Local Government Finals

DOCTRINES, RULINGS, PRINCIPLES ON THE GENERAL WELFARE
CLAUSE
LEGASPI vs. CEBU,

G.R. No. 159110 , 10 December 2013
 The goal of the decentralization of powers to the local government units (LGUs)
is to ensure the enjoyment by each of the territorial and political subdivisions of
the State of a genuine and meaningful local autonomy. To attain the goal, the
National Legislature has devolved the three great inherent powers of the State to
the LGUs. Each political subdivision is there by vested with such powers subject
to constitutional and statutory limitations.
 In particular, the Local Government Code (LGC) has expressly empowered the
LGUs to enact and adopt ordinances to regulate vehicular traffic and to prohibit
illegal parking within their jurisdictions. [Section 458(a), LGC]
 The general welfare clause has two branches. One branch attaches itself to the
main trunk of municipal authority, and relates to such ordinances and regulations
as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred upon the municipal council by law. The second branch of the clause is
much more independent of the specific functions of the council, and authorizes
such ordinances as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for health,
safety, prosperity and convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants.
 In a vital and critical way, the general welfare clause complements the more
specific powers granted a local government. It serves as a catch-all provision that
ensures that the local government will be equipped to meet any local contingency
that bears upon the welfare of its constituents but has not been actually
anticipated. So varied and protean are the activities that affect the legitimate
interests of the local inhabitants that it is well-nigh impossible to say beforehand
what may or may not be done specifically through law. To ensure that a local
government can react positively to the people’s needs and expectations, the
general welfare clause has been devised and interpreted to allow the local
legislative council to enact such measures as the occasion requires. (United
States vs. Salaveria, 39 Phil 102)
 The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has
held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to
the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must
not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public
policy; and (6) mus t not be unreasonable. (City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.)
2 DIVISIONS OF A VALID ORDINANCE
 As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the
ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU, and whether it
was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the
substantive (i.e.,involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with
the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the
requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).
 In particular, police power is regarded as "the most essential, insistent and the
least limitable of powers, extending as it does ‘to all the great public
needs.’“(Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor
of Manila, No. L-24693, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 849, 857-858)
It is unquestionably "the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to
make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subject of the same.“ (Chief Justice Shaw, in
Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, 85, 61 Mass 53.)
 "[The police power] embraces the whole system of internal regulation by which
the state seeks not only to preserve the public order and to prevent offences (sic)
against itself, but also to establish for the intercourse of citizens with citizens,
those rules of good manners and good neighborhood which are calculated to
prevent the conflict of rights and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of
his own, so far as it is reasonably consistent with the right enjoyment of rights by
others.“(Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, p. 572)
 It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature.
It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing
legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to
the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of
municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents
can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the
national lawmaking body. (Metropolitan Manila Development Authorityv. Bel-Air
Village Association,Inc.)
 In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., the Court expounded on the aspects of the
guaranty of due process of law as a limitation on the acts of government, viz:
This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government,
usually called "procedural due process" and "substantive due process.“
 Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the
government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.
Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with that kind of notice and
what form of hearing the government must provide when it takes a particular
action.
 Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government
has an adequate reason for taking away a person’s life, liberty, or property . In
other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is sufficient
justification for the government’s action.
 The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised
with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal
protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or
despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction
demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental
law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears
emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be
required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Due
process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the
person to his life, liberty and property.
 Notice and hearing are the essential requirements of procedural due process.
Yet, there are many instances under our laws in which the absence of one or
both of such requirements is not necessarily a denial or deprivation of due
process.
Among the instances are
1. cancellation of the passport of a person being sought for the commission of a
crime,
2. the preventive suspension of a civil servant facing administrative charges,
3. the distraint of properties to answer for tax delinquencies,
4. the padlocking of restaurants found to be unsanitary or of theaters showing
obscene movies, and
5. the abatement of nuisance per se.(Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2007 Ed., p. 119)
6. arrest of a person in flagrante delicto(Section 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court)
PARAYNO VS MUNICIPALITY OF CALASIAO, PANGASINAN
GR No. 148408, July 14, 2006
 Respondent municipality invalidly used its police powers in ordering the

closure/transfer of petitioner's gasoline station. While it had, under RA 7160, the
power to take actions and enact measures to promote the health and general
welfare of its constituents, it should have given due deference to the law and the
rights of petitioner.
REQUISITES (PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS POLICE POWERS)
 A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers
only when the following requisites are met:
1. the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the State (equal protection
clause ) and
2. the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the
object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. (due process
clause)
 Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process clause when it
passed Resolution No. 50. While it maintained that the gasoline filling station of
petitioner was less than 100 meters from the nearest public school and church,
the records do not show that it even attempted to measure the distance,
notwithstanding that such distance was crucial in determining whether there was
an actual violation of Section 44. The different local offices that respondent
municipality tapped to conduct an investigation never conducted such
measurement either.
 Moreover, petitioner's business could not be considered a nuisance which
respondent municipality could summarily abate in the guise of exercising its
police powers. The abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is
possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station is not a nuisance per se or
one affecting the immediate safety of persons and property, hence, it cannot be
closed down or transferred summarily to another location.
Local Government Code
SECTIONS 18-24
SECTION 18. POWER TO GENERATE AND APPLY RESOURCES.

Local government units shall have the power and authority to:
 establish an organization that shall be responsible for the efficient and
effective implementation of their development plans, program objectives
and priorities;
 create their own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges
which shall accrue exclusively for their use and disposition and which shall
be retained by them;
 have a just share in national taxes which shall be automatically and
directly released to them without need of any further action;
 have an equitable share in the proceeds from the utilization and
development of the national wealth and resources within their respective
territorial jurisdictions including sharing the same with the inhabitants by
way of direct benefits;
 acquire, develop, lease, encumber, alienate, or otherwise dispose of real
or personal property held by them in their proprietary capacity and
 apply their resources and assets for productive, developmental, or welfare
purposes, in the exercise or furtherance of their governmental or
proprietary powers and functions and thereby ensure their development
into self-reliant communities and active participants in the attainment of
national goals.
 establish an organization that shall be responsible for the efficient and
effective implementation of their development plans, program objectives
and priorities;
provided for in Section 76 of the Local Government Code (LGC)
limited by the Constitution, Civil Service Commission rules and
regulations, and pertinent laws .
 create their own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges
which shall accrue exclusively for their use and disposition and which shall
be retained by them;
- Section 5, Article X, 1987 Philippine Constitution
- fiscal autonomy
- subject to the guidelines or limitations set by Congress
- guided by Sections 128 to 283
Local government units shall have the power and authority to
 have a just share in national taxes which shall be automatically and
directly released to them without need of any further action;
- Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA)
- automatic release (within 5 days after every quarter)
- at least 20% allocated for development projects
- Sections 284-288, LGC
- amended by virtue of the Mandanas case
 have an equitable share in the proceeds from the utilization and
development of the national wealth and resources within their respective
territorial jurisdictions including sharing the same with the inhabitants by
way of direct benefits;

- Sections 289-294, LGC
- shares from projects which exploit natural resources
- 40% of revenue collection from mining, forestry, and fishery activities
- automatic release
- for development and livelihood projects
 acquire, develop, lease, encumber, alienate, or otherwise dispose of real
or personal property held by them in their proprietary capacity and
- Section 22, LGC
 apply their resources and assets for productive, developmental, or welfare
purposes, in the exercise or furtherance of their governmental or
proprietary powers and functions and thereby ensure their development
into self-reliant communities and active participants in the attainment of
national goals.
- fiscal administration (Title Five, Book One)
- planning
- budgeting
SECTION 19. EMINENT DOMAIN
A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose or welfare
for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however,
That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer
has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided,
further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property
upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the
proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property
based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally,
That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the
proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.
EMINENT DOMAIN
 power of the state to take private property for public use, purpose, or
welfare upon payment of just compensation
 essentially lodged in the Legislature
 delegated to the local government units (LGU’s)
LEGAL PROVISIONS THAT LIMIT THE EXERCISE OF EMINENT DOMAIN
 No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws
 Private property shall not be taken for public use without payment of just
compensation (Lagcao vs Labra, 2004)
REQUISITES FOR THE VALID EXERCISE OF EMINENT DOMAIN
 Ordinance authorizing the local chief executive (LCE) to subject a certain
property to expropriation
 Necessity of taking for public use, purpose, or welfare
 Just compensation
 Valid and definite offer to buy that was not accepted by the owner
(JILCSFI vs Pasig, 2005)
SECTION 21. CLOSURE AND OPENING OF ROADS
(a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily
close or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction:
Provided, however, That in case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be
approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the sanggunian, and when
necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility that is subject to closure is
provided.
(b) No such way or place or any part thereof shall be permanently closed without making
provisions for the maintenance of public safety therein. A property thus permanently
withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other
real property belonging to the local government unit concerned may be lawfully used or
conveyed: Provided, however, That no freedom park shall be closed permanently
without provision for its transfer or relocation to a new site.
(c) Any national or local road, alley, park, or square may be temporarily closed during an
actual emergency, or fiesta celebrations, public rallies, agricultural or industrial fairs, or
an undertaking of public works and highways, telecommunications, and waterworks
projects, the duration of which shall be specified by the local chief executive concerned
in a written order: Provided, however, That no national or local road, alley, park, or
square shall be temporarily closed for athletic, cultural, or civic activities not officially
sponsored, recognized, or approved by the local government unit concerned.
(d) Any city, municipality, or barangay may, by a duly enacted ordinance, temporarily
close and regulate the use of any local street, road, thoroughfare, or any other public
place where shopping malls, Sunday, flea or night markets, or shopping areas may be
established and where goods, merchandise, foodstuffs, commodities, or articles of
commerce may be sold and dispensed to the general public.
Ordinance is required for
 Opening or closure of local road, alley, park, or square
 Temporarily closure for establishment of shopping malls, Sunday, flea or
night markets, or shopping areas where goods, merchandise, foodstuffs,
commodities, or articles of commerce may be sold and dispensed to the
general public
In case of permanent closure, ordinance must be approved by at least 2/3
of all members and an adequate substitute for the public facility that is
subject to closure must be provided.
 Written order by the local chief executive specifying the duration of the closure for
temporary closure due to an actual emergency, or fiesta celebrations, public
rallies, agricultural or industrial fairs, or an undertaking of public works and
highways, telecommunications, and waterworks projects.
 Temporarily closure for athletic, cultural, or civic activities only if sponsored,

recognized, or approved by the local government unit .
SECTION 23. AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE AND SECURE GRANTS.

Local chief executives may, upon authority of the sanggunian, negotiate and secure
financial grants or donations in kind, in support of the basic services or facilities
enumerated under Section 17 hereof, from local and foreign assistance agencies
without necessity of securing clearance or approval therefor from any department,
agency, or office of the national government of from any higher local government unit:
Provided, That projects financed by such grants or assistance with national security
implications shall be approved by the national agency concerned: Provided, further,
That when such national agency fails to act on the request for approval within thirty (30)
days from receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed approved.
The local chief executive shall, within thirty (30) days upon signing of such grant
agreement or deed of donation, report the nature, amount, and terms of such assistance
to both Houses of Congress and the President.
 negotiate and secure financial grants or donations in kind

- authority of the sanggunian is necessary
projects financed by such grants or assistance with national security implications
- approval by the national agency concerned is necessary
 nature, amount, and terms of assistance to be reported to both Houses of

Congress and the President by the LCE within 30 days from signing of the grant
agreement or deed of donation.
SECTION 24. LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES.

Local government units and their officials are not exempt from liability for death or injury
to persons or damage to property.
Art. 2176, Civil Code of the Philippines
Whoever by act omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 21 80, Civil Code of the Philippines
 Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
 The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special
agent.; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom
the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Art.
2176 shall be applicable.
The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:

1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special
agents only.
2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it
becomes liable as an ordinary employer. (p. 961, Civil Code of the Philippines;
Annotated, Paras; 1986 Ed. ).
The State assumes a limited liability for the damage caused by the tortious acts or
conduct of its special agent.
Under paragraph 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily assumed liability for acts done
through special agents.
 The State's agent, if a public official, must not only be specially
commissioned to do a particular task but that such task must be foreign to
said official's usual governmental functions.
 If the State's agent is not a public official, and is commissioned to perform
non-governmental functions, then the State assumes the role of an
ordinary employer and will be held liable as such for its agent's tort.
 Where the government commissions a private individual for a special
governmental task, it is acting through a special agent within the meaning
of the provision. (Torts and Damages, Sangco, p. 347, 1984 Ed.)
 Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the government,
are more or less generally agreed to be "governmental" in character, and so the
State is immune from tort liability. On the other hand, a service which might as
well be provided by a private corporation, and particularly when it collects
revenues from it, the function is considered a "proprietary" one, as to which there
may be liability for the torts of agents within the scope of their employment.
Sections 25-27
SECTION 25. NATIONAL SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

 The President exercises general supervision over local government units to
ensure that their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and
functions.
 Direct supervision over
- provinces
- highly urbanized cities, and
- independent component cities;
 Indirect supervision over
- component cities and municipalities (through the province)
- barangays (through the municipality/city)
National agencies and offices, including government-owned and controlled corporations
with field units or branches within the jurisdiction of LGU’s are directed to :
 Coordinate with one another;
 Coordinate with the LGU’s concerned,
 Furnish the local chief executive (LCE) concerned monthly reports
 Extend financial, technical, or other forms of assistance to the Lgu, when required
by the President
 The power of CONTROL of the President over his subordinates in the executive
departments, bureaus or offices under him is recognized (Oliveros-Torre ve
Bayot, 1974), but he has no such power of control over local governments.
 The President or his alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the
concerned local government unit (LGU) acts within the parameter of the law and
the Constitution. Any directive, therefore, by the President or any of his alter egos
seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a
LGU is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy and
separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments (Dadole vs
COA, 2002).
 In ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the
latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform these duties. Control, on the other hand,
means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter. (Mondaño vs. Silvosa, 51 Off.
Gaz., 2885 cited in orras vs Abellana, 1959).
 The President’s power of the general supervision, as exercised by the DILG

Secretary as his alter ego, extends to the Liga ng mga Barangay. (Bito-Onon v.
Fernandez, 2001 cited in National Liga ng mga Barangay vs Paredes, 2004)
As the entity exercising supervision over the Liga ng mga Barangay, the DILG’s
authority over the Liga is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it
cannot lay down such rules itself, nor does it have the discretion to modify or
replace them.
 In this particular case, the most that the DILG could do was review the acts of the
incumbent officers of the Liga in the conduct of the elections to determine if they
committed any violation of the Liga’s Constitution and By-laws and its
implementing rules. If the National Liga Board and its officers had
violated Liga rules, the DILG should have ordered the Liga to conduct another
election in accordance with the Liga’s own rules, but not in obeisance to DILG-
dictated guidelines. Neither had the DILG the authority to remove the incumbent
officers of the Liga and replace them, even temporarily, with
unelected Liga officers.
 Like the local government units, the Liga ng mga Barangay is not subject to
control by the Chief Executive or his alter ego. (National Liga ng mga Barangay
vs Paredes, 2004)
 Section 187 of the LGC authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on
either or both of these grounds. The Secretary merely declared the passage of
the tax ordinance illegal for failure to follow the prescribed procedure for the
enactment of tax ordinances. It was not an act of control but of mere supervision.
(Crilon vs Lim, 1994)
 The President or his alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the
concerned local government unit (LGU) acts within the parameter of the law and
the Constitution. Any directive, therefore, by the President or any of his alter egos
seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a
LGU is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy and
separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments (Dadole vs
COA, 2002).
SECTION 26. DUTY OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN THE

MAINTENANCE OF ECOLOGICAL BALANCE. –
 It shall be the duty of every national agency or government-owned or controlled
corporation authorizing or involved in the planning and implementation of any
project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-
renewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover, and extinction
of animal or plant species, to consult with the local government units,
nongovernmental organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain the
goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the people and
the community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the
measures that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects
thereof.
SECTION 27. PRIOR CONSULTATIONS REQUIRED.

No project or program shall be implemented by government authorities unless the
consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior
approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in
areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless
appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of
the Constitution.
SECTIONS 28-36
SECTION 28. POWERS OF LOCAL CHIEF EXECUTIVES OVER THE UNITS OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
The extent of operational supervision and control of local chief executives over the
police force, fire protection unit, and jail management personnel assigned in their
respective jurisdictions shall be governed by the provisions of Republic Act Numbered
Sixty-nine hundred seventy-five (R.A. No. 6975), otherwise known as "The Department
of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990", and the rules and regulations issued
pursuant thereto.
 Relevant Provisions of RA 6975 "The Department of the Interior and Local
Government Act of 1990
 Section 43
 Section 51
 Section 52
 Section 43. People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). –
(a) Creation and Functions. – Within thirty (30) days from the issuance of the
implementing rules and regulations by the Commission, there shall be created by the
sangguniang panlungsod/bayan in every city and municipality such number of People's
Law Enforcement Boards (PLEBs) as may be necessary: Provided, That there shall be
at least one (1) PLEB for every municipality and for each of the legislative districts in a
city. The PLEB shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide citizen's complaints or cases
filed before it against erring officers and members of the PNP. There shall be at least
one (1) PLEB for every five hundred (500) city or municipal police personnel.
(b) Composition and Term of Office. – The PLEB shall be composed of the following:
(1) Any member of the sangguniang panlungsod/bayan chosen by his respective
sanggunian;
(2) Any barangay captain of the city or municipality concerned chosen by the
association of barangay captains; and
(3) Three (3) other members who shall be chosen by the peace and order council
from among the respected members of the community known for their probity and
integrity, one (1) of whom must be a member of the Bar or, in the absence
thereof, a college graduate, or the principal of the central elementary school in
the locality.
 The Chairman of the PLEB shall be elected from among its members. The
term of office of the members of the PLEB shall be for a period of two (2)
years from assumption of office. Such member shall hold office until his
successor shall have been chosen and qualified.
(c) Compensation – Membership in the PLEB is a civic duty. However, PLEB members
may be paid per diem as may be determined by the city or municipal council from city or
municipal funds.
(d) Procedure –
(1) The PLEB, by a majority vote of all its members and its Chairman shall
determine whether or not the respondent officer or member of the PNP is
guilty of the charge upon which the complaint is based.
(2) Each case shall be decided within sixty (60) days from the time the
case has been filed with the PLEB.
(3) The procedures in the PLEB shall be summary in nature, conducted in
accordance with due process, but without strict regard to technical rules of
evidence.
(4) The Commission shall issue the necessary implementing guidelines
and procedures to be adopted by the PLEB, including graduated penalties
which may be imposed by the PLEB.
(5) The Commission may assign the present NAPOLCOM hearing officers
to act as legal consultants of the PLEBs and provide, whenever
necessary, legal services, assistance and advise to the PLEBs in hearing
and deciding cases against officers and members of the PNP, especially
those involving difficult questions of law: Provided, That these lawyers
may also be assigned to investigate claims for death and disability benefits
of PNP members or their heirs.
(e) Decisions – The decision of the PLEB shall become final and executory: Provided,
That a decision involving demotion or dismissal from the service may be appealed by
either party with the regional appellate board within ten (10) days from receipt of the
copy of the decision.
D. PARTICIPATION OF LOCAL EXECUTIVES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE

PNP
Section 51. Powers of Local Government Officials Over the PNP Units or Forces. –
Governors and mayors shall be deputized as representatives of the Commission in their
respective territorial jurisdiction. As such, the local executives shall discharge the
following functions:
(a) Provincial Governor –
(1) Power to Choose the Provincial Director. – The provincial governor shall
choose the provincial director from a list of three (3) eligible recommended by the PNP
regional director.
(2) Overseeing the Provincial Public Safety Plan Implementation. – The governor,
as chairman of the provincial peace and order council, shall oversee the implementation
of the provincial public safety plan, which is prepared taking into consideration the
integrated community safety plans, as provided under paragraph (b) (2) of this section.
b) City and Municipal Mayors –
(1) Operational Supervision and Control. The city and municipal mayors shall
exercise operational supervision and control over PNP units in their respective
jurisdiction except during the thirty (30) day period immediately preceding and the thirty
(30) days following any national, local and barangay elections. During the said period,
the local police forces shall be under the supervision and control of the Commission on
Elections.
The term "operational supervision and control" shall mean the power to direct,
superintend, oversee and inspect the police units and forces.
 It shall include the power to employ and deploy units or elements of the PNP,
through the station commander, to ensure public safety and effective
maintenance of peace and order within the locality. For this purpose, the term
"employ" and "deploy" shall mean as follows:
 "Employ" refers to utilization of units or elements of the PNP for purposes of
protection of lives and properties, enforcement of laws, maintenance of peace
and order, prevention of crimes, arrest of criminal offenders and bringing the
offenders to justice, and ensuring public safety, particularly in the suppression of
disorders, riots, lawless violence, rebellious seditious conspiracy, insurgency,
subversion or other related activities.
 "Deploy" shall mean the orderly organized physical movement of elements or
units of the PNP within the province, city or municipality for purposes of
employment as herein defined.
(2) Integrated Community Safety Plans. – The municipal/city mayor shall, in
coordination with the local peace and order council of which he is the chairman pursuant
to Executive Order No. 309, as amended, develop and establish an integrated
area/community public safety plan embracing priorities of action and program thrusts for
implementation by the local PNP stations.
 It shall, likewise, be the duty of the city or municipal mayor to sponsor
periodic seminars for members of the PNP assigned or detailed in his city or
municipality in order to update them regarding local ordinances and legislations.
(3) Administrative Disciplinary Powers. – In the areas of discipline, city and
municipal mayors shall have the powers to impose, after due notice and summary
hearings, disciplinary penalties for minor offenses committed by members of the PNP
assigned to their respective jurisdictions, as provided in Section 41 of this Act.
4) Other Powers. – In addition to the aforementioned powers, city and municipal mayors
shall have the following authority over the PNP units in their respective jurisdictions:
(i) Authority to choose the chief of police from a list of five (5) eligibles
recommended by the provincial police director, preferably from the same province, city
or municipality.
(ii) Authority to recommend the transfer, reassignment or detail of PNP members
outside of their respective city or town residences; and
(iii) Authority to recommend, from a list of eligibles previously screened by the
peace and order council, the appointment of new members of the PNP to be assigned to
their respective cities or municipalities without which no such appointment shall be
attested.
Section 52. Suspension of Operational Supervision and Control. – The President may,

upon consultation with the provincial governor and congressman concerned, suspend
the power of operational supervision and control of any local executive over police units
assigned or stationed in his jurisdiction for any of the following GROUNDS:
(a) Frequent unauthorized absences;
(b) Abuse of authority;
(c) Providing material support to criminal elements; or
(d) Engaging in acts inimical to national security or which negate the
effectiveness of the peace and order campaign.
Upon good cause shown, the President may, motu propio or upon the
recommendation of the National Police Commission, restore such power withdrawn
from any local executive.
The validity of the deputization (sic) of the local chief executives was upheld by the
Supreme Court in the case of Carpio vs Executive Secretary (1991) where it was held
that “It is clear that the local chief executives are only acting as deputies of the National
Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) . As such deputies, they are answerable to the
NAPOLCOM for their actions in the exercise of their functions under that section
(Section 51).
SECTION 29. PROVINCIAL RELATIONS WITH COMPONENT CITIES AND
MUNICIPALITIES
The province, through the governor, shall ensure that every component city and
municipality within its territorial jurisdiction acts within the scope of its prescribed powers
and functions. Highly urbanized cities and independent component cities shall be
independent of the province.
The powers of the province, through the governor, over component cities and
municipalities include :
1. Review (executive orders)
2. Supervisory
3. Coordinative (plans and development activities of the component cities
and municipalities with the province and national agencies concerned)
The power of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has the power to review the following
legislative enactments of the Sangguniang Bayan or Panlungsod
1. Ordinances
2. Resolutions approving the development plans and public investment
programs
3. Annual or supplemental appropriations
SECTION 30. REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS.
(a) Except as otherwise provided under the Constitution and special statutes, the
governor shall review all executive orders promulgated by the component city or
municipal mayor within his jurisdiction. The city or municipal mayor shall review all
executive orders promulgated by the punong barangay within his jurisdiction. Copies of
such orders shall be forwarded to the governor or the city or municipal mayor, as the
case may be, within three (3) days from their issuance. In all instances of review, the
local chief executive concerned shall ensure that such executive orders are within the
powers granted by law and in conformity with provincial, city, or municipal ordinances.
(b) If the governor or the city or municipal mayor fails to act on said executive orders
within thirty (30) days after their submission, the same shall be deemed consistent with
law and therefore valid.
SECTION 31. SUBMISSION OF MUNICIPAL QUESTIONS TO THE PROVINCIAL
LEGAL OFFICER OR PROSECUTOR
In the absence of a municipal legal officer, the municipal government may secure the
opinion of the provincial legal officer, and in the absence of the latter, that of the
provincial prosecutor on any legal question affecting the municipality.
SECTION 32. CITY AND MUNICIPAL SUPERVISION OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE
BARANGAYS.
The city or municipality, through the city or municipal mayor concerned, shall exercise
general supervision over component barangays to ensure that said barangays act within
the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
SECTION 33. COOPERATIVE UNDERTAKINGS AMONG LOCAL GOVERNMENT
UNITS
Local government units may, through appropriate ordinances, group themselves,
consolidate, or coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for purposes commonly
beneficial to them. In support of such undertakings, the local government units involved
may, upon approval by the sanggunian concerned after a public hearing conducted for
the purpose, contribute funds, real estate, equipment, and other kinds of property and
appoint or assign personnel under such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon
by the participating local units through Memoranda of Agreement.
Examples of LGU Agglomerations
 BLIST (Baguio, La Trinidad, Itogon, Sablan, Tuba, Tublay)
 CELUMEPA (Central La Union Metropolitan Planning Area) – no longer existing
 Siquijor Province Coastal Resource Management Alliance (SPCRMA)
 Central Panay Eonomic Union (Jamidan and Tapaz in Capiz and Libacao,
Batan, Altavas in Aklan)
 MACASALTABAYAMI (Surigao del Sur and the LGU’s around Banate Bay in
Iloilo and Ginoog Bay in Misamis Oriental)
SECTION 34. ROLE OF PEOPLE'S AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
Local government units shall promote the establishment and operation of people's and
non-governmental organizations to become active partners in the pursuit of local
autonomy.
 Civil society organizations (people’s organization and non-government
organizations) seek accreditation by virtue of Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) Memorandum Circular 2019-72 for their membership in the
Local Special Bodies (Sections 99 to 117)
SECTION 35. LINKAGES WITH PEOPLE'S AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS
Local government units may enter into joint ventures and such other cooperative
arrangements with people's and non-governmental organizations to engage in the
delivery of certain basic services, capability-building and livelihood projects, and to
develop local enterprises designed to improve productivity and income, diversity
agriculture, spur rural industrialization, promote ecological balance, and enhance the
economic and social well-being of the people.
SECTION 36. ASSISTANCE TO PEOPLE'S AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS
A local government unit may, through its local chief executive and with the concurrence
of the sanggunian concerned, provide assistance, financial or otherwise, to such
people's and non-governmental organizations for economic, socially-oriented,
environmental, or cultural projects to be implemented within its territorial jurisdiction.
Sections 39-43
SECTION 39. QUALIFICATIONS.
An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding
the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or
dialect.
a. An elective local official must be :

1. A citizen of the Philippines
ALTAJEROS VS COMELEC, GR No. 163256, 10 November 2004
Is a candidate who reacquired Filipino citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines without registering the same with the civil registry and the
Bureau of Immigration qualified to run for the position of Mayor?
RA 8171
Section 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry
and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel
the pertinent alien certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.
 The citizenship qualification must be construed as applying to the time of

proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term. (Frivaldo vs
COMELEC)
 Repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of the application. PD 725 ((An Act
Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women Who Have lost Their Philippine
Citizenship By Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipinos-05 June 1975) is
a curative statute.
RA 9225 Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003
29 August 2003
 Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship
by reason of a foreign country may re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon taking
the oath provided for in the Act and enjoy full civil and political rights subject to
compliance with the conditions provided.
 For those seeking elective, in addition to the requirements and qualifications
provided for by law, they must make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath.
2. a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang
bayan, the district where he intends to be elected;
3. a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election; and
Co vs Electoral Tribunal of the House, 199 SCRA 692, 1991 citing Ong Huan Tin vs.
Republic, 19 SCRA 966 and Ujanovs Republic, 17 SCRA 147, 1966
 Residence is synonymous with domicile
Ong Huang Tin vs Republic, 19 SCRA 966 (1967)

Ujano vs Republic, 17 SCRA 147 (1966)
 The term “domicile” denotes a permanent residence to which when absent for
business or pleasure, one intends to return.
 A person’s absence from his permanent residence, no matter how long, does not
interrupt the continuity of his residence in that place
Tess Dumpit-Michelena vs Boado, 2005

 a beach house is at most a place of temporary relaxation. It can hardly be
considered a place of residence.
Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 92191-92, 30 July 1991,

199 SCRA 692
Domicile of origin is not easily lost.TO SUCCESSFULLY EFFECT A CHANGE OF
DOMICILE, THERE MUST BE CONCURRENCE OF THE FOLLOWING
REQUIREMENTS:
(1) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
(2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
new one; and
(3) acts which correspond with the purpose.
Aquino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120265, 18 September 1995, 248 SCRA
400
 Without clear and positive proof of the concurrence of these three requirements,
the domicile of origin continues.
 property ownership is not indicia of the right to vote or to be voted for an office.
Domino v. COMELEC, 369 Phil. 798 (1999)

 To effect change, there must be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The intent to remain in the new domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time, the change of residence must be voluntary, and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
JALOVER VS OSMENA, gr No. 209286, 23 September 2104

 The law does not require a person to be in his home 24 hours a day, seven days
a week, to fulfill the residency requirement.
 Property ownership is not among the qualifications required of candidates for
local election.
 The petitioner’s speculation that the dilapidated house of Osmena could not
serve as his residence in view of his stature involves the use of non-legal
standards which the Supreme Court condemned in Mitra vs COMELEC.
ABELLA VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 100710 September 3, 1991
 ... [M]ere absence from one's residence or origin-domicile-to pursue studies,
engage in business, or practice his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute
abandonment or loss of such residence.' ... The determination of a persons legal
residence or domicile largely depends upon intention which may be inferred from
his acts, activities and utterances. The party who claims that a person has
abandoned or left his residence or origin must show and prove pre-ponderantly
such abandonment or loss. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])
4. able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice-governor, or member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice-mayor or member of the sangguniang
panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on
election day.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities,
component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on
election day.
(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang
barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years of age
but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day
Has been amended by Section 10 of RA 10742 (Sangguniang Kabataan Reform Act of
2015) ! ! !
SEC. 10. Qualifications. – An official of the Sangguniang Kabataan, either elective or
appointee, must be a citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan, a resident of the barangay for not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the elections, at least eighteen (18) years but not more than
twenty-four (24) years of age on the day of the elections, able to read and write Filipino,
English, or the local dialect, must not be related within the second civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity to any incumbent elected national official or to any incumbent
elected regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official, in the locality where he
or she seeks to be elected, and must not have been convicted by final judgment of any
crime involving moral turpitude.
SECTION 40. DISQUALIFICATIONS. –
The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence;
Has Section 40(a) of the LGC removed the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification to run for public office pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC?
JALOSJOS vs.COMELEC, G.R. No. 205033 June 18, 2013
 Well-established is the rule that every new statute should be construed in
connection with those already existing in relation to the same subject matter and
all should be made to harmonize and stand together, if they can be done by any
fair and reasonable interpretation.
 ART. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification. - The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may
have held, even if conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to
be elected to such office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise
of any of the rights mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall last during the term of the sentence.
1. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office
formerly held.
 Keeping with the above-mentioned statutory construction principle, the Court
observes that the conflict between these provisions of law may be properly
reconciled. In particular, while Section 40(a) of the LGC allows a prior convict to
run for local elective office after the lapse of two (2) years from the time he serves
his sentence, the said provision should not be deemed to cover cases wherein
the law imposes a penalty, either as principal or accessory, which has the effect
of disqualifying the convict to run for elective office. An example of this would be
Article 41 of the RPC, which imposes the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification as an accessory to the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua
and reclusion temporal:
 ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory penalties.
- The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them
that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case
may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall
suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall
have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
 Article 30 of the RPC, as earlier cited, provides that the penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification has the effect of depriving the convicted felon of the
privilege to run for elective office. To note, this penalty, as well as other penalties
of similar import, is based on the presumptive rule that one who is rendered
infamous by conviction of a felony, or other base offense indicative of moral
turpitude, is unfit to hold public office, as the same partakes of a privilege which
the State grants only to such classes of persons which are most likely to exercise
it for the common good.
 the import of Article 41 in relation to Article 30 of the RPC is more direct and
specific in nature – insofar as it deprives the candidate to run for elective office
due to his conviction – as compared to Section 40(a) of the LGC which broadly
speaks of offenses involving moral turpitude and those punishable by one (1)
year or more of imprisonment without any consideration of certain disqualifying
effects to one’s right to suffrage.
 Accordingly, Section 40(a) of the LGC should be considered as a law of general
application and therefore, must yield to the more definitive RPC provisions in line
with the principle of lex specialis derogat generali – general legislation must give
way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally is so interpreted as
to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable.
 In other words, where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a
particular case, the one specially designed therefor should prevail
 In the present case, petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of
reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal which, pursuant to Article 41 of the
RPC, carried with it the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification
and in turn, pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC, disqualified him to run for elective
office. As discussed, Section 40(a) of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein
a penal provision – such as Article 41 in this case – directly and specifically
prohibits the convict from running for elective office. Hence, despite the lapse of
two (2) years from petitioner’s service of his commuted prison term, he remains
bound to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which
consequently, disqualifies him to run as mayor for Zamboanga City.
 Section 40(a) of the LGC has not removed the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification which petitioner continues to suffer. Thereby, he remains
disqualified to run for any elective office pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC.
In re : Gutierrez
5 SCRA 661 (1962)
 The phrase moral turpitude which disqualifies a candidate for local office simply
means “everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals”.
MAGNO VS COMELEC, G.R. No. 147904 October 4, 2002
 ‘moral turpitude’
 "x x x an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man
owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.“ (Black’s Law Dictionary)
 Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It frequently depends
on the circumstances surrounding the violation of the law
 In this case, we need not review the facts and circumstances relating to the
commission of the crime considering that petitioner did not assail his conviction.
By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the
crime of direct bribery:
1. the offender is a public officer;
2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or
through another;
3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer
with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act
which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing
something which it is his official duty to do; and [Italics supplied]
4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with
the performance of his official duties.
 Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender
agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or
refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a
malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes
his fellowmen and society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes
advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by
the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty,
justice, honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime
involving moral turpitude.
 It should be noted that the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) was approved on
December 3, 1985 while the Local Government Code (RA 7160) took effect on
January 1, 1992. It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable
conflict between two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the more
recent expression of legislative will.4 Legis posteriores priores contrarias
abrogant. In enacting the later law, the legislature is presumed to have
knowledge of the older law and intended to change it.
 Furthermore, the repealing clause of Section 534 of RA 7160 or the Local
Government Code states that:
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are
inconsistent with any provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
 In accordance therewith, Section 40 of RA 7160 is deemed to have repealed
Section 12 of BP 881. Furthermore, Article 7 of the Civil Code provides that laws
are repealed only by subsequent ones, and not the other way around. When a
subsequent law entirely encompasses the subject matter of the former
enactment, the latter is deemed repealed
 RA 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically applies to local government
units. Section 40 thereof specially and definitively provides for disqualifications of
candidates for elective local positions. It is applicable to them only. On the other
hand, Section 12 of BP 881 speaks of disqualifications of candidates for any
public office. It deals with the election of all public officers. Thus, Section 40 of
RA 7160, insofar as it governs the disqualifications of candidates for local
positions, assumes the nature of a special law which ought to prevail. (David vs.
COMELEC)
 The intent of the legislature to reduce the disqualification period of candidates for
local positions from five to two years is evident. The cardinal rule in the
interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the law. The
reduction of the disqualification period from five to two years is the manifest
intent.
 Therefore, although his crime of direct bribery involved moral turpitude, petitioner
nonetheless could not be disqualified from running in the 2001 elections. Article
12 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) must yield to Article 40 of the Local
Government Code (RA 7160). Petitioner’s disqualification ceased as of March 5,
2000 and he was therefore under no such disqualification anymore when he ran
for mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2001 elections
MORENO vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 168550, 10 August 2006
 “Service of sentence” in this section applies only to a convict who has been
confined in a penal facility for some time, and thus, does not apply to a
probationer, whose principal and accessory penalties were suspended upon the
grant of probation.
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
APPLIES ONLY TO THOSE REMOVED FROM OFFICE ON OR AFTER JANUARY
1, 1992.
Section 66, paragraph c of the Code reiterates the disqualification.
 Does Section 40(b) of the LGC embrace decisions that have not become final
and executory?
LINGATING vs COMELEC, G.R. No. 153475 November 13, 2002
 There is thus no decision finding respondent guilty to speak of. As Provincial
Secretary of Zamboanga del Sur Wilfredo Cimafranca attested, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan simply considered the matter as having become moot and
academic because it was "overtaken by the local elections of May [11,]1992.“
 Considering the failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to resolve respondent’s
motion, it is unfair to the electorate to be told after they have voted for respondent
Sulong that after all he is disqualified, especially since, at the time of the elections
on May 14, 2001, the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had been
rendered nearly ten years ago.
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic
(d) Those with dual citizenship
MERCADO vs. MANZANO
307 SCRA 630 (1999)
 Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as
a result of the concurrent application of the differentn laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously a national by the said states. Dual
allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some postive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individual’s volition.
 The phrase dual citizenship in Section 40(c) of RA 7160 and in Section 20 of
RA 7584 must be understood as referring to ‘dual allegiance’. Consequently,
persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad
Rodriguez vs COMELEC
259 SCRA 296 (1996)
 A “fugitive from justice” as a ground for the disqualification or inelgibility of a
person seeking to run for any elective local position under this section should be
understood according to the following definition:
 A fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution.
 Intent to evade on the part of the candidate must, therefore, be established by
proof that there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already
been filed, at the time of flight.
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to
reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code
Caasi vs CA
191 SCRA 229 (1990)
 To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that
the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing
a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself
constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the
United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or
acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this
country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective
office" (Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code).
SECTION 41. MANNER OF ELECTION. –
(a) The governor, vice-governor, city mayor, city vice-mayor, municipal mayor, municipal
vice-mayor, and punong barangay shall be elected at large in their respective units by
the qualified voters therein. However, the sangguniang kabataan chairman for each
barangay shall be elected by the registered voters of the katipunanngkabataan, as
provided in this Code.
(b) The regular members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod,
and sangguniang bayan shall be elected by district, as may be provided for by law.
Sangguniang barangay members shall be elected at large. The presidents of the
leagues of sanggunian members of component cities and municipalities shall serve as
ex officio members of the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned. The presidents of the
"ligangmga barangay and the pederasyonngmga sangguniang kabataan" elected by
their respective chapters, as provided in this Code, shall serve as ex officio members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang bayan.
 Note : The regular members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Bayan are still
elected at large.
(c) In addition thereto, there shall be one (1) sectoral representative from the women,
one (1) from the workers, and one (1) from any of the following sectors: the urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, disabled persons, or any other sector as may be
determined by the sanggunian concerned within ninety (90) days prior to the holding of
the next local elections as may be provided for by law. The COMELEC shall promulgate
the rules and regulations to effectively provide for the election of such sectoral
representatives.
SECTION 42. DATE OF ELECTION.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the elections for local officials shall be held every
three (3) years on the second Monday of May.
SECTION 43. TERM OF OFFICE. –
a) The term of office of all local elective officials elected after the effectivity of this Code
shall be three (3) years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as may be
provided for by law, except that of elective barangay officials: Provided, That all local
officials first elected during the local elections immediately following the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
Amended
Republic Act No. 8524
February 14, 1998
 AN ACT CHANGING THE TERM OF OFFICE OF BARANGAY OFFICIALS AND
MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN FROM THREE (3) YEARS
TO FIVE (5) YEARS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION 43 OF
REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SIXTY,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES
 Section 1. Sec. 43 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 43. Term of office. – (a) The term of office of all elective officials elected
after the effectivity of this Code shall be three (3) years, starting from noon of June 30,
1992 or such date as may be provided for by law, except that of elective barangay
officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan: Provided, That all local officials
first elected during the local elections immediately following the ratification of the 1987
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. (Republic Act No. 8524, 14
February 1998)
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected.
 The rule on the three-term limit, embodied in the Constitution and the Local
Government Code, has two parts:
1. An elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The
clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule.
2. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity
of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of
time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the
interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive
terms.
Lonzanida vs COMELEC
GR No. 135150, July 28, 1999
 The Court, citing Borja Jr., reiterated the two (2) conditions which must concur for
the three-term limit to apply:
1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post and
2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
 The Court held that Lonzanida cannot be considered as having been duly elected
to the post in the May 1995 elections since his assumption of office as mayor
"cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a
void proclamation." And as a corollary point, the Court stated that Lonzanida did
not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term having been ordered to vacate his
post before the expiration of the term, a situation which amounts to an involuntary
relinquishment of office.
Will the Lonzanida ruling apply if the decision on the nullity of proclamation came after
the candidate has already served the term during which the proclamation was null and
void?
Ong vs Alegre
479 SCRA 473, 481, 2006
 Ong invoked the ruling in Lonzanida and argued that he could not be considered
as having served as mayor from 1998-2001 because he was not duly elected to
the post and merely assumed office as a "presumptive winner." Dismissing Ong’s
argument, the Court held that his assumption of office as mayor for the term
1998-2001 constitutes "service for the full term" and hence, should be counted for
purposes of the three-term limit rule. The Court modified the conditions stated in
Lonzanida in the sense that Ong’s service was deemed and counted as service
for a full term because Ong’s proclamation was voided only after the expiry of the
term. The Court noted that the COMELEC decision which declared Ong as not
having won the 1998 elections was "without practical and legal use and value"
promulgated as it was after the contested term has expired.
 His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the
duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of
office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of
the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the
three-term rule, the Decision imposing the penalty of suspension having been
issued after he has fully served his term from 1998 to 2001.
Borja vs COMELEC
GR No. 133495, September 3, 1998
 delved on the effects of "assumption to office by operation of law" on the three-
term limit rule. This contemplates a situation wherein an elective local official fills
by succession a higher local government post permanently left vacant due to any
of the following contingencies, i.e., when the supposed incumbent refuses to
assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns or
is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office
 When private respondent occupied the post of the mayor upon the incumbent’s
death and served for the remainder of the term, he cannot be construed as
having served a full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional
provision. The term served must be one "for which [the official concerned] was
elected."
 The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve the same elective position. Consequently, it
is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective
local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same
number of times before the disqualification can apply.
 "it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an
elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the
same number of times before the disqualification can apply.“ There was no
violation of the three-term limit, for Capco "was not elected to the office of the
mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law“
when a permanent vacancy occurred in that office.
Latasa vs COMELEC
GR No. 154829, December 10, 2003
 This Court believes that (Latasa) did involuntarily relinquish his office as
municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed abolished due to the
conversion. However, the very instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor,
he also assumed office as city mayor. Petitioner Latasa never ceased from acting
as chief executive of the local government unit. He never ceased from
discharging his duties and responsibilities as chief executive of Digos.
 This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an
exception to the people’s freedom to choose those who will govern them in order
to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a
particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office.
To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served
for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very
intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed
another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would
then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial
jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the
very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
Montebon vs. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 180444, 08 April 2008
 Potencioso’s assumption of office as Vice-Mayor was considered an involuntary
severance from his office as Municipal Councilor, resulting in an interruption in
his second term of service.
It could not be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary renunciation
because it was by operation of law.
Dizon vs COMELEC and Morales GR No. 182088, January 30, 2009
 Morales occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following periods: 1
July 1995 to 30 June 1998, 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001, 1 July 2001 to 30 June
2004, and 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007. However, because of his disqualification,
Morales was not the duly elected mayor for the 2004-2007 term. Neither did
Morales hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full term. Morales cannot
be deemed to have served the full term of 2004-2007 because he was ordered to
vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Morales’ occupancy of the
position of mayor of Mabalacat from 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007 cannot be
counted as a term for purposes of computing the three-term limit. Indeed, the
period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap for purposes of the
three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is
effectively Morales’ first term for purposes of the three-term limit rule.
ABUNDO, SR. VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 201716 January 8, 2013
 The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo’s three
successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-2007
term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to
serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually
declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate.
 Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service
for the full term for which he was elected.
Adormeo v. ComElec (2002)
 The Court held therein that the remainder of Tagarao’s term after the recall
election during which Talaga served as mayor should not be considered for
purposes of applying the three-term limit rule. The Court emphasized that the
continuity of Talaga’s mayorship was disrupted by his defeat during the 1998
elections
Socrates vs COMELEC
GR No. 145512, November 12, 2002
 In upholding Hagedorn’s candidacy to run in the recall election, the Court ruled:
x x x After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen
until the recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his
closest opponent, Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of
Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private
citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn’s service as
mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition.
 One who wins and serves a recall term does not serve the full term of his
predecessor but only the unexpired term. The period of time prior to the recall
term, when another elective official holds office, constitutes an interruption in
continuity of service.
 The Court likewise emphasized in Socrates that "an elective local official cannot
seek immediate re-election for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the
next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive
term and, hence, any subsequent election, like recall election, is no longer
covered x x x."
Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009, 609 SCRA 234.
 the period during which a local elected official is under preventive suspension
cannot be considered as an interruption of the continuity of his service. The Court
explained why so:
 Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive
suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective
official’s stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot
simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in
office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the
office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended official’s
continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the
authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists
(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan
shall be for three (3) years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay
officials on the second Monday of May 1994.
Amended
 Section 1. Sec. 43 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 43. Term of office. –

(a) xxx
(c) The term of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan
shall be for five (5) years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay
officials on the second Monday of May 1997: Provided, That the sangguniang kabataan
members who were elected in the May 1996 elections shall serve until the next regular
election of barangay officials.“ (Republic Act 8524, 14 February 1998)
 The provision on the term of office of the Sangguniang Kabataan has been
amended by RA 10742, as follows :
SECTION 11. Term of Office. – (a) The chairperson and members of the
Sangguniang Kabataan shall hold office for a fixed term of three (3) years unless sooner
removed for cause, permanently incapacitated, have died or resigned from office.
SECTIOS 48-59
SECTION 48. LOCAL LEGISLATIVE POWER. –
Local legislative power shall be exercised by the sangguniang panlalawigan for the
province; the sangguniang panlungsod for the city; the sangguniang bayan for the
municipality; and the sangguniang barangay for the barangay.
 Powers of the Sanggunian
▪ Section 468
Sangguniang Panlalawigan
▪ Section 458
Sangguniang Panlungsod
▪ Section 447
Sangguniang Bayan
▪ Section 391
Sangguniang Barangay
Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Sangguniang Panlunsod of Dumaguete,

155 SCRA 421 (1987)
 LGU’s do not have an inherent power to cite anyone for contempt.
 The subpoena requiring the attendance and testimony of the petitioners at an
investigation and the order directing petitioners to show cause why they should
not be punished for legislative contempt for their disobedience to said subpoena
was declared null and void for being ultra vires.
Tano vs Socrates
278 SCRA 154 (1997)
 Ordinances enacted in the exercise of the powers under the Code enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow the presumption, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or
arrgumentative contradiction.
Lagcao vs Labra
440 SCRA 279 (2004)
 For an ordinance to be valid,
1. it must not only be within the corporate powers of the city or municipality to enact
but must also be
2. Passed according to the procedure prescribed by law
3. It must be in accordance with the following basic principles of substantive nature
a. Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute,
b. Must not be unfair or oppressive
c. Must no be partial or discriminatory
d. Must not prohibit but may regulate trade
e. Must be general and consistent with public policy
f. Must not be unreasonable
CITY OF MANILA vs. LAGUIO
G.R. No. 118127, 12 April 2005
 The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is
subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the
limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good.
 In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of
delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
 Further, the Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or limit the petitioners'
actions. It in no way controls or guides the discretion vested in them. It provides
no definition of the establishments covered by it and it fails to set forth the
conditions when the establishments come within its ambit of prohibition.
The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close
down establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in
its execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other
than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by
which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid.
The Ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement
could be secured.
 Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use of property must, in order to
be valid and constitutional, specify the rules and conditions to be observed and
conduct to avoid; and must not admit of the exercise, or of an opportunity for the
exercise, of unbridled discretion by the law enforcers in carrying out its
provisions.
 The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to
it and those which are necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof.
By reason of its limited powers and the nature thereof, said powers are to be
construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms
used in granting said powers must be construed against the City Council .
 The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law explains itself.
Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation
of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to
create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the
Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of
subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government units
cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case
before us, the enactment in question, which are merely local in origin cannot
prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute. (Solicitor
General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority, G.R. No. 102782, 11 December 1991)
 All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights
and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm.
The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its
operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the
enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the
Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and
void.
Legaspi vs Cebu
G.R. No. 159110, 10 December 2013
 As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the
ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU, and whether it
was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the
substantive (i.e.,involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with
the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the
requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).
 Congress enacted the LGC as the implementing law for the delegation to the
various LGUs of the State’s great powers, namely: the police power, the power of
eminent domain, and the power of taxation. The LGC was fashioned to delineate
the specific parameters and limitations to be complied with by each LGU in the
exercise of these delegated powers with the view of making each LGU a fully
functioning subdivision of the State subject to the constitutional and statutory
limitations.
 It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature.
It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing
legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to
the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of
municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents
can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the
national lawmaking body.(Metropolitan Manila Development Authorityv. Bel-Air
Village Association,Inc., G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000, 328 SCRA 836, 843-
844)
 Vesting cities like the City of Cebu with the legislative power to enact traffic rules
and regulations was expressly done through Section 458 of the LGC, and also
generally by virtue of the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16 of the
LGC. 24Section 458of the LGC relevantly states:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Composition. –(a) The sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and
shall:
xxxx
(5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of
the basic services and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in
addition to said services and facilities, shall:
xxxx
xxxx
(v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and
other public places and approve the construction, improvement repair and maintenance
of the same; establish bus and vehicle stops and terminals or regulate the use of the
same by privately-owned vehicles vesting cities like the City of Cebu with the legislative
power to enact traffic rules and regulations was expressly done through Section 458 of
the LGC, and also generally by virtue of the General Welfare Clause embodied in
Section 16 of the LGC.24Section 458of the LGC relevantly states: Section 458. Powers,
Duties, Functions and Composition. –(a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative
body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for
the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code
and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under
Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
xxxx
(5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of
the basic services and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in
addition to said services and facilities, shall:
xxxx
(v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and other
public places and approve the construction, improvement repair and maintenance of the
same; establish bus and vehicle stops and terminals or regulate the use of the same by
privately-owned vehicles which serve the public; regulate garages and operation of
conveyances for hire;designate stands to be occupied by public vehicles when not in
use; regulate the putting up of signs, signposts, awnings and awning posts on the
streets; and provide for the lighting, cleaning and sprinkling of streets and public places;
(vi) Regulate traffic on all streets and bridges; prohibit encroachments or
obstacles thereon and, when necessary in the interest of public welfare, authorize the
removal of encroachments and illegal constructions in public places;(emphasis
supplied)
 The foregoing delegation reflected the desire of Congress to leave to the cities
themselves the task of confronting the problem of traffic congestions associated
with development and progress because they were directly familiar with the
situations in their respective jurisdictions. Indeed, the LGUs would be in the best
position to craft their traffic codes because of their familiarity with the conditions
peculiar to their communities. With the broad latitude in this regard allowed to the
LGUs of the cities ,their traffic regulations must be held valid and effective unless
they infringed the constitutional limitations and statutory safeguards.
The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with
utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the
law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its
exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect
and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part
of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only
to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or
public welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the
rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.(In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R.
No. 118127, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 308)
 The aspects of the guaranty of due process of law as a limitation on the acts of
government, viz:
This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government,
usually called "procedural due process" and "substantive due process."
 Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures
that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty,
or property. Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with
that kind of notice and what form of hearing the government must provide
when it takes a particular action.
 Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the
government has an adequate reason for taking away a person’s life,
liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process looks to
whether there is sufficient justification for the government’s action. Case
law in the United States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a
justification depends very much on the level of scrutiny used. For example,
if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is applied,
substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose. But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is
used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then the government will
meet substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary
to achieve a compelling government purpose.(In City of Manila v. Laguio,
Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 308)
SPARK vs Quezon City
G.R. No. 225442, 08 August 2017
 It is a long-standing principle that "[c]onformity with law is one of the essential
requisites for the validity of a municipal ordinance.“[People v. Chong Hong, 65
Phil. 625, 628 (1938)]. Hence, by necessary implication, curfew ordinances
should be read and implemented in conjunction with RA 9344, as amended by
RA 10360 so that minors caught in violation of curfew ordinances are children at
risk and, therefore, covered by the provisions of the statute.
 Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly
authorizes local government units, through their city or municipal councils, to set
curfew hours for children. It reads:
 Article 139. Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal councils
may prescribe such curfew hours for children as may be warranted
by local conditions. The duty to enforce curfew ordinances shall
devolve upon the parents or guardians and the local authorities.
 Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the imposition of
penalties on minors for status offenses such as curfew violations, viz.:

 SEC. 57. Status Offenses. - Any conduct not considered an offense or not
penalized if committed by an adult shall not be considered an offense and shall
not be punished if committed by a child.
 SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. - Ordinances enacted by local
governments concerning juvenile status offenses such as but not limited
to, curfew violations, truancy, parental disobedience, anti-smoking and anti-
drinking laws, as well as light offenses and misdemeanors against public order or
safety such as, but not limited to, disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment,
drunkenness, public intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism, gambling,
mendicancy, littering, public urination, and trespassing, shall be for the protection
of children. No penalty shall be imposed on children for said violations , and they
shall instead be brought to their residence or to any barangay official at the
barangay hall to be released to the custody of their parents. Appropriate
intervention programs shall be provided for in such ordinances. The child shall
also be recorded as a "child at risk" and not as a "child in conflict with the law."
The ordinance shall also provide for intervention programs, such as counseling,
attendance in group activities for children, and for the parents, attendance in
parenting education seminars.
 Requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid form of intervention
program that a local government (such as Navotas City in this case) could
appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the welfare of minors. For one,
the community service programs provide minors an alternative mode of
rehabilitation as they promote accountability for their delinquent acts without the
moral and social stigma caused by jail detention .
 The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise consistent
with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as it is merely a formal way of giving
warnings and expressing disapproval to the minor's misdemeanor.
SECTION 49. PRESIDING OFFICER. –
(a) The vice-governor shall be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan;
the city vice-mayor, of the sangguniang panlungsod; the municipal vice-mayor, of
the sangguniang bayan; and the punong barangay, of the sangguniang
barangay. The presiding officer shall vote only to break a tie
(b) In the event of the inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at a
sanggunian session, the members present and constituting a quorum shall elect
from among themselves a temporary presiding officer. He shall certify within ten
(10) days from the passage of ordinances enacted and resolutions adopted by
the sanggunian in the session over which he temporarily presided.
SECTION 50. INTERNAL RULES OF PROCEDURE. –
(a) On the first regular session following the election of its members and within ninety
(90) days thereafter, the sanggunian concerned shall adopt or update its existing rules
of procedure.
(b) The rules of procedure shall provide for the following:
1. The organization of the sanggunian and the election of its officers as well as the
creation of standing committees which shall include, but shall not be limited to,
the committees on appropriations, women and family, human rights, youth and
sports development, environmental protection, and cooperatives; the general
jurisdiction of each committee; and the election of the chairman and members of
each committee;
2. The order and calendar of business for each session;
3. The legislative process;
4. The parliamentary procedures which include the conduct of members during
sessions;
5. The discipline of members for disorderly behavior and absences without
justifiable cause for four (4) consecutive sessions, for which they may be
censured, reprimanded, or excluded from the session, suspended for not more
than sixty (60) days, or expelled: Provided, That the penalty of suspension or
expulsion shall require the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) vote of all the
sanggunian members: Provided, further, That a member convicted by final
judgment to imprisonment of at least one (1) year for any crime involving moral
turpitude shall be automatically expelled from the sanggunian; and
6. Such other rules as the sanggunian may adopt.
Malonzo vs Zamora
G.R. No. 137718, 28 January 2000
 The law does not require the completion of the updating or adoption of the
internal rules of procedure before the Sanggunian could act on any other matter
like the enactment of an ordinance. It simply requires that the matter of adopting
or updating the internal rules of procedure be taken up during the first day of
session. It would be inequitable to read something more into the requirement of
the law and use it as a basis for finding petitioners guilty of misconduct,
especially when the charge is serious enough to warrant a penalty of suspension
from office for three (3) months without pay.
 There is nothing in the law which prohibits that the three readings of a proposed
ordinance be held in just one session day.
Mandatory Committees
 Appropriations
 Women and Family
 Youth and Sports Development
 Environmental Protection
 Cooperatives
SECTION 51. FULL DISCLOSURE OF FINANCIAL AND BUSINESS INTERESTS OF
SANGGUNIAN MEMBERS.
(a) Every sanggunian member shall, upon assumption to office, make a full disclosure of
his business and financial interests, or professional relationship or any relation by
affinity or consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, which he may have with any
person, firm, or entity affected by any ordinance or resolution under consideration by the
sanggunian of which he is a member, which relationship may result in conflict of interest.
Such relationship shall include:
(1) Ownership of stock or capital, or investment, in the entity or firm to which the
ordinance or resolution may apply; and
(2) Contracts or agreements with any person or entity which the ordinance or resolution
under consideration may affect.
In the absence of a specific constitutional or statutory provision applicable to this
situation, "conflict of interest" refers in general to one where it may be reasonably
deduced that a member of a sanggunian may not act in the public interest due to some
private, pecuniary, or other personal considerations that may tend to affect his judgment
to the prejudice of the service or the public.
(b) The disclosure required under this Act shall be made in writing and submitted to the
secretary of the sanggunian or the secretary of the committee of which he is a member.
The disclosure shall, in all cases, form part of the record of the proceedings and shall be
made in the following manner:
(1) Disclosure shall be made before the member participates in the deliberations on the
ordinance or resolution under consideration: Provided, That, if the member did not
participate during the deliberations, the disclosure shall be made before voting on the
ordinance or resolution on second and third readings; and
(2) Disclosure shall be made when a member takes a position or makes a privilege
speech on a matter that may affect the business interest, financial connection, or
professional relationship described herein.
SECTION 52. SESSIONS. –
(a) On the first day of the session immediately following the election of its members, the
sanggunian shall, by resolution, fix the day, time, and place of its regular sessions. The
minimum numbers of regular sessions shall be once a week for the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang bayan, and twice a month for
the sangguniang barangay.
(b) When public interest so demands, special sessions may be called by the local chief
executive or by a majority of the members of the sanggunian.
(c) All sanggunian sessions shall be open to the public unless a closed-door session is
ordered by an affirmative vote of a majority of the members present, there being a
quorum, in the public interest or for reasons of security, decency, or morality. No two (2)
sessions, regular or special, may be held in a single day.
d) In the case of special sessions of the sanggunian, a written notice to the members
shall be served personally at the member's usual place of residence at least twenty-four
(24) hours before the special session is held. Unless otherwise concurred in by two-
thirds (2/3) vote of the sanggunian members present, there being a quorum, no other
matters may be considered at a special session except those stated in the notice.
(e) Each sanggunian shall keep a journal and record of its proceedings which may be
published upon resolution of the sanggunian concerned.
SECTION 53. QUORUM. –
(a) A majority of all the members of the sanggunian who have been elected and
qualified shall constitute a quorum to transact official business. Should a question of
quorum be raised during a session, the presiding officer shall immediately proceed to
call the roll of the members and thereafter announce the results.
(b) Where there is no quorum, the presiding officer may declare a recess until such time
as a quorum is constituted, or a majority of the members present may adjourn from day
to day and may compel the immediate attendance of any member absent without
justifiable cause by designating a member of the sanggunian to be assisted by a
member or members of the police force assigned in the territorial jurisdiction of the local
government unit concerned, to arrest the absent member and present him at the
session.
(c) If there is still no quorum despite the enforcement of the immediately preceding
subsection, no business shall be transacted. The presiding officer, upon proper motion
duly approved by the members present, shall then declare the session adjourned for
lack of quorum.
Quorum
 fixed number of members present at a session which is considered legally
sufficient to transact the business of the sanggunian even if the others are absent
Quorum, How Determined
 Normally, a quorum is determined by simply dividing the number of the members
who have been elected and qualified into two and adding one to the dividend.
Simply put, there is a quorum if one-half of the members plus one are present at
a sanggunian session
 Special quorum (for certain intentions), for example 2/3 of all members
ZAMORA vs. CABALLERO
GR No. 147767, 14 January 2004
 What is at issue in this case is not the propriety or the wisdom of entering into the
Contract for the construction of the capitol building, which is beyond the power of
this Court to enjoin, but the Sanggunian’s compliance with the requirements
prescribed under the LGC before it may grant the Governor authority to enter into
the Contract, which issue falls under the exception to the proscription against
injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, as held in Malaga v.
Penachos, Jr., 213 SCRA 516 (1992).
 On the applicability of Avelino vs Cuenco ((G.R. No. L-2821, March 4, 1949) to
the present case: The issue in said case was whether there was a quorum in a
meeting attended by only 12 of 24 senators, one having been in the hospital
while another was out of the country. This Court held that although the total
membership of the Senate was 24, the presence of 12 members already
constituted a quorum since the 24th member was outside the country and beyond
the coercive power of the Senate.
 In the instant case, there is nothing on record, save for respondents’ allegation, to
show that Board Member Sotto was out of the country and to thereby conclude
that she was outside the coercive power of the Sanggunian when the February 8
and 26, 2001 sessions were held. In fact it is undisputed that the leave form filed
by said Board Member before the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG) did not mention that she was going out of the country. 40 Petitioner’s
contention that the trial court cannot take judicial notice of Board Member Sotto’s
whereabouts is thus well taken. On this score, the instant case is outside the
application of the doctrine in Avelino.
 Also, in Avelino, the legislative body involved was the Senate and the applicable
rule on quorum was that embodied in Article VI, Section 10 of the 1935
Constitution which reads:
Section 10. x x x
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a
smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of
absent Members in such manner and under such penalties as such House may
provide.43 (Emphasis supplied)
 The present case, however, involves a local legislative body, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Compostela Valley Province, and the applicable rule respecting
quorum is found in Section 53(a) of the LGC which provides:
Section 53. Quorum.-
(a) A majority of all members of the sanggunian who have been elected and
qualified shall constitute a quorum to transact official business. Should a question
of quorum be raised during a session, the presiding officer shall immediately
proceed to call the roll of the members and thereafter announce the results.
 The trial court should thus have based its determination of the existence of a
quorum on the total number of members of the Sanggunian without regard to the
filing of a leave of absence by Board Member Sotto. The fear that a majority may,
for reasons of political affiliation, file leaves of absence in order to cripple the
functioning of the sanggunian is already addressed by the grant of coercive
power to a mere majority of sanggunian members present when there is no
quorum.[Section 53(b), LGC]
 A sanggunian is a collegial body. Legislation, which is the principal function and
duty of the sanggunian, requires the participation of all its members so that they
may not only represent the interests of their respective constituents but also help
in the making of decisions by voting upon every question put upon the body. The
acts of only a part of the Sanggunian done outside the parameters of the legal
provisions aforementioned are legally infirm, highly questionable and are, more
importantly, null and void. And all such acts cannot be given binding force and
effect for they are considered unofficial acts done during an unauthorized
session.
SECTION 54. APPROVAL OF ORDINANCES. –
(a) Every ordinance enacted by the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan shall be presented to the provincial governor
or city or municipal mayor, as the case may be. If the local chief executive
concerned approves the same, he shall affix his signature on each and every
page thereof; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections
to the sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the same. The sanggunian
concerned may override the veto of the local chief executive by two-thirds (2/3)
vote of all its members, thereby making the ordinance or resolution effective for
all legal intents and purposes
(b) The veto shall be communicated by the local chief executive concerned to the
sanggunian within fifteen (15) days in the case of a province, and ten (10) days in
the case of a city or a municipality; otherwise, the ordinance shall be deemed
approved as if he had signed it.
(c) Ordinances enacted by the sangguniang barangay shall, upon approval by the
majority of all its members, be signed by the punong barangay.
Section 186. Power To Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges. -
 Local government units may exercise the power to levy taxes, fees or charges on
any base or subject not otherwise specifically enumerated herein or taxed under
the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, or other
applicable laws: Provided, That the taxes, fees, or charges shall not be unjust,
excessive, oppressive, confiscatory or contrary to declared national policy:
Provided, further, That the ordinance levying such taxes, fees or charges shall
not be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the purpose.
Sec. 187 — Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue
Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. —
 The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall
be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings
shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided
further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or
revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the
effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within
sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That
such appeal not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and
the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied
therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision
or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon
the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of
competent jurisdiction.
Section 188. Publication of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures
 Within ten (10) days after their approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city,
and municipal tax ordinances or revenue measures shall be published in full for
three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation: Provided,
however, That in provinces, cities and municipalities where there are no
newspapers of local circulation, the same may be posted in at least two (2)
conspicuous and publicly accessible places.
Reyes vs CA
GR No. 118233, 10 December 1999
 A municipal tax ordinance empowers a local government unit to impose taxes.
The power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues to
finance and support the myriad activities of local government units for the delivery
of basic services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and
enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. [Mactan Cebu
International Airport Authority vs. Marcos, 261 SCRA 667, 690 (1996)].
Consequently, any delay in implementing tax measures would be to the detriment
of the public. It is for this reason that protests over tax ordinances are required to
be done within certain time frames. In the instant case, it is our view that the
failure of petitioners to appeal to the Secretary of Justice within 30 days as
required by Sec. 187 of R.A. 7160 is fatal to their cause.
Ordinance vs Resolution
ORDINANCE RESOLUTION
Character General and permanent Temporary
Number of Required to go through three (3) Need not go through a third

readings readings reading
Purpose To permanently direct and control To express an opinion as to

matters applying to persons or things in some given matter or thing
general
Effectivity Generally, on the 11th day from the Immediately (except

date a copy thereof is posted in a resolutions approving the
bulletin board at the entrance of the local development plan and
provincial capitol, city, municipal or public investment program
barangay hall (except ordinances with
penal sanctions which should be
published in a newspaper of general
circulation and tax ordinances which
should be published in full for three
consecutive days in a newspaper of
local circulation or if none, posted in at
least two conspicuous and publicly
accessible places)
Procedure for the Enactment of Ordinances

 Writing a draft
 Inclusion in the calendar on first reading
 First Reading
▪ Reading of the title
▪ Referral to the concerned committee
 Committee Report
▪ Committee meetings/hearings may be conducted prior to the
rendering of the committee report
▪ The conduct of a public hearing is required for tax ordinances
 Second Reading
▪ Debates and amendments may be done during the second reading
▪ Draft ordinance is approved on second reading
 Third Reading
▪ Draft ordinance is approved on third reading by votation (no more
debates or amendments)
 Approval/Veto by the Local Chief Executive (LCE)
 If vetoed, the sanggunian can override the veto with 2/3 vote of all its members
Gallego vs. People of the Philippines
8 SCRA 813 (1963)
 Trial courts should take judicial notice of municipal ordinances within their
respective jurisdiction
SECTION 55. VETO POWER OF THE LOCAL CHIEF EXECUTIVE. –
a) The local chief executive may veto any ordinance of the sanggunian panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan on the ground that it is ultra vires or
prejudicial to the public welfare, stating his reasons therefor in writing.
(b) The local chief executive, except the punong barangay, shall have the power to veto
any particular item or items of an appropriations ordinance, an ordinance or resolution
adopting a local development plan and public investment program, or an ordinance
directing the payment of money or creating liability. In such a case, the veto shall not
affect the item or items which are not objected to. The vetoed item or items shall not
take effect unless the sanggunian overrides the veto in the manner herein provided;
otherwise, the item or items in the appropriations ordinance of the previous year
corresponding to those vetoed, if any, shall be deemed reenacted.
(c) The local chief executive may veto an ordinance or resolution only once. The
sanggunian may override the veto of the local chief executive concerned by two-thirds
(2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the ordinance effective even without the
approval of the local chief executive concerned.
San Miguel Brewery vs Magno
GR No. L-21879, 29 September 1967
 In cases where the constitutionality of statutes are directly put in issue, the
general rule is, that the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised
at the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal
(People and Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation vs. Vera and Cu
Unjieng. 37 O.G., 164 citing 12 C. J. p. 786). (See also Cadwallader-Gibson
Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil. 192; Robb and Hilscher vs. People of the
Philippines, 68 Phil., 320; Macondray & Co. vs. Benito and Ocampo, 62 Phil.,
137; Sofronio L. Quimson vs. P. L. de Guzman, L-18240, January 31, 1963.) The
exceptions are, as stated in Hongkong etc. vs. Cu Unjieng, supra, in criminal
cases, where the question may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, either
in the trial court or on appeal; in civil cases, it has been held that it is the duty of
the court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for the first time on
appeal, if it appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a
decision of the case; and it has been held that a constitutional question will be
considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of
the court below.
 The same rule should apply where the validity of a municipal ordinance is
questioned. We do not find any of the exceptions aforementioned applicable to
this case to justify a conclusion that the validity of Ordinance No. 26 of the City of
Butuan may be properly passed upon in this appeal.
Leynes vs COA
GR No. 143596, 11 December 2003
 it is well-settled that an ordinance must be presumed valid in the absence of
evidence showing that it is not in accordance with the law. (Figuerres vs. Court of
Appeals, 305 SCRA 206 [1999])
SECTION 56. REVIEW OF COMPONENT CITY AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES OR
RESOLUTIONS BY THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN.
(a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the sanggunian panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan shall forward to the sangguniang panlalawigan for review, copies of
approved ordinances and the resolutions approving the local development plans and
public investment programs formulated by the local development councils.
(b) Within thirty (30) days after the receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions,
the sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the
provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial prosecutor for prompt
examination. The provincial attorney or provincial prosecutor shall, within a period of ten
(10) days from receipt of the documents, inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing
of his comments or recommendations, which may be considered by the sangguniang
panlalawigan in making its decision.
(c) If the sangguniang panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond
the power conferred upon the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan
concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part. The
sangguniang panlalawigan shall enter its action in the minutes and shall advise the
corresponding city or municipal authorities of the action it has taken.
(d) If no action has been taken by the sangguniang panlalawigan within thirty (30) days
after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed
consistent with law and therefore valid.
Acaac vs Azcuna
G.R. No. 187378, 30 September 2013
 Par. (d) should be read in conjunction with par. (c), in order to arrive at the
meaning of the disputed word, "action." It is clear, based on the foregoing
provision, that the action that must be entered in the minutes of the sangguniang
panlalawigan is the declaration of the sangguniang panlalawigan that the
ordinance is invalid in whole or in part. x x x.
 In accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, its
constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of any controverting
evidence that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in its
enactment.
SECTION 57. REVIEW OF BARANGAY ORDINANCES BY THE SANGGUNIANG
PANLUNGSOD OR SANGGUNIANG BAYAN. –
(a) Within ten (10) days after its enactment, the sangguniang barangay shall furnish
copies of all barangay ordinances to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
bayan concerned for review as to whether the ordinance is consistent with law and city
or municipal ordinances.
(b) If the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, fails to
take action on barangay ordinances within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, the
same shall be deemed approved.
(c) If the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, finds the
barangay ordinances inconsistent with law or city or municipal ordinances, the
sanggunian concerned shall, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, return the same
with its comments and recommendations to the sangguniang barangay concerned for
adjustment, amendment, or modification; in which case, the effectivity of the barangay
ordinance is suspended until such time as the revision called for is effected.
SECTION 58. ENFORCEMENT OF DISAPPROVED ORDINANCES OR
RESOLUTIONS.
Any attempt to enforce any ordinance or any resolution approving the local development
plan and public investment program, after the disapproval thereof, shall be sufficient
ground for the suspension or dismissal of the official or employee concerned.
SECTION 59. EFFECTIVITY OF ORDINANCES OR RESOLUTIONS. –
(a) Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance or the resolution approving the local
development plan and public investment program, the same shall take effect after ten
(10) days from the date a copy thereof is posted in a bulletin board at the entrance of the
provincial capitol or city, municipal, or barangay hall, as the case may be, and in at least
two (2) other conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned.
(b) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall cause the posting of an ordinance
or resolution in the bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol and the city,
municipal, or barangay hall in at least two (2) conspicuous places in the local
government unit concerned not later than five (5) days after approval thereof.
The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be disseminated and posted in
Filipino or English and in the language understood by the majority of the people in the
local government unit concerned, and the secretary to the sanggunian shall record such
fact in a book kept for the purpose, stating the dates of approval and posting.
(c) The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in a newspaper of
general circulation within the province where the local legislative body concerned
belongs. In the absence of any newspaper of general circulation within the province,
posting of such ordinances shall be made in all municipalities and cities of the province
where the sanggunian of origin is situated.
(d) In the case of highly urbanized and independent component cities, the main features
of the ordinance or resolution duly enacted or adopted shall, in addition to being posted,
be published once in a local newspaper of general circulation within the city: Provided,
That in the absence thereof the ordinance or resolution shall be published in any
newspaper of general circulation.
Sections 60 to 68
SECTION 60. GROUNDS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS. –
An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any
of the following grounds:
(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of
duty;
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at
least prision mayor;
(e) Abuse of authority;
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case
of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang
bayan, and sangguniang barangay;
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an
immigrant of another country; and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated
above by order of the proper court.
Sangguniang Barangay of don mariano marcos
G.R. No. 170626, 03 March 2008
 In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.[326 Phil. 847, 904-905 (1996)], the Court en
banc categorically ruled that the Office of the President is without any power to
remove elected officials, since the power is exclusively vested in the proper
courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local
Government Code. It further invalidated Article 125, Rule XIX of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, which provided
that:
Article 125. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. x x x.
x x x x.
(b) An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds
enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article by order of the proper court or the
disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the
other.
 It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the power to remove erring elective local officials
from service is lodged exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124 (sic 125) (b),
Rule XIX, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code, insofar as it vests power on the "disciplining authority" to remove from
office erring elective local officials, is void for being repugnant to the last
paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The law on
suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and
applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is
vested must exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is involved is not just an
ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the exercise of their
constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice
or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Where the disciplining authority is
given only the power to suspend and not the power to remove, it should not be
permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove. [Pablico vs.
Villapando, 434 Phil. 860 (2002)]
 As the law stands, Section 61 of the Local Government Code provides for the
procedure for the filing of an administrative case against an erring
elective barangay official before the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang
Bayan. However, the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan cannot
order the removal of an erring elective barangay official from office, as the courts
are exclusively vested with this power under Section 60 of the Local Government
Code. Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official are of a
grave nature and, if found guilty, would merit the penalty of removal from office,
the case should be filed with the regional trial court. Once the court assumes
jurisdiction, it retains jurisdiction over the case even if it would be subsequently
apparent during the trial that a penalty less than removal from office is
appropriate. On the other hand, the most extreme penalty that the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring
elective barangay official is suspension; if it deems that the removal of the official
from service is warranted, then it can resolve that the proper charges be filed in
court. An elected public official cannot be removed for
administrative misconduct committed during a previous
OMBUDSMAN VS VERGARA
term if he is re-elected to office by the same electorate.
G.R. No. 216871, 06 December 2017
 This Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in
this jurisdiction. As can be seen from this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted
from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from - and
now rendered obsolete by - the current legal regime. In consequence, it is high
time for this Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that originated from
Pascual, and affirmed in the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo,
Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr.
 The above ruling, however, was explicit in its pronouncement that the
abandonment of the doctrine of condonation is prospective in application, hence,
the same doctrine is still applicable in cases that transpired prior to the ruling of
this Court in Carpio Morales v. CA and Jejomar Binay, Jr. 31 Thus:
It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the
condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason
that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution,
until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.32 Unto
this Court devolves the sole authority to interpret what the Constitution
means, and all persons are bound to follow its interpretation.
2015 – BINAY CASE
The case which abandoned prospectively the condonation doctrine in 2015.
Doctrine of condonation
 theorizes that an official’s re-election denies the right to remove him from office
due to a misconduct during a prior term [Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of
Nueva Ecija,106 SCRA 466 (1959) cited in Carpio-Morales vs Binay, G.R. Nos.
217126-27, 10 November 2015]
 The application of the doctrine does not require that the official must be re-
elected to the same position in the immediately succeeding election. In Giron v.
Ochoa (G.R. No. 218463 March 1, 2017), the Court recognized that the doctrine
can be applied to a public officer who was elected to a different position provided
that it is shown that the body politic electing the person to another office is the
same. Thus, the Court ruled:
On this issue, considering the ratio decidendi (the rule of law on which a
judicial decision is based) behind the doctrine, the Court agrees with the
interpretation of the administrative tribunals below that the condonation
doctrine applies to a public official elected to another office. The
underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms. Thus, in
Carpio-Morales, the basic considerations are the following: first, the
penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the
public officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct ; second,
an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous
misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor; and third,
courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known
the life and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers. In this
case, it is a given fact that the body politic, who elected him to another
office, was the same.
Other grounds as provided by law
 Article 125 of the IRR of the LGC adds that an elective official may be disciplined
on such other grounds provided by the Code, RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), the Administrative Code of
1987, RA 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), the Revised Penal
Code, and all other applicable general and special laws.
Republic Act 3019

Anti-graft and corrupt practices act
 Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x x x x x x x.
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of officers or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
x x x x x x x x x.
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer
profited or will profit thereby.
GONZAGA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 96131, 06 September 1991
 Under Section 13, Rep. Act 3019, suspension of a public officer upon the filing of
a valid information is mandatory. (People vs. Albano, G.R. No. L-45376-77, July
26, 1988, 163 SCRA 511) What the Constitution rejects is a preventive
suspension of indefinite duration as it raises, at the very least, questions of denial
of due process and equal protection of the laws; in other words, preventive
suspension is justifiable for as long as its continuance is for a reasonable length
of time;(Layno, Sr. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 65848, May 24, 1985, 136
SCRA 541-542)
 Preventive suspension is not a penalty ;11 a person under preventive suspension,
especially in a criminal action, remains entitled to the constitutional presumption
of innocence as his culpability must still be established . (Layno, Sr. vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 65848, May 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 541-542)
 The rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of validity, and that to
declare a law unconstitutional, the basis for such a declaration must be clearly
established.(Abbas vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 89651, November 10, 1989, 179
SCRA 287)
 Preventive suspension is not violative of the Constitution as it is not a penalty. In
fact, suspension particularly under Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019 is mandatory
once the validity of the information is determined.(People vs. CA, G.R. Nos.
67425-27, March 18, 1985, 135 SCRA 372). What the Constitution abhors is an
indefinite preventive suspension as it violates the due process and equal
protection clauses, and the right of public officers and employees to security of
tenure.
 Rules on the period of preventive suspension under Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019,
or Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807 :
1. Preventive suspension under Section 13, Rep. Act 3019 as amended
shall be limited to a maximum period of ninety (90) days, from issuance thereof,
and this applies to all public officers, (as defined in Section 2(b) of Rep. Act
3019) who are validly charged under said Act.
2. Preventive suspension under Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807 shall apply
to all officers or employees whose positions are embraced in the Civil Service, as
provided under Sections 3 and 4 of Id Pres. Decree 807; 22 and shall be limited to
a maximum period of ninety (90) days from issuance except where there is delay
in the disposition of the case, which is due to the fault, negligence or petition of
the respondent, in which case the period of delay shall not be counted in
computing the period of suspension herein stated; provided that if the person
suspended is a presidential appointee,23 the continuance of his suspension shall
be for a reasonable time as the circumstances of the case may warrant.
Presidential Decree No. 1606 (PD 1606) as amended by Republic Act No. 7975 (RA
7975)
Section 4.
 The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, xxx
x x x x x x x x x
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
x x x x x x x x x
 Thus, to famonll within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the crime charged must be either one of those mentioned in
paragraph (a) abovementioned or one committed by a public officer in relation to
his office.
 The Court has held that an offense is deemed to be committed in relation to the
accused’s office when such office is an element of the crime charged or when the
offense charged is intimately connected with the discharge of the official
functions of accused. This was our ruling in Cunanan v. Arceo wherein the Court
explained several decisions dealing with the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.
 In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the
scope and reach of the term "offense committed in relation to [an accused’s]
office" by referring to the principle laid down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49
(1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was recognized in People v.
Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)].
 The principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that an offense may be considered as
committed in relation to the accused’s office if "the offense cannot exist without
the office" such that "the office [is] a constituent element of the crime x x x."
 In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that
"although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract,"
the facts in a particular case may show that "x x x the offense therein charged
is intimately connected with [the accused’s] respective offices and
was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or
irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive
to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their
aforesaid offices. x x x"
Alarilla vs sandiganbayan
GR No. 136806, 22 August 2000
 The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information.39 In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations
that the accused, petitioner herein, took advantage of his official functions as
municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he committed the crime of grave
threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against complainant
Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor
charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to kill Legaspi during a
public hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of
petitioner’s administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged
is intimately connected with the discharge of petitioner’s official functions. This
was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein
it held that the "accused was performing his official duty as municipal mayor
when he attended said public hearing" and that "accused’s violent act was
precipitated by complainant’s criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief
executive of the municipality, during the latter’s privilege speech. It was his
response to private complainant’s attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he
would not have been irritated or angered by whatever private complainant might
have said during said privilege speech." Thus, based on the allegations in the
information, the Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
Cruz vs dalisay
152 SCRA 482 (1987)
 Even if a complainant desists from pursung his/her complaint, it does not
necessarily prevent the continuation of the investigation of the cause of the
complaint and even the punishment of the respondent if warranted by the
circumstances.
ARIAS VS SANDIGANBAYAN
180 SCRA 309 (1989)
 All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and
on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into
negotiations.
 There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing
on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction.
SECTION 61. FORM AND FILING OF ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS. –
A verified complaint against any erring local elective official shall be prepared as follows:
(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an
independent component city or component city shall be filed before the Office of the
President;
(b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality shall be filed before the
sangguniang panlalawigan whose decision may be appealed to the Office of the
President; and
(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before the
sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned whose decision shall be
final and executory.
SECTION 62. NOTICE OF HEARING. –
(a) Within seven (7) days after the administrative complaint is filed, the Office of the
President or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the
respondent to submit his verified answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof,
and commence the investigation of the case within ten (10) days after receipt of such
answer of the respondent.
(b) When the respondent is an elective official of a province or highly urbanized city,
such hearing and investigation shall be conducted in the place where he renders or
holds office. For all other local elective officials, the venue shall be the place where the
sanggunian concerned is located.
(c) However, no investigation shall be held within ninety (90) days immediately prior to
any local election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed within the said
period. If preventive suspension has been imposed prior to the 90-day period
immediately preceding local election, it shall be deemed automatically lifted upon the
start of aforesaid period.
SECTION 63. PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION. –
(a) Preventive suspension may be imposed:
(1) By the President, if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly
urbanized or an independent component city;
(2) By the governor, if the respondent is an elective official of a component city or
municipality; or
(3) By the mayor, if the respondent is an elective official of the barangay.
(b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when
the evidence of guilt is strong, and given the gravity of the offense, there is great
probability that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses
or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence : Provided,
That, any single preventive suspension of local elective officials shall not extend beyond
sixty (60) days: Provided, further, That in the event that several administrative cases are
filed against an elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for more than
ninety (90) days within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known
at the time of the first suspension.
(c) Upon expiration of the preventive suspension, the suspended elective official shall
be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings
against him, which shall be terminated within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
time he was formally notified of the case against him. However, if the delay in the
proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect, or request, other than the appeal
duly filed, the duration of such delay shall not be counted in computing the time of
termination of the case.
(d) Any abuse of the exercise of the power of preventive suspension shall be penalized
as abuse of authority.
Requisites for the imposition of preventive suspension
 Under Section 63 of the Local Government Code, preventive suspension may be
imposed
(a) after the issues are joined;
(b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and
(c) given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the
continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.
Issues are considered joined when the complaint has been answered and there
are no longer any substantial preliminary issues that remain to be threshed out. [A.
Pimentel, The Local Government Code of 1991 The Key to National Development 177
(1993)]
 Under the Ombudsman Act (RA 6770)
(a) the evidence of guilt is strong, and
(b)the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression
or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty;
(c) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or
(d) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against
him
HAGAD VS GOZO-DADOLE
251 SCRA 242 (1995)
 There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed,
whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act.
The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let
alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the
other .
 The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive
suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to
the Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the
Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A. No. 6770, specifically under Sections
21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant. The Local Government
Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what already
prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the
Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the President.
GANZON VS CA
200 SCRA 271 (1991)
 The Court held that Ganzon can be allowed the benefit of simultaneous service of
the three separate preventive suspension orders.
BUNYE VS ESCAREAL
226 SCRA 332 (1993)
 Preventive suspension is mandatory under Section 13 of RA 3019.
 Such suspension may not exceed the maximum period of ninety (90) days fixed
in Section 42 of P.D. No. 807. [Pimentel vs Garchitorena, 208 SCRA 122 (1992)
citing Deloso vs. Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA 409; Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan,
177 SCRA 354; and Gonzaga vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 96I31, September 6,
1991]
ALDOVINO, EL. AL. vs comelec
GR No. 184836, 23 December 2009
 Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of
a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three term limitation.
SECTION 64. SALARY OF RESPONDENT PENDING SUSPENSION. –

The respondent official preventively suspended from office shall receive no salary or
compensation during such suspension; but upon subsequent exoneration and
reinstatement, he shall be paid full salary or compensation including such emoluments
accruing during such suspension.
SECTION 65. RIGHTS OF RESPONDENT. –
The respondent shall be accorded full opportunity to appear and defend himself in
person or by counsel, to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and to
require the attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary process of
subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.
SECTION 66. FORM AND NOTICE OF DECISION.
(a) The investigation of the case shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from the
start thereof. Within thirty (30) days after the end of the investigation, the Office of the
President or the sanggunian concerned shall render a decision in writing stating clearly
and distinctly the facts and the reasons for such decision. Copies of said decision shall
immediately be furnished the respondent and all interested parties.
(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or
a period of six (6) months for every administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a
bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets the
qualifications required for the office.
(c) The penalty of removal from office as a result of an administrative investigation shall
be considered a bar to the candidacy of the respondent for any elective position.
 It is not only paragraph c of this section that makes such removal a bar to the
candidacy of a respondent bu also Section 40, paragraph b of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
SECTION 67. ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS. –
Decisions in administrative cases may, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, be
appealed to the following:
(a) The sangguniang panlalawigan, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang
panlungsod of component cities and the sangguniang bayan; and
(b) The Office of the President, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and
independent component cities.
Decisions of the Office of the President shall be final and executory.
DON VS LACSA
G.R. No. 170810, 07 August 7, 2007
 Obviously, the said Code does not preclude the taking of an appeal. On the
contrary, it specifically allows a party to appeal to the Office of the President. The
[phrase] "final and executory" x x x in Sections 67 and 68, respectively, of the
Local Government Code, are not, as erroneously ruled by the trial court,
indicative of the appropriate mode of relief from the decision of
the Sanggunian concerned. These phrases simply mean that the administrative
appeals will not prevent the enforcement of the decisions. The decision is
immediately executory but the respondent may nevertheless appeal the adverse
decision to the Office of the President or to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, as
the case may be. [Mendoza vs Laxina, 453 Phil. 1024-1025 (2003)]7
CALINGIN VS CA
GR No. 154616, 12 July 2004
 In Lapid v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 142261, 29 June 2000, 334 SCRA 738,
754) we held that it is a principle of statutory construction that where there are
two statutes that apply to a particular case, that which was specially intended for
the said case must prevail. The case on hand involves a disciplinary action
against an elective local official. Thus, the Local Government Code is the
applicable law and must prevail over the Administrative Code which is of general
application.(Corona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97356, 30 September 1992,
214 SCRA 378, 391-392; See also Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 102342, 3
July 1992, 211 SCRA 277, 284). Further, the Local Government Code of 1991
was enacted much later than the Administrative Code of 1987. In statutory
construction, all laws or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the later law are
repealed or modified accordingly.(Ruben Agpalo, STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION, Third Edition, p. 321)
 Besides, even though appeal to the Court of Appeals is granted under Sec. 1,
Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court, Sec. 12, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of
Court in relation to Sec. 68 of the Local Government Code provides for the
immediate execution pending appeal. Under the same case of Lapid v. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. 142261, 29 June 2000, 334 SCRA 738, 754) we enunciated
that the decisions of the Office of the President under the Local Government
Code are immediately executory even pending appeal because the pertinent
laws under which the decisions were rendered mandated them to be so.
SECTION 68. EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL. –
An appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory. The
respondent shall be considered as having been placed under preventive suspension
during the pendency of an appeal in the event he wins such appeal. In the event the
appeal results in an exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and such other emoluments
during the pendency of the appeal
Sections 70-75
RECALL
SECTION 69. BY WHOM EXERCISED
The power of recall for loss of confidence shall be exercised by the registered voters of
a local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs.
GARCIA vs COMELEC
227 SCRA 100 (1993)
 Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his
term of office.
EVARDONE vs COMELEC
204 SCRA 464 (1991)
 Loss of confidence, as a ground for recall, is a political question.
 It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.
 Loss of confidence is the formal withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a
person's ability to discharge his office previously bestowed on him by the same
electorate. [ANTONIO ORENDAIN, PHILIPPINE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ANNOTATED (1983), p. 87]
Republic Act No. 9244
February 19 2004
 AN ACT ELIMINATING THE PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY AS A
MODE OF INSTITUTING RECALL OF ELECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 70 AND 71,
CHAPTER 5, TITLE ONE, BOOK I OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE "LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991", AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
SECTION 70.INITIATION OF THE RECALL PROCESS. - (AS AMENDED BY
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9244 FEBRUARY 19 2004)
a) The Recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay official shall be
commenced by a petition of a registered voter in the local government unit
concerned and supported by the registered voters in the local government unit
concerned during the election in which the local official sought to be recalled was
elected subject to the following percentage requirements:
1. At least twenty-five percent (25%) in the case of local government units

with a voting population of not more than twenty thousand (20,000);
2. At least twenty percent (20%) in the case of local government units with a
voting population of at least twenty thousand (20,000) but not more than
seventy-five thousand (75,000): Provided, That in no case shall the
required petitioners be less than five thousand (5,000);
3. At least fifteen percent (15%) in the case of local government nits with a
voting population of at least seventy-five thousand (75,000) but not more
than three hundred thousand (300,000): Provided, however, That in no
case shall the required number of petitioners be less than fifteen thousand
(15,000); and
4. At least ten percent (10%) in the case of local government units with a
voting population of over three hundred thousand (300,000): Provided,
however, That in no case shall the required petitioners be less than forty-
five thousand (45,000).
b) The process of recall shall be effected in accordance with the following

procedure:
1. A written petition for recall duly signed by the representatives of the
petitioners before the election registrar or his representative, shall be filed
with the Comelec through its office in the local government unit
concerned.
2. The petition to recall shall contain the following:
a. The names and addresses of the petitioners written in legible form and
their signatures;
b. The barangay, city or municipality, local legislative district and the
province to which the petitioners belong;
c. The name of the official sought to be recalled; and
d. A brief narration of the reasons and justifications therefore.
1. The Comelec shall, within fifteen (15) days from the filing of the
petition, certify to the sufficiency of the required number of
signatures. Failure to obtain the required number of signatures
automatically nullifies the petition;
Alvarado vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 216457 (2014)
 The verification of the signatures is done during the verification process and not
at the initial stage. Under Section 12 of Resolution No. 7505, the PES(Provincial
Election Supervisor) is only required, within three (3) days from the filing of the
recall petition, to determine whether the percentage requirement of signatories
was met and whether all the necessary documents attached to the petition are
complete.
2. If the petition is found to be sufficient in form, the Comelec or its
duly authorized representative shall, within three (3) days form the
issuance of the certification, provide the official sought to be
recalled a copy of the petition, cause its publication a national
newspaper of general circulation and a newspaper of general
circulation in the locality, once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks at the expense of the petitioners and at the same time post
copies thereof in public and conspicuous places for a period of not
less than ten (10) days nor more than twenty (20) days, for the
purpose of allowing interested parties to examine and verify the
validity of the petition and the authenticity of the signatures
contained therein.
3. The Comelec or its duly authorized representatives shall, upon
issuance of certification, proceed independently with the verification
and authentication of the signatures of the petitioners and
registered voters contained therein. Representatives of the
petitioners and the official sought to be recalled shall be duly
notified and shall have the right to participate therein as mere
observers. The filing of any challenge or protest shall be allowed
within the period provided in the immediately preceding paragraph
and shall be ruled upon with finality within fifteen (15) days from the
date of filing of such protest or challenge;
4. Upon the lapse of the aforesaid period, the Comelec or its duly
authorized representative shall announce the acceptance of
candidates to the positive and thereafter prepare the list of
candidates which shall include the name of the official sought to be
recalled."
ANGOBUNG vs COMELEC
269 SCRA 245 (1997)
 The law is plain and unequivocal as to what initiates recall proceedings: only a
petition of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters, may validly
initiate recall proceedings. We take careful note of the phrase, "petition of at least
twenty-five percent (25%)" and point out that the law does not state that the
petition must be signed by at least 25% of the registered voters; rather, the
petition must be "of" or by, at least 25% of the registered voters, i.e., the petition
must be filed, not by one person only, but by at least 25% of the total number of
registered voters. This is understandable, since the signing of the petition is
statutorily required to be undertaken "before the election registrar or his
representative, and in the presence of a representative of the official sought to be
recalled, and in a public place in the . . . municipality . . . "
 Hence, while the initiatory recall petition may not yet contain the signatures of at
least 25% of the total number of registered voters, the petition must contain the
names of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in whose behalf
only one person may sign the petition in the meantime.
SEC. 71. ELECTION ON RECALL. - (AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9244
FEBRUARY 19 2004)
Upon the filing of a valid petition for recall with the appropriate local office of the
Comelec, the Comelec or its duly authorized representative shall set the date of the
election or recall, which shall not be later than thirty (30) days upon the completion of
the procedure outlined in the preceding article, in the case of the barangay, city or
municipal officials, and forty-five (45) days in the case of provincial officials. The officials
sought to be recalled shall automatically be considered as duly registered candidate or
candidates to the pertinent positions and, like other candidates, shall be entitled to be
voted upon."
SECTION 72. EFFECTIVITY OF RECALL. –

The recall of an elective local official shall be effective only upon the election and
proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the highest number
of votes cast during the election on recall. Should the official sought to be recalled
receive the highest number of votes, confidence in him is thereby affirmed, and he shall
continue in office.
SECTION 73. PROHIBITION FROM RESIGNATION. –
The elective local official sought to be recalled shall not be allowed to resign while the
recall process is in progress.
SECTION 74. LIMITATIONS ON RECALL.
(a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his
term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.
DANILO E. PARAS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
G.R. No. 123169 November 4, 1996
 It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the
Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the
office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and
be filled by the electorate.
CLAUDIO vs COMELEC
331 SCRA 388 (2000)
 Recall resolutions or petitions may not be used whimsically. In fact, they can be
resorted to only once during the term of the elective official sought to be recalled.
And since there is a prohibition against recalls within the first year of an official's
term of office, and within one year immediately preceding a regular local election,
the move to recall can only be done in the second year of the three year term of
local elective officials. (The Local Government Code of 1991: The Key to
National Development)
 The term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to the recall election and not to the
preliminary proceedings to initiate recall —
1. Because Section 74 speaks of limitations on "recall" which, according to
Section 69, is a power which shall be exercised by the registered voters of a
local government unit. Since the voters do not exercise such right except in an
election, it is clear that the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited
within the one-year period provided in paragraph (b);
2. Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is to provide voters
a sufficient basis for judging an elective local official, and final judging is not
done until the day of the election; and
3. Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as including the initiation
of recall proceedings would unduly curtail freedom of speech and of assembly
guaranteed in the Constitution.
SECTION 75. EXPENSES INCIDENT TO RECALL ELECTIONS. –
All expenses incident to recall elections shall be borne by the COMELEC. For this
purpose, there shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act a contingency
fund at the disposal of the COMELEC for the conduct of recall elections.
SECTIONS 76-97
HUMAN RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT
SECTION 76. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND STAFFING PATTERN

Every local government unit shall design and implement its own organizational structure
and staffing pattern taking into consideration its service requirements and financial
capability, subject to the minimum standards and guidelines prescribed by the Civil
Service Commission.
Gen San vs. COA
G.R. No. 199439, April 22, 2014
 Local autonomy also grants local governments the power to streamline and
reorganize. This power is inferred from Section 76 of the Local Government Code
on organizational structure and staffing pattern, and Section 16 otherwise known
as the general welfare clause
 Section 5, paragraph (a) of the Local Government Code states that "any provision
on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor,
and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor or
devolution of powers x xx."
 Section 5, paragraph (c) also provides that "the general welfare provisions in this
Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to local government units
in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the
people in the community." These rules of interpretation emphasize the policy of
local autonomy and the devolution of powers to the local government units.
 Designing and implementing a local government unit’s own "organizational
structure and staffing pattern" also implies the power to revise and reorganize.
Without such power, local governments will lose the ability to adjust to the needs
of its constituents. Effective and efficient governmental services especially at the
local government level require rational and deliberate changes planned and
executed in good faith from time to time.
 Thus, consistent with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the
1987 Constitution, under Section 25, Article II and Section 2, Article X, and the
Local Government Code of 1991, we declare that the grant and release of the
hospitalization and health care insurance benefits given to petitioner’s officials
and employees were validly enacted through an ordinance passed by petitioner’s
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. (Province of Negros Occidental v. Commissioners,
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 182574, September 28, 2010, 631 SCRA 431
 x xx Sec. 28 (b) as amended by RA 4968 in no uncertain terms bars the creation
of any insurance or retirement plan – other than the GSIS – for government
officers and employees, in order to prevent the undue and inequitous proliferation
of such plans. x xx. To ignore this and rule otherwise would be tantamount to
permitting every other government office or agency to put up its own
supplementary retirement benefit plan under the guise of such "financial
assistance. (Conte v. Commission on Audit)
SECTION 77. RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RESOURCES AND

DEVELOPMENT. –
The chief executive of every local government unit shall be responsible for human
resources and development in his unit and shall take all personnel actions in
accordance with the Constitutional provisions on civil service, pertinent laws, and
rules and regulations thereon, including such policies, guidelines and standards as
the Civil Service Commission may establish: Provided, That the local chief executive
may employ emergency or casual employees or laborers paid on a daily wage or
piecework basis and hired through job orders for local projects authorized by the
sanggunian concerned, without need of approval or attestation by the Civil Service
Commission: Provided, further, That the period of employment of emergency or
casual laborers as provided in this Section shall not exceed six (6) months.
LUEGO vs CSC
G.R. NO. L-69137, 05 August 1986
 It is well settled that the determination of the kind of appointment to be
extended lies in the official vested by law with the appointing power and not
the Civil Service Commission. The Commissioner of Civil Service is not
empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by
the appointing officer. When the appointee is qualified, as in this case, the
Commissioner of Civil Service has no choice but to attest to the appointment.
Under the Civil Service Law, Presidential Decree No. 807, the Commissioner
is not authorized to curtail the discretion of the appointing official on the nature
or kind of the appointment to be extended.(In Re: Elvira C. Arcega, 89 SCRA
318, 322)
 Indeed, the approval is more appropriately called an attestation, that is, of the
fact that the appointee is qualified for the position to which he has been
named. As we have repeatedly held, such attestation is required of the
Commissioner of Civil Service merely as a check to assure compliance with
Civil Service Laws. (In Re: Elvira C. Arcega, 89 SCRA 318, 322, Villanueva
vs. Bellalo, 9 SCRA 407-41 1; Said Benzar Ali vs. Teehankee, 46 SCRA 728,
730-731; Santos vs. Chico, 25 SCRA 343; City of Manila vs. Subido, 17
SCRA 231)
 Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by
the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition
being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If
he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are
others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political
question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide.
 The Civil Service Commission is limited only to the non-discretionary authority
of determining whether or not the person appointed meets all the required
conditions laid down by the law.
The Joint Commission on Local Government Personnel Administration organized
pursuant to Presidential Decree Numbered Eleven Hundred thirty-six (P.D. No. 1136) is
hereby abolished and its personnel, records, equipment and other assets transferred to
the appropriate office in the Civil Service Commission.
SECTION 78. CIVIL SERVICE LAW, RULES AND REGULATIONS, AND OTHER

RELATED ISSUANCES
All matters pertinent to human resources and development in local government units
shall be governed by the civil service law and such rules and regulations and other
issuances promulgated pursuant thereto, unless otherwise specified in this Code.
SECTION 79. LIMITATION TO APPOINTMENTS. –
No person shall be appointed in the career service of the local government if he is
related within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to the appointing or
recommending authority.
SECTION 80. PUBLIC NOTICE OF VACANCY; PERSONNEL SELECTION BOARD. –
(a) Whenever a local executive decides to fill a vacant career position, there shall be
posted notices of the vacancy in at least three (3) conspicuous public places in
the local government unit concerned for a period of not less than fifteen (15)
days.
(b) There shall be established in every province, city or municipality a personnel
selection board to assist the local chief executive in the judicious and objective
selection or personnel for employment as well as for promotion, and in the
formulation of such policies as would contribute to employee welfare.
(c) The personne l selection board shall be headed by the local chief executive, and
its members shall be determined by resolution of the sanggunian concerned. A
representative of the Civil Service Commission, if any, and the personnel officer
of the local government unit concerned shall be ex officio members of the board.
SECTION 81. COMPENSATION OF LOCAL OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES. –
The compensation of local officials and personnel shall be determined by the
sanggunian concerned: Provided, That the increase in compensation of elective local
officials shall take effect only after the terms of office of those approving such increase
shall have expired: Provided, further, That the increase in compensation of the
appointive officials and employees shall take effect as provided in the ordinance
authorizing such increase: Provided, however, That said increases shall not exceed the
limitations on budgetary allocations for personal services provided under Title Five,
Book II of this Code: Provided, finally, That such compensation may be based upon the
pertinent provisions of Republic Act Numbered Sixty-seven fifty-eight (R.A. No 6758),
otherwise known as the "Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989".
 NB
The most recent law on compensation of government officials and employees is
the SALARY STANDARDIZATION LAW OF 2019, otherwise known as Republic Act
11466, which was signed into law on 08 January 2020.
The punong barangay, the sangguniang barangay member, the sangguniang kabataan
chairman, the barangay treasurer, and the barangay secretary shall be entitled to such
compensation, allowances, emoluments, and such other privileges as provided under
Title One Book III of this Code.
Elective local officials shall be entitled to the same leave privileges as those enjoyed by
appointive local officials, including the cumulation and commutation thereof.
SECTION 82. RESIGNATION OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS. –

(a) Resignations by elective local officials shall be deemed effective only upon
acceptance by the following authorities:
(1) The President, in the case of governors, vice-governors, and mayors and
vice-mayors of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities;
(2) The governor, in the case of municipal mayors, municipal vice-mayors, city
mayors and city vice-mayors of component cities;
(3) The sanggunian concerned, in the case of sanggunian members; and
(4) The city or municipal mayor, in the case of barangay officials.
(b) Copies of the resignation letters of elective local officials, together with the action
taken by the aforesaid authorities, shall be furnished the Department of the Interior and
Local Government.
(c) The resignation shall be deemed accepted if not acted upon by the authority
concerned within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
(d) Irrevocable resignations by sanggunian members shall be deemed accepted upon
presentation before an open session of the sanggunian concerned and duly entered in
its records: Provided, however, That this subsection does not apply to sanggunian
members who are subject to recall elections or to cases where existing laws prescribed
the manner of acting upon such resignations.
SECTION 83. GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE. –
In every local government unit, the local chief executive shall establish a procedure to
inquire into, act upon, resolve or settle complaints and grievances presented by local
government employees.
SECTION 84. ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE. –
Investigation and adjudication of administrative complaints against appointive local
officials and employees as well as their suspension and removal shall be in accordance
with the civil service law and rules and other pertinent laws. The results of such
administrative investigations shall be reported to the Civil Service Commission.
SECTION 85. PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION OF APPOINTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES. –
(a) The local chief executives may preventively suspend for a period not exceeding sixty
(60) days and subordinate official or employee under his authority pending investigation
if the charge against such official or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there is reason to believe that the
respondent is guilty of the charges which would warrant his removal from the service.
(b) Upon expiration of the preventive suspension, the suspended official or employee
shall be automatically reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the
administrative proceedings against him until its termination. If the delay in the
proceedings of the case is due to the fault, neglect or request of the respondent, the
time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein
provided.
SECTION 86. ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION. –
In any local government unit, administrative investigation may be conducted by a person
or a committee duly authorized by the local chief executive. Said person or committee
shall conduct hearings on the cases brought against appointive local officials and
employees and submit their findings and recommendations to the local chief executive
concerned within fifteen (15) days from the conclusion of the hearings. The
administrative cases herein mentioned shall be decided within ninety (90) days from the
time the respondent is formally notified of the charges.
SECTION 87. DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION. –
Except as otherwise provided by law, the local chief executive may impose the penalty
of removal from service, demotion in rank, suspension for not more than one (1) year
without pay, fine in an amount not exceeding six (6) months salary, or reprimand and
otherwise discipline subordinate officials and employees under his jurisdiction. If the
penalty imposed is suspension without pay for not more than thirty (30) days, his
decision shall be final. If the penalty imposed is heavier than suspension of thirty (30)
days, the decision shall be appealable to the Civil Service Commission, which shall
decide the appeal within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof.
SECTION 88. EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL. –
An appeal shall not prevent the execution of a decision of removal or suspension of a
respondent-appellant. In case the respondent-appellant is exonerated, he shall be
reinstated to his position with all the rights and privileges appurtenant thereto from the
time he had been deprived thereof.
SECTION 89. PROHIBITED BUSINESS AND PECUNIARY INTEREST. –
(a) It shall be unlawful for any local government official or employee, directly or
indirectly, to:
(1)) Engage in any business transaction with the local government unit in which
he is an official or employee or over which he has the power of supervision, or
with any of its authorized boards, officials, agents, or attorneys, whereby money
is to be paid, or property or any other thing of value is to be transferred, directly or
indirectly, out of the resources of the local government unit to such person or
firm;
(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local
government unit;
(3) Purchase any real estate or other property forfeited in favor of such local
government unit for unpaid taxes or assessment, or by virtue of a legal process at
the instance of the said local government unit;
(4) Be a surety for any person contracting or doing business with the local
government unit for which a surety is required; and
(5) Possess or use any public property of the local government unit for private
purposes.
(b) All other prohibitions governing the conduct of national public officers relating to
prohibited business and pecuniary interest so provided for under Republic Act
Numbered Sixty-seven thirteen (R.A. No. 6713) otherwise known as the "Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees" and other laws shall
also be applicable to local government officials and employees.
SECTION 90. PRACTICE OF PROFESSION. –
(a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their
profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their
functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation,
or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian
members who are also members of the Bar shall not::
1. Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local
government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the
government is the adverse party;
2. Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of
the national or local government is accused of an offense committed in
relation to his office.
3. Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings
involving the local government unit of which he is an official; and
4. Use property and personnel of the government except when the
sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the
government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of
work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do
not derive monetary compensation therefrom.
JAVELLANA, vs. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND

LUIS T. SANTOS, SECRETARY
G.R. No. 102549 August 10, 1992
 Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991
and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the
Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches
upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice
of law. The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81
simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest
between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their
profession, in those instances where the law allows it.
 Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers
and doctors. It applies to all provincial and municipal officials in the professions or
engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian
members "may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in
schools expect during session hours." If there are some prohibitions that apply
particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of law is
more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of public service.
CATU vs RELLOSA
A.C. No. 5738, 19 February 2008
 Section 90 of RA 7160, Not Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, Governs The Practice
of Profession of Elective Local Government Officials.
 Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during
their incumbency, from engaging in the private practice of their profession
"unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will
not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions." This is the general
law which applies to all public officials and employees.
 Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors
are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation
other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is
because they are required to render full time service. They should therefore
devote all their time and attention to the performance of their official duties.
 On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their professions, engage in
any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In other
words, they may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors
and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan,sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to
hold regular sessions only at least once a week. Since the law itself grants
them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any occupation or
teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them
to secure prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for
any of these purposes.
 While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors,
mayors, provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to
a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any
occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the
members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are
allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason because they
are not mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is
supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month
 Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the
head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the
case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities
require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided,
further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside
activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the
agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer
or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the
case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve
real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in
any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part
in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of
directors. (Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules)
SECTION 91. STATEMENT OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES. –
Officials and employees of local government units shall file sworn statements of assets,
liabilities and net worth, lists of relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity in government service, financial and business interests, and personnel data
sheets as required by law.
ONG vs PP, G.R. Nos. 174845-52
GALEOS vs PP, G.R. Nos. 174730-37
09 February 2011
 By withholding information on his relative/s in the government service as required
in the SALN, Galeos was guilty of falsification considering that the disclosure of
such relationship with then Municipal Mayor Ong would have resulted in the
disapproval of his permanent appointment pursuant to Article 168 (j)
(Appointments), Rule XXII of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which provides:
o No person shall be appointed in the local government career service if he
is related within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to the
appointing power or recommending authority.
SECTION 92. OATH OF OFFICE. –
All elective and appointive local officials and employees shall, upon assumption to
office, subscribe to an oath or affirmation of office in the prescribed form. The oath or
affirmation of office shall be filed with the office of the local chief executive concerned. A
copy of the oath or affirmation of office of all elective and appointive local officials and
employees shall be preserved in the individual personal records file under the custody of
the personnel office, division, or section of the local government unit concerned.
SECTION 93. PARTISAN POLITICAL ACTIVITY. –
No local official or employee in the career civil service shall engage directly or indirectly
in any partisan political activity or take part in any election, initiative, referendum,
plebiscite, or recall, except to vote, nor shall he use his official authority or influence to
cause the performance of any political activity by any person or body. He may, however,
express his views on current issues, or mention the names of certain candidates for
public office whom he supports. Elective local officials may take part in partisan political
and electoral activities, but it shall be unlawful for them to solicit contributions from their
subordinates or subject these subordinates to any of the prohibited acts under the
Omnibus Election Code.
 Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) reads in full:
Sec. 55. Political Activity. – No officer or employee in the Civil Service including
members of the Armed Forces, shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan
political activity or take part in any election except to vote nor shall he use his
official authority or influence to coerce the political activity of any other person or
body. Nothing herein provided shall be understood to prevent any officer or
employee from expressing his views on current political problems or issues, or
from mentioning the names of his candidates for public office whom he supports:
Provided, That public officers and employees holding political offices may take
part in political and electoral activities but it shall be unlawful for them to solicit
contributions from their subordinates or subject them to any of the acts involving
subordinates prohibited in the Election Code.
SECTION 94. APPOINTMENT OF ELECTIVE AND APPOINTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS;
CANDIDATES WHO LOST IN AN ELECTION. –
(a) No elective or appointive local official shall be eligible for appointment or designation
in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no elective
or appointive local official shall hold any other office or employment in the government
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
FLORES vs DRILON
G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993
 As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to
the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his
appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the
Constitution cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City,
and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be
considered a de facto officer, "one whose acts, though not those of a lawful
officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they
involve the interest of the public and third persons, where the duties of the office
were exercised.
 The proviso in par. (d), Sec. 13, of R.A. 7227, which states: ". . . Provided,
however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the
Mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief
executive officer of the Subic Authority ," is declared unconstitutional;
consequently, the appointment pursuant thereto of the Mayor of Olongapo City,
respondent Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and VOID.
(b) Except for losing candidates in barangay elections, no candidate who lost in any
election shall, within one (1) year after such election, be appointed to any office in the
government or any government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of their
subsidiaries.
 Section 6, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 6. No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after
such election, be appointed to any office in the Government or any Government-owned
or controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.
PP vs SANDIGANBAYAN and VILLAPANDO
G.R. No. 164185 July 23, 2008
 Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 244. Unlawful appointments. — Any public officer who shall knowingly
nominate or appoint to any public office any person lacking the legal qualifications
therefore, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000
pesos.
 Legal disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code simply means
disqualification under the law. Clearly, Section 6, Article IX of the 1987
Constitution and Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 prohibits
losing candidates within one year after such election to be appointed to any office
in the government or any government-owned or controlled corporations or in any
of their subsidiaries.
SECTION 95. ADDITIONAL OR DOUBLE COMPENSATION. –
No elective or appointive local official or employee shall receive additional, double, or
indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the
consent of Congress, any present, emoluments, office, or title of any kind from any
foreign government. Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional,
double, or indirect compensation.
LORENZANA vs FAJARDO
A.C. No. 5712 , 29 June 2005
 Indeed, respondent, in accepting such appointment as PLEB member, has
transgressed the Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Local
Government Code of 1991. Being contra leges, respondent also violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Attorney’s Oath.
SECTION 96. PERMISSION TO LEAVE STATION. –
(a) Provincial, city, municipal, and barangay appointive officials going on official travel
shall apply and secure written permission from their respective local chief executives
before departure. The application shall specify the reasons for such travel, and the
permission shall be given or withheld based on considerations of public interest,
financial capability of the local government unit concerned and urgency of the travel.
Should the local chief executive concerned fall to act upon such application within four
(4) working days from receipt thereof, it shall be deemed approved.
(b) Mayors of component cities and municipalities shall secure the permission of the
governor concerned for any travel outside the province.
(c) Local government officials traveling abroad shall notify their respective sanggunian:
Provided, That when the period of travel extends to more than three (3) months, during
periods of emergency or crisis or when the travel involves the use of public funds,
permission from the Office of the President shall be secured.
(d) Field officers of national agencies or offices assigned in provinces, cities, and
municipalities shall not leave their official stations without giving prior written notice to
the local chief executive concerned. Such notice shall state the duration of travel and
the name of the officer whom he shall designate to act for and in his behalf during his
absence.
SECTION 97. ANNUAL REPORT. –
On or before March 31 of each year, every local chief executive shall submit an annual
report to the sanggunian concerned on the socio-economic, political and peace and
order conditions, and other matters concerning the local government unit, which shall
cover the immediately preceding calendar year. A copy of the report shall be forwarded
to the Department of the Interior and Local Government. Component cities and
municipalities shall likewise provide the sangguniang panlalawigan copies of their
respective annual reports.

Local Government Finals

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

Local Government Finals

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Local Government Finals

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

DOCTRINES, RULINGS, PRINCIPLES ON THE GENERAL WELFARE

LEGASPI vs. CEBU,

 Respondent municipality invalidly used its police powers in ordering the

SECTION 18. POWER TO GENERATE AND APPLY RESOURCES.

- Section 7, Article X, 1987 Philippine Constitution

 Temporarily closure for athletic, cultural, or civic activities only if sponsored,

SECTION 23. AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE AND SECURE GRANTS.

 negotiate and secure financial grants or donations in kind

 nature, amount, and terms of assistance to be reported to both Houses of

SECTION 24. LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES.

The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:

SECTION 25. NATIONAL SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

 The President’s power of the general supervision, as exercised by the DILG

SECTION 26. DUTY OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN THE

SECTION 27. PRIOR CONSULTATIONS REQUIRED.

D. PARTICIPATION OF LOCAL EXECUTIVES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE

Section 52. Suspension of Operational Supervision and Control. – The President may,

a. An elective local official must be :

 The citizenship qualification must be construed as applying to the time of

Ong Huang Tin vs Republic, 19 SCRA 966 (1967)

Tess Dumpit-Michelena vs Boado, 2005

Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 92191-92, 30 July 1991,

Domino v. COMELEC, 369 Phil. 798 (1999)

JALOVER VS OSMENA, gr No. 209286, 23 September 2104

SECTION 42. DATE OF ELECTION.

"Sec. 43. Term of office. –

Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Sangguniang Panlunsod of Dumaguete,

Character General and permanent Temporary

Number of Required to go through three (3) Need not go through a third

Purpose To permanently direct and control To express an opinion as to

Effectivity Generally, on the 11th day from the Immediately (except

Procedure for the Enactment of Ordinances

Republic Act 3019

SECTION 64. SALARY OF RESPONDENT PENDING SUSPENSION. –

1. At least twenty-five percent (25%) in the case of local government units

b) The process of recall shall be effected in accordance with the following

SECTION 72. EFFECTIVITY OF RECALL. –

SECTION 76. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND STAFFING PATTERN

SECTION 77. RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RESOURCES AND

SECTION 78. CIVIL SERVICE LAW, RULES AND REGULATIONS, AND OTHER

SECTION 82. RESIGNATION OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS. –

JAVELLANA, vs. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND

You might also like