TEAM CODE : 34

19TH NLIU ANNUAL FRESHER’S MOOT POOL

TOURNAMENT 2019

IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF KASHINDIA

IN THE MATTER OF

RAJTIWARI SARVAGYA SOOD & NIPUNJ GOYAL SHRIVASTAVA

(Petitioner)
v.
STATE of JACOOB & KASHTIKIR
(Respondents)

UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF KASHINDIA

SUBMITTED BEFORE THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND

OTHER COMPANION JUDGES AT
SUPREME COURT, KASHINDIA

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES -2-
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION -4-
STATEMENT OF FACTS -5-
ISSUES RAISED -6-
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS -7-
WHETHER ARTICLE 370 OF CONSTITUTION OF KASHINDIA A TEMPORARY
PROVISION WHICH HAS LAPSED? -8-
A. THE PURPOSE OF ARTICLE 370 - 8 -
B. WHETHER ARTICLE 370 AFFECTS THE FEDERAL STRUCTURE - 9 -
WHETHER THE STATE OF J&K HAS A RIGHT TO UNILATERALLY SECEDE
FROM KASHINDIA? - 10 -
A. THAT THE RIGHT TO SECESSION IS AN INTERNAL COMPONENT OF
RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND IS NOT ILLEGAL PER-SE. - 10
-
B. THAT THE RIGHT TO SECESSION IS GRANTED WHEN THE PEOPLE ARE
BEING OPPRESSED AND DENIED OF THEIR BASIC FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS.- 11 -
C. THAT UNILATERAL SECESSION FROM A LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC STATE
IS, WITHIN A LIBERAL THEORY, PRIMA FACIE IS NOT JUSTIFICIABLE.
- 12 -
WHETHER ARTICLE 35-A OF KASHINDIAN CONSTITUTION CAN BE
CHALLENGED CONSTITUTIONALLY? - 13 -
ii) THAT ARTICLE 35A THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL ORDER OF 1954 WAS
WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE PRESIDENT. - 14 -
PRAYER - 16 -

PAGE2
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v Union Of India 1951 AIR SC 41 - 16 -

Govt. Of NCT Of Delhi vs Union Of India CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2357 OF 2017 -9-
Hikkadu Koralalage Don Chandrasoma vs. Mawai S. Senathirajah Secretary and Ors. (04.08.2017 -
SLSC) : LEX/SLSC/0129/2017 - 11 -
Puranlal Lakhanpal vs. The President of India (1961 AIR 1519) - 15 -
Re Secession of Quebec Sup. Ct. of Canada 2 S.C.R. 217. 37 I.L.M. 1340 (1998) - 10 -
Sampat Prakash v State of Jammu and Kashmir and Anr., 1970 AIR SC 1118 - 13 -, - 15 -
Sampat Prakash v. state of J&K 1970 AIR 1118 -9-
State Bank Of India vs Santosh Gupta And Anr. Civil Appeal No. 12237-12238 of 2016 -9-
Texas v. White, MANU/USSC/0124/1868 : 74 U.S. 700 (1868); Horn v. Lockhart,
MANU/USSC/0107/1873 : 84 U.S. 570 (1873); United States v. Insurance Companies,
MANU/USSC/0056/1874 : 89 U.S. 99 (1874); Baldy v. Hunter, 171 U.S. 388 (1898). - 11 -

OTHER AUTHORITIES

United nation Charter resolution 1954, 3

International Covenant on Economical, social & Cultural Rights 1966 and International
Covenant on Civil and political rights 3
Preamble of Constitution of Kashindia 5
The Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954 7

BOOKS

1. ARTICLE 370: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF JAMMU AND KAHMIR, A.G.

NOORANI

2. KASHMIR IN THE CROSSFIRE, VICTORIA SCHOFIELD

PAGE3
LEGAL DATABASES

1. MANUPATRA

2. SCC ONLINE

3. WEST LAW

4. HEIN ONLINE

LEGISLATION

1. INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION, 1947

2. THE CONSTITUTION (APPLICATION TO JAMMU AND KASHMIR) ORDER,

1954

CONVENTIONS

1. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, 1966

2. INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL

RIGHTS

3. UNITED NATION RESOLUTION, 1514, 1960

PAGE4
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

THE PETITIONERS HAVE APPROACHED THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF KASHINDIA

UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KASHINDIA WHICH READS AS UNDER

“Article 32” Right to Constitutional Remedies”

1. The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the
enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
2. The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs,
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo
warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any
of the rights conferred by this Part.
3. Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (1) and
(2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local
limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court
under clause (2).
4. The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise
provided for by this Constitution.

PAGE5
 STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Kashindia is a country which had acquired independence from the Zamindari Empire
in 1947.

2. The state of Jacoob and Kartishkir of Kashindia was a princely state prior to 1947 and
acceded to Kashindia on certain terms and conditions. The ruler of J&K, Maharaja
Jazz Singh signed an Instrument of Accession with Kashindia which gave the
Kashindia parliament the power to legislate for the state of J&K only on matters
related to defence, communication and external affairs. Subsequently, Article 370 was
incorporated in the constitution which gives great autonomy to the state of J&K to
regulate and conduct its internal affairs.

3. In 1954, Article 35-A was also introduced in the Constitution of Kashindia through a
Presidential Order called the Constitution (Application to the State of J&K)
Order,1954 by exercising the powers conferred by clause(1) of the article 370 and
with the concurrence of the state of J&K.

4. Article 35-A enables the legislature of the State of J&K to define the class of persons
that shall constitute the permanent residents of the State of J&K and confer upon such
residents any special rights and privileges.

5. One of the resident of the State of J&K aggrieved by the status of J&K, Nipunj Goyal
Shrivastava along with a non-government organisation called Rajtiwari Sarvagya
Sood decided to approach the court and challenged the constitutionality of Article 370
and Article 35-A in the Supreme Court of Kashindia.

6. The Supreme Court of Kashindia has already been asked to decide on whether the
state of J&K has the right to unilaterally secede from Kashindia in accordance with
the principles of international law.

PAGE6
 ISSUES RAISED

1) WHETHER ARTICLE 370 IS A TEMPORARY PROVISION OF THE

KASHINDIAN CONSTITUTION?

2) WHETHER THE STATE OF J&K HAS A RIGHT TO UNILATERALLY

SECEDE FROM KASHINDIA?

3) WHETHER ARTICLE 35-A OF KASHINDIAN CONSTITUTION CAN BE

CHALLENGED CONSTITUTIONALLY?

PAGE7
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1) WHETHER ARTICLE 370 IS A TEMPORARY PROVISION OF THE

KASHINDIAN CONSTITUTION?
It is humbly submitted that Article 370 of Constitution of Kashindia was introduced as a
temporary provision which became permanent. It was further pointed out that Article
370 cannot be amended in as much as Constituent Assembly of the State before its
dissolution has not recommended its amendment and appeal.

2) WHETHER THE STATE OF J&K HAS A RIGHT TO UNILATERALLY

SECEDE FROM KASHINDIA?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the state of J&K can unilaterally secede
from Kashindia as per the international norms which clearly stated that all people
have the right to self-determination and all are free to choose their political status and
freely decide their destiny. It is further emphasized before this Court that the right to
secession is an internal component of self-determination and not contradictory to the
existing principles of state sovereignty.

3) WHETHER ARTICLE 35-A OF KASHINDIAN CONSTITUTION CAN BE

CHALLENGED CONSTITUTIONALLY?
It is humbly submitted that Article 35-A of Kashindian Constitution cannot be challenged
constitutionally as it was incorporated in the constitution by the provisions given
under Article 370 which was included in the constitution by the constituent assembly.
It is pointed out that Article 35-A cannot be scrapped as it would certainly impinge
upon the legality of the constitution order of 1954 in toto, and the subsequent
amendments to it. Moreover Article 35A forms part of the larger set of terms and
conditions for which the state government gave concurrence vis-à-vis the 1954 order
to scrap the Article.

PAGE8
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

WHETHER ARTICLE 370 OF CONSTITUTION OF KASHINDIA A

TEMPORARY PROVISION WHICH HAS LAPSED?

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Article370 of constitution of Kashindia
was introduced as a temporary provision which became permanent. This was a "temporary
provision" in that its applicability was intended to last till the formulation and adoption of the
State's constitution. However, the State's constituent assembly dissolved itself without
recommending either abrogation or amendment of the Article 370. Further, it is pointed out
that the Article was considered to have become a permanent feature of the Indian
constitution.

A. THE PURPOSE OF ARTICLE 370

(a) It is respectfully submitted that ARTICLE 370 of Kashindian Constitution has

been described as a `temporary provision’ in the Constitution.It is reverentially
submitted the temporary nature of this Article arises merely because the power
to finalize the constitutional relationship between the State and the Union of
India had been specifically vested in the Jacoob & Kartishkir
Constituent Assembly.
(b) It is deferentially submitted that the Constitution of India clearly envisaged the
convening of Constituent Assembly for Jacoob & Kartishkir State and also
provides that whatever modification, amendments or exceptions that might
become necessary either to Art. 370 or to any other Articles in the Constitution
of India in their application to the Jacoob & Kartishkir State were subject
to the decision of the Assembly. 
(c) It is most respectfully pointed out that the `temporary’ provision does not
mean that the Article is capable of being abrogated, modified or
replaced unilaterally.

PAGE9
 (d)   It is most humbly pointed out that is the Court has on various occasions,
including in Sampath Prakash 1and Santhosh Gupta 2relied on Article 370 (3)
to suggest that the provision continues to be in existence. Thus, the Court has
observed that the provision will cease to have effect only when the President
makes a public notification to the contrary, subject to the condition laid down
in clause 3 – i.e. recommendation of the Constituent Assembly for J&K –

being fulfilled. Despite the fact that it is, therefore, stated to be temporary in
nature, sub- clause (3) of Article 370 makes it clear that this article shall cease
to be operative only from such date as the President may by public notification
declare. And this cannot be done under the proviso to Article 370 (3) unless
there is a recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State so to do,” 

B. WHETHER ARTICLE 370 AFFECTS THE FEDERAL STRUCTURE

(a) It is respectfully submitted that the Article 370 as a basic feature is that its
destruction strikes at the root of India’s asymmetric federalism. While federalism
itself has been recognized as a basic feature. It is unclear whether asymmetry is an
essential attribute of it.
(b) It is respectfully submitted that there are clues to suggest that this is the case. The
Supreme Court has harped upon3 the federal balance of distribution of legislative
and executive powers as a fundamental feature of India’s federalism.
(c) It is deferentially submitted Asymmetrical arrangements, as in the case of Article
370 can be argued to be paradigm examples of such federal balancing of powers.
Given that India is a quasi-federal system with strong centralizing tendencies, any
exceptions carved out to this status quo (as in the case of Article 370) should carry
with them a presumption that they are specifically meant to ensure such delicate
balancing of federal powers.
(d) It is respectfully that given that such an asymmetrical relationship has been
subjected to the will of a higher law-making body, there is a strong case to be
1
Sampat Prakash v. state of J&K 1970 AIR 1118

2
State Bank Of India vs Santosh Gupta And Anr. Civil Appeal No. 12237-12238 of 2016

3
Govt. Of NCT Of Delhi vs Union Of India CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2357 OF 2017

PAGE10
 made for classifying Article 370 as an essential feature of federalism and thus in
turn a basic feature.

WHETHER THE STATE OF J&K HAS A RIGHT TO UNILATERALLY

SECEDE FROM KASHINDIA?

It is humbly submitted that the state of J&K can unilaterally secede from Kashindia as per
the international norms which clearly stated that all people have the right to self-
determination and all are free to choose their political status and freely decide their
destiny4. It is further added that the international law has not illegalized the concept of
right to secede from a territory and support the notion when people are being oppressed5.

A. THAT THE RIGHT TO SECESSION IS AN INTERNAL COMPONENT OF

RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND IS NOT ILLEGAL PER-SE.

(a) It is submitted that right to self-determination involves attaining an

Independent State, or, reciprocally, if the people asserting self-
determination freely choose to remain as part of another State, they retain
the right to secede at their will, because the only reliable way for a people
to fully control their political status, as well as their economic, social and
cultural development, is in an Independent State. Therefore the right to
secede is an integral component of the right to self-determination, even
though, at any given point in time, the people who have acquired the right
to self-determination might not assert their right to secession.
(b) It is humbly submitted that Article (1) of both the covenants of the United
Nations hold that "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development."6 This clearly
meant that demand for right to self-determination leading to self-secession
cannot be prohibited in Kashindia.
4
Article(1) of the United nation Charter

5
International Covenant on Economical, social & Cultural Rights 1966 and International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights adopted in 1966
6
“ibid”

PAGE11
 (c) It is further submitted that the international law on unilateral secession is
determined by the Kosovo Advisory Opinion para 81 and the Quebec case7
para 155. It has followed from Kosovo para 81 that unilateral declarations
of independence are not illegal per se, i.e. merely on the ground of
unilateral secession, but illegality may be attached to them in situations
similar to Northern Cyprus and Southern Rhodesia.
(d) It was further added that in Hikkadu Korakakage Don Chandrasoma v.
Mawai S. Senathirajah Secretary and Ors., the court held that ‘ it is
"peoples" who are repositories under international law for the right to self-
determination and thus the ITAK hold that the Tamil people are a "people"
in terms of the above international covenants, and therefore, it is axiomatic
that the Tamil people are also entitled to the right to self-determination8’

B. THAT THE RIGHT TO SECESSION IS GRANTED WHEN THE PEOPLE

ARE BEING OPPRESSED AND DENIED OF THEIR BASIC
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.

(a) In a plethora of cases9, the court held that ‘during a period of insurrection,
when territory is under the control and dominance of an unlawful, hostile
government and it is therefore impossible for the lawful authorities to
legislate for the peace and good order of the area, the laws passed by the
usurping government which are necessary to the maintenance of organized
society and which are not in themselves unconstitutional will be given
force and effect’.

(b) It is further argued that J&K people has not been granted the right to self-
determination at the time of independence from the Zamindari Empire
through the plebiscite which was previously decided to be held in the state
of J&K but never has happened. Their destiny was decided by their king
and Union of Kashindia. Furthermore, The right to self-determination is

7
Re Secession of Quebec Supreme Court of Canada 2 S.C.R. 217. 37 I.L.M. 1340 (1998)

8
Hikkadu Koralalage Don Chandrasoma vs. Mawai S. Senathirajah Secretary and Ors. SC SPL No. 03/2014

9
Texas v. White, MANU/USSC/0124/1868 : 74 U.S. 700 (1868); Horn v. Lockhart,: 84 U.S. 570 (1873);
United States v. Insurance Companies,89 U.S. 99 (1874); Baldy v. Hunter, 171 U.S. 388 (1898).

PAGE12
 protected by the Article 1.2 of the United Nations Charter signed in 1945,
which reads: “To develop friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,
and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.

C. THAT UNILATERAL SECESSION FROM A LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC

STATE IS, WITHIN A LIBERAL THEORY, PRIMA FACIE IS NOT
JUSTIFICIABLE.

(a) It is humbly submitted that in view of the fact that unilateral secession
breaches the principles of majority decision making and of equal
protection of rights, it only needs justification. It is not acceptable by the
fact that it breaches the territorial integrity of a nation 10, therefore it is
unjustified.

(b) It is further submitted that since it is secession that is to be justified, the

non-protectable rights of the minority could find the appropriate protection
only through secession: these rights could only be protected only in
specially designed states, the kind of state which is achieved by secession
from parent states. It is pointed out that J&K is a Mushlim majority state in
the majoritarian Hindu Union of Kashindia and the best solution to protect
the rights is through secession from the pre-existing state.
(c) It is submitted before this hon’ble court that the conditions for secession
aim to ensure that the rights both of the secessionists and of the citizens of
the parent state continue to be equally protected in spite of the secession.
On such an account, under some circumstances, a unilateral secession
would also be justified as a means of protecting the secessionists’ liberties
or rights.

10
Preamble of Constitution of Kashindia

PAGE13
 WHETHER ARTICLE 35-A OF KASHINDIAN CONSTITUTION CAN BE
CHALLENGED CONSTITUTIONALLY?

It is humbly submitted that Article 35-A of Kashindian Constitution cannot be challenged

constitutionally as it was incorporated in the constitution by the provisions given under
Article 370 which was included in the constitution by the constituent assembly. It is

pointed out that Article 35-A cannot be scrapped as it would certainly impinge upon the
legality of the constitution order of 1954 in toto, and the subsequent amendments to it.
Moreover Article 35A forms part of the larger set of terms and conditions for which the
state government gave concurrence vis-à-vis the 1954 order to scrap the Article.

A. THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF THE ARTICLE 35-A

CANNOT BE CHALLENGED.

a) It is submitted that the Article 35A of the Indian constitution merely

clarifies the different status of J&K in this regard. Questioning the validity
of this Article has no bearing on the rights of state subjects. Nor can the
Presidential Order of 195411 be questioned without questioning the validity
of other provisions of the Indian constitution it extended to J&K12. 
b) It is added that Article 370 has vested power to the President to extend the
provisions of the constitution “subject to such exceptions and
modifications as he may by order specify”13. The Supreme Court decided
this in Sampat Prakash v State of Jammu and Kashmir and Anr.14In which
the court ruled “modification” as used in Article 370 includes an
amendment. The court even went on to say that “there is no reason to limit
the word ‘modification’ as used in Article 370 only to such modifications

11
 The Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954 
12
Ibid, clause(1) of article 370
13
ibid
14
Sampat Prakash v State of Jammu and Kashmir and Anr., 1970 AIR SC 1118

PAGE14
 as do not make any radical transformation.” The Court observed: “Article
370 is a special provision for amending the Constitution in its application
to the state of J&K…..Article 368 does not curtail the power of the
President under Article 370.
c) It is submitted that the 1954 order has itself implied that Article 35A is not
a new Article. It is merely a saving clause and creates an exception to the
generality of Part III in order to save the pre-1947 state notifications of
1927 and 1932 from challenge under Article 13 of the Constitution of
Kashindia.
d) It is futher argued that both the Constitution of India and the Constitution
of Jacoob & Kashtikir are expressions of the sovereign will of the people,
they have equal status and none is subordinate to the other. 

B. THAT ARTICLE 35A THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL ORDER OF 1954 WAS

WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE PRESIDENT.

a) It is respectfully submitted that Article 35A was incorporated into the

Constitution in 1954 by an order of the then President. The Presidential Order
was issued under Article 370 (1) (d) of the Constitution. This provision allows
the President to make certain "exceptions and modifications" to the
Constitution for the benefit of "state subjects" of J&K. Ergo, Article 35A was
added to the Constitution as a testimony of the special consideration the
Indian government accorded to the "permanent residents" of J&K.
b) It is respectfully submitted that The parliamentary route of lawmaking was
bypassed when the President incorporated Article 35A into the Constitution as
Article 368 (i) of the Constitution empowers only Parliament to amend the
Constitution.
c) It is humbly submitted that the Article 370 is as much a part of the

Constitution as Article 368. But the framers were deeply cognizant of the fact
that the Constitution accorded J&K exceptional status is free of any doubt. It
is particularly clear from the address made by N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, the
chief drafter of Article 370, to the Constituent Assembly on October 17, 1949:
“J&K’s conditions are… special and require special treatment,”. Thus

PAGE15
 concluding that Article 370 overrides article 368 in the exceptional case of

J&K.
d) It is humbly pointed out that the above clarified from the case Puranlal
Lakhanpal vs. The President of India 15the court held that the President may
modify an existing provision in the Constitution under Article 370.
e) It is humbly pointed out that The meaning of modify was clarified in case of
Sampat Prakash vs State Of J&K16. Where the apex court ruled that the word
"modify" may just mean "vary", i.e., amend, and when Art. 370 (1) says that
the President may apply the provisions of the Constitution to the State of
Jammu & Kashmir with such modifications as he may by order specify, it
means that he may vary (i.e., amend) the provisions of the Constitution in its
application to the State of J&K. We are, therefore, ‘of opinion that in the
context of the Constitution we must give the widest effect to the meaning of
the word "modification" used in Art. 370 (1) and in that sense it includes an
amendment. There is no reason to limit the word "modifications" as used in
Art. 370 (1) only to such modifications as do not make any "radical
transformation".
ii) THAT ARTICLE 35A IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS.
a) It is humbly submitted that Article 35A immunises the state subject
notifications from challenge on the ground of being violative of Part III.
b) It is submitted that Article 371A of the Constitution of kasindia clearly
stated : “Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, – (a) no Act of
Parliament in respect of – (i) religion or social practices of the Nagas, (ii)
Naga customary law and procedure, (iii) administration of civil and criminal
justice involving decisions according to Naga customary law, (iv) ownership
and transfer of land and its resources, shall apply to the State of Nagaland
unless the legislative Assembly of Nagaland by a resolution so decides.” This
provision inserted in 1962 explicitly bars the Parliament of India from making
any law in respect of “ownership and transfer of land” in Nagaland and also

15
Puranlal Lakhanpal vs. The President of India (1961 AIR 1519)

16
Sampat Prakash v State of Jammu and Kashmir and Anr., 1970 AIR SC 1118

PAGE16
 “its resources”. It is pointed out that the classification here is based upon an
intelligible differentia having a rational relation to the object sought to be
achieved which is to preserve the autonomy of the state and it is nowhere
violative of fundamental rights.
c) In State Bank Of India v. Santosh Gupta And Anr. Etc17, the Court ruled out
that this Article only states that the conferring on permanent residents of
Jammu & Kashmir special rights and privileges regarding the acquisition of
immovable property in the State cannot be challenged on the ground that it is
inconsistent with the fundamental rights chapter of the Indian Constitution.
The conferring of such rights and privileges as mentioned in Section 140 of
the Jammu & Kashmir Transfer of Property Act is not the subject matter of
challenge on the ground that it violates any fundamental right of the
Constitution of India. Furthermore, in view of Rule 8(5) proviso, such rights
are expressly preserved.

d) It is further notified that Article 35A, its abrogation will, in no way, pave way
for the non-state subjects to purchase immovable property, apply for jobs, or
settle in the state. This argument is fortified by the fact that the state subject
notifications will continue to be protected under Para 8 of the Instrument of
Accession as it explicitly recognises the “validity of any law at present in
force in the state.
e) In Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v Union Of India and Others18, the Court ruled
that Article 35A is challenged on the ground of being violative of the equal
protection clause under Article 14 of the Constitution. This argument lacks
legal foresight in that “Article 14 protects classification for the purposes of
legislation”

17
State Bank of India v. Santosh Gupta And Anr. Etc APPEAL NO. 12240-12246_of 2016
18
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v Union Of India 1951 AIR SC 41

PAGE17
 PRAYER

WHEREFORE IN THE LIGHT OF ISSUES RAISED ARGUGEMTS ADVANCED AND

AUTHORITIES CITED THIS HON’BLE COURT MAY BE PLEASED TO DECLARE:

1. ARTICLE 370 IS NOT A TEMPORARY PROVISION

2. THE STATE OF J&K HAS A RIGHT TO UNILATERALLY SECEDE FROM
KASHINDIA
3. ARTICLE 35-A OF KASHINDIAN CONSTITUTION CANNOT BE CHALLENGED
CONSTITUTIONALLY

AND/OR PASS ANY OTHER JUDGMENT/ORDER WHICH THIS HON’BLE

COURTMAY BE PLEASED TO GRANT IN THE INTERST OF EQUITY, JUSTICE AND
GOOD CONSCIENCE

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

COUNSELS FOR RESPONDENT

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