governing motion pictures, television programs, and related promotional materials shall be penalized
with suspension or cancellation of permits and/or licenses issued by the Board and/or with the
imposition of fines and other administrative penalty/penalties. The Board recognizes the existing
Table of Administrative Penalties attached without prejudice to the power of the Board to amend it
when the need arises. In the meantime the existing revised Table of Administrative Penalties shall
be enforced. (Emphasis added.)

This is, in the final analysis, no more than a measure to specifically implement the aforequoted
provisions of Sec. 3(d) and (k). Contrary to what petitioner implies, the IRR does not expand the
mandate of the MTRCB under the law or partake of the nature of an unauthorized administrative
legislation. The MTRCB cannot shirk its responsibility to regulate the public airwaves and employ
such means as it can as a guardian of the public.

In Sec. 3(c), one can already find the permissible actions of the MTRCB, along with the standards to
be applied to determine whether there have been statutory breaches. The MTRCB may evaluate
motion pictures, television programs, and publicity materials "applying contemporary Filipino cultural
values as standard," and, from there, determine whether these audio and video materials "are
objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, [etc.] x x x" and
apply the sanctions it deems proper. The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details
in the enforcement of a particular statute.69 The grant of the rule-making power to administrative
agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the non-
delegation of legislative powers.70 Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated to
promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of
administering the law."71 Allowing the MTRCB some reasonable elbow-room in its operations and, in
the exercise of its statutory disciplinary functions, according it ample latitude in fixing, by way of an
appropriate issuance, administrative penalties with due regard for the severity of the offense and
attending mitigating or aggravating circumstances, as the case may be, would be consistent with its
mandate to effectively and efficiently regulate the movie and television industry.

But even as we uphold the power of the MTRCB to review and impose sanctions for violations of PD
1986, its decision to suspend petitioner must be modified, for nowhere in that issuance, particularly
the power-defining Sec. 3 nor in the MTRCB Schedule of Administrative Penalties effective January
1, 1999 is the Board empowered to suspend the program host or even to prevent certain people
from appearing in television programs. The MTRCB, to be sure, may prohibit the broadcast of such
television programs or cancel permits for exhibition, but it may not suspend television personalities,
for such would be beyond its jurisdiction. The MTRCB cannot extend its exercise of regulation
beyond what the law provides. Only persons, offenses, and penalties clearly falling clearly within the
letter and spirit of PD 1986 will be considered to be within the decree’s penal or disciplinary
operation. And when it exists, the reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the person charged
with violating the statute and for whom the penalty is sought. Thus, the MTRCB’s decision in
Administrative Case No. 01-04 dated September 27, 2004 and the subsequent order issued
pursuant to said decision must be modified. The suspension should cover only the television
program on which petitioner appeared and uttered the offensive and obscene language, which
sanction is what the law and the facts obtaining call for.

In ending, what petitioner obviously advocates is an unrestricted speech paradigm in which absolute
permissiveness is the norm. Petitioner’s flawed belief that he may simply utter gutter profanity on
television without adverse consequences, under the guise of free speech, does not lend itself to
acceptance in this jurisdiction. We repeat: freedoms of speech and expression are not absolute
freedoms. To say "any act that restrains speech should be greeted with furrowed brows" is not to
say that any act that restrains or regulates speech or expression is per se invalid. This only
recognizes the importance of freedoms of speech and expression, and indicates the necessity to
carefully scrutinize acts that may restrain or regulate speech.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the MTRCB in Adm. Case No. 01-04 dated September 27, 2004 is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION of limiting the suspension to the program Ang Dating
Daan. As thus modified, the fallo of the MTRCB shall read as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, a Decision is hereby rendered, imposing a penalty of
THREE (3) MONTHS SUSPENSION on the television program, Ang Dating Daan, subject of the
instant petition.

Co-respondents Joselito Mallari, Luzviminda Cruz, and UNTV Channel 37 and its owner, PBC, are
hereby exonerated for lack of evidence.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 202666               September 29, 2014

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners,

vs.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an equally
powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a personal adjustment process in
which he balances the desire for privacy with the desire for disclosure and communication of himself
to others, in light of the environmental conditions and social norms set by the society in which he
lives.

- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)

The Case

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to
Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC,  otherwise known as the "Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data."
1

Petitioners herein assail the July 27, 2012 Decision  of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu
2

City (RTC) in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB, which dismissed their habeas data petition.

The Facts

Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were, during the
period material, graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City.
Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to
attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in
their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her
Facebook  profile.
3

Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at STC’s high
school department, learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online,
depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her
students if they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia, Julienne,
and Chloe Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others.

Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook
accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne
drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets
of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. What is
more, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or the availability of the
identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends,  but were, in fact,
4

viewable by any Facebook user. 5

Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s Facebook page,
showed the photos to Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action.
Thereafter, following an investigation, STC found the identified students to have deported
themselves in a manner proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook, to wit:

1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;

2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;

3. Smoking and drinking alcoholic beverages in public places;

4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;

5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains sexually

suggestive messages, language or symbols; and 6. Posing and uploading pictures on the
Internet that entail ample body exposure.

On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in question,
reported, as required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima), STC’s high school
principal and ICM  Directress. They claimed that during the meeting, they were castigated and
6

verbally abused by the STC officials present in the conference, including Assistant Principal
Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda Jumiller, and Tigol. What is more, Sr. Purisima informed their
parents the following day that, as part of their penalty, they are barred from joining the
commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.

A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a
Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City against STC, et al., docketed as
Civil Case No. CEB-38594.  In it, Tan prayed that defendants therein be enjoined from implementing
7

the sanction that precluded Angela from joining the commencement exercises.

On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia, joined the fray as
an intervenor. On March 28, 2012, defendants inCivil Case No. CEB-38594 filed their memorandum,
containing printed copies of the photographs in issue as annexes. That same day, the RTC issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony, to which
STC filed a motion for reconsideration.

Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from
participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement exercises, its
adverted motion for reconsideration on the issuance ofthe TRO remained unresolved.

Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB  on the basis of the following considerations:
8

1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for posterity
before they changed into their swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday beach party;

2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at "Friends Only." They,
thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.
 3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have known of
laws that safeguard the right to privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to have
known that the girls, whose privacy has been invaded, are the victims in this case, and not
the offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the minors were called "immoral" and were
punished outright;

4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced
without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the
photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts
of petitioners’ children were intruded upon;

5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and
digital images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory; and

6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted by
respondents through their memorandum submitted to the RTC in connection with Civil Case
No. CEB-38594. To petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of their
children’s privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas databe issued; (b) respondents
be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the
subjectdata before or at the preliminary hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be rendered
declaring all information, data, and digital images accessed, saved or stored, reproduced,
spread and used, to have been illegally obtained inviolation of the children’s right to privacy.

Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order dated July 5, 2012,
issued the writ of habeas data. Through the same Order, herein respondents were directed to file
their verified written return, together with the supporting affidavits, within five (5) working days from
service of the writ.

In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified written return, laying
down the following grounds for the denial of the petition, viz: (a) petitioners are not the proper parties
to file the petition; (b) petitioners are engaging in forum shopping; (c) the instant case is not one
where a writ of habeas data may issue;and (d) there can be no violation of their right to privacy as
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas data. The
dispositive portion of the Decision pertinently states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.

xxxx

SO ORDERED. 9

To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the
minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data.
Moreover, the court a quoheld that the photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without
restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC
gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the implementation
of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.

Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Section 19 of the
Rule on Habeas Data. 10

The Issues

The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a writ of habeas datashould be
issued given the factual milieu. Crucial in resolving the controversy, however, is the pivotal point of
whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life,
liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.

Our Ruling

We find no merit in the petition.

Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data

The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of
a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.  It is an independent
11

and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to
informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order
to achieve unlawful ends. 12

In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational
privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas dataas "a procedure
designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age."  The writ, however,
13

will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a
person.Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the
one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.  Thus, the existence of a person’s
14

right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or

threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable
before the privilege of the writ may be extended. 15

Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a habeas
datapetition will not prosper. Viewed from the perspective of the case at bar,this requisite begs this
question: given the nature of an online social network (OSN)––(1) that it facilitates and promotes
real-time interaction among millions, if not billions, of users, sans the spatial barriers,  bridging the
16

gap created by physical space; and (2) that any information uploaded in OSNs leavesan indelible
trace in the provider’s databases, which are outside the control of the end-users––is there a right to
informational privacy in OSN activities of its users? Before addressing this point, We must first
resolve the procedural issues in this case.

a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances
Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas not enacted solely for the
purpose of complementing the Writ of Amparoin cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.

Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However,
in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by:

(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children
and parents; or

(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth
civil degreeof consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding
paragraph. (emphasis supplied)

Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to cases of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a
variance of habeas data situations, would not have been made.

Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information
age."  As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and enforced
17

disappearances only. In fact, the annotations to the Rule preparedby the Committee on the Revision
of the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data complements the Writ of Amparo,
pointed out that:

The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s
right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies against the
violation of such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the
database or information or files in possession or in control of respondents.  (emphasis Ours) Clearly
18

then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Datamay also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances.

b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information

Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it not being an entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.

To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only
against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the businessof gathering, storing, and collecting of
data. As provided under Section 1 of the Rule:

Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right
to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing
of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party. (emphasis Ours)

The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas
data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or
entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her
correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business of
collecting or storing data.

To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To "engage" means

"to do or take part in something."  It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in
19

pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or
storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such
undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature
of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such
will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.

To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the writ to a
very small group, i.e., private persons and entities whose business is data gathering and storage,
and in the process decreasing the effectiveness of the writ asan instrument designed to protect a
right which is easily violated in view of rapid advancements in the information and communications
technology––a right which a great majority of the users of technology themselves are not capable of
protecting.

Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the core of the controversy.

The right to informational privacy on Facebook

a. The Right to Informational Privacy

The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements having
an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno’s speech, The Common Right to Privacy,  where he explained the three strands of the right to
20

privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy;  (2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional
21

privacy.  Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to informational privacy––
22

usually defined as the right of individuals to control information about themselves.

23

With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data sharing nowadays, not
to mention each system’s inherent vulnerability to attacks and intrusions, there is more reason that
every individual’s right to control said flow of information should be protected and that each
individual should have at least a reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace. Several
commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites, however, all agree that given the
millions of OSN users, "[i]n this [Social Networking] environment, privacy is no longer grounded in
reasonable expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking." 24

It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial remedies that
would allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use of data or information and to remedy possible
violations of the right to privacy.  In the same vein, the South African High Court, in its Decision in
25

the landmark case, H v. W,  promulgated on January30, 2013, recognized that "[t]he law has to take
26

into account the changing realities not only technologically but also socially or else it will lose
credibility in the eyes of the people. x x x It is imperative that the courts respond appropriately to
changing times, acting cautiously and with wisdom." Consistent with this, the Court, by developing
what may be viewed as the Philippine model of the writ of habeas data, in effect, recognized that,
generally speaking, having an expectation of informational privacy is not necessarily incompatible
with engaging in cyberspace activities, including those that occur in OSNs.
The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs? Bear in mind
that informational privacy involves personal information. At the same time, the very purpose of OSNs
is socializing––sharing a myriad of information,  some of which would have otherwise remained
27

personal.

b. Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN activities

Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay connected
to other members of the same or different social media platform through the sharing of statuses,
photos, videos, among others, depending on the services provided by the site. It is akin to having a
room filled with millions of personal bulletin boards or "walls," the contents of which are under the
control of each and every user. In his or her bulletin board, a user/owner can post anything––from
text, to pictures, to music and videos––access to which would depend on whether he or she allows
one, some or all of the other users to see his or her posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN
phenomenon has paved the way to the creation of various social networking sites, includingthe one
involved in the case at bar, www.facebook.com (Facebook), which, according to its developers,
people use "to stay connected with friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and
to share and express what matters to them." 28

Facebook connections are established through the process of "friending" another user. By sending a
"friend request," the user invites another to connect their accounts so that they can view any and all
"Public" and "Friends Only" posts of the other.Once the request is accepted, the link is established
and both users are permitted to view the other user’s "Public" or "Friends Only" posts, among others.
"Friending," therefore, allows the user to form or maintain one-to-one relationships with other users,
whereby the user gives his or her "Facebook friend" access to his or her profile and shares certain
information to the latter.
29

To address concerns about privacy,  but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with
30

different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile  as well as information
31

uploaded by the user. In H v. W,  the South Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users
32

to "customize their privacy settings," but did so with this caveat: "Facebook states in its policies that,
although it makes every effort to protect a user’s information, these privacy settings are not
foolproof."
33

For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and accessibility of digital images(photos),
posted on his or her personal bulletin or "wall," except for the user’s profile picture and ID, by
selecting his or her desired privacy setting:

(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;

(b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the
photo;

(b) Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;

(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the
Facebook user; and

(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers to broaden
or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos, among others, from
another user’s point of view. In other words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the
availability of their Facebook activities reflect their choice as to "when and to what extent to disclose
facts about [themselves] – and to put others in the position of receiving such confidences."  Ideally,
34

the selected setting will be based on one’s desire to interact with others, coupled with the opposing
need to withhold certain information as well as to regulate the spreading of his or her personal
information. Needless to say, as the privacy setting becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook users
can view that user’s particular post.

STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy

Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in Facebook would, in context, be correct. However, such is not the case. It is through the
availability of said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to have a subjective expectation that
only those to whom they grant access to their profile will view the information they post or upload
thereto.35

This, however, does not mean that any Facebook user automatically has a protected expectation of
privacy in all of his or her Facebook activities.

Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that
said user, in this case the children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private,
through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility.  And this
36

intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In other
words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber world, of the user’s invocation
of his or her right to informational privacy.
37

Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or
her post or profile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which necessarily
accompanies said choice.  Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such
38

that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal information to his or her Facebook page
and sets its privacy level at "Only Me" or a custom list so that only the user or a chosen few can view
it, said photo would still be deemed public by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photo’s
visibility and accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of their
function but it would also disregard the very intention of the user to keep said photo or information
within the confines of his or her private space.

We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to other Facebook users
and whether the disclosure was confidential in nature. In other words, did the minors limit the
disclosure of the photos such that the images were kept within their zones of privacy? This
determination is necessary in resolving the issue of whether the minors carved out a zone of privacy
when the photos were uploaded to Facebook so that the images will be protected against
unauthorized access and disclosure.

Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right being violated, insist that
Escudero intruded upon their children’s Facebook accounts, downloaded copies of the pictures and
showed said photos to Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the minors’ privacy since their Facebook
accounts, allegedly, were under "very private" or "Only Friends" setting safeguarded with a
password.  Ultimately, they posit that their children’s disclosure was only limited since their profiles
39

were not open to public viewing. Therefore, according to them, people who are not their Facebook
friends, including respondents, are barred from accessing said post without their knowledge and
consent. As petitioner’s children testified, it was Angela who uploaded the subject photos which were
only viewable by the five of them,  although who these five are do not appear on the records.
40

Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit  that "my students showed me some pictures of
41

girls clad in brassieres. This student [sic] of mine informed me that these are senior high school
[students] of STC, who are their friends in [F]acebook. x x x They then said [that] there are still many
other photos posted on the Facebook accounts of these girls. At the computer lab, these students
then logged into their Facebook account [sic], and accessed from there the various photographs x x
x. They even told me that there had been times when these photos were ‘public’ i.e., not confined to
their friends in Facebook."

In this regard, We cannot give much weight to the minors’ testimonies for one key reason: failure to
question the students’ act of showing the photos to Tigol disproves their allegation that the photos
were viewable only by the five of them. Without any evidence to corroborate their statement that the
images were visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the
other students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus
deserving scant consideration. 42

It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her students,
who are the minors’ Facebook "friends," showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts.
This only goes to show that no special means to be able to view the allegedly private posts were
ever resorted to by Escudero’s students,  and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the
43

photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.

Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it can be surmised that the
photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’
children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke
the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The ensuing pronouncement in US v.
Gines-Perez  is most instructive:
44

[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all
privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here, where the Defendant
did not employ protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page
or the photograph itself.
45

Also, United States v. Maxwell  held that "[t]he more open the method of transmission is, the less
46

privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room or e-mail
that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy."

That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’
contention. In this regard, the cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this setting
still remain to be outside the confines of the zones of privacy in view of the following:

(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools
to interact and share in any conceivable way;" 47

(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers; 48

(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and
 (4) A user’s Facebook friend can "share"  the former’s post, or "tag"  others who are not
49 50

Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible only tohis or her own Facebook
friends.

It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to "Friends" is no
assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the
source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own
Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or
not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective
Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the
privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."

To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are not Facebook
friends. If C, A’s Facebook friend, tags B in A’s post, which is set at "Friends," the initial audience of
100 (A’s own Facebook friends) is dramatically increased to 300 (A’s 100 friends plus B’s 200
friends or the public, depending upon B’s privacy setting). As a result, the audience who can view
the post is effectively expanded––and to a very large extent.

This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebook’s proclivity towards user
interaction and socialization rather than seclusion or privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of
individual user posts. In fact, it has been said that OSNs have facilitated their users’ self-tribute,
thereby resulting into the "democratization of fame."  Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a
51

post, with visibility set at "Friends Only" cannot easily, more so automatically, be said to be "very
private," contrary to petitioners’ argument.

As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’
Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion
since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were
mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the
information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said
posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither
the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the
images to Escudero.

Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents reproduced and
broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what petitioners attributed to respondents as an act of
offensive disclosure was no more than the actuality that respondents appended said photographs in
their memorandum submitted to the trial court in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594.  These 52

are not tantamount to a violation of the minor’s informational privacy rights, contrary to petitioners’
assertion.

In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise, the photos of
minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the
reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative institution. However, the records are bereft of any
evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized Facebook’s privacy settings to make the
photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without proof that they placed the photographs subject
of this case within the ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have
an expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.

Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the original uploader,
through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit
access to a select few, through the "Custom" setting, the result may have been different, for in such
instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to the
public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.

On Cyber Responsibility

It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your children’s ears."  This means that self-
53

regulation on the part of OSN users and internet consumers in general is the best means of avoiding
privacy rights violations.  As a cyberspace community member, one has to be proactive in protecting
54

his or her own privacy.  It is in this regard that many OSN users, especially minors, fail. Responsible
55

social networking or observance of the "netiquettes"  on the part of teenagers has been the concern
56

of many due to the wide spread notion that teenagers can sometimes go too far since they generally
lack the people skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a public forum. 57

Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good cyber citizenship in its
curriculum to educate its students on proper online conduct may be most timely. Too, it is not only
STC but a number of schools and organizations have already deemed it important to include digital
literacy and good cyber citizenship in their respective programs and curricula in view of the risks that
the children are exposed to every time they participate in online activities.  Furthermore, considering
58

the complexity of the cyber world and its pervasiveness, as well as the dangers that these children
are wittingly or unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the
participation of the parents in disciplining and educating their children about being a good digital
citizen is encouraged by these institutions and organizations. In fact, it is believed that "to limit such
risks, there’s no substitute for parental involvement and supervision." 59

As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students to be
responsible in their dealings and activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, when it enforced the
disciplinary actions specified in the Student Handbook, absent a showing that, in the process, it
violated the students’ rights.

OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever they engage
incyberspace activities.  Accordingly, they should be cautious enough to control their privacy and to
1âwphi1

exercise sound discretion regarding how much information about themselves they are willing to give
up. Internet consumers ought to be aware that, by entering or uploading any kind of data or
information online, they are automatically and inevitably making it permanently available online, the
perpetuation of which is outside the ambit of their control. Furthermore, and more importantly,
information, otherwise private, voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by
third parties who may or may not be allowed access to such.

It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and
activities and must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding
relief from the courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding
a right which they allege to have been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot afford
protection to persons if they themselves did nothing to place the matter within the confines of their
private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if
they desire to keep the information private, and to keep track of changes in the available privacy
settings, such as those of Facebook, especially because Facebook is notorious for changing these
settings and the site's layout often.

In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy rights, We find no
cogent reason to disturb the findings and case disposition of the court a quo.

In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated July 27,
2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is hereby
AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURTBaguio City

EN BANC

G.R. No. 176951               April 12, 2011

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry
P. Treñas; City of Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P.
Treñas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Baybay, Province of Leyte; Municipality of
Bogo, Province of Cebu; Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Western Samar;
Municipality of Tandag, Province of Surigao del Sur; Municipality of Borongan, Province of
Eastern Samar; and Municipality of Tayabas, Province of Quezon, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 177499

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry
P. Treñas; City of Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P.
Treñas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Lamitan, Province of Basilan; Municipality of
Tabuk, Province of Kalinga; Municipality of Bayugan, Province of Agusan del Sur;
Municipality of Batac, Province of Ilocos Norte; Municipality of Mati, Province of Davao
Oriental; and Municipality of Guihulngan, Province of Negros Oriental, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 178056

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry
P. Treñas; City of Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P.
Treñas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Cabadbaran, Province of Agusan del Norte;
Municipality of Carcar, Province of Cebu; Municipality of El Salvador, Province of Misamis
Oriental; Municipality of Naga, Cebu; and Department of Budget and
Management, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

We consider and resolve the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners vis-à-
vis the Resolution promulgated on February 15, 2011.
To recall, the Resolution promulgated on February 15, 2011 granted the Motion for Reconsideration
of the respondents presented against the Resolution dated August 24, 2010, reversed the
Resolution dated August 24, 2010, and declared the 16 Cityhood Laws — Republic Acts Nos. 9389,
9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491 —
constitutional.

Now, the petitioners anchor their Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration upon the primordial
ground that the Court could no longer modify, alter, or amend its judgment declaring the Cityhood
Laws unconstitutional due to such judgment having long become final and executory. They submit
that the Cityhood Laws violated Section 6 and Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as
the Equal Protection Clause.

The petitioners specifically ascribe to the Court the following errors in its promulgation of the
assailed February 15, 2011 Resolution, to wit:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO PROMULGATE THE

RESOLUTION OF 15 FEBRUARY 2011 BECAUSE THERE IS NO LONGER ANY ACTUAL
CASE OR CONTROVERSY TO SETTLE.

II. THE RESOLUTION CONTRAVENES THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND
RELEVANT SUPREME COURT ISSUANCES.

III. THE RESOLUTION UNDERMINES THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN ITS DISREGARD OF

THE PRINCIPLES OF RES JUDICATA AND THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY OF
FINAL JUDGMENTS.

IV. THE RESOLUTION ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE SIXTEEN (16) CITYHOOD
BILLS DO NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE X, SECTIONS 6 AND 10 OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION.

V. THE SIXTEEN (16) CITYHOOD LAWS VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RIGHT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO A JUST
SHARE IN THE NATIONAL TAXES.

Ruling

Upon thorough consideration, we deny the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration for its lack of
merit.

I.
Procedural Issues

With respect to the first, second, and third assignments of errors, supra, it appears that the
petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Court in promulgating the February 15, 2011 Resolution,
claiming that the decision herein had long become final and executory. They state that the Court
thereby violated rules of procedure, and the principles of res judicata and immutability of final
judgments.

The petitioners posit that the controversy on the Cityhood Laws ended with the April 28, 2009
Resolution denying the respondents’ second motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the November 18,
2008 Decision for being a prohibited pleading, and in view of the issuance of the entry of judgment
on May 21, 2009.

The Court disagrees with the petitioners.

In the April 28, 2009 Resolution, the Court ruled:

By a vote of 6-6, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 31 March 2009 is DENIED for
lack of merit. The motion is denied since there is no majority that voted to overturn the Resolution of
31 March 2009.

The Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of 18 November 2008 is DENIED for being a
prohibited pleading, and the Motion for Leave to Admit Attached Petition in Intervention dated 20
April 2009 and the Petition in Intervention dated 20 April 2009 filed by counsel for Ludivina T. Mas,
et al. are also DENIED in view of the denial of the second motion for reconsideration. No further
pleadings shall be entertained. Let entry of judgment be made in due course.

Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. wrote a Dissenting Opinion, joined by Justices Consuelo Ynares-
Santiago, Renato C. Corona, Minita Chico-Nazario, Teresita Leonardo-De Castro, and Lucas P.
Bersamin. Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno and Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura took no part.
Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing is on leave. 1

Within 15 days from receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution, the respondents filed a Motion To
Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 By Declaring Instead That Respondents’ "Motion for
Reconsideration Of the Resolution Of March 31, 2009" And "Motion For Leave To File, And To
Admit Attached ‘Second Motion For Reconsideration Of The Decision Dated November 18, 2008’
Remain Unresolved And To Conduct Further Proceedings Thereon, arguing therein that a
determination of the issue of constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws upon a motion for
reconsideration by an equally divided vote was not binding on the Court as a valid precedent, citing
the separate opinion of then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Lambino v. Commission on Elections. 2

Thus, in its June 2, 2009 Resolution, the Court issued the following clarification of the April 28, 2009
Resolution, viz:

As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 2, Rule
52 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that: "No second motion for reconsideration of a
judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained." Thus, a decision becomes final
and executory after 15 days from receipt of the denial of the first motion for reconsideration.

However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for reconsideration is granted
by the Court, the Court therefore allows the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. In such a
case, the second motion for reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading.

In the present case, the Court voted on the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent
cities. In effect, the Court allowed the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. Thus, the
second motion for reconsideration was no longer a prohibited pleading. However, for lack of the
required number of votes to overturn the 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009
Resolution, the Court denied the second motion for reconsideration in its 28 April 2009 Resolution. 3
As the result of the aforecited clarification, the Court resolved to expunge from the records several
pleadings and documents, including respondents’ Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009
etc.

The respondents thus filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009,
asseverating that their Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc. was not another motion
for reconsideration of the November 18, 2008 Decision, because it assailed the April 28, 2009
Resolution with respect to the tie-vote on the respondents’ Second Motion For Reconsideration.
They pointed out that the Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc. was filed on May 14,
2009, which was within the 15-day period from their receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution; thus,
the entry of judgment had been prematurely made. They reiterated their arguments with respect to a
tie-vote upon an issue of constitutionality.

In the September 29, 2009 Resolution, 4 the Court required the petitioners to comment on the Motion
for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 within 10 days from receipt.

As directed, the petitioners filed their Comment Ad Cautelam With Motion to Expunge.

The respondents filed their Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached "Reply to Petitioners’
‘Comment Ad Cautelam With Motion to Expunge’", together with the Reply.

On November 17, 2009, the Court resolved to note the petitioners’ Comment Ad Cautelam With
Motion to Expunge, to grant the respondents’ Motion for Leave to File and Admit Reply to
Petitioners’ Comment Ad Cautelam with Motion to Expunge, and to note the respondents’ Reply to
Petitioners’ Comment Ad Cautelam with Motion to Expunge.

On December 21, 2009, the Court, resolving the Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc.
and voting anew on the Second Motion For Reconsideration in order to reach a concurrence of a
majority, promulgated its Decision granting the motion and declaring the Cityhood Laws as
constitutional,5 disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, respondent LGUs’ Motion for Reconsideration dated June 2, 2009, their "Motion to
Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead that Respondents’ ‘Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009’ and ‘Motion for Leave to File and to Admit
Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 18, 2008’ Remain
Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings," dated May 14, 2009, and their second Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision dated November 18, 2008 are GRANTED. The June 2, 2009, the
March 31, 2009, and April 31, 2009 Resolutions are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The entry of
judgment made on May 21, 2009 must accordingly be RECALLED.

The instant consolidated petitions and petitions-in-intervention are DISMISSED. The cityhood laws,
namely Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408,
9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491 are declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.

SO ORDERED.

On January 5, 2010, the petitioners filed an Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration against the
December 21, 2009 Decision.6 On the same date, the petitioners also filed a Motion to Annul
Decision of 21 December 2009.7
On January 12, 2010, the Court directed the respondents to comment on the motions of the
petitioners.8

On February 4, 2010, petitioner-intervenors City of Santiago, City of Legazpi, and City of Iriga filed
their separate Manifestations with Supplemental Ad Cautelam Motions for Reconsideration. 9 Similar
manifestations with supplemental motions for reconsideration were filed by other petitioner-
intervenors, specifically: City of Cadiz on February 15, 2010; 10 City of Batangas on February 17,
2010;11 and City of Oroquieta on February 24, 2010.12 The Court required the adverse parties to
comment on the motions.13 As directed, the respondents complied.

On August 24, 2010, the Court issued its Resolution reinstating the November 18, 2008 Decision. 14

On September 14, 2010, the respondents timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
"Resolution" Dated August 24, 2010. 15 They followed this by filing on September 20, 2010 a Motion
to Set "Motion for Reconsideration of the ‘Resolution’ dated August 24, 2010" for Hearing. 16 On
November 19, 2010, the petitioners sent in their Opposition [To the "Motion for Reconsideration of
‘Resolution’ dated August 24, 2010"]. 17 On November 30, 2010,18 the Court noted, among others, the
petitioners’ Opposition.

On January 18, 2011,19 the Court denied the respondents’ Motion to Set "Motion for Reconsideration
of the ‘Resolution’ dated August 24, 2010" for Hearing.

Thereafter, on February 15, 2011, the Court issued the Resolution being now challenged.

It can be gleaned from the foregoing that, as the June 2, 2009 Resolution clarified, the respondents’
Second Motion For Reconsideration was not a prohibited pleading in view of the Court’s voting and
acting on it having the effect of allowing the Second Motion For Reconsideration; and that when the
respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 questioning the
expunging of their Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc. (which had been filed within
the 15-day period from receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution), the Court opted to act on the Motion
for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 by directing the adverse parties through its
September 29, 2009 Resolution to comment. The same permitting effect occurred when the Court,
by its November 17, 2009 Resolution, granted the respondents’ Motion for Leave to File and Admit
Reply to Petitioners’ Comment Ad Cautelam with Motion to Expunge, and noted the attached Reply.

Moreover, by issuing the Resolutions dated September 29, 2009 and November 17, 2009, the Court:
(a) rendered ineffective the tie-vote under the Resolution of April 28, 2009 and the ensuing denial of
the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009 for lack of a majority to overturn;
(b), re-opened the Decision of November 18, 2008 for a second look under reconsideration; and (c)
lifted the directive that no further pleadings would be entertained. The Court in fact entertained and
acted on the respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009. Thereafter,
the Court proceeded to deliberate anew on the respondents’ Second Motion for Reconsideration and
ended up with the promulgation of the December 21, 2009 Decision (declaring the Cityhood Laws
valid and constitutional).

It is also inaccurate for the petitioners to insist that the December 21, 2009 Decision overturned the
November 18, 2008 Decision on the basis of the mere Reflections of the Members of the Court. To
be sure, the Reflections were the legal opinions of the Members and formed part of the deliberations
of the Court. The reference in the December 21, 2009 Decision to the Reflections pointed out that
there was still a pending incident after the April 28, 2009 Resolution that had been timely filed within
15 days from its receipt,20 pursuant to Section 10, Rule 51,21 in relation to Section 1, Rule 52,22 of the
Rules of Court. Again, the Court did act and deliberate upon this pending incident, leading to the
issuance of the December 21, 2009 Decision (declaring the Cityhood Laws free from constitutional
infirmity). It was thereafter that the Court rendered its August 24, 2010 Resolution (reinstating the
November 18, 2008 Decision), to correct which the respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration of the
"Resolution" Dated August 24, 2010 was filed. And, finally, the Court issued its February 15, 2011
Resolution, reversing and setting aside the August 24, 2010 Resolution.

It is worth repeating that the actions taken herein were made by the Court en banc strictly in
accordance with the Rules of Court and its internal procedures. There has been no irregularity
attending or tainting the proceedings.

It also relevant to state that the Court has frequently disencumbered itself under extraordinary
circumstances from the shackles of technicality in order to render just and equitable relief. 23

On whether the principle of immutability of judgments and bar by res judicata apply herein, suffice it
to state that the succession of the events recounted herein indicates that the controversy about the
16 Cityhood Laws has not yet been resolved with finality. As such, the operation of the principle of
immutability of judgments did not yet come into play. For the same reason is an adherence to the
doctrine of res judicata not yet warranted, especially considering that the precedential ruling for this
case needed to be revisited and set with certainty and finality.

II.
Substantive Issues

The petitioners reiterate their position that the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6 and Section 10 of
Article X of the Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause, and the right of local governments to a just
share in the national taxes.

The Court differs.

Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be
exempted from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. The apprehensions of the then Senate President with
respect to the considerable disparity between the income requirement of ₱20 million under the Local
Government Code (LGC) prior to its amendment, and the ₱100 million under the amendment
introduced by R.A. No. 9009 were definitively articulated in his interpellation of Senator Pimentel
during the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157. The then Senate President was cognizant of the
fact that there were municipalities that then had pending conversion bills

during the 11th Congress prior to the adoption of Senate Bill No. 2157 as R.A. No. 9009, 24 including
the municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws. It is worthy of mention that the pertinent
deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157 occurred on October 5, 2000 while the 11th Congress was in
session, and the conversion bills were then pending in the Senate. Thus, the responses of Senator
Pimentel made it obvious that R.A. No. 9009 would not apply to the conversion bills then pending
deliberation in the Senate during the 11th Congress.

R.A. No. 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the
clear legislative intent to exempt the municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during
the 11th

Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, entitled Joint Resolution
to Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the
coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on Joint Resolution No. 29.
Even so, the House of Representatives readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as

Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress,25 and forwarded Joint Resolution No. 1 to the
Senate for approval. Again, the Senate failed to approve Joint Resolution No. 1.

At this juncture, it is worthwhile to consider the manifestation of Senator Pimentel with respect to
Joint Resolution No. 1, to wit:

MANIFESTATION OF SENATOR PIMENTEL

House Joint Resolution No. 1 seeks to exempt certain municipalities seeking conversion into cities
from the requirement that they must have at least P100 million in income of locally generated
revenue, exclusive of the internal revenue share that they received from the central government as
required under Republic Act No. 9009.

The procedure followed by the House is questionable, to say the least. The House wants the Senate
to do away with the income requirement of P100 million so that, en masse, the municipalities they
want exempted could now file bills specifically converting them into cities. The reason they want the
Senate to do it first is that Cong. Dodo Macias, chair of the House Committee on Local
Governments, I am told, will not entertain any bill for the conversion of municipalities into cities
unless the issue of income requirement is first hurdled. The House leadership therefore wants to
shift the burden of exempting certain municipalities from the income requirement to the Senate
rather than do it itself.

That is most unusual because, in effect, the House wants the Senate to pass a blanket resolution
that would qualify the municipalities concerned for conversion into cities on the matter of income
alone. Then, at a later date, the House would pass specific bills converting the municipalities into
cities. However, income is not only the requirement for municipalities to become cities. There are
also the requirements on population and land area.

In effect, the House wants the Senate to tackle the qualification of the municipalities they want
converted into cities piecemeal and separately, first is the income under the joint resolution, then the
other requirements when the bills are file to convert specific municipalities into cities. To repeat, this
is a most unusual manner of creating cities.

My respectful suggestion is for the Senate to request the House to do what they want to do
regarding the applications of certain municipalities to become cities pursuant to the requirements of
the Local Government Code. If the House wants to exempt certain municipalities from the
requirements of the Local Government Code to become cities, by all means, let them do their thing.
Specifically, they should act on specific bills to create cities and cite the reasons why the
municipalities concerned are qualified to become cities. Only after the House shall have completed
what they are expected to do under the law would it be proper for the Senate to act on specific bills
creating cities.

In other words, the House should be requested to finish everything that needs to be done in the
matter of converting municipalities into cities and not do it piecemeal as they are now trying to do
under the joint resolution.

In my long years in the Senate, this is the first time that a resort to this subterfuge is being
undertaken to favor the creation of certain cities. I am not saying that they are not qualified. All I am
saying is, if the House wants to pass and create cities out of certain municipalities, by all means let
them do that. But they should do it following the requirements of the Local Government Code and, if
they want to make certain exceptions, they can also do that too. But they should not use the Senate
as a ploy to get things done which they themselves should do.

Incidentally, I have recommended this mode of action verbally to some leaders of the House. Had
they followed the recommendation, for all I know, the municipalities they had envisioned to be
covered by House Joint Resolution No. 1 would, by now – if not all, at least some – have been
converted into cities. House Joint Resolution No. 1, the House, in effect, caused the delay in the
approval in the applications for cityhood of the municipalities concerned.

Lastly, I do not have an amendment to House Joint Resolution No. 1. What I am suggesting is for
the Senate to request the House to follow the procedure outlined in the Local Government Code
which has been respected all through the years. By doing so, we uphold the rule of law

and minimize the possibilities of power play in the approval of bills converting municipalities into
cities.26

Thereafter, the conversion bills of the respondents were individually filed in the House of
Representatives, and were all unanimously and

favorably voted upon by the Members of the House of Representatives. 27 The bills, when forwarded
to the Senate, were likewise unanimously approved by the Senate. 28 The acts of both Chambers of
Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the
express articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception,
from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. Thereby, R.A. No. 9009, and, by necessity, the LGC, were
amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions being embodied in the exemption
clauses.

The petitioners further contend that the new income requirement of ₱100 million from locally
generated sources is not arbitrary because it is not difficult to comply with; that there are several
municipalities that have already complied with the requirement and have, in fact, been converted into
cities, such as Sta. Rosa in Laguna (R.A. No 9264), Navotas (R.A. No. 9387) and San Juan (R.A.
No. 9388) in Metro Manila, Dasmariñas in Cavite (R.A. No. 9723), and Biñan in Laguna (R.A. No.
9740); and that several other municipalities have supposedly reached the income of ₱100 million
from locally generated sources, such as Bauan in Batangas, Mabalacat in Pampanga, and Bacoor in
Cavite.

The contention of the petitioners does not persuade.

As indicated in the Resolution of February 15, 2011, fifty-nine (59) existing cities had failed as of
2006 to post an average annual income of ₱100 million based on the figures contained in the
certification dated December 5, 2008 by the Bureau of Local Government. The large number of
existing cities, virtually 50% of them, still unable to comply with the ₱100 million threshold income
five years after R.A. No. 9009 took effect renders it fallacious and probably unwarranted for the
petitioners to claim that the ₱100 million income requirement is not difficult to comply with.

In this regard, the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157 may prove enlightening, thus:

Senator Osmeña III. And could the gentleman help clarify why a municipality would want to be
converted into a city?
Senator Pimentel. There is only one reason, Mr. President, and it is not hidden. It is the fact that
once converted into a city, the municipality will have roughly more than three times the share that it
would be receiving over the internal revenue allotment than it would have if it were to remain a
municipality. So more or less three times or more.

Senator Osmeña III. Is it the additional funding that they will be able to enjoy from a larger share
from the internal revenue allocations?

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Osmeña III. Now, could the gentleman clarify, Mr. President, why in the original Republic
Act No. 7160, known as the Local Government Code of 1991, such a wide gap was made between a
municipality—what a municipality would earn—and a city? Because essentially, to a person’s mind,
even with this new requirement, if approved by Congress, if a municipality is earning P100 million
and has a population of more than 150,000 inhabitants but has less than 100 square kilometers, it
would not qualify as a city.

Senator Pimentel. Yes.

Senator Osmeña III. Now would that not be quite arbitrary on the part of the municipality?

Senator Pimentel. In fact, Mr. President, the House version restores the "or". So, this is a matter that
we can very well take up as a policy issue. The chair of the committee does not say that we should,
as we know, not listen to arguments for the restoration of the word "or" in the population or territorial
requirement.

Senator Osmeña III. Mr. President, my point is that, I agree with the gentleman’s "and", but perhaps
we should bring down the area. There are certainly very crowded places in this country that are less
than 10,000 hectares—100 square kilometers is 10,000 hectares. There might only be 9,000
hectares or 8,000 hectares. And it would be unfair if these municipalities already earning
P100,000,000 in locally generated funds and have a population of over 150,000 would not be
qualified because of the simple fact that the physical area does not cover 10,000 hectares.

Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, in fact, in Metro Manila there are any number of municipalities. San
Juan is a specific example which, if we apply the present requirements, would not qualify: 100
square kilometers and a population of not less than 150,000.

But my reply to that, Mr. President, is that they do not have to become a city?

Senator Osmeña III. Because of the income.

Senator Pimentel. But they are already earning a lot, as the gentleman said. Otherwise, the danger
here, if we become lax in the requirements, is the metropolis-located local governments would have
more priority in terms of funding because they would have more qualifications to become a city
compared to far-flung areas in Mindanao or in the Cordilleras, or whatever.

Therefore, I think we should not probably ease up on the requirements. Maybe we can restore the
word "or" so that if they do not have the 100 square kilometers of territory, then if they qualify in
terms of population and income, that would be all right, Mr. President.
Senator Osmeña III. Mr. President, I will not belabor the point at this time. I know that the
distinguished gentleman is considering several amendments to the Local Government Code.
Perhaps this is something that could be further refined at a later time, with his permission.

So I would like to thank the gentleman for his graciousness in answering our questions.

Senator Pimentel. I also thank the gentleman, Mr. President. 29

The Court takes note of the fact that the municipalities cited by the petitioners as having generated
the threshold income of ₱100 million from local sources, including those already converted into
cities, are either in Metro Manila or in provinces close to Metro Manila. In comparison, the
municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws are spread out in the different provinces of the
Philippines, including the Cordillera and Mindanao regions, and are considerably very distant from
Metro Manila. This reality underscores the danger the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 sought to
prevent, i.e., that "the metropolis-located local governments would have more priority in terms of
funding because they would have more qualifications to become a city compared to the far-flung
areas in Mindanao or in the Cordilleras, or whatever," actually resulting from the abrupt increase in
the income requirement. Verily, this result is antithetical to what the Constitution and LGC have
nobly envisioned in favor of countryside development and national growth. Besides, this result
should be arrested early, to avoid the unwanted divisive effect on the entire country due to the local
government units closer to the National Capital Region being afforded easier access to the bigger
share in the national coffers than other local government units.

There should also be no question that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws
belong to a class of their own. They have proven themselves viable and capable to become
component cities of their respective provinces. They are and have been centers of trade and
commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and other
natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. In his speech delivered on the floor of the Senate to
sponsor House Joint Resolution No. 1, Senator Lim recognized such unique traits, 30 viz:

It must be noted that except for Tandag and Lamitan, which are both second-class municipalities in
terms of income, all the rest are categorized by the Department of Finance as first-class
municipalities with gross income of at least P70 million as per Commission of Audit Report for 2005.
Moreover, Tandag and Lamitan, together with Borongan, Catbalogan, and Tabuk, are all provincial
capitals.

The more recent income figures of the 12 municipalities, which would have increased further by this
time, indicate their readiness to take on the responsibilities of cityhood.

Moreover, the municipalities under consideration are leading localities in their respective provinces.
Borongan, Catbalogan, Tandag, Batac and Tabuk are ranked number one in terms of income among
all the municipalities in their respective provinces; Baybay and Bayugan are number two; Bogo and
Lamitan are number three; Carcar, number four; and Tayabas, number seven. Not only are they
pacesetters in their respective provinces, they are also among the frontrunners in their regions –
Baybay, Bayugan and Tabuk are number two income-earners in Regions VIII, XIII, and CAR,
respectively; Catbalogan and Batac are number three in Regions VIII and I, respectively; Bogo,
number five in Region VII; Borongan and Carcar are both number six in Regions VIII and VII,
respectively. This simply shows that these municipalities are viable.

Petitioner League of Cities argues that there exists no issue with respect to the cityhood of its
member cities, considering that they became cities in full compliance with the criteria for conversion
at the time of their creation.
The Court considers the argument too sweeping. What we pointed out was that the previous income
requirement of ₱20 million was definitely not insufficient to provide the essential government
facilities, services, and special functions vis-à-vis the population of a component city. We also
stressed that the increased income requirement of ₱100 million was not the only conclusive indicator
for any municipality to survive and remain viable as a component city. These observations were
unerringly reflected in the respective incomes of the fifty-nine (59) members of the League of Cities
that have still failed, remarkably enough, to be compliant with the new requirement of the ₱100
million threshold income five years after R.A. No. 9009 became law.

Undoubtedly, the imposition of the income requirement of ₱100 million from local sources under R.A.
No. 9009 was arbitrary. When the sponsor of the law chose the specific figure of ₱100 million, no
research or empirical data buttressed the figure. Nor was there proof that the proposal took into
account the after-effects that were likely to arise. As already mentioned, even the danger the
passage of R.A. No. 9009 sought to prevent might soon become a reality. While the Constitution
mandates that the creation of local government units must comply with the criteria laid down in the
LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to
the LGC despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the
LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant national
growth.

Moreover, if we were now to adopt the stringent interpretation of the Constitution the petitioners are
espousing, we may have to apply the same restrictive yardstick against the recently converted cities
cited by the petitioners, and find two of them whose conversion laws have also to be struck down for
being unconstitutional. The two laws are R.A. No. 938731 and R.A. No. 9388,32 respectively
converting the municipalities of San Juan and Navotas into highly urbanized cities. A cursory reading
of the laws indicates that there is no indication of compliance with the requirements imposed by the
LGC, for, although the two local government units concerned presumably complied with the income
requirement of ₱50 million under Section 452 of the LGC and the income requirement of ₱100
million under the amended Section 450 of the LGC, they obviously did not meet the requirements set
forth under Section 453 of the LGC, to wit:

Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status.—It shall be the duty of the President to
declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum
requirements prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and
ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein.

Indeed, R.A. No. 9387 and R.A. No. 9388 evidently show that the President had not classified San
Juan and Navotas as highly urbanized cities upon proper application and ratification in a plebiscite
by the qualified voters therein. A further perusal of R.A. No. 9387 reveals that San Juan did not
qualify as a highly urbanized city because it had a population of only 125,558, contravening the
required minimum population of 200,000 under Section 452 of the LGC. Such non-qualification as a
component city was conceded even by Senator Pimentel during the deliberations on Senate Bill No.
2157.

The petitioners’ contention that the Cityhood Laws violated their right to a just share in the national
taxes is not acceptable.

In this regard, it suffices to state that the share of local government units is a matter of percentage
under Section 285 of the LGC, not a specific amount. Specifically, the share of the cities is 23%,
determined on the basis of population (50%), land area (25%), and equal sharing (25%). This share
is also dependent on the number of existing cities, such that when the number of cities increases,
then more will divide and share the allocation for cities. However, we have to note that the allocation
by the National Government is not a constant, and can either increase or decrease. With every
newly converted city becoming entitled to share the allocation for cities, the percentage of internal
revenue allotment (IRA) entitlement of each city will decrease, although the actual amount received
may be more than that received in the preceding year. That is a necessary consequence of Section
285 and Section 286 of the LGC.

As elaborated here and in the assailed February 15, 2011 Resolution, the Cityhood Laws were not
violative of the Constitution and the LGC. The respondents are thus also entitled to their just share in
the IRA allocation for cities. They have demonstrated their viability as component cities of their
respective provinces and are developing continuously, albeit slowly, because they had previously to
share the IRA with about 1,500 municipalities. With their conversion into component cities, they will
have to share with only around 120 cities.

Local government units do not subsist only on locally generated income, but also depend on the IRA
to support their development. They can spur their own developments and thereby realize their great
potential of encouraging trade and commerce in the far-flung regions of the country. Yet their
potential will effectively be stunted if those already earning more will still receive a bigger share from
the national coffers, and if commercial activity will be more or less concentrated only in and near
Metro Manila.

III.
Conclusion

We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only
had conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the
requirements of the LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9009. Congress undeniably
gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should
do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly
recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress.

WHEREFORE, the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February
2011) is denied with finality.

SO ORDERED
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 176951             November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P.
TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG
represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his personal
capacity as taxpayer, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE
OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR;
MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; and MUNICIPALITY OF
TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY
OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL
SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN,
CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY
OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF
TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention.

x-----------------------------x

G.R. No. 177499             November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P.
TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG
represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his personal
capacity as taxpayer, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN, PROVINCE OF BASILAN;
MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK, PROVINCE OF KALINGA; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN, PROVINCE
OF AGUSAN DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF MATI, PROVINCE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL; and MUNICIPALITY OF
GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY
OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL
SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN,
CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY
OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF
TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --x

G.R. No. 178056             November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P.
TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG
represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his personal
capacity as taxpayer, petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL
NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF EL
SALVADOR, MISAMIS ORIENTAL, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY
OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL
SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN,
CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY
OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF
TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

These are consolidated petitions for prohibition 1 with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City
of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas2 assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and
enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting
plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.

The Facts

During the 11th Congress,3 Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities.
However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.

During the 12th Congress,4 Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), 5 which took
effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the
annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million.
The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad
rush" of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue
Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. 6

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12 th Congress7 adopted Joint

Resolution No. 29,8 which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24
municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress
ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress,9 the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint
Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to
approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed,
through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common
provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also
approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June
2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws10) on various dates from March to July 2007
without the President's signature.11

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each
respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section
10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. 12 Petitioners also
lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in
the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set
aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code. 13

The Issues

The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:

1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and

2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petitions.

The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a
retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more
than five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in
the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and
just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.

Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009,
for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any
statutory construction.

Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA
9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic
aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

Preliminary Matters
Prohibition is the proper action for testing the constitutionality of laws administered by the
COMELEC,14 like the Cityhood Laws, which direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites in implementation of
the Cityhood Laws. Petitioner League of Cities of the Philippines has legal standing because Section 499
of the Local Government Code tasks the League with the "primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and
crystallizing issues affecting city government administration and securing, through proper and legal
means, solutions thereto."15 Petitioners-in-intervention,16 which are existing cities, have legal standing
because their Internal Revenue Allotment will be reduced if the Cityhood Laws are declared constitutional.
Mayor Jerry P. Treñas has legal standing because as Mayor of Iloilo City and as a taxpayer he has
sufficient interest to prevent the unlawful expenditure of public funds, like the release of more Internal
Revenue Allotment to political units than what the law allows.

Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law

RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the 11th Congress. This law specifically amended
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, which now provides:

Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be

converted into a component city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as
certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos
(P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and
if it has either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by
the Land Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as
certified by the National Statistics Office.

The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or
units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and
bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is
composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2)
or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive
of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20
million to P100 million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not
provide any exemption from the increased income requirement.

Prior to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress.
Thirty-three cityhood bills became law before the enactment of RA 9009. Congress did not act on 24
cityhood bills during the 11th Congress.

During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, exempting from
the income requirement of P100 million in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not
acted upon during the 11th Congress. This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the 12th Congress
adjourned without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No.
29 filed between November and December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress,
individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows:

Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income
requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.

This common provision exempted each of the 16 municipalities from the income requirement

of P100 million prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.
These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them.

Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA 9009. RA 9009 became
effective on 30 June 2001 or during the 11th Congress. The 13th Congress passed in December
2006 the cityhood bills which became law only in 2007. Thus, respondent municipalities cannot invoke
the principle of non-retroactivity of laws.17 This basic rule has no application because RA 9009, an earlier
law to the Cityhood Laws, is not being applied retroactively but prospectively.

Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria

Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)

The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in
the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. 18 The
Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for
the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such
criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.

The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation of a city. No other
law, not even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution is to
insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-
discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from
the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement
from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence,
from that moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become
a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement.

In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though
their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all
enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased
income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such
exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently
unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and
not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution

Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government Code are essential to
implement a fair and equitable distribution of national taxes to all local government units. Section 6, Article
X of the Constitution provides:

Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes
which shall be automatically released to them. (Emphasis supplied)

If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there can be no fair
and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.

A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not receive the
same share in national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100 million or more. The criteria of land
area, population and income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, must be
strictly followed because such criteria, prescribed by law, are material in determining the "just share" of
local government units in national taxes. Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, they prevent the fair and just distribution of the Internal
Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution.

Section 450 of the Local Government Code is Clear,

Plain and Unambiguous

There can be no resort to extrinsic aids – like deliberations of Congress – if the language of the law is
plain, clear and unambiguous. Courts determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the law,
within the law's four corners.19 If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply
apply the law according to its express terms. If a literal application of the law results in absurdity,
impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the
legislative history of the law.20

Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local Government Code, did not provide any
exemption from the increased income requirement, not even to respondent municipalities whose cityhood
bills were then pending when Congress passed RA 9009. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, contains no exemption whatsoever. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous
that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income requirement, there is
no reason to go beyond the letter of the law in applying Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009.

The 11th Congress' Intent was not Written into the Local Government Code

True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent municipalities from RA 9009, as shown by
the various deliberations on the matter during the 11 th Congress. However, Congress did not write this
intended exemption into law. Congress could have easily included such exemption in RA 9009 but
Congress did not. This is fatal to the cause of respondent municipalities because such exemption must
appear in RA 9009 as an amendment to Section 450 of the Local Government Code. The Constitution
requires that the criteria for the conversion of a municipality into a city, including any exemption from such
criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code. Congress cannot prescribe such criteria or
exemption from such criteria in any other law. In short, Congress cannot create a city through a law
that does not comply with the criteria or exemption found in the Local Government Code.

Section 10 of Article X is similar to Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting Congress from
creating private corporations except by a general law. Section 16 of Article XII provides:
 The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or
regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be
created or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the
test of economic viability. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Congress must prescribe all the criteria for the "formation, organization, or regulation" of private
corporations in a general law applicable to all without discrimination.21 Congress cannot create a
private corporation through a special law or charter.

Deliberations of the 11th  Congress on Unapproved Bills Inapplicable

Congress is not a continuing body.22 The unapproved cityhood bills filed during the 11th Congress

became mere scraps of paper upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. All the hearings and
deliberations conducted during the 11th Congress on unapproved bills also became worthless upon the
adjournment of the 11th Congress. These hearings and deliberations cannot be used to interpret bills
enacted into law in the 13th or subsequent Congresses.

The members and officers of each Congress are different. All unapproved bills filed in one Congress
become functus officio upon adjournment of that Congress and must be re-filed anew in order to be taken
up in the next Congress. When their respective authors re-filed the cityhood bills in 2006 during the
13th Congress, the bills had to start from square one again, going through the legislative mill just like bills
taken up for the first time, from the filing to the approval. Section 123, Rule XLIV of the Rules of the
Senate, on Unfinished Business, provides:

Sec. 123. x x x

All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1)
Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if presented for the first time.
(Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, Section 78 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, on Unfinished Business, states:

Section 78. Calendar of Business. The Calendar of Business shall consist of the following:

a. Unfinished Business. This is business being considered by the House at the time of its
last adjournment. Its consideration shall be resumed until it is disposed of. The
Unfinished Business at the end of a session shall be resumed at the commencement of
the next session as if no adjournment has taken place. At the end of the term of a
Congress, all Unfinished Business are deemed terminated. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved cityhood bills, as well as the
deliberations during the 12th and 13th Congresses on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009
certain municipalities, have no legal significance. They do not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing laws
passed by subsequent Congresses.

Applicability of Equal Protection Clause

If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contained an exemption to
the P100 million annual income requirement, the criteria for such exemption could be scrutinized for
possible violation of the equal protection clause. Thus, the criteria for the exemption, if found in the Local
Government Code, could be assailed on the ground of absence of a valid classification. However, Section
450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption. The
exemption is contained in the Cityhood Laws, which are unconstitutional because such exemption must
be prescribed in the Local Government Code as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, such exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation
of the equal protection clause. The exemption provision merely states, "Exemption from Republic Act
No. 9009 ─ The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under
Republic Act No. 9009." This one sentence exemption provision contains no classification standards or
guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities from those that are not exempted.

Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11th Congress that municipalities with pending
cityhood bills should be exempt from the P100 million income requirement, there is still no valid
classification to satisfy the equal protection clause. The exemption will be based solely on the fact that
the 16 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in the 11 th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted.
This is not a valid classification between those entitled and those not entitled to exemption from the P100
million income requirement.

To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on substantial distinctions, rationally
related to a legitimate government objective which is the purpose of the law, 23 not limited to existing
conditions only, and applicable to all similarly situated. Thus, this Court has ruled:

The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the
following conditions:

1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;

2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;

3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class. 24

There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11 th Congress
and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the
11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of
the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 th Congress does not affect or determine
the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11 th Congress might
even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the
classification criterion − mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress − is not rationally related to
the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.

Municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills were not informed that a pending cityhood bill in the
11th Congress would be a condition for exemption from the increased P100 million income requirement.
Had they been informed, many municipalities would have caused the filing of their own cityhood bills.
These municipalities, even if they have bigger annual income than the 16 respondent municipalities,
cannot now convert into cities if their income is less than P100 million.

The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition
existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates
the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. This requirement
is illustrated in Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck,25 where the challenged law allowed milk dealers
engaged in business prior to a fixed date to sell at a price lower than that allowed to newcomers in the
same business. In Mayflower, the U.S. Supreme Court held:
 We are referred to a host of decisions to the effect that a regulatory law may be prospective in
operation and may except from its sweep those presently engaged in the calling or activity to
which it is directed. Examples are statutes licensing physicians and dentists, which apply only to
those entering the profession subsequent to the passage of the act and exempt those then in
practice, or zoning laws which exempt existing buildings, or laws forbidding slaughterhouses
within certain areas, but excepting existing establishments. The challenged provision is unlike
such laws, since, on its face, it is not a regulation of a business or an activity in the
interest of, or for the protection of, the public, but an attempt to give an economic
advantage to those engaged in a given business at an arbitrary date as against all those
who enter the industry after that date. The appellees do not intimate that the classification
bears any relation to the public health or welfare generally; that the provision will discourage
monopoly; or that it was aimed at any abuse, cognizable by law, in the milk business. In the
absence of any such showing, we have no right to conjure up possible situations which might
justify the discrimination. The classification is arbitrary and unreasonable and denies the
appellant the equal protection of the law. (Emphasis supplied)

In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique
advantage based on an arbitrary date − the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11 th Congress
- as against all other municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.

Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the
classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16
respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly,
as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely:

Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434,
9435, 9436, and 9491.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC  

January 24, 2017

A.M.  No. RTJ-16-2472 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4141-RTJ]

JUDGE MARTONINO R. MARCOS (Retired), Complainant,

vs.
HON. PERLA V. CABRERA-FALLER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 90,
Dasmariñas City, Cavite, Respondent.

DECISION

Per Curiam:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint  against Judge Perla V. Cabrera-Faller (Judge

1

Cabrera-Faller) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñas City, Cavite (RTC), filed by
Martonino R. Marcos, a retired judge (complainant), for ignorance of the law, misconduct, violation
of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act, and for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment/order.

The Antecedents

The controversy stemmed from the death of complainant's grandson, Marc Andrei Marcos (Marc
Andrei), during the initiation rites of Lex Leonum Fratemitas (Lex Leonum) held on July 29, 2012 at
the Veluz Farm, Dasmariñas City, Cavite.

A preliminary investigation was conducted and, thereafter, the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) issued its Resolution,  dated May 8, 2013, recommending the prosecution of
2

several members of Lex Leonum for Violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8049, otherwise known
as The Anti-Hazing Law. In the same resolution, the OCP also recommended that Cornelio
Marcelo (Marcelo), the person assigned to be the buddy or "angel" of Marc Andrei during the
initiation rites, be discharged as a state witness pursuant to the provisions of Section 12 of R.A. No.
6981. 3

Thereafter, the Information  for Violation of R.A. No. 8049 was filed against Jenno Antonio
4

Villanueva (Villanueva), Emmanuel Jefferson Santiago, Richard Rosales (Rosales), Mohamad

Fyzee Alim (Alim), Chino Daniel Amante (Amante), Julius Arsenio Alcancia, Edrich Gomez, Dexter
Circa, Gian Angelo Veluz, Glenn Meduen, alias Tanton, alias Fidel, alias E.R., and alias Paulo,
before the RTC. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 11862-13.

Finding probable cause to sustain the prosecution of the accused, Judge Cabrera-Faller issued the
Order,  dated June 3, 2013, directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest and, at the same time,
5

the archiving of the entire record of the case until the arrest of the accused.

On June 13, 2013, acting on the Omnibus Motion filed by Rosales, Alim and Amante, Judge
Cabrera-Faller issued another Order  directing the recall of the warrants of arrest of the three
6

accused which she claimed were issued inadvertently.

On August 15, 2013, acting on the separate motions for the determination of probable cause and to
withhold issuance of warrants of arrest  and extremely urgent motion to quash warrant of arrest  filed
7 8
by the accused, Judge Cabrera-Faller issued the Omnibus Order,  quashing, lifting and setting
9

aside the warrants for their arrest and ultimately dismissing the case against all of them for lack
of probable cause.

According to Judge Cabrera-Faller, she found no probable cause to indict the accused for violation
of R.A. No. 8049 as the statement of Marcelo and those of the other accused "were not put in
juxtaposition with each other for a clearer and sharper focus of their respective weight and
substance."   To her, "there were nagging questions left unanswered by the testimony of Marcelo
10

and some improbabilities therein that boggle the mind and disturb the conscience into giving it
absolute currency and credence."   In her view, "the statement of Marcelo simply depicted the
11

stages of initiation rites"   and failed to show that the accused conspired to inflict fatal injuries on
12

Marc Andrei.   She found the statements of the prosecution witnesses, Marcelo
13

Cabansag (Cabansag) and Jan Marcel V. Ragaza (Ragaza) either untruthful, immaterial and

incompetent or brimming with flip flopping testimonies. She brushed aside the admission of the
accused that initiation rites were indeed conducted on July 29, 2012 and that they were allegedly
present in the different stages of the initiation rites, and simply believed the version of the accused
that it was Marcelo, the recruiter and "angel'' of Marc Andrei, who inflicted the fatal blows on him,
causing his death. Thus, the decretal portion of the Omnibus Order reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court holds to grant the motions filed by the following accused,
to wit:

(a) The motion for determination of probable cause filed by the accused Gian Veluz and Edrich
Gomez, which was received by this court on May 20, 2013;

(b) The motion for determination of probable cause, filed by the accused Julius Arsenio A. Alcancia
and Dexter S. Garcia;

(c) The motion for the determination of probable cause, filed by the accused Mahammad Fyzee
Alim, Richard Rosales and Chino Amante, which was received by this court on May 23, 2013;
although a warrant was issued inadvertently against the accused on June 3, 2013, the same was
lifted and recalled in view of the subject motion;

(d) The motion for the determination of probable cause, filed by Emmanuel Jefferson A. Santiago,
which was received by this court on May 29, 2013, although a warrant was issued inadvertently
against the accused on June 3, 2013; the same was lifted and recalled in view of the subject motion;
[and] (e) The extremely urgent motion to quash the warrant of arrest, filed by the accused Jenno
Antonio Villanueva on June 14, 2013.

ACCORDINGLY, the warrant for the arrest, dated June 3, 2013, is hereby quashed, lifted and set
aside, and this case is hereby DISMISSED in so far as all the accused named in the information is
concerned, for the reasons already afore-stated.

SO ORDERED. [Emphases supplied]

The order of dismissal prompted complainant to file this administrative case against Judge Cabrera-
Faller. In his Letter-Complaint,   he alleged, among others, that:
14

1. On June 3, 2013, the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller issued an Order in Crim. Case No. 11862-13
stating that "Finding probable cause to sustain the prosecution of the above-named accused for the
crime charged in the criminal information, let a warrant for their arrest be issued, in the meantime
sent the entire record of this case to the ARCHIVES until the said accused shall have been
arrested."

However, on June 13, 2013, the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller issued another order recalling the
warrant against accused Emmanuel Jefferson A. Santiago because the same was allegedly
INADVERTENTLY issued.

The actuations of the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller clearly demonstrate her incompetence and gross
ignorance of the law and jurisprudence. Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides that "the
judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may
immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he
finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest." When she issued the Order dated June 3,
2013, she certified that she personally evaluated the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence and ruled that there was probable cause so she directed the issuance of warrants of arrest
against all the accused. When she subsequently held that the warrant of arrest was inadvertently
issued against accused Emmanuel Jefferson A. Santiago, does this mean that she did not
personally evaluate the records of the case before directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against all the accused? Does this mean that the warrants of arrests issued against all the other
accused were also INADVERTENTLY issued? Does this mean that the Order dated June 3, 2013
finding probable cause against all the other accused was likewise INADVERTENTLY issued
considering the fact that the basis for the issuance of the warrants of arrest against all the accused is
the said order dated June 3, 2013? A judge who issues a warrant of arrest INADVERTENTLY has
no place in the judiciary because such actuation clearly shows her incompetence and gross
ignorance of both substantive and procedural laws.

The Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller could likewise not claim that the warrant of arrest was
INADVERTENTLY issued because of the filing of the Omnibus Motion by accused Emmanuel
Jefferson A. Santiago. It must be pointed out that when the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller issued the
Order, dated June 3, 2013, finding probable cause against all the accused and directed the issuance
of a warrant of arrest against all the accused, the said motion was already filed with the Honorable
Court. Despite the fact that the said Omnibus Motion was already filed with the court, the Hon. Perla
V. Cabrera-Faller still found probable cause and directed the issuance of warrants of arrests against
all the accused in its Order dated June 3, 2013. Consequently, it could not be said that the
warrant of arrest issued against the accused was INADVERTENTLY issued. It could only be
surmised that there are far more other reasons why the warrant of arrest was recalled but
definitely not due to its alleged INADVERTENT issuance. Unless, of course, the Hon. Perla V.
Cabrera-Faller admits issuing the Order dated June 3, 2013 without evaluating the resolution of the
public prosecutor and its supporting evidence.

Very clearly, the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller manifested her incompetence and/or gross ignorance
of the law by issuing the Order, dated June 13, 2013. She was probably swayed by reasons not
based on the law but probably for some other reasons to the great damage and prejudice of the
relatives of Marc Andrei Marcos whose life was lost at such a very young age.

xxxx

2. On August 15, 2013, Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller again issued an Omnibus Order in Criminal
Case No. 11862-13 quashing, lifting and setting aside the warrant of arrest, dated June 3, 2013, and
dismissing the case against all the accused in Criminal Case No. 11862-13. In issuing the said
Omnibus Order, the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller again demonstrated her incompetence and/ or
gross ignorance of the law as well as manifest biased in favor of the accused in the said case.
In dismissing the case against the accused, the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller ruled in its Findings
and Conclusions that Marcelo's statement and the statements of the accused were not put in
juxtaposition with each other for a clearer and sharper focus of their respective weight and
substance. She then further held that the information in Criminal Case No. 11862-13 was filed by the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Dasmariñas City only on the basis of the lone statement of Cornelio
Marcelo, without any corroborating testimony and that the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Dasmariñas City, Cavite, was swayed by public pulse, considering the media mileage caused by the
incident. These rulings of the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller are based solely on her own
conjectures and pre-determined decision to dismiss the case as clearly shown by the fact
that she recalled the warrants of arrests she earlier directed to be issued even without
conducting hearings and without waiting for any comment from the public and private
prosecutors.

A perusal of the Resolution, dated March 1, 2013, will readily show that the counter-affidavits of the
accused who submitted their counter-affidavits were duly considered in the issuance of the
resolution. In fact, a summary of their allegations were even put in the body of the said Resolution.
While the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dasmariñas City, Cavite, might not have presented the
resolution in the format desired by the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller, it does not mean that the Office
of the City Prosecutor did not weigh the substance of the statements of the accused and the
witnesses presented for purposes of determining probable cause. The ruling of the Hon. Perla V.
Cabrera-Faller that the information in the case was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor only on
the basis of the statement of Cornelio Marcelo, without any corroborating testimony, likewise shows
her incompetence and manifests biased in favor of the accused. The statement of Cornelio
Marcelo was corroborated by the statements of Manuel Adrian Cabansag and Jan Marcel V.
Ragasa. A perusal of the statements of the said neophytes clearly shows that they were subjected
to hazing, together with the late Marc Andrei Marcos and other neophytes, at the Veluz Farm in
Dasmariñas City, Cavite, by the members of the Lex Leonum Fraternity. The fact of hazing at the
Veluz Farm was likewise corroborated by statements of Rene Andaya and Roger Atienza,
farm overseers at the Veluz Farm. Consequently, the sweeping ruling by the Hon. Perla V.
Cabrera-Faller that the information was filed only on the basis of the statement of Cornelio
Marcelo, without corroborating testimony, and that the Office of the City Prosecutor was
swayed by public pulse is absolutely false and without any basis.

In dismissing the case, the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller likewise held that the statement of Marcelo
merely depicted the stages of the initiation rites. However, she conceded that there were physical
infliction of the neophytes but further ruled that the statement did not as much show that the
accused conspired to inflict fatal injuries on this particular neophyte, Andrei Marcos, and further
ruled that conspiracy was not even established. She further ruled that the story of Marcelo that the
neophytes were subjected to excessive beating with paddles and belts during the initiation rites is
incredible and uncorroborated. These rulings of the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller show
her incompetence and gross ignorance as a judge. Contrary to said rulings of the Hon. Perla V.
Cabrera-Faller, the statement of Cornelio Marcelo did not just depict the stages of initiation rites but
detailed what was actually done to Marc Andrei Marcos and other neophytes during the initiation
rites which resulted to the death of the late Marc Andrei Marcos. This was corroborated by the
statement of Manuel Adrian Cabansag and Jan Marcel V. Ragasa. Cornelio Marcelo stated that
Marc Andrei Marcos was hit with paddle, belt, and/or punched on the thighs and upper arms during
the different parts of the initiation rites. This was corroborated by the statements of Manuel Adrian
Cabansag and Jan Marcel V. Ragasa, two (2) neophytes who underwent initiation rites with Marc
Andrei Marcos and other neophytes, who stated that they were likewise beaten with paddle at their
thighs and/or arms during the different stages of the initiation rites. Very clearly, the Hon. Perla V.
Cabrera-Faller is incompetent and/ or blindfolded just like the neophytes and failed or refused to see
that the statement of Cornelio Marcelo was corroborated by the statements of Manuel Adrian
Cabansag and Jan Marcel V. Ragasa.
The Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller likewise ruled that the statement of Marcelo did not show that the
accused have conspired to inflict fatal injuries on this particular neophyte, Andrei Marcos, then
proceeds to posit the question "Is it reasonable and normal to suppose that all the accused resolved
to paddle and hit Andrei Marcos to death? Then ruled finally that no one is to be blamed for the
death of Andrei Marcos. These rulings of the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller clearly shows
her incompetence and gross ignorance of our existing laws. It likewise shows her manifest bias
in favor of the accused in this case. Section 4 of RA 8049 provides that "If the person subjected
to hazing or other forms of initiation rites suffers any physical injury or dies as a result
thereof, the officers and members of the fraternity, sorority or organization who actually
participated in the infliction of physical harm shall be liable as principals x x x. " Based on this
provision of law, there is no need to prove that the accused has conspired to inflict fatal
injuries to Marc Andrei Marcos during the latter's initiation rites. There is no need to prove
that the accused resolved to paddle and hit Marc Andrei Marcos to death. It is more than
sufficient to prove that Marc Andrei Marcos was subjected to hazing and initiation rites and
he died as a result thereof. In fact, mere presence during the hazing or initiation rites is
already a prima facie evidence of the participation therein as principal unless he prevented
the commission of the acts (Section 4, RA 8049).

The Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller then ruled that she "cannot somehow consign the above-named
accused to a life of untold infamy and cannot in conscience consign all the accused to the dustbin of
history simply on the basis of the uncorroborated and incredible lone statement of Cornelio Marcelo"
and proceeded to dismiss the case. In coming up with this ruling and dismissing the case, the Hon.
Perla V. Cabrera-Faller again manifested her incompetence and gross ignorance of existing laws. It
must be pointed out that the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller is only called upon to determine the
existence of probable cause for purposes of the issuance of warrants of arrest against the accused.
She is not being called upon yet to determine the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. As
held by the Supreme Court in Pp. vs. CA, et al. (G.R. No. 126005 January 21, 1999), the judge
should not override the public prosecutor's determination of probable cause to hold an accused for
trial on the ground that the evidence presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was
insufficient. If the information is valid on its face, and there is no showing of manifest error, grave
abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, the trial court should respect
such determination. The Supreme Court further held in the same case that the rights of the people
from what could sometimes be an "oppressive" exercise of government prosecutorial powers do
need to be protected when circumstances so require. But just as we recognize this need, we also
acknowledge that the State must likewise be accorded due process. Thus, when there is no showing
of nefarious irregularity or manifest error in the performance of a public prosecutor's duties, courts
ought to refrain from interfering with such lawfully and judicially mandated duties.   [Emphases and
15

underscoring supplied]

In her Very Respectful Comment,   Judge Cabrera-Faller denied the accusations and asserted that:
16

3) The undersigned very respectfully honors the grief of this grandfather who lost a beloved
grandson, but, charging the undersigned judge administratively for performing a judicial function
would cause a heavy toll on this respondent judge that always tries her best to dispose of cases
pending in the Regional Trial Court of Dasmariñas City, Branch 90, with justice and equity,
regardless of the personalities involved in a particular case;

4) The grapevine, as well as newspaper accounts, has it that the private complainant in

Criminal Case No. 11862-13 has already received settlement from all of the accused, except
for the self-proclaimed witness for the prosecution, Cornelio Marcelo, allegedly for the amount of 5
million pesos, and now Mr. Martonino R. Marcos charges the undersigned with his perceived notions
of corruption and dishonesty. If the alleged "pay-off' is true, then, the cries of injustice of Mr.
Martonino R. Marcos has become a charade.

The undersigned respondent judge humbly and modestly states that the questioned order is a
twenty-page resolution, where the respective postures of the parties were explicitly and painstakingly
incorporated, and in the mind of the undersigned respondent judge, negates corruption, malicious
rendering of an unjust judgment and any signs of shoddy disposition of the case. The private
complainant has remedies under the law to question the order of this court in Criminal Case No.
11862-13 for violation of the Anti-Hazing Law; in fact, the private complainant, through its private
counsel, had filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of this court, and dated August 15, 2013,
which is yet pending resolution.

Jurisprudence held that the "alleged errors committed by a judge pertaining to the exercise of his
adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings but should instead be
assailed through judicial remedies (A.M. No. MTJ-001311, 459 Phil. 214 [2003]."  [Emphasis
17

supplied]

In his Reply,   complainant insisted that Judge Cabrera-Faller did not simply commit an error of
18

judgment but she knowingly rendered an unjust judgment which was contrary to law, and prayed that
she be held accountable for having committed patent gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
discretion and complete disregard of the law and the rules of criminal procedure. Furthermore,
complainant denied that they had been paid the amount of ₱5 million pesos and asserted that Judge
Cabrera-Faller should not have believed or given credence to the "pay-off," which she heard from
the "grapevine." "Pay-off" was a term that she should not have even used as it did not exist under
the rules of criminal procedure. Granting that there was a "pay-off," Judge Cabrera-Faller should
know the basic rule that payment of civil liability was not equivalent to dismissal of the criminal case.

Report of the OCA

In its Report,   dated June 10, 2016, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found Judge
19

Cabrera-Faller liable for gross ignorance of the law [1] for inadvertently issuing the warrants of arrest
against the accused; [2] for sending the record of the case to the archives, even prior to the
return/report that the accused could not be apprehended in violation of the six (6)-month period
under Administrative Circular (A.C.) No. 7-A-92; and [3] for precipitately dismissing Criminal Case
No. 11862-13. The OCA recommended that Judge Cabrera-Faller be suspended from the service for
a period of six (6) months without salary and other benefits.

The Ruling of the Court

The findings of the OCA are well-taken, but the Court differs as to the recommended penalty.

Without a quibble, Judge Cabrera-Faller demonstrated lack of knowledge and understanding of the
basic rules of procedure when she issued the questioned orders.

A. On the immediate archiving of Criminal Case No. 11862

Judge Cabrera-Faller violated Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 when she issued the June 3, 2013
Order directing the immediate archiving of Criminal Case No. 11862-13, after ordering the issuance
of the warrants of arrest against the accused in the same order. The archiving of cases is a generally
acceptable measure designed to shelve cases but is done only where no immediate action is
expected.  A.C. No. 7-A-92 enumerated the circumstances when a judge may order the archiving of
20

a criminal case as follows:

(a) If after the issuance of the warrant of arrest, the accused remains at large for six (6) months from
the delivery of the warrant to the proper peace officer, and the latter has explained the reason why
the accused was not apprehended; or

(b) When proceedings are ordered suspended for an indefinite period because:

(1) the accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders
him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently, or to undergo trial,
and he has to be committed to a mental hospital;

(2) a valid prejudicial question in a civil action is invoked during the pendency of the criminal case
unless the civil and the criminal cases are consolidated; and

3) an interlocutory order or incident in the criminal case is elevated to, and is pending resolution/
decision for an indefinite period before a higher court which has issued a temporary restraining order
or writ of preliminary injunction; and

4) when the accused has jumped bail before arraignment and cannot be arrested by his bondsman.

When Judge Cabrera-Faller issued the warrants, she also archived the case. She, however, did not
cite any ground in A.C. No. 7-A-92 for the suspension of the proceedings. What she did was
unprecedented. She did not even bother to wait for the return of the warrants or wait for the six-
month period. By doing so, she exhibited bias, if not incompetence and ignorance of the law and
jurisprudence. It could also be that she knew it, but she opted to completely ignore the law or the
regulations. Certainly, it was a case of grave abuse of discretion as her actuations were not in
accord with law or justice.

B. On the recall of the warrants of arrest that were allegedly issued inadvertently

Judge Cabrera-Faller showed manifest bias and partiality, if not gross ignorance of the law, when
she issued the June 13, 2013 Order recalling the warrants of arrest against accused Alim, Amante
and Rosales claiming that they were issued inadvertently.

In the judicial determination of probable cause, no less than the Constitution mandates a judge
to personally determine the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. This has
been embodied in Section 2,  Article III of the Philippine Constitution and Section 6,  Rule 112 of the
21 22

Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Clearly, Judge Cabrera-Faller was mandated to personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, to issue a warrant of arrest. Though she was not required to personally examine the
complainant or his witnesses, she was obliged to personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor before ordering the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

In the June 13, 2013 Order, Judge Cabrera-Faller recalled the warrants of arrest against three of the
accused.  She, however, failed to explain why she issued the warrants inadvertently. She merely
1awp++i1

wrote that the warrants of arrest were "inadvertently issued" without any explanation why there was
such inadvertence in the issuance. The Court cannot accept this. There was clearly an abdication of
the judicial function. The records of the case were forwarded by the OCP and they contained not
only the information but all the supporting documents like the statement of Cornelio Marcelo and the
corroborating statements of Cabansag and Ragaza and those of Rene Andaya and Roger Atienza,
the farm overseers at the Veluz Farm.

It could only mean that she failed to comply with her constitutional mandate to personally determine
the existence of probable cause before ordering the issuance of the warrants of arrest. As the
presiding judge, it was her task, upon the filing of the Information, to first and foremost determine the
existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused.  It was incumbent upon
23

her to assess the resolution, affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor
to satisfy herself that probable cause existed and before a warrant of arrest could be issued against
the accused.   If she did find the evidence submitted by the prosecutor to be insufficient, she could
24

order the dismissal of the case, or direct the investigating prosecutor either to submit more evidence
or to submit the entire records of the preliminary investigation, or she could even call the
complainant and the witness to answer the courts probing questions to enable her to discharge her
duty.

Most probably, she did her duty to examine and analyze the attached documents but because she
took pity on the young accused (never mind the victim), she chose to ignore or disregard them.
Nonetheless, "when the inefficiency springs from failure to consider so basic and elemental a
rule, law or principle in the discharge of duties, the judge is either insufferably incompetent
and undeserving of the position she holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission
was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority." 25

C. On the hasty dismissal of Criminal Case No. 11862-13

In the same vein, Judge Cabrera-Faller should be held administratively accountable for hastily
dismissing the Criminal Case No. 11862-13. The Court cannot ignore her lack of prudence for it is
the Court's duty to protect and preserve public confidence in our judicial system.

The well-settled rule that once a complaint or information is filed before the trial court, any
disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests
on the sound discretion of the said court  is not absolute. Although a motion to dismiss the case or
26

withdraw the Information is addressed to the court, its grant or denial must always be in the faithful
exercise of judicial discretion and prerogative.  For the judge's action must neither impair the
27

substantial rights of the accused nor the right of the State and the offended party to due
process of law.   In the case of People v. Court of Appeals,   the Court elucidated:
28 29

We are simply saying that, as a general rule, if the information is valid on its face and there is no
showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor,
courts should not dismiss it for "want of evidence," because evidentiary matters should be presented
and heard during the trial. The functions and duties of both the trial court and the public prosecutor in
"the proper scheme of things" in our criminal justice system should be clearly understood.

The rights of the people from what could sometimes be an "oppressive" exercise of government
prosecutorial powers do need to be protected when circumstances so require. But just as we
recognize this need, we also acknowledge that the State must likewise be accorded due process.
Thus, when there is no showing of nefarious irregularity or manifest error in the performance of a
public prosecutor's duties, courts ought to refrain from interfering with such lawfully and judicially
mandated duties. 30
In the present case, the Court agrees with the observation of the OCA that there was haste in the
disposition of Criminal Case No. 11862-13. It must be noted that the Information for the said case
was instituted by the OCP on May 10, 2013. Thereafter, on June 3, 2013, Judge Cabrera-Faller
issued the order finding probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Barely 10 days had
lapsed, however, or on June 13, 2013, she recalled the warrants of arrest against three (3) accused
due to oversight or inadvertence. And on August 15, 2013, in the Omnibus Order, she lifted the
warrants of arrest she issued and dismissed the case for lack of probable cause.

Although no direct evidence was presented to show that Judge Cabrera-Faller was influenced by
improper considerations, the Court cannot close its eyes in the manner by which Criminal Case No.
11862-13 was dismissed. Her actuations put in serious doubts her integrity and honesty, both as a
person and a member of the Bench, qualities which every magistrate should possess.  31

Judge Cabrera-Faller dismissed Criminal Case No. 11862-13 without taking into consideration the
earlier resolution of the OCP and failed to evaluate the evidence in support thereof, which sustained
a finding of probable cause against the accused.

A perusal of the records would show that the OCP resolution was based on the Sinumpaang
Salaysay  and the Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Marcelo, who recounted in
32 33

detail the initiation rites that transpired on July 29, 2012, and his participation as the designated
"buddy or angel" of Marc Andrei, and enumerated the names of those who were present and
participated in the said initiation rites. This testimony of Marcelo was corroborated by the two
neophytes who were also present during the initiation rites, Cabansag   and Ragaza.   In their
34 35

respective statements, they bravely narrated their harrowing experience on that fateful night. The
sworn statements and affidavits of these prosecution witnesses all presented a consistent and
coherent version of the events that took place on July 29, 2012.

Considering the strong evidence on hand presented by the OCP, it would have been more prudent
for Judge Cabrera-Faller to conduct summary hearings in view of the conflicting statements of the
prosecution and defense witnesses. Although this is not actually required by the rules, when the
direct and circumstantial evidence are so detailed and corroborative of one another in every
particular, it behooved upon her to make further inquiries. Precipitate dismissal of the case, in the
face of overwhelming evidence, can only raise quizzical eyebrows.

Indeed, in her Omnibus Order  dismissing the case, her reasoning that there was no probable
36

cause was strained and taxed one's credulity. As earlier stated, Judge Cabrera-Faller wrote that the
statement of Marcelo simply depicted the stages of initiation rites and failed to show that the
accused conspired to inflict fatal injuries on Marc Andrei. Despite the admission on the part of the
accused that initiation rites were indeed conducted on July 29, 2012 and that they were present in
the different stages of the initiation rites, she brushed aside these admissions and the narrations of
the prosecution witnesses and simply opted to believe the claim of the accused that it was Marcelo,
and Marcelo alone, who inflicted the fatal blow on his recruit.

Judge Cabrera-Faller should know that the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is
evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on
the merits.   A hearing is absolutely indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether
37

the prosecution's evidence is strong or weak. Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049, if the person
subjected to hazing or other forms of initiation rites suffers any physical injury or dies as a result
thereof, the officers and members of the fraternity, sorority or organization who actually participated
in the infliction of physical harm shall be liable as principals, and the officers and members
present during the hazing are prima facie presumed to have actually participated, unless it can be
shown that he or she prevented the commission of the punishable acts.  This disputable
38

presumption arises from the mere presence of the offender during the hazing.

Judge Cabrera-Faller must be reminded that a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry
into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that
the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged  for it would be unfair to require
39

the prosecution to present all the evidence needed to secure the conviction of the accused upon the
filing of the information against the latter.40

A judge may dismiss the case for lack of probable cause only in clear-cut cases when the evidence
on record plainly fails to establish probable cause - that is when the records readily show
uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the
elements of the crime charged. 41

Hazing is commonly characterized by secrecy and silence and to require the prosecution to indicate
every step of the planned initiation rite in the information at the inception of the criminal case would
be a strenuous task.  Although a speedy determination of an action or proceeding implies a speedy
42

trial, it should be borne in mind that speed is not the chief objective of a trial. It must be stressed that
a careful and deliberate consideration for the administration of justice is more important than a race
to end the trial.  43

Although judges are generally not accountable for erroneous judgments rendered in good faith, such
defense in situations of infallible discretion adheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment
and does not apply where the basic issues are so simple and the applicable legal principle evident
and basic as to be beyond permissible margins of error. 44

Time and again, the Court has earnestly reminded judges to be extra prudent and circumspect in the
performance of their duties. This exalted position entails a lot of responsibilities, foremost of which is
proficiency in the law.  They are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
45

statutes and procedural rules and to apply them properly in all good faith.   When the law is
46

sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything less than that
would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. 47

Moreover, judges are duty bound to render just, correct and impartial decisions at all times in a
manner free of any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality or integrity.   The records must be free
48

from the slightest suspicion that the trial court seized upon an opportunity to either free itself from the
usual burdens of presiding over a full-blown court battle or worse, to give undue advantage or favors
to one of the litigants.  Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper
49

conduct of judges.   The appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public confidence
50

and the administration of justice as actual bias or prejudice.  51

Thus, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence.  They are likewise mandated to be faithful to the law and
1avvphi1

to maintain professional competence at all times.   A judge owes the public and the court the duty to
52

be proficient in the law. He is expected to keep abreast of the laws and prevailing
jurisprudence.  Basic rules must be at the palms of their hands  for ignorance of the law by a judge
53 54

can easily be the mainspring of injustice.  55

Unfortunately, Judge Cabrera-Faller fell short of this basic canon. Her utter disregard of the laws and
rules of procedure, to wit: the immediate archiving of Criminal Case No. 11862-13, the recall of the
warrant of arrest which she claimed were issued inadvertently and the hasty dismissal of the case
displayed her lack of competence and probity, and can only be considered as grave abuse of
authority. All these constitute gross ignorance of the law and incompetence.  56

Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross
ignorance of the law is a serious charge, punishable by dismissal from service, suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months, or a
fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.  In the case of Chua Keng Sin v.
57

Judge Mangeten,   the respondent judge was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law due to
58

procedural lapses in disposing the motions in the criminal case pending before his sala. The Court
stated that his careless disposition of the motions was a reflection of his incompetence as a judge in
discharging his official duties, thus, he could not be relieved from the consequences of his actions
simply because he was a newly appointed judge and his case load was heavy.

Accordingly, considering the blatant violation of the law and rules committed by Judge Cabrera-
Faller and her grievous exercise of discretion, the appropriate penalty should be dismissal from the
service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except leave credits, and with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and
controlled corporations.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Judge Perla V. Cabrera-Faller, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial

Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñas City, Cavite, GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and for violating
Rule 1.01 and Rule 3. 01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Court imposes the penalty
of DISMISSAL from the service, with FORFEITURE of retirement benefits, except leave credits, and
with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned and controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.