ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL v.

PET
G.R. No. 191618, June 7, 2011

To foreclose all arguments of petitioner, we reiterate that the establishment of the PET simply constitutionalized what was statutory
before the 1987 Constitution. The experiential context of the PET in our country cannot be denied

FACTS
Petitioner Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal, through a Motion for Reconsideration reiterates his arguments that Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution does not provide for the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and that the PET violates Section 12,
Article VIII of the Constitution. In order to strengthen his position, petitioner cites the concurring opinion of Justice Teresita J.
Leonardo-de Castro in ―Barok‖ C. Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 that the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC)
is a public office which cannot be created by the president, the power to do so being lodged exclusively with Congress. Thus,
petitioner submits that if the President, as head of the Executive Department, cannot create the PTC, the Supreme Court, likewise,
cannot create the PET in the absence of an act of legislature.

ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is Constitutional

HELD: Motion for Reconsideration DENIED.

Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary
implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide
presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.
The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the power
"shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law." Consistent with our presidential system
of government, the function of "dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or
prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable" is apportioned to courts of justice. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution,
judicial power was expanded to include "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." The power was expanded, but it remained
absolute.
It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vicepresidential election contest, it
performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, Justice Jose P. Laurel
enucleated that "it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels." In fact, Angara pointed out that "[t]he Constitution is a definition of the powers of
government." And yet, at that time, the 1935 Constitution did not contain the expanded definition of judicial power found in Article
VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the present Constitution.
With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter's exercise
of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in
the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly
provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the
Supreme Court.
We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were designated. Once
again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial
department, i.e., the Supreme Court. McCulloch v. State of Maryland proclaimed that "[a] power without the means to use it, is a
nullity." The vehicle for the exercise of this power, as intended by the Constitution and specifically mentioned by the Constitutional
Commissioners during the discussions on the grant of power to this Court, is the PET. Thus, a microscopic view, like the petitioner's,
should not constrict an absolute and constitutional grant of judicial power‖

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 83896; Feb. 22, 1991

FACTS:

In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to
limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The
constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the
Constitution which provides:

“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.”

CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase ―unless otherwise provided in this Constitution―, the only exceptions against holding any other
office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a
Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.

HELD:
No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the
Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in
those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an
ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then
called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be
considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitution‘s manifest intent and the people‘s understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is
unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may
hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284
actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the
1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER V. ELMA

G.R. No. 138965, March 5, 2007

FACTS
Elma was appointed as Chairman of the PCGG on 30 October 1998. Thereafter, during his tenure as PCGG Chairman, he
was appointed as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He accepted the second appointment, but waived any remuneration that
he may receive as CPLC.
Petitioner questions Elma's concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC. They contend that the appointments
contravene Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners also maintained that
respondent Elma was holding incompatible offices.
Elma alleged that the strict prohibition against holding multiple positions provided under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution applies only to heads of executive departments, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries; it does not cover other
public officials given the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary.
He also claimed that it is Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution that should be applied in his case. This
provision, according to him, would allow a public officer to hold multiple positions if (1) the law allows the concurrent appointment
of the said official; and (2) the primary functions of either position allows such concurrent appointment. Since there exists a close
relation between the two positions and there is no incompatibility between them, the primary functions of either position
would allow respondent Elma's concurrent appointments to both positions. He further added that the appointment of the CPLC among
incumbent public officials is an accepted practice.

ISSUES
1) Can the PCGG Chairman concurrently hold the position of CPLC?
2) Is the strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution applicable to the PCGG Chairman or to the
CPLC?
3) Does the ruling that the concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional, for being incompatible
offices, render both appointments void?
4) Is there a need to refer the case to the Court en banc?

HELD
1. No. The concurrent appointment to these offices is in violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution,
since these are incompatible offices. An incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC.
The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of various
executive departments and agencies and to review investigations involving heads of executive departments and agencies, as
well as other Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an agency under the Executive Department. Thus, the
actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the review of the CPLC. As CPLC, respondent Elma will be required to give
his legal opinion on his own actions as PCGG Chairman and review any investigation conducted by the Presidential Anti-
Graft Commission, which may involve himself as PCGG Chairman. In such cases, questions on his impartiality will
 inevitably be raised. This is the situation that the law seeks to avoid in imposing the prohibition against holding incompatible
offices.

2. The strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to
the CPLC, as neither of them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary, even if the former may have the same
rank as the latter positions.

Granting that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is applicable to the present case,
the defect in respondent Elma's concurrent appointments to the incompatible offices of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC
would even be magnified when seen through the more stringent requirements imposed by the said constitutional provision.
The said section allows the concurrent holding of positions only when: (1) provided for under the Constitution, such as
Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice-President to become a member of the Cabinet; or (2) the second post is required
by the primary functions of the first appointment and is exercised in an ex-officio capacity [which denotes an act done in an
official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the
office]. Although respondent Elma waived receiving remuneration for the second appointment, the primary functions of the
PCGG Chairman do not require his appointment as CPLC.
Appointment to the position of PCGG Chairman is not required by the primary functions of the CPLC, and vice
versa. The primary functions of the PCGG Chairman involve the recovery of ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family and associates, the investigation of graft and corruption cases assigned to him by
the President, and the adoption of measures to prevent the occurrence of corruption. On the other hand, the primary functions
of the CPLC encompass a different matter, that is, the review and/or drafting of legal orders referred to him by the President.
And while respondent Elma did not receive additional compensation in connection with his position as CPLC, he did not act
as either CPLC or PGCC Chairman in an ex-officio capacity. The fact that a separate appointment had to be made for
respondent Elma to qualify as CPLC negates the premise that he is acting in an ex-officio capacity.
In sum, the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply to respondent Elma since
neither the PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC is a Cabinet secretary, undersecretary, or assistant secretary. Even if this Court
assumes, arguendo, that Section 13, Article VII is applicable to respondent Elma, he still could not be appointed concurrently
to the offices of the PCGG appointments in question are not covered by Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, said
appointments are still prohibited under Section 7, Article IX-B, which covers all appointive and elective officials, due to the
incompatibility between the primary functions of the offices of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC.

3. The ruling that the concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional, for being incompatible
offices, does not render both appointments void. Following the common-law rule on incompatibility of offices, respondent
Elma had, in effect, vacated his first office as PCGG Chairman when he accepted the second office as CPLC.

4. There also is no merit in the respondents‘ motion to refer the case to the Court en banc. What is in question in the present
case is the constitutionality of respondent Elma‘s concurrent appointments, and not the constitutionality of any treaty, law or
agreement. The mere application of constitutional provisions does not require the case to be heard and decided en banc.

ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO

G.R. NOS. 146710-15, MARCH 2, 2001

FACTS
The case basically revolves around the series of events that happened prior and subsequent to the event we know as EDSA II.
During the 1998 elections, Joseph E. Estrada and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo were elected as president and vice-president respectively.
The downfall of the Estrada administration began when For. Gov. Luis Chavit Singson went to the media and released his exposé that
petitioner was part of the Jueteng scandal as having received large sums of money. After this expose, a lot of different groups and
many personalities had asked for the resignation of the petitioner. Some of which are the Catholic Bishops Conference of the
Philippines (CBCP), Sen. Nene Pimentel, Archbishop of Manila, Jaime Cardinal Sin, For. Pres. Fidel Ramos, and For. Pres. Corazon
Aquino who asked petitioner to make the ―supreme self-sacrifice‖. Respondent also resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social
Welfare and Services and also asked petitioner for his resignation. 4 senior economic advisers of the petitioner resigned and then
Speaker Manny Villar, together with 47 representatives, defected from Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.
By November, an impeachment case was to be held as Speaker Manny Villar had transmitted the Articles of Impeachment to
the senate. On November 20, the 21 senators took oath as judges to the impeachment trial with SC CJ Hilario Davide, Jr., presiding.
The impeachment trial was one for the ages. It was a battle royal of well known lawyers. But then came the fateful day, when by the
vote of 11-10, the judges came to a decision to not open the second envelop allegedly containing evidence showing that the petitioner
had a secret bank account under the name ―Jose Velarde‖ containing P3.3 billion. The not opening of the 2 nd envelop resulted to the
people going to the streets and the public prosecutors withdrawing from the trial. On January 19, AFP Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes
marched to EDSA shrine and declared ―on behalf of your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish
to announce that we are withdrawing our support to this government.‖ PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson together with
some Cabinet members made the same announcement.
 June 20 was the day of surrender. At around 12:20 AM, negotiations started for the peaceful transition of power. But at
around 12 noon, respondent took oath as the 14 th president of the Philippines. At 2:30 PM, petitioner and his family left Malacanang.
He issued the following Press Statement:
―20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o‘clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the
Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our
civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in
order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for
service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA‖
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter:
―Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am
unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the
Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA‖
On January 22, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC. The said resolution
confirmed the authority given by the 12 SC justices to the CJ during the oath taking that happened on January 20. Soon, other
countries accepted the respondent as the new president of the Philippines. The House then passed Resolution No. 175 ―expressing the
full support of the House of Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
Philippines.‖ It also approved Resolution No. 176 ―expressing the support of the House of Representatives to the assumption into
office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations and
expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the nation‘s goals under the Constitution.‖

On February 6, respondent recommended Teofisto Guingona to be the vice president. On February 7, the Senate adopted
Resolution 82 which confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona. On the same day, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring
that the impeachment court is functus officio and has been terminated. Several cases were filed against the petitioner which are as
follows: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2)
OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft
and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case
No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption,
bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000 for
malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property, plunder, etc., (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de
Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and
(6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.

A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the
petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as members, viz: Director Andrew
Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order
directing the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer
to the aforementioned complaints against him.

Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a petition for
prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from ―conducting any
further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be
filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted.‖ Thru another counsel, petitioner,
on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment ―confirming petitioner to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring
respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions
of the Constitution.‖ Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6, required the respondents ―to comment
thereon within a non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001.‖ On February 13, the Court ordered the consolidation of GR
Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the respondents‘ comments ―on or before 8:00 a.m. of February 15.‖
 In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and press statement for ―Gag Order‖
on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court resolved:

―(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the President vacant and
that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under pain of being cited for contempt to refrain from
making any comment or discussing in public the merits of the cases at bar while they are still pending decision by the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent Ombudsman from resolving or deciding the
criminal cases pending investigation in his office against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from
news reports that the respondent Ombudsman may immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days
after the hearing held on February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and academic.‖

ISSUES:
1. Do the petitions present a justiciable controversy?
2. Is conviction in the impeachment proceedings a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada? In the
negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, is he immune from criminal prosecution?
3. Should the prosecution of petitioner Estrada be enjoined on the grounds of prejudicial publicity?

HELD:
1. No. The case is legal not political.
A political question has been defined by our Court as ―those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.‖
Respondents allege that the legality of the Arroyo administration should be treated similarly with the Aquino administration.
Respondents propose that the situation of the Arroyo and Aquino administrations are similar. However, the Court finds otherwise. The
Court has made substantial distinctions which are the following:

Aquino Arroyo
Government was a result of a successful revolution Government was a result of a peaceful revolution
In the Freedom constitution, it was stated that the Aquino Arroyo took the oath of the 1987 Constitution. She is
government was instilled directly by the people in defiance discharging the authority of the president under the 1987
of the 1973 Constitution as amended. constitution.

It is a well settled rule that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people power is beyond
judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. But this would not apply as the Court finds
substantial difference between the 2 EDSA Revolutions. It would show that there are differences between the 2 governments set up by
EDSA I and II. This was further explained by the Court by comparing the 2 EDSA Revolutions.

EDSA I EDSA II
Extra-constitutional. Hence, ―Xxx IN DEFIANCE OF Intra-Constitutional. Hence, the oath of the respondent as
THE 1973 CONSTITUTION, AS AMENDED‖—cannot President includes the protection and upholding of the
be subject of judicial review 1987 Constitution.—resignation of the President makes it
subject to judicial review
exercise of the people power of revolution exercise of people power of freedom of speech and
which overthrew the whole government freedom of assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievances which only affected the office of
the President
Political question Legal Question

In this issue, the Court holds that the issue is legal and not political.

2. No. The impeachment proceedings was already aborted. As a non-sitting president, he is not entitled to immunity from
criminal prosecution.
The Court rejects the petitioner‘s argument that before he could be prosecuted, he should be first convicted of
impeachment proceedings. The impeachment proceeding was already aborted because of the walking out of the
prosecutors. This was then formalized by a Senate resolution (Resolution #83) which declared the proceeding functus
officio. According to the debates in the Constitutional Convention, when an impeachment proceeding have become moot
due to the resignation of the President, proper civil and criminal cases may be filed against him.
With regard to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President, the cases filed
against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By
no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the
allege mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the
 President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to
hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. As for civil immunity, it means
immunity from civil damages only covers ―official acts‖.

3. No, there is not enough evidence to warrant the Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the
respondent Ombudsman.

4. Petitioner contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting an investigation of the cases
filed against him for he has already developed a bias against the petitioner. He submits that it is a violation of due
process. There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of
unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases. The British approach the problem with
the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the
right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat. The American approach is different. US courts assume
a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. During
cases like such, the test of actual prejudice shall be applied. The test shows that there must be allegation and proof that
the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. The Court rules
that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by
the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.
According to the records, it was the petitioner who assailed the biasness of the Ombudsman. The petitioner alleges
that there were news reports which said that the Ombudsman had already prejudged the cases against him. The Court
rules that the evidence presented is insufficient. The Court also cannot adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of
petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. Investigating prosecutors
should not be treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases
against the petitioner and the latter believes that the finding of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has
the remedy of assailing it before the proper court.

ESTRADA VS. ARROYO

G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001

Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was
elected Vice-President. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his
popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, accused the petitioner,
his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expose‘ immediately ignited reactions of rage. On
November 13, 2000, HouseSpeaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of
all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened the impeachment
trial of the petitioner. On January 16, 2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against theopening of the second envelope
which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank accountunder the name ―Jose Velarde.‖
The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the PNP
withdrew their support to the Estrada government. Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistantsecretaries and bureau chiefs
resigned from their posts.

On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the
Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press statement that he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in
order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on the same day, he signed a letter stating that he was
transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and
the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate
President Pimentel on the same day.

After his fall from the power, the petitioner‘s legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the
Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President
(2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President

Held:
Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability.

Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a valid resignation, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled
by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be
written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the cases at bar, the
facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before leaving Malacanang Palace. Consequently, whether or
not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after Jan. 20, 2001 or by the totality of
prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. The Court had an
authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner provided by the diary of Executive Sec. Angara serialized in the Phil. Daily
Inquirer. During the first stage of negotiation between Estrada and the opposition, the topic was already about a peaceful and orderly
transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied. During the second round of negotiation, the resignation of the
petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties
during and after the transition period. The Court held that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his
leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as
President of the Republic, but with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the
presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due
to any kind of inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his
gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come
ahead in the same service of the country; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the
presidency, and hence is a President on leave. The inability claim is contained in the Jan. 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent to Senate
Pres. Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella. Despite said letter, the House of Representatives passed a resolution supporting the
assumption into office by Arroyo as President. The Senate also passed a resolution confirming the nomination of Guingona as Vice-
President. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the
premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner‘s claim of inability. The
Court cannot pass upon petitioner‘s claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question is political in
nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided by the Court without
transgressing the principle of separation of powers.

BIRAOGO VS PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

Facts:
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator
Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang
mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good
senator to the presidency.
The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his
capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress
under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to
appropriate funds therefor.
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C.
Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of
the House of Representatives.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).

Issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and question Executive Order No. 1;
2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create
and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and
5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.

Held:

Legal Standing of the Petitioners

The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo‘s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to
justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court
in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not
only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of all. Undoubtedly, the Filipino people
are more than interested to know the status of the President‘s first effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court
takes cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but
because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance
to society.

Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission

The Chief Executive‘s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally
granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all
executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is
sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the
former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.

Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate

The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court in Cariño v.
Commission on Human Rights. Thus:
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To
trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the
taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial
or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To finally determine‖. Synonymous
with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn.
x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."
Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness.
Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at
best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or
not to reject the recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be aided by the
reports of the PTC for possible indictments for violations of graft laws.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does
not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object
makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility." Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission must also cover
reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo.
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the
departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal
protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause.
The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft
and corruption during the previous administration" only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and
manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order.

Decision
The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives of the legislature and the executive department,
is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of
violating fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this issue has been addressed by the Court, but
it seems that the present political situation calls for it to once again explain the legal basis of its action lest it continually be accused of
being a hindrance to the nation‘s thrust to progress.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it
is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the provisions of Executive
Order No. 1.

DADOLE VS COA
G.R. No. 125350 December 3 2002

FACTS:
Acting on the DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 55, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowances to RTC and
MTC Judges, in excess of the amount (maximum of P1000 and P700 in provinces and cities and municipalities, respectively)
authorized by said circular. The additional monthly allowances of the judges shall be reduced to P1000 each. They were also asked to
reimbursed the amount they received in excess of P1000 from the last six months.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Local Budget Circular No. 55 void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the President.

RULING:
Yes. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains
subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the President. Sec 4 Art X of 1987 Constitution: "The
President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. ―The said provision has been interpreted to
exclude the power of control.

The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos of the President. As such, they are subject to
the power of control of the President; he will see to it that the local governments or their officials were performing their duties as
provided by the Constitution and by statutes, at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions
changed, suspended or reversed. They are subject to the President's supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised
within the sphere of their legitimate powers. The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a LGU if he or she finds
that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers over LGUs.

DENR vs. DENR Employees

G.R. No. 149724
FACTS:
DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum order issued by the Regional Exec. Director of
DENR, directing the immediate transfer of the DENR 12 Regional Offices from Cotabato to Koronadal City. The memorandum was
issued pursuant to DENR Executive Order issued by the DENR Secretary.

Issue: Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region 12 Office.

RULING:
The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. It is corollary to the
control power of the President as provided for under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The President shall have control of all
the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional
Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is
presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.

GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS MILTON SPRINGER

50 Phil 259 – Law on Public Officers – Power to Appoint is Essentially Executive

Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine Congress. The law created it (Act
No. 2822) provides that: ―The voting power … shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the
President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.‖
In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which divested the voting rights of the Senate
President and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized that the voting right should be solely lodged in the Governor-General
who is the head of the government (President at that time was considered the head of state but does not manage government affairs). A
copy of the said EO was furnished to the Senate President and the House Speaker.
However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well as the House Speaker, notwithstanding
EO No. 37 and the objection of the Governor-General, still elected Milton Springer and four others as Board of Directors of NCC.
Thereafter, a quo warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was filed against Springer et al questioning the validity of their
election into the Board of NCC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate President as well as the House Speaker can validly elect the Board Members of NCC.

HELD:
No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The Supreme Court emphasized that
the legislature creates the public office but it has nothing to do with designating the persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to a
public office is essentially executive. The NCC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It was created by Congress. To
extend the power of Congress into allowing it, through the Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is
already an invasion of executive powers. The Supreme Court however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the
legislature may appoint persons to fill public office. Such exception can be found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to
fill offices within the legislative branch – this exception is allowable because it does not weaken the executive branch.
 MATIBAG vs. BENIPAYO
G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002

Facts:
Herein petitioner Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en banc as ―Acting Director IV‖ of the EID and was reappointed
twice for the same position in a temporary capacity. Meanwhile, then PGMA also made appointments, ad interim, of herein
respondents Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners, respectively. Their appointments were
renewed thrice by PGMA, the last one during the pendency of the case, all due to the failure of the Commission of Appointments to
act upon the confirmation of their appointments.
Respondent Benipayo, acting on his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, issued a memorandum removing petitioner as Acting
Director IV and reassigning her to the Law Department. Petitioner requested for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, petitioner filed
the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of herein respondents, claiming that their ad
interim appointments violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on
temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members.

Issue:
(1) Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were prohibited under the Constitution
(2) Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were temporary in character

Ruling: NO.
(1) While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC ―shall be independent‖, this provision should be harmonized with
the President‘s power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission
on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the President‘s power to
make ad interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning and effect to every provision of
the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution. The original draft of Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution – on the nomination of officers subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments – did not provide for ad
interim appointments. The original intention of the framers of the Constitution was to do away with ad interim appointments because
the plan was for Congress to remain in session throughout the year except for a brief 30-day compulsory recess. However, because of
the need to avoid disruptions in essential government services, the framers of the Constitution thought it wise to reinstate the
provisions of the 1935 Constitution on ad interim appointments. Clearly, the reinstatement in the present Constitution of the ad
interim appointing power of the President was for the purpose of avoiding interruptions in vital government services that otherwise
would result from prolonged vacancies in government offices, including the three constitutional commissions.
Evidently, the exercise by the President in the instant case of her constitutional power to make ad interim appointments
prevented the occurrence of the very evil sought to be avoided by the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.
This power to make ad interim appointments is lodged in the President to be exercised by her in her sound judgment. Under the
second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, the President can choose either of two modes in appointing officials
who are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. First, while Congress is in session, the President may nominate
the prospective appointee, and pending consent of the Commission on Appointments, the nominee cannot qualify and assume office.
Second, during the recess of Congress, the President may extend an ad interim appointment which allows the appointee to
immediately qualify and assume office. Whether the President chooses to nominate the prospective appointee or extend an ad
interim appointment is a matter within the prerogative of the President because the Constitution grants her that power. This Court
cannot inquire into the propriety of the choice made by the President in the exercise of her constitutional power, absent grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on her part, which has not been shown in the instant case.
In fine, we rule that the ad interim appointments extended by the President to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC
Chairman and Commissioners, respectively, do not constitute temporary or acting appointments prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article
IX-C of the Constitution.
(2) An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in
character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.
The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides as follows:
―The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.‖
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can no
longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President.
While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by law, an appointment or designation in a
temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or acting appointee
does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the
President from making to the three independent constitutional commissions, including the COMELEC.
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject
only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments
during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. The ad interim appointments
of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of
Congress, to make appointments that take effect immediately.

RUFINO VS. ENDRIGA

GR No 139554, July 21, 2006

MAIN POINT:
Appointing authority may be given to other officials than the President provided the appointment is in a rank lower than the
appointing official. (ARTICLE 7, SECTION 16: APPOINTING POWER CAN BE VESTED IN OTHER OFFICIALS)

FACTS:
Two groups of appointed members of the Board of Trustees of CCP are contesting each other‘s appointment. The Endriga
group, sitting as current members, was appointed by then-President Ramos and is assailing the appointment of the Rufino group,
replacing all 7 members of the Endriga group, by then-President Estrada. Endriga group avers that the appointment into the Board of
the Rufino group transgressed PD 15 – creation of Board of Trustees of CCP. As stated in PD 15, specifically Section 6, appointment
into the Board shall only be made by a majority vote of the trustees; presidential appointments can only be made when the Board is
entirely vacant to uphold the CCP‘s charter of independence from pressure or politics. Meanwhile, Rufino group stands by their
appointment since the provision on appointments stated in Section 6, PD 15 is violative of Section 16, Article 7 of the Constitution.
The Board cannot invoke the charter of autonomy to extend to appointment of its members.

ISSUE: Whether or not PD 15, Section 6 allowing appointments made by trustees of their fellow members is constitutional
HELD:
No, PD 15, Section 6 allowing appointments of members by the trustees themselves is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. While it is
stated that appointing powers may be delegated by the President, such power is limited in scope to include only ranks lower than the
appointing authority. In the case, an appointment of a member made by a fellow member transgresses Article 7, Section 16 (1) since
both positions are equal in nature. CCP cannot invoke autonomy prescribed in its charter as an exemption from the limitation of
delegative appointing power because such invocation puts CCP outside the control of the President.

ARTURO DE CASTRO vs. JBC

G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

FACTS:
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential
elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice
Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that
―vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof‖ from a ―list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial
and Bar Council for every vacancy.‖ Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution
prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of
Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC ―automatically considered‖ for the position of Chief Justice the five most
senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B.
Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section
15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme
Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers
intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which
explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and
that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President‘s power to appoint members of the
Supreme Court to ensure its independence from ―political vicissitudes‖ and its ―insulation from political pressures,‖ such as stringent
qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme
Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there being an insistence
from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010).
Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section
4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court
(be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.

ISSUE:
Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.

HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a
Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification
was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President‘s or Acting President‘s term does not refer to the Members of
the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President to
appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that
Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must
be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts and kept subservient to
the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14
and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article
VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

IBP VS. ZAMORA

G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP
Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP
in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime
campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved.
The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the President‘s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial
review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

HELD:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily
exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the
factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President‘s action to
call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law
and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped
together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway
and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the
curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and
review by the Court.
 In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of
calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President‘s decision is totally bereft of factual basis.
The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no
justification for calling out the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is
―militarized‖ in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the
civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The
local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP.

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The
real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the
Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the
deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

LACSON VS. PEREZ

357 SCRA 756 G.R. No. 147780. May 10, 2001
FACTS:
President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as well as General Order No. 1
ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of
the ―rebellion‖ were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an application
for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38
and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the
information against them was filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved. They also contend that
they are allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that hold departure orders were issued against
them.

ISSUE: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and hold departure orders allegedly effected
by the same.

HELD:
President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly the instant petition has been rendered
moot and academic. Respondents have declared that the Justice Department and the police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants
of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so
warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioner‘s prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at
this time because an individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, providing for
preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing for the period in which a warrantlessly arrested person
must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such may be penalized for the delay of the
same. If the detention should have no legal ground, the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to
claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure
orders, nor were they expressing any intention to leave the country in the near future. To declare the hold departure orders null and
void ab initio must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners‘ prayer for relief regarding their alleged
impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no complaints have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ
of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not subjected to.

Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents,
representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial
warrants for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang.

SANLAKAS vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:
Armed with high-powered ammunition and explosives, some three hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City in the wee hours of July 27, 2003. Bewailing the
corruption in the AFP, the soldiers demanded, among other things, the resignation of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the
Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP).

In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued later in the day Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, both
declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.
PROCLAMATION NO. 427-DECLARING A STATE OF REBELLION – WHEREAS, under Section 18, Article VII of the present
Constitution, whenever it becomes necessary, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, may
call out such Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.

GENERAL ORDER NO. 4-DIRECTING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE TO SUPPRESS REBELLION-NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested
in me by the Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the
Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation No. 427 dated July 27, 2003, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Philippine National Police to suppress and quell the rebellion. I hereby direct the Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Chief of the Philippine National Police and the officers and men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and quell the rebellion with
due regard to constitutional rights.

Petitioners Contend that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not authorize the declaration of a state of rebellion. They
contend that the declaration is a constitutional anomaly that confuses, confounds and misleads because very zealous public officers,
acting pursuant to such proclamation or general order, are liable to violate the constitutional right of private citizens. Petitioners also
submit that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the
President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the
presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the
President.

ISSUE:
Whether or not proclamation 427 and General Order no. 4 was within the power of the President vested upon her the by the
Constitution.

RULING:
It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling out power the Constitution does not require the President to make a declaration
of a state of rebellion. Section 18, Article VII provides: Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days,
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight
hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person
or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of
the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article
VII does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not only
with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers.

The court cited The [1935] Philippine [C]onstitution which establishes the three departments of the government in this manner: The
legislative power shall be vested in a Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. The
executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines. The judicial powers shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such inferior courts as may be provided by law. These provisions not only establish a separation of powers byactual division but also
confer plenary legislative, executive, and judicial powers. For as the Supreme Court of the Philippines pointed out in Ocampo v.
Cabangis, a grant of legislative power means a grant of all the legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all
the judicial power which may be exercised under the government. If this is true of the legislative power which is exercised by two
chambers with a combined membership [at that time] of more than 120 and of the judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of
courts, it can equally if not more appropriately apply to the executive power which is vested in one official the president. He
personifies the executive branch. There is a unity in the executive branch absent from the two other branches of government. The
president is not the chief of many executives. He is the executive. His direction of the executive branch can be more immediate and
direct than the United States president because he is given by express provision of the constitution control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices.

Unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her
duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on Executive
Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution.

The President‘s authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time,
draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief Powers. Indeed, as the Solicitor General accurately points out, statutory authority for
such a declaration may be found in Section 4, Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Book III (Office of the President) of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, which states: SEC. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend,
shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.
It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the
exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President
acted without factual basis.

The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of
the report requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts in the theater of war
or that military authorities have taken over the functions of civil government. There is no allegation of curtailment of civil or political
rights. There is no indication that the President has exercised judicial and legislative powers. In short, there is no illustration that the
President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law powers.

Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of emergency powers, which exercise depends
upon a grant of Congress pursuant to Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution: Sec. 23. (1) .(2) In times of war or other national
emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe,
to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President
has attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The President, in
declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as
opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.DISMISSED.

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, et al vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,

AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, et al.
G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006
FACTS:
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the
president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented
by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was issued declaring a state of national emergency and aimed to suppress lawlessness
and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.

Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and
other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf
David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.

Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-
GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day,
Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his
actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.

In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition
Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for
such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the
emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP
1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become
moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is
within the president‘s calling out power, take care power and take over power.

ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

RULING: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because
there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC
ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the
following way:

Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration

The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor
General‘s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with
supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo
D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders.
There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance
between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the
Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the
incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.

Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‗on their faces‘ statutes in free speech cases.
The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‗freedom of speech‘ cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not
primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that ‗reflects legitimate state
interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.‘ Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are considered ‗harmful‘ and ‗constitutionally unprotected conduct.‘ Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only ‗spoken words‘ and again, that ‗overbreadth claims,
if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct.‘ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly
subject to state regulation.

Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine

On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the President‘s ‗calling-out‘ power as a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‗this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The
SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‗sequence‘ of
graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that ‗whenever
it becomes necessary,‘ the President may call the armed forces ‗to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.‘ And
such criterion has been met.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine

Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president
declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power
to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause ‗to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.‘ The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power
that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate ‗decrees.‘ Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of
the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that ‗[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.‘ To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify GMA‘[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only ―take care‖ of the carrying out
of laws but cannot create or enact laws.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine

The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any
authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities
but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but her
exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority
from Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration

The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of
the president by the president.
WHEREFORE, the Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce
laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In
addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution
is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest without prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e.
whatever is necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence. Considering that ―acts of
terrorism‖ have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

PHILIP SIGFRID FORTUN V. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL.,

G.R. No. 190293

I. THE FACTS
On November 23, 2009, heavily armed men believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family of Maguindanao gunned down and
buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians. In response to this carnage, President Arroyo issued on November 24, 2009 PP 1946
declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.
On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued PP 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in Maguindanao except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. On December 6, 2009, President
Arroyo submitted her report to Congress. On December 9, 2009, Congress convened in joint session to review the validity of the
President‘s action. But two days later, or on December 12, 2009, before Congress could act, the President issued PP 1963, lifting
martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

II. THE ISSUES

Did the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the [privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao, render the issues
moot and academic?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions on the ground that they have become MOOT and ACADEMIC.]
YES, the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the [privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao, rendered the
issues moot and academic
Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments of the government dictate that the Court should be cautious in entertaining
actions that assail the constitutionality of the acts of the Executive or the Legislative department. The issue of constitutionality, said
the Court in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, must be the very issue of the case, that the resolution of such issue is
unavoidable.
The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable for two reasons:

One. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus before the joint houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the same. xxx.
Under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after
the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of
the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have.
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review
powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through
such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the President‘s proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a
justiciable one in the hands of the Court.
Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could
act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of
martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any
justiciable controversy.

Two. Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in just eight days, they have not been meaningfully implemented. The military did not take over the operation and control of
local government units in Maguindanao. The President did not issue any law or decree affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily
be enacted by Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported. Those who were arrested during the period were either
released or promptly charged in court. Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court respecting arrests made in
those eight days. The point is that the President intended by her action to address an uprising in a relatively small and sparsely
populated province. In her judgment, the rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a determined and amply
armed government presence.
In a real sense, the proclamation and the suspension never took off. The Congress itself adjourned without touching the
matter, it having become moot and academic.
 PIMENTEL VS ERMITA
G.R. No. 158088
July 6, 2005

This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of
Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for
its concurrence in accordance with Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over
persons for the most serious crimes of international concern and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. Its
jurisdiction covers the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression as defined in the Statute.
The Philippines is one of its signatories. Its provisions, however, require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of
the signatory states.

FACTS
Petitioners filed the instant petition to compel the respondents the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of
Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed text of the treaty to the Senate of the Philippines for ratification.
It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and international law, is a function of the
Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive department to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to
exercise its discretion with respect to ratification of treaties. Moreover, petitioners submit that the Philippines has a ministerial duty to
ratify the Rome Statute under treaty law and customary international law. Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties enjoining the states to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when they have signed the
treaty prior to ratification unless they have made their intention clear not to become parties to the treaty.
On the substantive issue raised by petitioners, respondents argue that the executive department has no duty to transmit the Rome
Statute to the Senate for concurrence.

ISSUE
The core issue in this petition for mandamus is whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have
a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the
United Nations even without the signature of the President.

RULING
We rule in the negative.
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external
relations and is the country‘s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the
country‘s mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, in the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to
negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides limitation to
his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him.
Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective
unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to provide a check on the
executive in the field of foreign relations. By requiring the concurrence of the legislature in the treaties entered into by the President,
the Constitution ensures a healthy system of checks and balance necessary in the nation‘s pursuit of political maturity and growth.
Petitioners arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative with ratification. It should be
underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making process. As
earlier discussed, the signature is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of
the parties. It is usually performed by the states authorized representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is
the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative. It is generally held to
be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government. Thus, Executive Order No. 459 issued by President
Fidel V. Ramos on November 25, 1997 provides the guidelines in the negotiation of international agreements and its ratification. It
mandates that after the treaty has been signed by the Philippine representative, the same shall be transmitted to the Department of
Foreign Affairs. The Department of Foreign Affairs shall then prepare the ratification papers and forward the signed copy of the treaty
to the President for ratification. After the President has ratified the treaty, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall submit the same to
the Senate for concurrence. Upon receipt of the concurrence of the Senate, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall comply with the
provisions of the treaty to render it effective. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 459 reads:
Petitioners submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and international law to ratify the treaty which it has signed
is without basis. The signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the treaty. It is the ratification that binds the state to the
provisions thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute itself requires that the signature of the representatives of the states be subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. Ratification is the act by which the provisions of a treaty are formally
confirmed and approved by a State. By ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses its willingness to be bound by the
provisions of such treaty. After the treaty is signed by the states representative, the President, being accountable to the people, is
burdened with the responsibility and the duty to carefully study the contents of the treaty and ensure that they are not inimical to the
interest of the state and its people. Thus, the President has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine
representative whether or not to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not contemplate to defeat or
even restrain this power of the head of states. If that were so, the requirement of ratification of treaties would be pointless and futile. It
has been held that a state has no legal or even moral duty to ratify a treaty which has been signed by its plenipotentiaries. There is no
legal obligation to ratify a treaty, but it goes without saying that the refusal must be based on substantial grounds and not on
superficial or whimsical reasons. Otherwise, the other state would be justified in taking offense.
It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of
the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for
its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step
that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this
Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his
official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to
compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.
The petition is DISMISSED.

LIM vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002
FACTS:
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America
started arriving in Mindanao to take partin "Balikatan 02-1‖ on January 2002. The Balikatan 02-1 exercises involves the simulation of
joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the
United States in 1951. The exercise is rooted from the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in
reaction to the 3 commercial aircrafts hijacking that smashed into twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and the
Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. allegedly by the al-Qaeda headed by the Osama bin Laden that occurred on September 11,
2001. Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking
the constitutionality of the joint exercise. Partylists Sanlakas and Partido Ng Manggagawa as residents of Zamboanga and Sulu
directly affected by the operations filed a petition-in-intervention.
The Solicitor General commented the prematurity of the action as it is based only on a fear of future violation of the Terms of
Reference and impropriety of availing of certiorari to ascertain a question of fact specifically interpretation of the VFA whether it
covers "Balikatan 02-1‖ and no question of constitutionality is involved. Moreover, there is lack of locus standi since it does not
involve tax spending and there is no proof of direct personal injury.

ISSUE: W/N the petition and the petition-in-intervention should prosper.

HELD: NO. Petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a new petition
sufficient in form and substance in the proper Regional Trial Court - Supreme Court is not a trier of facts

Doctrine of Importance to the Public.

Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987
Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of
procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition.
Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question based on the doctrine of separation of powers, which
enjoins upon the department of the government a becoming respect for each other's act, this Court nevertheless resolves to take
cognizance of the instant petition.

Interpretation of Treaty
The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in "activities," the exact meaning of which was left
undefined. The expression is ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of undertakings subject only to the approval of the Philippine
government. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States personnel must "abstain
from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity." All other activities, in
other words, are fair game. To aid in this, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31 SECTION 3 and Article 32
contains provisos governing interpretations of international agreements. It is clear from the foregoing that the cardinal rule of
interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is presumed to verbalize the parties' intentions. The Convention likewise
dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context of the treaty, as well as other
elements, may be taken into account alongside the aforesaid context. According to Professor Briggs, writer on the Convention, the
distinction between the general rule of interpretation and the supplementary means of interpretation is intended rather to ensure that
the supplementary means do not constitute an alternative, autonomous method of interpretation divorced from the general rule. The
meaning of the word ―activities" was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. Thus, the VFA
gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the
conclusion that combat-related activities -as opposed to combat itself -such as the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed
authorized. The Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of section I stipulates that US exercise participants may not
engage in combat "except in self-defense." The indirect violation is actually petitioners' worry, that in reality, "Balikatan 02-1" is
actually a war principally conducted by the United States government, and that the provision on self-defense serves only as
camouflage to conceal the true nature of the exercise. A clear pronouncement on this matter thereby becomes crucial. In our
considered opinion, neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign troops to engage in an offensive war on Philippine territory. Under
the salutary proscription stated in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting
Forces Agreement, as in all other treaties and international agreements to which the Philippines is a party, must be read in the context
of the 1987 Constitution especially Sec. 2, 7 and 8 of Article 2: Declaration of Principles and State Policies in this case. The
Constitution also regulates the foreign relations powers of the Chief Executive when it provides that "[n]o treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Even more
pointedly Sec. 25 on Transitory Provisions which shows antipathy towards foreign military presence in the country, or of foreign
influence in general. Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry into the Philippines only by way of direct exception. International Law
vs. Fundamental Law and Municipal Laws Conflict arises then between the fundamental law and our obligations arising from
international agreements. Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: ―Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the law
of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere.
Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to
national legislation.‖ From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over municipal law pursuant to the principle
of pacta sunt servanda. Hence, "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith."
Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed to "invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."
Our Constitution espouses the opposing view as stated in section 5 of Article VIII: ―The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers: xxx (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and order of lower courts in: (A) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.‖ Ichong v. Hernandez:
―provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, or that it is subject to the police power
of the State‖ Gonzales v. Hechanova: ―our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the
fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.‖ The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are
prohibited / from engaging in an offensive war on Philippine territory.

BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA

G.R. No. 138570; October 10, 2000

FACTS:
The Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951, To further strengthen their defense
and security relationship. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces,
public vessels, and aircraft.
On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in
effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines.
On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA).This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter,
President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas
Hubbard.
On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6,
1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the
Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners – as legislators, non-governmental organizations, citizens and taxpayers – assail the
constitutionality of the VFA and impute to herein respondent grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.
Petitioner contends, under the provision cited, the ―foreign military bases, troops, or facilities‖ may be allowed in the Philippines
unless the following conditions are sufficiently met: a) it must be a treaty, b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and c) recognized as such by the
other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires for such treaty to be valid and
effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the senate.

ISSUES:
Issue 1: Do the Petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of the
VFA? No.
Issue 2: Is the VFA governed by section 21, Art. VII, or section 25, Art. XVIII of the Constitution?
Issue 3: Was Sec 25 Art XVIII's requisites satisfied to make the VFA effective?
RULING:
1. NO. Petitioners Bayan Muna, etc. have no standing. A party bringing a suit challenging the Constitutionality of a law must show
not only that the law is invalid, but that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. Petitioners have failed to show that they are in any danger
of direct injury as a result of the VFA.
As taxpayers, they have failed to establish that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. A
taxpayer's suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from
taxation. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned
statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public. Clearly, inasmuch as
no public funds raised by taxation are involved in this case, and in the absence of any allegation by petitioners that public funds are
being misspent or illegally expended, petitioners, as taxpayers, have no legal standing to assail the legality of the VFA.
Similarly, the petitioner-legislators (Tanada, Arroyo, etc.) do not possess the requisite locus standi to sue. In the absence of a clear
showing of any direct injury to their person or to the institution to which they belong, they cannot sue. The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) is also stripped of standing in these cases. The IBP lacks the legal capacity to bring this suit in the absence of a
board resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing its National President to commence the present action.

2. Issue 2: Is the VFA governed by section 21, Art. VII, or section 25, Art. XVIII of the Constitution?
Section 25, Art XVIII, not section 21, Art. VII, applies, as the VFA involves the presence of foreign military troops in the
Philippines.
The Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties or international agreements.
Section 21, Article VII reads: ―[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate.‖
Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:‖[a]fter the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by
the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.‖
Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in general, in which case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds
(2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is required to make the treaty valid and binding to the Philippines. This provision lays down the
general rule on treaties. All treaties, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the
concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective. In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties
which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of
the Senate is only one of the requisites to render compliance with the constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement
binding on the Philippines. Sec 25 further requires that ―foreign military bases, troops, or facilities‖ may be allowed in the Philippines
only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that
purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other contracting state.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of US troops visiting the Philippines. It provides for the
guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the US and RP government in the matter of
criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, import and export of equipment, materials and supplies. Undoubtedly, Section
25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the
instant case. To a certain extent, however, the provisions of Section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to determining
the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate.
It is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere transient agreements for the reason that there is no
permanent placing of structure for the establishment of a military base. The Constitution makes no distinction between ―transient‖ and
―permanent‖. We find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed
permanently in the Philippines. When no distinction is made by law; the Court should not distinguish. We do not subscribe to the
argument that Section 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops and facilities, are
involved in the VFA. The proscription covers ―foreign military bases, troops, or facilities.‖ Stated differently, this prohibition is not
limited to the entry of troops and facilities without any foreign bases being established. The clause does not refer to ―foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities‖ collectively but treats them as separate and independent subjects, such that three different situations are
contemplated — a military treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities —
any of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII.

3. Issue 3: Was Sec 25 Art XVIII's requisites satisfied to make the VFA effective?
YES
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are
sufficiently met:
(a) it must be under a treaty;
(b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by
the people in a national referendum; and
(c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through
Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the Constitution, as there were at least 16 Senators that concurred.
As to condition (c), the Court held that the phrase ―recognized as a treaty‖ means that the other contracting party accepts or
acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the US to submit the VFA to the US Senate for concurrence pursuant to its
Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to
be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
The records reveal that the US Government, through Ambassador Hubbard, has stated that the US has fully committed to living up to
the terms of the VFA. For as long as the US accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its
treaty obligations, there is indeed compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
Worth stressing too, is that the ratification by the President of the VFA, and the concurrence of the Senate, should be taken as a clear
and unequivocal expression of our nation's consent to be bound by said treaty, with the concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and
responsibilities embodied thereunder. Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state,
through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. A State may provide in its domestic legislation the process of
ratification of a treaty. In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the
legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
With the ratification of the VFA it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under principles of international law (pacta
sunt servanda), to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II declares that the Philippines adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION

FACTS:
An extradition treaty between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. was ratified by the
Senate.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the
United States. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice
Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment
on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. The request was denied by the Secretary of Justice for the
consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which states that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the
United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.
In the Court‘s ruling dated January 18, 2000, the Secretary was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition
request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.
However, on February 3, 2000, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration assailing the decision of the Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the extradition process.

RULING:
No, private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
First. Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069, which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty, provides the time when an extraditee
shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the petition for
extradition in the extradition court. There is no provision in the RP-US Extradition Treaty and in P.D. No. 1069 which gives an
extraditee the right to demand from the petitioner Secretary of Justice copies of the extradition request from the US government and
its supporting documents and to comment thereon while the request is still undergoing evaluation.
Second. All treaties, including the RP-US Extradition Treaty, should be interpreted in light of their intent. It ought to follow
that the RP-US Extradition Treaty calls for an interpretation that will minimize if not prevent the escape of extraditees from the long
arm of the law and expedite their trial. The fear of the petitioner Secretary of Justice that the demanded notice is equivalent to a notice
to flee must be deeply rooted on the experience of the executive branch of our government. As it comes from the branch of our
government in charge of the faithful execution of our laws, it deserves the careful consideration of this Court.
Third. An equally compelling factor to consider is the understanding of the parties themselves to the RP-US Extradition
Treaty as well as the general interpretation of the issue in question by other countries with similar treaties with the Philippines. The
rule is recognized that while courts have the power to interpret treaties, the meaning given them by the departments of government
particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is accorded great weight. The executive department of government, thru
the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), has steadfastly maintained that the RP-US Extradition
Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 do not grant the private respondent a right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of an extradition
process. This understanding of the treaty is shared by the US government, the other party to the treaty and also by other countries with
similar extradition treaties with the Philippines.
Fourth. An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights
of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of the
guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence,
as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an
extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation. As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in
character and the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in
the latter do not necessarily apply to the former.
Fifth. With regards to the threat on private respondent‘s liberty, it is merely imaginary and hypothetical since the US has not
yet requested for his provisional arrest, although it is provided under PD 1069 that the requesting party can and since the extradition
process is still in the evaluation stage of pertinent documents, there is no certainty that a petition for extradition will be filed in the
appropriate extradition court.
Sixth. Private respondent‘s plea to due process, however, collides with important state interests which cannot also be ignored
for they serve the interest of the greater majority. The clash of rights demands a delicate balancing of interests approach which is a
"fundamental postulate of constitutional law." The approach requires that we "take conscious and detailed consideration of the
interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation." These interests usually consist in the exercise by an
individual of his basic freedoms on the one hand, and the government‘s promotion of fundamental public interest or policy objectives
on the other.
Considering that in the case at bar, the extradition proceeding is only at its evaluation stage, the nature of the right being
claimed by the private respondent is nebulous and the degree of prejudice he will allegedly suffer is weak, we accord greater weight to
the interests espoused by the government thru the petitioner Secretary of Justice. Under our constitutional scheme, executive power is
vested in the President of the Philippines which includes, among others, the power to enter into treaties or international agreements.
The task of safeguarding that these treaties are duly honored devolves upon the executive department which has the competence and
authority to so act in the international arena. The executive department is aptly accorded deference on matters of foreign relations
considering the President‘s most comprehensive and most confidential information about the international scene of which he is
regularly briefed by our diplomatic and consular officials. The deference given to the executive department is dictated by the principle
of separation of powers. This principle is one of the cornerstones of a democratic government. It cannot be eroded without
endangering our government.
In sum, the Court ruled that the temporary hold on private respondent's privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on
his right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide to resist the request for his extradition to
the United States. There is no denial of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.

xi. EXECUTIVE IMMUNITY

Beltran vs. Makasiar

Facts: Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran. Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate
presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit". He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of
the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the
trial court's jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness
stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury. Beltran also contends that he could not be held liable for
libel because of the privileged character of the publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a
―chilling effect‖ on press freedom.

Issues: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when information for libel were filed against them although the
finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President;

(2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without
personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and

(3) Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners
through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.

Held: (1) The allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of
submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the
complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his
counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the
opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

(2) What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is
not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on
the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report
and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable
cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts

(3) The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside
from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the
office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant
cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President
may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege
or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

(4) Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts. Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the ―chilling effect‖ point. (Beltran vs.
Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988)

xii. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

Senate of the Phils. v Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006

Facts: Assailed in this petition was the constitutionality of Executive Order 464 issued by the President. Petitioners contend that the
President abused its power and prayed that said law be declared null and void. EO 464 requires that heads of departments obtain the
consent of the President before they can validly appear before investigations including the one conducted in the Senate. It also grants
executive privilege on all classified or confidential information between the President and the public officers covered by the EO.

The Senate conducted an investigation and issued invitations to various officials of the Executive department as resource
speakers in a public hearing on the North Rail project. Said public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Sen. Enrile urging the
Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the said project. The Senate
Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations to officials of the AFP.

Executive Ermita sent a letter to the Senate requesting postponement of the hearing. On the same day (Sept 28, 2005) the
President issued EO 464. Despite this development, the investigation pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani
among all the AFP officials invited attending. Both were subsequently relieved for defying the President‘s order.

Hence, three petitions (Bayan Muna, Sen. Chavez, Alt. Law Group), for certiorari and prohibition and TRO, were filed
before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress

RULING: YES. EO 464 bars the appearance of executive officials before the Congress, hence it deprives it of the information in
possession of these officials.

1. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Sec. 21 Article VI of the Constitution. This power is incidental to the
legislative function. The power of inquiry – with process to enforce it -- is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and when it does not possess the required information, recourse must be had on others who
possess it. This power is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch. The operation of the government is a proper subject
for investigation, as held in Arnault case.

2. Although the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which fall under the
rubric of ‗executive privilege‘. It is defined by Schwartz as ―the power of the government to withhold information from the public,
the courts and the Congress.‖ (e.g. state secret privilege, informer‘s privilege, generic privilege)

3. The power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find
their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot
frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. The oversight function of
Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent
with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
4. Congress undoubtedly, has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the
executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and
why it must be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need
of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power
of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible.

5. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types
of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not
depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive
officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary
character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

Sec. 21 (Inquiry in Aid of Legislation) vs Sec. 22 (Question Hour)

6. A distinction was made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be
discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. These are two distinct functions of the
legislature. Sec. 21 and 22 while closely related does not pertain to the same power of the Congress. One specifically relates to the
power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation with the aim of eliciting information that may be used in legislation while the other
pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress‘ oversight
function. Hence, the oversight function of Congress may only be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is
performed in pursuit of legislation.

7. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for the department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a
valid claim of privilege, and not by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from
this power – the president on whom the executive power is vested, hence beyond the reach of the Congress except by the power of
impeachment. Members of SC are likewise exempt from this power of inquiry. This is on the basis of separation of powers and fiscal
autonomy, as well as the constitutional independence of the judiciary.

On the constitutionality of EO 464

8. Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any reference to
inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the question hour
contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic rule of construction that issuances
must be interpreted, as much as possible, in a way that will render it constitutional. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to
appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the
department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by
the Executive Secretary.

9. Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated. Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore, cannot be dismissed outright as
invalid by the mere fact that it sanctions claims of executive privilege. This Court must look further and assess the claim of privilege
authorized by the Order to determine whether it is valid. The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b)
is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely
invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress
to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power
of inquiry of Congress.

10. The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is, just as direct as its violation of the
legislature‘s power of inquiry.

11. Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the
executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason thereof and
why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for
information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons thereof. By the mere expedient of invoking
said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. Resort to any
means then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we
shall not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into the operations of government, but we shall have given up
something of much greater value – our right as a people to take part in government.