1
A Combined Zone-3 Relay Blocking and
Sensitivity-Based Load Shedding for
Voltage Collapse Prevention
Kalid Jemal Yunus, Gustavo Pinares, Le Anh Tuan, Member IEEE,
Lina Bertling, Senior Member IEEE
Abstract— A typical power system voltage collapse scenarios
is often ended with the undesirable operation of the Zone-3
distance relay of the transmission lines. This paper presents a
protection scheme to avoid power system voltage collapse using a
combined method of distance relay’s Zone-3 blocking scheme and
a sensitivity-based load shedding selection. The Zone-3 distance
relay blocking is based on the proper differentiation between
transmission line overloading and line faulted conditions, using a
fast estimation of power flow based on Line Outage Distribution
Factor (LODF) and Generation Shift Factor (GSF). The Zone-3
distance relay of the transmission line would be blocked if the
power flow change over the line is determined to be due to an
overload so that more time would be available for the system to
take necessary control actions. One of the important control
actions is the emergency load shedding. A method based on the
calculated sensitivities GSF to identify the most effective load
shedding positions and amounts is proposed. The proposed
method has been implemented in the Advanced Real-Time
Interactive Simulator for Training and Operation (ARISTO)
software with the Nordic 32-bus test system. ARISTO offers the
possibility to test the proposed scheme since it can be seen as the
virtual power system with all live information. The analyses of
power system voltage collapse scenarios with and without the
proposed scheme implemented have shown the effectiveness of
the scheme to prevent the voltage collapses.
Index Terms— ARISTO, GSF, LODF, load shedding, voltage
collapse, power system protection.
I. INTRODUCTION
I n the past decades, many power utilities world-wide have
transformed their ways of doing business, from vertically
integrated functioning to open-market systems. The
transformations were undertaken by introducing commercial
incentives in generation, transmission and distribution of
electricity with, in many cases, large efficiency gains. Though
this may seem fairly straightforward at first glance, there are
several complexities involved in restructuring and several new
issues have surfaced. Recent large-scale power system
blackouts in the USA and Europe [1]-[3] have given us a
“wake-up” call on the vulnerability of our power systems that
they are being operated much closer to the limits than ever
before.
The authors are with the Division of Electric Power Engineering,
Department of Energy and Environment, Chalmers University of Technology,
41296 Gothenburg, Sweden (emails: <jemal; pinares>@student.chalmers.se;
<tuan.le; lina.bertling>@chalmers.se).
From the analysis of those blackouts, it has been identified
that blackouts starts with some triggering event, normally a
critical fault in the system, followed by subsequent system
dynamic responses. These triggering events push the system
into unreliable operating condition and reduced the capacity of
the transmission system but the system is still more or less
stabilized. However, additional events, such as load recovery
or improper relay operations, would lead, finally, to a long-
term voltage stability problem [4] and could lead to a voltage
collapse in some parts or the system or in a worst case, whole
system blackout. One of the factors that worsen the power
system condition after the triggering event has occurred is the
un-intentional operation of the distance relays. Due to line
overloading conditions, Zone-3 of the distance protection [5]
may operate and disconnect transmission lines when they are
needed most in the weakened system. That will have
immediate effects on the remaining lines and could eventually
lead to cascading tripping of them and system separations are
the obvious consequences. This phenomenon has been
identified in the blackouts in the USA and South Sweden-
Denmark in 2003.
Large-scale power outages can end up with billions of
dollar losses in economic activities as well as other un-
measureable inconveniences. Because of the great impacts of
those events on the modern society, the needs to analyze them
and to propose the mitigation or prevention measures are
becoming more critical.
A review of methods to prevent voltage collapses can be
found in the following section. In this paper, the method
proposed in [6] to prevent undesired operation of Zone-3 of
the distance relay during the overloading condition was
implemented and further extended with the sensitivity-based
load shedding selection scheme. This selection scheme would
allow the system operator to choose the most effective groups
of load to be shed in order to prevent the cascading outages.
This proposed combined method (i.e., blocking of Zone-3
relay and selective load shedding) could be implemented
based on a good communication infrastructure and a fast
power flow estimation.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section II, a brief
review of voltage collapses and methods for voltage collapse
preventions are presented. The Zone-3 blocking scheme,
developed in [6] is briefly explained in Section III and it is
further extended to the proposed combined voltage collapse
prevention method. In Section IV, a short description of the
software ARISTO is presented, which is used, likewise, for

dynamic simulations of the Nordic 32-bus test system. The
proposed method has been implemented with the dynamic
simulations of the power system blackout scenarios and the
simulation results are presented. Finally, important
conclusions of this work are presented in Section V.
II. A BRIEF REVIEW OF POWER SYSTEM VOLTAGE COLLAPSES
A. Voltage Stability and Voltage Collapse
Voltage stability refers to the ability of a power system to
maintain an acceptable state of equilibrium voltage at all
busses after being subjected to a disturbance from a given
initial operating condition. The ability of a system to be stable
depends on the capability of keeping the demand and supply
balance [7].
Voltage instability usually occurs in the form of continues
rise or fall of voltages on some busses. The phenomena
“voltage collapse” is the result of sequence of events in the
system that leads to abnormal low voltages in a significant
part of the power system. A possible consequence of this is the
disconnection of generators, lines, loads or other elements in
the power system by the operation of their respective
protection systems, and, in a most critical case, to a cascaded
total outage of a power system [4], [7].
In response to a disturbance, power consumed by the loads
tends to be restored by the action of motor slip adjustment,
distribution voltage regulators, tap changing transformers, and
thermostats. For instance, if the load is supplied through a
transformer equipped with under-load tap changer (ULTC),
the tap changer action tries to restore the load voltage, which
means the reduction of the effective impedance of the load as
seen by the transmission system. This will further reduce the
voltage which, in turn, leads to increased reactive power loss.
The worst case causing voltage instability occurs when load
dynamics attempt to restore power consumption beyond the
capability of the transmission network and the connected
generation. If this is case, the capability limits of some of the
generators and lines are reached, protective relays operate due
to high currents and low voltages, disconnecting lines, leading
to reducing the power transfer capacity of the system,
overloading other elements, and cascading tripping of
transmission lines will occur leading to system separation and
voltage collapses.
The operation of protective relays under overload condition
is undesirable since relays are intended to operate under faults
and not under overload conditions. One way avoid this
undesirable operation is to differentiate overload conditions
from faults. This will be discussed further in Section III.
B. Voltage Collapse Prevention
There is a number of protection schemes proposed to
prevent power system voltage collapses (see for example, [8]-
[12]). These schemes include the modification of protection
settings, smart islanding, circuit-breaker blocking,
transformers tap-changers blocking, and load shedding (under
frequency and under voltage).
In this paper, the Zone-3 blocking scheme presented in [6]
is further extended to include multiple outage power flow
2
estimation and sensitivity-based load shedding which is
utilized as a solution to prevent voltage collapse. For the sake
of completeness, the next section will summarize the key
points in this scheme and discuss the extension of the scheme
into the proposed combined method.
III. THE PROPOSED COMBINED ZONE-3 RELAY BLOCKING AND
SENSITIVITY BASED LOAD SHEDDING SCHEME
This section is divided in two parts. The first one is devoted
to summarize the zone-3 blocking scheme developed in [6]
and its extension to multiple outages. The second part will
present a sensitivity-based load shedding scheme in order to
alleviate the stress condition in the system.
A. Zone 3 Relay Blocking Scheme to Avoid Tripping
Overloads
This procedure is based on blocking Zone-3 relay within
the adaptive distance relay scheme (ADRS) presented in [6].
This scheme relies on a reliable system-wide communication
scheme which will be presented next. Following to this, the
algorithm itself to differentiate overload from short circuit
conditions will be introduced.
1. Communication for the blocking scheme
In this scheme, we have one central control unit (CCU),
which is located in the control center, and regional control
units (RCU), which are located at each substation. Fig. 1
shows the principles of this scheme.
Fig. 1: The adaptive distance relay scheme
CCU takes care of calculating the line outage distribution
factor (LODF) and generation shift factor (GSF) values for
each line following line(s) or generator(s) outage, respectively
[13]. With those factors the power flow redistribution at each
line after a contingency can be estimated. To calculate those
factors, the CCU needs, as inputs, the system parameters (i.e.,
the impedance matrix) and the system element operating states
(i.e, elements in or out of service, power flows over lines)
which can be obtained from the energy management system
(EMS) and regional control units (RCU). After the CCU
calculates those factors, it will send them to the RCUs.
The RCUs, which are located in every substation, calculate
the estimated power flow on each monitored line and takes
necessary action on the relays in charge of each monitored
lines. This calculation is based on the values of LODF and the
GSF factors given by the CCU. The RCUs also get the

information of which components are the cause of
contingency and their power flow before the contingency
occurs. The RCUs which supervise the component that caused
the contingency are responsible in providing this data to the
CCU and the other RCUs. In order to broadcast the
information of pre-contingency load flow, RCUs must store
the power flow data at certain time intervals.
2. Fast Estimation of Power Flow and the Zone-3 Relay
Blocking Algorithm
In this scheme, a fast estimation of power flow following
an outage and its comparison with measured power flow is
proposed as a way to differentiate between faulted conditions
and overload conditions over transmission lines.
The power flow estimation is based on the computation of
the well-known sensitivity factors, LODF and GSF [13]. The
LODF represents the change of power flow in a line “l” due to
an outage in line “k”. The GSF represents the change of power
flow in a line “l” due to a change of power in generator “g” (it
can also be a change in the load, as will be discussed in
Section III.B).
After a line outage and a generation/load change, the
estimated power flow over a line “l” is calculated as:
P(l , k , g )Estimated = PlInitial + LODF (l , k ) × Pk +
GSF (l , g ) × Pg
xk
x
( X in − X jn − X im + X jm )
LODF ( l ,k ) = l
xk − ( X nn + X mm − 2 X nm )
1
GSF ( l,g ) =
xl
( X jg − X ig )
where:
xk : reactance of the disconnected line k
xl : reactance of the monitored line l
Xa,b : a, b element of the impedance matrix
i,j : Buses IDs where line l is connected
n,m : Buses IDs where line k is connected
g : Bus ID where the generator or load is connected
Pl : Measured power in the monitored line l
Pg : Measured power of the generator or load before
disconnected
Pk : Measured power of the line k before disconnected
Once the estimated power flow is calculated, if a relay
detects the line impedance in its Zone-3, it will send a signal
to the RCUs. The RCUs calculate the error as a percentage of
the difference between the measured power flow from the
same line at the given instant and the estimated power. If the
error is within the given tolerance range it will send the block
signal. This would indicate that the power flow change is due
to a line outage. The algorithm is shown in Fig. 2.
In the meantime, a fast relieving action in the form of load
shedding should be taken. If a load shedding action is
triggered by the system condition, the line flows will change
as a consequence. The proposed method will monitor the new
system condition and determine if any Zone 3 blocking is still
3
necessary, by continuously comparing the measured and
estimated power flow once the impedance of a particular line
is found to be in zone of protection of a given relay.
Fig. 2: The schematic diagram for the Zone-3 relay blocking scheme
The algorithm was tested for single outage in [6], however
multi-outage cases were not considered. An extension of the
single outage case is presented in this paper. For multiple
contingencies, it depends on how long it takes between
contingencies. If another contingency occurs after the system
has stabilized we can consider it as single contingency with
reduced components. Then the actual load flow data stored
(1)
before the second contingency occurs is used in calculating the
estimated power flow on the remaining lines. But, if the
contingencies occur at the same time, which could be the case
(2)
of a bus-bar fault, we have to figure out the way to use the
data before any contingency occurs. The multi-outage power
(3)
flow estimation is also based on [6] but considering every
outage (i.e., generators, lines) occurred one after the other and
estimating a new power flow and LODFs or GSFs at every
stage. Fig. 3 presents a schematic diagram of the procedure to
estimate the power flow on all lines after a multiple outages.
Basically, the procedure to calculate the estimated power after
multiple outages can be summarized as follow:
1. All the system element states and power flows are
obtained after the given outage.
2. The first calculation is done for generation outage or
output power change since it doesn’t imply the
modification of the impedance matrix.
3. The new power flow is calculated using GSFs and it is
stored. The change of power due to slack generator
must be also taken into account.
4. When finished with all generator outages, continue
with line outage.
5. The second calculation is for lines outage. It implies
the modification of the impedance matrix. The
“original power flow” in this case comes from the
calculation stored when calculating the change of
power flow due to generator/load changes.
6. The new power flow is estimated using LODFs and is
stored.
7. A new impedance matrix Zbus is evaluated considering
the line outage and the procedure is repeated until all
 4

specified lines are taken out. example, [14]-[16]). However, this is out of the scope of this
paper, and we have assumed that the fast detection of a
voltage collapse, in this case, is known and the proposed
scheme is focused on the points after that.

IV. SIMULATION STUDY

This section describes the software used to simulate the
power system dynamic operation. It is called Advanced Real-
Time Interactive Simulator for Training and Operation
(ARISTO) and presents the dynamic simulation of the voltage
collapse scenarios with and without the proposed protection
scheme implemented using the Nordic 32-bus test system [17].
A. Description of ARISTO
ARISTO is an Advanced Real-time Interactive Simulator
for Training and Operation. One of the important
characteristic of this simulator is that it handles detailed
dynamic phenomena in real time, being capable of running
large scale systems [18]. The interactive graphic user interface
is very suitable to get a deep understanding of the system
behavior. The architecture of the software is as shown in Fig.
4.
Fig. 3: Schematic diagram of fast estimation of line flows after multiple
outages

B. Combined Zone-3 Blocking and Sensitivity Based Load

Shedding Scheme
Even though unwanted disconnections using Zone-3 relay
blocking algorithm, described above, can be prevented, the
system can be still prone to a voltage collapse. Due to this, an
emergency control, the load shedding scheme based on the
calculated sensitivity factors, is proposed. In this scheme, the
location of the best "shedding" candidates will be identified.
The best candidates here refer to the loads which could relieve
the most with the stress in the critical power system elements.
The selection of the shedding candidates can be done based on
the calculation of the sensitivity factors GSF, which were
described earlier. As stated in the previous Section, this factor
indicates the change in power flow over a line “l” due to the
change in either generation or load at a bus “g”. The Fig. 4: The architecture of ARISTO [18]
disconnections of loads located at buses with the highest GSFs
for the corresponding overloaded line (which needs to be The ARISTO simulator has been developed by the Swedish
relieved) will greatly reduce the loading of that line. Once the Transmission System Operator (Svenska Kraftnät), and is used
potential candidate locations for load shedding are identified, for power system analysis and training of the system
the amount of power to be shed to relieve a particular line is operators. One of the unique features of this software is the
given by: “Event Panel” where the “operator” can send instructions to
PLimit ( l ) − PMeasured ( l ) the simulator. It is particularly useful for creating different
PShed ( g ) = (4) scenarios, i.e. a sequence of events with certain time-stamped
GSF ( l,g )
occurrence for each event in the scenario. The scenarios are
where: sent to the simulator to see the dynamic responses of the
PShed (g) : is the estimation of power to be shed at bus g system. Other facility is the “Curve Diagram Panel,” which is
PLimit (l) : is the power flow limit on line l used to monitor the system, where the generator frequency, the
PMeasured(l) : is the measured power on line l bus voltage, the line transfer power, and the generator output
GSF ( l , g ) : is the highest GSF factor referring to the change power are represented in different graphs. Every variation of
in the load at location g with respect to the flow those parameters can be checked and analyzed there. The
on the line l. “Event Browser Panel” is also an important facility of
It should be noted that before load shedding starts, first the ARISTO because each control action done by the “operator”
prediction of the possibility of a voltage collapse is important. or automatic actions by the system and the precise time at
There are a number of methods dealing with this issue (see for which the actions happened are recorded there. By observing

the Event Brower, the user can easily notice different
actions/responses of the system to certain events occurred,
especially automatic actions by the protection system.
The ARISTO simulator is also used for educational
purpose, e.g., in the courses on “Power System Operation” and
“Project Engineering Design Project”, as well as on research
work at Chalmers University of Technology [11]-[12].
B. Simulation scenario
The Nordic 32-bus system [17] is used to simulate the power
system voltage collapse scenarios. The single-line diagram of
this system is shown in Fig. 5. This system is divided into 4
main areas: the North, Central, Southwest and Northeast. The
North is characterized by high generation and mostly consists
of hydro power plants and some load centers. The Central
region consists of a large amount of load and large thermal
power plants. The Southwest region consists of some thermal
power plants and some load and finally the northeast is
connected to the north and has a mix of generations and loads
and it also connects the system with the external network. The
North generation region is connected to central load centers by
long transmission lines. The power flow in the normal
operating condition is mainly for the North to the Center and
the Southwest.
In the pre-fault scenario, generator G1 and G2 from the
substation FT63, G1 from RT131, and G2 from FT44 were out
of service. These buses are marked with red circles as shown
in Fig. 5. These generator outages correspond to a total
disconnection of 1.41 GW which leaves the total generation in
this scenario to 9.2 GW. In addition to this, two important
transmission lines, CL14 and CL17, which links the central
and the north part of the network, were on a scheduled outage
for maintenance. The system was working with normal
frequency and bus voltages. The line CL15 is with high load
but within the limit.
Fig. 5: Nordic 32-bus system in the pre-fault condition in ARISTO
The triggering event for the voltage collapse scenario was a
double bus-bar fault at substation FT44 (shown with the red
circle in Fig. 6). This fault resulted in the disconnection of line
FL16, FL1, CL12 and generators G1 and G3, which are all
connected to FT44. The network condition just after the fault
5
at FT44 can be seen in Fig. 6.
Fig. 6: The Nordic 32-bus system just after the fault at FT44
C. Simulation of the voltage collapse scenario without the
proposed prevention method implemented
The voltage collapse scenario observed was rather slow.
The loading of remaining lines CL15 and CL16 (see Fig. 6)
increased just after the fault at FT44 was cleared. On the other
hand, due to lack of generation in south area, voltage at
substations FT42 and FT150 in the central and FT62 in the
south west decreased substantially. As a consequence, tap
changers in these areas started to operate to bring the voltage
on the load side (low voltage) back to normal. This worsened
the situation and the voltage drop in these areas kept on
decreasing as the result of transformers’ tap changer actions.
Fig. 7 illustrates the curve diagram of system conditions
showing generation, line loadings, system frequency and
voltages after the fault.
Generation during
the fault Line loading
during fault
Frequency during
the fault
Voltage during
the fault
Fig. 7: System condition after the fault
The results of this sequence of events was that the power
transfers in critical lines (CL15, CL16) increased and
oscillates; the lines were, thereby, disconnected by Zone-3
distance relays due to high currents and low voltages. Thus,
the central area was separated from the north. Since central
area was mainly a consumption area, the generation in this
 6

area was not enough to supply its load, as a result under the actual power system. To implement the proposed
frequency protections of the generators disconnects the units protection scheme as explained in Section III, after a
and total collapse in the central and south western part took contingency occurred (lines and/or generators outages), the
place as shown in Fig. 8. “measured” power flows on all the lines need to be compared
with their estimated values based on fast calculation of power
flows using the sensitivity factors calculated and stored earlier
in order to differentiate between overloading conditions and
Generation during
the voltage collapse
the faulted conditions on the remaining lines.
Line loading during
the voltage collapse To begin with, Table 1 shows the pre-fault “measured”
power flow taken from ARISTO on the critical transmission
Output power from Power flow over lines.
Generators some lines TABLE 1: POWER FLOW ON THE CRITICAL LINES (FROM ARISTO)
Line Number From To MW at MW at
Bus I Bus J Bus I Bus J
CL15 CT21 FT41 896.7 850.6
Slow decrease CL16 CT32 FT42 658.8 633.6
of voltages
Frequency in CL12 CT21 FT44 502.5 479.4
the system Voltages
FL16 FT44 FT42 455.0 451.1
Frequency during
the voltage collapse
FL1 FT44 FT43 450.6 446.8

Voltage during the

voltage collapse
When the double bus-bar fault occurred at the substation
FT44, as mentioned earlier, this fault resulted in the
Fig. 8: Nordic 32-bus system in total system collapse disconnection of line FL16, FL1, CL12 and generators G1 and
G3, which were all connected to FT44. These will be
In the North area, where there were lots of generators and considered as the multiple outages in our calculation. The total
small loads, the voltage and frequency increased due to loss of generation disconnected at the bus FT44 was 730 MW.
load in the south area, the supply–demand balance was heavily The data in Table 1 and the changes in generation at FT44
disturbed causing the system frequency to reach its upper limit were used as inputs in a Matlab routine developed according
and the generators are disconnected by the operation of over to the schematic diagram shown in Fig. 3, in order to fast
frequency protection. This loss of generation in the north area estimate line flows after multiple outages. The estimated
leads to total blackout of the entire system as shown in Fig. 9 power flows on the critical lines after the fault at FT44 are
below. presented in Table 2.
TABLE 2: ESTIMATED POWER FLOWS ON CRITICAL LINES
Line Number From From MW at MW at
Substation Substation Substation Substation
I J I J
CL15 CT21 FT41 1265.211 1215.915
CL16 CT32 FT42 985.540 944.946

The “measured” power flow in ARISTO on the critical

lines right after the fault is cleared is given in Table 3.

TABLE 3: MEASURED POWER FLOWS ON CRITICAL LINES,

AFTER THE FAULT IS CLEARED
Line Number From From MW at MW at
Substation Substation Substation Substation
I J I J
CL15 CT21 FT41 1215.400 1107.500
CL16 CT32 FT42 1035.400 949.700

The errors between the two values, the “measured” and

Fig. 9: Nordic 32-bus system in a total system voltage collapse estimated values, are determined and shown in Table 4
D. Simulation of voltage collapse scenario with the proposed
prevention method implemented TABLE 4: POWER FLOW ERROR (% DIFFERENCE) ON THE CRITICAL LINES
Line Number From To % error at % error at
The proposed protection scheme were tested in order to Substation Substation Substation Substation
prevent the system from a total voltage collapse. As presented I J I J
earlier, ARISTO is a continuous real-time simulator. It can be CL15 CT21 FT41 4.1 9.8
seen as a virtual power system. The power flows and voltages CL16 CT32 FT42 -4.8 -0.5
taken from ARISTO can be seen as the “measured” values in
 7

According to [6], an error of 10% might be composed of disconnected. These loads amount a total of 689 MW. The
1% of current transformer (CT) error, 1% of potential total load shedding could also be shared with the substation
transformer (PT) error, 3% of device errors, and 5% of FT61, since both have the same GSF value.
calculation errors. Our error should be 5%, since we are using
TABLE 5: GSF CALCULATION RESULTS AT DIFFERENT BUSES
“correct” measured data. However, since in the multi-outage (SUBSTATIONS) WITH RESPECT TO LINE CL15
algorithm we introduce error after error, we must consider Buses GSF values
increasing the acceptable error, to 10%. If any Zone 3 relay of 4041 (FT41) 0.445
those monitored lines start, the RCU will make a comparison 1044 0.146
and will determine the error. In the current simulation, the 4043 0.120
4046 0.120
difference in the power flow was within the 10% error as can 1043 0.146
be since in Table 4. This indicates that the start of Zone-3 4061 (FT61) 0.445
relay action was due to an overload condition rather than due 1041 0.146
to a short circuit condition. 1045 0.146
About 3 minutes after the fault, Zone-3 relay of line CL15 4062 0.146
4063 0.146
detected the fault (and the Zone-3 timer starts) since the
4051 0.146
impedance seen by the relay had been reducing and entered in 4047 0.120
its protection zone. However, this was not the result of an
actual fault, but from overloading condition as will be During load shedding, we had to also make sure that the
discussed. According to the communication scheme, the relay system frequency does not overshoot. This was handled by
sends a signal to the corresponding RCU. The RCU compares step by step load shedding of some magnitude depending on
the measured power flow with the calculated value. In our the primary frequency regulation capability of the system. The
case, the error in measured and calculated power flow on the system condition after the application of the mitigation action
critical lines at this time was found to be similar to those (load shedding) is shown in Fig. 10. It can be seen that the
shown in Table IV, which was lower than 10%, indicating that system has been stabilized after the proposed load shedding,
the relay had to be blocked. However, blocking the relay was and thus the total voltage collapse has been avoided.
not enough to save the system from collapse. Even though the
Zone-3 was blocked, the voltages in the system would
gradually go down and finally the system would collapse due Generation during
to a voltage instability scenario. The blocking of Zone-3 on the load shedding Line loading during
the load shedding
critical lines would give more time to the system operator to
take actions such as load shedding. Output power from Power flow over
At this point, the Zone-3 relay on the line CL15 relay had Generators some lines
to be blocked and load shedding should be carried out as fast
as possible, otherwise, the system would disintegrate due to
voltage collapse. This situation was also dangerous for the line
Increase of
since the power flow can be above its maximum loading system voltage
Frequency in
(thermal) limit. It should be noted that the decision to block the system Voltages
the relay must be done quickly before the Zone-3 relay trips.
The time setting for Zone-3 relay is usually in an order of 1 Frequency during Voltage during the
second [5]. the load shedding load shedding

A more reliable automatic load shedding will be possible if
some method to identify the proximity to voltage collapse is
implemented. As mentioned in Section III.A.2, voltage
collapse identification is out of the scope of this work.
However, one of the methods discussed in [14]-[16] could be
implemented. To start the load shedding algorithm, voltage
collapse identification was assumed. To do this, we used the
GSF calculation for each load buses in the South as shown in
Table 5 to determine which load buses would be the most
effective in reducing the power flow on the stressed lines.
As can be seen in Table 5, load buses FT41 (4041) and
FT61 (4061) have the highest relieving effects on the line
CL15. The amount of the load that must be shed should bring
the power flow on the line below its maximum limit. This can
be calculated using Equation (4). The calculation result set the
total amount of load that should be shed as 714 MW. Taking
this result into account, some of the loads connected to the
transformers T1, T2, T3 at substation FT41 were
Fig. 10: Stabilized system after mitigation action
The system frequency increased, in this case approximately
to 50.2 Hz, immediately after the load shedding and is
stabilized with the automatic frequency regulation. In reality,
this is composed of primary frequency control by decreasing
the generators output to stop frequency increases first, then
followed by the secondary frequency control actions
(automatic or manual) to bring back frequency to the
acceptable level. It can be also noticed also that the loading of
the transmission line CL16 was reduced. It is observed also
that the power flows on some other lines such as FL6 and FL2
increase but below dangerous values. Finally, the system
voltage is recovered to more acceptable values. This has
shown that our proposed method works effectively.

V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a method of Zone-3 relay blocking has been
implemented and extended by the combination of the selective
load shedding scheme to prevent potential power system
voltage collapse. The method makes use of the continuous
real/time power system simulator ARISTO as a “test-bed” or a
virtual power system for implementing voltage collapse
scenarios and the preventive measures. This method aims at
avoiding the unwanted operation of Zone-3 distance relays in
the line overload conditions, and complements with selective
load sheddings as the emergency control action based on line
loading relief sensitivity factors. The simulation study has
shown that the scheme works effectively and a voltage
collapse scenario could be avoided after applying the proposed
mitigation scheme.
VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors would like to thank the contribution to this work
made by Shemsedim Nursebo, Chrispin Singoyi, and
Mohammed Abdul Wasi during the course on Power
Engineering Design Project in the academic year 2009/2010 at
Chalmers University of Technology.
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VIII. BIOGRAPHIES
Kalid Jemal Yunus was born in Mechara, western
harage, Oromia Regional state, Ethiopia on July 6,
1983. He graduated from Arba-Minch University in
Electrical Engineering in 2006 and has served as an
assistant lecturer from 2006-2008 in Haramaya
University. Currently, he is studying master degree in
Electric power engineering at Chalmers university of
Technology. His field of interest is renewable energy
technologies, power electronic, power systems.
Gustavo Pinares Ccorimanya was born in Lima,
Peru, on June 11th, 1981. He graduated from
Universidad Nacional de Ingeniería on 2003 and
worked for Red de Energía del Perú from 2004 to
2008 as a protection engineer. Currently, he is
pursuing a master degree in Electric Power
Engineering at Chalmers University of Technology.
His fields of interest are power system protection and
power electronic application in power systems.
Le Anh Tuan (S’01, M’09) received his Ph.D. in
2004 in Power Systems from Chalmers University of
Technology, Sweden, and his M.Sc. degree in 1997
in Energy Economics from Asian Institute of
Technology, Thailand. Currently he is a senior
lecturer at the Division of Electric Power
Engineering, Department of Energy and
Environment, Chalmers University of Technology,
Sweden. His research interests include power system
operation and planning, power market and
deregulation issues, grid integration of renewable energy and plug-in electric
vehicles.
Lina Bertling (S’98-M’02-SM’08) was born in
Huddinge, Sweden, in 1973. She has a Professor
Chair in Sustainable Electric Power Systems and is
Head of the Division of Electric Power Engineering,
at the Department of Energy and Environment, at
Chalmers University of Technology, in Gothenburg,
Sweden. She has been with Svenska Kraftnät, the
Swedish Transmission System Operator during
2007-2009, and from June 2008 as head of the
R&D. She has been with KTH School of Electrical
Engineering, in Stockholm, during 1997-2009 where
she finalized her Docent degree, Associate Professor, in 2008, and the Ph.D.
in 2002, both in Electric Power Systems. Her research interests are in
transmission and distribution systems including high voltage equipment and
HVDC, and wind power systems with applications for reliability assessment
and modeling, and maintenance planning.
Dr. Bertling is a senior member of IEEE and a member of Cigré, Cired,
World Energy Council, and the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering
Sciences. She was the general chair of the 9th International conference on
probabilistic methods applied to power systems (PMAPS) in Stockholm, in
2006 and is the chair of the first IEEE PES Conference on Innovative Smart
Grid Technologies Europe 2010 in Gothenburg in 2010.