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The impact of political ideology on concern and behavior during COVID-19

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 The impact of political ideology on concern and behavior during COVID-19

Eric Joseph van Holm*

evanholm@uno.edu

Jake Monaghan**

Dan C. Shahar**

J.P. Messina**

Chris W. Surprenant**

University of New Orleans

Urban Entrepreneurship and Policy Institute
Department of Political Science*
Department of Philosophy**

Keywords: COVID-19; Coronavirus; political ideology; behavior; social distancing

April 2020 Draft

Abstract: Beliefs about objective matters of fact are caused in no small part by political identity. This includes
beliefs regarding the seriousness of the COVID-19 pandemic, which tend to align with ideological
commitments. These linkages between beliefs and political identity matter for behavior, and not just in the
voting booth. Decisions about whether (and how) to adopt measures like social distancing rely in part upon
how one evaluates the seriousness of the risk posed by the virus. In this paper we investigate the relationship
between one’s political ideology, sources of information and news consumption, and COVID-19 oriented
behavioral changes. We find that liberals and moderates make fewer trips than conservatives and are more
likely to change their behavior in ways suggested by government recommendations and guidelines. The results
further show little effect of state-level orders on behavior, but we do find some indication that beliefs about
the behavior of others and the existence of norms can predict behavior changes.

1
Introduction

In March 2020, the United States became the country with the most confirmed cases of COVID-19,

just a few months after the outbreak began in Wuhan, China and just weeks after hospitals were overwhelmed

in Italy. As the virus has spread across the United States, states and localities have enacted a number of policies

to attempt to slow transmission. Many jurisdictions have adopted “shelter in place” policies, ordering citizens

to stay home except to meet essential needs, forcing restaurants to restrict services to take-out or delivery,

and requiring “non-essential” businesses to either shift to remote working arrangements or close entirely. In

several states, unprecedented restrictions have been placed on the movement of non-residents. In Texas, for

example, people coming from Louisiana are required to self-quarantine for two weeks before entering public

places, while Rhode Island has used its State Troopers to set up checkpoints to record information from

drivers with New York license plates.

At the time of this paper’s writing, the precise details of COVID-19’s virology are still unknown.

However, COVID-19 is generally understood to be transmitted through respiratory droplets emitted when

people sneeze, cough, or talk. The respiratory droplets can be exhaled by one person and inhaled by another

when they are within six feet of one another (Bai et al. 2020). Additionally, the virus can live on physical

surfaces—particularly people’s hands—and pass into an individual’s body when they touch their face.

Accordingly, federal guidelines for behavioral changes in response to COVID-19 include social distancing

practices such as avoiding groups larger than ten, staying home when possible, and maintaining two meters

of distance when engaging with others. In addition, the guidelines recommend people wash their hands

frequently and for 20 seconds each time, avoid touching their faces, cough into their elbows, and disinfect

frequently used items and surfaces as often as possible.

Each of the measures enacted or recommended by governments has been controversial with the

American public. Before it was clear how severe the outbreak would be, many citizens, journalists, and

politicians downplayed the risk, with some insisting that it would be comparable to the seasonal flu. Some

2
have suggested that the “cure” of publicly mandated social distancing will have a larger impact than the virus

itself, putting millions out of work and wreaking havoc on the economy without adequate compensating

benefit. Conversely, others have condemned official responses for being complacent and lackadaisical,

needlessly imperiling citizens across the country and potentially causing thousands of unnecessary deaths.

These divisions have appeared roughly to track the major ideological divide in the United State, with liberals

and Democrats generally expressing higher levels of concern and support for more drastic policy responses

than conservatives and Republicans.

This paper investigates relationships between political ideology, risk perceptions, and behavioral

changes in response to the COVID-19 crisis. We add to a growing literature analyzing the influence of

partisanship on how people view the COVID-19 crisis. For instance, Gadarian, Goodmin, and Pepinsky

(2020) found major partisan gaps in how individuals perceive the threat of COVID-19 and officials’ responses

to it, finding that liberals were generally more concerned by the crisis. Barrios and Hochbergg (2020)

analyzed differences in Google searches for terms related to COVID-19, further demonstrating variations in

concern along partisan lines. Allcott et al. (2020) and Anderson (2020) used anonymized cellphone

geolocation data and found counties that voted in higher numbers for Republicans had practiced less social

distancing. This paper expands on these investigations by providing a more granular understanding of how

individuals’ political views and beliefs about the crisis shape the specific behavioral choices they make, yielding

insights that may prove helpful in crafting policy responses and public messaging as the crisis continues to

unfold.

In the next section we review the existing literature on partisan divides and their influence on

behavior, both in general and in the context of the COVID-19 crisis. We next review the study design before

describing our results. We find that liberals are more concerned about the public health impacts of COVID-

19 and more likely to change their behavior. The effect of partisanship on behavior is only partially mediated

by higher levels of concern and views towards government orders. We conclude by discussing the potential

3
implications of our findings for understanding the centrality of political ideology in shaping behavior and for

helping policymakers mitigate the harms of COVID-19 by influencing citizens.

Political ideology, belief, and behavior

Political ideology exercises a strong influence on individuals’ public policy preferences and

descriptive beliefs about the world. It does so in part by influencing the way people seek out information and

the levels of trust they have in various sources of information. In turn, the ways individuals acquire and

evaluate information helps shape their political outlooks (Boyle et al. 2004; Lau and Redlawsk 2006; LaMarre,

Landreville, and Beam 2009). This complicated web of causal influence generates significant differences in

how partisans think and behave in many contexts, even going beyond the domain of what we would normally

think of as “politics.”

According to a typical “folk theory” of political partisanship and ideology, individuals’ policy

preferences are based on their views regarding various descriptive and normative facts. On this theory, people

support and vote for the political parties or candidates who come closest to representing or advocating for

their preferences. Although this picture of political life has considerable intuitive appeal, recent empirical

research on voter psychology has undermined its plausibility. Instead of finding that individuals’ assessments

and preferences of policy options cause them to identify with particular political parties, researchers have

consistently found that “partisan loyalties strongly color citizens’ views about candidates, issues, and even

‘objective’ facts” (Achen and Bartels 2016, 269, 280). In other words, individuals’ commitments to a

particular partisan identity comes first, heavily influencing what individuals believe about descriptive and

normative facts, as well as which public policies they prefer.

This picture of partisanship and ideology is well illustrated by debates over the empirical facts about

climate change. Around the world, partisan affiliation and political ideology are the primary predictors for

climate change beliefs. In Australia, politicians in the (left-leaning) Labor and Green parties have beliefs that

4
better align with mainstream scientific findings than politicians in the right-leaning parties (Fielding et al.

2012). In the United States, citizens who are affiliated with the Democratic party and report liberal political

ideology are more likely to have beliefs consistent with mainstream findings than Republicans and

conservatives. Even among Republicans, those who self-describe as moderate are more likely to believe that

climate change is occurring—and are more likely to be worried about it—than those who self-describe as

conservative Republicans. What is more, these differences in partisan outlooks are largely resistant to

education: whereas education level is positively correlated with concern about climate change amongst liberal

Democrats, there is no such relationship amongst conservative Republicans (McCright and Dunlap 2011;

Hamilton, Hartter, and Saito 2015).

This divergence in partisan outlooks on climate change can be traced to several different sources.

One key driver is the differing levels of trust that individuals ascribe to various sources of information (Bolsen

and Druckman 2018; Leiserowitz et al. 2019b). Across a wide range of issues, Democrats are more likely

than Republicans to defer to the “consensus” findings of expert scientists in forming their beliefs (Hamilton,

Hartter, and Saito 2015; Blank and Shaw 2015). On the other hand, Republicans are most likely to be

convinced to embrace mainstream scientific findings on climate change by being engaged by other Republicans

(Benegal and Scruggs 2018). Some resistance to mainstream scientific findings may also be tied to the moral

framings with which climate change narratives are presented in popular discourse, which tend to focus on

issues of harm and care that are more deeply held by liberals than conservatives (Feinberg and Willer 2013).

Whatever the causes, these differences in outlook translate predictably into differences in how

partisans are disposed to behave. For instance, independents and democrats are much more likely to support

policies aimed at ameliorating climate change (such as a carbon tax) and to have engaged in actions as

consumers to reward and punish companies on the basis of their environmental performance (Leiserowitz et

al. 2019b; 2019a). These policy positions extend to other behaviors as well, with Republicans being less likely

to have engaged in pro-environmental behaviors such as recycling (Coffey and Joseph 2013).

5
 The effects of partisanship are not isolated to the issue of climate change. Research suggests that

beliefs about the efficacy of a counterinsurgent airstrike are better explained by political commitments than

by the “empirical nature” of the action (Silverman 2018).1 Beliefs about vaccines and trust in scientific

testimony about vaccines also appear to be heavily influenced by partisanship and political ideology

(Featherstone, Bell, and Ruiz 2019). Conservatives (especially Tea Party members) are more likely than

liberals to endorse vaccine conspiracy theories, and Democrats are more likely to trust scientists as a source

for information about vaccines, with education levels exacerbating, rather than moderating, this partisan

divide (Hamilton, Hartter, and Saito 2015).

Partisan loyalties or political identity partly creates an individual’s descriptive picture of the world,

and influences their behavior in non-political contexts. For instance, “pro-environmental behavior” such as

recycling can be explained primarily by partisan and ideological dispositions (Coffey and Joseph 2013). In

addition, a persons’ willingness to vaccinate is also influenced by their partisan ideology (Baumgaertner,

Carlisle, and Justwan 2018).

These partisan divisions can be difficult to bridge. Neuroimaging studies find that having an emotional

stake in the conclusions of reasoning about political matters can lead people to engage in “motivated

reasoning”—reasoning that seeks evidence for an already accepted conclusion rather than seeking to form a

conclusion on the basis of evidence (Westen et al. 2006). More controversially, some research has identified

a potential “backfire effect” whereby correcting a misconception which aligns with a person’s political identity

actually strengthens their belief in that misconception (Nyhan and Reifler 2010).2 The strength of these

1
The influence of partisanship has limits, of course. In warzones those who are close to and therefore exposed to relevant events
are less likely to have inaccurate beliefs in virtue of their partisan commitments. One’s need to have accurate information and
one’s exposure to it can be enough to overcome the effects of partisanship (Silverman and Kaltenthaler, ms.).
2
However, some of these studies (including the canonical Nyhan and Reifler study) have not replicated. Even where they do,
they do not appear to generalize well across contexts. Additionally, as Tappin and Gadsby (2019) point out, when researchers
disentangle descriptive belief from behavioral intent, they find that the former is updated appropriately in response to the new
counterevidence, even where behavior does not adjust. More recent, large scale experiments have found no evidence of backfire:
see e.g., Wood and Porter (2019) and Swire et al. (2017).

6
phenomena may be mediated by the emotional states that accompany citizens’ interactions with information.

Anger—a common emotion in contentious political domains—has been found to reduce information seeking

behavior and drive citizens to defend their preexisting beliefs in familiar disputes. On the other hand, anxiety

has been found to increase information seeking behavior and encourage more openness and willingness to

compromise (MacKuen et al. 2010; Valentino et al. 2008).

Further complicating matters are a variety of ways in which partisan differences shape how individuals

engage with various mechanisms of communication. For one thing, partisans select the news they consume

in ways that track the other differences in their thinking. Conservatives appear to pay more attention to media

outlets that embrace a highly partisan identity, whereas liberals acquire their news from outlets that have

cultivated an identity as impartial and objective (Faris et al. 2017). Likewise, supporters of Donald Trump

appear more likely than their peers to share stories on social media that have been published by known “junk

news” outlets (Narayanan et al. 2018). Partisanship also appears to predict perceptions of media bias, with

higher levels of party identification correlating with increased perception of media hostility, with a stronger

effect for Republicans than Democrats (Oh, Park, and Wanta 2011). The relationship between citizens’

partisan outlooks and their curation of information sources may work in the opposite direction as well, with

informational choices serving to deepen citizens’ partisanship (Abramowitz and Webster 2018; Levendusky

2013; though see Prior 2013). For instance, consumption of news from polarized outlets appears to

significantly affect voting behavior (Martin and Yurukoglu 2017). If political partisans access, evaluate, and

disseminate information in predictably different ways, then we might expect especially deep effects of

partisanship on behavior when the latter is especially sensitive to new information.

Preliminary results suggest that partisanship has similar effects on beliefs about COVID-19 and on

which sources of information are deemed trustworthy. Although Democrats and Republicans both report

trusting their state governments more than the federal government for information about the outbreak, the

margin of difference is larger for Democrats, whose political views put them at odds with the Trump

7
administration. Unlike in the case climate change beliefs, all partisans have reported high levels of trust in

medical professionals as sources of information (Sanders 2020). However, Democrats and Republicans have

nevertheless perceived the threat of COVID-19 differently, with Democrats more likely to be worried about

the virus than Republicans (Gadarian, Goodman, and Pepinsky 2020).

In light of the wide-ranging literature on the influence of partisanship and ideology on beliefs and

behaviors, and given the potentially life-or-death nature of partisan gulfs in the contexts of a developing public

health crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic presents an urgent opportunity for further investigation. This paper

primarily seeks to test whether political ideology has an impact on the behavioral choices people make in

response to the COVID-19 pandemic:

H1: Political ideology will influence the extent to which individuals report changing their behavior

as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Methods

We collected data for our study through a survey on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online

crowdsourcing marketplace where jobs or tasks can be listed for registered workers. MTurk has grown over

the last decade to be a common source of survey participants in the social sciences (e.g., Ahler 2014;

Arceneaux 2012; Clifford, Jewell, and Waggoner 2015; Johnston, Newman, and Velez 2015). However,

concerns have been raised about the external validity of surveys and experiments conducted on MTurk,

particularly related to the quality of the data collected and the representativeness of the sample (Clifford,

Jewell, and Waggoner 2015; Hauser, Paolacci, and Chandler 2018; Smith et al. 2016). For instance,

researchers have found that MTurk respondents are younger, better educated, and earn less than the average

American, though different surveys have found different distributions concerning the gender of respondents

(Clifford, Jewell, and Waggoner 2015; Jilke, Van Ryzin, and Van de Walle 2016; Marvel 2015; Paolacci and

Chandler 2014).

8
 To mitigate against concerns about the quality of survey responses, we included two questions to test

whether responders were paying attention to the survey (as opposed to simply selecting answers at random).

Any respondent found to answer either question incorrectly was removed from the final sample.

To address concerns with representativeness, we use weights in the final sample that account for the gender,

age, income, race, education, and political ideology of respondents in order to approximate greater

representativeness to the nation.3 In all, 1665 complete responses were received for the survey which was

available in batches between April 1st and 7th. As shown below in Figure 1, responses were recorded from 48

different states and Washington D.C..

Insert Figure 1 Here

In order to test the paper’s hypothesis, we examine patterns of behavior and behavioral change during

the COVID-19 crisis using two sets of dependent variables. The first dependent variable focuses on

individuals’ movements throughout their community, measuring how many outings each individual reported

the members of their household undertaking over the previous two days. Specifically, we asked individuals

how many times people in their household left their homes in the two days prior to taking the survey (not

including short walks or bike rides), with the option to select a specific number from 0 to 4 or “5 or more”

(coded as 5) for each day. As such, a value of 5 may underreport the number of trips those individuals have

made. However, since only 1% reported having made 5 or more trips in either of the prior two days, such

undercounting is not likely significant. Surveys were run in the morning to increase recall about trips taken,

and only two days were asked about to avoid limits on accuracy.

A second set of dependent variables examined the extent to which individuals have complied with

general federal guidelines for how Americans can help protect themselves and others. We asked whether

individuals, since hearing about the coronavirus, have more often 1) washed their hands, 2) avoided touching

3
Data on age, race, education, and income was gathered from the 2018 5-year IPUMS. Data on political ideology was gathered
from Wave 49 of the American Trends Panel survey.

9
their face, 3) sneezed into their elbow, 4) kept 6 feet between themselves and others, and 5) stayed home.

The five questions were all asked with a 4-point Likert scale from “Definitely yes” to “Definitely not”, with

“Don’t know” as a fifth option.

The dependent variables and summary statistics are listed below in Table 1.

Insert Table 1.

We first control for political ideology in order to test hypothesis 1. We identify individuals as either

liberal, moderate, or conservative (omitted) based on their response to a question asking about their political

self-identification with 5 options that ranged from very liberal to very conservative. We predict that

conservatives (conservative or very conservative) will be less likely to demonstrate altered behavior as a result

of the coronavirus crisis than liberals (very liberal or liberal) or moderates (moderate).

In order to test the relationship between concern and behavior, we include two variables related to

the health and economic impact of the crisis. The first variable is the individual’s response to the question

“How concerned are you about the impact of the coronavirus on the United States' public health system?”

with responses of ‘very concerned’ coded as a 1. The second measures a similar question asking about whether

individuals are concerned about the impact of COVID-19 on the United States’ economy, with responses

coded the same way. We predict that high levels of concern will be positively associated with behavior

changes. In addition, those that believe the government response has been correct may see acting in lines with

the government restrictions as a political act. As such, we include a variable for whether the respondent

strongly agreed that the “lockdown or shelter-in-place orders by governments in the United States were

appropriate.” The isolation of the extreme responses to these questions was determined by the high

proportion of respondents taking a strong position (64%, 70%, and 67% respectively).

Much of the direction during a pandemic comes from scientists because the situation is unfamiliar

and uncertain. As such, individuals’ reactions may differ based on how they perceive information that comes

from experts, particularly scientists, and as such their preexisting trust may have an effect. To capture this

10
the potential influence of trust in experts, we include a variable for whether the say they had either “A great

deal of trust” or “a good amount of trust” in response to the question “how much trust do you have in scientists

to act in ways that serve the common good?”

We control for media consumption with a set of dichotomous variables indicating whether their

primary source of news was tv, social media, a newspaper or news website, with all other sources as the

omitted category (radio, podcasts, or talking to others). In addition, we include a variable for whether

respondents indicated they had received either text messages, emails, or social media posts about the crises.

A final media-related variable measures how closely individuals have followed news about the coronavirus,

which is coded as a 1 if they selected “as closely as possible” or “very closely” and 0 if otherwise.

We test for an impact of social norms and beliefs about others’ behavior by including whether

respondents thought the average person in their community was definitely or probably following government

guidelines. Social scientists and philosophers often look to norms to explain behavior (Bicchieri 2016; Lapinski

and Rimal 2005) and the emergence of norms is likely an important component of the response to COVID-

19 because many of the behaviors policy makers are trying to induce are both novel and costly. The

elimination of handshaking and hugs, maintaining six feet of separation, minimizing trips to the grocery store,

and other behaviors, are all costly in the sense that people would prefer not to make those changes if they

could avoid them. Thus, we predict those believing that others are doing so themselves will be more likely

to make changes themselves.

We control for an individual’s demographics by including their race, gender, income, education,

age, and whether they were employed (outside MTurk) at the time of taking the survey. We expect that

individuals that have a high socioeconomic status, specifically higher income and college educated, will be

able to make more behavior changes than others.

Finally, we control for the status of the coronavirus crisis in the individual’s community by

controlling for (i) whether their state had issued a “shelter-in-place” or “shelter-in-home” order by the date

11
of their response and (ii) the number of confirmed cases in the respondent’s county as of the date they

responded. We collected data on state orders and county cases from open-source data published by the New

York Times. We expect that individuals in areas where the crisis is more advanced, either in terms of

individual cases or where restrictions have been put in place, will be more likely to change their behavior.

Two additional variables are included in the regression for trips to control for unique aspects of those

questions. One relates to whether individuals live alone or with others, as those not living alone may report

more trips owing to the larger number of people that constitute their household. In addition, we report

whether the days the survey is asking about are on the weekend, as such days may have different travel

patterns.

As such the model can be stated as:

!"ℎ$%&'( = !! + !" ,'-&.&/$- 01"'-'23 + !# 4'5/"(5 + !$ 6(78. &5 9:;"(.8 + !% <'(=8

+ !' >"1&$ 4'587=;.&'5 + !( ?"='2($;ℎ&/8 + !) @.$.78 &5 @.$." + A

Descriptions of the independent and control variables are available in Table 2 below.

Insert Table 2 Below

The first set of regressions on the number of trips taken is reported using ordinary least squares.

Although this dependent variable is a censored count variable, differences between OLS and a tobit regression

were minor. As such, we report results from the ordinary least squares regression to more clearly

communicate the magnitude of the effects. However, to account for any potential error introduced because

of the upper limit on the dependent variable, a censored tobit regression is reported in the appendix. The

second set of dependent variables reporting changes in behavior are all dichotomous, so logit regressions are

estimated with the coefficients reported as odds ratios. Clustered standard errors for states are reported for

both sets of regressions.

Results

12
 Insert Table 3 Here

Table 3 displays a correlation matrix for selected variables. Variation inflation factors were analyzed

for all models, and no variations exceeded 5. Owing to the large number of measures used, we exclude

demographics and state-level variables from the correlation matrix; included are those variables either related

to political ideology, or unique characteristics connected to the coronavirus crisis. Figures are only reported

for those correlations that were significant at the .01 level. As shown, being liberal had a correlation with

several of the other independent variables. Specifically, liberals were more likely to be concerned about the

public health impacts of the virus than conservatives, but not the economic impacts. In addition, liberals they

believe the lockdown orders were appropriate, trusted in scientists, got news from a newspaper or news

website, and followed news closely.

Insert Table 4 Here

In Table 4, we report the results of both a bivariate regression only controlling for political ideology,

as well as the full model below. With the initial bivariate models, we find consistent evidence that political

ideology shapes behavioral responses to COVID-19. We find that liberals not only take fewer trips than

conservatives—roughly 0.4 fewer over two days—but are also statistically more likely to report staying

home, maintaining safe distances from others, avoiding touching their faces, and sneezing into their elbows.

The full models somewhat dilute these results. However, even after controlling for concern, trust,

norms, media consumption, and demographics, liberal respondents were still twice as likely as conservatives

to report maintaining safe distances from others and staying home because of the coronavirus crisis. In

addition, differences in the number of trips taken over two days and the likelihood of reduced face-touching

both reach low levels of statistical significance. Differences between moderates and conservatives actually

strengthen with the inclusion of the full model, with results for both maintaining safe distances and staying at

home reaching statistical significance.

13
 The inclusion of other independent variables plays a significant role in explaining behavior changes as

well. Individuals who are very concerned about the public health impacts of COVID-19 reported fewer trips

over two days and higher rates of compliance with each of the five official behavioral recommendations we

examined. Strongly agreeing that the government lockdown orders were appropriate decreased the trips

taken by an individual over two days by 0.41 and raised the odds of staying home by 795%; similarly large

and significant effects are observed for the other four recommended behaviors as well.

Social expectations also appear to play some role in shaping behavior changes as well during the

COVID-19 pandemic. Those who believed others in their community were following official guidelines

reported doing so themselves at higher rates across all six models.

Media consumption has some effects in reported behavior change as well. All three types of media

tested—TV, newspapers and news websites, and social media—had a significant effect on the rate at which

respondents said they have been staying home more. Interestingly, however, none demonstrated a significant

effect on the number of trips taken. Those who get their news primarily from TV were significantly more

likely than those who use radio, podcasts, or talk to others (the omitted category) to report changing their

behavior to wash their hands more, touch their face less, and maintain safe distances more regularly.

On the other hand, many of the variables that we expected to influence individuals’ behavioral choices

did not appear to have a significant impact. In particular, the number of cases of COVID-19 in an individual’s

community had a significant influence on only one behavioral variable: the rate at which individuals reported

maintaining safe distances from others. Individuals’ receipt of direct government contact via email, text

message, or social media did not significantly drive more behavioral changes, and in fact respondents who

received these communications reported taking significantly more trips over two days than those who do not

report direct contact from the government. Individuals living in states with active shelter-in-place orders

showed no significant behavioral differences for many variables, and citizens living in these states reported

lower rates of compliance with recommendations to increase their handwashing and sneeze into their elbows.

14
Demographics have also played a largely inconsequential role in explaining behavior change during COVID-

19. Generally, demographics effects were inconsistent in direction, with few clear signals across the models.

Similarly, state level factors appear to have little effect as well. The number of cases in the county is

only significant in one model, increasing the likelihood individuals maintain safe distances. In addition, states

where stay in place orders are in force decreased the odds that individuals would report washing their hands

more and sneezing into their elbow.

Discussion

Our results support the claim that political ideology is a predictor of behavioral changes in response

to COVID-19. The bivariate regressions show consistently that liberals were more likely than conservatives

to report taking fewer trips and adopting recommended behavioral changes. These results were sustained

(though in somewhat weaker form) even after controlling for differences in individuals’ level of concern,

normative outlook, media consumption, governmental interactions, and demographics. Moreover, some of

the strongest non-ideological predictors of behavioral change in our multivariate models are themselves

correlated with being liberal. In particular, liberals were more likely to report being very concerned about

the public health impacts of COVID-19 and to strongly agree with the appropriateness of mandatory

lockdowns,. As such, it seems reasonable to think that these mediating factors are indirect effects of being

liberal. Even so, the variable for being liberal still reached at least low levels of significance in four of the six

regressions even with these variables controlled for. In addition, it should be mentioned that moderates

appeared to behave more similarly to liberals than conservatives. In the full model there were three significant

differences between conservatives and moderates. Political ideology appears to exercise a power over

individuals’ behavioral choices that goes beyond its influence on any of the mediating variables we tracked.

That said, it should be emphasized that individuals’ partisan identities are not the sole drivers of their

behavioral decisions. Across partisan lines, individuals who report higher levels of concern about the public

15
health and economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic have a higher likelihood of behavioral change. The

same is true of individuals who agree that lockdowns are appropriate and expect others to follow official

recommendations. Cultivating concern about the virus, support for public measures, and expectations of

others’ compliance thus seem like potentially efficacious strategies for increasing behavioral compliance.

Insofar as we have already seen that conservatives in particular are especially likely to change their views on

controversial issues when they are corrected by people who share their own ideology, greater efforts to

communicate by Republican party leaders and conservative media outlets stand out as potentially fruitful

mechanisms for driving change.

On the other hand, our survey indicates that governments’ efforts have thus far failed to exercise

their desired influences on citizens’ behavior. Contrary to expectations, individuals who report receiving

emails, text messages, or social media directly from the government have not reported changing their

behavior in line with official recommendations, and in fact they reported taking more trips outside their

homes than people who did not receive such communications. Even more surprising, individuals who are

living in states with official stay-at-home mandates do not report greater behavioral changes, and in fact they

are less likely to have adopted some measures than citizens whose states lack similar policies. Understanding

why governments have failed to materially affect their citizens’ decisions is essential to the success of current

efforts to control COVID-19 and to our ability to effectively manage future pandemics, and this represents a

potentially fruitful area for future research.

Yet, it is important to consider the possibility that our findings have revealed only a partial picture of

the effects of government actions. For example, one possible explanation for our findings regarding

individuals’ travel decisions is that as local governments adopt lockdowns and communicate directly with

citizens, these actions are perceived as evidence that the severity of the situation is increasing and behavioral

mandates will become stricter in the future. If citizens make inferences like these, then they may respond to

government actions by immediately leaving their homes to run errands—just in case grocery stores, gas

16
stations, and the like are shut down in the future. Likewise, people may respond to perceptions of a worsening

situation by attempting to buy supplies before others clear store shelves of essential goods. In principle,

actions like these might be compatible with individuals increasing their compliance with recommendations to

stay home after they have met their immediate needs.

Another possibility is suggested by research on willingness to self-isolate in Italy (Briscese et al.

2020). Survey results suggested that people are less willing to comply with social distancing measures if they

are “negatively surprised” or disappointed to learn about the duration of a hypothetical extension of isolation

policies. These results are compatible with our findings. Because the adoption of state-wide shelter-in-place

orders rolled out over time rather than all at once, and because messaging from the Trump administration

early on was dismissive of the threat, people may have found themselves negatively surprised by the length

and scope of the social distancing measures adopted. The beginning of the outbreak in the United States was

characterized by iteratively escalating containment measures, so that by the time the full extent of the problem

became clear, it was likely much worse than what most were expecting. If the communication strategies and

shelter-in-place policies had the effect of contributing to negative surprises or disappointment, they may have

therefore unintentionally backfired.

An additional implication of our findings relates to how effective state shelter-in-place orders are

proving. Here, we find little evidence the adoption of such orders changes behavior. That does not necessarily

mean that behavior has not changed since COVID-19 became a serious threat in the United States, but rather

that other factors are causing individuals to limit trips or follow other guidelines. The weak effects of orders

indicate that respondents, based largely on their political ideology and individual concern about the crisis, are

changing their behavior without respect to what government directives are saying. This has serious

implications for the perceived legitimacy of these orders, and for how well they will work to slow the spread

of the virus. Future work may want to examine the differentials in how citizens view these orders as

implemented.

17
 A different explanation of governments’ apparent lack of influence is that this impact has simply not

been confined to the residents of particular areas and is instead reflected in the behaviors of citizens

nationwide. Whether or not individuals have been directly contacted by governments or affected by stay-at-

home mandates, we find substantial rates of behavioral change across our sample. If individuals’ behaviors

have been influenced by communications received by other citizens or policies adopted in other jurisdictions,

then this might make it seem like these actions have been ineffective when actually they have been especially

effective. Although our study provides no evidence in favor of such a hypothesis, we cannot contradict it

either.

Contrary to the lack of an effect of government orders, we do find some evidence that norms and

beliefs about others play a role in shaping behavior during the crisis. Across models, those that believed others

were following the government restrictions reported acting more in line with the guidelines themselves.

Those results indicate that broadcasting or demonstrating how people are following the restrictions may help

to produce higher rates of those exact behaviors. However, further work studying the effect of social norms

or other devices would be valuable.

Our analysis is not without limitations. One potential limitation of our study concerns whether

individuals’ self-reported behaviors are accurate. Insofar as ideology shapes people’s beliefs and reactions

regarding COVID-19, it may bias their responses to survey questions in ways that do not translate

straightforwardly to differences in their actions. For example, if liberals believe COVID-19 to be a more

significant concern and see adopting recommended behaviors as a demonstration of their moral virtue, then

they may have provided inaccurate responses that align with their perceptions of social desirability. The

general concordance of our findings with independent geolocator data on individuals’ physical movements—

particularly the findings of Anderson (2020)—help to lessen these reservations. But the possibility that

individuals are misdescribing their behavior must nevertheless be considered when interpreting the results

we report here.

18
19
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables

Name Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Description

Trips Over Two
1.21 1.52 0 10 Number of trips taken last 2 days
Days
Stay Home 0.94 0.241 0 1 Stays home more since coronavirus
Maintains safe distance more since
Safe Distance 0.94 0.25 0 1
coronavirus
Touch Face 0.74 0.44 0 1 Touches face less since coronavirus

Wash Hands 0.93 0.25 0 1 Washes hands more since coronavirus

Sneeze into Sneezes into elbow more since
0.81 0.39 0 1
Elbow coronavirus

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Table 2. Summary Statistics for Independent Variables (after weighting)

Std.
Name Mean Min Max Description
Dev.
Liberal 0.38 0.49 0 1 Liberal or very liberal
Moderate 0.31 0.46 0 1 Moderate
Concerned About Pub. Health Very concerned about public health impacts of
0.64 0.48 0 1
Impacts coronavirus
Concerned About Economic Very concerned about economic impacts of
0.70 0.46 0 1
Impacts coronavirus
Strongly agrees that lockdown orders by
Lockdown appropriate 0.67 0.47 0 1
government were appropriate
A great deal of trust I could in scientists to act in a
Trust in Scientists 0.36 0.48 0 1
way to serve common good
Believes others in community are definitely or
Believe others in community
0.60 0.49 0 1 probably following government restrictions or
follow guidelines
guidelines
Primary News Source TV 0.31 0.46 0 1 Primary source of news is television
Primary News Source Social
0.24 0.43 0 1 Primary source of news is social media
Media
Primary News Source Primary source of news is newspaper or news
0.39 0.49 0 1
Newspaper or Website website
Received contact from government by text
Receives Government Contact 0.52 0.50 0 1
message, email, or social media
Followed news about the coronavirus as closely as
Followed News Closely 0.30 0.46 0 1
possible or very closely
White 0.67 0.47 0 1 White
Black 0.11 0.31 0 1 Black
Male 0.51 0.50 0 1 Male
$30-59k 0.33 0.47 0 1 Income is between $30k and 59.9k
$60-89k 0.16 0.36 0 1 Income is between $60k and 89.9k
Over $90k 0.12 0.33 0 1 Income is over $90k
College or Higher 0.35 0.48 0 1 Has graduated college or higher
Age 18-24 0.11 0.32 0 1 Age between 18 and 24
Age 25-34 0.23 0.42 0 1 Age between 25 and 34
Age 35-44 0.21 0.41 0 1 Age between 35 and 44
Age 45-54 0.19 0.39 0 1 Age between 45 and 54
Age 55-64 0.17 0.38 0 1 Age between 55 and 64
Employed 0.73 0.44 0 1 Is currently employed full or part-time
# Cases in County (logged) 3016 11462 0 68776 Number of cases in county (logged in model)
State has adopted shelter-in-place or stay-at-home
State had adopted SIP 0.89 0.31 0 1
order
Survey captures weekend 0.52 0.50 0 1 Survey asked about trips during a weekend day
Lives Alone 0.21 0.41 0 1 Lives alone

24
Table 3. Correlation Matrix for Selected Variables

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Liberal (1) 1
Moderate (2) -0.52 1
Concerned about pub. health impacts (3) 0.24 -0.12 1
Concerned about economic impacts (4) 0.36 1
Lockdowns Appropriate (5) 0.21 0.40 0.10 1
Trusts Scientists (6) 0.23 0.25 0.09 0.29 1
Believe others in community follow guidelines (7) 0.07 1
Primary News Source TV (8) -0.11 -0.09 1
Primary News Source Social Media (9) -0.07 -0.07 -0.38 1
Primary News Source Newspaper or Website (10) 0.14 0.08 .09 0.07 0.08 -0.51 -0.50 1
Receives Government Contact (11) 0.20 -0.18 1
Followed News Closely (12) 0.28 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.11 0.11 1

25
 Table 4. Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trips Over Stay Home Safe Touch Face Wash Hands Sneeze
Two Days Distance Elbow

Liberal -0.22* 2.46** 2.24** 1.57** 1.38 1.23

(0.11) (0.91) (0.78) (0.36) (0.55) (0.26)
Moderate -0.24* 2.33** 2.46*** 1.08 1.20 0.97
(0.13) (0.92) (0.70) (0.23) (0.44) (0.17)
Concerned about pub. health impacts -0.33*** 3.13*** 1.97** 1.51** 2.71*** 1.68***
(0.11) (0.99) (0.56) (0.26) (0.86) (0.31)
Concerned about economic impacts -0.18 3.55*** 1.58** 0.99 1.33 1.34
(0.14) (1.21) (0.35) (0.16) (0.37) (0.27)
Lockdowns Appropriate -0.41*** 8.03*** 6.27*** 1.79*** 3.17*** 2.40***
(0.10) (2.74) (2.37) (0.28) (0.86) (0.48)
Trusts Scientists 0.0052 1.49 0.76 1.03 0.81 1.62***
(0.099) (0.52) (0.27) (0.24) (0.25) (0.28)
Believe others in community follow guidelines -0.27*** 2.06*** 1.67** 1.41* 2.31*** 1.60***
(0.093) (0.40) (0.37) (0.29) (0.59) (0.29)
Primary News Source TV -0.26 4.47*** 2.51* 2.29** 3.35** 1.73
(0.28) (2.37) (1.35) (0.83) (1.61) (0.79)
Primary News Source Social Media -0.30 7.37*** 1.94 1.47 2.85** 1.52
(0.31) (3.83) (1.40) (0.53) (1.45) (0.75)
Primary News Source Newspaper or Website -0.28 3.94** 1.50 1.73 1.90 1.25
(0.28) (2.23) (0.87) (0.58) (0.87) (0.62)
Receives Government Contact 0.35*** 0.74 0.91 1.23 1.06 1.26
(0.074) (0.23) (0.23) (0.25) (0.37) (0.25)
Followed News Closely -0.093 0.89 0.94 1.53* 1.45 1.18
(0.075) (0.44) (0.36) (0.35) (0.49) (0.25)
White -0.040 1.17 1.99** 0.94 0.89 0.89
(0.12) (0.39) (0.67) (0.15) (0.37) (0.20)
Black 0.32 0.89 1.26 0.96 1.08 1.14
(0.22) (0.44) (0.56) (0.26) (0.48) (0.40)
Male 0.27** 0.82 0.75 1.00 0.80 0.76*
(0.10) (0.30) (0.19) (0.15) (0.26) (0.13)
$30-59k 0.18 1.46 0.77 1.05 1.16 1.21
(0.11) (0.55) (0.25) (0.18) (0.26) (0.29)
$60-89k 0.23* 1.74 0.69 0.91 1.66 0.91
(0.13) (0.69) (0.26) (0.26) (0.81) (0.24)
Over $90k -0.12 1.21 1.56 0.68 1.04 1.07
(0.14) (0.72) (0.67) (0.20) (0.57) (0.32)
College or Higher 0.12 0.71 0.90 1.01 0.96 1.00
(0.11) (0.17) (0.27) (0.21) (0.27) (0.13)
Age 18-24 0.056 0.48 0.37 0.68 1.26 1.64
(0.30) (0.54) (0.35) (0.31) (0.63) (0.77)
Age 25-34 0.13 0.43 0.69 0.83 0.93 1.88*
(0.24) (0.45) (0.55) (0.29) (0.57) (0.72)
Age 35-44 -0.076 0.46 0.97 0.73 1.98 1.65
(0.23) (0.48) (0.76) (0.30) (1.43) (0.68)
Age 45-54 0.13 0.46 0.57 0.76 1.57 2.02
(0.22) (0.46) (0.43) (0.26) (1.06) (0.89)
Age 55-64 -0.045 0.65 1.06 0.79 1.23 2.03
(0.20) (0.68) (1.09) (0.28) (0.81) (0.94)
Employed 0.049 1.13 1.49 2.32*** 1.54 1.40
(0.11) (0.55) (0.47) (0.48) (0.54) (0.37)
Cases in State -0.0043 1.00 1.14* 0.98 1.02 0.94
(0.024) (0.054) (0.082) (0.030) (0.063) (0.037)
State had adopted SIP -0.063 1.32 0.87 0.66* 0.83 0.55***
(0.15) (0.35) (0.33) (0.17) (0.25) (0.094)
Survey captures weekend -0.065
(0.087)
Lives alone -0.17
(0.12)
Constant 2.06*** 0.31 0.54 0.61 0.60 0.71
(0.36) (0.48) (0.64) (0.43) (0.54) (0.41)

Observations 1,665 1,665 1,665 1,665 1,665 1,665

Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.118
Pseudo R2 0.32 0.21 0.090 0.16 0.12
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

26
 Figure 1. Map of responses

27

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