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Personal Details

Principal Investigator Prof. A. Raghuramaraju Department of Philosophy,

University of Hyderabad

Paper Coordinator Prof. Raghunath Ghosh University of North Bengal

Content Writer Prof. Raghunath Ghosh Professor of Philosophy (Retired),

University of North Bengal

Content Reviewer Prof. Pradeep Gokhale Department Of Philosphy,

CUTS, Sarnath, Varanasi
Language Editor Miss Aruna Ramachandran Freelance editor, Manipal,
Karnataka

Description of Module

Subject Name Philosophy

Paper Name Epistemology II
Module Name/ Title Anupalabdhi as a Pramāņa
Module Id 6.12
Prerequisites General understanding of the method of knowing absence

Objectives To generate awareness regarding the cognition of abhāva and

anupalabdhi as a separate pramāņa
Key words anubhava, smŗti, arthāpatti, vyāpāra, sāmagrī
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Anupalabdhi as a Pramāņa

Introduction

In Indian philosophy, different systems hold diverse opinions regarding the acceptability of anupalabdhi
as a separate pramāņa. Anupalabdhiis the means of knowing the absence (abhāva) of an object. The
Naiyāyikas are of the view that absence can be known through perception or pratyakşa, and hence there is
no need of admitting anupalabdhi as a separate pramāņa. The Buddhists think that absence can be known
through inference with the hetuin the form of anupalabdhi. But the Advaitins and Bhāţţa Mīmāmsakas
emphasise the fact that while anupalabdhican never be reduced to perception and inference, it is
necessary to admit it as a separate pramāņa.

Nature ofAnupalabdhi

According to Vedānta-Paribhāşā, the means of valid cognition as anupalabdhi is the extra-ordinary cause
of the apprehension of non-existence, which is not due to knowledge as instrument
(jňānakaraņājanyābhāvānubhavāsādhāraņakāraņamanupalabdhirūpampramāņam).1 In other words,
anupalabdhi is an uncommon cause of awareness of absence which is not caused by other knowledge.
The word ‘apprehension’ (anubhava) in the definition is incorporated in order to exclude memory, where
there may be the recollection of non-existence, and the term is used in such a way only in order to
emphasise the direct awareness of non-apprehension. The means of direct awareness of absence is called
anupalabdhi. Awareness is of two types:smŗti (recollection) and anubhava (presentative cognition).
When the object is directly known, it is a kind of presentative cognition. That is to say, when some
objects are known, they are verified through the presence of those objects. If we have the awareness of a
jar, it can be verified through the physical presence of the jar. This is called presentative cognition or
anubhava because the object is physically present here. So far as recollective cognition orsmŗti is
concerned, there is also awareness which is not of the anubhava type. The object of recollective
knowledge is not physically present. On the other hand, the awareness of absence is of the anubhava type.
If we feel the absence of a jar, for example, on the ground, it is a kind of presentative cognition or
anubhava. For its absence can be verified. But when the absence of an object is recollected, it is not of the
anubhava type. Recollection of absence is not a presentative cognition (anubhava), but smŗti. In order to

1
DharmarājaAdhvarīndra,Vedānta-Paribhāşā, Bengali translation by Panchanana Bhattacharya, Calcutta, 1377
(BS), p.223.
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exclude this type of knowledge,DharmarājaAdhvarīndra, the author of Vedānta-Paribhāşā, incorporates

the word anubhava in the definition of anupalabdhi.2

The phrase ‘which is not due to the instrumentality of knowledge’ (jñānakaraņājanyā) is inserted in order
to exclude other means of cognition, like inference, that are caused through the instrumentality of other
knowledge.3 For inference is caused through the instrumentality of the knowledge of hetu, which has
invariable concomitance with the thing to be inferred(sādhya). When the nature of the thing is ascertained
by itself as in the case of the knowledge of non-existence, the relation of any hetu to it cannot be
determined. So there can be no inference without an appropriate hetu. Verbal testimony (śabda) and
presumption(arthāpatti) are all due to knowledge, namely, words conveying an intention and the things to
be explained, respectively. Hence, these are excluded from the scope of the definition. It is also to be
noted that non-apprehension is the sole means of having direct knowledge of the non-existence of
perceptible objects and their attributes, but the indirect knowledge of their non-existence can be attained
by other means. In other words, the non-existence of objects that are capable of being cognised is known
directly by non-apprehension (anupalabdhi). Moreover, if the adjunct jñānakaraņājanya, i.e., ‘not caused
by the instrumentality of other knowledge’, had not been not inserted in the definition, it would have been
unduly extended to inference, verbal testimony, etc. The term asādhāraņakāraņam, i.e., uncommon
cause, is included in the definition in order to exclude common causes like unseen factors (adŗṣṭa).4The
non-existence of dharma (merit) and adharma (demerit) are supposed to be known only through
inference, and not through non-apprehension, as they are supersensuous in nature. Hence, the definition
given by Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra is free of every possible shortcoming.

In this context, it is important to point out that anupalabdhi is also without any vyāpāra (function or
operation), like upamāna and arthāpatti. Here, the karaņa (instrument) is not taken as that which is
vyāpāravat(having some operative process), but is understood as that which is vyāpārabhinna(free from
an operative process).5 If anupalabdhi does not have karaņa, it will not be considered as a pramāņa,
defined as pramāyāhkaraņampramāņam, i.e., the uncommon cause along with the operative process of a
valid cognition is apramāņa. As anupalabdhi is a pramāņa, it is to be presumed that there must be some

2
Ibid.
3
Ibid, p.224
4
Ibid.
5
Annambhatta,Tarkasamgraha-Dīpikā, English translation by Gopinath Bhattacharya, Progressive Publishers,
Calcutta, 1983, p.80.
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karaņa. If the term karaņa is taken in the traditional sense (i.e.,

vyāpāravadasādhāraņamkāraņamkaraņam, meaning an uncommon cause having an operative process is
karaņa), there is no karaņatva in this sense in anupalabdhi. Hence, the term karaņa is to be interpreted in
a different manner. In the case of perception, etc., the uncommon cause is associated with an operative
process, i.e., the eye and its contact with the object (sannikarşa). In the case of anumāna also there is an
uncommon cause, i.e., the knowledge of vyāpti connected with vyāpāra, i.e., parāmarśa. But in the case
of anupalabdhi, no doubt there is uncommon cause, but there is novyāpāra due to the impossibility of the
operation of the sense organ in the case of absence. Hence, here karaņa has to be taken as vyāpārabhinna,
and not vyāpāravat. So far as an uncommon cause is concerned, it is obviously present. Thus, it is said
that while perception, etc., are endowed with uncommon cause as associated with vyāpāra (vyāpāravad),
non-apprehension is endowed with an uncommon cause having no vyāpāra at all (i.e., vyāpārabhinna).

The BhāţţaMīmāmsakas have admitted anupalabdhi as a valid, separate means of knowing.

NārāyaņaBhaţţa, a follower of the Bhāţţaschool, gives the following definition of anupalabdhi. The
criterion of anupalabdhi is the aggregate of causal conditions (sāmagrī) for knowing an absence without
its absentee (pratiyogī) or contact with the absence. If we know the absence of a jar on the ground
(bhūtaleghaţābhāvah), there is no absentee (pratiyogī) in the form of a jar, and there is absence of contact
of the eye with the jar, but other causes are present, like the opening of the eyelids, the contact of the
mind with the jar, sufficient light for visualizing, etc. (Athopalambhayogyatvesatyapyanupalambhanam/
abhāvākhyampramāņamsyādabhāvasyāvabodhakam//Atrahyanupalambhahkāraņam. Tasya ca jňānā-
bhāva-rūpatvādabhāvahpramāņamityucyate.)6 The collocation of these causal conditions (sāmagrī) is the
criterion for the non-cognition of the jar. Such an absence of the jar becomes an object of valid cognition
(pramā) (vişayamtadadhīnāmścasannikarşādikamvinā/ upalambhasyasamagrīsampattihkhaluyogyatā).7

Some Observations

Though Kumārila admits anupalabdhi as a separate source of knowing, the Naiyāyikas and Prābhākaras
reject this argument and are of the opinion thatanupalabdhi cannot be considered an independent
pramāņa in order to know absence. To them, absence is known either by perception or by inference, as
the absentee (pratiyogī) of the absence is subject to perception or inference. The same sense organ which
visualizes an object perceives the absence also. For this reason, the Naiyāyikas think that a separate

6
NārāyaņaBhaţţa,Manameyodayah, vol. I, edited by DinanathTripathi, Sanskrit College, Calcutta, 1989,
pp.212–13.
7
Ibid.
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pramāņa is not needed to know an absence. They reduce the knowledge of absence to perception. The
Prābhākaras join hands with the Naiyāyikas in not admitting anupalabdhi as a pramāņa. Their only
difference from Nyāya is that they do not believe absence is a separate category, but view it as a positive
entity. The cognition of bare existence of the locus in itself is wrongly called ‘absence’. Kumārila refutes
the idea of the perceptibility and inferability of absence as admitted by opponents. To him, absence can
never be perceived due to the absence of sense–object contact. It cannot be inferred because of the non-
ascertainment of invariable concomitance. The absence cannot be known by verbal testimony(śabda),
comparison (upamāna) and presumption (arthāpatti). Hence, absence, which is an independent category,
is known by an independent pramāņa called anupalabdhi.

Classifications of Abhāva

The author of Vedānta-Paribhāşā admits four kinds of non-existence that can be known through
anupalabdhi: previous non-existence (prāgabhāva), non-existence as destruction (pradhvamsābhāva),
absolute non-existence (atyantābhāva) and mutual non-existence (anyonyābhāva).

Prāgabhāvais defined as the non-existence of an effect in its material cause before the effect is originated.
It is the object of an apprehension that a thing will come into being. The non-existence of a jar, for
example, in its material cause (earth), prior to the production of the jar, would be called prāgabhava.8So
the judgement ‘the jar will exist’ applies only to the case of prāgabhāva, whereas the judgement ‘the jar
does not exist’ is common to all kinds of non-existence.9

The second absence is illustrated as follows: ‘There is absence of a jar after it has been destroyed with a
club.’ This non-existence as destruction is also certainly destroyed when its substratum (i.e., the pieces of
the jar) is destroyed.10This is contrary to the view of the logicians, according to whom non-existence has a
beginning but no end. It cannot be questioned how there can be a cessation of destruction where the
substratum of the destruction is eternal. The Advaitins admit that when the locus of non-existence created
by destruction is destructible, the non-existence cannot be endless or indestructible. Moreover, when the
locus in question is endless or eternal, the non-existence in question is eternal, as in the case of an atom.

8
sa ca bhavişyatitiprativişayah(ibid.).
9
Vivŗtion DharmarājaAdhvarīndra, Vedānta-Paribhāşā, p.237.

Tatraivaghaţasyamudgarapātānantaramyo’bhāvahsadhvamsābhāvah.DharmarājaAdhvarīndra,
10
Vedānta-
Paribhāşā, p.237.
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Atyantābhāva,the third variety of non-existence, literally means absolute non-existence. If a particular

thing does not exist in the past, the present and the future, it is to be taken as the absolute non-existence of
that thing in that locus. The other three kinds of absence, i.e., prāgabhāva (prior absence), dhvamsābhāva
(non-existence as destruction) and anyonyābhāva (mutual absence) do not remain for all time. According
to the Advaitins, after the production of the counter-positive there is prāgabhāva, at the destruction of the
locus there is dhvamsābhāva, and after the removal of nescience there is anyonyābhāva (i.e., mutual
absence).11But absolute absence remains as long as time remains. That is why absolute negation is all-
pervading; e.g., the absence of colour in the air. This is a kind of absolute absence, because it spans the
three times (i.e., colour does not exist in air in the past, present or future). This absolute absence becomes
the counter-positive of destruction at the time of dissolution, just like space. At the time of dissolution,
the locus of space is destroyed, just as space is destroyed. In like manner, after the destruction of the locus
of absolute negation, absolute negation is destroyed.

Lastly, mutual non-existence (anyonyābhāva) is nothing but difference or separateness which entitles us
to say ‘this is not such and such, ‘or ‘this is not that.’ The object of such awareness is a kind of absence
which is called anyonyābhāva.12 This mutual absence is generally represented by the terms ‘difference’
(bheda), ‘separateness’ (pŗthaktva) and ‘classification’ in the following ways: ‘This is different from that,
‘This is separated from that,’ and ‘This is classified from that.’ The Naiyāyikas accept separateness and
classification as qualifications (guņa). But the Vedāntins do not think so. For them, classification,
separateness and difference are not different from each other due to the identity of their awareness.

The Bhāţţa school of the Mīmāmsakas also admits two types of anupalabdhi—the absence of pramāņa
and the absence of smŗti. The absence of any pramāņalike perception comes under the purview
ofanupalabdhi. In the same way, any type of cognition arising out of non-cognition in the form of
absence of memory is also a kind of anupalabdhi.13

11
Yatrādhikaraņeyasyakālatraye’pyabhāvahso’tyantābhāvah(ibid.).
12
Idamidamnetipratīti-vişayo’nyonyābhāvah(ibid.).
13
Anupalabdhistudvividhahpramāņābhāvarūpahsmaraņābhāvarūpaśca’.NārāyaņaBhaţţa, Manameyodayah, vol.
I, pp.212–13.