cademic skepticism refers to the skeptical period of ancient Platonism dating from around 266 BC, when

Arcesilaus became head of the Platonic Academy, until around 90 BC, when Antiochus of Ascalon
rejected skepticism, although individual philosophers, such as Favorinus and his teacher Plutarch
continued to defend Academic skepticism after this date. Unlike the existing school of skepticism, the
Pyrrhonists, they maintained that knowledge of things is impossible. Ideas or notions are never true;
nevertheless, there are degrees of probability, and hence degrees of belief, which allow one to act. The
school was characterized by its attacks on the Stoics and on their belief in convincing impressions which
lead to true knowledge. The most important Academic skeptics were Arcesilaus, Carneades, and Philo of
Larissa.

Overview
Greek skepticism, as a distinct school, began with Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360 BCE-c. 270 BCE), with
antecedents in Xenophanes and Democritus. His followers, the Pyrrhonists, maintained that our
theories and our sense impressions were unable to accurately distinguish truth from falsehood;
therefore we must suspend judgment (epoche).[1] They were consistent enough to extend their
doubt even to their own principle of doubt, making their skepticism universal, thus escaping
reproach for basing it upon a fresh dogmatism. Mental imperturbability (ataraxia) was the result
to be attained by cultivating such a frame of mind.[1]

Around 266 BCE, Arcesilaus became head of the Platonic Academy, and adopted skepticism as a
central tenet of Platonism. This skeptical period of ancient Platonism, from Arcesilaus to Philo of
Larissa, became known as the New Academy, although some ancient authors added further
subdivisions, such as a Middle Academy. The Academic Skeptics do not seem to have doubted
the existence of truth in itself, only the capacities for obtaining it.[2] They differed from the
principles of the Pyrrhonists in the practical tendency of their doctrines: while the object of the
Pyrrhonists was the attainment of ataraxia, it seems that the Academics were less overborne than
the Pyrrhonists by the practical issue of their doubts. The attitude maintained by the Academics
contained a negative criticism of the views of others, in particular of the dogmatism of the Stoics.
[1]
But they acknowledged some vestiges of a moral law within, at best but a probable guide, the
possession of which, however, formed the real distinction between the sage and the fool.[2] Slight
as the difference may appear between the positions of the Academic Skeptics and the
Pyrrhonists, a comparison of their lives leads to the conclusion that a practical philosophical
moderation was the characteristic of the Academic Skeptics[2] whereas the objectives of the
Pyrrhonists were more psychological.

Arcesilaus
Up to Arcesilaus, the Platonic Academy accepted the principle of finding a general unity in all
things, by the aid of which a principle of certainty might be found.[3] Arcesilaus, however, broke
new ground by attacking the very possibility of certainty. Socrates had said, "This alone I know:
that I know nothing." But Arcesilaus went farther and denied the possibility of even the Socratic
minimum of certainty: "I cannot know even whether I know or not."[3]
The doctrines of Arcesilaus, which must be gathered from the writings of others,[4] represent an
attack on the Stoic phantasia kataleptike (Criterion) and are based on the skepticism which was
latent in the later writings of Plato.[5] Arcesilaus held that strength of intellectual conviction
cannot be regarded as valid, inasmuch as it is characteristic equally of contradictory convictions.
The uncertainty of sense data applies equally to the conclusions of reason, and therefore man
must be content with probability which is sufficient as a practical guide. "We know nothing, not
even our ignorance"; therefore the wise man will be content with an agnostic attitude.[5]

Carneades
The next stage in Academic skepticism was the moderate skepticism of Carneades, which he said
owed its existence to his opposition to Chrysippus, the Stoic.[3] Carneades is the most important
of the Academic skeptics.[6]

To the Stoic theory of perception, the phantasia kataleptike, by which they expressed a
conviction of certainty arising from impressions so strong as to amount to science, he proposed
the doctrine of acatalepsia, which denied any necessary correspondence between perceptions
and the objects perceived.[3] All our sensations are relative, and acquaint us, not with things as
they are, but only with the impressions that things produce upon us. Experience, he said, clearly
shows that there is no true impression. There is no notion that may not deceive us; it is
impossible to distinguish between false and true impressions; therefore the Stoic phantasia
kataleptike must be given up. There is no phantasia kataleptike ("Criterion") of truth. Carneades
also assailed Stoic theology and physics. In answer to the doctrine of final cause, of design in
nature, he pointed to those things which cause destruction and danger to man, to the evil
committed by men endowed with reason, to the miserable condition of humanity, and to the
misfortunes that assail the good man. There is, he concluded, no evidence for the doctrine of a
divine superintending providence. Even if there were orderly connexion of parts in the universe,
this may have resulted quite naturally. No proof can be advanced to show that this world is
anything but the product of natural forces.[6]

Knowledge being impossible, a wise man should practise epoche (suspension of judgment).[6] He
will not even be sure that he can be sure of nothing. He saved himself, however, from absolute
skepticism by the doctrine of probability, which may serve as a practical guide in life.[3] Ideas or
notions are never true, but only probable; nevertheless, there are degrees of probability, and
hence degrees of belief, leading to action. According to Carneades, an impression may be
probable in itself; probable and uncontradicted (not distracted by synchronous sensations, but
shown to be in harmony with them) when compared with others; probable, uncontradicted, and
thoroughly investigated and confirmed. In the first degree there is a strong persuasion of the
propriety of the impression made; the second and third degrees are produced by comparisons of
the impression with others associated with it, and an analysis of itself.[6] Carneades left no written
works; his opinions seem to have been systematized by his pupil Clitomachus, whose works,
which included one "on suspension of judgment," were made use of by Cicero.[7]
Philo of Larissa
In Philo of Larissa we find a tendency not only to reconcile the internal divergences of the
Academy itself, but also to connect it with parallel systems of thought.[3] In general, his
philosophy was a reaction against the skeptic or agnostic position of the Middle and New
Academy in favor of the dogmatism of Plato.[8] Philo of Larissa endeavored to show that
Carneades was not opposed to Plato, and further that the apparent antagonism between Platonism
and Stoicism was because they were arguing from different points of view. From this syncretism
emerged the eclectic Middle Platonism of Antiochus of Ascalon, the last product of Academic
development.[3]