CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES (CLAWS)

FOREWORD

C4I2SR SYSTEM FOR THE INDIAN ARMY

A COST EFFECTIVE SYSTEM

1. Traditionally, technical subjects in the Indian Army were the preserve of

technical arm officers and consequently the operational focus of the proposed
systems were sometimes at variance with the desired military synergy. To
envision technical concepts from a tactical and operational perspective was
accordingly a long felt and an essential military exigency, especially in context
of the transformation undertaken by the army. The research by Col Shantanu
Dayal, an infantry officer, on an attainable C4I2SR system for the Indian Army,
in a low cost context, is both visionary and implementable and merits
cognizance at appropriate levels for its incorporation in the contemporary
transformational matrix.

2. A C4I2SR system(s) to integrate the multidimensional and impressive

combat capabilities attained by the Indian Army in recent years has been
attempted on numerous occasions over the last two decades by several
agencies. The results achieved and the systems introduced have generally
remained tactically sub-optimal and technologically vintaged. The desired
synergy in command and control has consequently remained elusive to
battlefield commanders.

3. In the decade of the 80s and 90s, when the technological base in the
country was perhaps not so well developed, the Army‟s exertions at
developing „prototypes‟ from „original‟ technical concepts and ideas was
conceivably mandatory. Contemporarily, however, wherein India has emerged
as an undisputed leader in the IT and communication fields, it appears
implausible to attempt separate IT and communication „research‟ outside the
civil domain. Instead of adopting appropriate sub-systems of the available
technologies, the developmental process of most C4I2SR systems appear to
suffer from the vintaged methodology of trying to „re-discover‟ military systems
from that already available in the civil domain.

4. Col Shantanu Dayal has carried out an incisive analysis of the military
requirements in the present and futuristic battlefield milieu, likely to be
obtained in varied sectors / terrain of the country as also of the contemporary
IT and communication technologies, available in the civil and commercial
 2

domains. With his experience in all sectors and terrains obtaining in the
country, the author has been able to conceptualize a system which can be
procured „off the shelf‟, deployed in real-time frame in all sectors and
exploited effectively by all combatants without the induction / training /
gestation time, normally associated with introduction of new systems.

5. The entire civil World, including most militaries, has graduated to the
cellular communication with its inherent synergy between computers (the
handset) and a wide band communication system (the third generation mobile
media). The computer sub system with its data acquisition (from surveillance
and intelligence generation sources like radars, aircraft, patrols etc) and data
processing (for command and control functions) has the potential of
facilitating commanders in all their battlefield endeavours. Mobile media
network having requisite bandwidth to transmit all visualized battlefield
transmissions (data, videos, pictures, fire orders etc), redundancies to
withstand the vagaries of military use and combat attrition (alternate „cells‟ to
communicate) and higher levels of assurance levels required in battle
situations is considered the most combat hardened and cost effective
communication system in any future battlefield. Integration of above two
subsystems, already in effective use in the civil domain, is the essential
recommendation made in the paper.

6. The present day electronic notebooks and laptop computers pack

adequate capability to meet most of the military‟s combat and combat support
requirements. Third generation CDMA cellular telephony, with superlative
compatibility in related bandwidth domain offers immense potential for almost
all communication and associated requirements. The visualised C4I2SR is
based on a network of appropriately configured and adequately compatible
computers (3G cellular handsets) having broadband connectivity with all
entities of battle space and support zone. The proposal has attempted to
translate information superiority into combat power by effectively linking
knowledge entities in battle-space. The visualized computers and the
telephones are similar to that available in the commercial market with specific
re-orientation / re-configuration, as required for integration with the plethora of
Army equipment, devices and software of the existing communication and
Tac C3I applications.

7. Superiority of the recommended system, meriting introduction in the

Army, emanates from its simplicity, implement-ability, proven / „user‟s
hardened‟ complexion and its relative inexpensive nature (only a fraction
compared to all other similar projects). There is a high degree of user
„friendliness‟ of the system already ingrained in the army owing to proliferated
usage of similar systems in all sections of the society. Introduction of the
proposed system is likely to catalyze the transformation process underway in
the Army and usher in enhanced battle implementable capabilities in all its
dimensions and envisioned scope.
 3

CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES (CLAWS)

C4I2SR SYSTEM FOR THE INDIAN ARMY

A COST EFFECTIVE SYSTEM

References:- 1. Indian Army Doctrine.

2. Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations.

3. CLAWS Seminar Report on NCW, July 2008.

Appendices:- A: C4I2SR Glossary.

B: C4I2SR Requirement Matrix.

C: Third Generation Cellular Telephone Technology.

The Backbone of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is a C4I2SR

System which facilitates dominant battle-space awareness … Advances
in C4I2SR also make possible a new concept of war fighting, viz Network
Centric Warfare.
Indian Army Doctrine. pg 48, para 3.40.
 4

INTRODUCTION

General

1. Indian Army is one of the most battle experienced and

professional armies in the world. High achievement quotient of the Army is
manifestation of its enduring regimentation and committed leadership; which
in turn has generated superlative combat capabilities transcending the entire
range of conflicts in the sub conventional, conventional and nuclear domains.
Accordingly, the human component and its command structure occupies an
eminent position in Army‟s institutionalized framework.

2. Notwithstanding the strong human dimension, technological

progression, in recent years has dominated the emerging battle space.
Concurrently, primacy of the human dimension has also endured to a great
degree in the Indian
context. The exigencies of HUMAN AND TECHNOLOGICAL
contemporary command DIMENSIONS OF COMMAND
have therefore acquired a

Contemporary Command
multi-dimensional scope,

Enhanced Scope of
(Demands on the Military Leader)

encompassing both the

Command Exigency

complex human dimension

and the progressive
technological dimension. In
addition, the challenges of
command in the modern,
high tempo operations
have been further Mid 20th End 20th Early 21st
Century Century Century
accentuated by the
growing complexity of the battlefield1. In consequence, the need for
appropriate empowerment of the military command structure, in the
emerging battlefield milieu, is high.

3. The visualized C4I2SR systems are accordingly aimed at

attainment of superior combat capabilities by further improvement of
battlefield transparency, situational awareness, communication, combat and
support capabilities, etc; all leading to the attainment of a superior
command capability in the Army.

1
Technology and Command, Implications for Military Operations in the Twenty-first Century
William B. McClure, Lt Colonel, USAF, July 2000, Occasional Paper No. 15, Pg 1, Center for
Strategy and Technology, Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base.
 5

Emerging Character of Conflict

4. While security issues dominated the 20th century, the 21st century
commenced with primacy of economy and energy well established. However,
terrorist strikes in USA and Mumbai and the situation in Af-Pak region obliged
the re-emergence of security issues to the global and regional forefront. The
ultimate outcomes of the prolonged conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan will have
a major bearing on the global contours of security2. The relative ease of
conventional victories in Iraq and Afghanistan by the US lead coalition
forces and their acute predicament at sub conventional levels thereafter,
merits analysis.
EMERGING CHARACTER OF CONFLICTS
5. These wars and numerous

Propensity of Conflict
other recent conflicts have re-
emphasized the emergence of „war
by other means‟ - unconventional,
asymmetrical and across a wide
range in the spectrum of conflict.
Despite a perceived enhancement
in the conventional capabilities of Mid 20 End 20 Early 21 th
Mid 21 th st st

Century Century Century Century

modern armed forces, the
propensity of conventional conflicts is likely to further decrease. The Army
needs to be cognizant to this transition to Fourth Generation of Warfare.

6. Contrary to the above trend, the Indian security mechanism has

traditionally been a function of conventional threat matrix. The ongoing
transformation, including the process of technological advancement, appears
biased towards the conventional forces. Accordingly, the sub conventional
security dynamics, perhaps, is yet to attain the political, strategic, economic
and technological impetus, to the extent that it deserves.

7. In consequence, while the Indian Security mechanism has acquired

the desired capabilities to deter adversaries in the conventional domain,
the same may not be true in the sub conventional domain. Proxy war in
J&K3, Parliament attack, 26/11, and political intransigence of neighbours are
perhaps, manifestation of such inadequacies in the sub conventional domain.
India, therefore, needs to take adequate measures to be adequately prepared
for the emerging character of conflict.
2
Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi, PVSM, AVSM, VSM, (retd), former Vice Chief of Army Staff. Approach
Paper on Army 2020, CLAWS Seminar 2005.
3
―Jihad to continue till India quits Kashmir‖- Sayed Salahuddin, Chairman United Jehad
Council, Times of India 05 Feb 2010, pg 16.
 6

Emerging Battlefield Requirements

8. The emerging battlefield requirements are a function of the objectives

and the means required to achieve the objectives in the contemporary
conflicts. From the conventional domain necessitating destruction of forces
and capture of territories, the conflict scenario has graduated to a pre-
dominant sub conventional domain requiring greater battlefield transperancy,
superior situational awareness and terrain and operations specific combat
capabilities. While the overall combat capabilities need to cater for the entire
spectrum of conflict, the primacy of sub conventional conflicts, visualised in
the Indian sub continent, merits acknowledgement. Lower end of the
violence spectrum, accordingly, deserves greater concern in the C4I2SR
endeavours.

9. Battlefield transparency is an essential pre-requisite for success in

battle. The Army needs to exploit the advances in Information Technology for
providing all weather surveillance,
detection, monitoring and thereafter
collation and instant dissemination of
Situational
information from the battlefield and from its Awareness
support areas. Enhanced battlefield
transparency should lead to enhanced
Battlefield Combat
situational awareness, which in turn will Transparency Capabilities
further optimize the capabilities, both in the
conventional and in the sub conventional
Other
domains. Integration of radars, sensors, Capabilities
navigation devices and direction finding
capabilities would be required for the
purpose. EMERGING CAPABILITY MATRIX

10. Realization of battlefield transparency and situational awareness

is contingent on the availability of modern, state of the art
communication with adequacy of bandwidth and requisite computation
capabilities. While the existing radio and line communication needs to be
further improved, there is an exigency of exploring new frontiers in the
field. Thereafter, the numerous means of communication needs to be
appropriately integrated for optimizing their capabilities. The above
capabilities should contribute to enhancement of the command and control
potential as also provide a common operating picture to the entire
hierarchical structure, thereby reducing friction and fog of war.
 7

Emerging Technologies Relevant to C4I2SR Systems

11. Contemporary technologies are driven by the growing economic needs

of the people. Rapidity of socio - economic transformation has mandated the
subservience of agricultural and the manufacturing sectors by the services
sector. The needs of the services sector and the entertainment world have
accordingly shaped the technologies in a significant way. In consequence,
information technology aptly supplemented by computers, cellular
communication, related disciplines and satellite-based technologies are
dominating the Global scenario.

12. In concert with the emergent trends in technology, future battlefield

would witness advanced technologies in almost every field. The impact of
technology on the conduct of warfare would appear in a number of dominant
trends, viz, extension in the reach and range of weapons, volume and
accuracy of fire, systems integration, and increasing transparency on the
battlefield. Manoeuver capabilities would also increase manifold with greater
situational awareness, better sensors, enhanced navigation capabilities and
the ability to converge speedily at a decisive point. Advanced communications
and computer systems will expand the
commander‟s vision and detection
ranges. It will also improve the quality of
information transfer and instant transfer
of instructions and orders to
subordinates.

13. To a large measure, the above

dominant trends in the battlefield may be
attributed to three essential emerging
technologies, ie Information
Technology with computers at its core,
Satellites with its varied configurations
and Cellular Communication with
abilities transcending a vast range of
applications. Integration of these
technologies has the potential to
transform the battlefield decisively.

14. In context of the above technological matrix, the visualised C4I2SR

systems have the potential to leverage a large number of emergent
technologies for enhancing Army’s combat capabilities.
 8

Research Objectives

15. Contemporary C4I2SR issues are, as yet, largely in the development /

design domain, thereby precluding adequacy of functional / execution level
discussion / criticism, aimed at optimization of the systems. The research
paper is a user‟s perspective of the subject and is aimed at providing a base
document for development and optimization of the C4I2SR systems for
the Indian Army. The objectives of the study are threefold, as follows:-

(a) Enhance the C4I2SR capability of the Indian Army by exploring

the already validated and commercially available, inexpensive
technologies and equipment.

(b) Facilitate infusion of contemporary ‘low - end’ technology,

which can be applied appropriately in the Indian context to augment the
potential of „upper-end‟ technologies in the existing and planned C4I2SR
systems.

(c) Enhance the ‘user interface’ in the planned up-gradation of the

Indian Army in the command and control, communication, information
and related fields.

Hypothesis

16. Indian Army can attain essential C4I2SR capabilities, from

relatively simple and inexpensive technologies, by making a pragmatic
and realistic assessment of the C4I2SR requirements in the
contemporary and futuristic battlefield, and thereafter, based on the
appreciated requirements, carry out requisite adoption and re-
orientation of the proven and emerging technologies, readily available in
the civil / commercial domain.

17. Essential drivers of the hypothesis are twofold; firstly, a pragmatic and
realistic assessment of the requirements of C4I2SR systems in the Indian
context and secondly, requisite adoption / re-orientation of the proven
and emerging technologies available in the commercial domain. The study
will attempt to validate the hypothesis and thereby suggest measures in terms
 9

of emerging technologies that can be adopted / re-oriented for introduction of

„Low Cost - High Payoff C4I2SR Systems for the Indian Army‟, as follows:-

(a) Ascertain the contemporary and futuristic requirements of

4 2
C I SR capability in the Indian Army in terms of command and control,
battlefield transparency and situational awareness, communication and
integration methodologies.

(b) Explore the modern technical systems, which are readily

available, both commercially and in the design domain, and can be
suitably incorporated in the C4I2SR philosophy of the Indian Army. The
ability to adopt proven and validated technologies, thereby precluding
the requirement of time consuming and relatively expensive research /
innovation, will bestow the desired „low-cost‟ character to the system.

(c) The recommendations will include the C4I2SR structure

attainable by the above format in the short term as well as the
structure desired in the long term.

Preview

18. This study is laid out in the following chapters (ch):-

(d) Ch 1. Environmental Scan: Character of Conflicts.

(e) Ch 2. Emerging Operational Imperatives.

(f) Ch 3. Analysis: C4I2SR Considerations.

(g) Ch 4. Philosophy of C4I2SR.

(h) Ch 5. Analysis : C4I2SR Structure in the Indian Context.

(i) Ch 6. Emerging Technologies for the C4I2SR Systems.

(j) Ch 7: Low Cost, High Payoff C4I2SR System.

(k) Ch 8. Summary of Recommendations.

19. The study will attempt to recommend a C4I2SR System within the „low
cost - high payoff‟ parameter with the components / parts being pre-validated
and immediately „apply-able‟ in the Indian context. The system as a whole
should be capable of being appropriately integrated in the Network
Centric Warfare philosophy, conceptualized for the Indian Army.
 10

CHAPTER 1

Both leaders (Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan) agreed that

terrorism is the main threat to both countries. Both leaders affirmed their
resolve to fight terrorism and to cooperate with each other to this end….

- Dr. Manmohan Singh and Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani, Joint

Statement, Sharm El Sheikh, 16 July 2009

ENVIRONMENTAL SCAN: CHARACTER OF CONFLICTS

Global Conflict Paradigm

20. The World is witnessing a paradigm shift in the character of

conflict. While territorial issues continue to remain important motivating
factors; energy security, water scarcity, economic disparity, religious
prejudices, ideological biases and historical differences appear to have
gained prominence as possible reasons for conflict. The stakeholders to
contemporary conflicts are not confined to states and statutory bodies
but have now expanded to include groups representing sub-
nationalities, terrorists and insurgents, religious
fanatics and ethnic interests. The methodology
employed range from sabotage and subversion to
open confrontation and armed conflict.

21. From among the possible reasons of

contemporary conflict, economics has
emerged as the essential raison d'être in the
global political realms. Energy, water,
environment, raw materials and markets are other
reasons for politico-economic insecurities leading to
conflicts. „Energy Security‟ is the current flavour in the geo-political strategic
matrix. Nations, over the ages, have exerted politico-military influence /
coercion to protect and secure own energy resources as also acquire
additional resources through negotiations, treaties and force (where required).
Energy is likely to continue as an important motive for conflict at the regional
and the global levels in the fore-seeable future.
 11

22. Prolonged economic inrqualities have lead to acute disparity in

standard of living of peoples, which in turn has resulted in acute animosity
due to perceived injustices, economic coercion, energy exploitation, etc.
Historical prejudices, religious fundamentalism, ethnic struggle, etc can all be
traced back to acute economic disparity and political differences and the
consequent insecurity / animosity. The above often manifests in the sub
conventional domain, both directly as also by proxy, through the medium of
terror. Response of the weaker nations / sub nationalities / ethnic groups
to perceived politico-economic-military coercion is the second issue
generating ‘heat’ and motivating conflicts.

Strategic Criticality: Regional Context

2. The growing Asian economies have created a „strategic pull‟, leading to

a flux in strategic equations, which in turn, is manifesting in the form of
strategic shift from West to East. The second „strategic pull‟, resulting from the
epicenter of global terror in the Af-Pak region, has further accentuated the
security environment in the Indian sub - continent. The bilateral and regional
equations in South Asia are accordingly undergoing a transformation with
enhanced global perspective. Therefore, there exists a strategic criticality
for emerging powers like India, to graduate to a higher geo-strategic
plane with matching politico - economic - military capabilities. The
military exigencies for attainment of requisite capabilities in the conventional
and the sub conventional domains are therefore high.

3. Regional Security Complexity. Within the Asian Region, India has a

pivotal role in South Asia due to it‟s size, strategic location, control over Indian
Ocean, political and economic stature. China appears uncomfortable with
India‟s emergence as an economic and military power in the region. Pakistan
is in a perpetual state of antagonism and confrontation with India owing to
perceived historical injustices, contemporary economic inadequacies,
potentially grave internal failings and humiliating military defeats. These and
other flawed reasons are perhaps the essential motivating factors for Pakistan
sponsored terrorism in J&K and large parts of India. Other neighbours,
unfortunately, despite having several commonalities have witnessed
“interdependence of shared rivalry and not interdependence of shared
interests” which keeps them in economic and political flux and precludes the
desired stability and an environment conducive to prosperity and growth.
 12

REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEXITY

CHINA
PAKISTAN
• Uncomfortable with India’s growth
• Intransigence - anti India psyche.
• Fundamentalism, Proxy War J&K. NORTH EAST
• Controlled political irrationality. • Internal origins, external abetment

AF-PAK NEPAL
• Extra-regional dimension, Pak factor • Nascent democracy, Maoist insur.
• Ethnic fault lines, terrorism, taliban
BANGLADESH
JAMMU & KASHMIR • Politico eco issues, fundamentalism.
• Internal aggravation, Pak abetment MYANMAR
• Democracy, International isolation.
EXTRA REGIONAL OVERTURES
• Geo-Strategic exertion, terrorism SRI LANKA
• Regional issues in Global domain • Ethnic fault-lines, Post LTTE scenario

Conflict Paradigm: Indian Context

23. The C4I2SR systems, required for the Indian Army, need to conform to
the nature of warfare, visualized in the Indian context. While there is a
conspicuous rise in the sub conventional threat matrix, Pakistan and China
continue as important protagonists in the conventional and nuclear domains.

(a) Pakistan. India‟s conventional progression has significantly

enhanced the military
asymmetry in the sub
THREAT MATRIX : PAKISTAN
continent. Growing
irrelevance of Pakistan‟s
Combat Power

Sub Conventional Domain

conventional capabilities
in the future has
apparently constrained
Pakistan to seek
leverages in the sub -
conventional and nuclear Mid 20 End 20 Early 21 th
Mid 21 th st st

Century Century Century Century

domains. Counter
insurgency experience on its Western borders is likely to further
 13

enhance Pakistan‟s sub conventional capabilities. Strategically

therefore, with respect to Pakistan, there would be a requirement of
greater sub-conventional and nuclear exertion by the Indian security
establishment, while concurrently maintaining conventional superiority.

(b) China. While Pakistan may seek leverages in the sub-

conventional and nuclear domains, China will continue posing threat in
the conventional domain in the long term. Such conventional threat,
however, may lose its credibility if the existing Sino - Indian
military asymmetry is reduced to a level wherein the feasibility of a
decisive victory by the
Peoples Liberation
THREAT MATRIX : CHINA
Army is significantly
diluted. Military Combat Power
adventurism by China, if
planned, will accordingly
be prior to a stage when
India achieves credible
conventional capabilities Sub Conventional Domain
against its Northern Mid 20 th
End 20 th st
Early 21 st
Mid 21
Century Century Century Century
neighbour. China may
also resort to a „last ditch‟ effort at embarrassing India militarily as part
of its larger geo - strategic aspiration of demonstrating its rise to a
global power status. Beyond the asymmetrical threat stage, explained
above, the Sino-Indian military matrix is likely to conform to nuclear and
conventional deterrence requirements, with increased emphasis on
economic dominance.

(c) Out of Area Contingencies (OOACs). India‟s emergence as a

regional power necessitates a matching OOAC capabilities, essentially
for UN mandated and internationally justifiable contingencies. Such
contingencies may largely be sub-conventional in scope & dimension.

(d) Internal Security. Internal security obligations will continue to

endure thus necessitating prolonged sub-conventional indulgence by
the Indian Army.

24. Focus of C4I2SR Systems. The focus of C4I2SR systems, therefore,

needs to be on sub conventional and nuclear domains with adequate
stress on the current and near term conventional requirements, especially for
 14

the mountains4. The network centricity, visualized for the Indian Army, also
merits configuration in a similar manner.

Battlefield Milieu : Indian Context

25. Conventional Domain. Enhanced economic power and apparent

inadequacies in the conventional domain (Operation PARAKRAM) and the
sub conventional domain (attack on Parliament, 26 / 11 and other terrorist
attacks) appear to have significantly shaped the transition to an innately
aggressive and predominantly proactive strategy of the Indian Army.
While the introduction of the nuclear calculus in the nineties was initially
viewed as a major inhibitor of conflict in the conventional domain, India
appears to have unambiguously graduated to the capability of operations
in a nuclear environment / overhang5.
Nuclear dimension, however, has reduced EMERGING CHARACTER OF
the time window for conventional operations. CONVENTIONAL CONFLICTS
At the international level, however,

Intensity of Conflict
conventional wars between states, especially
nuclear powered states and states perceived
to be responsible powers, are a waning
phenomenon. In the Indian context,
probability of a major conventional war will
exist as long as territorial and boundary
disputes involving China and Pakistan remain
unresolved6. Conventional conflicts, Duration of Conflict
therefore, are likely under conditions of
extreme provocation / duress. In consequence, the conflict is likely to be
short, swift and intense. Such a war between two states is likely to be
characterized by the following:-
(a) Dominance of information wars.
(b) Enhanced battlefield transparency.
(c) Enhanced situational awareness.
(d) Enhanced night fighting capabilities.

4
The probability of the next conventional war breaking out in the mountains is far higher than
that of a war in the plains – Brig (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal – Seminar IDSA May 2009.
5
Cold Start: Indian Threat to Pakistan & China, Asian Tribune, Thu, 2010-01-14 05:45 —
editor, Vol. 9 No. 268.
6
India Plans for Swift Wars, Heavy Reliance On Remote Assets, by Vivek Raghuvanshi
Published: Defence News, 20 April 2009
 15

(e) Enhanced lethality and precision of weapon systems.

(f) Pre-dominance of manoeuvre operations in plains.
(g) Manpower time & firepower intensive operations in mountains.
(h) Asymmetric warfare factored even into conventional conflicts.
(i) Greater synergy in land, air and maritime efforts.
(j) Decreased tolerance for casualty and collateral damage.

CONVENTIONAL DOMAIN; ESSENTIAL BATTLEFD MILIEU

Short and intense wars, Battlefd transparency, Situational awareness,
Non-linear operations and Dominance of Information Wars.

26. Sub Conventional Domain. Security forces in India have gained

extensive experience in the sub conventional domain. Over the past few
decades, they have developed their unique genre of manpower (infantry)
intensive operations as opposed to the technology and fire power intensive
solutions practiced by the USA in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan as also by
the Russians in Afghanistan and Chechnya and the Israelis in Lebenon and
Gaza. The Indian security forces have deliberately eschewed the
employment of offensive airpower, tanks, ICVs, artillery and heavy
caliber weapons. In consequence, the small component of armour, artillery
and other support arms, EMERGING CHARACTER OF
employed in the counter SUB CONVENTIONAL CONFLICTS
insurgency operations,
Intensity of Violence

have been in purely

infantry / police format
resulting in operations
being confined to foot /
light Infantry / police
actions with small arms.
The visualized C4I2SR Jungle Rural Urban
capabilities for sub Insurgencies Insurgencies Insurgencies
conventional warfare in the Indian context must accordingly be
cognizant of such an operational environment.

27. The future insurgencies of the Left Wing Extremists (LWE) are likely to
focus on counter insurgency operations in dense Jungle terrain. Jehadi
terrorism, on the other hand, may increasingly become an Urban
 16

phenomenon. The essential characteristics of the sub conventional conflicts

in the Indian context are likely to be as follows:-
(a) Pre-eminence of human intelligence.
(b) Infantry (small arms) predominant operations.
(c) Low tolerance for collateral damage.
(d) Lower tolerance for own casualties.
(e) High threshold for escalation.
(f) Major challenge – locating and confirming identity of terrorists.

SUB CONVENTIONAL DOMAIN; ESSENTIAL BATTLEFD MILIEU

Battlefd transparency and Situational awareness for realtime location,
identification and awareness of terrorist / insurgents activities.

28. Navy and Air Force. While the strategy being adopted by these
Services is outside the preview of this paper, the impact of their operations
and their relevance to the Army‟s operations are as follows:-

(a) Air Force will continue to play a significant role in shaping the
battlefield for conventional operations of the mechanized forces in
plains and in the desert sector. In the mountains and at the sub
conventional plane, their employment is visualized in a supporting role.

(b) Navy and Air Force will be the dominant partners for
operations in the IOR, OOACs in littoral states and in our area of
influence.

(c) In the long term, the importance of SLOC will increase leading to
a dominant role by the navy in the Indian Ocean.

29. Having analysed the likely battlefield milieu in the Indian context, the
stage is set for analyzing the emerging operational imperatives, which will
influence the formulation of the C4I2SR philosophy in the Indian context.
 17

CHAPTER 2

The rise of international terrorism indeed shows that the information

age is both an integrating and a dividing force. Terrorism remains the
principal challenge to liberal and democratic societies and now occupies
centre stage in the international security matrix.

General Deepak Kapoor, Chief of the Army Staff. Quoted

from the text of his lecture delivered as a part of National Security
Lecture series at the IDSA on 3 July 2008.

EMERGING OPERATIONAL IMPERATIVES: C4I2SR CONTEXT

General

4. The challenge for contemporary armies is to “leverage” their advantage

in conventional weaponry to deal with asymmetrical and unconventional
threats. Information technology can be an important enabler for such tasks7.
The C4I2SR capabilities will accordingly be a function of emerging
operational imperatives in the contemporary battle space. Enhanced
transparency of military operations to the public and the concurrent audit by
the media has a direct impact on the operational imperatives, which in turn
will significantly shape the C4I2SR
EMERGING OPERATIONAL IMPERATIVES
environment. From the conventional
domain mandating destruction of
Operational Imperatives

forces and capture of territories, the

conflict scenario appears to be
graduating to sub conventional
domain necessitating attainment of
politico – military objectives through a
process of domination of the Time
Mid 20
Century
End 20
Century
th
Early 21
Century
th st

environment, isolation of the threat

and politico – military manoeuvres. Accordingly, future battlefield is likely to be
characterized by increased requirements of intelligence, manoeuver and
focused employment of combat and combat support assets.
7
―War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of Modern History, 1500 to Today‖,
Max Boot, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a columnist for the Los Angeles
Times, and a contributing editor to The Weekly Standard.
 18

Conventional Domain

5. Despite enhanced requirements in the sub-conventional and nuclear

domains, the primacy of conventional operations will continue in the Indian
context owing to terrain, high value political-economic sensitivities on both
sides of the border and existing conventional infrastructure. Nation States
will continue to be assessed on the scale of conventional military
capability, as a component of comprehensive military power.
Enhancement of conventional capabilities would accordingly form an
important factor in formulating C4I2SR systems.

6. Cold Start Strategy. In the plains sector of the Western borders, the
dynamics of „Cold Start Strategy8‟ mandates renewed emphasis on mobility,
speed of operations, manoeuvre capability and a dynamic command and
control structure. C4I2SR is an important enabler in the entire operational
matrix visualized in the ‘Cold Star’ environment. In the mountains in the
Northern and the Eastern sector, the need to overcome the terrain friction and
manoeuvre has accentuated the need for an effective C4I2SR system.

7. Plains / Desert Sector. In the defensive / proactive mode, Some of

the areas where C4I2SR systems can qualitative enhance the military
capability at the operational level are as follows:-

(a) Mobilization. Overcoming the mobilization differential with

respect to Pakistan is an emerging operational imperative, especially in
light of the „Cold
Start‟ strategy.
The location
synergy of
Pakistan Communication
Centre
peacetime
military stations
can be
Command and
degraded more Control Centre
effectively with a Enemy Fire Support
4 2 Mobilizing Columns Centre
superior C I SR
system in place. Real-time connectivity to surveillance devices
monitoring enemy movements (satellites, aircrafts, UAVs, human
intelligence, etc), and other intelligence gathering apparatus will be
8
Army may use Cold Start doctrine against Pak, CNN – IBN 09 Dec 2008, post Mumbai
terror strikes, http://ibnlive.in.com/news/army-may-use-cold-start-doctrine-against-pak/80160-
3-1.html.
 19

required for accuracy and optimization of weapons platforms deployed

for targeting Pakistan formations on the move and in the process of
deployment. Such an arrangement will lead to focused delivery of
munitions, thereby contributing to capability enhancement.

(b) First Line of Conventional Defence. In the Indo - Pakistan

matrix, the traditional first line of defence is based on the series of
Dhussis, DCBs and Canals configured along the IB in Punjab and
Rajasthan. In J&K, the defensive posts are generally configured along
the ridgelines on own
side of the Line of PAKISTAN INDIA
4 2
Control (LC). C I SR
systems bestow the
capability to graduate
from this attrition style
of defensive
deployment to a more
pro-active and
inherently
maneuverable profile
by „pushing‟ the first
line of defence across
the IB / LC. This
quantum jump is feasible, wherein enhanced ‘look-in’ capability,
appropriately supported by requisite communication and accuracy
of combat and combat support elements, permits ‘assured
detection, accurate targeting and guaranteed destruction of
enemy’s offensive / pro-active designs, prior to his crossing the IB
/ LC. The above will make available large quantum of forces, currently
employed for purely defensive tasks on the Dhussis / DCBs / Canals,
thereby enhancing the pro-active content of the Pivot Corps.

(c) Positioning of Reserves. Political exigencies mandate „no loss‟

of territory. Such an operational environment necessitates earmarking
large quantum of pre-positioned reserves to obviate intrusions. C4I2SR
capabilities, with enhanced potential to detect, respond and
destroy such military overtures by the adversary, in real-time
frame, can substantially reduce the quantum and number of
reserves required for such tasks, which interalia makes up for a
more optimal and inherently pro-active deployment of forces.
 20

Existing arrangement : Extensive pre-positioning of reserves C4I2SR enabled arrangement : Reduced reserves requirement
Communication
PAKISTAN PAKISTAN enabled detection /
surveillance equipment

GIS enabled 3G
mobile handset

Communication Node

INDIA

INDIA

(d) Defensive Balance in Pivot Corps. The current deployment of

Pivot Corps takes care of Indian vulnerabilities adequately in their
defensive design provided their offensive content is available to them to
restore any adverse situation. The inadequacies of forces apparently
occur due to a proactive strategy, wherein offensive content of Pivot
Corps is culled out for theatre offensives, leading to imbalance in
defences in certain areas, which in turn may be exploited by the
adversary. The apparent inadequacies need to be mitigated by
appropriate enhancement of Mechanised Forces capabilities to exploit
the opportunities in a dynamic battle space. C4I2SR systems provide
the requisite wherewithal to exploit such opportunities by
enhancing the intelligence gathering, data processing, munition
delivery and combat capabilities.

(e) Shaping the Battlefield for Offensive Operations. Denial of

launch pads to Pakistan offensive designs, shaping of battlefield for
launch of own offensive capabilities, degradation of enemy sectoral
reserves thereby enhancing the offensive potential of own strategic
reserves and ensuring security of own sensitivities are some of the
immediate operational imperatives at the commencement of operations.
All the above will require a high level of synergy between the
intelligence gathering and surveillance resources deployed for gaining
information in the intended area of operations across the IB and the
combat and combat support elements deployed for the purpose. The
role of real-time surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, suitably
integrated in the command and control matrix assumes added
 21

importance since such pro-active operations will invariably be

undertaken by the Pivot Corps, whose essential charter may not be
compromised owing to voids in the intelligence picture.

(f) Offensive Imperatives. Offensive operations should be capable

of achieving substantial destruction of the adversary‟s strategic
reserves and control of critical
areas in depth. The above
requires effective manoeuvre Adversary’s
Criticality
capability, both in the plains and
in the mountains, in a
transparent battle space with
superior situational awareness
capabilities. C4I2SR capabilities,
with enhanced potential to
Adversary’s
detect, respond and facilitate Strategic
manoeuvre is a contemporary Reserves
operational exigency both for
the plains and the mountains.

(g) Conflict Termination Profile. Realistic assessment of the

ground situation and the purported achievement of the component
formations, in the fog of „claims and counter - claims‟ need to be
unambiguously assessed, prior to deliberation on the conflict
termination issue. Such an assessment if feasible in the contemporary
high-tempo conflict environment, through the medium of C4I2SR
systems.

8. Mountains Sector. While India is in the process of graduating from the

denial / denial plus capability against China to a more pro-active and
inherently robust status, the exigencies of operations in mountains and
relative inadequacies of infrastructural support continue to constrain the
defensive capabilities. Battlefield transparency and situational awareness
assume importance in such terrain and get further accentuated by the
technical limitations of the devices employed for bestowing such capabilities
in mountains. Line of sight parameters of the radars, long-range vision
devices, VHF communication equipment, etc are some of the technical
constrains hampering capability enhancement. Vagaries of terrain and
weather are additional impediments to military operations. Operational
imperatives having a direct bearing on the C4I2SR systems are as follows:-
 22

(a) Discernment of Intent. In the Sino – Indian matrix, discernment

of intent is of paramount importance owing to relative intelligence void
with respect to Chinese preparatory activities and prolonged time
required for preparation and mobilization by India. There may however,
not be any particular / one activity which needs to be detected but a
series of activities in the form of trends / pattern which may indicate
offensive intent. The capability to continuously detect, register, collate
and establish pattern over a prolonged period of time and thereafter,
generate early warning / indication of changes in the military activity
pattern, if any, is the basic requirement for the system visualised in the
Sino – Indian context at the strategic level.

(b) Mobilisation. Mobilisation in real time-frame is the key to

adequacy of dissuasive posture against the Northern adversary. The
issue assumes importance owing to limitations of Indian lines of
communication close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) as compared
to relatively improved communication system in Tibetan Autonomous
Region. Intelligence gathering apparatus, including satellite inputs and
inputs ex the IAF will require to be suitable integrated in the command
and control setup to overcome inadequacies in initial deployment and
for further optimizing the existing mobilization capabilities.

(c) Enhanced Integration of Defences in Mountains. Owing to

remoteness and ruggedness of terrain, obtaining in most areas along
the LAC, the defensive deployment, in posts / units / formations tend to
be isolated and consequently relatively weak. While physical integration
of the defences is desirable, and the process of upgrading the lines of
road communication, for the purpose, is already under way, requisite
induction of C4I2SR capabilities will provide the required integration in
the interim. Real-time all inclusive visibility to commanders at various
levels, integration of surveillance and reconnaissance devices etc will
substantially upgrade the battlefield transparency and provide the
command and control centre with the desired integration, which will, by
and large be, unconstrained by the mountain terrain friction.

(d) Employment of Reserves, Long deployment timings preclude

the desired flexibility in employment of reserves. Early warning and
continuous monitoring of enemy activities is an essential pre-requisite
for ensuring appropriate employment of reserves. The same is feasible
in mountains by an enhanced C4I2SR capability suitably integrated to
IAF, UAVs, radars and long-range vision devices.
 23

Sub Conventional Domain

30. Indian Army has successfully contained several sub conventional

conflicts, like in Mizoram, Nagaland & Manipur, Punjab, J&K, etc. The scope
and depth of Army‟s sub conventional achievements are perhaps unparalleled
anywhere in the world. The key to the performance at sub conventional
level has been the human element. While the scope for employing C4I2SR
systems for enhancement of the capabilities of the security forces in the sub-
conventional domain is vast, the nature of counter insurgency / counter
terrorist operations, undertaken by the Armed Forces, needs to be
factored in all technological planning parameters.

31. Manifestation of Sub Conventional Threat Vs Capability Required.

The capability required for the Indian Armed Forces is contingent on the type
and intensity of threat visualized in the present, in the
near future (next five years) and the distant future
(next ten years). The insurgencies / terrorism
appear to conform to a pattern of three
conspicuous phases, ie, the initial stage,
wherein militancy is
subservient to
political activity and
INDIA
is relatively less
SUB CONVENTIONAL DOMAIN intense but on the
rise. This phase is
followed by a phase of
intense militancy
wherein the political activity is
relegated to the backstage. The final
phase manifests in the form of declining
militancy and emerging political overtures. The
duration of various phases and the intensity of militancy, however, are not
sacrosanct and is contingent on the fundamental cause, public support and
the state‟s response.

32. J&K. The most conspicuous manifestation of sub conventional conflict,

ie the Pakistan sponsored proxy war in J&K appears to have graduated to the
third stage wherein the militancy is on the decline and the moderating
voices appear to have started gaining prominence. However, owing to its
trans-border complexion, the militancy has the potential of escalation owing to
Pakistan‟s intransigence. For planning purposes, however, the level of
 24

militancy is expected to persist at present levels for few more years and
thereafter further decline. Lasker e Taiba and Hizbul Mujaheedin are the
only two groups of significance, which need to be factored in the long term
planning parameters. The Taliban factor, post withdrawal of US troops from
Afghanistan, also merit examination. The operations are likely to be
characterized by the following imperatives:-

(a) Long periods of lull, interrupted by high profile actions and

intensification of militancy for short spells. Such prolonged relative
inactivity may result in complacency, which in turn may be detrimental
to effectiveness of the counter insurgency grid. C4I2SR permits
adequacy of surveillance, monitoring and ‘operational alertness’
without the concomitant human dimension.

(b) Operations under the media glare and in the public domain would
necessitate faster response parameters and more focused timely and
measured application of combat power. Dynamics of media activism
will require enhanced application of C4I2SR capabilities.

(c) Effectiveness of counter infiltration grid along the Line of

Control will endure for a prolonged period. Effectiveness of the fence is
the essential pre-requisite for such effectiveness. A typical sensor to
shooter grid is visualized in the counter – infiltration scenario with
C4I2SR systems.

33. North East. The insurgencies in the North East have decidedly
graduated to the third state and there are unambiguous signs of declining
militancy. NSCN (IM) in Nagaland and Manipur and ULFA (Paresh Baruah
group) in Assam are the only two militant groups of concern in the long term.
For planning process, the level of militancy is likely to gradually decline in
the next decade with residual presence by 2020. The operational
imperatives are likely to be similar to that in J&K except that the intensity and
frequency of violence may be at a reduced scale.

34. Left Wing Extremetism (LWE). LWE is a recent phenomenon where

the militancy is in its infancy. The potential for escalation is large and may
assume grave proportions if not controlled in its infancy. This phase of
insurgency may witness a slow rise in the intensity and scope of militancy
in the affected areas9. The essential contours of counter insurgency

9
“Trends in Rising Violence will continue in 2010‖.Times of India 02 Feb 2010, Union Home
Minister, P Chidambaram.
 25

operations by the security forces in the areas affected by LWE, ie the likely
operational parameters indicative of the mandated technological
direction, are as under:-

(a) Manpower intensive operations will necessitate manpower

empowering technology in terms of sensors, night vision devices etc.
Optimization in the capability of such devices is feasible in the realms of
C4I2SR.

(b) Constrained utility of line of sight devices in jungle / hilly terrain

will enhance the importance of aerial platforms in terms of UAVs and
helicopters for combat support operations, which in turn will require to
be appropriately linked to the command and control structure
established for operations.

(c) Importance of counter IED and counter explosive capabilities will

need to be enhanced owing to the likelihood of terrorists employing IED
and sabotage tactics in a major way against security forces.

(d) High terrain friction owing to dense secondary jungles will

necessitate emphasis on communication, surveillance, mobility and
combat technologies in jungle terrain obtaining in Chotanagpur Plateau,
Western MP and Northern AP.

APPRECIATED SUB CONVENTIONAL THREAT MATRIX

Intensity of Violence

Time 1990 2000 2010 2020

 26

35. Urban Terrorism. While the anti – India sentiment in Pakistan has
been ever-present, its manifestation in the form of terrorist activities seen in
metropolitan cities is a relatively recent phenomenon. Owing to the trans
border complexion of the threat and the ongoing global pressure
against all terrorist activities, the likelihood of escalation of the threat to
a chronic phenomenon, is remote. Isolated incidents, akin to 26 /11,
however, cannot be ruled out. Notwithstanding the propensity of the threat,
the impact of urban terrorism on the state and the national psyche is relatively
higher. Military perspective of the urban battle space are as follows:-

(a) Military operations are conducted in the public domain, which

inter alia results in constrained employment of combat power. The
higher human dimension, owing to above, necessitates added
emphasis on supplementary issues like collateral damage, casualties,
etc. Transparency of the battle-space and situational awareness
will assume importance in such an environment.

(b) Urban terrain is relatively intricate / difficult compared to rural /

semi urban terrain. The operational imperative to reduce terrain
friction has immense scope for application of C4I2SR systems.

(c) There is sub optimal applicability of military power owing to

the media glare, efficacy of direct firing weapons and line of sight
support equipment and communication limitations.

(d) Cosmopolitan character of contemporary urban sub conventional

conflict enables concurrent adversarial activities, which needs to be
suppressed.

(e) In addition to combat and logistic support, numerous other

supplementary operations, like population control, traffic, civil
amenities, etc, also assume immense importance.

36. As a consequence of the above, urban operations are transforming

from painstaking large ground assaults and excessive destructive strikes, to
more efficient operations that identify, isolate and destroy terrorist locations
with precision strikes / weapons. Successful employment of such techniques
will reduce force requirements, civilian casualties and collateral damage, and
reduce mission times10.

10
Advanced Command and Control Technologies for Enhancing urban operations by Gary A.
Yerace Science and Technology Objective (STO) Manager, Command and Control in
 27

37. Urban battle space permits only sub-optimal exploitation of the Armed
Forces inherent technological and tactical superiority. The scope of
employment of C4I2SR systems in the urban environment is vast. There
is therefore a need for innovative means and methods, especially from the
contemporary and emerging technological domain, to usher in greater
asymmetry between the armed forces and the terrorists in an urban
environment.

38. After having analysed the military operational aspects in the first two
chapters, the subsequent chapters will attempt to deduce the configuration of
the C4I2SR system in the context of the Indian security environment.

Complex and Urban Terrain (C2CUT), U.S. Army Research Laboratory, Adelphi, and Albert
A. Sciarretta, President, CNS Technologies, Inc., Springfield, para 2.
 28

CHAPTER 3

Our country’s demonstrated abilities in the field of information

technologies should be leveraged… for the requirements of the armed
forces. The ability to process information and respond rapidly to
changes in conflict situations can make all the difference between
success & failure.

Raksha Mantri, Shri AK Antony, Enhancing Indian Defence

Capabilities,C4I2 Summit, 10-11 Aug 2009, Taj Palace, New Delhi

ANALYSIS : C4I2SR CONSIDERATIONS IN THE INDIAN CONTEXT

General

39. Indian Army‟s innate ability to absorb new ideas and technologies has
enabled its emergence as a progressive and highly adaptable force. An
integrated configuration, achieved due to higher level of synergy between the
information systems and devices deployed for military operations and the
supporting communication system, combined with matching human resource,
is the first step towards actualizing an effective C4I2SR System.

Current C4I2SR Status

40. Espousal of advanced communication system, information technology,

systems and applications, into the Indian Army, has been a major component
of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)11. Remarkable developments in the
Information technology in the civil and commercial fields has lead to path
breaking developments in satellite, cellular communication, bandwidth and
spectrum availability, milli-metric waves, nano technology, embedded
technology, etc. This has created a vast potential for ‘seeing further, in a
larger area and more clearly’ along with ‘anywhere, anytime and with
anybody’ communication. A large content of such capability has already
been inducted and consequently, C4I2SR capability has already been
achieved to a significant degree in the Army. The current C4I2SR capability is
11
Article on Network Centric Warfare in the context of ‗Operation Iraqi Freedom‘ by
Shitanshu Mishra in Strategic Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 4, Oct-Dec 2003, © Institute for Defence
Studies and Analyses, in December 17, 2003
 29

higher in the arms primarily designed for conflicts in the conventional domain
than those designed for sub conventional conflicts.

41. Within the Army, the scope of capability enhancement through C4I2SR
Systems is higher in the SCOPE OF CAPABILITY ENHANCEMENT
conventional domain; however,
the propensity of achievement of Conventional Desired level
Domain of C4I2SR
the desired capability is likely to capabilities
be higher in the sub
Sub Conventional

C4I2SR Capability
conventional domain owing Domain
primarily due to simpler and

(Armour, Mech Infantry)

Appreciated

Mechanized Forces
current level
easily available systems of C4I2SR

(Arty, Engrs, Sigs)

visualized for the sub

Support Arms
capabilities

conventional domain. To

Infantry

Police
CPOs
achieve desired levels, while
integrating all the existing and
ongoing projects and systems
are essential, the main challenge would lie in critically auditing our existing
systems and projects, with a long-term perspective, to enable induction of
validated and modern technologies.

C4I2SR ACHIEVABILITY QUOTIENT

Higher in the Sub Conventional Domain.

Visualised Objectives

42. C4I2SR Systems should aim at enhancement in the operational

capability of the Army by exploiting and augmenting the potential of the
existing „communication networks‟ and induction of validated „information
systems and projects‟, suitably integrated in the context of our military
operational requirements. Unlike US, which has a global military presence
and the military operations are expeditionary in nature, the requirement
for India is regional in nature and confined to our security concerns
along our borders, internal security contingencies and OOACs. The
requirement, therefore, is of a simple and functional system and not of a
caliber purportedly being fielded by US Army for their Global designs.

43. The architecture of the C4I2SR System would aim at seamlessly joining
all components of the Army in an effective manner. In effect, the aim is to
improve association and synergy between the existing Sensors, the Decision
Making Mechanism, the Shooters and the communication backbone at all
 30

levels. The C4I2SR Systems should therefore be capable of enhancing the

„network enabled‟ military operations, with existing resources and
environment, and graduate to full-fledged network centricity subsequently.

44. Despite the enormous impact of technology in our daily lives, in military
hardware and software driven solutions, the human interface with technology
remains vital. This may be an obvious point, but when one surveys
contemporary defence literature with discussion on emergent trends like
unmanned aerial vehicles, data links and near real time global surveillance,
the human element may appear
Realm of C4I2SR Systems
absent or second to technology.
Battlefield
Integrated
Yet, all technology relies on Transparency
Communication
and Situational
the ‘smartest’ processor ever Awareness
Network
12
invented – the human brain .
Human cogent capabilities Effective Command Quasi Matrix
accordingly will continue as the and Control System Working Ethos

core capability in all versions of

visualized technological up- Network
gradation. Enabled
Army
Enhanced Combat
45. The introduction of Capability
advanced technologies into the
military, is producing an opportunity for significant changes in the military's
paradigm for command and control. The future battle-space will require
commanders to operate more efficiently and at a higher operations tempo.
For the commanders to use the advantages of dominant battle-space,
command-by-intent or directional style of command is considered more
prudent. But the more likely outcome is a return to command-by-direction. A
potential consequence of this change is that significant command
functions may be carried out by machines that act, not as an assistant,
but as the decision maker and executor, thereby precluding a more
‘directional’ style13. However, the current Indian Army doctrine is
inconsistent about the admissibility of such an entity, even though
technological developments are on the threshold of delivering such
capabilities.

12
Emerging Military Capabilities, Air Commodore S. W. Peach, Commandant Air Warfare,
Centre, Thomson Building, RAF Waddington, Lincoln LN5 9NB, United Kingdom,
http://ftp.rta.nato .int/public//PubFullText/RTO/MP/RTO-MP-077///MP-077-$KN2.pdf
13
Technology and Command, Implications for Military Operations in the Twenty-first Century
William B. McClure, Lt Colonel, USAF, July 2000, Occasional Paper No. 15, Center for
Strategy and Technology, Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base
 31

Visualized Methodologies

46. The structure of C4I2SR System will be a function of envisaged military

operations at various levels as follows:-

(a) Cover the entire range of communication requirements from

the strategic to the tactical domain (Army HQ to the tactical battle area).

(b) Commence from the existing state of communication

networks, organizations and ongoing projects, to a simple integrated
C4I2SR system, which can be developed into a full-fledged NCW
structure subsequently.
VISUALISED METHODOLOGY OF
(c) Simplify and reduce C4I2SR CAPABILITY ENHANCEMENT
the scope of ongoing
projects to technically
pragmatic and operationally
feasible requirements.
C4I2SR Capabilities

(d) Analyse the scope

based on the operational
dynamics, ie, consequent Incremental
C4I2SR Progress
to achievement of the Quantum
essential C4I2SR capability, C4I2SR Jump
progress incrementally as Existing C4I2SR
status
per the requirements.
Time 2000 2010 2020 2030

(e) Consider induction

of proven, validated, state of art, working technologies from civil /
commercial fields to obviate technological obsolescence of
information and communication systems, which have the potential of
exponential advancement.

(f) Initiate process of selection and training of core group of

personnel forthwith for transformation and implementation of network
enabled structures.

47. In effect, therefore, consider those projects and systems, which will
bring about initial transformational up-gradation in the C4I2SR capabilities
in the shortest time and thereafter, once the essential capability has been
attained, carry out incremental improvements, as necessitated by military
dynamics and technological improvements / innovations.
 32

Ingredients of C4I2SR System

48. C4I2SR (acronym for Command, Control, Communications, Computers,

Intelligence, Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) system is
defined as an integrated system of projected doctrines, procedures,
organizational structures, personal, equipments, devices, installations and
communications to support the military commander in the command and
control of operations and military activities14. Essentially, therefore, the
C4I2SR Systems are aimed at improving command and control content of the
Armed Forces to further optimize the combat and combat support
capabilities in the battle zone. The definitions of the various components of
C4I2SR are given at Appendix A.

49. The system will consist of a device / system, at the core, which
provides command and control support to the commander. The command and
control centre will receive inputs from the surveillance and reconnaissance
devices installed for combat, various other intelligence agencies and data
bank / information centres, if established. The centre will also be linked to
higher command centre (s) from where it will receive directions / orders and
inputs available at that level. The orders / directions from the centre will be
transmitted to the combat and combat support units / formations under
command. Similar configuration is visualised at various hierarchical levels.

Surveillance / Communication and

Reconnaissance devices Computer Support Framework
Combat
Elements
Intelligence Inputs / Command and
Other inputs Control Centre
Combat Support
Elements
Data Bank and
Information Centre Higher / Lateral
Command Centre

50. Essentially, therefore, the visualized system will consist of a

command centre linked to the input and output activity stations. The
system providing connectivity to the entire sub systems and computing the
operational parameters would play a key role in enhancing the effectiveness
of the system.

14
DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms/NATO, Only Terms; http:// www. dtic.mil /
doctrine / jel / doddict / natoterm / c/00305. html
 33

C4I2SR Sub Systems in the Indian Context

51. While there are numerous examples of conventional and sub

conventional operations in the contemporary world, the Indian experience is
unique owing to high intensity of operations, sustained and varied nature of
conflict, higher human dimension and superior success quotient. The
uniqueness of the Indian environment mandates unique C4I2SR
solutions. The four essential sub systems of the C4I2SR system are the
command and control sub system at the core with the inputting sub systems
in the form of surveillance and reconnaissance devices and the intelligence /
information data base and the execution sub systems in the form of combat
and combat support structures. The entire the C4I2SR system will have to be
appropriately linked by a robust communication sub system. The essential
sub systems, as visualized, are given at succeeding paragraphs.

52. Command and Control Sub System.

(a) Military Headquarters are organizations staffed to support the

Commander of a military force in planning of operations and execution
of those operations by the command. These organizations act as
bridges between the commander and the tactical force. The
headquarters personnel must therefore maintain a regular routine of
information flow while being able to respond to unforeseen events in
the dynamical external environment. In essence, therefore, the
Command and Control Sub System should be able to replicate the
capabilities of the traditional military headquarters for the military
commander.

(b) Modeling and simulation input into decision-making, thereby

enhancing the cogent potential of military commanders will be value
addition to the visualized command and control system.

(c) While the Western model of the C4I2SR system has purportedly
attempted to develop a technological supplement (through modeling
and simulation techniques), to the human cogent faculties, though, with
little success, the Indian Army is largely dependent on the experience
and cogent capabilities of its military commanders, for all command and
control functions. Indian Army will continue to be a command
centric structure in the fore-seeable future.

(d) The time tested and operationally proven functioning ethos

of the command centric Indian Army, may not permit subservience
 34

of the human cogent faculties to an automated command and

control solution. In the Indian context, therefore, the C4I2SR enabled
command and control sub system will remain in a supporting role with
regard to analysis of inputs and generation of operational options. The
C4I2SR exercise should therefore be directed at developing a system,
which can receive and process the vast quantum of varied data and
present it to the military commander in a user-friendly format for human
analysis. It should thereafter be capable of transmitting the orders,
instructions and synthesized information / intelligence to the combat
and the combat support systems.

Combat and Combat Combat and Combat

Support Structure Support Structure

Human
Interface
Human Cogent Domain
Computer Based Command Command and
and Control Centre Control Centre

Intelligence sources / Surveillance / detection Intelligence sources / Surveillance / detection

Data Bank reconnaissance devices Data Bank reconnaissance devices

APPRECIATED WESTERN MODEL RECOMMENDED INDIAN MODEL

(e) One of the best known theories on command and control today is
the OODA loop15. Command and control process can be appreciated to
be consisting of four steps: observe-orient-decide-act (OODA). The
process is continuous as new information is constantly entering in the
observe step and thus can be depicted as a cycle or “OODA loop”.
Combat advantage over adversaries can be achieved by executing this
loop of command and control faster than the adversary16. This means
that by the time an enemy has made a decision, the conditions on
which that decision was based have already changed. The result of this
advantage in the speed of command and control is to keep the enemy
off-balance and uncertain of the true condition of the battlefield.
Potential of the visualized C4I2SR Systems in actualizing such capability
for the commander is immense.
15
John R. Boyd, ―Organic Design for Command and Control‖, Air University, May 1987), 23.
Discussed in Concept for Future Joint Operations: Expanding Joint Vision 2010 (67), Air
Force literature, and Army and Marine Corps doctrine (MCDP 6, 63).
16
Ibid., 23. John Boyd states, ―A similar implicit orientation for commanders and subordinates
alike will allow them to diminish their friction and reduce time, thereby permit them to exploit
variety/rapidity while maintaining harmony/initiative, thereby permit them to get inside the
adversary‘s O-O-D-A loops, thereby magnify adversary‘s friction and stretch-out his time,
thereby deny adversary the opportunity to cope with events/efforts as they unfold.‖
 35

53. Communication Sub System.

(a) Army already has an effective communication system consisting
of several layers with inbuilt redundancies, based on satellites, fiber
optics, line, microwaves, radio (HF / VHF), civil hired communication
lines etc. The basic framework of Army communication incorporates a
high-speed backbone communication network, numerous access
networks at station and formation level and field communication
infrastructure, which in turn is linked to the backbone and access
communication network17.

(b) The communication at the formation level and above, ie the

operational and the strategic levels appears adequate; however, the
essential inadequacy lies at the tactical / execution level where the
Army continues to be dependent on HF / VHF spectrum with limited
data transfer capabilities18.
Communication Layers

VHF / HF Radio network / AREN / INMARSAT

Tactical / Execution level
Static cable / wire network
Command Integrated Communication Network Operational / Supervisory level
Army Static Communication Network
ASTROIDS
Strategic / Directional level
Army Mobile Communication Network
Defence Communication Network
Project Dhruv, Project Rohini, etc

(c) The communication sub system should bestow the desired

flexibility to the command and control sub system as also possess
intrinsic redundancies to withstand the vagaries of warfare and
appreciated overload in the communication requirements.

(d) Owing to extensive proliferation of the communication

facilities in the civil / commercial fields, the aspiration levels have
increased exponentially in the military domain. In addition, the
entire civil / commercial communication has graduated to cellular

17
Official Homepage of the Indian Army Corps of Signals, Army Static Communication
Network (ASCON) (India), Systems, Jane's Military Communications Publication, 09 Jun
2009 and Bharat-Rakshak.com at Bharat Rakshak Land Forces Site - Corps of Signals.mht.
18
Ready for futuristic communication challenges, Signals Officer-in-Chief Lieutenant General
P. Mohapatra, AVSM, in an interview with SP‘s Editor-in-Chief Jayant Baranwal and SP‘s
Land Forces Editor Lieutenant General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor prior to C4I2 Summit - Enhancing
Indian Defence Capabilities, 10-11 Aug 2009, Taj Palace, New Delhi, India
 36

technology, which is small, fail proof and user friendly. The need for
communication (cellular) towers / nodes, which is a pre-requisite for
establishing the required „cells‟ is well appreciated and has perhaps
been the inhibiting factor in widespread introduction of the cellular
technology in the Army. Secrecy requirements of cellular
communication may also have been a constraining factor.

54. Other Sub Systems.

(a) The surveillance and reconnaissance systems and other inputs

pertaining to intelligence etc, must all contribute to greater battlefield
transparency and enhanced situational awareness. Contemporary
technology offers immense potential for enhancement of battlefield
transparency and situational awareness. Satellites, UAVs, distant
imaging and remote sensing, Global Positioning System (GPS), Geo-
spatial Information System (GIS), cellular technology, enhanced
computing capabilities, thermal imaging etc can be appropriately re-
oriented and re-configured, as required.

(b) Surveillance and reconnaissance devices and other

intelligence gathering related activities require a variety of
equipment to perform a diverse range of data capture, sharing and
analysis functions. Technology developers of these platforms require
systems that can seamlessly integrate with disparate control
capabilities, to allow for such critical features as intuitive displays,
immediate access and user-friendly functionality.

Essence of C4I2SR System: Translating information superiority into

combat power by effectively linking knowledge entities in battle space.
 37

Current C4I2SR Status in the Indian Army

55. The advancements visualized for the Indian Army in the fields of
C4I2SR, commenced in the late eighties and were:-

(a) Motivated largely, by similar systems in vogue in the more

advanced Western Armies19.

(b) Technically based on the technologies prevalent then, which

can now, at best, deliver sub-optimal results.

56. The effort to keep pace and repeatedly upgrade the ‘core’
technologies, of the eighties and nineties has perhaps lead to delays and
substantial non-actualization of the visualized C4ISR systems, despite efforts
spanning more than 20 years.

57. During the 1990s, NEED FOR QUANTUM UPGRADE

the Indian Army fielded TO OBVIATE TECHNOLOGICAL OBSOLESCENCE
the Tactical Command
Control Communication Average obsolescence
Technological Progression

age of Information Desired

and Intelligence system Technology: 10 to 15 yrs Technical
(TAC C3I), Threshold

Management
Information Systems Existing
Technical
(MIS) and Geo-spatial Threshold
Information System (On the
verge of
(GIS). TAC C3I system Technical
consists of Command Obsolesce)
Time 1990 2000 2010 2020
Information Decisions
Support Systems New Technology Obsolete Technology

(CIDSS), ACCCS, ADC&RS, BSS, EWS etc. These projects were developed
independently. Subsequently, the requirement of intra-Service interoperability
was realized. Presently, these projects are in various stages of development
and fielding. Based on the TAC C3I vision, attempts are being made to
achieve the required interoperability. Vertical integration with various sub-
systems and development of standard protocols to facilitate integration is also
under way20.

19
Army Static Communication Network (ASCON) (India), Systems, Jane's Military
Communications Publication, 09 Jun 2009.
‗C4I2SR in the Indian context: challenges and responses, Interoperability’ by Maj Gen
20

DV Kalra, ADG IS, CLAWS Seminar 2008.

 38

Essential Inadequacies

58. While reasonable adequacy of C4I2SR capabilities exist at the strategic

and operational levels (nuclear systems, missiles, aircraft etc), there are
apparent synergy mismatches at the tactical level. At the functional level,
we have limited accessibility to information available in the battlefield.
The commanders do not possess the required data and wherewithal to
process the information in real-time for it to be useful in decision-making. The
application of the decisions to the weapons and execution platforms
accordingly lack focus, thereby resulting in attrition style of warfare wherein
dominance over the enemy is achieved by preponderance of ordnance
rather than precision and focused application of firepower.

59. Other important inadequacies identified are as follows:-

(a) Despite ongoing projects aimed at enhancing capabilities, there

is little battlefield transparency and situational awareness at the
tactical level. Shortcomings related to networking of sensors, decision-
making apparatus and weapon platforms are the main friction areas.

(b) The existing communication networks have been developed

primarily for the communication needs of the Army, as visualized in the
early nineties. Hence, its concept and design do not cater for the type
of data connectivity required for C4I2SR systems.

(c) While communication backbone exists for permanent stations

and selected field locations, there is no suitable tactical network
system in place for the tactical battle area21.

(d) Difficulties in amalgamation of the existing networks with

each other due to non-availability of requisite software, bandwidth and
spectrum are the main technology related inadequacies22.

(e) The existing „rigid‟ and „strictly hierarchical‟ command and control
processes and practices in the Army are at variance with the „matrix‟
and „parallel‟ organization, required to function in an environment of
„simultaneity‟.

21
―Tactical Communication System, being a large and technologically intensive project, will
take some time to fructify‖ - Signals Officer-in-Chief Lieutenant General P. Mohapatra,
AVSM, in an interview with SP‘s Editor-in-Chief Jayant Baranwal and SP‘s Land Forces
Editor Lieutenant General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor prior to C4I2 Summit - Enhancing Indian
Defence Capabilities, 10-11 Aug 2009, Taj Palace, New Delhi, India.
22
Ibid.
 39

Felt Needs

60. The surveillance and intelligence gathering apparatus, the

command and control system, the weapon platforms and other related
systems in the battlefield, currently in a ‘stand alone’ mode, need to ‘talk
freely’ with each other for optimization of their potential. The important
„felt needs‟ are as follows:-

(a) The C4I2SR system needs to cater for enhanced battlefield

transparency and real-time situational awareness for the
commanders at the tactical and the operational level23.

(b) An integrated and composite system, which is capable of

unifying the large number of varied networks is required. The
system should be able to synthesize the vast plethora of data
available for decision-making and execution of orders, thereby
resulting in a superior war waging potential.

(c) Graduate from the existing vertical, sequential and hierarchical

organisation to a more horizontal and quasi matrix organisation and
the concomitant up-gradation required in training and HRD fields.

(d) Space based capability to provide communication, navigation

and imagery services at the theatre, sector and the tactical battle area
levels.

(e) Cyber capabilities merit emphasis. Adequate cryptographic

controls need incorporation within the ambit of C4I2SR systems.

61. The network architecture in the Army should provision for connectivity
at the same level as also between the existing hierarchical levels 24.
Bandwidth requirements for the C4I2SR systems also assume
importance as the demands of situational awareness will require
transmission of maps, overlays, images and video clips, UAV streams and
data, all of which are bandwidth intensive25.

23
An article on the C4ISR in Operation Iraqi Freedom, by John Ferris, The Centre for Military
and Strategic Studies, The University of Calgary, US, provides numerous examples of
optimization of C4ISR capabilities for Network centricity at the tactical and operational level.
24
Seminar on Infostructure for NCW held in May 2004 under the aegis of SOC in C.
25
http://voicendata.ciol.com/content/goldbook/goldbook07/107031223.asp: The article
provides insight into the potential of CDMA 2000 technology and its employability in the
Indian context. It enables high-speed wireless connectivity comparable to wired broadband.
 40

62. While it is apparent, that command-by-intent (inherently cogent) is

constrained and hence risky in high-tempo conventional operations,
nevertheless, in the Indian context, the human cogent threshold will limit
technological up-gradation. Secondly, the information superiority of the
modern battle-space will create information overload. In the above context,
while the current Indian Army doctrine reinforces the primacy of the
human element in war, it also promotes automation as a way to manage
the accelerating tempo of battle and enhanced information overload.

Scope of C4I2SR systems

63. As discussed above, sub conventional conflicts are likely to endure in

the Indian sub continent. Accordingly, primacy of sub - conventional
capabilities, in the planning parameters of the visualized C4I2SR system, is
likely to generate greater effectiveness in the Indian conflict paradigms.
Infantry centric operations being the basic counter terrorist and counter
insurgency capability in the Indian context, C4I2SR systems should
essentially aim at enhancement of infantry operations at unit and sub -
unit levels. Beyond the infantry sub conventional perspective, a long-term
view of the requirements in the conventional domain, with emphasis on
operations in the Northern and the Eastern Sector, is warranted.
64. C4I2SR system should be capable of an information superiority
enabled war-fighting concept that generates increased combat power by
robust networking of sensors (inputs from surveillance and reconnaissance
devices, intelligence sources and higher command centres), decision makers
(the command and the control centre) and shooters (the combat and the
combat support elements). It should enable a shift from attrition style of
warfare to faster and more effective concepts of speed of command and
precision / synchronization, both in the conventional and the sub
conventional domains.
65. Technologically, „speed of command will require excellent sensors,
ability to accurately geo-locate information, fast and powerful networks,
superior display technologies as well as modeling and simulation
capabilities. There is therefore a need to take stock of the current state of
information evolution and define an unambiguous course for speedy migration
into the C4I2SR paradigm.

66. The contemporary and futuristic battlefield milieu necessitates

amalgamation and integrated employment of all components of warfare. Such
integration is possible in the realms of C4I2SR for which the immediate
 41

exigency is of developing a tactical level network for greater battlefield

transparency and situational awareness. A command and control system,
suitably integrated with the battlefield network and the command, control
centres at the theatre, and the sector level is the core need.

Command and Control and Communication for tactical battle area,

suitably integrated in the Theatre Information Grid, are the essential
pre-requisites for an effective C4I2SR System in the Army
 42

CHAPTER 4

Execution of this enabling mechanism (C4I2SR Systems and Net

Centric Warfare) must be viewed in the realities of the Indian scenario …
We should not blindly ape the Western thought process because our realities
are different.

General JJ Singh, PVSM, AVSM, VSM, ADC (retd), former Chief

of the Army Staff. Inaugural address at CLAWS Seminar on Net
Centric Warfare July 2008.

PHILOSOPHY OF C4I2SR SYSTEMS

General

67. Consequent to analysis of the Indian context of the C4I2SR systems and
having deduced the essential inadequacies and felt needs, the basic
parameters for formulating the philosophy of C4I2SR have been established.
Chapter 4 will enunciate the vision, concept and doctrinal framework of
C4I2SR System.

68. While significant improvement have been made in the C4I2SR

capability, the progress appears uneven and faces immense challenges
before it can be fully realized in the Indian context. While there appears to be
a joint vision for the implementation of C4I2SR capability in the three services,
the development of many of the enabling steps (such as a communications
architecture) has not been coordinated well but is often environment (i.e. land,
sea and air) specific.

Visualised C4I2SR for the Indian Army: Superior War winning Combat
Capability through capability enhancement of the existing infrastructure.
 43

Vision

69. Based on the discussion in the preceding chapter, the suggested vision
of the C4I2SR System for the Indian Army is as follows:-

“Capability enhancement of the Indian Army’s command and

control structure, capable of optimally exploiting its surveillance,
reconnaissance and intelligence resources, weapon systems and
combat support apparatus for a superior war winning combat
capability”.

70. The enunciated vision has the following components:-

(a) A Seamlessly Integrated C4I2SR system. Scope of the C4I2SR

system is envisioned to transcend the entire span of the Army‟s
operational responsibilities and visualized tasks.

(b) Shaped by Capability Enhancement Needs of the Command

and Control Infrastructure. C4I2SR System is envisioned to enhance
the existing command and control capability. The system is accordingly
planned to be introduced in a complementary mode and not in an
alternative mode. A high degree of automation in terms of computer
aided devices and requisite communication already exists, which needs
to be further upgraded to the next „quantum‟ level.

(c) Capable of Optimally Exploiting its Surveillance and

Reconnaisance Resources, Weapon Systems and Combat Support
Apparatus for a Superior War Winning Comb Capability. The
system visualized for the Army should be capable of exploiting all
resources, currently available, for an optimal command and control
capability, leading to quantum upgrade in the combat capability.

Concept

71. The principle entities in the visualized combat matrix in the Indian
context are „Command and Control, Reconnaissance and Surveillance,
Combat and Combat Support and others including intelligence and geo-
spatial data banks. The visualized concept should aim at capability
enhancement of the Army by a process of integration of the above entities
and accordingly may be articulated as follows:-
 44

“C4I2SR System should contribute to capability enhancement through

superior decision-making process26. It should provide the
enhanced capability of voice, data and imagery transfer in a secure
media and should meet the requirement of networking surveillance,
communication, navigation, decision making and weapon platforms
/ system as per the theatre specific requirements”.

APPRECIATED EXISTING C4I2SR STATUS DESIRED C4I2SR STATUS

Narrow Broad
’paths’ with ’highways’
limited with redundent
capacity capacities

Limited Enhanced
Capability of Capability of
Entities Entities

ESSENCE OF C4I2SR SYSTEM

Translating information superiority into combat power by
effectively linking knowledge entities in battle-space.

72. The recommended „concept for the C4I2SR‟ is as follows:-

(a) Primacy of Military Operations. The C4I2SR infrastructure must

be a function of operational requirements of the Indian Army and
should contribute to quantifiable enhancement in its operational
capabilities.
(b) Simultaneity of Operational Process. The C4I2SR System
must facilitate up-gradation of our largely sequential operational
processes to essentially a simultaneous process with a certain

26
―Information superiority is not an end in itself but a means to achieve ‗decision superiority‘.
Decision superiority is the ability to make better decisions and to arrive at and implement
them faster than the opponent can react‖ ‗Assessing the value of information superiority for
the ground forces – proof of concept, RAND Corporation paper by Dan Gonzalves, Lou
Moore, Chris Pernin, David Matonick and Paul Dreyer, 2001.
 45

degree of ‘sequentiality’ built in by design. Parallel thinking,

forewarned troops, early preparation and focused execution are some
of the positive spinoffs from this capability.
(c) Command and Control.

(i) Optimum command and control in the 2010 and beyond

environment will depend on seamless communications, all
weather real-time sensors, current and accurate databases,
and the resulting near-real-time situational awareness for the
entire chain of command.27”

(ii) Four operational concepts provide the backbone for our

future war fighting capability: Dominant Manoeuver, Precision
Engagement, Full-Dimension Protection, and Focused
Logistics, with Information Superiority as a key enabler.

(iii) For Dominant Maneuver, “information superiority will allow

information-based control to displace physical control of forces -
this will promote seamless integration of both forces and
capabilities while limiting the potential for fratricide28.” For
Precision Engagement, “information superiority provides the
means to rapidly and accurately identify and assess targets or
objectives and to select and apply the precise force to achieve
the desired effects29.” “Full Dimension Protection requires
information superiority to provide battlespace awareness in all
dimensions.” Finally, in Focused Logistics the information
processing systems for the integrated logistics system of 2010
“will be an integral part of the commander‟s command and
control system30.”

(iv) Future commanders will use the Information Age‟s

revolutionary advances in information transfer, storage,
recognition, and filtering to orchestrate attacks and defences.
Theater-wide tasking will flow with unprecedented fidelity and
speed. Commanders will convert “the understanding of the

27
Concept for Future Joint Operations: Expanding Joint Vision 2010, 66. (Ft Monroe,
Va.: Joint Warfighting Center, May 1997).
28
Ibid., 50.
29
Ibid., 52, 53
30
Ibid., 54.
 46

battlespace into missions and assignments designed to alter,

control, and dominate that space31.

(d) Decision Making. Technologically empowered command and

control centre will form the hub of C4I2SR System. It should enable :-

(i) Faster, enhanced and shared situational awareness

both for enemy and own, based on real-time battlefield
information, acquisition of intelligence and dissemination of
decisions, which can be both simultaneous as well as sequential.

(ii) The decision-making process need to be made more

broad-based and informed. It should enhance and complement
the cogent capabilities of the commanders and the decisions
will be based on processed intelligence / operational inputs from
a well-established and validated knowledge base (data banks).

(iii) The essentials of „need to know‟ will continue to be

ensured. Protocols for accessing, bypassing, veto and obviating
information overload, will have to be accordingly formulated.

(iv) Adequate redundancies must be factored in the planned

infrastructure and capabilities as protective mechanisms.

(e) Secrecy.

(i) For achievement of the desired C4I2SR state in an early

timeframe, there may be a requirement of hiring the services of
civil / open domain agencies for communication connectivity at
the National and to some extent at the Theatre and the Sector
level. A “National Service” clause may accordingly have to be
built in the service regulations.

(ii) Enhanced media activism, proliferation of remote sensing

satellites and unbridled cellular connectivity has diluted the
traditional security concerns. The present day security lies in
speed of operations and is a function of time. The secrecy
parameters, therefore, have to be pragmatic to cater for the
contemporary environmental realities. The prevalent security
norms, accordingly, merit a review.

31
Adm. William A. Owens, ―The Emerging System of Systems,‖ Proceedings, May
1995, 38.
 47

(f) Jointmanship. Intrinsic in the C4I2SR design parameters should

be the „jointmanship‟ requirements of the Army, Navy and the IAF.
The visualized system for the Armed Forces must provide the requisite
interface for joint operations by all the three Services in air, land, sea
and space. Synergy in command and control is recognized as
“perhaps the single most important function” for joint operations in the
information age with Information Superiority as the key enabler32.

(g) Uniformity of Concept. At the planning stage, the uniformity of

concept should be institutionalized to ensure commonality in
technology, formats, processing, orders, execution and related
aspects. Uniformity of concept will facilitate initial fabrication and
interoperability, maintenance, day-to-day functions and subsequent up-
gradations.

Doctrinal Framework for the C4I2SR System

73. Having analyzed the vision and concepts of C4I2SR System, we are
now in a position to formulate the doctrinal framework of the System. The
policy on C4I2SR System will encompass the aspects of initial fabrication,
implementation and exploitation. The primacy of operational capabilities
will be retained in the proposed doctrinal framework.

74. The essential doctrinal framework of NCW for the IA are as follows:-

(a) Battlefd Transparency and Situational Awareness. Real-time

connectivity to all the battlefield surveillance devices, sensors,
intelligence agencies, forward troops and civil sources will have to be
ensured and be allotted the requisite priority, both in peace and
wartime, for the desired battlefd transparency.

(b) Shortened OODA Cycle. The essence of effective decision lies

in the realms of shortened OODA cycle in an atmosphere of
situational awareness and real-time intelligence. Such an
arrangement will lead to focused decision-making, thereby contributing
to the overall capability enhancement.

(c) Focused Operations and Economy of Effort. The weapon

platforms continue to function in the existing model. However, owing to
better connectivity, the system will be forewarned of the impending task

32
Concept for Future Joint Operations: Expanding Joint Vision 2010, 65. (Ft Monroe,
Va.: Joint Warfighting Center, May 1997).
 48

leading to early commencement of preparation and better execution.

The execution of tasks is likely to be more focused leading to
economy of effort.

(d) Continuation of Existing Command and Control Hierarchy.

Existing hierarchy is recommended to continue with simultaneous
horizontal sharing of information. A C4I2SR enabled Army has been
visualized for the immediate future which interalia translates into an
Army with a high degree of network connectivity but not a fully network
centric army, as
conceptualized in the West. THE C4I2SR PROCESS
Informed and focused
Combat and
(e) Strategic Level execution, parallel
Combat Support
monitoring and real-time
Weapons Control. This will Systems
course correction
continue to be within the
political domain with Tactical Simultaneous transmission
command and control Communication to forewarned combat and
Systems combat support elements
mechanism at National
Level, through a standalone
Human cogent decision
secure network, with limited Human Cogent making, assisted by
access to concerned theatre Capabilities enhanced computing
capabilities
commands, on need basis.
(f) Organisation. While Simultaneous
Computing /
reception, parallel
there shall be no immediate Data Processing processing, early
Systems
change in the manpower preparation

profile of the Armed Forces,

the recruitment parameters Communication Real-time, multi-destination
data transfer by a high
are recommended to be Systems
capacity media
upgraded with selective
technical accretion of
Surveillance and Digital transmission enabled
personnel in the technical Reconnaissance surveillance and
arms. Staff configuration will Systems reconnaissance devices

consist of a balanced mix of

specialists and generalists. In order to avoid ambiguity, fresh protocols,
procedures and channels would be required to be put in place
75. The chapter has discussed the vision of C4I2SR in the Indian context,
the appreciated objectives, concept and desired doctrinal framework. Based
on the above fundamentals, the appreciated C4I2SR requirements will be
discussed in the next chapter.
 49

CHAPTER 5

Warfare in the information age, irrespective of whether it is nuclear,

conventional or low intensity in nature will require highly complex planning
and coordination, near real-time and total situational awareness, decision
support systems and massive data base and information exchange
capabilities…

Army 2020: Shape, Size, Structure and Emerging Doctrine for

Emerging Challenges – Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi, (retd), former
VCOAS and Director CLAWS, CLAWS Seminar 2005.

ANALYSIS: C4I2SR STRUCTURE IN THE INDIAN CONTEXT

General

76. Future battlefield would witness high technology in almost every field.
The impact of information technology on the conduct of warfare would appear
in a number of dominant trends, viz, extension in the reach and range of
weapons, volume and accuracy of fire, systems integration, and increasing
transparency on the battlefield. Manoeuver capabilities, especially in
mountains and adverse terrain conditions would also increase manifold, with
greater situational awareness, better sensors, enhanced navigation
capabilities and the ability to converge speedily at a decisive point. Advanced
communications and computer systems will expand the commander‟s vision
and detection ranges. It will also improve the quality of information transfer
and instant transfer of instructions and orders to subordinate. C4I2SR
capability requires a number of underlying technologies33, including
communications architecture, sensors and processing and data dissemination
systems. This chapter will analyze the essential C4I2SR requirements in the
Indian context.

33
Australian Strategic Policy Review, Australian Defence Forces capability review:
C4ISR(EW), by Douglas Abdiel and Andrew Davies, 28 August 2008, Pg 1
 50

Essential C4I2SR Requirements

77. The appreciated C4I2SR requirement essentially revolves around an

effective command and control system that can be appreciated to be
consisting of two essential components, ie the synergy component and the
cogent component. While the synergy component should be capable of
integrating the vast information space in the battlefield and the support areas,
the cogent part should be capable of processing the inputs for generation of
logical and viable options in real-time frame.

78. After the command and control centre, the second most important sub
systems are the battlefield transparency and situational awareness sub
systems. The need for greater battlefield
transparency and situational awareness
Situational
transcends the conventional and the sub Awareness
conventional domains. The above

Battlefield Transparency

Combat Capabilities
components need to be seamlessly
integrated by a robust and adequately
capable communication sub system. and

79. Communication requirements in

the battlefield scenario are vast and Other
dynamic. In addition, the scope and the Capabilities

options available are immense owing to the

exponential progress made in the civil / EMERGING CAPABILITY MATRIX
commercial fields. The ancillary
requirements in terms of reconnaissance and surveillance devices and
enhanced automation and computing capabilities need to complement the
above system to further enhance the combat potential of the Army.

80. The essential stages in achievement of the C4I2SR capability will entail
improvement in the reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities,
improvement in the command and control structure and the concomitant
enhancement in the communication capabilities. Basic configuration,
visualised to be achieved in the initial stage, should be capable of catering for
the essential operational requirements. It should be capable of satisfying the
entire requirements of the sub conventional domain and the fundamental
requirements of the conventional domain34. National and inter service level
34
―Using the template of another country and aping it would be unwise and effective. We
have to design our own (C4I2SR) structures‖ -Network Centric Warfare; paradigm Shift – Lt
Gen Vinayak Patankar, PVSM, UYSM, VSM (Retd). CLAWS Seminar on Network Centric
Warfare 2008
 51

requirements including superior command and control structure with

cogent capabilities could be catered for in the second phase of the
C4I2SR development.

81. In the Indian context, therefore, the broad C4I2SR capabilities

visualized are as follows:-

(a) Command and control.

(b) Battlefield transparency.

(c) Situational awareness.

(d) Communication.

(e) Data management and computing capabilities.

Command and Control

82. Emergence of Command Requirements. With the advent of modern

communications, greater specialization of forces and weapons of longer
range and greater lethality, the battlefield became too physically large and too
complex for the commander to control as a single person. The traditional
solution has been the development of a hierarchy of command and the
concept of supporting staff. The commander was thus, removed from the
immediate battlefield and was now needed to deal with intervening staff and
commanders. The intervening commanders and the staff were the
extended eyes and ears of the commander but inevitably filtered and
distorted the information coming to the commander for his decision
making process. Similarly, the directions of the commander in shaping the
battle were subject to the interpretation of his subordinates and the
vicissitudes of the complicated organisation that was his command.
83. Fog of War and Friction of War. Military philosophers have cited two
enduring ingredients of war ie ‘fog of war’ and the ‘friction of war’. The fog
of war relates to the uncertainty and lack of command awareness of the battle
space situation. One can argue that this is partly because of the constraints of
communication and the turmoil of battle, but also since the commander must
rely on relayed descriptions of the situation. There is also a strong argument
that the modern ubiquity of communications, and the consequent flood of
data and information, has added to the fog through information (or data)
overload. The friction of war was created by the sophistication of the war
machine under command, and in particular the complexity of interaction
 52

between the parts. This model also raises the potential that the breakdown of
one element can bring large parts of the war machine to a complete halt. At
best, the need for the commander to control the simultaneous action of these
components and for the components to
coordinate with each other slows down the
progress of the battle. Accordingly, the Inter-Services

Visualised Milestones for attainment of C4I2SR Capability

integration and
need for an effective command and Integration at
National Level
control system to reduce the friction of
war has accentuated rather than Superior
reduce, with advent of advanced Command and
Control System
information technologies.
Superior
Battlefield
84. Initial Command and Control Transparency and
Systems35. Computer and communication Situational

Initial / Basic Configuration

Awareness
technology has been advancing within Basic Command
& Control and
military command and control (C2) Enhanced
computation
systems since the advent of the modern capabilities
computer. These C2 systems have
Enhanced
progressed noticeably from the first Reconnaissance
and Surveillance
systems that were primarily stove-pipe Capabilities

workstations that did not share information Improved Synergy

in the Existing
among the various battlefield functional Communication
areas (BFAs), much less among the Systems and
Devices
services. Realizing this shortcoming and
leveraging the advances in computer and communication technology, the
1990s saw a proliferation of networked C2 systems that automated the
sharing of battlefield information. Numerous workstations like intelligence,
field artillery, logistics, and air and missile defense were connected. Emerging
technology will allow for even more advances, including autonomous
intelligent agents, more fully integrated software modules, cross service
common applications, and the development of common displays and
databases both within and across the services.

85. Appreciated Requirements. Commanders in battlefield and at the

supervisory / direction level essentially require to know the situation in terms
of enemy / terrorist activities, own activities and capability, terrain and other
factors impinging on operations along with the directions / instructions on the
subject / situation from higher headquarters / neighbouring formations / units /

35
David Sauter; Mario Torres; Steve McGee; Richard Okrasinski; Army Research Lab White
Sands Missile Range NM, Pentagon reports, www.stormingmedia.us/26/2697/A269764.html
 53

databanks / formatted analysis carried out on the subject. An appreciated

user’s C4I2SR requirement matrix is given at Appendix B.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

INPUT LEVEL OUTPUT
• Input to support cogent domain • Supervisory / National level
DIRECTIONAL
• Intelligence Inputs, from other Services • National Assets / platforms
LEVEL
• All inputs available at Supervisory level • Other Services

• Other Services, neighbouring formations • Execution / Direction levels

SUPERVISORY
• Intelligence Inputs • Combat & Support levels
LEVEL
• All inputs available at the Execution level • Other Services

• Reconnaissance & Surveillance Devices • Combat formations / units

EXECUTION
• Orders / Instructions from Higher HQs • Combat Support units
LEVEL
• Data bank/ intelligence / templates • Logstic units

Battlefield Transparency

86. There is a vast potential for „seeing further, in a larger area and more
clearly‟. Battlefield transparency is attained by superior sensors, surveillance
devices, intelligence network, communication and the capability to synthesize
the inputs in realtime frame. In the Indian context, intelligence gathering is
primarily a human endeavour. The technological capability currently available
for counter terrorist operations are the binoculars, weapon mounted
telescopic sights, Infantry BFSR, LORROS and TIIOE for day operations and
night vision binoculars, BFSR, HHTI and LORROS for night operations. To
attain battlefield transparency, the inputs from the surveillance devices
need to be connected in real-time frame to the command and control
system.

87. The areas of capability enhancement are as follows:-

(a) Intelligence Gathering. While human pre-eminence in the sub

conventional domain will continue as hither to fore, the emerging
technologies can empower the personnel involved in the task.
Hand held surveillance devices and equipment need to be integrated in
the digital network for optimization of the human intelligence capability.
In addition, there are numerous audio / video recording and transmitting
devices, which can be used innocuously in various modes, especially in
the sub conventional conflicts. Encryption and transmission of
 54

intelligence is another aspect, which is likely to further empower the

human component of the intelligence gathering apparatus.

(b) UAVs. Rapid advances in UAV technologies are enabling more

and more capability to be placed on smaller airframes. Smaller UAVs
offer the most
BATTLEFIELD TRANSPARENCY
potent source for
enhanced Communication
Node Communication
battlefield enabled detection /
surveillance equipment
transparency and
greater situational GIS enabled 3G
awareness. The mobile handset

range and variety Commander /

Target
of UAVs likely to Assault Team

be available in the
near future make Surveillance
it the most Team / System
versatile force Networking of the surveillance
devices and communication
multiplier, system in a Geo-spatial
capable of Information matrix
Mobile Cellular
employment in a Communication Node
wide variety of roles.

(c) Collation and Synthesis of Intelligence Inputs. Advanced

computing technologies and advancement in the field of
information technology have the potential of enhancing the
generation of actionable intelligence from the vast amount of
information and data collected from various sources. GIS technology
offers a suitable platform for management and appropriate exploitation
of the vast plethora of terrain and human intelligence.

(d) Data Management. Institutional memory has traditionally been a

weakness in the Indian context. The enhanced scope of intelligence
requirements, especially in the sub conventional domain to include
battlefield information and related information from the fields of
cyberspace, telephony, transport, finance, etc, necessitates an
advanced database management system. For the database to be
useful, the contents need to be accessible to relevant elements of
combat.
 55

Situational Awareness

88. The opportunity presented by technology is to increase the audience

of information. “Situational awareness,” “dominant battle-space knowledge,”
or the “common operational picture”
are expressions for the concept of SCOPE : BATTLEFIELD TRANSPARENCY AND
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS : PLATOON
providing a baseline of information to a
broad base of forces so that forces can
become more coordinated and
synchronized in the execution of their
3 2
mission. With knowledge of the
situation at multiple echelons, lower
level organizations can anticipate 1

requests and have a better

understanding of how their plans and
actions support the overall campaign.
At all levels prudent commanders try to
anticipate likely situations, think them through, and create plans to deal with
them; problems that have not been thought through in advance are less likely
to be solved effectively under the pressure of a rapidly evolving situation36.

89. Lack of adequate situational SCOPE : BATTLEFIELD

TRANSPARENCY & SITUATIONAL
awareness has long been
AWARENESS : SQUADRON
recognized as a major impediment
Own River
Enemy
to successful operations. This Obstacle Canal
Defence
Line
shortfall applies not only to fourth-
generation warfare and terrorism, but Enemy
also to crisis and complex incident Reserves

management, peace operations,

urban operations, counterterrorism,
complex humanitarian emergencies,
consequence management, and
disaster response. Dynamic nature
of sub conventional battlefield
demands immense flexibility from
all the components of the
operation, which can be greatly Bridge Head Operations
sustained and further enhanced by
superior situational awareness.
36
Frank M. Snyder, Command and Control: The Literature and Commentaries, (Washington
D.C.: National Defense University Press, September 1993), 29.
 56

90. In the Indian context, where the operations in the sub conventional
domain are essentially manpower intensive with the use of weaponry confined
to the lowest rung, ie small arms, situational awareness assumes added
significance. In simplistic terms, situational awareness in the Indian
context translates into the realistic awareness of own and adversary’s
location and activities. The requirement, while simple, gets acutely
accentuated when seen in the context of adverse terrain and weather
conditions obtaining in most counter insurgency areas in a dynamic
operational scenario.

91. While integration of surveillance and reconnaissance devices with the

command and the control setup is the basic requirement, enhanced
situational awareness will involve employment of GPS, GIS, laser range
finders / sensing devices and real-time communication means.

(a) GPS and GIS. Greater transparency of the geo – spatial

battlespace is the first requirement. While GIS (Geo-spatial Information
System) is essential for the basic terrain configuration, the GPS will be
required to locate each component of the force and indicate the same
on a vector map actualized by a GIS. The location of each
component is
then shared SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
in real-time
with all other Intelligence & Geo
Spatial Data Base
components
Surveillance and
thereby Reconnaissance
Command &
completing Control Combat Elements
the matrix
regarding
location of Adversary Combat Support
own forces.
These actions are possible on hand held machines and thus are ideally
suited for counter insurgency operations. A suitable communication
media is a mandatory requirement to ensure transmission of data
realistically.

(b) 3 G Cellular Technology. The emerging 3G cellular technology

in the CDMA mode offers exciting possibilities for bestowing the
situational awareness capability on the armed forces. A brief on the
emerging 3G (Third Generation) cellular technology is given at
 57

Appendix C. The essential capabilities of the technology facilitating

C4I2SR actualization are as follows:-

(i) Higher bandwidth, thereby enabling higher volume of

faster data transfer thus enabling real-time voice, data, imagery
and video connectivity.

(ii) Broadband internet capability on a palm top opens up the

entire cyber matrix to active combatants. Facilities of a modern
desk - top computer are now feasible on a palm top mobile set.

(c) Laser Range Finders and Sensors. The most challenging part
of situational awareness requirement is the location of the enemy /
terrorist. The adversary will first have to be physically located by any
one component, ie reconnaissance device, radar, human intelligence
resource, etc. In the sub conventional domain, such location exercise
can be carried out by a member of the patrol (Laser Range Finders will
assist) or by a remote sensor / device. Thereafter the location of the
adversary needs to be computed with respect to the person who has
located it or the sensor and the same plotted on the dynamic GIS map
available with all members of own patrol / combat group.

(d) Integration Technology. The need for an integration

technology to synthesize the above inputs in small hand-held machines
is paramount. Advance communication-computing techniques, already
available in the 3G cellular technology is considered ideal for bestowing
greater situational capability on the armed forces. The facilities of
location, direction finding, navigation and enhanced communication
facilities are all available commercially in a single palm top set.

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ON A 3 G CELLULAR TELEPHONY PLATFORM

The mapped
GPS locates GIS displays
location displayed
Own the Soldier soldier’s
in maps with
Location (Own position on a
members of the
position) dynamic map
patrol instantly

Soldier uses Terrorist The mapped

GPS locates GIS displays
the LRF to position location displayed
Terrorist the Soldier
‘spot’ terrorist calculated wrt
terrorist
in maps with
Location (Own position on a
and GPS to soldier’s members of the
position) dynamic map
obtain bearing position (OT) patrol instantly

Domain : 3 G Cellular Telephony

 58

92. In the context of above technology integration, the example of an

infantry patrol, in a sub conventional operation, in a dense jungle terrain
exemplifies the capability requirements of situational awareness
appropriately, as follows:-

(a) Commander’s Position. GPS positioning data, integrated to the

GIS Vector maps and available on a hand held machine, is the basic
requirement for operations in the sub conventional domain. This data
will supplement the traditional methods of navigation and finding own
position. The position data need to be dynamic and have the facility of
being electronically transmitted to other selected components of the
operation / group.

(b) Position of Other Members of the Patrol. All members of the

patrol need to be on a common GIS system, displayed in a similar
fashion in the hand held machines available with the patrol. After own
position has been tracked on the map and transmitted to all other
components of the operation, the same are plotted on the GIS maps
held with all, thereby completing the situational awareness picture
pertaining to the patrol.

(c) Support Asset’s Position. This is done in a similar fashion as

above.

(d) Adversary’s Position. Any one member of the patrol with the
help of a laser target designator ascertains the adversary‟s location.
The same, after getting plotted in one locator, gets transmitted to all
members and gets plotted on the GIS map.

Communication

93. The core of the required capability is „anywhere, anytime and with
anybody‟ communication. The essential capabilities required are
broadband, two ways digital communication on a small handset with
plasma display. The communication means should have adequate
redundancies to obviate failure in operational contingencies.
 59

(a) The last few years have witnessed revolutionary developments in

the communication and
information fields. There has
been a quantum
enhancement in the satellite
communication capability,
resolution in satellite
photography and cellular
telephony – all of which have
contributed to bringing about
a „generation change‟ in the
overall profile of
communication related
technologies.
Cellular ‘Tower’
(b) A simple 3G palm top GIS enabled mobile
cellular telephone can
provide most of the facilities enunciated for the current visualized
military requirements. Availability of cellular communication nodes
and secrecy of communication, however, remain an issue meriting
further analysis. The process of deploying mobile towers in remote
and insurgency prone areas needs to be further enhanced in scope and
expedited along with provision for adequate secrecy to such
communication.

(c) In addition to above the existing series of HF and VHF radios

need to be made more user friendly by transforming the controls to
modern digitized format. While the radio sets are considered
satisfactory for the current voice communication requirements of the
army, there is immense scope for improvement in terms of its capability
(bandwidth, radiating power, battery life, weight etc).

94. Essential Considerations. Essentially, the information systems are

helpful to the extent that they reduce the fog of war. The command structure
must be capable of winning / performing even in the absence / failure of
technology. The visualized information capabilities should accordingly
ensure the following:-

(a) Assured Access. Assured access means that a connection

exists between the user and a network under vagaries of terrain,
weather and adverse combat situations. Loss of assured access can be
 60

due to a lack of connectivity, traffic overload, or to the loss of a key

node. Many military systems overcome their lack of capacity by
providing flash communications priority to assure access for critical
transmissions. In a system with surge capacity for peak loads and/or
with a diversity of means available, assured access can be provided
without such a priority system. While commercial systems are not
hardened per se, they generally incorporate a tremendous robustness
through redundant infrastructure. Within their network architecture,
commercial systems provide redundancy for critical nodes and
alternate routing for failed paths, leading to a robust and reliable
system.

(b) Robust Security. Security can take a number of forms.

Encryption secures the content of a transmission. Physical security
protects the system infrastructure from attack. Protected user account
databases and operational security of organizational charts and
directories protects user identity. Firewalls and monitoring devices
protect systems from hacking and spoofing. Spread spectrum signals
and directional antennas can assist users in avoiding detection. With
information warfare defensive operations, the authenticity and accuracy
of the communications can be effectively protected. The networks with
satellite cross-linking provide a clear advantage in protection
because the infrastructure and the content of the communications
are not readily accessible37.

(c) Operations Security. In addition to protecting the content of

traffic with encryption, the location of the elements involved in
communications and the timing of their communications also need to be
protected in the military domain. One method to discourage location,
and also to minimize the effects of interference, is to use spread
spectrum technology. This technology hides the signal over a wide
portion of the spectrum so that it becomes virtually
indistinguishable from regular spectrum noise. Code Division
Multiple Access (CDMA) waveforms use spread spectrum techniques
to minimize interference and use the allocated spectrum more
efficiently. Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) and Frequency
Division Multiple Access (FDMA) are other waveforms in common use.

37
Michael Lars, ―The Price of the Deal,‖ Newsweek, 9 December 1996, 44
 61

Instead of spreading the signal, they use time or frequency slots to

share the spectrum between multiple users38.

(d) Interoperability. The commercial market is driven by consumers

and are generally adapted to interfaces and protocols already in place.
If a new capability requires too much additional expense or too different
an interface to be “user-friendly,” the capability is difficult to market. In
contrast, many military systems require extensive training to ensure
proper use. All commercial voice communications systems currently
offered or planned are interoperable through the public switched
telecommunications network39. Commercial products, because of
economic realities, provide user-friendly capabilities to access
their data via commonly used formats40.

95. Generally, commercial systems are universally available. Accordingly,

the capability, which is commercially available to India, is also available to an
adversary. In consequence, failing to leverage commercial capabilities,
may constrain own capabilities in comparison to an adversary who has
exploited such emergent and advanced technologies.

Data Banks, Computing Capabilities and Management of the Electronic

Environment

96. Recent apprehension of Headley and Rana, the two Pakistan origin
operatives by FBI in USA can be attributed to superior data management and
computing capabilities available with FBI. The capability enjoins software
programmes for real-time pattern analysis, imagery and video management,
communication monitoring and related capabilities. While the computing
technologies, per se, required for superior management of the sub
conventional environment already exist, its apposite incorporation and
amalgamation in the C4I2SR structure merits further analysis.

97. Data. Intelligence data and institutional memory is constrained owing to

non-connectivity of data centres maintained at various field formation and

38
David A. Brown, ―Government Efforts Confound Commercial Wireless Security,‖
Signal 52. no. 7 (March 1998): 68
39
This does not mean that each handsets can be used with any system or that the
different constellations of satellites can interoperate. Here, interoperability denotes that
the functionality can be shared between the different systems—e.g. I can use my Airtel
phone to call others on MTNL phone (or any other of the commercial phones).
40
An example of the accessibility of data is the use on the internet of the hypertext
mark-up language (*.html) which enables web surfers to view data created by a number
of different applications.
 62

National levels. Configuration of the commercial banking system wherein

the data banks at various branches and centres can be easily and
securely accessed from other branches and ATMs, on a variety of media
channels, is an example worth emulating. For management of intelligence,
geo-spatial, combat and combat support resource data banks, the
requirement entails creation of computer data banks on common formats and
thereafter linking them appropriately with requisite protocols and permissions.
There is no requirement of providing such facility at each entity level in the
battlefield, thereby obviating the need for extensive IT structure in field and
laborious training requirements for combatants.

98. Computing. Management and combat utility of enhanced battlefield

transparency and the plethora of electronic inputs (audio, video, imagery, data
inputs from sensors, monitors, communication media and other sources)
available in the environment will remain constrained without advanced
computing capability. The capability is required in terms of reception,
detection, storage and management of all electronic inputs for its analysis,
synthesis, detection of the required inputs from the given media and
monitoring as per given operational parameters. Software programming
technologies and expertise, abundantly available in India needs to be tapped
appropriately for the purpose.

99. Provision of Data to Users for Common Operating Picture. To meet

the functional requirements, the software system must maintain a real-time,
easy-to-understand, and accurate Common Operating Picture (COP). This
implies that the volume of information / data distributed throughout the
battlefield sensors and systems network must be rapidly and accurately
integrated, analyzed and organized to support military decisions. For a COP
two options exist, firstly, the data can be stored in one place and thereafter
distributed, or secondly intelligence data is produced and stored wherever
needed, using distributed information and communication channels.
The first approach calls for centralized command, and becomes an obvious
bottleneck, where delays or failure limit or prevent access to an up-to-date
COP. The second approach has no such bottleneck and is recommended41.
In such a system, there would be no central creation point whose destruction
would prevent the COP from being formed. All combat, combat support and
intelligence components would provide COP information to the network. In

41
―Suitability of Agent Technology for Military Command and Control in the Future Combat
System Environment‖ Thomas Potok, Laurence Phillips, Robert Pollock, and Andy Loebl,
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Post Office Box 2008, Mail Stop 6414, Computational
Sciences and Engineering Division, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, USA.
 63

effect therefore, all units and formations would assume the mantle of
data bases and the C4I2SR systems should have the capability to access
data from all such sources, as required. Protocols and IP addresses, as
necessitated by the military hierarchy and security requirements may be put in
place.

100. Having analysed the C4I2SR requirements in the preceding few

chapters, the next chapter is devoted to analyzing the contemporary
technologies, as relevant to the visualized C4I2SR system.

GENERAL CONFIGURATION OF DATA BASES WITH ASSURED IP ACCESSIBILITY TO ALL USERS

Battalion / Battalion / Battalion / Formation Other Centralised Geo- Combat Logistic
Regiment Regiment Regiment HQ Data Formations Intelligence Spatial Support Support
Data Base Data Base Data Base Base and Units Data Base Data Base Data Base Data Base

TYPICAL COMPONENTS OF DATA BASE AT FORMATION HQ LEVEL

UAV Human– Forward Patrol Para Case
Air Force Terrain Enemy
streams int Data Troop Report Military Studies /
Data Base Intelligence Intelligence
Data Base Base Data Base Data Base Data Base Appreciation
 64

CHAPTER 6

All information technologies, which are highly advanced, are available

in the commercial market rather than the military market. The commercial
market is what we have to tap to the largest extent and tailor it to our
requirements …. One does not have to do fundamental research in any of
these areas (NCW and C4I2SR systems).
Dr VK Saraswat, Chief Controller, R&D, DRDO. CLAWS
Seminar on NCW in 2008.

EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE C4I2SR SYSTEMS

General

101. Substantial technological advancement has been made in the Indian

Army as part the planned Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). While the
synergy amongst various components of RMA is high, the primacy of combat
systems like armoured vehicles, artillery guns, missile systems, assault rifles
etc, over the combat support
systems in the form of vehicles,
protective gear, logistic equipment,
etc, need to be maintained. In the
above context, however, the
C4I2SR systems tend to get
grouped with the combat support
systems, thereby mitigating its due
importance. C4I2SR systems need
to be viewed in the context of its
enabling qualities and TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESSION : INDIAN ARMY
empowerment capability for the
entire span of combat and combat support systems. The essentials of RMA,
in fact, are sustained, in a very large measure, by the C4I2SR systems42. In
consequence, actualization of modern combat and combat support
systems may not be feasible without a matching C4I2SR system.

42
“Information Warfare will form a key component of our War fighting doctrine‖. Indian Army
Doctrine, 2004. Pg 48, para 3.41
 65

Emerging Technology Matrix

102. Contemporary technologies appear driven by the growing economic

needs of the global populace. The needs of the services sector and the
entertainment world have substantially shaped the modern technologies43. In
consequence, information technology, computers, cellular technology
and satellite-based technologies are dominating the global scenario.
Technologies in the commercial domain have the potential to be further
improved and re-oriented, where required, for most of the appreciated C4I2SR
requirements.

Impact of Emerging Technologies in the Sub Conventional Domain

103. The impact of emerging technologies in the sub conventional

domain is likely to be much higher than that in the conventional domain.
The relatively reduced level of
violence in sub conventional IMPACT OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES ON THE
CAPABILITY OF ARMED FORCES
conflicts generate greater
scope for induction of
Capability of Armed Forces

technologies supporting the

primary combat operations in
the form of battlefield Sub
Conventional
transparency, situational Conventional
Domain
awareness, communication Domain
etc. Moreover, the level of
execution of sub conventional
warfare at tactical and lower
levels, as compared to Intensity of Violence
conventional warfare, also
Regional war

Global War

Nuclear War
Proxy war

Limited war
Insurgency
Non Combat

Terrorism
Operations

mandates greater applicability

of technology. Lastly, owing to
the traditional emphasis on
conventional operations, the technology threshold of conventional domain is
already high. Relatively lower threshold of the sub conventional
technological domain, in the Indian context, necessitates greater scope
for induction of emergent technologies.

43
―The Pentagon has adapted consumer-driven technology such as satellite TV & digital
video to give pilots, combat troops & commanders at HQs a real-time look at the enemy on
computer screens.‖ Drone pilots have a front-row seat on war, from half a world away - by
David Zucchino in Los Angeles Times, 21 February, 2010
 66

Contemporary Technological Matrix

To a large measure, contemporary technological advancement may be
attributed to three essential emerging technologies, ie Information
Technology with computers at its core, Satellites with its numerous
configurations and Cellular Communication with abilities transcending a
vast range of applications. Integration of these technologies has the
potential to transform the sub-conventional battlefield decisively in
favour of the Armed Forces.

104. The emerging technologies, relevant to the C4I2SR systems have been
covered under the following heads:-
(a) Satellites.
(b) UAVs and Micro UAVs.
(c) Communication.
(d) GIS Technologies.
(e) Integration Technologies.
(f) Intelligence, Surveillance Devices and Reconnaissance.
(g) Direction Finding and Locating.
(h) Night Vision Devices.

Satellites

105. Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has established two major
space systems, the Indian National Satellite System (INSAT) series for
communication, television broadcasting and meteorological services, which
are geo-stationary satellites, and Indian Remote Sensing Satellites (IRS)
system for resources monitoring and management, which is earth observation
satellites44. The INSAT series of geo-stationary satellites have created a
major revolution in India‟s communications sector. IRS is the largest civilian
remote sensing satellite constellation in the world providing imageries in a
variety of spatial resolutions, spectral bands and swaths.

106. Satellite Applications: Emerging Technologies. The essential

emerging technologies, relevant to C4I2SR, are as follows:-

44
http://www.isro.org/satellites/satelliteshome.aspx
 67

(a) Communication. The versatility and reliability of satellite

communication makes it the most potent resource for long-range
communication, especially in underdeveloped and far-flung areas
where other means of communication are not so well developed. The
power requirement to enable transmission to the geo-stationary
satellite, however, makes the ground equipment bulky and unwieldy in
most operational conditions. Integrating the satellite telephony with
the cellular technology, thereby reducing the power requirement
of the hand held sets to that required to transmit to mere four to
five kms (radius of one cellular telephone ‘cell’), is likely to make
the satellite telephony more versatile and user friendly.
Technologies required for such an arrangement are already in use by
the electronic media for live telecast of important events.

(b) Navigation. While the Global Positioning System (GPS) enabling

satellites are USA owned, the progress in the mini satellite series
forebodes encouraging signs towards self-sufficiency in GPS like
requirements. Notwithstanding the actualization of the GPS Aided Geo
Augmented Navigation (GAGAN) system and efforts at indigenization of
GPS, the capability currently is not yet indigenous. Since the scope
and mandate of the GPS incorporates almost all fields with global
linkages, its assured availability in conflict situations is assessed
to be high. The challenge of real-time situation awareness in poor
navigable terrain and low visibility conditions can be met
effectively by integrating the GPS technology with radio / cellular
technology and geo-spatial capability enabled handheld sets. For
example, the location of each member of a patrol, indicated in his
personal GPS, can be transmitted electronically to the commander
where it is plotted on the electronic map in his GPS console. The
commander is thus capable of accurately locating each member of his
patrol, even in adverse weather and terrain conditions.

(c) Indian version of US's WAAS (Wide-Area Augmentation system)

has been named GPS Aided Geo Augmented Navigation
(GAGAN)45. Once GAGAN is available, users who have WASS -
compatible receivers will be able to get GPS position with accuracy of
roughly 1 meter or better. GAGAN is not a replacement for the GPS

45
India Approves Gagan System" (in English). Magazine article. Asian Surveying and
Mapping. 15 September 2008. http://www.asmmag.com/news/india-approves-gagan-system.
and. ISRO, Raytheon complete tests for GAGAN Satellite Navigational System. India
Defense Website. 20 June 2006
 68

system but an extension that will make US's GPS more accurate
over India and thus can be used for many high-precision
applications. Application of GAGAN in counter insurgency operations
is visualized in the following fields:-

(i) Direction Finding (of hostile transmissions) in concert with

the existing direction finding equipment.

(ii) Jamming / denying satellite / GPS facility to adversaries.

(d) Bandwidth for Satellite Transmission Channels. The exigency

of real-time situational awareness necessitates live transmission
of video / UAV streams and images from / to commanders in field.
Despite the connectivity through various media, the utility for data
transfer of most mediums, remain constrained due to limited bandwidth.
The critical linkage in communication channels would be the satellite
linkage, which accordingly needs to be appropriately formatted for
adequacy of bandwidth.

(e) Electronic Warfare. Growing dependence on satellites for

navigation and communication opens up electronic warfare options for
denying the same to the adversaries and terrorists. Selective jamming,
impersonation, diversion and total denial of the facility will severely
constrain the sub conventional threat capabilities of terrorists. While a
dedicated military satellite may not be a feasible option in the near
future, suitable empowerment of the communication satellites with
capability to deny relevant frequencies will meet the requirement
in the near future.

(f) Other Applications. The potential

SCOPE OF GIS
Layers of Maps / Data

for cooperation of the Indian Space Mission GPS enabled real-time

location indicators
and the military establishment is vast and Aerial photography /
includes real-time mapping and imagery, UAV imageries
GPS, and Geo-spatial Information Satellite generated /
demanded maps
System (GIS) applications specifically Google Maps /
formatted for military use, monitoring of Bhuvan Maps

movements, communication and Raster / digitized

maps
communication integration with the 1:50,000 / 1:25,000
existing military communication means Survey of India Maps

available in selected regions of the country,

etc.
 69

UAVs and Micro UAVs

107. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have the potential to

qualitatively transform the battle space, both in the conventional and the
sub – conventional domains. These remotely piloted or self-piloted aircraft
can carry cameras, sensors, communications equipment or other payloads.
They have been used in a reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering role
since the 1950s. Contemporarily, more challenging roles are envisioned,
including combat and proactive targeting missions. The military role of
unmanned aircraft systems is growing at unprecedented rates 46. The majority
of UAV functions are some form of remote sensing, which; this is central to
the reconnaissance role most UAVs can fulfill.

108. Reconnaissance (Remote Sensing). Reconnaissance and

Surveillance are perhaps the most important and versatile uses of UAVs in
the sub conventional domain. The reconnaissance and surveillance
requirements permit usage in a wide variety of configurations influencing size,
endurance, payload, maneuverability, control, accuracy and cost. The vast
potential mandates further exploitation and indigenous development of the
technology. Reconnaissance and surveillance UAVs are likely to
constitute the most significant technical infusion and are likely to
produce extraordinary results in the sub-conventional domain.

109. Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems. Rapid advances in related

technologies are enabling more and more capability to be placed on
smaller airframes, which is spurring an increase in the number of Small
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (SUAS) being deployed on the battlefield. In
the Indian context:-

(a) SUAS offer the most potent systems for greater situational
awareness in sub conventional conflict situations. SUAS with capability
to be launched by hand and retrieved on a vacant football field / road
will have immense applicability in the Indian scenario.

(b) UAVs will also prove as the most versatile force multiplier,
capable of employment in a wide variety of roles and situations.

110. Micro UAVs. Augmented Reality Gaming Drone (micro UAV) with
live video transmission capability, range of approximately 50m, sustenance of
approx 15 mins and controllable by a wi-fi enabled iphone (3G Cellular

46
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unmanned_aerial_vehicle
 70

technology) has portents of immense applicability in counter terrorist and

counter insurgency operations to ‘look inside’ a compound / building /
window, prior to its entry, specifically in the urban and semi - urban
environment. Developed by Paris based Frnch company called „Parrot‟, the
technology can be further improved and reoriented for more enhanced military
applicability for point detection / surveillance47. There are numerous other
similar versions of the technology which are suitable for military applicability in
the sub conventional domain.

Communication

111. Cellular telephone technology has transformed not only the

telephony scenario, but a vast plethora of systems and working ethos,
transcending almost the entire civil / commercial domain. It has vast
potential of emergent capabilities, is small, relatively fail proof and user
friendly (refer Appendix C). The need for communication nodes / cellular
towers, which is a pre-requisite for establishing the required „cells‟ is well
appreciated and has perhaps been the inhibiting factor in widespread
introduction of the cellular technology in the Army. Since the operations in the
sub conventional domain are all in the hinterland, where establishment of
cellular towers do not pose any problem, except pertaining to its local
security, the feasibility of establishing cellular communication in insurgency
prone areas is high.

112. Communication: Emerging Technologies.

(a) While second generation (2G) mobile telephones with GSM

technology, had been introduced in the mid nineties, the current
revolution in the mobile technology commenced after 2000 wherein
CDMA technology was introduced. In light of the ready availability of
modern, validated, working and inexpensive technologies, it may be
more operationally viable and more cost effective option to shed
vintaged communication projects and opt for the third generation (3G)
and beyond CDMA cellular telephone and equivalent technologies.

(b) 3G Cellular Technology has numerous advantages and is likely

to contribute significantly to situational awareness in the sub
conventional domain in addition to the communication requirements
in the entire span of conflict situations. The facilities of voice, data,

47
―Now Gaming goes real with phone controlled mini Drones‖, Times of India 17 January
2010 page 17.
 71

image, video clips, GPS and navigation are available in the 3G

technology. These applications are mainly possible due to the
enhanced data rates resulting due to 2 (plus) Mbps bandwidth
capabilities. The civil / commercial applications of 3G technology,
of relevance in the military domain, are as follows:-

(i) Mobile TV. The capability of viewing TV on mobile phones

can be re-oriented to military use to include viewership of UAV
video streams, imageries of remotely located radars / night
vision devices, hand held devices and cameras operated by
patrols in difficult terrain / challenging operational
situations.

(ii) Tele-Medicine. Just like a doctor medicating a patient from

a distant location, a military commander / military specialist
can guide / direct a forward line patrol into the nuances of the
operation at hand, without resorting to time-consuming rearward
movement / consultation.

(iii) Mobile Phone Tracking / Positioning. Mobile

positioning technology, i.e. location based service (LBS) 48 that
constructs the coordinates of a mobile phone bearer, is used
to approximate the location of a mobile phone user. The
technology of locating is based on measuring power levels and
antenna patterns and uses the concept that a mobile phone
always communicates wirelessly with one of the closest base
stations. Qualified services may achieve a precision of down to
50 meters in urban areas where mobile traffic and density of
antenna towers (base stations) is sufficiently high. Rural and
desolate areas may see greater distances between base stations
and therefore determine locations less precisely49. The
technology can be further improved to determine location of
hostile transmissions, since most contemporary terrorist
organisations are dependent on mobile technology, for their
communication needs.

(iv) Video Conferencing. Real-time video conferencing

capabilities have immense applications in the military field for the
48
"Location Based Services for Mobiles: Technologies and Standards―, Shu Wang, Jungwon
Min and Byung K. Yi, IEEE International Conference on Communication (ICC) 2008, Beijing,
China
49
Mobile phone tracking - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.mht
 72

requirements of situational awareness and real-time

operational consultation / passage of orders / instructions.

(v) Video on Demand. Videos can be viewed on demand

from a service provider. The facility can be used by command
and control centres for live viewership of active operations
and by the forward combatants to access intelligence data
and other specialized facilities from data banks. For example,
identifying a suspect in a remote region by matching his
photograph / identification marks with the intelligence data bank
available at selected locations will avoid the laborious task of
apprehending the suspect (s) and sending him for identification.

(c) Following related issues, however, will require further

deliberation:-

(i) Secrecy Factor. The issue of security in the Army mobile

communication network will have to be resolved by in-house /
DRDO indulgence. Surprise due to present day battlefield
transparency is related to ‘time and speed’ of operations.
Secrecy norms accordingly need a review in the contemporary IT
environment. Moreover, modern transmission techniques offer
immense potential for secure military communication. Code
Division Multiple Access (CDMA) waveforms use spread
spectrum techniques to minimize interference and use the
allocated spectrum more efficiently. This technology hides the
signal over a wide portion of the spectrum so that it becomes
virtually indistinguishable from regular spectrum noise. Numerous
other emerging technologies need to be explored for inherent
secrecy of transmissions rather than the traditional methods
of encryption and modulation of the signals.

(ii) Cellular Towers / Nodes / Base Stations. The cellular

technology provides for a „cell‟ radius of 5 to 10 kms from the
„tower‟. Taking a conservative range of 5 kms for one side of the
„cell‟, for a 25 km x 25 km area of operations by a brigade sized
force in counter insurgency operations, there would be a
requirement of approximately 15 to 25 mobile towers to provide
almost all C4I2SR facilities on a „palm top‟, to each soldier. In this
context, there may be a case to encourage / enhance private
sector participation in establishing static cellular tower grid in
 73

remote regions where mining and other economic opportunities

exist.

(iii) Cells on Wheels / Mobile Tower Unit50. Service

providers have
Cells-On-Wheels COVERAGE ENHANCEMENT BY CELL ON WHEELS

(COW) and Cells-

On-Light-Trucks
(COLT) vehicles to
Enhanced Coverage in 30/35
restore mobile kmsx15/20 kms with 10 to15 COWs
phone service or
add additional call
Existing Cellular
capacity in the Telephone Grid
event of cell tower
failure or an
emergency. A
COW is self-
contained, Mobile Node (Cell on Wheels)
Cellular Telephone Communication Node
portable cell tower
that can replace existing cell towers for an indefinite period51.

Geospatial Information System (GIS)

113. Better situational awareness necessitates a high degree of sensor,

navigation and locating capabilities complemented by adequately secure and
robust communication media. The enhanced scope of emerging GIS and
GPS offer immense possibilities for the situational awareness
requirements in the Indian context, as follows:-

(a) GIS is diverging into location based services (LBS). LBS

allows GPS enabled mobile devices to display their location in
relation to fixed assets (nearest mobile tower, ASCON tower, Road
junction, Mountain peak etc), mobile assets (own patrols, patrols ex
neighbouring unit location etc) or to relay their position back to a central
server for display or other processing. These services continue to

50
A cell on wheels, usually referred to as a COW, is a mobile cell site that consists of a
cellular antenna tower and electronic radio transceiver equipment on a truck or trailer,
designed to be part of a cellular network. (New York Times, "Inauguration Crowd Will Test
Cell phone Networks", 19 Jan 2009). COWs are used to provide expanded cellular network
coverage and/or capacity at special events or in disaster areas where cellular coverage either
was never present or was compromised by the disaster. A COW is also referred-to as a site
on wheels (SOW) or mobile tower unit (MTU).
51
http://www.operationgadget.com/spamfw.php?tb_id=726
 74

develop with the increased integration of GPS functionality with

increasingly powerful mobile electronics (cell phones, laptops)52.

(b) GIS applications are graduating to creating tools that allow users
to create interactive queries (user created searches), analyze spatial
information, edit data, maps, and present the results of all these
operations. Commercially available applications like finding driving
directions and availability of GPS program on hand-held devices are
already in use. GPS is the real-time location component of the GIS
that uses satellites to show current position.

(c) In recent years there has been an exponential increase of

mapping applications on the web such as Google Maps and Bing
Maps. These websites provide access to vast geographic data. Some
of them, like Google Maps and Open Layers, expose an API that
enables users to create custom applications. These toolkits commonly
offer street maps, aerial/satellite imagery, geo-coding, searches, and
routing functionality. These have numerous applications in the
military field in the C4I2SR domain.

Integration of Satellite and Cellular Telephony Technologies

114. Integration of Cellular and the Satellite technologies offer vast potential
for exploitation in the military domain. The essential ingredients for such
integration are the mobile
towers (Cell on Wheels -
COW) which permits
establishment of cellular Communication
Dead Zone
communication in remote and
inaccessible areas /
insurgency infested area at
short notice. The Cellular
establishment of such towers Tower

enables usage of light palm From a remote &

sized communication devices inaccessible region, a
small palm top device is
/ mobile telephones for capable of
voice, data, image &
establishment of link to the Satellite
video communication
Communication Transmitter
mobile tower. A mid powered Network / Receiver with the entire network.

COW, having a configuration

of a jeep / light truck towed trailer, has adequate power for an approximate
52
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geographic_information_system
 75

range of 5 to 7 kms. The handsets in this range can accordingly be of

relatively small size with small power requirements. Few such towers are
adequate for providing communication to each personnel of a battalion-sized
force. The ‘highway’ from the cellular tower, linked to a satellite tower /
transmitter / receiver in turn can connect the mobile telephones of the
operating battalion to the satellite and thence to the selected network at
the National / Services level. Similar technological arrangement is already in
use by TV News channels for live coverage of important events.

Integration of GPS and GIS Technologies

115. The essential technologies, required for such integration, are explained
as under:-

(a) GPS. The GPS Navigation Satellite timing and Ranging Global
Positioning System (NAVSTAR) is a satellite-based navigation, timing
and positioning system. The GPS provides continuous three-
dimensional positioning 24 hrs a day throughout the world. It provides
accurate data upto about 100 meters accuracy for navigation and
meter level for mapping. The GPS technology has tremendous
applications in GIS data collection, surveying, and mapping.

(b) Geospatial Information System (GIS). GIS has emerged as a

powerful tool having potential to organize complex spatial environment
with tabular relationships. GIS captures, stores, analyzes, manages
and presents data that is linked to location. Technically, GIS is a
system which includes mapping software and its applications. In the
strictest sense, the term describes any information system that
integrates stores, edits, analyzes, shares and displays geographic
information.

116. Integration of GPS and GIS technologies has vast potential in the
realms of „situational awareness’. Situational awareness is the state wherein
the combat elements are fully cognizant of the location state and the activities
of own troops and of the adversaries. The basic ingredients for such an
integration are:-

(a) GPS enabled handsets suitably linked to cellular communication

nodes.

(b) Mobile communication nodes / towers, also called “Cell on

Wheels (COW)”, explained in earlier sections.
 76

(c) GIS enabled mobile handsets.

(d) Capability of
handsets to access GIS Enabled Set

data banks
pertaining to geo- Geo – Spatial Data Base
GPS enabled real-time
spatial information location indicators
Aerial photography /
and intelligence at UAV imageries
various locations Intelligence Data Base Satellite generated /
demanded imageries
and under various Data Base of National Google Maps /
Intelligence Agencies Bhuvan Maps
configurations and Army / Servicers Level Communication
Node
thereafter display Data Base Digitized maps
Unit / Formation Level 1:50,000 / 1:25,000
them on the hand Intelligence Data Base Survey of India Maps
set in an user
friendly GIS environment.

117. Thus, by suitably juxtapositioning the GIS, GPS, communication

means, sensors and other related devices, a holistic picture of own and
adversary can be created thereby enhancing situational awareness
significantly.

Intelligence, Surveillance Devices and Reconnaissance

118. In concert with the increased agility and versatility of the contemporary
forces and their weapon systems, there is a need to increase the capabilities
of military intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) to support the
same. In the Indian context, human intelligence forms the core of the
intelligence gathering apparatus. There are a large number of surveillance
devices already available to the forces to cater for varied requirements like
the binocular, radars, ground sensors, etc. In the field of radars, numerous
contemporary technologies exist. Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) is a
sophisticated all-weather sensor capable of providing photographic-like
images through clouds, rain or fog, and in adverse light conditions in real-
time. Incorporation of such technology needs to be enhanced for better
situational awareness.

119. Some of the key technologies, from the point of view of surveillance, in
a net centric environment are Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and Hyper
Spectral Imaging (HIS) and a combination of the two in a number of satellites
would enable a constant surveillance capability by day and by night.
Positioning of as little as four maneuverable satellites over a selected
geographical area could provide battle assessment every six hours over a 24
 77

hours period. Other advances in space technology such as transmission of

huge amounts of data by vehicles like the Transformation Satellite System
(TSAT) would enable the dissemination of large packets of data such as HIS
pictures. Today it takes a few minutes to receive, typically 500 MB data (one
scene) from satellites. In the future with TSAT, at data rates of 10 to 40 GBPS
the same scene would take less than a second to transmit53.

120. While there is a scope for improvement in all the sensors, the greatest
challenge in the Indian context, however, is not in the process of obtaining
intelligence, but in the process of collating, synthesizing and the ability to fuse
inputs from various sources and surveillance devices to build a coherent
intelligence picture that can be used as „actionable intelligence‟. A readily
available, user friendly, scientifically formatted data bank at various
levels of intelligence gathering hierarchy and their requisite synergy is
the essential challenge. The scope of emerging technologies in computers,
data transfer, communication, computing, software programming and data
integration offer numerous options for fusion of intelligence inputs, available in
varied forms to include images, video clips, audio clips, transcripts and other
forms of electronic data.

Direction Finding and Locating Technologies

121. Direction Finding and Locating capabilities are directly linked to

surveillance and reconnaissance component of C4I2SR system. While the
conventional locating devices for conventional operations are considered
satisfactory, locating terrorists and confirming their identity is one of the
most important challenges facing the security forces in counter
insurgency and counter terrorist operations. Based on the transmission made
by terrorists on radio and telephones on HF, VHF and the cellular telephony
bands, the direction finders triangulates the position with at least three
direction finders. The degree of accuracy is dependent on the number of
direction finders employed and the accuracy / power of the direction finders.
The current capability is not adequate to focus on a single village in the
hinterland, a single valley in the mountains and a single building in the
urban terrain, except when the direction finders are specifically
positioned for a specific operation.

122. Increase in the number of direction finders is not a very practical

preposition owing to the requirement of security for each direction finder as

53
Lieutenant General V K Kapoor, PVSM (Retd), former Commandant of Army War College
Mhow, USI Journal, 2008.
 78

also due to the connotation of enhancing military deployment. The solution

lies in enhancing the accuracy of the direction finders to acceptable
levels.

Night Vision Devices

123. The Mechanised Forces are in the process of graduating to the thermal
sights, with enhanced efficacy. In the sub conventional domain, the current
night fighting capabilities are based on Night Vision Goggles and Devices
(Image intensification mode), Hand Held Thermal Imagers (HHTI) (thermal
imaging technology) and LORROS (these are long-range cameras with night
capability based on thermal imagers). There is a plethora of night vision
devices available globally, both in the commercial and in the purely military
domain. In the Indian context, owing to the sub-conventional conflicts being
undertaken in relatively colder areas (J&K) and areas with light undergrowth
(LWE regions), thermal imaging technology appears to have certain
advantages over the image intensification technology.

124. Progress in remote sensing and obtaining sub meter resolution through
space cameras offers improved scope for the qualitative enhancement of the
existing night vision capabilities. Miniaturization of the existing night vision
cameras will make the equipment usable for sustained night operations, since
the intensity of the TI light generated by the devices and the weight precludes
its sustained use. In addition to above, advances in laser and thermal imaging
technologies offer innovative opportunities for breakthrough technologies in
night vision and related fields.

125. Another persistent problem is the power source of the night vision
devices. Owing to their sustained power requirements, the battery life is
limited leading to constrained operational parameters. Emerging technologies
in long lasting high yield batteries need to be explored for re-configuration for
military use.

Options for Technological Upgradation / Adoption

126. Our country is standing on the threshold of a technical revolution in the

fields of information technology and information systems. Persisting with the
old and vintage technologies may relegate the Army into a tedious
developmental cyclic mode, which may be at the cost of our operational
preparedness. However, owing to the immense cost and effort already sunk in
the various projects, a pragmatic view is desirable to catalyze the ongoing
projects to the current, if not futuristic levels of technologies. A judicious mix
 79

of old and emergent technologies appear to be the logical solution in the

Indian context.

OPTIONS TO OBVIATE OBSOLESCENCE

Option 2

Example of Generation
Upgradation / Changes
Adoption of modern
technologies
Technological

4G (Pkt)
Up-gradation

3G (CDMA)

2G (GSM)

1G (FDMA)

HF/VHF
Option 1
Up-gradation of Line
ongoing technologies
Time
Theoretically, while it may be feasible to improve any
technology to any extent, it may not be entirely feasible to
graduate to higher generation levels after initially adopting a
lower generation technology.
 80

CHAPTER 7

The success in future conflicts will be affected greatly by our ability to

use information technology. The processing of large amount of
information, available on the battlefield, requires the fielding of C4I2
systems.

General JJ Singh, PVSM, AVSM, VSM, ADC (retd), former

Chief of the Army Staff. Valedictory address at CLAWS Seminar
on Net Centric Warfare, July 2008.

LOW COST HIGH PAYOFF SYSTEM

General

127. As analyzed in the preceding chapters, the essential requirement is

the capability to acquire, store, process and display ALL information
required by combat commanders and troops at the tactical, operational
and the strategic levels. Speed of accessibility and ease of data usage is
perhaps of greater value than the attainment of automated decision support
system with cogent capabilities to assist the commander. While the progress
being made in enhancing the capabilities of the reconnaissance and the
surveillance devices, including the night vision devices should be pursued, the
essential challenge lies in suitably integrating the inputs from all sensors and
making it available to the combat elements in the form and the time required.
Sensor – Decision Maker - Shooter grid is a natural resultant of common
operational picture attained because of enhanced battlefield transparency and
superior situational awareness.

128. The recommended system has been explained in three parts. The
technical essence, the structure and the process visualized for its
actualization.
 81

Technical Essence

129. Technical Concept. Digitization (converting information into bits

and bytes) of all data (voice, images, video, processed information etc)
into universally accessible formats (like html, jpeg etc) and thereafter
making available the data for, firstly, processing / expert interface / data
storage (by computers, technical experts, senior commanders) at
selected locations (central servers, data bases, formation headquarters
etc – but not in the battlefield) and secondly, feeding it on a ‘information
highway’ (large bandwidth with enhanced and universal accessibility to
all combatants) for real-time availability to all entities (mobile hand sets,
data enabled radio sets like TADIRAN, communication enabled
computers, communication networks like ASCON, AREN, etc, and sub-
systems like ACCCS, BMS, EW etc), is the basic archetype being
recommended for the visualized C4I2SR System.

Data
Processing

Universally
Digitization
Accessible
of Data
Formats

Data
Storage

130. The system therefore will consist of two essential features, ie

communication highways and the entities, which will have a high degree of
synergy in operation. This basic configuration will in no way inhibit the
developmental aspiration of individual entities and the need for specialization
of various arms and services / components of the battle-space. Progress and
further development of individual entities, in fact, will complement the
progress of the entire system. In effect, therefore, the system is
appropriately configured for induction of futuristic innovations and
further development.
 82

Recommended Structure

131. The transformation in the civil commercial fields is driven by the

information technology consisting essentially of computers, telephones and
the „parallel‟ working ethos. The present day electronic notebooks and laptop
computers pack-in adequate capability to meet most of the military‟s combat
and combat support requirements. Third generation (3G) CDMA cellular
telephony, with superlative compatibility in the internet domain offers
immense potential for almost all communication and associated requirements.
The visualised C4I2SR is based on a network of appropriately configured
and adequately compatible computers and 3G cellular telephones
having broadband connectivity with all entities of battle space and
support zone. It has attempted to achieve the essential requirement of
translating information superiority into combat power by effectively
linking knowledge entities in battle-space. The visualized computers and
the telephones are similar to that available in the commercial market with
specific re-orientation / re-configuration, as required for integration with the
plethora of Army equipment, devices and software of the existing
communication and Tac C3I applications.

132. Command and Control Sub System. The system will have capability
to firstly access all sensors, combat and combat support, subordinate, parallel
and higher entities and data banks in real-time, secondly, the commander
should be „on line‟ with his command (subordinates) at all times and thirdly,
be intrinsically capable of
COMMAND AND CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
„processing‟ data / inputs from
• Input to support cogent domain • Supervisory / National level
DIRECTIONAL
• Intelligence Inputs, from other Services • National Assets / platforms
LEVEL
• All inputs available at Supervisory level • Other Services

various sources and generate • Other Services, neighbouring formations

• Intelligence Inputs
• All inputs available at the Execution level

• Reconnaissance & Surveillance Devices

• Orders / Instructions from Higher HQs
• Data bank/ intelligence / templates
SUPERVISORY
LEVEL

EXECUTION
LEVEL
• Execution / Direction levels
• Combat & Support levels
• Other Services

• Combat formations / units

• Combat Support units
• Logstic units

instructions / orders / output for

dissemination to the environment.
The appreciated system will consist
firstly of a „user friendly‟ computer
to store required data and operate
CLAWS
selected software to execute /
STATIC MOBILE
operate computer programmes / MODE MODE

formats utilized by reconnaissance and surveillance sub systems, the data

storage / server sub system and other subordinate, lateral and hierarchical
entities. Secondly, the commander should have „highway‟ connectivity on a
mobile handset, with capability of high capacity voice, video and data
linkages to all the entities of combat and combat support. The communication
set should be compatible to the computer for „online‟ and „real-time‟
connectivity requirements as also for data processing requirements.
 83

133. Reconnaissance and Surveillance Sub System. The essential

requirement is to provide real-time connectivity from numerous sensor
devices / radars / night vision devices to other sub systems. The sub system,
per se, will not enhance the range or visibility obtained by the sensors,
but will enhance the utility of
the inputs by making it RECONNAISSANCE & SURVEILLANCE
SUB SYSTEM
significantly more ‘visible’ to
all the combat elements as also

Sensor
optimize its utility by carrying

out real-time processing of the
inputs. The inputs from the
Sensor
• Input to support cogent domain
• Intelligence Inputs, from other Services
• All inputs available at Supervisory level

• Other Services, neighbouring formations

• Intelligence Inputs
• All inputs available at the Execution level

• Reconnaissance & Surveillance Devices

• Orders / Instructions from Higher HQs
DIRECTIONAL
LEVEL

SUPERVISORY
LEVEL

EXECUTION
• Supervisory / National level
• National Assets / platforms
• Other Services

• Execution / Direction levels

• Combat & Support levels
• Other Services

• Combat formations / units

• Combat Support units
LEVEL
• Data bank/ intelligence / templates • Logstic units

sensors are in various formats

like video from UAVs and
LORROS or radar outputs from
TIIOE and BFSR. These need to CLAWS
be converted into transferable
STATIC MOBILE
formats prior to feeding it in the
MODE MODE
media. The sub systems will
accordingly consist of a computer for selective storage, on-site processing of
the inputs and requisite changing of the format for transmission on the media.
The second component will be a mobile handset for broadband connectivity
with other sub systems.

134. Combat Sub System. The combat structure

• Data bank/ intelligence / templates
• Orders / Instructions from Higher HQs
• Reconnaissance & Surveillance Devices

• All inputs available at the Execution level

• Intelligence Inputs
• Other Services, neighbouring formations

• All inputs available at Supervisory level

• Intelligence Inputs, from other Services
• Input to support cogent domain

should provide assured access, in a secure media

SUPERVISORY

DIRECTIONAL
EXECUTION

COMBAT SUB SYSTEM

LEVEL

LEVEL

LEVEL

with adequate redundancy, to all the entities in

• Logstic units
• Combat Support units
• Combat formations / units

• Other Services
• Combat & Support levels
• Execution / Direction levels

• Other Services
• National Assets / platforms
• Supervisory / National level

battle space. It should be „light‟ and „user friendly‟

and should be usable by all combat personnel Command &
Control
without extensive training requirements.
Metaphorically speaking, it should be the Combat
Support
pinnacle of the ‘information pyramid’.
Accordingly, personnel in combat may Reconnaissance
& Surveillance
not be required to carry anything
more than a mobile telephone for Intelligence and Geo-
Spatial Data Banks
operations. The telephone
handset should be capable of Logistic Support
providing the combatants ALL
information required in Others
battle. It should also be
capable of transmitting the battle situation to other systems for requisite
 84

information, assessment and formulation of orders, combat support and

logistic sustenance, as required. In the contemporary world, such
arrangement is already in use by media personnel for live coverage of
important events from remote and inaccessible areas. The recommended
methodologies of overcoming the perceived constraints of the cellular towers
and secrecy requirements have been elucidated in the preceding chapters.

135. Combat Support Sub System. Support arms have achieved a certain
degree of automation with regard to their respective command and control
requirements, which need to be
4 2 COMBAT SUPPORT
incorporated in the visualised C I SR
system. The configuration of the Combat SUB SYSTEM
Support Sub System will be similar to the

ACCCS
configuration of the reconnaisance and
surveillance sub system with the addition
• Input to support cogent domain • Supervisory / National level
DIRECTIONAL
• Intelligence Inputs, from other Services • National Assets / platforms
LEVEL
• All inputs available at Supervisory level • Other Services

of the support arm specific command and • Other Services, neighbouring formations
• Intelligence Inputs
• All inputs available at the Execution level

• Reconnaissance & Surveillance Devices

• Orders / Instructions from Higher HQs
• Data bank/ intelligence / templates
SUPERVISORY
LEVEL

EXECUTION
LEVEL
• Execution / Direction levels
• Combat & Support levels
• Other Services

• Combat formations / units

• Combat Support units
• Logstic units

control devices which have already been

developed like the ACCCS (in all its
formats and levels) of the field artillary and
the AD C&R of the Army Air Defence. CLAWS
These components will have to be suitably
re-oriented to make them digitally compatible with commercial computers /
servers and the 3G cellular telephony.

136. Data Base / Server (Decision Support, Intelligence & Geo-Spatial).

(a) The system explained above may appear to cater for the
communication aspect only. While in itself, enhancement of the
communication profile will substantially enhance the capability of the
Army, there is a requirement of ‘value addition’ to the information
in the form of professional interface. This process is best carried out
at nodal locations where the data is collated / stored. The existing
projects like the CIDSS and BMS, accordingly, need not be undertaken
at the location of each commander / headquarter. It need not
necessarily be configured for a headquarter / commander, but could be
location / terrain / operation specific with accessibility provided to the
affected headquarters / commanders based on IP protocols /
permissions / passwords, similar to the process followed by banks /
railways, wherein the data is managed centrally with accessibility
differentiation between junior employees and senior executives.
 85

DATA STORAGE AND PROCESSING SUB SYSTEM

Intelligence
Inputs
Output
Forward OFC
Troops
Server & Processing /
All major data processing
Data Bank Military Interface
activities like command
decision support,
intelligence, terrain etc
can be done out of active
Logistic
Inputs

battle zone. The results /

processed data to be
available to frontline
elements, as required

Media for Inputs : 3G, OFC, Data Bank – Access Media

existing communication channels, Server Media: for Users: 3G
etc, as applicable OFC

(b) While there will be nominated data bases and servers to better
manage the entire system, the visualised system will essentially
function on the „internet‟ format with essential controls and „nodes‟ to
obviate „choking‟ and „stagnation‟. All sub systems explained above
will act like a data base, the information of which can be drawn by
entities requiring it. In addition, specific data bases will be created
to store specifically formatted data for intelligence, geo-spatial
information, etc, pertaining to certain area / zone. Data managers will
require to be nominated for effective management of protocols and
permissions. The electronic structure of commercial banks and the
popular internet banking system can be taken as an examplar for the
system with high degree of security for the data bases and the users.

137. Decision Making Sub System / Entity. For too long has the Indian
Army been attempting to tailor make computer programmes and associated
hardware for automating the processes, which contribute to an effective
decision by the commander. While substantial progress has been made, it is
 86

yet to measure up to the aspirations of field commanders. The US Army has

also apparently realized the futility of automating the numerous intangibles
required for decision in combat and are veering to the view that “network-
centric warfare advocates underestimated the nature of future combat at
the muddy-boot or dirty-track level … removing the fog of war through
network-centric technology is not possible54.” While the vision of a
decision support system may have been apt, the inadequacy perhaps was in
the methodology of execution. Instead of attempting automation of relatively
simple systems / processes (like working out the azimuth and bearing of the
artillery gun on receipt of the grid reference of the target), and thereafter
graduating to more complex systems (like the effect in terms of casualties in
comparative areas under varying ammunition, gun, intensity of fire and other
operational parameters), most advanced armies attempted development of a
comprehensive system, which were naturally constrained to produce sub-
optimal results. In consequence, following are recommended:-

(a) Corporate Exemplar. The contemporary corporate sector has

advanced exponentially in the decision making field. Accordingly,
military decision-making system should initially be adopted from
the corporate sector by requisite re-orientation of the existing
systems. Corporate ventures transcending continents and
incorporating vast range of raw material, production, human resource,
sales and finances are increasingly employing computer automation
and networking to assist in decision-making55. While the military
decision-making is inherently different, the modalities of developing the
corporate system could act like an exemplar for the Army.

(b) Level of Automation. The second and a more important issue

is the level of automation desired in decision-making process. Apart
from the need of the field commanders, it is also perhaps contingent
on the quality of the decision making structure achievable in the
contemporary technological matrix and the degree of managerial
transformation / change acceptable in the human resource matrix.

(c) Physical Structure. Notwithstanding the level and scope of the

decision – making system selected for the Indian Army, the structure of
54
Conclusions of a Study directed by General Peter W. Chiarelli, Vice Chief of Staff, US
Army, on the Future Force Design. Members consisted of Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans
and Commanding Officers. Quote reproduced from U.S Army, Military Review_20091031 _
art 008.
55
http://www.sap.com/community/events/2009_08_10_UEP/index.epx. and
http://www.sap.com/community/showdetail.epx?ItemID=20173
 87

the system, as explained in the preceding sections, will remain simple.

Instead of burdening each hierarchical level of command with
comprehensive decision-making structures [like the Manoeuvre Control
System (MCS)56 System of the US Army and the Cammand Information
and Decision Support System (CIDSS) of the Indian Army], the
commander and his staff need to only possess the means to
access the system from the combat zone (a mobile phone)! Bulky
parts of the system, per se, can be located elsewhere, out of the
combat zone. Such an arrangement will also facilitate greater
specialization, optimization of resources and professional assistance to
commanders. Piloting the predator UAVs / drones in Afghanistan,
from bases in USA57 and the mobile banking system adopted by
some banks are pertinent examples of this arrangement.

138. Overall Profile. The visualized structure will provide seamless

integration of all battle-space entities, thereby bestowing the following
advantages on the entire system:-

(a) Reduced size and scope of the entities in battle zone makes the
combat elements more agile and flexible.

(b) Enhanced size and scope of the combat support and ancillary
structures enhances the combat capabilities of the Army.

(c) Real-time connectivity of the combat support and ancillary

structures to the entities in the battle zone empowers the combat
elements with the entire range of capabilities provided by the combat
support and ancillary entities.

139. While the ongoing efforts at developing and improving battle

space entities like CIDSS, BMS, ACCCS etc must be pursued, the
primacy of the enhanced connectivity, both in terms of bandwidth and
compatibility, needs to be recognized and implemented on priority.
Similar to the infrastructure (roads, ports, airports, electricity etc), which has

56
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground: The US Army has adopted the MCS
for its army and had fielded it in the second Iraqi campaign.
57
CBS News. Com. 25 Jan 2010. ―Taking stock of the drone surge‖. The US Air Force has
created an interconnected global command-and-control system to carry out its war in
Afghanistan. Drone pilots and other personnel control the planes themselves from the high-
tech U.S. bases around the world …. with the data streaming back to / from them on a
global network. Drones are physically based at Kandahar and Jalalabad Air Fields and the
operators are located at Nevada's Creech Air Base .. and Wright-Patterson Air Force Base,
in Dayton, Ohio.
 88

been recognized as a catalyst driving the economic growth of the country, the
recommended integration of the battle-space entities, by a robust cellular
telephone „highway‟, is likely to provide the required environment for
transformational improvement of the Army‟s combat capabilities.

140. Significant progress has already been made in development of the

C4I2SR system for the Indian Army. However, there are constrained choices
at this stage wherein on
one side, contemporary THE WAY AHEAD
technology has progressed Existing Recommended
fast and on the other hand, Methodology Methodology
the ongoing Tac C3I
projects, with relatively
older technology, may be Core Endeavour: Core Endeavour:
Capability Capability
under the peril of enhancement of
enhancement of
obsolescence. The battle-space connectivity
technology (3G cellular entities (Highways)
technology and advanced
processors) being
recommended, are
currently in an emergent De-novo Utilisation of
stage and are likely to development of commercially
remain current in the next tailor made available
one to two decades. military specific technology for
entities capability
Adoption of the enhancement of
recommended technology entities
along with concurrent
development of the ongoing projects, therefore, appears a pragmatic
preposition.

Process

141. In context of the „cellular – computer‟ framework described above, a

pragmatic audit needs to be undertaken for the ongoing C4I2SR projects.
There is a need to jettison vintaged ventures and retain only proven and
validated projects. Where feasible, up-gradation needs to be carried out
without resorting to time-consuming research. Commercial, off the shelf
equipment and technologies are recommended for the purpose. Ultimately,
concurrent development of the proposed structure and selected
ongoing projects is visualized for the desired C4I2SR capability.
 89

142. The process of building up the cellular - computer framework will

involve the following:-

(a) Establishment of the Cellular Grid in areas of visualized military

operations.

(b) Development of ‘compatibility’ software which will facilitate

unhindered and fast transmission amongst battle-space entities,
modern computers and the 3 G CDMA media, with the following
essentials:-

(i) Operating system that is equally effective in computers as

well as in telephone hand set environment.

(ii) Data exchange formats with low bandwidth requirements.

(iii) Conversion of analog to digital formats for videos (example

LORROS is analog), voice (common battlefield transmissions /
intercepts, etc) and data.

(c) Suitable adaptation of the civil cellular grid already

established in various parts of the country.

(d) Selection and re-orientation of the ‘cell on wheels’ for short

notice requirements in areas devoid of cellular grid. Some AREN
Regiments may require to be converted into „Cellular Grid
Establishment‟ Regiments holding mobile „cells‟ for deployment at short
notice.

(e) Selection and re-orientation of the handsets and computers

for use at various hierarchical levels.

(f) Working out the modalities for integration of the existing

communication grid with the proposed cellular grid.

(g) Prioritize the establishment of the system as follows:-

(i) Establishment of the sub conventional cellular

telephony grid in J&K and North East.
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(ii) Tactical level cellular telephony networking for

conventional tactical battle area and adjoining areas.

RECOMMENDED PRIORITY

Basic C4I2SR

C4I2SR Capability
Capability
Establishment / Extension of Cellular Grid

Substantial
Digitization of inputs ex Sensors / Intelligence
Development of Compatibility Capabilities
Improvement of Battle-space entities
Development of Mobile Grid Capability

Time

(iii) Further improvement and implementation of the

ongoing C4I2SR projects58.

(iv) Satellite based / aerial communication to offset

geographical dispersion of far-flung and difficult areas.

(v) Integration of captive / assured navigation, imagery and

communication satellites.

(vi) Establishment of the Sensor to Shooter grid - beyond the

Divisional level.

143. The process of development of the C4I2SR capability is visualized in

two essential phases, ie the initial transformational phase to „kick – start‟
the „network enabled‟ operations in the Indian Army by achieving the „cellular
– computer highway‟ to all the battle-space entities and the subsequent
incremental phase wherein the development and improvement of the battle-
space entities will be pursued. While both phases can be undertaken
simultaneously, the primacy of the transformational phase may not be
compromised.

58
This will include the entire gamut of communication (like Army One, TCS, ASTROIDS,
DCN, VSAT etc) and Tac C3I projects (like CIDSS, BMS, ACCCS, ADC&R etc).
 91

Miscellaneous Issues

144. Satellites. Communication assisted by satellites is already an

important component of Army communication infrastructure. The visualized
computer – cellular grid needs to be linked to the satellite communication grid
to further optimize its capability. The requirement enjoins establishment of
‘bridges’ at suitable communication nodes which will provide duel
connectivity to the cellular grid as well as the satellites.

145. UAVs. UAVs are the most potent force multiplier in the contemporary
battlefield. For the potential of the UAVs to be exploited optimally, its
reconnaissance and surveillance framework needs to integrated in the
command and control sub system.

146. Utilizing Already Developed TV Grid. The already established TV

Channel gird with satellite connectivity for real-time passage of information
can be considered for exploitation for video and data connectivity to field
formations. The technology is already in use extensively and has the
capability to cover the entire range of grids from the global to the tactical
levels.

147. Outsourcing Cellular Grid. Hiring BSNL / VSNL and other cellular
grids to network areas not covered by Army communication backbone can be
considered. However, appropriate „secrecy‟ aspects may have to be
incorporated in the outsourcing parameters. Separate military cellular grid
may be developed only in such remote areas where civil infrastructure is
unlikely to come up in the near future.

148. Existing Network Integration. To „kick start‟ the network enabled

operations in the Army, the need for integrating the existing communication
networks is recognized. However, a seamless integration of all the networks
may not be feasible at this stage, hence is not being recommended for the
time being.

149. OFC. The Armed Forces are in the process of surrendering a part of
defence spectrum so as to enable development of next generation cellular
services in the country. In return for this, a nationwide 30,000 KM long OFC
backbone along with an access network covering 238 military stations is
being provided. OFC is considered a suitable media for integrating the large
bandwidth cellular telephony with the existing communication setup having
various configurations.
 92

150. Computer Servers. Varied communication media needs to be

terminated in selected computer servers, with enhanced computing
capabilities, for apposite integration. Specialized media and network
managers will have to be actualized for the purpose.

151. Training Requirements. The recommended structure is akin to the

system already in use in the civil domain and being extensively used even by
soldiers. No training requirement is visualized for the users / combatants.
Training of the specialized personnel / network operators will be required to
be undertaken.

152. Reorientation of Technical Arms. The existing manpower in Signals

and EME will have to be technically re-oriented to cater for the enhanced
C4I2SR requirements.

153. HRD. No major change in the HRD aspects is visualized owing to

introduction of already in use technology.

154. Tri Service Integration. While tri Service integration is beyond the
scope of the paper, the recommended system provides easy inter – Service
access and integration. .

The Cost Factor

155. Financial cost of military technologies and hardware are generally

determined based on the cost of research / development, production versus
volume considerations, material and the labour expenses. In the case of the
proposed computer – cellular framework, the cost factor is appreciated to be
minimal owing to the following:-

(a) No fundamental research is required for the proposed structure

since it is already in use.

(b) Owing to widespread usage, the production volumes are large. In

consequence, the margins are likely to be low resulting in reduced cost.

(c) The cellular service provider market has emerged as a highly

competitive venture. Multi vendor configuration will ensure
competitiveness in quality and pricing.

156. Apart from the financial cost, the cost in terms of time, and material and
human resources is also likely to be minimal for the recommended C4I2SR
system, owing to the following:-
 93

(a) Time. In areas where the civil cellular grid is in place, the system
can be implemented forthwith. For the areas where the decision to
layout the grid is taken, the time required will be less than one year,
whatever may be the size and location of the area. Concurrently, cell on
wheels / mobile towers can be procured for deployment in balance
areas, at short notice.

(b) Material Resources. The structure recommended is „miniscule‟

in physical size and cost, as compared to similar systems being
attempted by various armies, the world over. The resources required for
the system is accordingly likely to be comparatively much less.

(c) Human Resource. As regards the usage of the system, the

structure and components (mobile telephone and personal computers)
are user friendly and are already in use by most of the military
personnel. As regards the management of the system there will be a
requirement of technically empowered network / media and data bank
managers, which can be met from the existing technical establishment
of the Army.
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CHAPTER 8

In theory, NCW will result in revolutionary changes in the way we think

and conduct warfare; in reality, it is more likely to result in… incrementa
and evolutionary changes in military capabilities & doctrine …
Aldo Borgu of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, as
quoted by Lt Gen V Patankar (retd) at CLAWS Seminar on NCW
in Jul 2008. Seminar Report pg 18.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Strategic Criticality: Regional Context

157. Attainment of Higher Military capability. There exists a strategic

criticality for emerging powers like India, to graduate to a higher geo-strategic
plane with matching politico - economic - military capabilities. The military
exigencies for attainment of requisite capabilities in the conventional and the
sub conventional domains are therefore high.

158. Regional Security Complexity. India‟s neighbours, despite having

several commonalities, have witnessed “interdependence of shared rivalry
and not interdependence of shared interests” which keeps them in economic
and political flux and precludes the desired stability and an environment
conducive to prosperity and growth.

159. Pakistan. India‟s conventional progression has significantly enhanced

the military asymmetry in the sub continent. Growing irrelevance of Pakistan‟s
conventional capabilities has apparently constrained Pakistan to seek
leverages in the sub - conventional and nuclear domains.

160. China. While Pakistan may seek leverages in the sub-conventional

and nuclear domains, China will continue posing threat in the conventional
domain in the long term. Such conventional threat, however, may lose its
credibility if the existing Sino - Indian military asymmetry is reduced to a level
wherein the feasibility of a decisive victory by Peoples Liberation Army is
significantly diluted.
 95

161. Out of Area Contingencies (OOACs). India‟s emergence as a

regional power with a „say‟ in Global affairs necessitates a matching OOAC
capabilities, which may largely be sub-conventional in scope.

162. Internal Security. Internal security obligations will continue to endure

thus necessitating prolonged sub-conventional emphasis.

163. Focus of C4I2SR Systems. The relative ease of conventional victories

in Iraq and Afghanistan by the US lead coalition forces and their acute
predicament at sub conventional levels thereafter, merits analysis. The focus
of C4I2SR systems, therefore, needs to be on sub conventional domain with
adequate stress on the current and near term conventional requirements,
especially for the mountains.

Battlefield Milieu : Indian Context

164. Conventional Domain. Conventional conflicts are likely under

conditions of extreme provocation / duress. In consequence, the conflict is
likely to be short, swift and intense. Essential characteristics are likely to be:-
(a) Enhanced battlefield transparency.
(b) Enhanced situational awareness.
(c) Enhanced night fighting capabilities.
(d) Enhanced lethality and precision of weapon systems.
(e) Asymmetric warfare factored even into conventional conflicts.
(f) Decreased tolerance for casualty and collateral damage.

165. Sub Conventional Domain. The Indian security forces have

deliberately eschewed the employment of offensive airpower, tanks, ICVs,
artillery and heavy caliber weapons at sub conventional levels. In
consequence, the counter insurgency operations, are purely in the infantry /
police format. Essential characteristics are likely to be:-
(a) Pre-eminence of human intelligence.
(b) Infantry (small arms) predominant operations.
(c) Low tolerance for collateral damage.
(d) Lower tolerance for own casualties.
(e) High threshold for escalation.
(f) Major challenge – locating and confirming identity of terrorists.
 96

Emerging C4I2SR Imperatives: Indian Context

166. Objectives. C4I2SR Systems should aim at enhancement in

operational capability of the Army by exploiting and augmenting the potential
of the existing „communication networks‟ and induction of validated
„information systems and projects‟, suitably integrated in the context of our
military operational requirements.

167. Artitecture. The architecture will consist of a command centre linked

to the input and output activity stations. The system would aim at seamlessly
joining all components of the Army in an effective manner. In effect, the aim is
to improve association and synergy between the existing sensors, the
decision making mechanism, the shooters and the communication backbone
at all levels. in consequence, the C4I2SR Systems should be capable of
enhancing the „network enabled‟ military operations, with existing resources
and environment, and graduate to full-fledged network centricity
subsequently.

168. Ingredients. The four essential sub systems of the C4I2SR system are
the command and control sub system at the core with linkages to surveillance
and reconnaissance devices and the intelligence / information data base and
the execution sub systems in the form of combat and combat support
structures. The entire the C4I2SR system will be appropriately integrated by a
robust communication sub system.

169. Methodologies. In the first stage of capability enhancement, consider

those systems, which will bring about transformational up-gradation in the
capabilities in the shortest time and thereafter, once the essential capability
has been attained, carry out incremental improvements, as necessitated by
military exigencies and technological improvements / innovations.

170. Decision Support System. The time tested and operationally proven
functioning ethos of the command centric Indian Army, may not permit
subservience of the human cogent faculties to an automated command and
control solution. The decision support system, therefore, should be in a
complementary mode to the commander‟s cogent domain.

171. Current C4I2SR Status in the Indian Army. The advancements

visualized for the Indian Army in the fields of C 4I2SR, commenced in the late
eighties and were motivated largely, by similar systems in vogue in the more
advanced Western Armies and technically based on the technologies
prevalent then, which can now, at best, deliver sub-optimal results. The effort
 97

to keep pace and repeatedly upgrade the „core‟ technologies, of the eighties
and nineties has perhaps lead to delays and substantial non-actualization of
the visualized C4I2SR systems, despite efforts spanning more than 20 years.

172. Essential Inadequacies. At the functional level, we have limited

accessibility to information available in the battlefield, ie, there is little
battlefield transparency and situational awareness at the tactical level.
Shortcomings related to networking of sensors, decision-making apparatus
and weapon platforms are the main friction areas. The existing
communication networks have been developed primarily for the
communication needs of the Army, as visualized in the early nineties. Hence,
its concept and design do not cater for the type of data connectivity required
in the year 2010 and beyond.

173. Essential Felt Needs. The surveillance and intelligence gathering

apparatus, the command and control system, the weapon platforms and other
related systems in the battlefield, currently in a „stand alone‟ mode, need to
‘talk freely’ with each other for optimization of their potential. The system
should cater for enhanced battlefield transparency and real-time situational
awareness for the commanders at the tactical and the operational level.
Command and Control and Communication for tactical battle area, suitably
integrated in the Theatre Information Grid, are the essential pre-requisites for
an effective C4I2SR System in the Army.

Philosophy of C4I2SR Systems

174. Vision. Capability enhancement of the Indian Army‟s command and

control structure which is capable of optimally exploiting its surveillance,
reconnaissance and intelligence resources, weapon systems and combat
support apparatus for a superior war winning combat capability

175. Concept. C4I2SR System should contribute to capability enhancement

through superior decision-making process. It should provide the enhanced
capability of voice, data and imagery transfer in a secure media and should
meet the requirement of networking surveillance, communication, navigation,
decision making and weapon platforms / system as per the theatre specific
requirements.
 98

C4I2SR Considerations in the Indian Context

176. Command and Control. Commanders in battlefield and at the

supervisory / direction level essentially require to know the situation in terms
of enemy / terrorist activities, own activities and capability, terrain and other
factors impinging on operations along with the directions / instructions on the
subject / situation from higher headquarters / neighbouring formations / units /
databanks / formatted analysis carried out on the subject.

177. Battlefield Transparency. Battlefield transparency is attained by

superior sensors, surveillance devices, intelligence network, communication
and the capability to synthesize the inputs in realtime frame.

178. Situational Awareness. In simplistic terms, situational awareness in

the Indian context translates into the realistic awareness of own and
adversary‟s location and activities. The requirement, while simple, gets
acutely accentuated when seen in the context of adverse terrain and weather
conditions obtaining in most operational areas in a dynamic combat scenario.

179. Communication. The core of the required capability is „anywhere,

anytime and with anybody‟ communication. The essential capabilities required
are broadband, two ways digital communication on a small handset. The
communication means should have adequate redundancies to obviate failure
in operational contingencies.

180. Data Banks and Computing Capabilities. For a common operating

picture, all data need to be available to everybody else. Accordingly,
intelligence and other data should be acquired, stored and thereafter made
available for access by others, at all entity locations. In effect therefore, all
units and formations would assume the mantle of data bases and the C 4I2SR
systems should have the capability to access data from all such sources, as
required. Protocols and IP addresses, as necessitated by the military
hierarchy and security requirements may be put in place.

181. Essential Considerations. Essentially, the information systems are

helpful to the extent that they reduce the fog of war. The command structure
must be capable of winning / performing even in the absence / failure of
technology. The visualised information capabilities should accordingly ensure
the following:-
(a) Assured Access.
(b) Robust Security.
 99

(c) Operations Security.

(d) Interoperability.

182. Commercial Considerations. Generally, commercial systems are

universally available. Accordingly, the capability, which is commercially
available to India, is also available to an adversary. In consequence, failing
to leverage commercial capabilities, may constrain own capabilities in
comparison to an adversary who may exploit such emergent and
advanced technologies.

Emerging Technologies Favouring C4I2SR

183. Contemporary Technological Matrix. To a large measure,

contemporary technological advancement may be attributed to three essential
emerging technologies, ie Information Technology with computers at its core,
satellites with its numerous configurations and cellular communication with
abilities transcending a vast range of applications. Integration of these
technologies has the potential to transform the sub-conventional battlefield
decisively in favour of the Armed Forces

184. Satellite Applications.

(a) Communication. Integrating the satellite telephony with the

cellular technology, thereby reducing the power requirement of the
hand held sets to that required to transmit to mere four to five kms
(radius of one cellular telephony „cell‟), is likely to make the satellite
telephony more versatile and user friendly.

(b) Navigation. The challenge of real-time situation awareness in

poor navigable terrain and low visibility conditions can be met
effectively by integrating the GPS technology with radio / cellular
technology and dynamic electronic maps displayable on handheld
machines.

185. UAVs. UAVs have the potential to qualitatively transform the battle
space, both in the conventional and the sub – conventional domains.
Reconnaissance and surveillance UAVs are likely to constitute the most
significant technical infusion, especially in the sub-conventional domain,
suitably linked to the operational information grid.

186. Communication. 3G Cellular Technology has numerous advantages

and is likely to contribute significantly to situational awareness in the sub
 100

conventional domain in addition to the communication requirements in the

entire span of conflict situations. The facilities of voice, data, image, video
clips, GPS and navigation are available in the 3G technology. Following
related issues, however, will require further deliberation:-

(a) Secrecy Factor. Surprise due to present day battlefield

transparency is related to „time and speed‟ of operations. Moreover,
modern transmission techniques offer immense potential for secure
military communication. Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA)
technology hides the signal over a wide portion of the spectrum so that
it becomes virtually indistinguishable from regular spectrum noise.

(b) Cells on Wheels / Mobile Tower Unit. Service providers have

Cells-On-Wheels (COW) and Cells-On-Light-Trucks (COLT) vehicles to
restore mobile phone service or add additional call capacity in the event
of cell tower failure or an emergency. A COW is self-contained, portable
cell tower that can replace existing cell towers for an indefinite period.
The system has immense utility in remote and inaccessible areas which
are devoid of cellular coverage.

187. Geo-spatial Information System (GIS) and GPS. The enhanced

scope of emerging GIS and GPS offer immense possibilities for the situational
awareness requirements in the Indian context. GIS is diverging into location
based services (LBS). LBS allows GPS enabled mobile devices to display
their location in relation to fixed assets (nearest mobile tower, ASCON tower,
Road junction, Mountain peak etc), mobile assets (own patrols, patrols ex
neighbouring unit location etc) or to relay their position back to a central
server for display or other processing. These services continue to develop
with the increased integration of GPS functionality with increasingly powerful
mobile electronics (cell phones, laptops).

188. Intelligence, Surveillance Devices and Reconnaissance. Human

intelligence forms the core of the intelligence gathering apparatus in
India. The efforts should accordingly be aimed at empowering the human
effort in intelligence gathering, especially in the sub conventional domain.
Signal intelligence has assumed importance as a consequence to enhanced
use of radios by terrorists in J&K and North East.

189. Options for Technological Upgradation / Adoption. Our country is

standing on the threshold of a technical revolution in the fields of information
technology and information systems. Persisting with the old and vintage
technologies may relegate the Army into a tedious developmental cyclic
 101

mode, which may be at the cost of our operational preparedness. However,

owing to the immense cost and effort already sunk in the various projects, a
pragmatic view is desirable to catalyze the ongoing projects to the current, if
not futuristic levels of technologies. A judicious mix of old and emergent
technologies appear to be the logical solution in the Indian context.

Recommended Low Cost High Payoff System

190. Technical Concept. Digitization (converting information into bits and

bytes) of all data (voice, images, video, processed information etc) into a
universally accessible format (like html, jpeg etc) and thereafter making
available the data for, firstly, processing / expert interface / data storage (by
computers, technical experts, senior commanders) at selected locations
(central servers, data bases, formation headquarters etc – but not in the
battlefield) and secondly, feeding it on a „information highway‟ (large
bandwidth with enhanced and universal accessibility to all combatants) for
real-time availability to all entities (mobile hand sets, data enabled radio sets
like TADIRAN, communication enabled computers, communication networks
like ASCON, AREN, etc, and sub-systems like ACCCS, BMS, EW etc), is the
essential technical concept being recommended for the C4I2SR System.

191. End State. The visualised C4I2SR is based on appropriately configured

and adequately compatible computers and 3G cellular telephones having
broadband connectivity with all entities of battle space and support zone. It
has attempted to achieve the essential requirement of translating information
superiority into combat power by effectively linking knowledge entities in
battle-space.

192. Command and Control Sub System. The appreciated system will
consist firstly of a „user friendly‟ computer to store required data and operate
selected software to execute / operate computer programmes / formats
utilized by reconnaissance and surveillance sub systems, the data storage /
server sub system and other subordinate, lateral and hierarchical entities.
Secondly, the commander should have „cellular telephone highway‟
connectivity on a mobile handset, with capability of high capacity voice,
video and data linkages to all the entities of combat and combat support. The
communication set should be compatible to the computer for „online‟ and
„real-time‟ connectivity requirements as also for data processing
requirements.

193. Reconnaissance and Surveillance Sub System. The essential

requirement is to provide real-time connectivity from numerous sensor
 102

devices / radars / night vision devices to other sub systems. The inputs from
the sensors are in various formats like video from UAVs and LORROS or
radar outputs from TIIOE and BFSR. These will need to be converted into
transferable formats prior to feeding it in the media. The sub systems will
accordingly consist of a computer for selective storage, on-site processing of
the inputs and requisite changing of the format for transmission on the media.
The second component will be a mobile handset for broadband connectivity
with other sub systems.

194. Combat Sub System. The combat structure should provide assured
access, in a secure media with adequate redundancy, to all the entities in
battle space. Metaphorically speaking, it should be the pinnacle of the
„information pyramid‟. Accordingly, personnel in combat may not be required
to carry anything more than a mobile telephone in operations. The telephone
handset should be capable of providing the combatants ALL information
required in battle. It should also be capable of transmitting the battle situation
to other sub systems for requisite information, assessment and formulation of
orders, combat support and logistic sustenance, as required.

195. Combat Support Sub System. Support arms have achieved a certain
degree of automation with respect to their respective command and control
requirements, which need to be incorporated in the visualised C4I2SR system.
The configuration of the Combat Support Sub System will be similar to the
configuration of the reconnaisance and surveillance sub system with the
addition of the support arm specific command and control devices which have
already been developed like the ACCCS of the field artillary and the AD C&R
of the Army Air Defence etc.

196. Data Base / Server (Decision Support, Intelligence & Geo-Spatial).

(a) The system explained above may appear to cater for the
communication aspect only. While in itself, enhancement of the
communication profile will substantially enhance the capability of the
Army, there is a requirement of ‘value addition’ to the information
in the form of professional interface. This process is best carried out
at nodal locations where the data is collated / stored. The existing
projects like the CIDSS and BMS, accordingly, need not be undertaken
at the location of each commander / headquarter. It need not
necessarily be configured for a headquarter / commander, but could be
location / terrain / operation specific with accessibility provided to the
affected headquarters / commanders based on IP protocols /
 103

permissions / passwords, similar to the process followed by banks /

railways, wherein the data is managed centrally with accessibility
differentiation between junior employees and senior executives.

(b) While there will be nominated data bases and servers to better
manage the entire system, the visualised system will essentially
function on the „internet‟ format with essential controls and „nodes‟ to
obviate „choking‟ and „stagnation‟. All sub systems explained above will
act like a data base, the information of which can be drawn by entities
requiring it. In addition, specific data bases will be created to store
specifically formatted data for intelligence, geo-spatial information, etc,
pertaining to certain area / zone. Data managers will require to be
nominated for effective management of protocols and permissions.

197. Decision Making Sub System / Entity. Instead of burdening each

hierarchical level of command with comprehensive decision-making structures
(like the MCS System of the US Army and the CIDSS of the Indian Army), the
commander and his staff need to only possess the means to access the
system from the combat zone (a mobile phone)! The bulky components, per
se, can be located elsewhere, out of the combat zone. Such an arrangement
will also facilitate greater specialization, optimization of resources and
professional assistance to commanders. Piloting the predator UVA / drones in
Afghanistan from bases in USA and mobile banking systems are some
pertinent examples of this arrangement.

198. Overall Profile. The visualized structure will provide seamless

integration of all battle-space entities, thereby bestowing the following
advantages on the entire system:-

(a) Reduced size and scope of the entities in battle zone makes the
combat elements more agile and flexible.

(b) Enhanced size and scope of the combat support and ancillary
structures enhances the combat capabilities of the Army.

(c) Real-time connectivity of the combat support and ancillary

structures to the entities in the battle zone empowers the combat
elements with the entire range capabilities provided by the combat
support and ancillary entities.

199. While the ongoing efforts at developing and improving battle space
entities like CIDSS, BMS, ACCCS etc must be pursued, the primacy of the
 104

enhanced connectivity, both in terms of bandwidth and compatibility, needs to

be recognized and implemented on priority.

Implementation Process

200. Significant progress has already been made in development of the

C4I2SR system for the Indian Army. However, there are constrained choices
at this stage wherein on one side, contemporary technology has progressed
fast and on the other hand, the ongoing Tac C3I projects, with relatively older
technology, may be under the peril of obsolescence. The technology (3G
cellular technology and advanced processors) being recommended, are
currently in an emergent stage and are likely to remain current in the next one
to two decades. Adoption of the recommended technology along with
concurrent development of the ongoing projects, therefore, appears a
pragmatic preposition.

201. The process of building up the cellular - computer framework will

involve the following:-

(a) Establishment of the Cellular Grid in areas of visualized military

operations (selected areas in J&K, Western Rajasthan and North
Eastern States).

(b) Development of „compatibility‟ software which will facilitate

unhindered and fast transmission amongst battle-space entities,
modern computers and the 3 G CDMA media.

(c) Suitable adaptation of the civil cellular grid already established in

various parts of the country.

(d) Selection and re-orientation of the „cell on wheels‟ for short notice
requirements in areas devoid of cellular grid. Some AREN Regiments
may require to be converted into „Cellular Grid Establishment‟
Regiments holding mobile „cells‟ for deployment at short notice.

(e) Selection and re-orientation of the handsets and computers for

use at various hierarchical levels.

(f) Working out the modalities for integration of the existing

communication grid with the proposed cellular grid.

(g) Prioritize the establishment of the system as follows:-

 105

(i) Establishment of the sub conventional cellular telephony

grid in J&K and North East.

(ii) Tactical level cellular telephony networking for

conventional tactical battle area and adjoining areas.

(iii) Further improvement and implementation of the ongoing

4 2
C I SR projects.

(iv) Satellite based / aerial based communication to offset

geographical dispersion of far-flung and difficult areas.

(v) Integration of captive / assured navigation, imagery and

communication satellites.

(vi) Establishment of the Sensor to Shooter grid - beyond the

Divisional level.

202. The process of development of the C4I2SR capability is visualized in

two essential phases, ie the initial transformational phase to „kick – start‟ the
„network enabled‟ operations in the Indian Army by achieving the „cellular –
computer highway‟ to all the battle-space entities and the subsequent
incremental phase wherein the development and improvement of the battle-
space entities will be pursued. While both phases can be undertaken
simultaneously, the primacy of the transformational phase may not be
compromised.

Miscellaneous Issues

203. Satellites. Communication assisted by satellites is already an

important component of Army communication infrastructure. The visualized
computer – cellular grid needs to be linked to the satellite communication grid
to further optimize its capability. The requirement enjoins establishment of
‘bridges’ at suitable communication nodes which will provide duel
connectivity to the cellular grid as well as the satellites.

204. UAVs. UAVs are the most potent force multiplier in the contemporary
battlefield. For the potential of the UAVs to be exploited optimally, its
reconnaissance and surveillance framework needs to integrated in the
command and control sub system.

205. Utilizing Already Developed TV Grid. The already established TV

Channel gird with satellite connectivity for real-time passage of information
 106

can be considered for exploitation for video and data connectivity to field
formations. The technology is already in use extensively and has the
capability to cover the entire range of grids from the global to the tactical
levels.

206. Outsourcing Cellular Grid. Hiring BSNL / VSNL and other cellular
grids to network areas not covered by Army communication backbone can be
considered. However, appropriate „secrecy‟ aspects may have to be
incorporated in the outsourcing parameters. Separate military cellular grid
may be developed only in such remote areas where civil infrastructure is
unlikely to come up in the near future.

207. Existing Network Integration. To „kick start‟ the network enabled

operations in the Army, the need for integrating the existing communication
networks is recognized. However, a seamless integration of all the networks
may not be feasible at this stage, hence is not being recommended for the
time being.

208. OFC. The Armed Forces are in the process of surrendering a part of
defence spectrum so as to enable development of next generation cellular
services in the country. In return for this, a nationwide 30,000 KM long OFC
backbone along with an access network covering 238 military stations is
being provided. OFC is considered a suitable media for integrating the large
bandwidth cellular telephony with the existing communication setup having
various configurations.

209. Computer Servers. Varied communication media needs to be

terminated in selected computer servers, with enhanced computing
capabilities, for apposite integration. Specialized media and network
managers will have to be actualized for the purpose.

210. Training Requirements. The recommended structure is akin to the

system already in use in the civil domain and being extensively used even by
soldiers. No training requirement is visualized for the users / combatants.
Training of the specialized personnel / network operators will be required to
be undertaken.

211. Reorientation of Technical Arms. The existing manpower in Signals

and EME will have to be technically re-oriented to cater for the enhanced
C4I2SR requirements.
 107

212. HRD. No major change in the HRD aspects is visualized owing to

introduction of already in use technology.

213. Tri Service Integration. While tri Service integration is beyond the
scope of the paper, the recommended system provides easy inter – Service
access and integration. .

The Cost Factor

214. The financial cost is appreciated to be minimal since no fundamental

research is required for the proposed structure, the physical components are
comparatively less expensive and the sale volumes are large. Since the
system is already in extensive use, the time required for implementation is
likely to be less than a year in most of the visualized operational areas. The
human resource investment is also likely to be low since most of the military
personnel are already familiar with the cellular and the computer technology.
 108

CONCLUSION

215. Attempts to achieve network centricity commenced in the USA in the

late eighties and thereafter the trend was replicated in numerous western
armies. India commenced development of individual C4I2SR capabilities in
the nineties. Despite the near obsession witnessed in the Army
technological circles worldwide, and the hullabaloo associated with its
actualization, the full system, as conceptualized, is yet to see the light of
day, anywhere in the world! The recent conventional conflicts waged by US
and allies did validate the essentials of C4I2SR concepts as being sound and
pragmatic. However, the technological implementation of the concepts
appears to have been wanting. The sub - conventional application of the
network centricity also appears not to have attained satisfactory levels as
evident from the progress of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

216. In the Indian context, the sub – conventional exigencies are presently
greater. In the conventional domain also, it is known that our potential
adversaries are well on their way of acquiring the technology for network-
enabled operations. China has already advanced significantly in this field.
Acquisition of optimal C4I2SR capability, therefore, is an operational
exigency, which needs to be undertaken, post haste.

217. The „man behind the machine‟ continues to be the most important
battle-winning factor. Accordingly, there is an urgent requirement of upgrading
the quality content of all ranks in combat in terms of capability to understand,
absorb and use the state of the art technology, systems and procedures for
network centric warfare. The cellular – computer structure recommended in
the paper for achieving the initial stage of network centricity is user friendly
and is appreciated to meet all the requirements of the emerging conflict
scenario. “C4I2SR capability in the Indian context” has been the
underlying feature of the analysis, propounded in the paper. The
recommendations are accordingly pragmatic and implementable in the Indian
scenario and are in keeping with our current and visualized operational
requirements and technological capabilities.
 109

Appendix A
(Refers to Paragraph 48 of the
Study Report on C4I2SR Systems
for the Indian Army)

C4I2SR Glossary

1. C4I2SR. Acronym for Command, Control, Communications,

Computers, Intelligence, Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.
C4I2SR systems are defined as integrated systems of projected doctrines,
procedures, organizational structures, personal, equipments, installations and
communications to support the commander in chief in the command and
control of operations and military activities

2. Command. The authority that a commander in the Armed Forces

lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.
Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using
available resources and for planning the employment of, organising, directing,
coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of
assigned missions.

3. Command and Control (C2). The exercise of authority and direction

by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in
the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are
performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment,
communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in
planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the
accomplishment of the mission.

4. Computing and Communications. Two enabling technologies that

support C2 and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Computers
and communications process and transport information. Computers also
enable cyber warfare activities.

5. Control. Authority that may be less than full command exercised by a

commander over part of the activities of subordinate or other organisations.

6. Information Superiority. The relative advantage of one opponent over

another in commanding and controlling his force. Information superiority or
dominance is achieved both through the training of leaders to make rapid and
appropriate decisions using superior technical information means provided to
 110

them, and through efforts to degrade and deny these same capabilities to an
opponent while protecting one‟s own capability.

7. Intelligence. The product resulting from the collection, processing,

analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning
foreign countries or areas. Information and knowledge about an adversary
obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding.

8. Network Centric Warfare. The aim of Network Centric Warfare is to

improve the ability of the Army to collaborate internally, with supporting
agencies, and with coalition partners across organisational and geographic
boundaries. Network Centric Warfare will allow Defence to harness recent
developments in computing and communications technologies to enhance
decision making and war-fighting capability.

9. Reconnaissance. A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual

observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and
resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the
meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular
area. Reconnaissance is often instigated as a result of observations made
during surveillance.

10. Situational Awareness. The knowledge of where you are, where other
friendly and neutral elements are located, and the status, state, and location
of the enemy.

11. Surveillance. The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or

subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic,
photographic, or other means.

12. NCW Grid. NCW consists of four sub grids as follows59:-

(a) Sensor Grid – Collects information from sensors, intelligence

gathering devices and resources.

(b) Command and control Grid – uses collected information for

decision making.

(c) Engagement Grid – For use by combat and combat support

elements.

(d) Communication Grid – connects the above grids.

59
Dr VK Saraswat, Chief Controller, R&D, DRDO. CLAWS Seminar on NCW, Jul 2008.
 Appendix B
(Refers to Paragraph 85 of the
Study Report on C4I2SR Systems for
the Indian Army)

C4I2SR REQUIREMENT MATRIX : CAPABILITY REQUIRED

MILITARY DECISION MAKING PROCESS

1. Military decision-making process, in India, follows a systemic and a logical process, which has been formalized
significantly . The format could be written or verbal, short or comprehensive, at the tactical level or the strategic level. The
commander carries out the appreciation process based on his knowledge and experience for which traditionally the human
cogent capabilities were considered supreme. While the process has generally withstood the test of time, some of the
inadequacies observed were the constraints of incomplete intelligence picture, meager ground knowledge and not keeping
pace with the dynamics of the changing battlefield scenario. While there are varied methods adopted by different countries,
the sequence and the essentials are fundamentally the same and tend to conform to the sequence and the components
given below.

Decision Combat Enemy

Orders / Terms of Ground Enemy Own Own Courses Best Course
Making Instructions Reference
Aim
Factor Factor Situation
Support & Courses of
of Action of Action
Logistics Action
Process

Sensors, Int Sensors, Higher Higher

Inputs Higher
elligence & forward tps HQ, Own HQ, Own
Required Command &
Geo-Spatial Intelligence troops and Troops and
Control
Data Base Data Base Data Base Data Bases
 112

Appendix B (Contd)

SCOPE OF C4I2SR REQUIREMENTS AT VARIOUS HIERARCHICAL LEVELS

AN EXAMPLE : SCOPE OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

AT COMMENCEMENT OF BRIDGEHEAD OPERATIONS BROAD REQUIREMENT CONFIGURATION

River
Directional Conceptual Executional
Depth
Canal Objective
Own Enemy Enemy Enemy
Obstacle Obstacle Obstacle Obstacle
IB

Corps and Brigade and Battalion Company /

Army Divisional Commander Platoon
Commander Commander Commander
Forward Zone Inter Zone Depth Areas
 113

Appendix B (contd)

BROAD FRAMEWORK OF INPUTS REQUIRED AT VARIOUS HIERARCHICAL LEVELS

Level Command and Control Communication Geo-Spatial Navigation

Data / Information Decision Voice Data (including Battlefield GPS
Accessibility Support imagery & video) Transparency &
Situational Awareness

Section / Platoon / Troop - -

Company / Squadron / Battery - -

Battalion / Regiment -

Brigade -

Division -

Corps - -
 114

INPUTS REQUIRED AT VARIOUS HIERARCHICAL LEVELS

Level Battlefield Transparency & Situational Integration with Support Surveillance – Decision Communication Command and
Awareness Arms & Services Maker – Shooter grid Control
Own Enemy
Section / Location of Location of enemy / Capability to transmit own Capability to receive real-time Voice and data connectivity Voice and data
Platoon and neighbouring terrorists and chosen enemy inputs / feeds, including video with neighbouring Section, connectivity from
Company Section / Platoon / Activities / movements coordinates to Platoon / feeds from selected Platoon, Company and the Battalion
Commanders Company and made by the enemy / Company / Battalion surveillance devices / UAVs / Battalion Commander. Commander,
Battalion terrorists Commander command centres. Capability to communicate Company
Commanders Location from where fire Transmit own and enemy Voice and data connectivity with entire hierarchy, when commander and
is drawn / enemy fire location to Fire support with support arms and required. the platoon
support unit / sub unit. devices. commander

Troop / Location of all Location from where fire Capability to transmit own Capability to receive real-time Voice and data connectivity Voice and data
Squadron, tanks in the is drawn and chosen enemy inputs / feeds, including video with neighbouring Troop, connectivity from
Regimental squadron / Location of enemy tanks coordinates to Squadron, feeds from selected Squadron, Regiment and Troop / Squadron,
Commander regiment, IRG / Activities / movements Regiment and Formation surveillance devices / UAVs / Formation Commanders, Regimental
EVC Column, made by the enemy Commander. Command Centres. Capability to communicate Commanders and
tanks Transmit location of Fire Voice & data connectivity with with entire hierarchy, when also the
support unit / sub unit. support arms and devices. required. Formation
Enemy fire support Commanders
location
Formation Location of tank Location of terrorist / Capability to transmit own Capability to receive real-time Voice and data connectivity Voice and data
Commanders squadrons, enemy transmissions and chosen enemy inputs / feeds, including video with neighbouring connectivity from
infantry Location of enemy tank coordinates to company, feeds from selected Squadron, Regiment and company,
companies and concentrations, infantry battalion, squadron, surveillance devices / UAVs / Formation Commanders, battalion,
battalions. deployment regiment and higher Command Centres at the Capability to communicate squadron,
Location of Fire Activities / movements formation Commander. battalion and the formation with entire hierarchy, when regimental
support and made by the enemy Transmit location of Fire level. required. commanders and
Logistic Support tanks support unit / sub unit. Voice & data connectivity with also the
elements support arms and devices. Formation
Enemy fire support Commanders
Enemy HQs and location
major troop
concentrations.
 Appendix C
(Refers to Paragraph 91 (c)
of the Study Report on
C4I2SR Systems for the
Indian Army)

THIRD GENERATION (3G) CELLULAR TECHNOLOGY

General

1. 3G - Third Generation mobile telephone networks are the latest

stage in the development of wireless communications technology.
Compared to the existing communication technologies, 3G systems
support much higher data transmission rates and offer increased
capacity, which makes them suitable for high-speed data
applications. Third Generation systems use packet-switching
technology, which is more efficient and faster than the traditional
circuit-switched systems.

2. The benefits
of higher data rates
and greater
bandwidth mean that
3G mobile phones DATA
NETWORKS
can sustain a wide
range of data
services, such as
• Data bank/ intelligence / templates
• Orders / Instructions from Higher HQs
• Reconnaissance & Surveillance Devices

• All inputs available at the Execution level

• Intelligence Inputs
• Other Services, neighbouring formations

• All inputs available at Supervisory level

• Intelligence Inputs, from other Services
• Input to support cogent domain

• Data bank/ intelligence / templates

• Orders / Instructions from Higher HQs
• Reconnaissance & Surveillance Devices

• All inputs available at the Execution level

• Intelligence Inputs
• Other Services, neighbouring formations

• All inputs available at Supervisory level

• Intelligence Inputs, from other Services
• Input to support cogent domain

mobile Internet Voice Image Video + Internet

SUPERVISORY

SUPERVISORY
DIRECTIONAL

DIRECTIONAL
EXECUTION

EXECUTION
LEVEL

LEVEL

LEVEL

LEVEL

LEVEL

LEVEL
• Logstic units
• Combat Support units
• Combat formations / units

• Other Services
• Combat & Support levels
• Execution / Direction levels

• Other Services
• National Assets / platforms
• Supervisory / National level

• Logstic units
• Combat Support units
• Combat formations / units

• Other Services
• Combat & Support levels
• Execution / Direction levels

• Other Services
• National Assets / platforms
• Supervisory / National level

access and
multimedia 3G Only Voice and SMS 3G

applications.
2G 2G
Compared to earlier
cellular phones a 3G handset provides many new features, and the
possibilities are almost limitless, including many popular
applications such as TV streaming, multimedia, videoconferencing,
Web browsing, e-mail, paging, fax, and navigational maps,
including GPS. These applications provide immense scope for quantum
improvement in the C4I2SR Systems, visualized for the Indian Army.
 116

What is Cellular Technology

3. A cellular network is a radio network made up of a number of

radio cells (or just cells) each served by at least one fixed-location
transceiver known as a cell site or base station. These cells cover
different land areas to provide radio coverage over a wider area than the
area of one cell, so that a variable number of portable transceivers can
be used in any one cell and moved through more than one cell during
transmission.

4. To distinguish signals from several different transmitters,

frequency division multiple access (FDMA) and code division multiple
access (CDMA) were developed. With
FDMA, the transmitting and receiving
frequencies used in each cell are different
from the frequencies used in each
neighbouring cell. The transceivers can
select one cell and listen to it. Other
available methods of multiplexing such as
polarization division multiple access
(PDMA) and time division multiple access
(TDMA) cannot be used to separate
signals from one cell to the next since the
effects of both vary with position and this would make signal separation
practically impossible. Time division multiple access, however, is used in
combination with either FDMA or CDMA in a number of systems to give
multiple channels within the coverage area of a single cell.

Multiple Access

Downlink
Handoff
Uplink

Mobile Station Base Station

Distributed transceivers Fixed transceiver
Cells
Different
Frequencies or
Codes
 117

Temporary Cells / Mobile Cells / Cell on Wheels

5. Although cell antennas are normally attached to permanent

structures, cell providers maintain a fleet of temporary cell sites. When
mounted on a trailer, they are called a COW or Cell On Wheels. These
usually include a base station controller and a telescoping tower with
antennas attached. A generator may be included when electrical power
isn't available, and an additional backhaul antenna may be mounted to
link the temporary tower into the network.

6. COWs are often used at the site

of a permanent cell site. Floods, fires,
terrorism, and other disasters may
destroy permanent antennas or base
station controllers. Fast dispatch of
COWs can maintain vital communications
during an emergency. They are also used
in planned outages, such as when an
antenna site is unavailable due to
construction or maintenance. Finally, they are often used to augment
capacity when large numbers of additional cell phone users are expected
such as at large football games etc.

International Standards Certification

7. International Mobile Telecommunications-2000 (IMT-2000),

better known as 3G or 3rd Generation, is a family of standards for mobile
telecommunications defined by the International Telecommunication
Union60, which includes GSM EDGE, UMTS, and CDMA2000 as well as
DECT and WiMAX. Services include wide-area wireless voice
telephone, video calls, and wireless data, all in a mobile
environment. Compared to 2G (currently in wide use in India), 3G
allows simultaneous use of speech and data services and higher
data rates (up to 14.0 Mbit / sec on the downlink and 5.8 Mbit / sec on
the uplink). Thus, 3G networks enable network operators to offer users a
wider range of more advanced services while achieving greater network
capacity through improved spectral efficiency.

8. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) defined the

third generation (3G) of mobile telephony standards – IMT-2000 – to

60
Clint Smith, Daniel Collins. "3G Wireless Networks", page 136. 2000
 118

facilitate growth, increase bandwidth, and support more diverse

applications. For example, GSM (the current most popular cellular phone
standard in India) could deliver not only voice, but also circuit-switched
data at download rates up to 14.4 kbps. But to support mobile multimedia
applications, 3G had to deliver packet-switched data with better spectral
efficiency, at far greater bandwidths.

History of 3G

9. The first pre-commercial 3G network was launched by NTT

DoCoMo in Japan branded FOMA, in May 2001 on a pre-release of W-
CDMA technology61. The first commercial launch of 3G was also by NTT
DoCoMo in Japan on 1 October 2001, although it was initially somewhat
limited in scope62.

10. By December 2007, 3G networks were operating in 40

countries and 154 HSDPA networks were operating in 71 countries,
according to the Global Mobile Suppliers Association (GSA). In Asia,
Europe, Canada and the USA, telecommunication companies use W-
CDMA technology with the support of around 100 terminal designs to
operate 3G mobile networks.

11. China announced in May 2008, that the telecoms sector was
re-organized and three 3G networks would be introduced. China
Unicom would retain its GSM customer base but relinquish its
CDMA2000 customer base, and launch 3G on the globally leading
WCDMA (UMTS) standard. The CDMA2000 customers of China Unicom
would go to China Telecom, which would then launch 3G on the CDMA
1x EV-DO standard. This meant that China would have all three main
cellular technology 3G standards in commercial use. The launch of 3G
occurred on 1 October 2009, to coincide with the 60th Anniversary
of the Founding of the People's Republic of China.

12. 3G was introduced in India in February 2009 when MTNL

introduced the 3G Jadoo Services in Delhi. Facilities like video
streaming applications like “Live TV”, movie downloads etc, high-speed
data download were offered63. This service will also enable customers to

61
The history of UMTS and 3G development". http://www.umtsworld.com/umts/history.htm.
62
World's first 3G launch on 1 October severely restricted (hktdc.com)". http://info.hktdc.
com/imn / 01100401/info14.htm. "broadbandmag.co.uk/3G grinds to a start".
http://www.broadbandmag.co.uk/analysis/3G/3G.html.
63
MTNL New Delhi Press release dated 05 Feb 2009.
 119

see their caller LIVE on screen. Broad configuration of 3G Technology is

explained below:-

Data rates : 3G

13. Data rates have an important bearing on the capability of the

system. ITU has not provided a clear definition of the data rate users
can expect from 3G equipment or providers. Thus users sold 3G service
BASIC STRUCTURE HOW 3G WORKS.
may not be able to point to a standard and say that the rates it specifies

SIP Video
Phones PC Video
Terminals

3G
Network

IP
M E1 - ISUP
S 3G-324M
GATEWAY
C Protocol

Mobile Video
Phone

Video Voice
Streaming Mail
Media Server System

are not being met. While stating that "it is expected that IMT-2000 will
provide higher transmission rates: a minimum data rate of 2 Mbit/s for
stationary or walking users, and 348 kbit/s in a moving vehicle," the ITU
does not actually clearly specify minimum or average rates or what
modes of the interfaces qualify as 3G, so various rates are sold as 3G
intended to meet customers expectations of broadband data.

Security

14. 3G networks offer a greater degree of security than 2G

predecessors. By allowing the UE (User Equipment) to authenticate the
network it is attaching to, the user can be sure the network is the
intended one and not an impersonator. 3G networks use the KASUMI
block crypto instead of the older A5/1 stream cipher. Security resulting
 120

from use of FDMA technology has been discussed in subsequent

sections.

Applications : 3G

15. 3G offers a wide range of applications. These applications are

mainly made possible due to the enhanced data rates as a result of the
2Mbps bandwidth availabilities. Some of the applications are:-

(a) Mobile TV. Due to the high data transfer rate being
offered due to 3G, TV can be viewed on Mobile Phones. For this
have to tie up with a service provider, through which the content can
be accessed. Eg.Apalya for BSNL(India).

(b) Video Conferencing. It is possible to conduct a video

conferencing using the available network, due to the 2 Mbps
bandwidth.

(c) Tele-medicine. his is an extended feature of video

conferencing where a remote person can be given attention by a
doctor located at a distant place.

(d) Location Based Services. These are some services

which can be accessed on the dependence of the service provider.
These include weather updates, live road traffic view, and vehicle
tracking.

(e) Video on Demand. Videos

can be viewed on demand from a
service provider. For providing this
service, the service provider should
have collaborations with content
providers such as Perceptknorigin (in
India). This is again possible due to
high buffering speed possible due to
the 3G network.

CDMA 2000

16. 3G uses CDMA Technology. It is generally accepted that CDMA

is a superior transmission technology, when compared to the old
techniques used in GSM / TDMA. CDMA systems make more efficient
use of the available spectrum, because the CDMA technique enables all
 121

base stations to use the same frequency. In the CDMA system, the data
is split into separate packets, which are then transmitted using packet
switching technology, and the packets are reassembled in the correct
sequence at the receiver end by using the code that is sent with each
packet.

17. The Third Generation of mobile phones is also designed for

global roaming. However there are problems due to the different
standards, and so it is still necessary for phones to be multi-band or
multi-mode for widespread roaming. A 3G phone may have to make use
of existing 2G and 2.5G networks where the 3G service is unavailable.

18. The operating frequencies of many 3G systems will typically use

parts of the radio spectrum in the region of approximately 2GHz (the
IMT-2000 core band), which were not available to operators of 2G
systems, and so are away from the crowded frequency bands currently
being used for 2G and 2.5G networks. UMTS systems are designed to
provide a range of data rates, depending on the user‟s circumstances,
providing up to 144 kbps for moving vehicles, up to 384 kbps for
pedestrians and up to 2 Mbps for indoor or stationary users. In contrast,
the data rates supported by the basic 2G networks were only 9.6 kbps,
such as in GSM, which was inadequate to provide any sophisticated
digital services.

Key features of CDMA2000

19. CDMA2000 builds on the inherent advantages of CDMA. The

numerous advantages are as follows:-
(a) Leading performance: CDMA2000 performance in terms
of data-speeds, voice capacity and latencies continue to
outperform in commercial deployments other comparable
technologies.
(b) Efficient use of spectrum: CDMA2000 technologies offer
the highest voice capacity and data throughput using the least
amount of spectrum, lowering the cost of delivery for operators
and delivering superior customer experience for the end users.
(c) Support for advanced mobile services: CDMA2000
1xEV-DO enables the delivery of a broad range of advanced
services, such as high-performance VoIP, push-to-talk, video
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telephony, multimedia messaging, multicasting and multi-playing

online gaming with richly rendered 3D graphics.
(d) All-IP – CDMA2000 technologies are compatible with IP
and ready to support network convergence. Today, CDMA2000
operators that have deployed IP-based services enjoy more
flexibility and higher bandwidth efficiencies, which translate into
greater control and significant cost savings.
(e) Devices selection: CDMA2000 offers the broadest
selection of devices and has a significant cost advantage
compared to other 3G technologies to meet the diverse market
needs around the world.
(f) Seamless evolution path : CDMA2000 has a solid and
long-term evolution path which is built on the principle of
backward and forward compatibility, in-band migration, and
support of hybrid network configurations.
(g) Flexibility: CDMA2000 systems have been designed for
urban as well as remote rural areas for fixed wireless, wireless
local loop (WLL), limited mobility and full mobilility applications in
multiple spectrum bands, including 450 MHz, 800 MHz, 1700
MHz, 1900Mhz and 2100 MHz.

20. The above results in following superior features:-.

(a) Superior voice clarity.
(b) High-speed broadband data connectivity.
(c) Low end-to-end latency.
(d) Increased voice and data throughput capacity.
(e) Time-to-market performance advantage.
(f) Long-Term, robust and evolutionary migration path with
forward and backward compatibility.
(g) Differentiated value-added services such as voip, ptt,
multicasting, position location, etc.
(h) Flexible network architecture with IP-based networks and
flexible backhaul connectivity.
(i) Application, user and flow-based quality of service (QoS).
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(j) Flexible spectrum allocations with excellent propagation

characteristics.
(k) Robust link budget for extended coverage and increased
data throughputs at the cell edge.
(l) Multi-mode, Multi-band, global roaming.
(m) Improved security and privacy.
(n) Lower total cost of ownership.

The 3G iPhone

21. The iPhone is one of the most popular contemporary tools in

information age. It was first released in 2007 and was one of the most
advanced touch screen phones available. Other companies also
followed, using relatively the same
features to contend with the iPhone.
Recently, iPhone 3G was also
launched, taking the gadget a step
further and making it one of the
niche products available for
consumers all over the world. The
iPhone 3G features a multi touch
screen. This means that one can navigate all the items on the screen via
the slider and fingers. Zoom in and out can be done by simply pressing
with fingertips. The second main advantage is the accelerometer which
has a quick reaction. It has numerous other features which are of value
in military type scenario.

22. The iPhone is also one of

the fastest mobile units, featuring
high speed 3G and Wi-Fi with
facilities like internet, etc. There
is excellent GPS navigation,
because of the bundled GPS
locator. Google Maps is also part
of the collaboration, allowing you
to get easy and simple directions
while on the move.
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Evolution Towards 4G Technology

23. Numerous companies are researching for further extensions to

3G standards, named Long Term Evolution and Ultra Mobile Broadband.
Being based on an all-IP network infrastructure and using advanced
wireless technologies, these specifications already display features
characteristic for IMT-Advanced (4G), the successor of 3G. However,
falling short of the bandwidth requirements for 4G (which is 1 Gbit / s for
stationary and 100 Mbit / s for mobile operation), these standards are
classified as 3.9G or Pre-4G.

24. On December 14, 2009 Telia Sonera (A Scandinavian Cellular

Telephone Company) announced in an official press release that "We
are very proud to be the first operator in the world to offer our customers
4G services". With the launch of their network, initially they are offering
services in Stockholm, Sweden and Oslo, Norway. In India, the process
to introduce 4G Services have commenced in February 201064.

3G Prognosis

25. 3G services have been successfully introduced to consumers the

world over. The extensive usage of the technology has already ensured
its efficacy in numerous diverse fields. Presence of technology in active
public domain has ensured its critical audit and constant
improvement. Though a number of issues are still being debated and
improved, the technology appears to have reached the „take-off‟ point
from where the progress and its exploitation is likely to be fast. Research
in the 4G technologies has opened up frontiers, which enable
progression of 3G beyond its natural obsolescence age. 3G is an
emergent technology with immense potential for up-gradation and
development.

64
―Trai has floated a pre-consultation paper on 4G Spectrum which is already creating a
storm in the telecom sector‖. Shalini Singh, Times of India 11 February 2010, pg 23.