and Wheels
The 1st Aero Squadron,
Truck Transport, and
the Punitive Expedition of 1916(vere late tck
the it ere Sharon
fovsuh-ono atte
Sin dniono uinton
ena ding wr ot
ta1s1016 (Prove
Courtesy on Fert
Sam Houston seu)
THE 1ST
AERO
SQUADRON
PLAYED A
SIGNIFICANT
ROLE IN
PERSHING’S
PUNITIVE
EXPEDITION
Roger G. Miller is an historian with the Air Foree History and Museums Program whose articles
have appeared in The Indiana Magazine of History, Miliary Affairs, Prologue, and Air Power
History. He tecently edited a book, Seeing Off the Bear: Anglo-American Air Power Cooperation
During the Cold War, and is currently writing an official history, Keep ‘Em Flying: Air Force
Logisties from the Mexican Border to the Persian Gulf.
Foulois and the 1st Aero Squadron steamed
into Columbus, New Mexico, on the morn:
ing of March 15, 1916, it brought with it two ted
nological innovations that would cause a revolu-
tion in the mobility and striking power of the US.
‘Army, The first of these was, perhaps, the most
dramatic, Off the train came eight wood, wire,
and fabrie Curtiss JN-3 biplanes, virtually every
airplane owned by the army save those at the
Signal Corps Aviation School at San Diego,
California, For the first time, America’s “air
force"—consisting entirely of the Ist Aero
Squadron—had deployed for an active campaign.
Teas dramatic but more immediate, was the see-
ond piece of technology. In addition to the air-
We the train carrying Captain Benjamin D.
planes, the train carried the 1st Aero Squadron's
organic transportation: ten four-wheel drive
‘motor trucks, oddities in an army still wedded to
the horse and mule.' When they arrived at
Columbus, Captain Foulois and his men expected
to join Brig, Gen. John J. Pershing's mobile
cohimns in Mexico immediately: Instead, they
found themselves caught up in the practical prob-
lems of army logistics. The Ist Aero Squadron
played a significant role in Pershing’s Punitive
Expedition in a way totally unexpected by its air
minded officors and men. Because of its expertise
with the truck, the squadron became the initial
key to the Expedition’s logistical support.
‘The call to action for the 1st Aero Squadron
came because of longstanding trouble along the
Mexican border. Revolt had broken out in late
1910 against the old dictator, Porfirio Diaz, and
since then Mexico had experienced the attentions
of a series of patriots, militarists, insurrection-
ists, revolutionaries, and outright bandits fight-
ing for political and economic control of the coun-
try—or at least for access to its wealth. The
United States’ extensive investment in Mexico's
economy and regrettable tendency to meddle in
its neighbor's affairs ensured that the unsettled
conditions would eventually spill onto American
territory, By early 1916, most of the US. Army's
field forces were arrayed along the border from
Brownsville, Texas, to San Diego, California,
‘Among these units was the 13th Cavalry, head-
quartered at Columbus with outposts covering
the border three miles to the south.?
Columbus, population about three hundred,
was a typical Southwestern town of adobe and
‘rame buildings bisected by the railroad that con-
nected it with El Paso, Texas, seventy-five miles
to the east. It sprang to national attention partly
because President Woodrow Wilson rocognized
the de facto government of Venustiano Carranza
late in 1915, Shortly afterward United States offi-
cials allowed Carrancista troops to cross
‘American territory on American railroads to
strengthen the garrison at Agua Prieta then
under siege by Carranza’s fierce rival, Pancho
Villa, Reinforced, the Carrancistas broke the
back of Villa's army on November 1, 1915. Villa
swore revenge on the United States. Shortly after
midnight on Mareh 9, 1916, he led some five hun-
dred men into Columbus, burned part of the
town, and killed eighteen Americans including
eight soldiers, The 13th Cavalry reacted quickly,
however, forcing the raiders out of Columbus and.
chasing them several miles into Mexico. In the
bitter fighting, Villa lost over sixty men}
‘Over the next few days the telegraph wires
between Columbus and Washington, D.C,, flashed
im power 2istory /yareR 586airy inte,
‘riage Pura
xpdion. Preto
cntey abe
tonal ces)
IT WAS
OBVIOUS
FROM THE
OUTSET
THAT TRANS-
PORTATION
AND SUPPLY
WOULD.
PROVE THE
MAJOR
CHALLENGE
TO
PERSHING’S
FORCE
reports, requests, and instructions. Within hours
of the attack, President Wilson and his eabinet
agroed that Villa must be brought to account. At
the same time, Maj. Gen, Frederick Funston,
commander of the army's Southern Department,
notified Washington that Villa's force was at Boca
Grande and proposed sending troops after it
President Wilson authorized the expedition.
“Black Jack” Pershing, a strict diseiplinarian with
a growing reputation, was appointed to com-
mand, For the most part, Funston and Pershing
assembled what, would be called the Punitive
Expedition from forees already near the border
the 7th, 10th, Lith, and 13th Cavalry, 6th and
16th Infantry, and two batteries from the 6th
Field Artillery. Supporting units included two
companies of engineers, an ambulanee company,
a field hospital, and two mule-drawn wagon sup-
ply companies. And someone, the record is
lunclear as to whom, remembered the Ist Aero
Squadron, then at its post near San Antonio,
‘Texas, The Expedition initially comprised 4,800
men and 4,175 animals
1 was obvious from the outset that trans-
portation and supply would prove the major chal-
lenge to Pershing’s force, and that his ability to
deal with these factors might determine the suc-
cess or failure of the campaign. Mexico was a
logistician’s nightmare. The state of Chihuahua
covered more than 94,000 square miles divided
into two geographic regions. To the east, a
plateau section occupied four-fifths of the state
and consisted of alkaline flats and sandy plains
intersected by ranges of barren hills. To the west,
the Sierra Madre mountains rose above 10,000
feet and proved passable only through jagged,
wind-swept canyons. Weather could include any-
thing from dust storms to sudden blizzards, and
the temperature ranged from burning hot to
freezing cold, sometimes veering ninety degrees
mrownn History / woe 1955
in a single day. Few adequate roads crossed the
region, and those that existed were little more
than unpaved tracks—erusted, rock-hard ruts in
the dry season that changed to rivers of mud dur-
ing the rainy. Subsistence was available—mostly
beef, corn, and beans—and forage could be found,
but even under ideal conditions the region would
wear down horses and men quickly. And condi-
tions were far from ideal. Northern Chihuahua
‘was grazing country, but the lack of rain since the
previous July had rendered the grass dry and
unnourishing, and if the campaign extended into
the summer, the heat would evaporate the avail-
able water and burn off the forage.®
‘The impact of these conditions would be mini:
mized if Pershing could properly exploit the
resources available in Moxico. Since the
American Civil War, armies had operated on rail
roads where possible, and General Funston pro-
posed using the rail lines in northern Mexico. The
Northwestern Railroad connected the major city
of Chihuahua with Juarez, across the border from
El Paso, Equipped with American rolling stock, it
would provide an ideal method for moving troops
quickly to areas frequented by Villa's forces and
for keeping widely dispersed columns supplied,
though the rails were in poor condition and the
tracks might have proven vulnerable to Villista
raiders, Likewise, the army's standard practice
was to procure food and forage locally where pos-
sible, and enough villages and towns existed in
the region to greatly reduce the expedition’
dependence on its line of supplies.
Early on March 10, the new Secretary of War
Newton D, Baker, asked General Funston for an
analysis of the force required to subdue Villa and
fof the support that foree would require.
‘Addressing the latter point, Funston recom:
mended an immediate advance from Columbus to
Casas Grandes, Mexico, then to points south as
15Tse side enoy
dng
fate cours of
favor ares)
THE U.S.
ARMY HAD
BEGUN
EXPERI-
MENTING
WITH MOTOR
VEHICLES
ABOUT 1900
AND
TRUCKS AS
EARLY AS
1902
16
the situation dictated. He suggested that this ini
tial advance could be supplied temporarily by
truck from the rail head at Columbus. After the
expedition secured Casas Grandes as its
advanced base, El Paso would beeome the main
base and supplies could then be sent by train over
the Northwestern Railroad, Other factors quickly
intervened, however. War Department orders to
General Pershing stated explicitly that use of the
railroads required the permission of Mexican offi-
cials, But the Carranza government—with long
memories of the Mexican War and gringo inter-
ference—proved obdurate, and the State
Department failed to gain permission for the use
of the Mexican railroads.” Facing @ harsh and
extensive terrain with inadequate roads and for:
biden the use of the railroad, Pershing deter.
mined to rely upon the unproven motor truck as
his basie means of supply: What Funston had pro:
posed as a temporary measure, Pershing decided
‘would be the logistical engine of his campaign.
‘There was a minor problem. The army had lit
tle experience with trucks, especially under field
conditions.
‘The US. Army had begun experimenting with
motor vehicles about 1900 and trucks as early as
1902, It soon had a small number of primitive
vehicles in use, primarily at arsenals and depots.
In 1911 the General Staff began a systematic
study of truck transport at posts and during
maneuvers, Of particular note was a cross-coun
try test in 1912 featuring one F.W.D., one
Sampson, one Autocar, and two White trucks. The
vehicles left Washington, D.C., on February 8,
traveled to Atlanta and then north, reaching Fe
Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, on March 28. The
results of these experiments were generally posi-
tive despite the unreliability of commercial
trucks and the fact that most were designed for
uuse on paved surfaces. Based upon this experi-
ence army leaders accepted, in principle, the
value of motorized transportation in the field.
Nevertheless, limited peacetime funding, lack of a
sense of urgency, and the military's innate cor
servatism prevented immediate application. As of
the beginning of 1916, the army had purchased
about one hundred trucks from at Jeast twenty
different companies. The majority of these were
in use at depots and posts, though a few were
delivering supplies to outlying detachments
along the Mexican border. The Quartermaster
Corps had also set specifications for a field truck
and had proposed a tentative organization for
‘motor truck supply companies and repair shops.
However, the Corps had yet to adopt a standard
truck. More significantly, army personnel were
neither trained nor experienced in the manage-
ment, operation, and maintenance of motor vehi-
cles.* Fortunately for Pershing and the Punitive
Expedition, however, one small unit had been
experimenting with trucks and had developed
some expertise, That unit was the Ist Aero
Squadron.
Aviation personnel in the Signal Corps had
‘become interested in trucks almost as early as in.
airplanes, Lieutenant Foulois, for example, who
tested the army's first airplane at Fort’ Sam
Houston near San Antonio, Texas, in 1910,
ineluded a requirement for ten “aero trucks” and
ten “auto trucks” for an aero company in the pro-
visional regulations that he wrote early in 1911
fas a result of his experience. At least one truck
was in use at the Signal Corps’s first aviation
school at College Park, Maryland, in August of
that year, and Lts. Henry H. Arnold and Thomas
DeW. Milling drove one to Fort Riley, Kansas,
when they tested an airplane there in October
1912.9
Beyond their own limited experience, aviation
personnel locked to developments abroad for
inspiration, During its field maneuvers in 1911,
for example, the French army fielded twenty air:
craft supporting two army corps, and provided
that foree, army aviators noted, with an extensive
truck-based supply and transport system orga
nized into three echelons. The first echelon
included the airplanes and enough trucks to
carry the crew, hangar tents, repair tools, spare
parts, first aid materials, gasoline, and oil. The
second echelon comprised “freight automobiles”
with “complete spares and reserve supplies”
including extra motors, wings, frames, controls,
and materials for complete airplane repairs. The
third echelon consisted of a workshop on wheels,
carrying a forge, special tools, additional repair
materials, and an electrical light plant for work
at night? US. Army aviators viewed the French
with envy!
‘An American aviation deployment was muci
less impressive. From August 10 through 17,
1912, two mismatched aireraft, a radio-equipped
Burgess-Wright and a dual-control Curtiss, par-
ticipated in maneuvers held in Connecticut sup-
ported by a White Motor Company truck operated
by the Quartermaster Department, Surprisingly,
the airplanes—despite their limited capabilities
and the difficult flying conditions—performed
am powen History J wae 095valuable reconnaissance and communications
missions that earned compliments from army
leaders. But the support effort proved inade-
quate, especially the truck. Captain Frederick
Hennessy, the senior aviator at the maneuvers,
called for an establishment of one truck for each
aircraft in the field to haul fuel, spare parts, and
equipment. These needed, he specified, to be 60
horse power (h.p.) four-wheel drive trucks rather
than the 80 h.p, vehicle used during the maneu-
vers. He recommended that they have standard
army escort wagon beds covered with removable
bows and a canvas cover, much like the covered
CAPTAIN wagons of the Old West, and that at least one be
FOULOIS equipped as a mobile workshop complete with a
SELECTED ‘ge lathe mills and other machinery fe
AS THE was indmatel edt the orgniaton oan er
cea ae aller wa oc lactis
TRUCK (FOR following year. On Fobruary 22, 1918, Gon
RRO GRON te days nine auplans ana thar sopporting
THE CHASSIS ipa ofthe amy’ tm vin Bie Oxy
George P. Scriven, the Chief Signal Officer, seized
THE JEFFERY this opportunity, arguing in a memorandum to
COMPANY Mei. Gen, Hugh’ L Seote, the Chie of staff on
March 3 that “the presont concentration of aro:
haute material at Galveston presonts the fret,
opportunity to officially recognize a squadron.
ae result, the group wo organized two days
Intar an the let Aero. Squadron (Provisional)
Ey ea al by
‘ra ry, etre
Sauseron persone ta:
(ere ted wings
‘sot etary
aks 3 Cokmogn New
Amn power History
under Captain Charles deF. Chandler. On
December 4, 1913, the army officially specified
that the squadron would comprise twenty off
cers, ninety enlisted men, and eight airplanes
organized into s headquarters and two aero com-
panies, The orders authorized the squadron six
teen trucks to enable it to cooperate with the
army in the field.”
Tnadeguate funding meant that establishing
the authorization was easier than getting vehi
cles. When Foulois and one company of the 1st
‘Aero Squadron went to Texas in April 1914, two
‘weary, underpowered school vehicles were al
that was available. They soon wore out. The
Quartermaster Corps was responsible for all
army transport, and was supposed to purchase
vehicles to meet Signal Corps requirements. On
May 8, Foulois requested that the Quartermaster
Corps purchase four trucks ta replace his two.
‘The Quartermaster General's Office combined
this request with several others into the army’s
first major motor vehicle purchase. On June 11,
the Corps bought twenty-one trucks: seven
White, five Velie, three Lippard-Stewart, two
Mack, and one each from Kelly-Sprinafield,
Driges-Seabury, Federal, and Lord Baltimore
Despite Fouloiss request for four trucks, the Ist
Aero Squadron unit apparently received only two
White trucks in exchange for its old vehicles."
Later that yeur, Captain Foulois selected as
the standard truck for the Ist Aero Squadron the
one-and-one-half ton, four-wheel drive chassis
built by the Thomas B. Jeffery Company, equip-
ped with an escort wagon body designed by him
Self The Jeffery Quad, as it was known, featured
a 87 hp, engine and four-wheel steering and
braking The Quartermaster Corps purchased six
of these on December 29, 1914, and the Ist Aero
Squadron had received them by April 1916.
Foulois subsequently requisitioned ten more to
replace the two Whites and to bring the squadron
to its authorized complement with one standard
type truck, thus simplifying squadron supply and
maintenance."*
The shortage of funds, however, remained a
persistent prablem. In response to Foulois's
request, Lt, Col, Samuel Reber, head of the
‘Aviation Section, reported that the Quartermas-8 pans blog
iow ous
Counts New Meco,
tye steve
hon ty tacks
CONGRESS
APPROPRI-
ATED ONLY
$301,000 FOR
MILITARY
AERONAU-
TICS IN
FISCAL
YEAR
1916
FOR THE
FIRST TIME,
THE 1ST
AERO
SQUADRON
TRAVELED
ACROSS
COUNTRY
UNDER ITS
OWN POWER
18
ter General had “practically robbed us of $17,500
for truck purchases.” Fiscal year 1915 funding
hhad authorized $32,500 for trucks for the Signal
Corps, and the Quartermaster General had
bought the original Jeffery trucks using a portion
of the money, When Reber requested the addi-
tional trucks, however, the Quartermaster
General reported that, at the direction of the
President, the remaining money had been placed
in a general transportation fund owing to the tur-
mail on the Mexican border. Further, Reber had
asked the Quartermaster Corps to include
$54,000 for motor transportation in its annual
estimates for fiscal year 1916. The Corps, how.
over, failed to include that request, Subsequently,
Colonel Reber made a deal with the Quartermas-
ter General that allowed the Signal Corps to pur
chase transport for the air arm. Unfortunately,
Congress appropriated only $301,000 for military
aeronautics in fiscal year 1916 instead of the
$500,000 the Aviation Section wanted. As a
result, there was no money in the near future for
ground transportation and precious little for avi-
‘ation in general beyond operating costs. Ten new
trucks were out of the question. All was not lost,
however. Someone squeezed a little money out of
the budget for the Ist Aero Squadron shortly
after the new fiscal year began, In August 1915,
the squadron received three Jeffery trucks, bring-
ing the squadron total to nine Jefferys and two
Whites, still well below the sixteen trucks autho-
rized in the December 1913 table of equipment."
While Foulois sought a full complement of
trucks, another pilot, Lt. Townsend F. Dodd,
developed one of those on hand into mobile
‘machine shop. Dodd began by preparing a list of
equipment and machinery required by a mobile
squadron, including lathes, mills, grinders, and
other power tools, He designed the machine truck
with a separate power plant so that the tools
could be operated even if the truck engine was
disabled, Further, he organized the shop so that it
could be broken down into standard loads for
pack mules if the truck could no longer operate,
Construction of the machine shop truck began on
April 8, 1915, and squadron personnel finished it
by early summer. The machine shop track
vastly inereased the 1st Aero Squadron's ability
to support itself in the field and greatly enhanced
the unit's mobility.
From duly through November 1915, the Ist
‘Aero Squadron conducted tests with the army's
artillery fire control school at Fort Sill,
Oklahoma. During these months, the squadron
operated under near-field conditions. The
squadron equipment experienced extreme heat,
‘and cold, high winds, and heavy rain. The air
planes and trucks also suffered severely from
Supply shortages, Truck parts proved almost
impossible to obtain. As late as October 3,
Foulois, still waiting for some parts ordered in
June, expressed the hope “that we get them
hhefore the trucks go to pieces.”!® On a positive
note, the squadron organization paid off in
increased flexibility coon after its arrival at Fort
Sill. On August 21, Captain Foulois received
orders to send one airplane to Brownsville, Texas.
Within two hours, he reported, the airplane, crew,
and equipment were ready to entrain, Before that
section could depart, however, the War Depart-
‘ment ordered a second airplane to join the first.
Within three hours, Foulois and his crew had the
second section on the train heading south. The
captain boasted that “all I had to do was to detach
two complete sections, assign one truck, one
motoreyele, and sufficient spare parts and they
are ready to go."
‘In November, the Ist Aero Squadron trans-
ferred from Fort Sill to its new permanent home,
the Signal Corps Aviation Center, under con-
struction near Fort Sam Houston. For the first
time, the Ist Aero Squadron traveled across coun-
try under its own power. The aircraft flew the 400
miles while the trucks followed by road carrying
‘as much of the tools, parts, supplies, and equip-
‘ment as they could hold, The ten trucks remained
‘well below the squadron's authorized strength,
however, and Foulois borrowed two one-and-one-
half ton “trailmobile” trailers from the Sechler
Company of Cincinnati, Ohio, to increase his car-
rying eapacity, Even this was insufficient, how:
fever, and much of the squadron equipment still
had to go by train, Pulled by the trucks, the trail-
ers proved extremely useful, especially when one
of the Jeffery trucks caught fire and burned near
Fort Worth. The trip was otherwise uneventful,
am vownn History / wasn 185PRESIDENT
WILSON AND
SECRETARY
BAKER
APPROVED
GENERAL
FUNSTON’S:
BASIC PLAN
FOR THE
PUNITIVE
EXPEDITION
ain
fereage Fem
‘Columbus, New Wesco
amr PowER History
and the experience enabled Foulois to identify a
number of problems and shortages. Among these,
Foulois concluded, was that even sixteen trucks
were too few. A mobile squadron of eight aircraft
required, he believed, at least twenty-one
trucks.”
But even keeping ten was a challenge. Soon
after the squadron's arrival, the army tried to
take away Foulois's vehicles. Citing “Changes No.
to the standard Tables of Organization for
1914, Col. Omar Bundy, Adjutant of the Southern
Department, decreed that the 1st Aero Squadron
was authorized only one truck and one “sergeant
chauffeur” He was, Colonel Bundy told Captain
Foulois, working on getting a chauffeur for the
squadron, but in the meantime would Foulois
please provide a date upon which he would turn
in his nine excess trucks! Foulois telegraphed
Washington immediately, and within a few days
the Quartermaster General affirmed that the
money for the trucks had been appropriated
Specifically for the Ist Acro Squadron before
‘anges No. 6” had been published. Accordingly,
the trucks should be considered the permanent
property of the Signal Corps.”®
"At the end of 1915, then, the Ist Aero
Squadron had developed valuable, practical
expertise in maintaining and operating trucks
under field conditions. The squadron that
reached San Antonio, however, was tired and
worn and should have immediately turned its
attention to refurbishing and upgrading its
equipment. Instead, Foulois found that the
Quartermaster Corps had failed to finish build-
ing the aviation center. While some work on air-
planes and trucks was accomplished, the
Squadron had to devote much of its time and
effort to building buildings, roads, and sidewalks,
‘and clearing and preparing the flying field, They
were still at this task on March 9, 1916, when
Pancho Villa attacked Columbus.
President Wilson and Secretary Baker
approved General Funston’s basic plan for the
Punitive Expedition on March 10 and directed
him to employ any transportation the force
required, including motor transport. Accordingly,
‘on March 11, General Funston requested the
immediate purchase of twenty-seven Jeffery one-
and-one-half ton trucks and twenty-seven White
one-and-one-hall ton trucks, and asked that these
be sent—along with drivers, mechanics, tools, and
spare parts—by special train to El Paso. The
Quartermaster Corps responded quickly, inviting
bids for a total of fifty-four Jeffery and twenty-
seven White trucks on March 14, 79 meet
Pershing’s immediate neec first. twenty.
seven Jefferys wore shipped from the factory in
Wisconsin aboard a special train before daylight
on the Mareh 16, In the meantime, Brig. Gen.
Henry G. Sharpe, the Acting Quartermaster
General, advocated renting commercial trucks
temporarily until the new trucks reached the
Expedition.”
Ti was at this juncture that the Ist Aero
Squadron and its organic transport entered the
picture, ‘The Ist Aero Squadron left Fort Sam
Houston for Columbus at noon on Mareh 13 with
cight airplanes, ten motor trucks, and six motor
tyeles, Also on board the train were three trucks
hired by the quartermaster at Fort Sam Houston:
a five ton Peerless, a three-quarter ton Republic,
and a one-and-one-half ton Wichita. The train
arrived late on March 14 at El Paso, where it
picked up a pair of one-and-one-half ton Reo
trucks leased by the quartermaster at Fort Bliss.
‘The squadron reached Columbus at mid-morning
on March 15 just as Pershing’s columns moved
south, The men immediately detrained and
assembled their aircraft.
‘Instead of joining the advancing columns or
reconnoitering ahead of them, however, the Ist
‘Aero Squadton remained at Columbus with little
aviation work at hand, At this point the
Squadron's experience with motor vehicles came
to the fore. The motley assortment of rented com:
mercial trucks assembled at Columbus proved
useless for field work, and Foulois made the 1st
‘Aero Squadron trucks and their drivers available
to the base quartermaster, Major John F.
Madden, to haul supplies and personnel to the
Punitive Expedition’s southbound columns.°“On
the night of March 15,” according to pilot Lt.
Edgar 8. Gorrell: