THEME:

US Security and Defense Policy

1. US Security Strategies Levels

2. US Grand Strategy Dilemmas
3. Preventive war, preemption, war on terrorism and USFP
 US Security strategies levels
• Grand Strategy. An overarching strategy summarizing the
national vision for developing, applying, and coordinating all the
instruments of national power in order to accomplish the grand
strategic objectives, viz., preserve national security; bolster national
economic prosperity; and promote national values. Grand Strategy
may be stated or implied.
• National Security Strategy (also sometimes referred to as
Grand Strategy and National Strategy). The art and science of
developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national
power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to
achieve objectives that contribute to national security.
• National Military Strategy. The art and science of distributing
and applying military power to attain national objectives in peace
and war.
• Theater Strategy. The art and science of developing integrated
strategic concepts and courses of action directed toward securing
the objectives of national and alliance or coalition security policy
and strategy by the use of force, threatened use of force, or
operations not involving the use of force within a theater
 US Grand Strategy Dilemmas
• Grand strategy can be understood simply as the use of all instruments of
national power to secure the state
• It exists at a level above particular strategies intended to secure
particular ends, and above the use of military power alone to achieve
political objectives
• Grand strategy is therefore related to, but not synonymous with,
national security strategies, national military strategies, quadrennial
defense reviews, or defense strategic guidance.
• True grand strategy transcends the security pronouncements of political
parties or individual administrations.
• Its basic components include fostering strong alliances and bilateral
security arrangements; maintaining a strong and survivable nuclear
deterrent; fielding balanced, powerful and capable military forces,
dominant in each war fighting domain, that can project and sustain
military power globally and prevail in armed conflict; and providing
intelligence services that can ensure global situational awareness and
provide strategic early warning.
• These components are intrinsically linked to a powerful economy and
industrial base, advanced technology, an extensive military reserve
component, an educated and technically skilled population fit for
military service,50 and a political system that is based on classically
liberal democratic values
• Emerging nontraditional threats such as cyber
attacks, weapons of mass destruction
(whether chemical, biological, or radiological)
wielded by non-state actors, and international
terrorism now crowd the security agenda.
• Increasingly, other threats such as narco-
trafficking, illegal immigration,
environmental degradation, shifting and
unstable demographics, organized crime, and
even climate change are also cast as national
security threats.
• What does this portend for U.S. grand
strategy?
• Broadly speaking, vital or core national interests remain remarkably
consistent.
• These include the defense of U.S. territory and its citizens and that of our
allies, supporting and defending our constitutional values and forms of
government, and promoting and securing the U.S. economy and standard of
living.
• The broad threats that confront US have deep roots but have also evolved
over time. In order of importance, they can be summarized as:
 Use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against the homeland. These
could be nuclear, biological, chemical, cyber, or explosive/ kinetic in nature
(such as the 9/11 attacks) delivered by either state or non-state actors;
 Economic disruption from without. The crash of 2008 was largely self-
induced, but the health and stability of the U.S. economy could also be
affected by the actions of foreign powers;
 The rise of a hostile peer competitor. The U.S. “rebalance” to Asia and
opposition to Chinese territorial moves in the East and South China seas can
be seen as an attempt to counter the rise of China in a manner consistent with
longstanding U.S. grand strategy;
 Direct challenges to key allies. Alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and bilateral security arrangements with close allies
such as Japan and South Korea constitute solemn commitments that extend
American power and influence globally. To preserve international stability
and deter conflict, they must be honored. U.S. leaders can be expected to act
decisively when close allies are directly threatened etc.
• The United States, along with other great powers, seeks to provide
for its own security by maximizing its power relative to potential
and actual adversaries, within limits imposed by its domestic
politics.
• Its political and military leaders are constrained in attempting to
balance the pragmatic reality of an international politics that cannot
and does not ignore the role of force—and an ethics of conviction.
• It is thus true that U.S. power, and particularly military power, is
often employed to secure and advance American interests.
• Today the United States spends almost as much on defense as the
rest of the world combined, allies and enemies included
• It invests six times more in defense research and development
activities (e.g. designing military aircraft, testing new weapons, and
seeking better military communications gear and sensors) than the
rest of the world, and sustained its high spending for more than six
decades.
• U.S. grand strategy since 1945 has been based first and
foremost on nuclear deterrence. The ability to deter other
nuclear powers dominated strategic thought at least through
the end of the Cold War.
• Under the framework of containment and deterrence, the
United States at times flirted with efforts to roll back parts of
the Soviet Empire and occasionally resorted to the use of
nuclear threats but basically sought to block further Soviet
expansion, to avoid a nuclear war, and to promote economic
prosperity at home and in the West generally.
• Thus, since the end of World War II, the United States has
established bases, positioned forces, and stockpiled weapons
and munitions around the globe, buttressed by economic and
development assistance, exercises, formal treaties, coalitions
of the willing, and alliances
• The 1990s became a period of policy drift as American leaders sought
another grand strategy on which to base the country’s foreign
relations and the size of its military forces.
• The vast network of study organizations, planning staffs, think tanks,
university programs, laboratories, committees, consultants, and
contractors that serve the American security establishment soon held
countless conferences and issued reports on potential directions.
• Some worried about a rising China, while others saw danger in a
resurgent Russia. The Middle East was described as a “powder keg”
and perpetuall unstable, East Asia as the “most dangerous place on
earth,” and the Balkans as on the brink of genocide that could spill
across borders to threaten Europe.
• Another question is - has USA an enemy? For ex Al-Qaeda is not- as it
is a non-state terrorist group
• Attempts to aggregate today’s problems under the “axis of evil”
banner have been unconvincing, even counterproductive. So too has
been the effort to cope with the militant Islamic terrorist threat by
referring to it as a Global “War on Terror.” There are just too many
differences among militant groups’ causes, ideology, cohesion, and
friends for this label to provide much basis for grand strategy.
 Post-Cold War grand strategy alternatives
• The Global War on Terror and the preventive war in Iraq have stimulated a new
period of contemplation about American grand strategy.
• Four main strategies have been proposed, although two of these (1,2) have
dominated most of the policy discourse since the end of the Cold War.
 The first of the strategies is generally referred to as primacy.
• Under this strategy, the United States accepts its dominance and seeks to
maintain it.
• Primacists are most concerned about the rise of a peer competitor to the United
States. China and the European Union are often cited as possible challengers,
given their increasing economic power.
• For example, Primacists might propose that the United States work with China’s
regional rivals to contain its rise and that the United States encourage continued
European military dependence on the United States to prevent the European
Union from acquiring the ability to act unilaterally in areas of concern to the
United States.
• They also tend to believe that shows of force will lead other countries to
bandwagon with the United States rather than balance against it by linking arms
with a rising power.
• Because few failed states or regional conflicts have the potential to produce true
challengers to US power, Primacists traditionally viewed these problems as
distractions and were not interested in policing or managing them.
• But many Primacists – including President Bush, who ran for office on a
promise not to do nation-building – reconsidered this view after 9/11,
concluding that the United States should destroy the perceived root cause of
terrorists’ strength: repressive regimes in the Middle East.
The second strategy is liberal internationalism.
• Liberal internationalists, including many who served in or
advised the Clinton administration, argue that the best way to
reduce the possibility of conflict in the international system is to
spread democracy and free trade, because liberal polities with
extensive economic engagement tend not to fight each other
• Not unlike Primacists, they see the need for a large and versatile
US military prepared for the full spectrum of operations.
• Liberal internationalists lack the Primacists’ hostility toward
multilateral bodies like the International Criminal Court and the
United Nations, but in practice they are often willing to bypass
these organizations if they are found to be unaccommodating of
American wishes. For example, the Clinton administration did
not seek UN authorization of the war in Kosovo, knowing that
Russia and China would not give it.
• Although liberal internationalists wish for multilateral approval
and involvement in US foreign policy, the expectation is that the
United States will be in charge, directing or guiding all important
activities
 The third strategy is selective engagement.
• It draws on the school of thought known as realism and is most
concerned with preventing wars among the world’s major industrial
and military powers on the scale of the world wars or the Cold War.
• In contrast to the first two strategies, selective engagers tend to be
more skeptical about the uses to which US power can be put, and
they are also wary of the potential for other nations to view US
power as a danger and to balance against it if this power is not used
carefully
• Selective engagers are not squeamish about the use of force, merely
aware that it often has counterproductive results and unforeseen
costs. As a result, military power must be husbanded for the defense
of true interests.
• Realists also often emphasize that US popular support, critical for
sustaining military operations, fades quickly when true interests are
not at stake.
• This view, often described as cold-hearted for its predisposition
against humanitarian intervention, is not especially popular in
either political party, with most of its advocates found in academia,
the officer corps, and parts of the civil service.
 The fourth strategy is restraint.
• It, too, draws on realism, the principle that a state’s grand strategy
should reflect its power and interests.
• The basic argument is that the United States lacks the need, the
capability, and the mandate to manage global security.
• With the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States is a very secure
nation. Much of its security comes from its favorable geography,
surrounded as it is by two big oceans and two benign neighbors. The
rest comes from its large size and wealth. It is the world’s third most
populous nation and has a very capable military.
• Beyond concern about access to Middle Eastern oil and the danger of
nuclear terrorism, the United States need pay little attention to distant
turmoil, be it civil war or regional conflict.
• Proponents of restraint believe that the way the United States can
encourage others to burden-share and to offer their votes for various
necessary interventions is to do less, not more. An America that showed
restraint could help the world find ways to cope with the problems of
the many by not claiming for itself the responsibilities that are truly
global. Critics label such thinking as isolationist, although proponents
make it clear that they do not wish the United States to withdraw from
the world, only to avoid behaving as its self-appointed global sheriff.
 Preventive war, preemption, war on
terrorism and USFP
• The concept of deterrence has been a cornerstone of U.S.
national security strategy for the last fifty years. It is based on
the idea that actors will not undertake some unwanted action
if the costs of that action are greater than the gains.
• The threat of inflicting punishing retaliation against some
transgressor, not the ability to prevent some hostile act from
occurring, lies at the core of deterrence theory.
• On the other hand, appears the question if deterrence alone
will protect the United States, U.S. forces, and U.S. allies.
Officials argue that deterrence was a viable defense strategy
during the Cold War because likely attackers were known, had
something of value to lose, and were deemed by most
observers most of the time to be capable of perceiving the
strategic situation in a rational way. Now, these conditions are
no longer hold.
• The 9/11 terrorist attacks did transform the way
many Americans think about U.S. foreign and
defense policy
• After vigorously criticizing the Clinton
administration for its foreign policy of “engagement”
and the commitment of U.S. military forces around
the globe, the Bush administration has found itself
adopting military commitments that were never
even contemplated just a few years ago.
• After The 9/11, discussions of preventive war and
preemption, which featured prominently in the
January 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and
the September 2002 National Security Strategy,
appear to be a rational response to the changed
strategic circumstances that the United States
confronted
• As rogue states and terrorism cannot be deterred - deterrence
will not work against the most likely threats faced by the US
• US administration officials suggest that preventive
war and preemption are the only alternatives
available to deal with these threats.
• Although the terms often are used interchangeably, “preventive
war” and “preemption” are distinct strategic concepts.
• Preventive war is based on the concept that war is
inevitable, and that it is better to fight now while the costs are
low rather than later when the costs are high.
• It is a deliberate decision to begin a war. Preventive war
thinking seems to dominate Bush administration planning
about Iraq: It is better to destroy Saddam Hussein’s regime
now than to deal later with a regime armed with nuclear
weapons or other WMD.
• Preemption, by contrast, is nothing more than a quick draw.
Upon detecting evidence that an opponent is about to attack,
one beats the opponent to the punch and attacks first to blunt
the impending strike.
• Under these circumstances, the Bush administration has
developed new guidelines to govern the use of force in
combating emerging terrorist adversaries or to deal with
“terrorist states.”
• The Bush administration’s National Security Strategy
states: “We must be prepared to stop rogue states and
their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or
to use weapons of mass destruction against the United
States and our allies and friends.” (The National Security
Strategy, p. 14)
• The potential targets for action using these assumptions
are: (1) terrorist organizations, (2) states that harbor or
support terrorist organizations, and (3) states that are
developing and/or maintaining weapons of mass
destruction that do not conduct themselves in
accordance with generally accepted norms of
international behavior.
 Preventive War and Iraq
• The feasibility of a preventive war against Iraq in 2003 was not an issue. Iraq was
politically isolated and militarily helpless—it had neither nuclear weapons nor competitive
conventional forces.
• The United States had no superpower rival and enjoyed global military primacy. It could
overthrow the Iraqi regime, directly attack Iraq’s suspected WMD facilities, or both.
• Yet the ease with which Operation Iraqi Freedom toppled Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship
in the spring of 2003 was strategically misleading.
• The American war on Iraq and its ongoing aftermath exemplify the risks and penalties of
preventive war, especially preventive war aimed at regime change.
• First, the war exposed a massive U.S. intelligence failure, which suggests the United States
cannot sustain a strategy of anticipatory self-defense because such a strategy presumes—
indeed, rests upon—near perfect knowledge of enemy capabilities and long-term
intentions.
• In addition to exposing an embarrassing U.S. intelligence failure, the second war against
Iraq entangled the United States in a costly and open-ended insurgent conflict that
threatens Iraq’s reconstruction as well as the U.S. ability to deal effectively with major
military contingencies that might arise elsewhere.
• Third, the decision to attack a country that was neither at war with nor posed a credible
threat to the United States alienated key friends and allies (including France, Germany,
Canada, and Mexico), who may not have been necessary to successfully prosecute the war
but could have greatly contributed to postwar peacekeeping operations and reconstruction
efforts. As a result, the United States was doomed to a “go it alone” strategy where a
“coalition of the willing” did not translate into a “coalition of the capable.”
• Fourth, the establishment of a large American military presence in an Arab heartland may
have opened a new front for Islamist terrorists.
• Critics believe that the Bush administration’s ideas about preventive
war and preemption represent a significant departure from
America’s history and traditions of using force, and are at odds with
the evolution of international norms that identify when it is
permissible to use force.
• For the international community, preventive war, preemption, or
unilateral American military action is alarming because it raises the
possibility that the United States will ignore the international
institutions it has created with great effort since the end of the
World War II.
• In this context, US scholars argue that - what is forgotten in the
international reaction to the U.S. threats against Iraq is that the
United States is also within its rights, not to launch a preventive
war, but to insist that the UN Security Council enforce its own
mandates on Iraqi disarmament following the end of the Gulf War.
• The international community has demanded that Iraq abandon its
effort to build, stockpile, or deploy weapons of mass destruction,
and the United States claims the right to use force to back up this
demand if Saddam Hussein fails to abide by those Security Council
resolutions (16 by our count) calling for Iraqi disarmament.