Auguste Comte and Modern Epistemology

Author(s): Johan Heilbron

Source: Sociological Theory, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Autumn, 1990), pp. 153-162
Published by: American Sociological Association
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 AUGUSTE COMTE AND MODERN EPISTEMOLOGY
JOHAN HEILBRON
Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study, Uppsala

Au lieu de chercher aveuglement une sterile unite scientifique, aussi oppressive que
chimerique, dans la vicieuse reduction de tous les phenomenes a un seul ordre de lois,
I'esprit humain regardera finalement les diverses classes d'evenements comme ayant
leurs lois speciales.
Auguste Comte

Among the masters of sociological thought sociologists Comte is a textbook personal-

Auguste Comte probably has the worst
reputation. "Positivism" is commonly con-
sidered a form of narrow-mindedness, and
the term is used most often in a polemical
sense. If someone says, "He is a positivist"
or "It is a bit positivistic," there is some-
thing wrong, although it is not precisely
clear what it is. During the famous Positi-
vismusstreit, one of the great dispute rituals
of German sociology, Adorno and his op-
ponent Hans Albert each criticized the
other for being a "positivist." One of the
few things they agreed on was that "posi-
tivism" was to be rejected. That is quite
typical of the status of positivism and of
Auguste Comte, who is considered to be its
founder.
In philosophy Comte's attempt to de-
throne metaphysics never received much
sympathy, and academic philosophers
never have really forgiven him for it. To
many of them Comte was persona non
grata. Although his work is seldom read, it
is widely associated with unsophisticated
thinking: with empiricism, with a blind imi-
tation of the natural sciences, and with the
unreflective use of quantitative methods.
The fact that none of these associations has
anything to do with Comte's actual writ-
ings has not made any difference for his
reputation.
In sociology Comte does not have a
much better name. He is a figure of some
historical importance, but references to his
work have long since disappeared from
the debates. His writings did not become
the object of ongoing commentary and
interpretation. They have often been edited
by followers outside academia, and there
is no Comte scholarship comparable to that
which exists for Montesquieu and Tocque-
ville or for Weber and Durkheim. To most
ity, vaguely familiar but strange and some-
what embarrassing. Sociologists, who
usually are not sure of their scientific status,
do not like to be bothered with a man who
founded the religion of humanity.
Most references to Comte in academic
discourse reproduce the established cliches.
When Comte is discussed in a more elab-
orate way, apart from rather vague associa-
tions, there are two types of interpretation.
First, there are the interpretations based on
his political, social, or religious signifi-
cance. In these cases Comte is read against
the background of the ideological crisis of
postrevolutionary France; his work is dis-
cussed in relation to the Saint-Simonians,
the rise of conservatism, or the attempts to
find a worldly substitute for Catholicism.
The best-documented study on Comte,
Henri Gouhier's La jeunesse d'Auguste
Comte et la formation du positivisme
(1933-41), was inspired by such an
interpretation.
The second type of interpretation stresses
a different aspect. Here Comte is seen pri-
marily as a theorist. His earlier works are
central; his later activities appear only in
sarcastic subordinate clauses. In such cases
Comte's originality is located in his "posi-
tivism" and his "sociology." Positivism is
seen as the center of his theory of knowl-
edge; his sociology is regarded as an elabo-
ration or application of that theory. This is
the standard way in which Comte is pre-
sented in academic textbooks. It is also
the most obvious way. Comte introduced
both terms-positivism and sociology-
and nothing seems more plausible than to
summarize his contribution according to
these terms.
Both interpretations, I think, are mis-
taken. The first is inaccurate because it has

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154 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
nothing to say about Comte's extended positivism in this sense was nothing new. In
writings about the sciences. If Comte's 1835, when he gave a lecture to the Acad-
project from the beginning was primarily emy of Sciences, he started his speech by
political or quasi-religious, it remains a saying that scientific statements need
mystery why he went to the trouble of writ- "positive verification." That was an "in-
ing numerous books and articles on recent dispensable condition" for validity and
developments in the sciences. That effort was "universally accepted" (Comte 1970a
represented an intellectual endeavor and [1835], p. 585). He expressed the same atti-
should be interpreted as such. The second tude in the Cours de philosophie positive.
interpretation does this, but this inter- Where he states that it is "useless" to insist
pretation is misleading because one can on the "principle" that distinguishes meta-
show that neither Comte's positivism nor physical from scientific knowledge. Every-
his sociology was particularly original. One one who had some knowledge of the
may add that historically they have not advanced sciences was "familiar" with this
been very significant either. That statement principle (Comte 1975 [1830], p. 26). Comte
requires some explanation. made no claim that he contributed much to
the idea of positive sciences. In his later
writings the term "positivism" assumed a
POSITIVISM AND SOCIOLOGY much broader meaning. "Positive" then
also mean "useful," "precise," and "cer-
Positivism commonly has two different tain" (Comte 1983 [1844], pp. 64-65). Such
meanings. First, it refers to a form of imita- an extension was part of positivism as a
tion of the natural sciences in the domain of world view or an ideology. That idea prob-
the human sciences. If one follows this ably was original, but I will not discuss
description, Hobbes is probably the first Comte's later work here.
positivist. Condorcet, Cabanis, and per- As to Comte's "sociology," one might
haps the early Saint-Simon were positivists, make the same comments as about his
but Comte explicitly rejected such imita- positivism. Comte invented the word, but
tions and was certainly not a positivist in the ideas to which it referred were not par-
this sense of the word. ticularly new. The law of the three stages,
Positivism also can refer more broadly to for example, which Comte regarded as the
antimetaphysical conceptions of knowl- core of his whole sociology, can be found in
edge. Here the idea is that there can be no Turgot's work. The human mind, accord-
knowledge of "first causes" or "final ing to Turgot, developed in three stages.
causes," that there is no positive knowledge At first, when people had no idea of true
of the "essence" of things, and that all such causes, they imagined that "invisible
questions must be banned from science. beings," gods, were responsible for every-
Comte is a positivist in this sense. The ques- thing that was not done by humans. Then
tion, however, is whether he contributed philosophers started to criticize these con-
much to the formulation of this concep- ceptions, but because they also lacked suffi-
tion. He invented a word for it, but it is cient knowledge of the true connections,
doubtful whether he did much more. Posi- they proposed explanations in terms of
tivism in this sense emerged parallel to "abstract entities." Scientific explanations
classical physics. Newton wished to refrain emerged only much later with the help of
from what he called "hypothetical" ques- mathematics (Turgot 1750). Comte might
tions, i.e. questions about first or final have known this text; he certainly knew
causes. That attitude became conventional Condorcet's biography of Turgot and the
in the French Academy of Sciences during Esquisse d'un tableau historique des
the eighteenth century (Hahn 1971, p. 34), progres de l'esprit humain (1794), which
and by 1800 the explicit rejection of meta- was an elaboration of Turgot's scheme.
physics was commonly accepted in French Nor can other aspects of Comte's sociology
scientific circles (Dhombres and Dhombres (the distinction between "statics" and
1989, p. 450). "dynamics" or between "spiritual" and
Comte never disputed this development. "worldly power") be seen as important
On the contrary, he himself stressed that innovations.

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AUGUSTE COMTE AND MODERN EPISTEMOLOGY
Comte undoubtedly made contributions
to both positivism and sociology. Probably
most important were his attempts to formu-
late more systematic and more elaborate
conceptions, but interpreting them as re-
markable breakthroughs in any sense is
questionable. One may add that historically
these contributions have not been especially
significant either. Sociology became an
academic discipline and logical positivism
developed in philosophy, but in both cases
the relationship with Comte's conceptions
was almost entirely nominal. For the logical
positivists Comte hardly existed; there is
not one such thinker for whom Comte has
been important. In fact, Comte's theory
was opposed in many ways to the program
of the logical positivists. Comte rejected the
idea that there existed universal criteria by
which scientific statements could be distin-
guished once and for all from nonscientific
statements. He also rejected the reduc-
tionist ideal that was so dear to the logical
positivists. In sociology the situation was
the same. Durkheim, the sociologist who
owed most to Comte, regarded the law of
the three stages as a "historical curiosity"
(Durkheim 1975 [1915]). He was no more
strongly impressed with Comte's other
sociological insights.
COMTE'S ORIGINALITY
The conclusion, then, must be either that
Comte was a very minor figure or that
something has been overlooked. Com-
monly the first conclusion is accepted, but
that, I think, is a major mistake because
Comte's intellectual contributions cannot
be reduced to his positivism and his sociol-
ogy. To do so is to fail to recognize his
theory of the sciences; that lack of recogni-
tion is standard practice (for one of the very
few exceptions see Elias 1979). Whatever
may be the significance of his positivism
and his sociology, Comte's theory of the
sciences was both more original and histori-
cally of much greater significance. Comte
was more important as a theorist of science
than as a positivist or a sociologist. Very
briefly, one might say that Comte was the
first to have developed systematically a his-
torical and differential theory of science.
Comte, in effect, broke with the idea that
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155
science could be founded on some nonhis-
torical, logical, or (in any case) universal
principle. Accordingly he rejected virtually
all of the existing theories. Descartes had
located a foundation for knowledge in an
ahistorical subject; Leibniz had looked for
a logical foundation and unification of the
sciences; all classical theories presupposed
that there actually was a timeless and uni-
versal criterion for truth (see, for example,
McRae 1961).
Comte's epistemology broke with this
presupposition as the result of a twofold
operation. First of all, Comte historized the
question: scientific knowledge was to be
seen as a historical process. Concepts and
theories change; any statement about sci-
ence therefore should be a statement about
historical processes, not about universals.
In comparison with the earlier contribu-
tions of Turgot and Condorcet and with the
emerging historicism and Hegelian philoso-
phy in Germany, this position was not
uncommon. More original was the second
operation, whereby Comte differentiated
the sciences according to a theory about the
specific characteristics of their object. He
rejected monist or reductionist theories of
science and replaced them with a differ-
ential theory. What science was depended
on phases and stages, but also on the spe-
cific properties of the scientific object in
question. It was impossible to reduce the
different sciences to one basic type.
This differential approach, first of all,
was the establishment of a fact. With the
expansion and the enormous prestige of
science during the revolutionary period in
France, scientific differentiation accelera-
ted. The Academy of Sciences remained a
dominant institution, but was no longer the
undisputed center of scientific work. Under
the old regime the Academy of Sciences,
like other academies, had held a monopoly
on judgment. A scientist's career depended
essentially on the support of the Academy,
which also controlled the possibilities of
publication. One of the major effects of
the French Revolution was that the mono-
polistic structures (guilds and other pro-
fessional corporations) were abolished.
Universities and academies were replaced
by new institutions such as the Ecole
Polytechnique, specialized journals arose,
scientific societies were founded, and at
156
the same time conflicts became manifest
between different groups of what soon
would be "disciplines" in the modern
sense.
The new regime was a more differentiated
structure, in which the traditional "supra-
disciplinary control" (Stichweh 1984) was
weakened severely. This shift may be de-
scribed as the transition from the classical
to the modern epistemic regime. It was
accompanied by a similar change in episte-
mology (for a more detailed analysis see
Heilbron, forthcoming). Whereas theories
of science during the Enlightenment had
been based on the unity and invariability of
reason, around 1800 epistemology became
an area for competing conceptions and
divergent cognitive strategies.
In France this change led to open con-
flicts, especially between representatives of
the mathematico-mechanical disciplines
and spokesmen for the life sciences. Each
group tended to defend a form of monism.
Representatives of the mathematical sci-
ences, such as Condorcet and Laplace,
claimed that their models also were valid
for chemistry, biology, and even the
"moral sciences." With the tools of the
calculus and probability theory, mathe-
matization had become an important tool
in many areas. Condorcet's "social ma-
thematics" was only one example of this
trend. Representatives of the life sciences,
on the other hand, argued that their theo-
ries were in fact more general. Cabanis, for
instance, claimed that gravity was merely a
particular form of "affinity" or "sensibil-
ity" and that physics therefore was part of
the more general science of physiology
(Staum 1980, pp. 179-82).
Against this background, Auguste Com-
te may be seen as one of the first to have
investigated these struggles with some de-
tachment. He rejected the generalizations
of the various parties and tried to specify
the conditions under which certain methods
and procedures were more effective than
others. The result was a differential theory
of science, which was founded on the dis-
tinction between different levels of com-
plexity. Astronomers studied the geometry
and the mechanics of celestial bodies; these
were fairly simple phenomena. Physics was
a more complex and less unified field that
could not be reduced to mechanics. Phy-
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SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
sical phenomena (light, heat, electricity,
magnetism), however, were simple enough
for adequate mathematical description.
Chemists studied matter at the level of
molecular "composition" and "decompo-
sition." These processes were subject not
only to the laws of mechanics and physics,
but also to what were called "chemical
affinities." Biologists studied living beings,
which were more complex than dead bodies.
Their conduct could not be explained solely
by physical forces and chemical affinities
because it depended primarily on the "or-
ganization" of the body. Social phenomena
were yet more complicated because human
beings had the capacity to learn. In that
respect they differed from other living
creatures.
The sciences, Comte argued, formed a
series of increasing complexity and decreas-
ing generality. The laws of mechanics and
physics were fairly simple and were valid
for all natural phenomena, big or small,
dead or alive. Chemistry was more complex
and less general. There were many physical
phenomena without chemical effect, but
no chemical phenomena without physical
effects. The laws of biology were more
complex, and were valid only for living
bodies. The laws of human societies were
still more complex and less general. Human
beings formed, so to speak, the smallest
subset of natural phenomena.
This series of increasing complexity,
according to Comte, also explained the his-
torical development of the sciences. The
human mind first discovered the principles
of the simplest objects. Knowledge of more
complex objects was acquired only after the
simpler phenomena had become known.
Chemistry became a positive science only in
the eighteenth century. Biology was in the
process of becoming and science; in socio-
logy the first steps had yet to be taken.
This basic idea of a differential series of
the sciences was elaborated in detail in
Comte's Cours de Philosophie Positive,
which appeared in six volumes between
1830 and 1842. Comte's theory basically
concerned the relationships between differ-
ent sciences. He recognized, of course, that
the sciences had characteristics in common;
he discussed this matter in the first lesson of
the Cours, where one finds Comte's posi-
tivism. Yet these six volumes were not
AUGUSTE COMTE AND MODERN EPISTEMOLOGY
about what the sciences had in common.
Contrary to what is generally assumed, they
were not concerned with the demarcation
between science and metaphysics. The
Cours tried to explain how recent develop-
ments in the sciences could be interpreted in
the light of the ontological scheme that
Comte had developed earlier. Thus the
Cours de Philosophie Positive is not a
positivist textbook, and positivism (in the
sense of an antimetaphysical conception of
knowledge) is not the principal subject of
the book. The Cours presents essentially an
elaboration of a historical and differential
theory of science.
If this interpretation is valid, Auguste
Comte can be described as one of the very
first modern epistemologists. His differ-
ential approach to scientific knowledge
implied a radical rejection of any claim for
scientific monopolies. It also put an end to
the illusion of universal methods. This
antireductionist form of theorizing was an
extremely important intellectual break-
through. Therefore what must be explained
is not so much Comte's positivism or soci-
ology as the rise of this theory.
THE DYNAMICS OF THE COMTEAN
PROJECT
Comte grew up in a period when French
science flourished as never before. Around
1800 Paris became the center of the scien-
tific world. This was true for almost all
fields, but especially for the mathematical
disciplines.
At school Comte had been most impressed
by his mathematics teacher, and at the age
of 14 he began to prepare for the entrance
examinations for the Ecole Polytechnique.
Seventy-five candidates were admitted
to the prestigious school. Comte placed
fourth; three Parisians had done better (for
Comte's biography see Gouhier 1933-41).
In 1814 Comte left Montpellier, his home
town; after a journey of 16 days he arrived
in Paris to start his studies. Among his
teachers were some of the best-known scien-
tists of the time, and his first letters to
friends show an enormous enthusiasm and
excitement.
Barely two years later, a crucial event
occurred, which would change Comte's life
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157
in an unexpected manner. The Ecole Poly-
technique was closed down, and the pupils
were sent home. A conflict between the stu-
dents and an authoritarian tutor had been
the beginning of a student rebellion. In the
midst of this conflict 15 pupils asked the
man to leave the school; among them was
Auguste Comte. The directors of the school
thought it necessary to demonstrate their
firmness because they needed the support of
the Restoration government that had just
come to power. They demanded that the
government expel the 15 pupils. The gov-
ernment, in turn, used the situation to close
the whole school, which was suspected of
republican and Napoleonic sympathies.
Comte was forced to return to Mont-
pellier. He took some courses there at the
Faculty of Medicine, but soon Paris proved
to be irresistible. He went back to the
capital, and from that time earned his living
by giving private lessons in mathematics.
Occasionally he thought of finding a better
job. He was employed by Saint-Simon for
some months; he had a plan to go to
England; he dreamed of a chair; but for 16
years he continued giving his lessons. Not
until after the Revolution of July 1830 did
he begin to work as a tutor at the Ecole
Polytechnique. By then, however, his theo-
ry already was formulated; it needed only
elaboration and recognition.
A closer look at these years makes it
possible to reconstruct the steps that
resulted in his theory. The first systematic
outline can be found in a piece published in
1822; thus the theory essentially had
emerged in the six previous years. In this
period Comte struggled with two problems;
both were linked to his exclusion from the
Ecole Polytechnique.
The first problem was political; Comte
blamed the Bourbon Restoration for his
expulsion. His very first text is a violent
attack on the "terrible league of kings and
priests." Almost immediately afterward,
however, Comte raised the question of a
more scientific approach to politics and
society. In early articles he clearly drew on
Saint-Simonian arguments, but his work
differs in tone and style from the prophetic
declarations of his master. His views corre-
sponded to those of the liberal opposition,
but they were not merely political com-
ments. He wrote a text on tax reform which
158
actually is an analysis of the function of
taxes in industrial society. He also wrote a
critical note about the role of liberal politi-
cians, in which he stated that it is not pos-
sible to analyze and participate in politics
at the same time. Thus even these early
political texts revealed the attitude and the
dispositions of a scientist, or in any case
someone who was used to reasoning in a
way that was very different from Saint-
Simon's.
The second problem that concerned
Comte was mathematics, which was the
basis of the training at the Ecole Polytech-
nique. Most of the leading scientists in
France were mathematicians, and they had
been either teachers or pupils at the school.
Their reputation was due largely to what
has been described as the "burst of mathe-
matization" in the first quarter of the
nineteenth century (Kuhn 1976). French
scientists firmly dominated this develop-
ment, of which Laplace was the leading
figure (Fox 1974; Grattan-Guinnness 1981).
Mathematics also was the science that
Comte knew best. He did not doubt its sig-
nificance, but he became increasingly cri-
tical about the way in which mathematical
tools were used. He also was critical about
the unlimited claims that were made in the
name of mathematics. What was needed, he
thought, was a theory of mathematics that
also would account for its limitations. Such
a theory would be useful both to scientists
and to teachers of mathematics. Being lib-
erated from the routines of the school,
Comte felt that he perceived the imperfec-
tions of the school and of its mathematical
spirit more clearly than other people. The
book he planned on the subject, however,
was never written. He abandoned it after
writing about 80 pages because he soon dis-
covered that a theory of mathematics would
have to be based on the role of mathematics
in science, and an explanation of that role
would require a theory of science rather
than a theory of mathematics.
In 1819 Comte was convinced that he had
formulated the problem in a new way and
that he was reaching an interesting solu-
tion. The "learning years" were over, he
wrote to a friend, and to mark the transi-
tion he changed his name from Isodore to
Auguste.
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SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
In a letter, the 21-year-old Comte
explained to a friend that most mathemati-
cians were merely "calculating machines."
They were preoccupied with a few very
special questions, and did not even under-
stand why the methods they applied were so
effective. If they had some knowledge of
other sciences and other methods, they
would understand their own work better
and would not pretend that all scientific
problems had a mathematical solution
(Comte 1973 [1819]). Comte had in mind
specifically the biomedical sciences. For
these disciplines, which were not taught in
the Ecole Polytechnique, the term "bio-
logy" was coined between 1800 and 1802.
The introduction of a new term as a general
designation for botany, zoology, and medi-
cine was part of a struggle for scientific
recognition. Lamarck, who introduced the
term in France, had opposed the efforts of
mathematical physicists in this domain and
he strongly rejected the validity of their
approach. A similar position had been for-
mulated by Bichat, who belonged to the
so-called Montpellier school. Comte refer-
red often to Bichat and called him the true
founder of biology; in the positivist calen-
dar it is Bichat rather than Galileo, Newton,
or Laplace who figures as the patron of
modern science.
The Montpellier version of biology is an
important clue to the Comtean theory of
the sciences. According to Bichat, living
organisms differ from inorganic phenom-
ena because they are irregular. Therefore in
biology it is impossible to look for the same
kind of regularities as in mechanics. Math-
ematical models are inappropriate, and
biology should be an independent science
based on the study of "vital principles" or
"vital forces" (see Canguilhem 1983, pp.
75-80).
Comte was not an unconditional admirer
of this concept. He reformulated certain
aspects, but basically he agreed with it.
With the recognition of biology as a science
different from physics, Comte acquired a
fruitful analogy by which to redefine the
status of social science: Social science
would be to biology what biology was to
chemistry. This reasoning can be found
almost literally in a note written by Comte
in 1819. The note is titled "On the attempts
AUGUSTE COMTE AND MODERN EPISTEMOLOGY
that have been undertaken to found the
social science on another science" (in
Comte 1970b [1817], 473-82).
If the analogy with biology was to be
followed, what were the specific character-
istics of social phenomena as compared to
biological phenomena? The answer can be
found in a text about Condorcet, written in
the same year. The progressive develop-
ment of civilization, or the law of progress,
is the dominant force in the human world.
It was, in a way, the "vital principle" in the
life of human beings; according to Comte,
it was to Condorcet's credit that he had
discovered it.
Thus Bichat's concept of biology was
the clue to Comte's theory of the sciences.
The theory of the sciences, in turn, was the
solution to the two problems with which
Comte struggled: mathematics and politics.
In his epistemology they form the two ends
of the chain.
One may add that Comte's understand-
ing of biology also was crucial for his
sociology. His sociological conceptions
depended strongly on biological notions,
and his sociological vocabulary is essen-
tially a transposition of biological concepts.
Comte recognized that sociology was a dif-
ferent science from biology, and that the
law of the three stages was the specific prin-
ciple of human society. Yet although he
never ceased to stress this point, his notion
of historical processes remained biological.
Progress was the development of order;
dynamics, for that matter, were subordi-
nated to statics. Comte borrowed this idea
from biology, a biology that was not evolu-
tionist but "preformist," and in which
developments were seen as the realization of
a pre-existing entity. The appropriate
images for this mode of thinking were
embryos and germs (Canguilhem et al.
1985, pp. 22-25).
A CRITIQUE OF MATHEMATICAL
REASON
Comte's theory was the outcome of a
dilemma. It was the work of a man thor-
oughly trained in the mathematical and
physical sciences, who had been virtually
expelled from the scientific community and
excluded from the career possibilities that
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159
his education normally offered. From the
beginning, Comte's intention was critical;
he wanted to write a critique of mathemati-
cal reason. Yet it was no less typical of his
project that this critique would be con-
structive. It would be based on science and
would be addressed to the very people who
formed the object of his criticism. Comte
did not recognize any reference group other
than these mathematically trained physi-
cists at the Ecole Polytechnique and the
Academy of Sciences. He did not try to
find a position anywhere else, and he
maintained that biologists and sociologists
should learn mathematics and physics
before starting to work on more complex
objects.
Comte tried to convince his former col-
leagues that they unjustly claimed a mono-
poly on scientificity. There were other
positive sciences, in which physicists could
learn other procedures than those to which
they were accustomed. From biologists they
could learn the comparative method; from
sociologists they could learn the historical
method. To think that there were math-
ematical methods for these sciences was to
strive for "impossible perfection," as
Comte said in his early texts. His later
formulations were less diplomatic; in the
Cours he rejected probability theory be-
cause he saw it as an instrument of mathe-
maticians with which to dominate the other
sciences.
On the other hand, Comte did not agree
with the biologists' claim to independence.
Increasing complexity also meant increas-
ing dependency. Living beings depended on
chemical and physical processes, whereas
physics and chemistry did not depend on
biology. Biological phenomena formed a
specific level of reality, but this was not an
independent level. Nor was it an antago-
nistic level, as Bichat had supposed. The
struggle between the forces of life and the
forces of death was a vitalist myth that
Comte did not accept. Instead he did much
to find concepts that could bridge the gap
between the organic and the inorganic. His
idea was that of "relatively autonomous"
sciences. Comte formulated this idea, al-
though he did not use this expression, which
seems to be very recent. (It is found in the
work of Louis Althusser and Norbert Elias,
160
both of whom have expressed their admira-
tion for Comte.)
It is not possible to state exactly when
and how Comte discovered the work of the
biologists. Yet one could say that sooner or
later he would have had to assimilate their
work because it was the only critique of
mathematical physics that was scientifically
sound. There were many other forms of
critique, but Comte was never tempted by
the antiscientific romanticisms of Cha-
teaubriand or by the theological resistance
to science of de Maistre and de Bonald.
What Saint-Simon wrote about science
must have been like science fiction to
Comte, and for spiritualist philosophers
such as Victor Cousin he had a deep
contempt.
Comte adhered to a strict idea of positive
science, and his proposals were addressed
to the established scientists. This persever-
ance is linked to the fact that he had no
resources other than his scientific abilities.
Coming from a relatively humble social
background, he had no economic resources.
Being a native of Montpellier, he had very
few relatives in Paris, and he thought of
himself as incapable of moving in Parisian
circles. In this world he was condemned to
"philosophical observations," as he once
wrote in a letter in which he described his
visit to a ball. He did not dance, and he did
not like the "gens comme ilfaut." What he
had was his scientific capital, and his whole
strategy in the beginning was aimed at
accumulating this kind of capital in a
particular way.
Comte's theory emerged from the ten-
sions between a scientist and the scientific
establishment from which he was partially
excluded. The distance allowed him to see
what insiders did not see and what outsiders
could not see with sufficient precision. By
elaborating these insights he hoped to win
back what had been taken from him, and in
fact, his first work was fairly well received.
In 1826 he made another move and started
his course in "positive philosophy." A few
prominent members of the Academy of Sci-
ences were present at the opening session.
In 1830 the first volume of the Cours
appeared in print; by 1838, however,
having reached the fourth volume, Comte
wrote that there was no longer any hope
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SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
that his project would gain recognition.
The scientists were interested only in their
own specialties and in their careers, and
other intellectuals were even worse. For
reasons of "mental hygiene," Comte
stopped reading other work. This act sym-
bolized his relationship with the intellectual
world. It announced a new dynamic-a
search for a new audience and for other
possibilities and pleasures.
What Auguste Comte had offered was
too critical for the scientific establishment
and too scientific for men of letters and
philosophers. In the humane sciences in
France, half a century passed before the
Comtean epistemology was taken up again.
CONCLUSION
Comte's theory of the sciences was a
detailed elaboration of a historical and dif-
ferential theory of science. It was opposed
to any form of cognitive absolutism; how-
ever strange it may seem, Comte thought of
himself as a relativist. "Tout est relatif,
voild la seule chose absolue" was a favorite
maxim of the young Comte (see, for exam-
ple, Comte 1970b [1817]). For Comte this
"relativism" was related to the historical
nature of science and to his differential
ontology of the sciences. The theory was
formulated in opposition to different forms
of absolutism, but because it presented an
ontological scheme, it also was opposed to
the intellectual voluntarism that spokesmen
of the literary intelligentsia propagated.
Chateaubriand and later romantics adhered
to the cult of the creative genius. Against
such forms of intellectual voluntarism,
Comte's theory presented an account of the
sciences that was formulated in terms of the
degree of complexity and generality of their
object. Ultimately the issue is whether there
is a need and a possibility for such a form of
ontology. If this is the case, Comte's con-
ception certainly has not lost its relevance.
The difference in levels of complexity is
a central issue in any discussion of the
ontological questions of science, and it
is a central topic again in contemporary
epistemology.
Comte's historical and differential
theory of science inaugurated an original
tradition in epistemology. This tradition
AUGUSTE COMTE AND MODERN EPISTEMOLOGY
may be regarded as specifically French.
It started to develop at the end of the
nineteenth century, when academic philo-
sophers such as Boutroux began to be inter-
ested in Comte's work. Ever since that
time, French history and philosophy of sci-
ence have been closely intertwined. This
historical epistemology, as it has been
called, replaced the search for logical foun-
dations with a problematic in which pro-
cesses of concept formation and theory
building were analyzed as historically and
regionally bound. This mode of analysis,
represented by Bachelard and Canguilhem,
continued something that began with
Auguste Comte and that was opposed-
curiously enough-to the logical positivism
which had come to dominate the Anglo-
American world. This tradition was used by
Althusser to reinterpret Marx, was renewed
by Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu,
and is present in the assumptions of many
French works. In this respect Comte's work
may be said to represent a tacit reference
for quite a few leading French intellectuals.
The French reception of Kuhn's work, for
example, which has astonished foreign
observers, can be understood only with
reference to the Comtean tradition in the
sense outlined above.
If Auguste Comte is seen in this way, one
cannot easily overestimate his significance.
Yet this is not the whole story. In fact,
Comte's theorizing contained a fundamen-
tal shortcoming. This was not so much his
"positivism" or his "internalism" as his
objectivism. Comte's approach was limited
to a theory about the subject matter of the
different sciences. It gave no real account
of the subjects of scientific work or the
social practices in which they are involved.
For Comte science was an activity of
humanity; the only way in which he could
explain why certain people discover certain
things at a certain time was by referring to
his levels of complexity: the human mind
necessarily discovered simple things before
more complex phenomena. That is a poor
explanation for the actual development of
the sciences. By eliminating the scientists
from science, Comte eliminated all the
problems of interpretation and sociability,
of hermeneutics and sociology. Recent
work has made it quite clear that these
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161
dimensions, which are related to scientific
actors and to the social arrangements that
they form, should be included in any ade-
quate theory of science. Yet there is no
reason why such a theory should be incom-
patible with a historical and differential
epistemology such as Comte proposed.
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