Uy vs.

BIR Search and Seizure – Requisites of a Valid Search Warrant

In Sept 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former employee of UPC reported to the BIR that Uy Chin Ho aka Frank Uy, manager of UPC, was selling thousands of

cartons of canned cartons without issuing a report. This is a violation of Sec 253 & 263 of the Internal Revenue Code. In Oct 1993, the BIR requested

before RTC Cebu to issue a search warrant. Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a warrant on the same day. A second warrant was issued which contains the

same substance but has only one page, the same was dated Oct 1 st 2003. These warrants were issued for the alleged violation by Uy of Sec 253. A

third warrant was issued on the same day for the alleged violation of Uy of Sec 238 in relation to sec 263. On the strength of these warrants, agents of

the BIR, accompanied by members of the PNP, on 2 Oct 1993, searched the premises of the UPC. They seized, among other things, the records and

documents of UPC. A return of said search was duly made by Labaria with the RTC of Cebu. UPC filed a motion to quash the warrants which was

denied by the RTC. They appealed before the CA via certiorari. The CA dismissed the appeal for a certiorari is not the proper remedy.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of UPC and Uy in a way for it ordered the return of the seized items but sustained the validity of the warrant. The SC ruled

that the search warrant issued has not met some basic requisites of validity. A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing

constitutional and statutory provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are:

(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;

(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person;

(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may

produce; and

(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.

The SC noted that there has been inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched as indicated in the said warrants. Also the thing to be

seized was not clearly defined by the judge. He used generic itineraries. The warrants were also inconsistent as to who should be searched. One

warrant was directed only against Uy and the other was against Uy and UPC. The SC however noted that the inconsistencies wered cured by the

issuance of the latter warrant as it has revoked the two others.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and

for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by

the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be

searched and the persons or things to be seized.

People vs. CA Search Warrant – Place to be Searched is Controlling

In December 1995, Quezon City PNP applied for a search warrant before the QC RTC against   Azfar Hussain  who had allegedly in his possession

firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. A warrant was

issued the next day by J Bacalla not at AVS but at AVS, Apt. 1 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan – Apt 1 is

immediately adjacent to AVS. The PNP then proceeded to search the said apartment where they seized money, some clothings, 4 Pakistani nationals

including Hussain and some explosives. The Pakistanis petitioned before J Casanova that the search warrant is invalid for there is a discrepancy in the

place described and place indicated in the warrant. AVS is not in any way the same as Apt 1 for Apt 1 is totally separate. J Casanova quashed the

search warrant and ordered the return of the things seized and at the same time ordered the seized things to be inadmissible as evidence. Prosecutor

Chiong moved that the decision be reversed. The CA affirmed the decision of J Casanova. Chiong averred that the policemen who did the search has

acted on their knowledge. The PNP actually knew that the Pakistanis are indeed residing in Apt 1 and not in the AVS.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued.

HELD: The SC affirmed the decision of the CA. The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers’ own

personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the

Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It

would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the

door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from

them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot

be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.

People vs. Aruta Search and Seizure – Informer’s Tip

In the morning of 13 Dec 1988, the law enforcement officers received information from an informant named “Benjie” that a certain “Aling Rosa” would be

leaving for Baguio City on 14 Dec 1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large volume of marijuana;   At 6:30 in

the evening of 14 Dec 1988, Aruta alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag even as the informant pointed her out to the law

enforcement officers;  NARCOM officers approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents;  When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents

of her travelling bag, she gave the same to him;  When they opened the same, they found dried marijuana leaves;  Aruta was then brought to the

NARCOM office for investigation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conducted search and seizure is constitutional.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Aruta and has noted that some drug traffickers are being freed due to technicalities. Aruta cannot be said to be

committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Aruta was merely crossing the street and was not acting

in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only

when the informant pointed to Aruta and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The

NARCOM agents would not have apprehended Aruta were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on

record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the

informant. The SC could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure.

Neither was there any semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests. Consequently, there was no

legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of Aruta’s bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having

been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being

not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-

appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are “fruits of a poisoned tree” and, therefore,

must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.

People vs. Montilla Political Law – Search and Seizure – Informer’s Tip – Warrantless Arrest

On 19 June 1994 at about 2pm, police officers Talingting and Clarin were informed by an asset that a drug courier would be arriving from Baguio to

Dasmariňas carrying an undetermined amount of marijuana. The next day, the informant pointed at Montilla as the courier who was waiting in a waiting

shed Brgy Salitran, Dasmariňas. Montilla was then apprehended and he was caught in possession of a bag and a carton worth 28 kilos of marijuana.

Montilla denied the allegation and he said he came to Cavite from Baguio for work and he does not have any effects with him at that time except for

some pocket money. He was sentenced to death thereafter. He averred that the search and seizure conducted was illegal for there was no warrant and

that he should have been given the opportunity to cross examine the informant. He said that if the informant has given the cops the information about his

arrival as early as the day before his apprehension, the cops should have ample time to secure a search warrant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest conducted is legal.

HELD: The SC ruled that the warrantless arrest is legal and so was the warrantless search. Sec 2 Art 3 of the Constitution has its exception when it

comes to warrantless searches, they are:

(1) customs searches;

(2) searches of moving vehicles,

(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;

(4) consented searches;

(5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;

(6) “stop and frisk” measures  have been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.

In the case at bar, it should be noted that the information relayed by informant to the cops was that there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay

Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio in the “early morning” of June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the policemen were not pressed for time, this

would be beside the point for, under these circumstances, the information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the

corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there is an indication that the informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal that he knew him by

name.

On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a warrant, assuming that they could readily have access to a judge

or a court that was still open by the time they could make preparations for applying therefor, and on which there is no evidence presented by the

defense. In determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling but all the coincident and ambient

circumstances should be considered, especially in rural areas.

A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the

offender

(1) dangerous weapons, and

(2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.

People vs. Racho 626 SCRA 633, August 3, 2010

Facts:

On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent reported the

transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team to apprehend the appellant. The team members posted themselves along the

national highway in Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the
confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with, and when the latter was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and

invited him to the police station as he was suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled out his hands from his

pants’ pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened

, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug. The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation and the confiscated

specimen was marked in the presence of appellant. The field test and laboratory examination son the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive

results for methamphetamine hydrochloride. Appellant was charged in two separate informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for

transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs.During the arraignment, appellant pleaded

"Not Guilty" to both charges.

On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 but acquitted him of the charge

of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The appellant brought the case to SC assailing for the first

time he legality of his arrest and the validity of the subsequent warrantless search.

Issue:

Whether or not the appellant has a ground to assail the validity of his arrest.

Held:

The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition,

that the accused perform some overt act thatwould indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Wefind

no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.Appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. Neither

did thearresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested hadcommitted, was committing, or about to commit

an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had justalighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any

suspiciousmanner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that hewas committing or intending to

commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by the informant,appellant would not have been apprehended and no search would have been

made, and consequently, thesachet of shabu would not have been confiscated. Neither was the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would

allow them to do away with therequisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their office received

the "tipped information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not

only the appellant’s physical description but also his name. Although it was not certain that appellant

would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was an assurance that he would be there the following day(May 20). Clearly, the police had ample

opportunity to apply for a warrant.

People vs. Aminnudin [GR L-74860, 6 July 1988] First Division, Cruz (J): 3 concur

Facts: Idel Aminnudin y Ahni was arrested on 25 June 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 p.m., in Iloilo City. The PC

officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their

headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination.

When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the information was

amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. Both were arraigned and

pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers

absolving her after a "thorough investigation." The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against Aminnudin, who was eventually convicted, and

Narratives (Berne Guerrero) sentenced to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00.

Issue: Whether there was ample opportunity to obtain a warrant of arrest against Aminnudin, for alleged possession and transport of illegal drugs.

Held: It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they had no warrant when they arrested

Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who

reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time they received the tip, one saying it
was two days before the arrest (this was the declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr.), another two weeks and a third

"weeks before June 25." There was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by him of the existence of

probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, Aminnudin was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just

been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with

the obtention of the warrant. The present case presented no urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at

least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name

was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a

judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The

Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that

"search warrant was not necessary."

People v. Malmstedt (1991)

Malmstedt (defendant) entered the Philippines in 1988. In 7 May 1989, defendant went to Baguio and the
following day, went to Sagada and stayed there for 2 days. The NARCOM set up checkpoints near Sagada.
Information was received that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.
Malmstedt’s bus was stopped and NARCOM members conducted inspection. CIC Galutan noticed a bulge
on defendant’s waist and suspecting that it was a gun, he asked for defendant’s passport and other
documents but the latter failed to comply. Thereupon, Galutan ordered defendant to bring out whatever
it was that was bulging on his waist. It turned out to be a pouch bag, which contained 4 suspiciouslooking
objects wrapped in brown packing tape. The wrapped object contained hashish, a derivative of
marijuana.
Malmstedy was thus convicted for a violation of Dangerous Drug Act of 1972. The SC upheld the search
and the conviction. There was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then
and there committing a crime, arising from a) persistent reports of drugs being transported from Sagada,
b) information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that day had drugs, and c) there was a bulge on
the waist of defendant and he failed to present his passport. Malmstedt, at the time of the arrest, was
actually in possession of illegal drugs, and thus caught in flagrante delicto. As there was a valid
warrantless arrest, there was a lawful search even without a search warrant.

Sonehill vs Diokno Search and Seizure – General Warrants – Abandonment of the Moncado Doctrine

Stonehill et al and the corporation they form were alleged to have committed acts in “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.” By the strength of this allegation a search warrant was issued against their persons and their corporation.
The warrant provides authority to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize
and take possession of the following personal property to wit:

“Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers).”

The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into (2) major groups, namely:

(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and

(b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

Stonehill averred that the warrant is illegal for:

(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;

(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;

(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them;

(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and

(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law.

The prosecution counters, invoking the Moncado doctrine, that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners’ consent; and (3) that, in
any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against them. In short, the criminal cannot be set free just because the government blunders.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. The SC emphasized however that Stonehill et al cannot assail the validity of the search warrant issued
against their corporation for Stonehill are not the proper party hence has no cause of action. It should be raised by the officers or board members of the
corporation. The constitution protects the people’s right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides; (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to
be seized. In the case at bar, none of these are met. The warrant was issued from mere allegation that Stonehill et al committed a “violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.” In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who
issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against
whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the
applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to
convict anybody of a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,” — as alleged in the
aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes.
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of
the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:

“Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.”
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of Stonehill et al, regardless of whether the
transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of Stonehill et al and the aforementioned corporations, whatever
their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as
tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. The Moncado doctrine is likewise abandoned and the right of the accused
against a defective search warrant is emphasized.

Bache vs Ruiz Search and Seizure – Personal Examination of the Judge

On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to J Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against

petitioners for violation of Sec 46(a) of the NIRC, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sects 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and

authorizing Revenue Examiner de Leon make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter. The next day, de Leon and his

witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the search warrant. At that time J Ruiz was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his

Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, J Ruiz was informed that the depositions had

already been taken. The stenographer read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, J Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and

warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. J  Ruiz signed de Leon’s application for

search warrant and Logronio’s deposition. The search was subsequently conducted.

ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Bache on three grounds.

1.  J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.

Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a

probable cause.

2.  The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.

The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. As ruled in Stonehill “Such is the seriousness of the

irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules

of Court that ‘a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense.’ Not satisfied with this qualification, the

Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that ‘no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.

3.  The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.

The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in the Search Warrant

“Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for

payments received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business

communications, accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign

remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.”

The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the

warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized.

A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will

ordinarily allow or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and

seizure or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.

Secretary of Justice vs Marcos Search and Seizure

On March 31, 1971, Amansec went to Baguio and passed by a house at 47 Ledesma Street, Baguio; he was attracted by the sight of several persons

inside the house; he peeped from outside the house and when the curtain was moved he saw a Buddha that was inside the house; he observed what

was going on inside the house and he heard someone say that the golden Buddha was actually for sale and when he observed them closer he

overheard that it was being offered for sale for 100,000 pesos by Rogelio Roxas; he saw the Buddha and firearms and some bullets inside the house. By

these facts, Colonel Calano requested for a warrant from J Marcos at about 12 midnight on Apr 4, 1971. Due to the urgency he issued the warrant. And

eventually the golden Buddha and some firearms were seized from Roxas’s house. Santos assailed the warrant averring that the search warrant was not
limited to one offense covering both illegal possession of firearms and violation of Central Bank rules and regulations; that it did not particularly describe

the property to be seized; that he did not carefully examine under oath the applicant and his witnesses; that articles not mentioned were taken; and that

thereafter the return and the inventory although appearing to have been prepared on said date were not actually submitted to respondent Judge until

April 13, 1971 and the objects seized delivered only about a week later on April 19.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued by Judge Marcos is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor Judge Marcos and had basically affirmed the decision of appellate Judge Gatamaitan. Taking into consideration to nature

of “the articles so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could be given, particularly because it is difficult to give a

particular description of the contents thereof, The description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law who

executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to Identify the articles in question, which he did,’ … so that here, since certainly, no

one would be mistaken in Identifying the Buddha, whose image is well known, and even the firearms and ammunition because these were those without

permit to possess, and all located at 47 Ledesma St., Baguio City, so far as description was concerned, the search warrant perhaps could not be said to

have suffered fatal defects.

Castro vs Pabalan constitutional law, search and seizure, search warrant

Facts: Judge Pabalan ordered the issuance of a search warrant despite failure of the application of Lumang or the warrant itself to specify the offense, to

examine the applicant as well as his witnesses on the part of the Judge, and to describe with particularity the place to be searched and the things to be

seized. Judge never refuted the assertions when required to answer. Application alleged that applicants wee informed and claimed that they verified the

report that Maria Castro and Co Ling are in possession of narcotics and other contraband in Barrio Padasil, Bangar, La Union without specifying the

particular place in the Barrio. No complete description of the goods and inquiry was brief. Upon actual search, it turned out that it was in Barrio Ma.

Cristina and not in Padasil.

Issue: Whether or not the search warrant is validly issued.

Held: Search warrant issued illegal for violation of the 1935 Constitution and the Rules of Court because the two basic requirements are not complied

with: (a) no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, (b) the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized, thus, a general warrant.

However, things seized cannot be returned and shall be destroyed, except the liquors, playing cards, distilled water and five bottles of Streptomycin.