JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff and appellant, vs. MANILA RAILROAD Co., defendant and appellee.

MASTER AND SERVANT; CONTRACT; NEGLIGENCE.—Failure to perform a contract cannot be

excused upon the ground that the breach was due to the negligence of a servant of the obligor, and that the
latter exercised due diligence in the selection and control of the servant.

CONTRACTS; NEGLIGENCE; CULPA AQUILIANA; CULPA CONTRACTUAL.—The distinction

between negligence as the source of an obligation (culpa aquiliana) and negligence in the performance of a
contract (culpa contractual) pointed out.

CARRIERS; PASSENGERS; NEGLIGENCE; ALIGHTING FROM MOVING TRAIN.—It is not

negligence per se for a traveler to alight from a slowly moving train.

JAPAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. JESUS SIMANGAN, respondent.

Common Carriers; Air Transportation; Where a passenger, despite his protestations and valid travel
documents, was unceremoniously bumped off by the airlines, damage was already done when he was
offered to fly the next day, which offer did not cure the airline’s default.—JAL did not allow respondent to
fly. It informed respondent that there was a need to first check the authenticity of his travel documents with
the U.S. Embassy. As admitted by JAL, “the flight could not wait for Mr. Simangan because it was ready
to depart.” Since JAL definitely declared that the flight could not wait for respondent, it gave respondent
no choice but to be left behind. The latter was unceremoniously bumped off despite his protestations and
valid travel documents and notwithstanding his contract of carriage with JAL. Damage had already been
done when respondent was offered to fly the next day on July 30, 1992. Said offer did not cure JAL’s
default.

Same; Same; Novation; Since novation implies a waiver of the right the creditor had before the novation,
such waiver must be express.—Considering that respondent was forced to get out of the plane and left
behind against his will, he could not have freely consented to be rebooked the next day. In short, he did not
agree to the alleged novation. Since novation implies a waiver of the right the creditor had before the
novation, such waiver must be express. It cannot be supposed, without clear proof, that respondent had
willingly done away with his right to fly on July 29, 1992. Moreover, the reason behind the bumping off
incident, as found by the RTC and CA, was that JAL personnel imputed that respondent would only use the
trip to the United States as a pretext to stay and work in Japan.

Same; Same; A common carrier ought to know the kind of valid documents a passenger carries.—Apart
from the fact that respondent’s plane ticket, boarding pass, travel authority and personal articles already
passed the rigid immigration and security routines, JAL, as a common carrier, ought to know the kind of
valid travel documents respondent carried. As provided in Article 1755 of the New Civil Code: “A common
carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.” Thus, We find
untenable JAL’s defense of “verification of respondent’s documents” in its breach of contract of carriage.
It bears repeating that the power to admit or not an alien into the country is a sovereign act which cannot
be interfered with even by JAL.

Same; Same; Breach of Contract; Requisites.—In an action for breach of contract of carriage, all that is
required of plaintiff is to prove the existence of such contract and its nonperformance by the carrier through
the latter’s failure to carry the passenger safely to his destination. Respondent has complied with these twin
requisites.
Same; Same; Same; Damages; As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for
damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Article 2219 of
the Civil Code, except in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, and in the cases in
which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Article 2220.—As a general rule, moral
damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of
the items enumerated under Article 2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception, such damages are recoverable:
(1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Article 1764, in relation
to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith,
as provided in Article 2220. The acts committed by JAL against respondent amounts to bad faith. As found
by the RTC, JAL breached its contract of carriage with respondent in bad faith. JAL personnel summarily
and insolently ordered respondent to disembark while the latter was already settled in his assigned seat. He
was ordered out of the plane under the alleged reason that the genuineness of his travel documents should
be verified.

Same; Same; Same; Same; It is firmly settled that moral damages are recoverable in suits predicated on
breach of a contract of carriage where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith—
inattention to and lack of care for the interests of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration,
particularly as to their convenience, amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to an award of moral
damages.—Clearly, JAL is liable for moral damages. It is firmly settled that moral damages are recoverable
in suits predicated on breach of a contract of carriage where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud
or bad faith, as in this case. Inattention to and lack of care for the interests of its passengers who are entitled
to its utmost consideration, particularly as to their convenience, amount to bad faith which entitles the
passenger to an award of moral damages. What the law considers as bad faith which may furnish the ground
for an award of moral damages would be bad faith in securing the contract and in the execution thereof, as
well as in the enforcement of its terms, or any other kind of deceit.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Passengers have a right to be treated by the carrier’s employees with kindness,
respect, courtesy and due consideration and are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees.—Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier’s
employees could give ground for an action for damages. Passengers have a right to be treated by the carrier’s
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration and are entitled to be protected against
personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees.

Actions; Counterclaims; Damages; Well-settled is the rule that the commencement of an action does not
per se make the action wrongful and subject the action to damages, for the law could not have meant to
impose a penalty on the right to litigate; If damages result from a party’s exercise of a right, it is damnum
absque injuria.—This compulsory counterclaim of JAL arising from the filing of the complaint may not be
granted inasmuch as the complaint against it is obviously not malicious or unfounded. It was filed by
respondent precisely to claim his right to damages against JAL. Well-settled is the rule that the
commencement of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the action to damages,
for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. We reiterate case law that if
damages result from a party’s exercise of a right, it is damnum absque injuria. Lawful acts give rise to no
injury. Walang perhuwisyong maaring idulot ang paggamit sa sariling karapatan.

Freedom of Expression; Libel; The publication of a passenger’s complaint about his being bumped off
involves matters about which the public has the right to be informed because they relate to a public issue
and could not be the basis for a claim for damages.— JAL is a common carrier. JAL’s business is mainly
with the traveling public. It invites people to avail themselves of the comforts and advantages it offers.
Since JAL deals with the public, its bumping off of respondent without a valid reason naturally drew public
attention and generated a public issue. The publications involved matters about which the public has the
right to be informed because they relate to a public issue. This public issue or concern is a legitimate topic
of a public comment that may be validly published. Assuming that respondent, indeed, caused the
publication of his complaint, he may not be held liable for damages for it. The constitutional guarantee of
freedom of the speech and of the press includes fair commentaries on matters of public interest.

Same; Same; Even though an airline is not a public official, the rule on privileged commentaries on matters
of public interest applies to it.—Even though JAL is not a public official, the rule on privileged
commentaries on matters of public interest applies to it. The privilege applies not only to public officials
but extends to a great variety of subjects, and includes matters of public concern, public men, and candidates
for office.

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILS., INC. (RCPI), petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and LORETO DIONELA, respondents.

Civil Law; Damages; Breach of contract; Inclusion of extraneous and libelous matter in telegraphic
message constitutes breach of contract. —Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
receiving and transmitting messages. Everytime a person transmits a message through the facilities of the
petitioner, a contract is entered into. Upon receipt of the rate or fee fixed, the petitioner undertakes to
transmit the message accurately. There is no question that in the case at bar, libelous matters were included
in the message transmitted, without the consent or knowledge of the sender. There is a clear case of breach
of contract by the petitioner in adding extraneous and libelous matters in the message sent to the private
respondent.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Telegraph corporation, as employer is liable directly for the acts of its
employees; Action based on Arts. 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, not on subsidiary liability of corporation
under Article 1161, New Civil Code.—As a corporation, the petitioner can act only through its employees.
Hence the acts of its employees in receiving and transmitting messages are the acts of the petitioner. To
hold that the petitioner is not liable directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of petitioner’s
business is to deprive the general public availing of the services of the petitioner of an effective and adequate
remedy. The action for damages was filed in the lower court directly against respondent corporation not as
an employer subsidiarily liable under the provisions of Article 1161 of the New Civil Code in relation to
Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The cause of action of the private respondent is based on Arts. 19 and
20 of the New Civil Code (supra). As well as on respondent’s breach of contract thru the negligence of its
own employees.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Res ipsa loquitur; Since negligence may be hard to substantiate in some cases,
the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is proper; Case at bar.—In most cases, negligence must
be proved in order that plaintiff may recover. However, since negligence may be hard to substantiate in
some cases, we may apply the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself), by
considering the presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the injury.

JUAN J. SYQUIA, CORAZON C. SYQUIA, CARLOTA C. SYQUIA, CARLOS C. SYQUIA and

ANTHONY C. SYQUIA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and THE
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY, INC., respondents.

Civil Law; Torts; Negligence; Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not
preclude the existence of a culpa quiliana, Supreme Court finds no reason to disregard the respondent’s
Court finding that there was no negligence.—With respect to herein petitioners’ averment that private
respondent has committed culpa aquiliana, the Court of Appeals found no negligent act on the part of
private respondent to justify an award of damages against it. Although a pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana, We find no reason to disregard
the respondent’s Court finding that there was no negligence.

Same; Same; Same; Had there been actual negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery,
Inc. it would be held liable not for a quasidelict or culpa aquiliana but for culpa contractual as provided
by Article1170 of the Civil Code.—In this case, it has been established that the Syquias and the Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., entered into a contract entitled “Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual
Care” on August 27, 1969. That agreement governed the relations of the parties and defined their respective
rights and obligations. Hence, had there been actual negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc., it would be held liable not for a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana, but for culpa contractual
as provided by Article 1170 of the Civil Code.

Same; Same; Same; Contracts; Well settled is the rule that when the terms of the contract are clear and
leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, then the literal meaning of the stipulation shall
control. —There was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care and in the Rules
and Regulations of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. that the vault would be water-proof. Private
respondent’s witness, Mr. Dexter Heuschkel, explained that the term “sealed” meant “closed.” On the other
hand, the word “seal” is defined as “x x x any of various closures or fastenings x x x that cannot be opened
without rupture and that serve as a check against tampering or unauthorized opening.” The meaning that
has been given by private respondent to the word conforms with the cited dictionary definition. Moreover,
it is also quite clear that “sealed” cannot be equated with “waterproof’. Well settled is the rule that when
the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, then the
literal meaning of the stipulation shall control. Contracts should be interpreted according to their literal
meaning and should not be interpreted beyond their obvious intendment.

Same; Same; Same; In the absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary, the diligence
to be observed in the performance of the obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family.—
The law defines negligence as the “omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.” In the
absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary, the diligence to be observed in the
performance of the obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family.

FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, LUIS A. LUNA and CLARITA S. LUNA, respondents.

Civil Law; Damages; In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown
to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract.—In culpa contractual, moral damages
may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of
the contract. Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. Exceptionally, in a
contract of carriage, moral damages are also allowed in case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault
(which is presumed) of the common carrier.

Same; Same; Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a
dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. —Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to
do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of
negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or ill will.

Same; Same; Application of Article 21 of the Code can be warranted only when the defendant's disregard
of his contractual obligation is so deliberate as to appropriate a degree of misconduct certainly no less
worse than fraud or bad faith.—Article 21 of the Code, it should be observed, contemplates a conscious act
to cause harm. Thus, even if we are to assume that the provision could properly relate to a breach of contract,
its application can be warranted only when the defendant's disregard of his contractual obligation is so
deliberate as to approximate a degree of misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad faith. Most
importantly, Article 21 is a mere declaration of a general principle in human relations that clearly must, in
any case, give way to the specific provision of Article 2220 of the Civil Code authorizing the grant of moral
damages in culpa contractual solely when the breach is due to fraud or bad faith.

Same; Same; A quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the
application of applicable principles on tort even where there is a pre-existing contract between the plaintiff
and the defendant. —The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the
cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort even
where there is a pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant (Phil. Airlines vs. Court of
Appeals, 106 SCRA 143; Singson vs. Bank of Phil Islands, 23 SCRA 1117; and Air France vs. Carrascoso,
18 SCRA 155). This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot improve private respondents' case for it can aptly
govern only where the act or omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort independently of
the contract. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be
stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or omission can
nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar
to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private respondents' damage claim is
predicated solely on their contractual relationship; without such agreement, the act or omission complained
of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort.

KHRISTINE REA M. REGINO, Assisted and Represented by ARMANDO REGINO, petitioner, vs.
PANGASINAN COLLEGES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, RACHELLE A. GAMUROT
and ELISSA BALADAD, respondents.

One of the exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine is when the issue is purely legal and well within the
jurisdiction of the trial court—an action for damages inevitably calls for the application and interpretation
of the Civil Code.—The exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which arises when the issue is
purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioner’s action for damages inevitably
calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil Code, a function that falls within the jurisdiction
of the courts.

Schools and Universities; Contracts; The school-student relationship is contractual in nature.—In Alcuaz
v. PSBA, the Court characterized the relationship between the school and the student as a contract, in which
“a student, once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one semester.” Two years later, in Non
v. Dames II, the Court modified the “termination of contract theory” in Alcuaz by holding that the
contractual relationship between the school and the student is not only semestral in duration, but for the
entire period the latter are expected to complete it.” Except for the variance in the period during which the
contractual relationship is considered to subsist, both Alcuaz and Non were unanimous in characterizing the
school-student relationship as contractual in nature. The school-student relationship is also reciprocal. Thus,
it has consequences appurtenant to and inherent in all contracts of such kind—it gives rise to bilateral or
reciprocal rights and obligations. The school undertakes to provide students with education sufficient to
enable them to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the students agree to abide by
the academic requirements of the school and to observe its rules and regulations.

Same; Same; The terms of the school-student contract are defined at the moment of its inception—upon
enrolment of the student.—The terms of the school-student contract are defined at the moment of its
inception—upon enrolment of the student. Standards of academic performance and the code of behavior
and discipline are usually set forth in manuals distributed to new students at the start of every school year.
Further, schools inform prospective enrollees the amount of fees and the terms of payment. In practice,
students are normally required to make a down payment upon enrollment, with the balance to be paid before
every preliminary, midterm and final examination. Their failure to pay their financial obligation is regarded
as a valid ground for the school to deny them the opportunity to take these examinations.

A fee that was not part of the school-student contract entered into at the start of the school year could not
be unilaterally imposed to the prejudice of the enrollees.—In the present case, PCST imposed the assailed
revenue-raising measure belatedly, in the middle of the semester. It exacted the dance party fee as a
condition for the students’ taking the final examinations, and ultimately for its recognition of their ability
to finish a course. The fee, however, was not part of the school-student contract entered into at the start of
the school year. Hence, it could not be unilaterally imposed to the prejudice of the enrollees.

QuasiDelicts; Torts; An academic institution may be held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract
with its students where the act that violated the contract may also be a tort. — Generally, liability for tort
arises only between parties not otherwise bound by a contract. An academic institution, however, may be
held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with its students, since the act that violated the contract
may also be a tort.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO LIGON y TRIAS and
FERNANDO GABAT y ALMERA, accused, FERNANDO GABAT y ALMERA, accused-appellant.

Civil Liability; It does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also civilly liable; Only a
preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages; When does a judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the civil liability of the accused—However, it does not follow that a person who is not
criminally liable is also free from civil liability. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution
must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action
for damages. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes
a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

Preponderance of evidence exists sufficient to establish the facts from which the civil liability of the
appellant arises; Appellant by his act and omission with fault and negligence caused damage to the victim
and should answer civilly for the damage done; Case at bar.—ln the instant case, we find that a
preponderance of evidence exists sufficient to establish the facts from which the civil liability of Gabat
arises. On the basis of the trial court's evaluation of the testimonies of both prosecution and defense
witnesses at the trial and applying the quantum of proof required in civil cases, we find that a preponderance
of evidence establishes that Gabat by his act and omission with fault and negligence caused damage to
Rosales and should answer civilly for the damage done. Gabat's wilfull act of calling Rosales, the cigarette
vendor, to the middle of a busy street to buy two sticks of cigarettes set the chain of events which led to the
death of Rosales. Through fault and negligence, Gabat (1) failed to prevent the driver from moving forward
while the purchase was completed; (2) failed to help Rosales while the latter clung precariously to the
moving vehicle, and (3) did not enforce his order to the driver to stop. Finally, Gabat acquiesced in the
driver's act of speeding away, instead of stopping and picking up the injured victim. These proven facts
taken together are firm bases for finding Gabat civilly liable under the Civil Code for the damage done to
Rosales.
RUFO MAURICIO CONSTRUCTION and/or RUFO MAURICO, petitioner, vs. HON.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Criminal Law; Evidence; Homicide and damage to property thru reckless imprudence; Death of accused
during the pendency of his appeal or before the judgment of conviction became final and executory
extinguished his criminal liability, but not his civil liability should the liability or obligation arise not from
a crime but from a quasidelict; Liability of employer not subsidiary but solidary with his driver, unless he
can prove due diligence.—The first contention of petitioner that the death of the accused-employee wipes
out not only the employee’s primary civil liability but also his employer’s subsidiary liability is without
merit. The death of the accused during the pendency of his appeal or before the judgment of conviction
(rendered against him by the lower court) became final and executory extinguished his criminal liability)
meaning his obligation to serve the imprisonment imposed and his pecuniary liability for fines, but not his
civil liability should the liability or obligation arise (not from a crime, for here, no crime was committed,
the accused not having been convicted by final judgment, and therefore still regarded as innocent) but from
a quasi-delict (See Arts. 2176 and 2177, Civil Code), as in this case. The liability of the employer here
would not be subsidiary but solidary with his driver (unless said employer can prove there was no
negligence on his part at all, that is, if he can prove due diligence in the selection and supervision of his
driver). (See 8th par. of Art. 2180, Art. 2194, Civil Code; also People vs. Navoa, 132 SCRA 412; People
vs. Tirol, 102 SCRA 558; People vs. Sandaydiego, 82 SCRA 120).

The petitioner-employer who was not a party to the criminal case should be granted an opportunity to
cross-examine the prosecution witnesses on their testimonies on the driver’s alleged negligence and the
amount of damages the victim’s heirs are entitled and to introduce evidence or witnesses in his defense;
Remand to lower court, proper.— Inasmuch as the employer (petitioner herein) was not a party in the
criminal case, and to grant him his day in court for the purpose of cross-examining the prosecution witnesses
on their testimonies on the driver’s alleged negligence and the amount of damages to which the heirs of the
victim are entitled, as well as to introduce any evidence or witnesses he may care to present in his defense,
the hearing on the motion to quash the subsidiary writ of execution must be reopened precisely for the
purpose adverted to hereinabove.

MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in behalf of the minor children KRIZTEEN
ELIZABETH, BEVERLY MARIE and NAPOLEON II, all surnamed DULAY, petitioners, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, Former Eighth Division, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Quezon City, Br. 84,
SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., and SUPERGUARD SECURITY
CORPORATION, respondents.

Remedial Law; Actions; The filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal
action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express
reservation.—It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the
criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express
reservation (Yakult Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990]). This is precisely what the
petitioners opted to do in this case. However, the private respondents opposed the civil action on the ground
that the same is founded on a delict and not on a quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended by negligence.
What is in dispute therefore is the nature of the petitioner’s cause of action.

Civil Law; Damages; Negligence; There is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil
Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence.—Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there
is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or entrenched is the
doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary
and intentional.

The term “physical injuries” in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing
death.—Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries
intentionally committed pursuant to the ruling in Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and that the actions
for damages allowed thereunder are ex-delicto. However, the term “physical injuries” in Article 33 has
already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the
Philippines, 121 Phil. 638 [1965]; Carandang v. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is not the crime of physical
injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated,
frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293 [1983]).

FRANCIS CHUA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA C. HAO, respondents.

Criminal Law; Principles; Civil Liability; Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the
fundamental postulate that every man criminally liable is also civilly liable.—Generally, the basis of civil
liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate that every man criminally liable is also civilly
liable. When a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in
or the political entity called the State whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of the
society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property has been actually or directly injured or damaged by
the same punishable act or omission. An act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it
gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another.
Additionally, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to
repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, whether done
intentionally or negligently. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the
penalty imposed by law for the commission of the crime. The civil action involves the civil liability arising
from the offense charged which includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification
for consequential damages.

Damages; Evidence should be taken of the damages claimed and the court should determine who are the
persons entitled to such indemnity.—When the civil action is instituted with the criminal action, evidence
should be taken of the damages claimed and the court should determine who are the persons entitled to such
indemnity. The civil liability arising from the crime may be determined in the criminal proceedings if the
offended party does not waive to have it adjudged or does not reserve the right to institute a separate civil
action against the defendant. Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence
should be allowed to establish the extent of injuries suffered.

SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA C. SANTOS, NORA BARNALO, BELINDA

LUMACTAD, MARIENELA DY, NIKKA SANTOS and LEONARDO FERRER, petitioners, vs.
HON. NORMANDIE B. PIZARRO, as Presiding Judge, RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101,
DIONISIO M SIBAYAN, and VIRON TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., represented by
VIRGILIO Q. RONDARIS, President/Chairman, respondents.

Actions; Criminal Law; Damages; Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable, such
civil liability consisting of restitution, reparation of the damage caused and indemnification of
consequential damages.—Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable for a felony
is also civilly liable. Such civil liability may consist of restitution, reparation of the damage caused and
indemnification of consequential damages. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil liability arising
from the offense is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, subject to three notable exceptions: first,
when the injured party expressly waives the right to recover damages from the accused; second, when the
offended party reserves his right to have the civil damages determined in a separate action in order to take
full control and direction of the prosecution of his cause; and third, when the injured party actually exercises
the right to maintain a private suit against the offender by instituting a civil action prior to the filing of the
criminal case.

Actions; Criminal Law; Damages; Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable, such
civil liability consisting of restitution, reparation of the damage caused and indemnification of
consequential damages.—Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable for a felony
is also civilly liable. Such civil liability may consist of restitution, reparation of the damage caused and
indemnification of consequential damages. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil liability arising
from the offense is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, subject to three notable exceptions: first,
when the injured party expressly waives the right to recover damages from the accused; second, when the
offended party reserves his right to have the civil damages determined in a separate action in order to take
full control and direction of the prosecution of his cause; and third, when the injured party actually exercises
the right to maintain a private suit against the offender by instituting a civil action prior to the filing of the
criminal case. are allegations of negligence on the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not
necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a cause of action based on quasi delict, considering that at
the time of the filing of the complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Besides,
in cases of negligence, the offended party has the choice between an action to enforce civil liability arising
from crime under the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi delict under the Civil Code. An act or
omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender,
i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil
liabilities, such as those (a) not rising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa
contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under
Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party
is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the
Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under
Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission
of the defendant and the similar proscription against double recovery under the Rules above-quoted.

Prescription; The prescription of action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce
the civil liability arising from the crime.—At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this
case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the
remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This
is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce
the civil liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved.

The rationale of the rule that reservation or institution of a separate civil action waives the other civil
actions is the avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants arising out of the same act or omission
of the offender. Where the stale action for damages based on quasi delicts is considered waived, there is
no more occasion for the offended party to file multiple suits as the only recourse available to him is to
pursue damages ex delicto.—The trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription, but instead allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on the merits,
considering petitioners’ allegations in their complaint, opposition to the motion to dismiss and motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, insisting that the action was to recover civil liability arising from
crime. This does not offend the policy that the reservation or institution of a separate civil action waives
the other civil actions. The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the same
litigants arising out of the same act or omission of the offender. However, since the stale action for damages
based on quasi delict should be considered waived, there is no more occasion for petitioners to file multiple
suits against private respondents as the only recourse available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto.
This interpretation is also consistent with the bar against double recovery for obvious reasons.

L.G. FOODS CORPORATION and VICTORINO GABOR, VicePresident and General Manager,
petitioners, vs. HON. PHILADELFA B. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City, and SPS. FLORENTINO and THERESA
VALLEJERA, respondents.

Actions; Damages; An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., 1) civil liability ex delicto; and, 2) independent civil liabilities.—
Section 2, Rule 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines cause of action as the “act or omission by
which a party violates the right of another.” Such act or omission gives rise to an obligation which may
come from law, contracts, quasi contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts. Corollarily, an act or omission causing
damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., 1) civil
liability ex delicto; and 2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission
complained of as felony (e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law; the intentional torts; and
culpa aquiliana); or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct
from the criminal action. Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender.

Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Negligence; Victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to
enforce the civil liability arising from culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an
action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil Code.—Victims of
negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from culpa
criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana)
under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil Code. If, as here, the action chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff
may hold the employer liable for the negligent act of its employee, subject to the employer’s defense of
exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family. On the other hand, if the action chosen is for culpa
criminal, the plaintiff can hold the employer subsidiarily liable only upon proof of prior conviction of its
employee. Article 1161 of the Civil Code provides that civil obligation arising from criminal offenses shall
be governed by penal laws subject to the provision of Article 2177 and of the pertinent provision of Chapter
2, Preliminary Title on Human Relation, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages. Plainly,
Article 2177 provides for the alternative remedies the plaintiff may choose from in case the obligation has
the possibility of arising indirectly from the delict/crime or directly from quasi-delict/tort. The choice is
with the plaintiff who makes known his cause of action in his initiatory pleading or complaint, and not with
the defendant who can not ask for the dismissal of the plaintiff’s cause of action or lack of it based on the
defendant’s perception that the plaintiff should have opted to file a claim under Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code.

SEA COMMERCIAL COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, JAMANDRE INDUSTRIES, INC. and TIRSO JAMANDRE, respondents.

Torts and Damages; Quasi-Delicts; Human Relations; Abuse of Rights Principle; The principle of abuse
of rights stated in Article 19 of the Civil Code departs from the classical theory that “he who uses a right
injures no one”—the modern tendency is to depart from the classical and traditional theory, and to grant
indemnity for damages in cases where there is an abuse of rights, even when the act is not illicit; The
absence of good faith is essential to abuse of right.—Both courts invoke as basis for the award Article 19
of the Civil Code which reads as follows: “Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.”
The principle of abuse of rights stated in the above article, departs from the classical theory that “he who
uses a right injures no one.” The modern tendency is to depart from the classical and traditional theory, and
to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is an abuse of rights, even when the act is not illicit.
Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law.
If mere fault or negligence in one’s acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with
more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. The absence of good faith is essential to abuse of
right. Good faith is an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another,
even through the forms or technicalities of the law, together with an absence of all information or belief of
fact which would render the transaction unconscientious. In business relations, it means good faith as
understood by men of affairs.

Elements of Abuse of Rights.—While Article 19 may have been intended as a mere declaration of principle,
the “cardinal law on human conduct” expressed in said article has given rise to certain rules, e.g. that where
a person exercises his rights but does so arbitrarily or unjustly or performs his duties in a manner that is not
in keeping with honesty and good faith, he opens himself to liability. The elements of an abuse of rights
under Article 19 are: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole
intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

Equity; Even if the dealership agreement is on a non-exclusive basis, the distributor may not exercise its
right unjustly or in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty or good faith; otherwise it opens itself to
liability under the abuse of right rule; What is sought to be written into the law is the pervading principle
of equity and justice above strict legalism.—Even if the dealership agreement was amended to make it on
a non-exclusive basis, SEACOM may not exercise its right unjustly or in a manner that is not in keeping
with honesty or good faith; otherwise it opens itself to liability under the abuse of right rule embodied in
Article 19 of the Civil Code above-quoted. This provision, together with the succeeding article on human
relation, was intended to embody certain basic principles “that are to be observed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order.” What is sought to be written
into the law is the pervading principle of equity and justice above strict legalism.

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS, respondents.

Torts and Damages; Human Relations; Labor Law; Dismissal; The employer is liable for damages to the
employee if the dismissal is done abusively.—The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to
dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects
flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the
employee [Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer and Plywood Inc., G.R. No. L-38088, August 30, 1974, 58
SCRA 771; See also Philippine Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-21871, September 27, 1966, 18
SCRA 107]. Under the circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a
legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under Article
19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.

Malicious Prosecution; The right to institute criminal prosecutions cannot be exercised maliciously and in
bad faith.—While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to
the courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights [Buenaventura v. Sto. Domingo, 103 Phil.
239 (1958)], the right to institute criminal prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith
[Ventura v. Bernabe, G.R. No. L-26760, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 587]. Hence, in Yutuk v. Manila Electric
Co., G.R. No. L-13016, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 337, the Court held that the right to file criminal complaints
should not be used as a weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay an indebtedness. To do so would be a clear
perversion of the function of the criminal processes and of the courts of justice. And in Hawpia v. CA, G.R.
No. L-20047, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 536, the Court upheld the judgment against the petitioner for actual
and moral damages and attorney’s fees after making a finding that petitioner, with persistence, filed at least
six criminal complaints against respondent, all of which were dismissed.

Quasi Delict; The principle of damnum absque injuria does not apply in the instant case considering the
abusive manner in which petitioner exercised its right to dismiss private respondent, and the several other
quasi-delictual acts committed by the former.—According to the principle of damnum absque injuria,
damage or loss which does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not
actionable [Escano v. CA, G.R. No. L-47207, September 25, 1980, 100 SCRA 197; See also Gilchrist v.
Cuddy, 29 Phil. 542 (1915); The Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, G.R. No. L-18805, August 14, 1967, 20
SCRA 987]. This principle finds no application in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that
petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right
was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the
damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed
but was also the result of several other quasidelictual acts committed by petitioners.

Heirs of PURISIMA NALA, represented by their attorney-in-fact EFEGENIA DIGNA DUYAN,

petitioners, vs. ARTEMIO CABANSAG, respondent.

Civil Law; Abuse of Rights; There is an abuse of right when it is exercised only for the purpose of
prejudicing or injuring another.— When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But a right, though by itself legal because recognized or
granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. A person should be
protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right; that is, when he acts with prudence and
in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised
only for the purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with
the purpose for which it was established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no
intention to injure another.

Requisites to be Liable for Damages under the Abuse of Rights Principle.—In order to be liable for damages
under the abuse of rights principle, the following requisites must concur: (a) the existence of a legal right
or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

It should be stressed that malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code.—It should be
stressed that malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith is presumed, and
he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad faith, on the other hand, does not simply
connote bad judgment to simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing
of a wrong, or a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature
of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do
ulterior and unjustifiable harm.

Damages; Damages and Injury, Distinguished.—Respondent failed to show that Nala and Atty. Del
Prado’s acts were done with the sole intention of prejudicing and injuring him. It may be true that
respondent suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety and sleepless nights when he received the demand
letters; however, there is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the legal invasion of
a legal right while damage is the hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury. Thus, there can be damage
without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty.
In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone; the law affords no remedy for
damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often
called damnum absque injuria.

One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury— thus, whatever damages are suffered by
respondent should be borne solely by him.—Nala was acting well within her rights when she instructed
Atty. Del Prado to send the demand letters. She had to take all the necessary legal steps to enforce her
legal/equitable rights over the property occupied by respondent. One who makes use of his own legal right
does no injury. Thus, whatever damages are suffered by respondent should be borne solely by him.

MIGUEL PEREZ RUBIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ROBERTO O. PHILLIPS &
SONS, INC., MAGDALENA YSMAEL PHILLIPS, MANUFACTURERS BANK & TRUST CO.,
INC., HACIENDA BENITO, INC., ET AL., respondents.

Civil Law; Damages; Interest to defraud petitioner evident in the execution of Memorandum Agreement.—
Hence, the scheme provided for in the Memorandum Agreement wherein all the properties of Hacienda
Benito will be ultimately transferred to VVDC without any mention at all and completely ignoring the
petitioner's interest in said Hacienda placed the petitioner's rightful claim to the payment of his shares of
stock in dear jeopardy. The fact that the Memorandum Agreement was not fully implemented is immaterial.
The intent to defraud the petitioner and the damage which led to the filing of this case was present in the
execution of the Memorandum Agreement.

Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same. —Parenthetically, these
respondents did not observe honesty and good faith in dealing with the rightful claim of the petitioner to
the still unpaid P4,250,000.00 collectibles from ROPSI. The respondents' acts are tortious pursuant to
Articles 19 and 20 of the New Civil Code. Hence, these respondents are obliged to pay for the damage done
to the petitioner. (See Article 2176, New Civil Code).

The responsibility of two or more persons who an liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.—In the case at bar,
the tortious and fraudulent scheme of the private respondents made it impossible for the petitioner to collect
the P 4,250,000.00 still unpaid purchase price of his shares of stock in Hacienda Benito. All the respondents
are, therefore, solidarily liable for these actual damages suffered by the petitioner.

JOSE S. ROQUE, JR., substituted by his wife NORMA ROQUE, petitioner, vs. JAIME T. TORRES,
substituted by his son JAMES KENLEY M. TORRES, and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

Damages; When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to
another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held accountable.—In the case at bar, it is
clear that respondent violated the principle embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code which mandates that
“every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” When a right is exercised in a manner which
discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be
held accountable. As we have stated in a previous case, if mere fault or negligence in one’s acts can make
him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him
liable.
Damages; It is essential in the award of damages that the claimant must have satisfactorily proven during
the trial the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal connection to defendant’s acts.—
With respect to the award of damages, we sustain the ruling of the trial court. It is essential in the award of
damages that the claimant must have satisfactorily proven during the trial the existence of the factual basis
of the damages and its causal connection to defendant’s acts. During trial, petitioner, through his own
testimony and that of his wife, was able to establish that they have incurred actual damages in the amount
of P300,000.00 for the hospitalization of petitioner as a result of the shooting and the mauling incident,
thus, the award of actual damages in said amount is proper.

Civil Law; Damages; It must be emphasized that moral damages are not intended to enrich the complainant
at the expense of a defendant. They are awarded only to enable injured parties to obtain means, diversions
or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral sufferings the injured parties have undergone by reason
of defendant’s culpable action.—As regards the award of moral damages, we have ruled that there is no
hard and fast rule in the determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages, since each case
must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances. As reflected in the records of the instant case, there is
no gainsaying the fact that petitioner, together with his family, had suffered physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety and moral shock resulting from respondent’s acts which caused petitioner
grave physical injuries eventually leading to his death. The several years of torment and agonizing on the
part of the deceased petitioner and his family more than justify the award of moral damages. It must be
emphasized that moral damages are not intended to enrich the complainant at the expense of a defendant.
They are awarded only to enable the injured parties to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will
serve to alleviate the moral sufferings the injured parties have undergone by reason of defendant’s culpable
action. In other words, the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration within the limits of the possible,
of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Therefore,
in light of the sufferings sustained by petitioner and his family, we are inclined to sustain the award of
P1,000,000.00 as moral damages.

TITUS B. VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. EMMA M. ROSQUETA, respondent.

Civil Law; Damages; Abuse of Rights; A person must, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good
faith; He would be liable if he instead acts in bad faith with intent to prejudice another.—Under the abuse
of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise of his legal right or
duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acts in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another.
Complementing this principle are Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for
the injury he suffers because of such abuse of right or duty.

A party’s refusal to abide by a court order enjoining him from doing an act, otherwise lawful, constitutes
an abuse and an unlawful exercise of right.—That petitioner Villanueva ignored the injunction shows bad
faith and intent to spite Rosqueta who remained in the eyes of the law the Deputy Commissioner. His
exclusion of her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia was not an honest mistake by any reckoning.
Indeed, he withheld her salary and prevented her from assuming the duties of the position. As the Court
said in Amonoy v. Spouses Gutierrez, 351 SCRA 731 (2001) a party’s refusal to abide by a court order
enjoining him from doing an act, otherwise lawful, constitutes an abuse and an unlawful exercise of right.

Moral Damages; Moral damages may be awarded when the defendant’s transgression is the immediate
cause of the plaintiff’s anguish.—The CA correctly awarded moral damages to respondent Rosqueta. Such
damages may be awarded when the defendant’s transgression is the immediate cause of the plaintiff’s
anguish in the cases specified in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
H.L. CARLOS CONSTRUCTION, INC., petitioner, vs. MARINA PROPERTIES CORPORATION,
JESUS K. TYPOCO, SR. and TAN YU, respondents.

Civil Law; Human Relations; Unjust Enrichment; Requisites; There is unjust enrichment under Article 22
of the Civil Code when the following are met.—There is unjust enrichment under Article 22 of the Civil
Code when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with
damages to another.

Quantum Meruit Principle; Quantum meruit means that in an action for work and labor, payment shall be
made in such amount as the plaintiff reasonably deserves.—Under the principle of quantum meruit, a
contractor is allowed to recover the reasonable value of the thing or services rendered despite the lack of a
written contract, in order to avoid unjust enrichment. Quantum meruit means that in an action for work and
labor, payment shall be made in such amount as the plaintiff reasonably deserves.To deny payment for a
building almost completed and already occupied would be to permit unjust enrichment at the expense of
the contractor.

Corporation Law; Corporate Officers; Personal Liability; Requisites; The personal liability of corporate
officers validly attaches only when the following are met.—The personal liability of corporate officers
validly attaches only when (a) they assent to a patently unlawful act of the corporation; or (b) they are guilty
of bad faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs; or (c) they incur conflict of interest, resulting in
damages to the corporation, its stockholders or other persons.

Damages; Liquidated Damages; Penal Clause; Under Philippine laws, liquidated damages take the nature
of penalties.—Liquidated damages are those that the parties agree to be paid in case of a breach. As worded,
the amount agreed upon answers for damages suffered by the owner due to delays in the completion of the
project. Under Philippine laws, these damages take the nature of penalties. A penal clause is an accessory
undertaking to assume greater liability in case of a breach. It is attached to an obligation in order to ensure
performance.

VICENTE S. ALMARIO, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE AIR-LINES, INC., respondent.

Unjust Enrichment; The provision on unjust enrichment embodied in Article 22 of the Civil Code recognizes
the principle that one may not enrich himself at the expense of another.— The pertinent provision of the
CBA and its rationale aside, contrary to Almario’s claim, Article 22 of the Civil Code which reads: Art. 22.
Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him, applies. This provision on unjust enrichment recognizes the principle that one may not enrich himself
at the expense of another. An authority on Civil Law writes on the subject, viz.: Enrichment of the defendant
consists in every patrimonial, physical, or moral advantage, so long as it is appreciable in money. It may
consist of some positive pecuniary value incorporated into the patrimony of the defendant, such as: (1) the
enjoyment of a thing belonging to the plaintiff; (2) the benefits from service rendered by the plaintiff to the
defendant; (3) the acquisition of a right, whether real or personal; (4) the increase of value of property of
the defendant; (5) the improvement of a right of the defendant, such as the acquisition of a right of
preference; (6) the recognition of the existence of a right in the defendant; and (7) the improvement of the
conditions of life of the defendant. x x x x The enrichment of the defendant must have a correlative
prejudice, disadvantage, or injury to the plaintiff. This prejudice may consist, not only of the loss of property
or the deprivation of its enjoyment, but also of non-payment of compensation for a prestation or service
rendered to the defendant without intent to donate on the part of the plaintiff, or the failure to acquire
something which the latter would have obtained. The injury to the plaintiff, however, need not be the cause
of the enrichment of the defendant. It is enough that there be some relation between them, that the
enrichment of the defendant would not have been produced had it not been for the fact from which the
injury to the plaintiff is derived.

An airline who, at its expense, spends for the training of a pilot to enable him to acquire a higher level of
skill, proficiency, or technical competence expects to recover the training costs by availing of the pilot’s
services for a certain period of time, and if that expectation is not fully realized because the pilot resigns
before the completion of that period, said pilot cannot refuse to reimburse the costs of training without
violating the principle of unjust enrichment.—PAL invested for the training of Almario to enable him to
acquire a higher level of skill, proficiency, or technical competence so that he could efficiently discharge
the position of A-300 First Officer. Given that, PAL expected to recover the training costs by availing of
Almario’s services for at least three years. The expectation of PAL was not fully realized, however, due to
Almario’s resignation after only eight months of service following the completion of his training course.
He cannot, therefore, refuse to reimburse the costs of training without violating the principle of unjust
enrichment.

ADVANCED FOUNDATION CONSTRUCTION SYSTEMS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NEW

WORLD PROPERTIES AND VENTURES, INC., respondent.

Unjust Enrichment; Equity necessarily dictates that the principal be held liable for the expenses incurred
for the extra work conducted for its sole benefit.—As explained by the appellate court itself, the experts
and CIAC have agreed that the removal of the underground obstructions was not covered by the scope of
work in the contract. It is not disputed though that the same was a major work entailing additional expenses
and extra working time. Neither was it denied that such major work was indeed necessary for the successful
completion of the project. Indeed, to deny AFCSC relief for the expenses it incurred in removing said
obstructions would result in allowing New World to unjustly enrich itself at the expense of AFCSC. Equity
necessarily dictates that New World be held liable for the expenses incurred for the extra work conducted
for its sole benefit. Further, it cannot be said that New World was not made aware of the existence of the
underground obstruction nor of the additional expense that would be necessary for its removal. As
heretofore stated, AFCSC, on 21 November 1996, sent a proposal to New World regarding the additional
expenses that would be incurred in the instance that the contractor shall encounter underground
obstructions; however, New World never responded to said proposal until 9 September 1997, when it
informed AFCSC of the rejection of said proposal or almost ten (10) months after said proposal was first
offered, and after all the necessary extra work had been accomplished.

Article 22 of the Civil Code embodies the maxim, Nemo ex alterius incommode debet lecupletari (no man
ought to be made rich out of another’s injury).—Article 22 of the Civil Code which embodies the maxim,
Nemo ex alterius incommode debet lecupletari (no man ought to be made rich out of another’s injury) states:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes
into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same
to him. The above-quoted article is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the provisions
of which were formulated as “basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human
beings and for the stability of the social order, x x x designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the
fountain of good conscience, x x x guides human conduct [that] should run as golden threads through society
to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice. Hence, to
allow New World to acquire the finished project at a price far below its actual construction cost would
undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for the bank to the prejudice of AFCSC. Such unjust enrichment,
as previously discussed, is not allowed by law.
AVON COSMETICS, INCORPORATED and JOSE MARIE FRANCO, petitioners, vs. LETICIA
H. LUNA, respondent.

Unjust Enrichment; It doesn’t take a genius to realize that a newly-formed-direct selling business, by
making petitioner company’s supervisor an important part of its distribution arm, would be saving time,
effort and money as it will no longer have to recruit, train and motivate supervisors and dealers—said
supervisor, who learned the tricks of the trade from the petitioner corporation will do it for them, an act
which is tantamount to unjust enrichment.—Such prohibition is neither directed to eliminate the
competition like Sandré Phils., Inc. nor foreclose new entrants to the market. In its Memorandum, it admits
that the reason for such exclusion is to safeguard the network that it has cultivated through the years.
Admittedly, both companies employ the direct selling method in order to peddle their products. By direct
selling, petitioner Avon and Sandré, the manufacturer, forego the use of a middleman in selling their
products, thus, controlling the price by which they are to be sold. The limitation does not affect the public
at all. It is only a means by which petitioner Avon is able to protect its investment. It was not by chance
that Sandré Philippines, Inc. made respondent Luna one of its Group Franchise Directors. It doesn’t take a
genius to realize that by making her an important part of its distribution arm, Sandré Philippines, Inc., a
newly formed direct-selling business, would be saving time, effort and money as it will no longer have to
recruit, train and motivate supervisors and dealers. Respondent Luna, who learned the tricks of the trade
from petitioner Avon, will do it for them. This is tantamount to unjust enrichment. Worse, the goodwill
established by petitioner Avon among its loyal customers will be taken advantaged of by Sandré
Philippines, Inc. It is not so hard to imagine the scenario wherein the sale of Sandré products by Avon
dealers will engender a belief in the minds of loyal Avon customers that the product that they are buying
had been manufactured by Avon. In other words, they will be misled into thinking that the Sandré products
are in fact Avon products. From the foregoing, it cannot be said that the purpose of the subject exclusivity
clause is to foreclose the competition, that is, the entrance of Sandré products in to the market. Therefore,
it cannot be considered void for being against public policy. How can the protection of one’s property be
violative of public policy? Sandré Philippines, Inc. is still very much free to distribute its products in the
market but it must do so at its own expense. The exclusivity clause does not in any way limit its selling
opportunities, just the undue use of the resources of petitioner Avon.

AGAPITO BONZON, plaintiff and appellant, vs. STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK
and LEONARDO OSORIO, as sheriff, defendants and appellees.

EXECUTION SALE; RIGHT OF PURCHASER AGAINST EXECUTION CREDITOR.—If the purchaser

of real property sold on execution, or his successor in interest, be evicted therefrom, because of a total
failure of title, it appearing that the judgment debtor had no right, title, or interest in or to the property sold
under execution, he may recover the price paid, with interest, from the judgment creditor.

IRREGULARITY IN PROCEEDINGS.—The sale of property on execution in and to which the judgment

debtor has no right, title, or interest, is an "irregularity in the proceedings concerning the sale" as that term
is used in section 470 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, RITA GUECO
TAPNIO, CECILIO GUECO and THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., respondents.

Sugar quota; Banks and Banking; Chattel Mortgage; Torts; Circumstances which show that the Philippine
National Bank acted unreasonably in raising the price of the lease of sugar quota allotment from P2.80 to
P3.00 per picul.—As observed by the trial court, time is of the essence in the approval of the lease of sugar
quota allotments, since the same must be utilized during the milling season, because any allotment which
is not filled during such milling season may be reallocated by the Sugar Quota Administration to other
holders of allotments. There was no proof that there was any other person at that time willing to lease the
sugar quota allotment of private respondents for a price higher than P2.80 per picul. “The fact that there
were isolated transactions wherein the consideration for the lease was P3.00 a picul”, according to the trial
court, “does not necessarily mean that there are always ready takers for said price.” The unreasonableness
of the position adopted by the petitioner’s Board of Directors is shown by the fact that the difference
between the amount of P2.80 per picul offered by Tuazon and the P3.00 per picul demanded by the Board
amounted only to a total sum of P200.00. Considering that all the accounts of Rita Gueco Tapnio with the
Bank were secured by chattel mortgage on standing crops, assignment of leasehold rights and interests on
her properties, and surety bonds and that she had apparently “the means to pay her obligation to the Bank,
as shown by the fact that she has been granted several sugar crop loans of the total value of almost
P80,000.00 for the agricultural years from 1952 to 1956”, there was no reasonable basis for the Board of
Directors of petitioner to have rejected the lease agreement because of a measly sum of P200.00.

Assignments; The Philippine National Bank, as assignee of lease of sugar quota allotment, should show
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which circumstances demand in approving or disapproving
a lease of sugar quota, otherwise it will be liable for damages on account of tort.—While petitioner had
the ultimate authority of approving or disapproving the proposed lease since the quota was mortgaged to
the bank, the latter certainly cannot escape its responsibility of observing, for the protection of the interest
of private respondents, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand
in approving or disapproving the lease of said sugar quota. The law makes it imperative that every person
“must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.” This petitioner failed to do. Certainly, it knew that the agricultural
year was about to expire, that by its disapproval of the lease private respondents would be unable to utilize
the sugar quota in question. In failing to observe the reasonable degree of care and vigilance which the
surrounding circumstances reasonably impose, petitioner is consequently liable for the damages caused on
private respondents. Under Article 21 of the New Civil Code, “any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage.” The afore-cited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the
concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral
wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes.

Corporation Law; Corporations can be liable in same manner as natural persons, for tort.—A corporation
is civilly liable in the same manner as natural persons for torts, because “generally speaking, the rules
governing the liability of a principal or master for a tort committed by an agent or servant are the same
whether the principal or master be a natural person or a corporation, and whether the servant or agent be a
natural or artificial person. All of the authorities agree that a principal or master is liable for every tort
which he expressly directs or authorizes, and this is just as true of a corporation as of a natural person.

FELINA RODRIGUEZLUNA, JOSE R. LUNA and ROBERTO R. LUNA, JR., petitioners, vs. THE
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JOSE E. DELA ROSA and LUIS DELA ROSA,
respondents.

Damages; Torts; Being engaged in gokart racing will not. merit reduction of one’s life expectancy.—The
Court of Appeals, in reducing Luna’s life expectancy from 30 to 10 years said that his habit and manner of
life should be taken into account, i.e. that he had been engaged in car racing as a sport both here and
abroad— a dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his life expectancy. That Luna had engaged in
car racing is not based on any evidence on record. That Luna was engaged in gokart racing is the correct
statement but then gokart racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for gokarts are extremely low
slung, low powered vehicles, only slightly larger than footpedalled four wheeled conveyances. It was error
OR the part of the Court of Appeals to have disturbed the deter mination of the trial court which it had
previously affirmed.

Equity; Equity will not be applied if to do so will not serve ends of justice. Father’s liability for damages
made by his son who later become emancipated but is now abroad and could hardly support himself cannot
be merely subsidiary.—The private respondents invoked Elcano vs. Hill, L24803, May 26, 1977; 77 SCRA
98, where it was held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code applied to Atty. Marvin Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald Hill, his son but since Reginald had attained age, as a matter of
equity, the liability of Atty. Hill had become merely subsidiary to that of his son, It is now said that Luis
dela Rosa, is now married and of legal age and that as a matter of equity the liability of his father should be
subsidiary only. We are unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law in this case because to do so will not
serve the ends of justice. Luis dela Rosa is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine courts, Moreover, he
does not have any property either in the Philippines elsewhere. In fact his earnings are insufficient to support
his family.

LINDAY PALEYAN, for her own and behalf of her Minor children, namely:
TERESA,FORTUNATO,VENANCIO and JOSE, all surnamed PALEYAN, plaintiffappellants, vs.
CARLOS BANGKILI and VICTORIA BANGKILI alias CUYOYAN,defendantsappellees.

Revised Penal Code; Subsidiary liability of parents under Art. 101.—It is true that under Article 101 of the
Revised Penal Code, a father is made civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if the latter is an
imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of age, or over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acts without discernment,
unless it appears that there is no fault or negligence on his part. This is because a son who commits the act
under any of these conditions is by law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2 and 3,
Revised Penal Code). The idea is not to leave the act entirely unpunished but to attach certain civil liability
to the person who has the delinquent minor under his legal authority or control.

Civil Code; Civil liability of parents for acts of minors over 15. —A minor over 15 who acts with
discernment is not exempt from criminal liability, for which reason the Code (Revised Penal Code) is silent
as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand convicted. In that case, resort should be had to
the general law which is our Civil Code. The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180. To hold
that this provision does not apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations which arise from
quasidelicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while
for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the
damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent.
Verily, the void that apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular provision
of our Civil Code, as may be gleaned from some recent decisions of this Court which cover equal or
identical cases.

Legal defense under Article 2180, Civil Code.—The contention that the application of Article 2180 should
be relaxed, considering that appellee’s son, although living with her, was already 19 years of age and hence
mature enough to have a mind of his own, is not a legal defense and does not exempt the appellant from
her responsibility as parent and natural guardian. Article 2180 does not provide for any exemption except
proof that the defendant parent “observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.”
There is no such proof in this case.
FELIX LANUZO, plaintiffappellee, vs. SY BON PING and SALVADOR MENDOZA,
defendantsappellants.

Civil Law; Quasidelict; Allegations to be alleged in actions based on quasidelict.— The terms of plaintiff’s
reservation clearly and unmistakably make out a case for quasidelict. This is also evident from the recitals
in plaintiff’s complaint averring the employer-employee relationship between the appellants, alleging that
damages to the house and store were caused by the fact that Salvador Mendoza had driven the truck
“recklessly, with gross negligence and imprudence, without observance of traffic rules and regulations and
without regard to the safety of persons and property”, and praying that appellants be held jointly and
solidarily liable for damages. There are, basically, what should be alleged in actions based on quasidelict.

Institution of criminal actions arising from vehicular accident does not interrupt the separate civil action
for damages based on quasidelict for the same accident; Exception. —As it is quite apparent that plaintiff
had predicated his present claim for damages on quasidelict, he is not barred from proceeding with this
independent civil suit. The institution of criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the civil
action based on quasidelict. And the separate civil action for quasidelict may proceed independently and
regardless of the result of the criminal case, except that a plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.

Civil action under the Rules of Court that should be suspended after institution of the criminal action is
that arising from delict, not the civil action based on quasidelict or culpa aquiliana.—The civil action
referred to in Sections 3(a) and (b) of Rule III of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the
institution of the criminal action, is that arising from delict, and not the civil action based on quasidelict or
culpa aquiliana.

Liability of employer for negligent act of his employee; Nature of liability; Presumption of negligence of
employer; Effect of failure by employer to rebut the legal presumption of its negligence.—We come now
to the subject of liability of the appellants herein. For his own negligence in recklessly driving the truck
owned and operated by his employer, the driver, Salvador Mendoza, is primarily liable under Article 2176
of the Civil Code. On the other hand, the liability of his employer, Sy Bon Ping, is also primary and direct
under Article 2180 of the same Code. x x x For failure of the appellant Sy Bon Ping to rebut the legal
presumption of his negligence in the selection and supervision of his employee, he is likewise responsible
for the damages caused by the negligent act of his employee (driver) Salvador Mendoza, and his liability is
primary and solidary.

Solidary liability of employer for his employee’s negligent acts; Exception.—But although the employer is
solidarity liable with the employee for damages, the employer may demand reimbursement from his
employee (driver) for whatever amount the employer will have to pay the offended party to satisfy the
latter’s claim.

PRIMA MALIPOL, in her own behalf and as guardian ad litem of her minor children, LYDIA
MALIJAN,JOSEFINA MALIJAN,TEODORA MALIJAN, and SEBASTIAN MALIJAN,
plaintiffsappellees, vs. LILY LIM TAN and ERNESTO LABSAN, defendantsappellants.

Civil law; Quasidelict; In actions for quasidelict the employer is solidarily liable with the employee for
damages.— The action in the instant case was brought not to demand civil liability arising from a crime.
The complaint makes no mention of a crime having been committed, much less of the driver having been
convicted of a crime. But there is an allegation in the complaint that Labsan was the authorized driver of
the Lily Lim Tan in connection with her gasoline business. The instant action, therefore, was based, as the
complaint shows, on quasidelict. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which treats of quasidelicts, the
liability of the owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise for damages caused by their
employees is primary and direct, not subsidiary. The employer, however, can demand from his employee
reimbursement of the amount which he paid under his liability.

GREGORIO ANURAN, MARIA MALIGAYA, LAPAZ LARO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. PEPITO
BUÑO, PEDRO GAHOL, LUISA ALCANTARA, GUILLERMO RAZON, ANSELMO
MALIGAYA and CEFERINA ARO, respondents.

Common carriers; Duty to transport passengers safely; Liability of driver and owner of vehicle.—The
obligation of the carrier to transport its passengers safely is such that the New Civil Code requires “utmost”
diligence from the carriers (Art. 1755) who are “presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently
unless they prove that they have observed extraordinary diligence” (Art. 1756). Where the driver
improperly parked his jeepney in such a way that its left wheels were on the asphalted pavement, he was
negligent. The driver and the owner of the vehicle must answer for injuries to its passengers resulting from
the negligence of the driver.

Application of principle of “last dear chance".—The principle of “last clear chance” applies in a suit
between the owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles. It does not apply where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligation. It would he inequitable to exempt the
negligent driver and his employer on the ground that the other driver was also negligent.

Solidary liability.—Where a jeepney improperly parked was bumped by a truck, the drivers and owners of
the truck and jeepney are solidarily liable for the damages suffered by the passengers of the jeepney.

JOHN KAM BIAK Y. CHAN, JR., petitioner, vs. IGLESIA NI CRISTO, INC., respondent.

Civil Law; Quasidelicts; The requisites of quasidelict are the following: (a) there must be an act or
omission; (b) such act or omission causes damage to another; (c) such act or omission is caused by fault
or negligence; and (d) there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties.—ART. 2176.—
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Based on this provision of
law, the requisites of quasidelict are the following: (a) there must be an act or omission; (b) such act or
omission causes damage to another; (c) such act or commission is caused by fault or negligence; and (d)
there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties. All the requisites are attendant in the instant
case. The tortious act was the excavation which caused damage to the respondent because it was done
surreptitiously within its premises and it may have affected the foundation of the chapel. The excavation
on respondent’s premises was caused by fault. Finally, there was no preexisting contractual relation
between the petitioner and Yoro on the one hand, and the respondent on the other.

Damages; Joint Tortfeasors; The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasidelict is
solidary. As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it
after it is done, if done for their benefit.—For the damage caused to respondent, petitioner and Yoro are
jointly liable as they are joint tortfeasors. Verily, the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable
for a quasidelict is solidary. As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate,
promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve
of it after it is done, if done for their benefit.
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano,
deceased, plaintiffsappellants, vs. REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and
Natural Guardian of said minor, defendantsappellees.

Civil law; Damages; Quasidelicts; The concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in
character, whether voluntary or negligent.—Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a
reading of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia—that the concurrence of the Penal Code and
the Civil Code therein referred to contemplates only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts—
deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in
fact is actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of
the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a
negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, provided
textually that obligations “which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not
punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter 11, Title XV of this book (which refers to
quasidelicts.)” And it is precisely the underlined qualification, “not punishable by law,” that Justice Bocobo
emphasized could lead to an undesirable construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that “killeth,
rather than the spirit that giveth life” hence, the ruling that “(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law
to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development
as culpa aquiliana or causidelito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Spanish Civil Code.” And so, because Justice Bocobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted
the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the
Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, “not punishable by law,” thereby making it clear that the concept
of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether
voluntary or negligent.

Same; Same; Same; A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the victim do not recover damages on
both scores.—. . . It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not
extinguished his liability for quasidelict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

The vicarious liability of the parents on account of a delict committed by their minor child is not
extinguished by the fact that said, child who is Hiring with and dependent upon said parents is married.—
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald’s emancipation by marriage on the possible
civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that
Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld. It must be borne in mind that, according to
Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending child under Article
2180 is that it is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from
causing damage to third persons. On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that
a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents,
is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can
give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, id., Vol.II, pp. 766767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else
invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the
duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give cause to any litigation, in the same manner
that the parents are answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property
which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent, (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation
by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of
equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become merely subsidiary to that of his son.
NARCISO GUTIERREZ, plaintiff and appellee, vs. BONIFACIO GUTIERREZ, MARIA V. DE
GUTIERREZ, MANUEL GUTIERREZ, ABELARDO VELASCO, and SATURNINO CORTEZ,
defendants and appellants.

DAMAGES; MASTER AND SERVANT; MOTOR VEHICLES; LIABILITY OF HEAD OF HOUSE

FOR ACTS OF DRIVER WHO is HIS MINOR CHILD.—The head of a house, the owner of an automobile,
who maintains it for the general use of his family, is liable for its negligent operation by one of his children,
whom he designates or permits to run it, where the car is occupied and being used at the time of the injury
for the pleasure of other members of the owner's family than the child driving it.

CASE AT BAR.—One G, a passenger in a truck, recovers damages in the amount of P5,000 from the owner
of a private automobile not in the car, the machine being operated by a son 18 years of age, with other
members of the family accommodated therein, and from the chauffeur and owner of the truck which
collided with the private automobile on a bridge, causing physical injuries to G as a result of the automobile
accident.

SABINA EXCONDE, plaintiff and appellant, vs. DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE CAPUNO,
defendants and appellees.

ClVIL LlABILITY OF PARENTS FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY THEIR MINOR CHILDREN;

RELIEF FROM LIABILITY.—The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father, and, in case of
his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live
with them is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon
the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing
them in proportion to their means" while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish
them in moderation" (Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieve
themselves of such liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent the damage (Article 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code).

LIABILITY OF TEACHERS OR DIRECTOR; INSTITUTIONS AFFECTED.—The civil liability

imposed by Article 1903 of the old Civil Code on teachers or directors of arts and trades for damages caused
by pupils or apprentices under their custody, only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any
academic educational institution.

AGAPITO FUELLAS, petitioner, vs. ELPIDIO CADANO, ET AL., respondents.

Damages; Subsidiary liability; Civil liability for crimes committed by minors; Scope of parents’ liability.—
The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Art. 2180 of the
new Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasidelicts and criminal offenses.

Liability determined under both the Civil Code and the Penal Code.—The subsidiary liability of parents
arising from the criminal acts of their minor children who act with discernment is determined under the
provisions of Art. 2180, N.C.C. and under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, because to hold that the
former only covers obligations which arise from quasidelicts and not obligations which arise from criminal
offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or
mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if
the damage is caused with criminal intent.
MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, minor represented by her father ULISES P. CUADRA, ET AL.,
plaintiffs-appellees, vs. ALFONSO MONFORT, defendant-appellant.

Civil Law; Minors; Damages; Diligence of a good father of a family; Liability of parents for damages
caused by their minor children.—In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the
defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss
in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the
contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right
to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the
injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent,
however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate, much less guard against. Nor did it reveal
any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child’s character which would reflect unfavorably on
her upbringing and for which the blame would be attributed to her parents.

BARREDO, J.:dissenting

Civil Law; Minors; Damages; What constitutes fault within contemplation of law on torts; Knowledge of
consequence of minor’s acts could be determined by her age.—She was 13 years and should have known
that by jokingly saying aloud “that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl,
tossed the object at her,” it was likely that something would happen to her friend, as in fact, she was hurt.

Liability of the father.—There being no evidence that he had properly advised his daughter to behave
properly and not to play dangerous jokes on her classmates and playmates, he can be liable under Article
2180 of the Civil Code.

CRESENCIO LIBI and AMELIA YAP LIBI, petitioners, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, FELIPE GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG, respondents.

Civil Law; Damages; Liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children under Article 2180
of the Civil Code.—In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of
petitioners, respondent court cites Fuellas vs. Cadano, et al. which supposedly holds that “(t)he subsidiary
liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code covers obligations arising from both quasidelicts and criminal offenses,” followed by an extended
quotation ostensibly from the same case explaining why under Article 2180 of the Civil Code and Article
101 of the Revised Penal Code parents should assume subsidiary liability for damages caused by their minor
children. The quoted passages are set out two paragraphs back, with pertinent underscoring for purposes of
the discussion hereunder. Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding the parents liable,
but the categorization of their liability as being subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a hard second
look considering previous decisions of this court on the matter which warrant comparative analyses. Our
concern stems from our readings that if the liability of the parents for crimes or quasidelicts of their minor
children is subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense
that they acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. On the other hand, if
such liability imputed to the parents is considered direct and primary, that diligence would constitute a valid
and substantial defense. We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasidelicts of their minor children,
as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article
2194 of said code which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the
act or omission, in this case the minor and the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph
of Article 2180 provides that “(t)he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.”
Criminal Law; Civil liability of parents for crimes committed by their minor children.—Accordingly, just
like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, xxx the civil liability of the parents for crimes committed by
their minor children is likewise direct and primary, and also subject to the defense of lack of fault or
negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. That in both
quasidelicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for such damages is buttressed by the corresponding
provisions in both codes that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall respond with his own
property only in the absence or in case of insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto
of minors, Article 2182 of the Civil Code states that “(i)f the minor causing damage has no parents or
guardian, the minor x x x shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a
guardian ad litem shall be appointed.” For civil liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent provision is
found in the third paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: “Should there be no person
having such x x x minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent,
said x x x minor shall respond with (his) own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in
accordance with civil law.”

MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA TAMARGO, petitioners, vs. THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS; THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch 20, Vigan,
IIocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and CLARA BUNDOC, respondents.

Actions; Quasidelicts; Parents and Child; Adoption; The natural parents of a minor still living with the
former when the latter accidentally shot a girl with an air rifle are liable for damages thus caused rather
than the adopter even if petition for adoption filed before the accident and granted thereafter.—We do not
believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and vested in
the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not consider
that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting
parents accruing at a time when the adopting parents had no actual or physical custody over the adopted
child. Retroactive effect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is
essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant
case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as
to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not
have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child
Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the
philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no
presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have
arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.

Same; Same.—Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents
during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely because the
adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such trial period. In the instant case, the trial
custody period either had not yet begun or had already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting;
in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not the adopting parents.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. NOEL DARILAY, appellant.

Parent and Child; Where, at the time of the commission of the crime, the accused was minor under the
parental authority of his parents, the latter are primarily and directly liable for the damages sustained by
the heirs of the victim. —Considering that at the time of the commission of the crime, the appellant was a
minor under the parental authority of his parents, the Spouses Manuel and Julieta Darilay are primarily and
directly liable for the damages sustained by the heirs of the victims Marilyn and Ailyn Arganda.
Consequently, the Spouses Manuel and Julieta Darilay are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, in Criminal
Case No. RTC97201, to pay to the heirs of the victim Marilyn Arganda, the amount of P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; and P28,000.00 as exemplary damages. The prosecution failed
to adduce evidence in support of actual damages; hence, the heirs of the victim are not entitled thereto.
They are, however, entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00. In Criminal Case No.
RTC’97202, the Spouses Manuel and Julieta Darilay are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to
Ailyn Arganda, the amount of P25,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

ORLANDO D. GARCIA, JR., doing business under the name and style COMMUNITY
DIAGNOSTIC CENTER and BU CASTRO,1 petitioners, vs. RANIDA D. SALVADOR and
RAMON SALVADOR, respondents.

Health Care Providers; Torts; QuasiDelicts; Appeals; Whether a person is negligent or not is a question
of fact which the Supreme Court cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari which is limited to
reviewing errors of law; For health care providers, the test of the existence of negligence is—did the health
care provider either fail to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have
done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent health care provider would not have done,
and that failure or action caused injury to the patient.—We note that the issues raised are factual in nature.
Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact which we cannot pass upon in a petition for review
on certiorari which is limited to reviewing errors of law. Negligence is the failure to observe for the
protection of the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. For health care providers, the test
of the existence of negligence is: did the health care provider either fail to do something which a reasonably
prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent
health care provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient; if yes, then
he is guilty of negligence. Thus, the elements of an actionable conduct are: 1) duty, 2) breach, 3) injury,
and 4) proximate causation.

Owners and operators of clinical laboratories have the duty to comply with statutes, as well as rules and
regulations, purposely promulgated to protect and promote the health of the people by preventing the
operation of substandard, improperly managed and inadequately supported clinical laboratories and by
improving the quality of performance of clinical laboratory examinations.—Owners and operators of
clinical laboratories have the duty to comply with statutes, as well as rules and regulations, purposely
promulgated to protect and promote the health of the people by preventing the operation of substandard,
improperly managed and inadequately supported clinical laboratories and by improving the quality of
performance of clinical laboratory examinations. Their business is impressed with public interest, as such,
high standards of performance are expected from them.

Violation of a statutory duty is negligence.—Violation of a statutory duty is negligence. Where the law
imposes upon a person the duty to do something, his omission or nonperformance will render him liable to
whoever may be injured thereby.

Art. 20 of the Civil Code provides the legal basis for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage
whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision.—Article 20 of the New Civil Code
provides: Art.20.Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same. The foregoing provision provides the legal basis for the award of damages
to a party who suffers damage whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision. This was
incorporated by the Code Commission to provide relief to a person who suffers damage because another
has violated some legal provision.
ALFREDO P. PACIS and CLEOPATRA D. PACIS, petitioners, vs. JEROME JOVANNE
MORALES, respondent.

QuasiDelicts; Torts and Damages; Under Article 1161 of the Civil Code, an injured party may enforce his
claim for damages based on the civil liability arising from the crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code or he may opt to file an independent civil action for damages under the Civil Code; Unlike the
subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, the liability of the
employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, based
on a person’s own negligence.—This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners’
son. Under Article 1161 of the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based on the
civil liability arising from the crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code or they may opt to file an
independent civil action for damages under the Civil Code. In this case, instead of enforcing their claim for
damages in the homicide case filed against Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil action for
damages against respondent whom they alleged was Matibag’s employer. Petitioners based their claim for
damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, the liability of the employer, or any person for that matter,
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a person’s own negligence. Article
2176 states: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting
contractual relation between the parties, is called quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.

A higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his control an
instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances.—A higher
degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his control an instrumentality
extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in possession or
control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional precautions to prevent any injury
being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a business
dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree of care.

Gun Stores; A gun store owner is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have
known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others.—
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have
known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others.
Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should be stored
unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access defensive use.
With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded precisely because they are
defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as what happened in this case. Respondent was clearly
negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it
was not loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the
defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward
accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept a firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action
is open and he has personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded. For failing to insure that
the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in this case
whether respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes him to repair defective firearms to restore its
original composition or enhance or upgrade firearms.
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and FELIX PANGALANGAN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.PHILAMERICAN FORWARDERS, INC., ARCHIMEDES J. BALINGIT and FERNANDO
PINEDA, defendants-appellees.

Damages; Liability of employer for damages caused by their employees; Term “employers” does not
include manager of a corporation.—The terms “employers” and “owners and managers of an establishment
or enterprise” used in article 2180 of the Civil Code do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be
gathered from the context of article 2180 that the term “manager” (“director” in the Spanish version) is
used in the sense of “employer”. No tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on the manager of
the corporation owning the truck in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be
regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer (the corporation).

JOSE E. GENSON, petitioner, vs. SPS. EDUARDO ADARLE and SHERLITA MARION, and
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.

Liability; No sufficient basis for the "masterservant" doctrine in tort law to apply. It is doubtful if the district
engineer can be considered "employer" to make him liable for tort liability.—There is likewise no sufficient
basis for the "masterservant" doctrine in tort law to apply. Buensalido was not working overtime as a
government employee. It is doubtful if the district engineer can be considered an "employer" for purposes
of tort liability who may be liable even if he was not there. No evidence was presented to show that an
application for overtime work or a claim for overtime pay from the district engineer's office was ever filed.
It is more logical to presume that Buensalido, the operator of the payloader, was trying to earn a little money
on the side from the junk buyer and that his presence in the compound on that Saturday was a purely private
arrangement. From the records of this case, we are not disposed to rule that a supervisor who tolerates his
subordinates to moonlight on a nonworking day in their office premises can be held liable for everything
that happens on that day. It would have been preferable if Mr. Arbatin brought his own payloader operator
and perhaps, his own equipment but we are not dealing with sound office practice in this case. The issue
bef ore us is subsidiary liability for tort committed by a government employee who is moonlighting on a
nonworking day.

A public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused
by his act done with malice and in bad faith beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.—Examining
the allegations of the complaint and reviewing the evidence it would indeed be correct to say that petitioner
was sued in his official capacity, and that the most that was imputed to him is act of culpable neglect,
inefficiency and gross indifference in the performance of his official duties. Verily, this is not imputation
of bad faith or malice, and what is more was not convincingly proven." At any rate, we see no malice, bad
faith, or gross negligence on the part of Genson to hold him liable for the acts of Buensalido and Arbatin.

ERNESTO MARTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MANILA ELECTRIC
COMPANY, respondents.

Civil Law; Tort; Art. 2180 Civil Code; The rule contemplated in Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is applicable
only if there is an employer-employee relationship although it is not necessary that the employer be engaged
in any business or industry.—It is important to stress that the complaint for damages was filed by the private
respondent against only Ernesto Martin as alleged employer of Nestor Martin, the driver of the car at the
time of the accident. Nestor Martin was not impleaded. The action was based on tort under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, providing in part that: Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry. The above rule is applicable only if there is an employer-employee
relationship although it is not necessary that the employer be engaged in any business or industry. It differs
in this sense from Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, which requires that the employer be engaged in
an industry to be subsidiarily liable for the felony committed by his employee in the course of his
employment.

Employment relationship; To hold the employer liable under Art. 2180 for torts committed by his employees
within the scope of their assigned task, it is necessary to establish the employment relationship.—Whether
or not engaged in any business or industry, the employer under Article 2180 is liable for the torts committed
by his employees within the scope of their assigned task. But it is necessary first to establish the employment
relationship. Once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was
acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that
the defendant, as employer, may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection
and supervision of the employee as allowed in that article.

Case at bar; No evidence whatsoever was adduced by plaintiff to show that defendant was the employer of
Nestor Martin at the time of the accident. The trial court merely presumed the existence of the employer-
employee relationship and held that petitioner had not refuted that presumption.—In the case at bar, no
evidence whatsoever was adduced by the plaintiff to show that the defendant was the employer of Nestor
Martin at the time of the accident. The trial court merely presumed the existence of the employer-employee
relationship and held that the petitioner had not refuted that presumption. It noted that although the
defendant alleged that he was not Nestor Martin's employer, "he did not present any proof to substantiate
his allegation." As the trial court put it: There is no need to stretch one's imagination to realize that a car
owner entrusts his vehicle only to his driver or to anyone whom he allows to drive it. Since neither plaintiff
nor defendant has presented any evidence on the status of Nestor Martin, the Court presumes that he was
at the time of the incident, an employee of the defendant. It is elementary that he who makes an allegation
is required to prove the same. Defendant alleges that Nestor Martin was not his employee but he did not
present any proof to substantiate his allegation. While it is true plaintiff did not present evidence on its
allegation that Nestor Martin was defendant's employee, the Court believes and so holds, that there was no
need for such evidence. As above adverted to, the Court can proceed on the presumption that one who
drives the motor vehicle is an employee of the owner thereof.

BALBINO CUISON, plaintiff and appellant, vs. NORTON & HARRISON Co., TELESFORO
BINOYA Y ALMINANZA and FRANCISCO BAUTISTA Y CRUZ, defendants. NORTON &
HARRISON Co., appellee.

DAMAGES; MASTER AND SERVANT; CIVIL LAW THEORY OF MASTER'S LIABILITY; CIVIL
CODE, ARTICLES 1902 AND 1903 APPLIED.—The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior
but the relationship of paterfamilias. This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own
negligence and not on that of his servant. Under the civil law, an employer is only liable for the negligence
of his employees in the discharge of their respective duties. The employer would not be liable for the
negligence of an independent contractor. One, O, had a contract with the firm N, but at the same time O
was an employee of the firm N, charged with the duty of directing the loading and transportation of lumber.
It is held that O was not an independent contractor but was the servant of the defendant, and that for his
negligence the defendant was responsible. The reason for this distinction is that the employer retained the
power of directing and controlling the work.
DE LEON BROKERAGE Co., INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and ANGELINE
STEEN, represented by her guardian ad litem LEOPOLDO STEEN, respondents.

Prosecution of civil actions; Reservation to file civil action includes action based on quasidelicts.— There
servation to file separate civil action made in the criminal action does not preclude a subsequent action
based on a quasidelict.

Quasidelicts; Damages resulting from negligent driving of vehicle.—A complaint which alleged that the
complainant suffered injuries as a result of the collision between the jeepney in which she was riding and
the petitioner's cargo truck recklessly driven by its employee, and for which the latter had been prosecuted
and convicted, is not a suit for civil liability arising from crime but one for damages resulting from a
quasidelict. Mention of the criminal conviction merely tended to support the claim that the driver had been
recklessly negligent in driving the truck.

When owner of automobile not liable for injuries resulting from negligent operation of vehicle by his
employee.—In order that an owner of a motor vehicle may be relieved from liability for injuries or damages
resulting' from the negligent operation of his automobile while it is being used by his employee for the
latter's own personal business, the said employee must have abandoned completely his master's business to
engage in some purpose wholly his own.

Owners who are solidarily liable even if they are not riding in the vehicle at the time of mishap. —The
owners of an establishment or enterprise are solidarily liable with their driver for any accident resulting
from the latter's negligent operation of the vehicle even if said owners are not riding therein at the time of
the mishap.

MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI and

ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL, INC., respondents.

Torts; Motor Vehicles; Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses—physiological “fight or flight”
mechanisms are at work, provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs, alcohol, exhaustion,
drowsiness, etc.—One will have to suspend disbelief in order to give credence to Li’s disingenuous and
patently self-serving asseverations. The average motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty
applying the brakes to a car traveling at the speed claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the visibility of the
street, and the road conditions on a principal metropolitan thorough-fare like Aurora Boulevard, Li would
have had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road if he were alert—as every driver should
be—to those conditions. Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. Physiological “fight or flight”
mechanisms are at work, provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs, alcohol, exhaustion,
drowsiness, etc. Li’s failure to react in a manner which would have avoided the accident could therefore
have been only due to either or both of the two factors: 1) that he was driving at a “very fast” speed as
testified by Rodriguez; and 2) that he was under the influence of alcohol. Either factor working
independently would have diminished his responsiveness to road conditions, since normally he would have
slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuela’s car, rather than be in a situation forcing him to suddenly apply
his brakes.

Words and Phrases; Contributory Negligence, Defined.—Contributory negligence is conduct on the part
of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard
to which he is required to conform for his own protection. Based on the foregoing definition, the standard
or act to which, according to petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to have conformed for her own protection was
not to park at all at any point of Aurora Boulevard, a no parking zone. We cannot agree.
“Emergency Rule,” Explained; An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is
required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear
to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.—Courts have traditionally
been compelled to recognize that an actor who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to the
standard of conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no such situation. The law takes stock of
impulses of humanity when placed in threatening or dangerous situations and does not require the same
standard of thoughtful and reflective care from persons confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening
conditions. Under the “emergency rule” adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals, an individual
who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider
the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to
undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency
was brought by his own negligence.

A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faultedfor stopping
at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists.—A
woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at
a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not
expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where she
would likely find no one to help her. It would be hazardous for her not to stop and assess the emergency
(simply because the entire length of Aurora Boulevard is a no-parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle
would be both a threat to her safety and to other motorists.

“Negligence,” Explained; Negligence, as it is commonly understood, is conduct which creates an undue

risk of harm to others—it is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.—Obviously in the case at bench,
the only negligence ascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of the accident. “Negligence, as it is
commonly understood, is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others.” It is the failure to observe
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury. We stressed, in Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company, that negligence is the want of
care required by the circumstances.

Employer-Employee Relationships; The liability of an employer for the negligence of his employee is not
based on the principle of respondeat superior but that of pater familias.—We agree with the respondent
court that the relationship in question is not based on the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the
master liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon
the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of his employees.

Once evidence is introduced showing that the employer exercised the required amount of care in selecting
its employees, half of the employer’s burden is overcome, but the question of diligent supervision depends
on the circumstances of employment.—The employer’s primary liability under the concept of pater familias
embodied by Art. 2180 (in relation to Art. 2176) of the Civil Code is quasidelictual or tortious in character.
His liability is relieved on a showing that he exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of its employees. Once evidence is introduced showing that the employer
exercised the required amount of care in selecting its employees, half of the employer’s burden is overcome.
The question of diligent supervision, however, depends on the circumstances of employment.

Company Car Plans; Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent
supervision of its employee during the performance of the latter’s assigned tasks would be enough to relieve
him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. —Ordinarily,
evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent supervision of its employee during the
performance of the latter’s assigned tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article
2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The employer is not expected to exercise supervision
over either the employee’s private activities or during the performance of tasks either unsanctioned by the
former or unrelated to the employee’s tasks. The case at bench presents a situation of a different character,
involving a practice utilized by large companies with either their employees of managerial rank or their
representatives.

When a company gives full use and enjoyment of a company car to its employee, it in effect guarantees that
it is, like every good father, satisfied that its employee will use the privilege reasonably and responsively.—
Most pharmaceutical companies, for instance, which provide cars under the first plan, require rigorous tests
of road worthiness from their agents prior to turning over the car (subject of company maintenance) to their
representatives. In other words, like a good father of a family, they entrust the company vehicle only after
they are satisfied that the employee to whom the car has been given full use of the said company car for
company or private purposes will not be a threat or menace to himself, the company or to others. When a
company gives full use and enjoyment of a company car to its employee, it in effect guarantees that it is,
like every good father, satisfied that its employee will use the privilege reasonably and responsively.

A company owes a responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or other employees to whom
it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the company issue capably and
responsibly.—Since important business transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of
situations and under all kinds of guises, the provision for the unlimited use of a company car therefore
principally serves the business and goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private purposes of the
individual who actually uses the car, the managerial employee or company sales agent. As such, in
providing for a company car for business use and/or for the purpose of furthering the company’s image, a
company owes a responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or other employees to whom it
entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the company issue capably and
responsibly.

Where no allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine
or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of its employee to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a
company car, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and severally
liable with the former for the injuries caused to third persons.—In fine, Alexander Commercial, Inc. has
not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family
in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the
steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and
unlimited use of a company car. Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it
should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle
of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained
by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.

While moral damages are not meant to enrich the plaintiff at the expense of a defendant, the award should
nonetheless be commensurate to the suffering inflicted.—Finally, we find no reason to overturn the amount
of damages awarded by the respondent court, except as to the amount of moral damages. In the case of
moral damages, while the said damages are not intended to enrich the plaintiff at the expense of a defendant,
the award should nonetheless be commensurate to the suffering inflicted. In the instant case we are of the
opinion that the reduction in moral damages from an amount of P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00 by the Court
of Appeals was not justified considering the nature of the resulting damage and the predictable sequelae of
the injury.
TEODORO C. UMALI, petitioner, vs. HON. ANGEL BACANI, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan and FIDEL H. SAYNES, respondents.

Civil law; Torts; Quasidelicts; An electric plant company which fails to use ordinary foresight in taking
necessary precaution to eliminate tall banana plants which when blown by a moderate wind could trigger
danger, visavis, its electric lines; which after a storm and foresecable damage to its lines that could
endanger life and limb did not cut off electric power from its plant; and which, after being made aware,
thru one of its employees, that a live wire had been cut by the action of the storm, did not take precaution
to prevent anybody from approaching the live wire, is negligent and liable for damages for death of 3½
year old boy who went to the place where live wire is located and got into contact with it.—A careful
examination of the record convince Us that a series of negligence on the part of defendants’ employees in
the Alcala Electric Plant resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution. First, by the very evidence of
the defendant, there were tall and big banana plants at the place of the incident standing on an elevated
ground which were about 30 feet high and which were higher than the electric post supporting the electric
line, and yet the employees of the defendant, who, with ordinary foresight, could have easily seen that even
in case of moderate winds the electric line would be in angered by banana plants being blown down did not
even take the necessary precaution to eliminate that source of danger to the electric line. Second, even after
the employees of the Plant were already aware of the possible damage the storm of May 11, 1972, could
have caused their electric lines, thus becoming a possible threat lo life and property, they did not cut off
from the plant the flow of electricity along the lines, an act they could have easily done

Civil law; Torts; Quasidelicts; An electric plant company which fails to use ordinary foresight in taking
necessary precaution to eliminate tall banana plants which when blown by a moderate wind could trigger
danger, visavis, its electric lines; which after a storm and foresecable damage to its lines that could
endanger life and limb did not cut off electric power from its plant; and which, after being made aware,
thru one of its employees, that a live wire had been cut by the action of the storm, did not take precaution
to prevent anybody from approaching the live wire, is negligent and liable for damages for death of 3½
year old boy who went to the place where live wire is located and got into contact with it.—A careful
examination of the record convince Us that a series of negligence on the part of defendants’ employees in
the Alcala Electric Plant resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution. First, by the very evidence of
the defendant, there were tall and big banana plants at the place of the incident standing on an elevated
ground which were about 30 feet high and which were higher than the electric post supporting the electric
line, and yet the employees of the defendant, who, with ordinary foresight, could have easily seen that even
in case of moderate winds the electric line would be in angered by banana plants being blown down did not
even take the necessary precaution to eliminate that source of danger to the electric line. Second, even after
the employees of the Plant were already aware of the possible damage the storm of May 11, 1972, could
have caused their electric lines, thus becoming a possible threat lo life and property, they did not cut off
from the plant the flow of electricity along the lines, an act they could have easily done

Where negligence of electric utility plan was proximate cause of death of child, parental negligence in
allowing the child to go to place where fallen live wire was located is merely contributory.—It may be true,
as the lower Court found out, that the contributory negligence of the victim’s parents in not properly taking
care of the child, which enabled him to leave the house alone on the morning of the incident and to go a
nearby place (cut wire was very near the house where victim was living) where the fatal fallen wire
electrocuted him, might mitigate respondent’s liability, but We cannot agree with petitioner’s theory that
the parents’ negligence constituted the proximate cause of the victim’s death because the real proximate
cause was the fallen live wire which posed a threat to life and property that morning due to the series of
negligence adverted to above committed by defendants’ employees and which could have killed any other
person who might by accident get into contact with it. Stated otherwise, even if the child was allowed to
leave the house unattended due to the parents’ negligence, he would not have died that morning were it not
for the cut live wire he accidentally touched.
Negligence of employee is presumed to be negligence of his employer who may escape liability only by
proof that it exercised diligence of good father of family to prevent damage not only in selection of
employees but in adequately supervising their work.—The negligence of the employee is presumed to be
the negligence of the employer x x x. This liability of the employer is primary and direct. In fact, the proper
defense for the employer to raise so that he may escape liability is to prove that he exercised the diligence
of the good father of the family to prevent damage not only in the selection of his employees but also in
adequately supervising them over their work. This defense was not adequately proven as found by the trial
Court, and We do not find any sufficient reason to deviate from its finding.

RAYMUNDO ODANI SECOSA, EL BUENASENSO SY and DASSAD WAREHOUSING and

PORT SERVICES, INCORPORATED, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF ERWIN SUAREZ FRANCISCO,
respondents.

Civil Law; Negligence; Damages; When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there
instantly arises a presumption that there was negligence on the part of the employer either in the selection
of his employee or in the supervision over him after such selection; Presumption may be rebutted by a clear
showing on the part of the employer that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of his employee.—Based on the foregoing provisions, when an injury is caused
by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption that there was negligence on the part
of the employer either in the selection of his employee or in the supervision over him after such selection.
The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that it exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. Hence,
to evade solidary liability for quasidelict committed by an employee, the employer must adduce sufficient
proof that it exercised such degree of care.

Employer must not merely present testimonial evidence to prove that he observed the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee, but he must also support such testimonial
evidence with concrete or documentary evidence.—Jurisprudentially, therefore, the employer must not
merely present testimonial evidence to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of his employee, but he must also support such testimonial evidence with
concrete or documentary evidence. The reason for this is to obviate the biased nature of the employer’s
testimony or that of his witnesses.

Corporation Law; Veil of Corporate Fiction; Petitioner El Buenasenso Sy cannot be held solidarily liable
with his copetitioners; A corporation is invested by law with a personality separate from that of its
stockholders or members; Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or
nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not in itself sufficient ground for disregarding the separate
corporate personality.—We find that petitioner El Buenasenso Sy cannot be held solidarily liable with his
copetitioners. While it may be true that Sy is the president of petitioner Dassad Warehousing and Port
Services, Inc., such fact is not by itself sufficient to hold him solidarily liable for the liabilities adjudged
against his copetitioners. It is a settled precept in this jurisdiction that a corporation is invested by law with
a personality separate from that of its stockholders or members. It has a personality separate and distinct
from those of the persons composing it as well as from that of any other entity to which it may be related.
Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of
a corporation is not in itself sufficient ground for disregarding the separate corporate personality. A
corporation’s authority to act and its liability for its actions are separate and apart from the individuals who
own it.

For the separate juridical personality of a corporation to be disregarded, the wrongdoing must be clearly
and convincingly established.—The so-called veil of corporation fiction treats as separate and distinct the
affairs of a corporation and its officers and stockholders. As a general rule, a corporation will be looked
upon as a legal entity, unless and until sufficient reason to the contrary appears. When the notion of legal
entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard
the corporation as an association of persons. Also, the corporate entity may be disregarded in the interest
of justice in such cases as fraud that may work inequities among members of the corporation internally,
involving no rights of the public or third persons. In both instances, there must have been fraud and proof
of it. For the separate juridical personality of a corporation to be disregarded, the wrongdoing must be
clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be presumed.

Moral damages are awarded to allow the plaintiff to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve
to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone due to the defendant’s culpable action and must, perforce,
be proportional to the suffering inflicted.—Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a
plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded to allow the former to obtain means, diversion
or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone due to the defendant’s
culpable action and must, perforce, be proportional to the suffering inflicted.

MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. SEBASTIAN M. BAKING, respondent.

Civil Law; Negligence; Damages; Requisites to sustain a claim based on Article 2176 of the New Civil
Code.—To sustain a claim based on the above provision, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage
suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.

When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of the law
that there has been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection of his employee or in the
supervision over him after such selection; Presumption may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of
the employer that he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employee.—It is thus clear that the employer of a negligent employee is liable for the
damages caused by the latter. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly
arises a presumption of the law that there has been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the
selection of his employee or in the supervision over him, after such selection. The presumption, however,
may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that he has exercised the care and diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. Here, petitioner’s failure to
prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employee will make it solidarily liable for damages caused by the latter.

JOSE A. ORTALIZ, plaintiff and appellant, vs. CONRADO ECHARRI, defendant and appellee.

CIVIL LIABILITY; SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY

THEIR EMPLOYEES.—Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
(Par. 5, Art. 2180, new Civil Code.)

ACTION FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM PHYSICAL INJURIES DISTINCT FROM CRIMINAL
ACTION.—In cases of physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Art. 33, new Civil Code).
MR. AND MRS. AMADOR C. ONG, plaintiffs and appellants vs. METROPOLITAN WATER
DISTRICT, defendant and appellee.

DAMAGES; FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE; CLAIMANT HAS BURDEN TO PROVE. —The person

claiming damages has the burden of proving that the damages is caused by the fault or negligence of the
person from whom the damage is claimed, or of one of his employees (Walter A. Smith & Co. vs.
Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517).

ABSENCE OF NEGLIGENCE OF OPERATOR OF SWIMMING POOLS: DROWNING OR DEATH

OF PATRON.—The operator of swimming pools will not be held liable for the drowning or death of a
patron, if said operator had exercised due diligence in the selection of, and supervision over, its employees
and that it had observed the diligence required by law under the circumstances—in that it has taken all
necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident which may cause their
death.

WORDS AND PHRASES; “DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE”.—The doctrine of last clear
chance simply means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of
defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided
injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. Or “As the doctrine usually is stated, a
person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwith standing the negligent
acts of his opponent or the negligence of a third person which is imputed to his opponent, is considered in
law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.” (38 Am. Jur. pp. 900902.)

PLACIDO C. RAMOS and AUGUSTO L. RAMOS, petitioners, vs. PEPSICOLA

BOTTLING CO. OF THE P.I. and ANDRES BONIFACIO, respondents,

Quasidelicts; When employer proved that it exercised due diligence in the selection of its driver.—Where
it was proven that the employer had carefully examined the erring driver as to his qualifications, experience
and record of service, such evidence is sufficient to show that the employer exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection of the driver and rebuts the juris tantum presumption that the
employer was negligent in selecting said driver.

FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE, petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE

COURT, HON. ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, in his capacity as Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch XIV, Roxas City and POTENCIANO KAPUNAN, SR., respondents.

Labor Law; Employer-Employee relationship; In relation to the school, Funtecha was an employee even if
he was assigned to clean the school premises for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day.—
It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working student, being a parttime janitor and a scholar of petitioner
Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an employee even if he was assigned to clean the school premises
for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day.

Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is
an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school.— Driving the vehicle to and from the house
of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the
petitioner-school. Allan’s job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students
in the morning of the next school day.
Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was done for
and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing
that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties.—In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle
home in the direction of Allan’s house, Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not
driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a “frolic of his own” but ultimately, for the service for which
the jeep was intended by the petitioner school. (See L. Battistoni v. Thomas, Can SC 144, 1 D.L.R.. 577,
80 ALR 722 [1932]; See also Association of Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc. v. Fieldmen’s Insurance
Co., Inc. 124 SCRA 618 [1983]). Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha
in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-
school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties.
The clause “within the scope of their assigned tasks” for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of
an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for
the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage.

An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to avoid liability under the
substantive provisions of the Civil Code.—The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions
of employment between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one
for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and
his employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an
employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used
by an employer as a shield to avoid liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.

Civil Law; Negligence; There is evidence to show that there exists in the present case an extra-contractual
obligation arising from the negligence or reckless imprudence of a person whose acts or omission are
imputable by a legal fiction to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over
him.—There is evidence to show that there exists in the present case an extra-contractual obligation arising
from the negligence or reckless imprudence of a person “whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal
fiction, to other(s) who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over (him).”

Fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting within the scope of his janitorial duties does
not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence
on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee or in the supervision over him.—Funtecha is an
employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a driver’s position in order
that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of
driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was
not the school driver or was not acting within the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner
of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the
selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof
of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and
Allan.

Supervision includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulation for the guidance of its employees and
the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the
employer has relations through his employees.—The Court reiterates that supervision includes the
formulation of suitable rules and regulation for the guidance of its employees and the issuance of proper
instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations
through his employees.

Employer is expected to impose upon its employees the necessary discipline called for in the performance
of any act indispensable to the business and beneficial to their employer.—An employer is expected to
impose upon its employees the necessary discipline called for in the performance of any act indispensable
to the business and beneficial to their employer.

In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its
employees.—The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled
manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. (Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil. 768, 772 [1918]).
In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its
employees.

Liability of the employer under Article 2180 is primary and solidary.—The liability of the employer is,
under Article 2180, primary and solidary. However, the employer shall have recourse against the negligent
employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.

CHILD LEARNING CENTER, INC. and SPOUSES EDGARDO L. LIMON and SYLVIA S.
LIMON, petitioners, vs. TIMOTHY TAGORIO, assisted by his parents BASILIO TAGORIO and
HERMINIA TAGORIO, respondents.

Actions; Torts; Requisites; Words and Phrases; “Fault,” and “Negligence,” Explained.—In every tort
case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1)
the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for
whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and
the damages incurred. Fault, in general, signifies a voluntary act or omission which causes damage to the
right of another giving rise to an obligation on the part of the actor to repair such damage. Negligence is
the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. Fault requires the execution of a positive act which causes
damage to another while negligence consists of the omission to do acts which result in damage to another.

Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur; Schools and Universities; The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where
(1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except
for the defendant’s negligence, (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality
within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with negligence complained of, and, (3)
the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
injured; The fact that a student had to go through the window, instead of the door, shows that something
was wrong with the door.—The fact, however, that Timothy fell out through the window shows that the
door could not be opened from the inside. That sufficiently points to the fact that something was wrong
with the door, if not the door knob, under the principle of res ipsa loquitor. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor
applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have
happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence
complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the
part of the person injured. Petitioners are clearly answerable for failure to see to it that the doors of their
school toilets are at all times in working condition. The fact that a student had to go through the window,
instead of the door, shows that something was wrong with the door.

Petitioners, with the due diligence of a good father of the family, should have anticipated that a student,
locked in the toilet by a nonworking door, would attempt to use the window to call for help or even to get
out.—As to the absence of grills on the window, petitioners contend that there was no such requirement
under the Building Code. Nevertheless, the fact is that such window, as petitioners themselves point out,
was approximately 1.5 meters from the floor, so that it was within reach of a student who finds the regular
exit, the door, not functioning. Petitioners, with the due diligence of a good father of the family, should
have anticipated that a student, locked in the toilet by a nonworking door, would attempt to use the window
to call for help or even to get out. Considering all the circumstances, therefore, there is sufficient basis to
sustain a finding of liability on petitioners’ part.

Due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is applicable where the employer is being held
responsible for the acts or omissions of others under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, not when the liability
is under Article 2176, premised on the fact of the defendant’s own diligence in not ensuring that all its
doors are properly maintained.—Petitioners’ argument that CLC exercised the due diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees is not decisive. Due diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees is applicable where the employer is being held responsible for the
acts or omissions of others under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. In this case, CLC’s liability is under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, premised on the fact of its own negligence in not ensuring that all its doors
are properly maintained.

Corporation Law; Piercing the Veil of Corporate Fiction; Elements.—We, however, agree with petitioners
that there was no basis to pierce CLC’s separate corporate personality. To disregard the corporate existence,
the plaintiff must prove: (1) Control by the individual owners, not mere majority or complete stock
ownership, resulting in complete domination not only of finances but of policy and business practice in
respect to a transaction so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind,
will or existence of its own; (2) such control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or
wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or a dishonest and unjust act
in contravention of the plaintiff’s legal right; and (3) the control and breach of duty must proximately cause
the injury or unjust loss complained of. The absence of these elements prevents piercing the corporate veil.
The evidence on record fails to show that these elements are present, especially given the fact that plaintiffs’
complaint had pleaded that CLC is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines.

MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION and ROLANDO J. DEL ROSARIO, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES
RICHARD HUANG and CARMEN HUANG, and STEPHEN HUANG, respondents.

Torts; QuasiDelicts; Employer-Employee Relationships; The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of
the Civil Code is direct or immediate—it is not conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent
employee, or a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. It is also joint and solidary with the
employee.—The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is direct or immediate. It is not
conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent employee, or a prior showing of insolvency of such
employee. It is also joint and solidary with the employee. To be relieved of liability, petitioner Mercury
Drug should show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, both in the selection of the
employee and in the supervision of the performance of his duties. Thus, in the selection of its prospective
employees, the employer is required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service
records. With respect to the supervision of its employees, the employer should formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for their breach. To establish
compliance with these requirements, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary
evidence.

Damages; The employee and his employer are also liable for all damages which are the natural and
probable consequences of the act or omission complained of.—Petitioners are also liable for all damages
which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. The doctors who
attended to respondent Stephen are one in their prognosis that his chances of walking again and performing
basic body functions are nil. For the rest of his life, he will need continuous rehabilitation and therapy to
prevent further complications such as pneumonia, bladder and rectum infection, renal failure, sepsis and
severe bed sores, osteoporosis and fractures, and other spinal cord injury-related conditions. He will be
completely dependent on the care and support of his family. We thus affirm the award of P23,461,062.00
for the life care cost of respondent Stephen Huang, based on his average monthly expense and the actuarial
computation of the remaining years that he is expected to live; and the conservative amount of
P10,000,000.00, as reduced by the trial court, for the loss or impairment of his earning capacity, considering
his age, probable life expectancy, the state of his health, and his mental and physical condition before the
accident.

The amount of the award of moral damages bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the
offender.—“The award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the
spiritual status quo ante.” Moral damages are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a person. Although incapable of pecuniary
computation, they must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The amount of the award bears no
relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the offender.

THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD C. AFRICA, and the HEIRS OF DOMINGA
ONG, petitioners and appellants, vs. CALTEX (PHIL.), INC., MATEO BOQUIREN and THE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents and appellees.

Presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.—Where the thing which caused the
injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident
is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident
arose from want of care (45 C.J. 1193).

Application of principle to the case at bar.—The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and
employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the
neighboring houses. The person who knew or could have known how the fire started were the appellees
and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference
that the incident happened because of want of care.

Torts; Quasidelicts; Force majeure; Intervention of unforeseen and unexpected cause.—The intervention
of an unforeseen and unexpected cause is not sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from consequences of
negligence, if such negligence directly and proximately cooperates with the independent cause in the
resulting injury. (MacAfee v. Traver’s Gas Corporation, 153 S.W. 2nd 442.)

Damages; Liability of owner of gasoline station; Case at bar. —A fire broke out at the Caltex service
station. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank into the underground storage. The fire spread
to and burned several neighboring houses owned by appellants. Issue: Whether Caltex should be held liable
for the damages caused to appellants. Held: This question depends on whether the operator of the gasoline
station was an independent contractor or an agent of Caltex. Under the license agreement the operator would
pay Caltex the purely nominal sum of P1.00 for the use of the premises and all equipment therein. The
operator could sell only Caltex products. Maintenance of the station and its equipment was subject to the
approval, in other words control, of Caltex. The operator could not assign or transfer his rights as licensee
without the consent of Caltex. Termination of the contract was a right granted only to Caltex but not to the
operator. These provisions of the contract show that the operator was virtually an employee of the Caltex,
not an independent contractor. Hence, Caltex should be liable for damages caused to appellants.
VICENTE LAMIS and SANDIGAN PROTECTIVE & INVESTIGATION AGENCY, INC.,
petitioners, vs. DAVID Y. ONG, respondent.

Damages; Torts; QuasiDelicts; The employer is likewise liable for damages caused by its employee.—
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that “Whoever by an act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. x x x.” The obligation imposed by
this Article is “demandable not only for one’s own wrongful acts or omissions, but also for those persons
for whom one is responsible.” Thus, petitioner Sandigan, being the employer of petitioner Lamis, is likewise
liable for damages caused by the latter.

HERMANA R. CEREZO, petitioner, vs. DAVID TUAZON, respondent.

Criminal Law; QuasiDelict; Civil Liability; An action based on a quasidelict may proceed independently
from the criminal action.—The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, or may give rise to an action for a quasidelict under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code. An aggrieved party may choose between the two remedies. An action based on a quasidelict
may proceed independently from the criminal action. There is, however, a distinction between civil liability
arising from a delict and civil liability arising from a quasidelict. The choice of remedy, whether to sue for
a delict or a quasidelict, affects the procedural and jurisdictional issues of the action.

Labor Law; Employer’s Liability; An employer’s liability in an action for a quasidelict is not only solidary,
it is also primary and direct.—Contrary to Mrs. Cerezo’s assertion, Foronda is not an indispensable party
to the case. An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the court’s action in the litigation,
and without whom no final resolution of the case is possible. However, Mrs. Cerezo’s liability as an
employer in an action for a quasidelict is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct. Foronda is not an
indispensable party to the final resolution of Tuazon’s action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo.

The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasidelict is solidary; Where the obligation
of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable and the other is not even a necessary party
because complete relief is available from either.— The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable
for a quasidelict is solidary. Where there is a solidary obligation on the part of debtors, as in this case, each
debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full.
There is no merger or renunciation of rights, but only mutual representation. Where the obligation of the
parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party because
complete relief is available from either. Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as
Tuazon may collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone.

An employer’s liability based on a quasidelict is primary and direct while the employer’s liability based on
a delict is merely subsidiary.—Moreover, an employer’s liability based on a quasidelict is primary and
direct, while the employer’s liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary. The words “primary and direct,”
as contrasted with “subsidiary,” refer to the remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than
to the character and limits of the obligation. Although liability under Article 2180 originates from the
negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. When an employee causes
damage, the law presumes that the employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing
or avoiding the damage. This is the fault that the law condemns. While the employer is civilly liable in a
subsidiary capacity for the employee’s criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly liable directly and
separately for his own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in selecting and supervising his
employee. The idea that the employer’s liability is solely subsidiary is wrong.
To hold the employer liable in a subsidiary capacity under a delict, the aggrieved party must initiate a
criminal action where the employee’s delict and corresponding primary liability are established.—In
contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce the subsidiary liability of the employer for the criminal
negligence of the employee as provided in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. To hold the employer
liable in a subsidiary capacity under a delict, the aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action where the
employee’s delict and corresponding primary liability are established. If the present action proceeds from
a delict, then the trial court’s jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary. However, the present action is clearly
for the quasidelict of Mrs. Cerezo and not for the delict of Foronda.

EVELYN YONAHA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF HECTOR
CAÑETE, respondents.

Criminal Law; Damages; Civil Liability; Employer-Employee Relationship; Due Process; While the
Supreme Court has sanctioned the enforcement of the employer’s subsidiary liability in the same criminal
proceedings in which the employee is adjudged guilty, execution against the employer must not issue as
just a matter of course—it behooves the court, as a measure of due process to the employer, to determine
and resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the purpose, the legal applicability and propriety of the employer’s
liability.—The statutory basis for an employer’s subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code. This Court has since sanctioned the enforcement of this subsidiary liability in the same criminal
proceedings in which the employee is adjudged guilty, on the thesis that it really is a part of, and merely an
incident in, the execution process of the judgment. But, execution against the employer must not issue as
just a matter of course, and it behooves the court, as a measure of due process to the employer, to determine
and resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the purpose, the legal applicability and propriety of the employer’s
liability. The requirement is mandatory even when it appears prima facie that execution against the
convicted employee cannot be satisfied. The court must convince itself that the convicted employee is in
truth in the employ of the employer; that the latter is engaged in an industry of some kind; that the employee
has committed the crime to which civil liability attaches while in the performance of his duties as such; and
that execution against the employee is unsuccessful by reason of insolvency.

Requisites for the enforcement of subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code.—To repeat, the subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
requires: (a) the existence of an employer-employee relationship; (b) that the employer is engaged in some
kind of industry; (c) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed
the offense in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily any offense he commits “while” in the discharge
of such duties); and (d) that said employee is insolvent. The judgment of conviction of the employee, of
course, concludes the employer and the subsidiary liability may be enforced in the same criminal case, but
to afford the employer due process, the court should hear and decide that liability on the basis of the
conditions required therefor by law.

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT

OF APPEALS and CLARITA T. CAMACHO, respondents.

Civil Law; Damages; Liability of employer; Employer-employee relationship must exist.—It is a well-
entrenched rule that an employer-employee relationship must exist before an employer may be held liable
for the negligence of his employee. It is likewise firmly settled that the existence or nonexistence of the
employer-employee relationship is commonly to be determined by examination of certain factors or aspects
of that relationship. These include: (a) the manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee;
(b) the mode of payment of wages; (c) the presence or absence of a power to control the putative employee’s
conduct, although the latter is the most important element.
Same; Same; Same; Same.—As aptly held by the trial court, petitioner did not exercise control and
supervision over Feliciano with regard to the manner in which he conducted the hydropressure test. All that
petitioner did, through its Field Engineer, Roberto Mitra, was relay to Feliciano the request of private
respondent for a hydro-pressure test, to determine any possible leakages in the storage tanks in her gasoline
station. The mere hiring of Feliciano by petitioner for that particular task is not the form of control and
supervision contemplated by law which may be the basis for establishing an employer-employee
Relationship between petitioner and Feliciano. The fact that there was no such control is further amplified
by the absence of any Shell representative in the job site at the time when the test was conducted. Roberto
Mitra was never there. Only Feliciano and his men were.

Independent contractor liable for own acts of negligence.—A careful perusal of the records will lead to the
conclusion that Feliciano is an independent contractor. Section 8 of Rule VIII, Book III of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides: “Sec. 8. Job contracting.— There is job contracting
permissible under the Code if the following conditions are met: (1) The contractor carries on an independent
business and undertakes the contract work on his own account under his own responsibility according to
his own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters
connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof; and (2) The contractor has
substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, and other
materials which are necessary in the conduct of his business.” Feliciano is independently maintaining a
business under a duly registered business name, “JFS Repair and Maintenance Service,” and is duly
registered with the Bureau of Domestic Trade. He does not enjoy a fixed salary but instead charges a lump
sum consideration for every piece of work he accomplishes. If he is not able to finish his work, he does not
get paid, as what happened in this case. Further, Feliciano utilizes his own tools and equipment and has a
complement of workers. Neither is he required to work on a regular basis. Instead, he merely awaits calls
from clients such as petitioner whenever repairs and maintenance services are requested. Moreover,
Feliciano does not exclusively service petitioner because he can accept other business but not from other
oil companies. All these are the hallmarks of an independent contractor. Being an independent contractor,
Feliciano is responsible for his own acts and omissions. As he alone was in control over the manner of how
he was to undertake the hydro-pressure test, he alone must bear the consequences of his negligence, if any,
in the conduct of the same.

LEONARDO PALAFOX, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants, vs. PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE,
THE DISTRICT ENGINEER, AND THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER, defendants and appellees.

To attach liability to the State for the negligence of Sabas Torralba a declaration must be made that he was
"a special agent,"—and not one upon whom properly devolved the duty of driving the truck on that
occasion. This is under Article 1903 of the Civil Code; but this ruling may not be made, because the driver
was not a special agent of the Government within the scope of said article. (Merrit vs. Government of the
Philippines, 34 Phil., 311.) And the principle applies only to the Insular, as distinguished from the provincial
or municipal governments. Appellants invoke the doctrine of respondent superior as illustrated in the case
of Mendoza vs. De Leon, 33 Phil., 508, concerning liability of municipal corporations for negligent acts of
their employees. It will be seen from that decision that if the negligent employee was engaged in the
performance of governmental duties, as distinguished from corporate or proprietary or business functions—
the government is not liable. The construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver
worked at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities. Hence, the death of Palafox—
tragic and deplorable though it may be—imposed on the province no duty to pay monetary compensation.
MARCELA M. BAGAJO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE GERONIMO R. MARAVE, Presiding
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch II, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Criminal law; A schoolteacher who whipped her pupil in school The latter having sustained only moderate
bruises, is not guilty of slight physical injuries as the nature of the wound and the circumstances of the case
show that it was made only to discipline the pupil.—In this respect, it is Our considered opinion, and so We
Hold that as a matter of law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil,
Wilma, with the bamboo stick-pointer, in the circumstances proven in the record. Independently of any
civil or administrative responsibility for such act she might be found to have incurred by the proper
authorities, We are persuaded that she did not do what she had done with criminal intent. That she meant
to punish Wilma and somehow make her feel such punishment may be true, but We are convinced that the
means she actually used was moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent
intent. The nature of the injuries actually suffered by Wilma, a few linear bruises (at most 4 inches long and
1/4 cm. wide) and the fact that petitioner whipped her only behind the legs and thigh, show, to Our mind,
that indeed she intended merely to discipline her. And it cannot be said, that Wilma did not deserve to be
disciplined. In other words, it was farthest from the thought of petitioner to commit any criminal offense.
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.

Same; Same.—Nothing said above is intended to mean that this Court sanctions generally the use of
corporal punishment by teachers on their pupils. All that We hold here is that in the peculiar circumstances
of the instant case before Us, there is no indication beyond reasonable doubt, in the evidence before the
trial court, that petitioner was actuated by a criminal design to inflict the injuries suffered by complainant
as a result of her being whipped by petitioner. What appears is that petitioner acted as she did in the belief
as a teacher exercising authority over her pupil in loco parentis, she was within her rights to punish her
moderately for purposes of discipline. Whether or not she exceeded the degree of moderation permitted by
the laws and rules governing the performance of her functions is not for Us, at this moment and in this case,
to determine.

Fernando, J., dissenting:

Criminal Law; Nature and extent of injuries in case at bar show criminal intent.—Moreover, it is
wellsettled that the doctrine parens patriae calls for the state exercising the utmost vigilance of assure that
teachers and educators should refrain from the infliction of corporal punishment which for me at least is a
relic of the past. This is not to lose sight of the significance of the view stressed in the opinion of Justice
Barredo that criminal intent must be shown to justify a finding of guilt. Nonetheless, considering the nature
and extent of the physical injuries sustained, as shown in the dissenting opinion of Justice Muñoz Palma,
the protestation of good faith on the part of appellant had, for me, lost its persuasiveness.

Teehankee, J., dissenting:

Criminal Law; Parental Authority; The power to inflict corporal punishment is vested exclusively in the
parents, not teachers.—It cannot be contended then that teachers in the exercise of their authority in loco
parentis may without incurring criminal liability inflict moderate corporal punishment. The power to inflict
moderate punishment on children is vested by Article 316 of the Civil Code exclusively in the parents. The
petitioner might be entitled to the appreciation of mitigating circumstances in her favor such as having acted
with obfuscation, but in the face of the express provision of law she may not be absolved of the proven
charge.
Makasiar, J., dissenting:

Criminal Law; Motive is distinguishable from intent.—The motive of the accused was to avenge the injury
to the victim who, as found by the trial court, has been living with (and working for) the accused teacher.
Will vengeance justify the act? But assuming that the motive of the accused was really good, does this mean
that criminal intent on her part is thus completely ruled out? WE do not believe so. A good motive, as we
have earlier intimated, is not incompatible with an unlawful intent. One may be convicted of a crime
whether his motive appears to be good or bad or even though no motive is proven. A good motive does not
prevent an act from being a crime.

Same; Teachers are denied the power to inflict corporal punishment on their pupils.—Needless to
emphasize, the authority delegated to teachers cannot be greater than that conferred on parents. Truly, the
power exercised by teachers over pupils is more restrictively, if not more clearly, defined in law. The very
chapter which gives teachers and professors substitute parental authority explicitly denies them the power
to administer corporal punishment.

Muñoz, Palma, J., dissenting:

Criminal law; The legal presumption of malice is not overthrown by protestation of good faith or honest
belief that accused whipped her pupil merely to discipline her.—But a more basic reason for this dissent is
that the legal presumption of malice is not overthrow by protestations of good faith and honest belief of
petitioner that she was merely imposing discipline, for the findings of the trial courts, viz: the Municipal
Court and the Court of First Instance, attest that petitioner herein whipped Wilma with a bamboo stick in
the “heat of anger” because Benedicta Guirigay, the victim of Wilma’s naughtiness or mischief, was “a
working pupil living in the house of the accused (petitioner now) for several years.” In truth, therefore,
anger, a desire to avenge the mischief done on her protege, Benedicta, motivated petitioner in striking
Wilma with her bamboo stick.

JOSEPH SALUDAGA, petitioner, vs. FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY and EDILBERTO C. DE

JESUS in his capacity as President of FEU, respondents.

Colleges and Universities; Obligations and Contracts; Where a student is enrolled in an educational
institution, there is created a contractual obligation between the two parties—the student is obliged to
comply with the rules and regulations of the school while the latter, as a learning institution, is mandated
to impart knowledge and equip its students with the necessary skills to pursue higher education or a
profession, as well as to ensure and take adequate steps to maintain peace and order within the campus.—
It is undisputed that petitioner was enrolled as a sophomore law student in respondent FEU. As such, there
was created a contractual obligation between the two parties. On petitioner’s part, he was obliged to comply
with the rules and regulations of the school. On the other hand, respondent FEU, as a learning institution is
mandated to impart knowledge and equip its students with the necessary skills to pursue higher education
or a profession. At the same time, it is obliged to ensure and take adequate steps to maintain peace and
order within the campus. It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract
and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. In the instant case, we
find that, when petitioner was shot inside the campus by no less the security guard who was hired to
maintain peace and secure the premises, there is a prima facie showing that respondents failed to comply
with its obligation to provide a safe and secure environment to its students.

Security Guards; A learning institution should not be allowed to completely relinquish or abdicate security
matters in its premises to the security agency it hired—to do so would result to contracting away its inherent
obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for its students.—Respondents also failed to show that
they undertook steps to ascertain and confirm that the security guards assigned to them actually possess the
qualifications required in the Security Service Agreement. It was not proven that they examined the
clearances, psychiatric test results, 201 files, and other vital documents enumerated in its contract with
Galaxy. Total reliance on the security agency about these matters or failure to check the papers stating the
qualifications of the guards is negligence on the part of respondents. A learning institution should not be
allowed to completely relinquish or abdicate security matters in its premises to the security agency it hired.
To do so would result to contracting away its inherent obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for
its students.

Majeure; An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the
possible adverse consequences of such a loss.—Respondents’ defense of force majeure must fail. In order
for force majeure to be considered, respondents must show that no negligence or misconduct was
committed that may have occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who
has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of such a loss. One’s negligence may
have concurred with an act of God in producing damage and injury to another; nonetheless, showing that
the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt one
from liability. When the effect is found to be partly the result of a person’s participation—whether by active
intervention, neglect or failure to act—the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules
applicable to acts of God.

Negligence; For breach of contract due to negligence in providing a safe learning environment, an
educational institution is liable to petitioner for damages.—Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that
those who are negligent in the performance of their obligations are liable for damages. Accordingly, for
breach of contract due to negligence in providing a safe learning environment, respondent FEU is liable to
petitioner for damages. It is essential in the award of damages that the claimant must have satisfactorily
proven during the trial the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal connection to
defendant’s acts. In the instant case, it was established that petitioner spent P35,298.25 for his
hospitalization and other medical expenses. While the trial court correctly imposed interest on said amount,
however, the case at bar involves an obligation arising from a contract and not a loan or forbearance of
money. As such, the proper rate of legal interest is six percent (6%) per annum of the amount demanded.
Such interest shall continue to run from the filing of the complaint until the finality of this Decision. After
this Decision becomes final and executory, the applicable rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum
until its satisfaction.

Corporation Law; A corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from those of
the persons composing it, such that, save for certain exceptions, corporate officers who entered into
contracts in behalf of the corporation cannot be held personally liable for the liabilities of the latter.—We
note that the trial court held respondent De Jesus solidarily liable with respondent FEU. In Powton
Conglomerate, Inc. v. Agcolicol, 400 SCRA 523 (2003), we held that: [A] corporation is invested by law
with a personality separate and distinct from those of the persons composing it, such that, save for certain
exceptions, corporate officers who entered into contracts in behalf of the corporation cannot be held
personally liable for the liabilities of the latter. Personal liability of a corporate director, trustee or officer
along (although not necessarily) with the corporation may so validly attach, as a rule, only when—(1) he
assents to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or when he is guilty of bad faith or gross negligence
in directing its affairs, or when there is a conflict of interest resulting in damages to the corporation, its
stockholders or other persons; (2) he consents to the issuance of watered down stocks or who, having
knowledge thereof, does not forthwith file with the corporate secretary his written objection thereto; (3) he
agrees to hold himself personally and solidarily liable with the corporation; or (4) he is made by a specific
provision of law personally answerable for his corporate action. None of the foregoing exceptions was
established in the instant case; hence, respondent De Jesus should not be held solidarily liable with
respondent FEU.
Labor Law; Security Guards; Where the security agency recruits, hires and assigns the works of its
watchmen or security guards to a client, the employer of such guards or watchmen is such agency, and not
the client, since the latter has no hand in selecting the security guards—the duty to observe the diligence
of a good father of a family cannot be demanded from the said client.— We agree with the findings of the
Court of Appeals that respondents cannot be held liable for damages under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code
because respondents are not the employers of Rosete. The latter was employed by Galaxy. The instructions
issued by respondents’ Security Consultant to Galaxy and its security guards are ordinarily no more than
requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into by a principal and a security agency.
They cannot be construed as the element of control as to treat respondents as the employers of Rosete. As
held in Mercury Drug Corporation v. Libunao, 434 SCRA 404 (2004): In Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon, 209
SCRA 47 (1992), we held that where the security agency recruits, hires and assigns the works of its
watchmen or security guards to a client, the employer of such guards or watchmen is such agency, and not
the client, since the latter has no hand in selecting the security guards. Thus, the duty to observe the diligence
of a good father of a family cannot be demanded from the said client.

Security Guards; For acts of negligence and for having supplied an educational institution with an
unqualified security guard, which resulted in the latter’s breach of obligation to its student, it is proper to
hold the security agency liable to the client for such damages equivalent to the amounts awarded to the
student.—Respondents and Galaxy were able to litigate their respective claims and defenses in the course
of the trial of petitioner’s complaint. Evidence duly supports the findings of the trial court that Galaxy is
negligent not only in the selection of its employees but also in their supervision. Indeed, no administrative
sanction was imposed against Rosete despite the shooting incident; moreover, he was even allowed to go
on leave of absence which led eventually to his disappearance. Galaxy also failed to monitor petitioner’s
condition or extend the necessary assistance, other than the P5,000.00 initially given to petitioner. Galaxy
and Imperial failed to make good their pledge to reimburse petitioner’s medical expenses. For these acts of
negligence and for having supplied respondent FEU with an unqualified security guard, which resulted to
the latter’s breach of obligation to petitioner, it is proper to hold Galaxy liable to respondent FEU for such
damages equivalent to the abovementioned amounts awarded to petitioner.

JOAQUINITA P. CAPILI, petitioner, vs. SPS. DOMINADOR CARDAÑA and ROSALITA

CARDAÑA, respondents.

Torts and Damages; Negligence; Schools and Universities; Words and Phrases; A negligent act is an
inadvertent act—it may be merely carelessly done from a lack of ordinary prudence and may be one which
creates a situation involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable action of the other,
a third person, an animal, or a force of nature; The probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree
could fall and harm someone is clearly a danger that is foreseeable; A school principal is tasked to see to
the maintenance of the school grounds and safety of the children within the school and its premises.—A
negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly done from a lack of ordinary prudence and
may be one which creates a situation involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable
action of the other, a third person, an animal, or a force of nature. A negligent act is one from which an
ordinary prudent person in the actor’s position, in the same or similar circumstances, would foresee such
an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the act or to do it in a more careful manner.
The probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree could fall and harm someone is clearly a danger
that is foreseeable. As the school principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the maintenance of the school
grounds and safety of the children within the school and its premises. That she was unaware of the rotten
state of a tree whose falling branch had caused the death of a child speaks ill of her discharge of the
responsibility of her position.
Same.—In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the
defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.

Res Ipsa Loquitor; The fact that a pupil died as a result of the dead and rotting tree within the school’s
premises shows that the tree was indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by and calls for application
of the principle of res ipsa loquitur.—The fact, however, that respondents’ daughter, Jasmin, died as a result
of the dead and rotting tree within the school’s premises shows that the tree was indeed an obvious danger
to anyone passing by and calls for application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur. The doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not
have happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency
or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence
complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the
part of the person injured. The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to warrant a presumption or
inference that the mere falling of the branch of the dead and rotting tree which caused the death of
respondents’ daughter was a result of petitioner’s negligence, being in charge of the school.

The fact that a school principal failed to see the immediate danger posed by the dead and rotting tree shows
she failed to exercise the responsibility demanded by her position.—As the school principal, petitioner was
tasked to see to the maintenance of the school grounds and safety of the children within the school and its
premises. That she was unaware of the rotten state of the tree calls for an explanation on her part as to why
she failed to be vigilant. Petitioner contends she was unaware of the state of the dead and rotting tree because
Lerios merely offered to buy the tree and did not inform her of its condition. Neither did any of her teachers
inform her that the tree was an imminent danger to anyone. She argues that she could not see the immediate
danger posed by the tree by its mere sighting even as she and the other teachers conducted ground
inspections. She further argues that, even if she should have been aware of the danger, she exercised her
duty by assigning the disposition of the tree to another teacher. We find petitioner’s explanation wanting.
As school principal, petitioner is expected to oversee the safety of the school’s premises. The fact that she
failed to see the immediate danger posed by the dead and rotting tree shows she failed to exercise the
responsibility demanded by her position.

CIRIACO L. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, MANUEL QUISUMBING,

JR., ET AL., respondents.

DAMAGES; ARTICLE 2180 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE NOT APPLICABLE TO ACADEMIC
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS; SITUATION CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE.—Article 2180 "of
the new Civil Code which provides that "teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody", applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic institution and contemplates a
situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on
the pupil supersede those of the parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct
and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher, and so would the
responsibility for the torts of the pupil.
Spouses MOISES P. PALISOC and BRIGIDA P. PALISOC, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ANTONIO C.
BRILLANTES and TEODOSIO V. VALENTON, owner and President, respectively, of a school of
arts and trades, known under the name and style of “Manila Technical Institute” (M.I.T.),
VIRGILIO L. DAFFON and SANTIAGO M. QUIBULUE, defendants-appellees.

Civil law; Damages; Student need not live with schoolteacher for latter to be liable for former’s tort.—
Under the provisions of Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code, the president of a vocational school and the
instructor of the student of the school who caused the death of his classmate are jointly and severally liable
for damages to the parents of the deceased who was fatally injured at the school’s laboratory room. No
liability attaches, however, to a defendant who was sued as a mere member of the school’s board of directors
nor to the school itself which was not impleaded as a party-defendant.

Same; Same; Same.—The phrase used in Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code “so long as they (the students)
remain in their custody” means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school and includes
recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach, the pupil or student
who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and
in the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed to have been set
aside by the present decision.

School officials must prove due diligence in supervision of students.—The law holds school officials liable
unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Art. 2180 of the
New Civil Code by “(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage.”

JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A.AMADORA JR., NORMA A. YLAYA,

PANTALEON A.AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA, ROSALINDA A.
AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A. AMADORA and
MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH, SERGIO P. DAMASO, JR.,
CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON, thru his parents and natural
guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian,
ATTY. FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.

Civil Law; Torts; Article 2180 of the Civil Code should apply to all schools, academic as well as
nonacademic.— After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion that
the provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as nonacademic. Where the school
is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student
will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the
general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall
be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the
acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who
shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis, “teachers” should apply to the words
“‘pupils and students” and “heads of establishments of arts and trades” to the word “apprentices.”

No substantial distinction between the academic and the nonacademic schools insofar as torts committed
by their students are concerned.—There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the
nonacademic schools insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is
expected from the teacher over the students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the
school where he is teaching, The suggestion in the Sxconde and Mercado Cases is that the provision would
make the teacher or even the head of the school of arts and trades liable for an injury caused by any student
in is custody but if that same tort were committed in an academic school, no liability would attach to the
teacher or the school head. All other circumstances being the same, the teacher or the head of the academic
school would be absolved whereas the teacher and the head of the nonacademic school would be held liable,
and simply because the latter is a school of arts and trades.

No plausible reason why different degrees of vigilance should be exercised by the school authorities. —
The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be exercised by the school authorities on
the basis only of the nature of their respective schools. There does not seem to be any plausible reason for
relaxing that vigilance simply because the school is academic in nature and for increasing such vigilance
where the school is nonacademic. Notably, the injury subject of liability is caused by the student and not
by the school itself nor it is a result of the operations of the school or its equipment. The injury contemplated
may be caused by any student regardless of the school where he is registered. The teacher certainly should
not be able to excuse himself by simply showing that he is teaching in an academic school where, on the
other hand, the head would be held liable if the school were nonacademic.

Reason for the disparity. —The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the head
of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic
school. The old schools of arts and trades were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their master
who personally and directly instructed them on the technique and secrets of their craft. The head of the
school of arts and trades was such a master and so was personally involved in the task of teaching his
students, who usually even boarded with him and so came under his constant control, supervision and
influence. By contrast, the head of the academic school was not as involved with his students and exercised
only administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons directly dealing with the students. The
head of the academic school had then (as now) only a vicarious relationship with the students.
Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the acts of the students, the head of the school of
arts and trades, because of his closer ties with them, could be so blamed.

Distinction no longer obtains at present—It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in
view of the expansion of the schools of arts and trades, the consequent increase in their enrollment, and the
corresponding diminution of the direct and personal contact of their heads with the students. Article 2180,
however, remains unchanged. In its present state, the provision must be interpreted by the Court according
to its clear and original mandate until the legislature, taking into account the changes in the situation subject
to be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary amendment.

Custody requirement; Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not mean that the student must be boarding with
the school authorities but the student should be within the control and under its influence at the time of the
occurrence of the injury. —From a reading of the provision under examination, it is clear that while the
custody requirement, to repeat Palisoc vs. Brillantes, does not mean that the student must be boarding with
the school authorities, it does signify that the student should be within the control and under the influence
of the school authorities at the time of the occurrence of the injury. This does not necessarily mean that
such custody be coterminous with the semester, beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the
close thereof, and excluding the time before or after such period, such as the period of registration, and in
the case of graduating students, the period before the commencement exercises. In the view of the Court,
the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the
school and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended.

Extent of responsibility; As long as the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate
purpose, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues.—As long as it can be shown
that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of
the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more
than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and
atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities
under the provisions of Article 2180.

Teacher-in-charge must answer for his student’s torts.—During all these occasions, it is obviously the
teacher-in-charge who must answer for his students’ torts, in practically the same way that the parents are
responsible for the child when he is in their custody. The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the
dean, principal, or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils in the specific
classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher
be physically present and in a position to prevent it. Custody does not connote immediate and actual
physical control but refers more to the influence exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as
a result of such influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not the parent shall
be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority
could be validly exercised over him.

The school may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof under the general
principle of respondent superior but may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the
diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.—In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article
is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the school
itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of
the head thereof under the general principle of respondent superior, but then it may exculpate itself from
liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.

Such defense also available to the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trade, —Such defense is,
of course, also available to the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades directly held to answer
for the tort committed by the student. As long as the defendant can show that he had taken the necessary
precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by
Article 2180.

Liability attaches to the teacher and the head of the technical school although the wrongdoer was already
of age.—In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only when he is
acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the
parent, who will be liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held answerable by the law for the
act of the student under him regardless of the student’s age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability attached to
the teacher and the head of the technical school although the wrongdoer was already of age. In this sense,
Article 2180 treats the parent more favorably than the teacher.

REYNALDO PASCO, assisted by his father PEDRO PASCO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF BULACAN, BRANCH V, STA. MARIA and ARANETA UNIVERSITY,
respondents.

Civil Law; Damages; Interpretation; Article 2180 of the Civil Code which refers to liability of teachers or
heads of establishments of arts and trades for damages caused by students who are in their custody, does
not apply to the school or the university itself or to educational institutions which are not schools of arts
and trades; Case at bar.—We find no necessity of discussing the applicability of the Article to educational
institutions (which are not schools of arts and trades) for the issue in this petition is actually whether or not,
under the article, the school or the university itself (as distinguished from the teachers or heads) is liable.
We find the answer in the negative, for surely the provision concerned speaks only of “teachers or heads.”
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

Civil Law; Damages; Interpretation; Article 2180 of the Civil Code may be construed as basis for liability
of the school as the employer for failure of its teachers or school heads to perform their mandatory duty as
substitute parents.—Paragraph 5 of Art, 2180 may be construed as the basis for the liability of the school
as the employer for the failure of its teachers or school heads to perform their mandatory legal duties as
substitute parents. Herrera, J. concurring (Amadora et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L47745,
citing Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts & Damages, 1978 ed., p. 201).

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Civil Law; Damages; Interpretation; While the educational institution is not civilly liable, yet the school,
as the employer, may be held liable for failure of its teachers or school heads to perform their mandatory
legal duties as substitute parents, but the school may interpose due diligence to exculpate itself.—As stated
by him (Justice Sarmiento), my view is that while the educational institution is not directly liable, yet the
school, as the employer, may be held liable for the failure of its teachers or school heads to perform their
mandatory legal duties as substitute parents (Article 2180, Civil Code). The school, however, may exculpate
itself from liability by proving that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of the family.

FEDERICO YLARDE and ADELAIDA DORONIO, petitioners, vs. EDGARDO AQUINO, MAURO
SORIANO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Torts and Damages; Schools and Colleges; Liability of teachers for torts committed by their students.—It
is only the teachers and not the principal or head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts
committed by their students. In a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the school who can be held
liable. Under Section 2180 of the Civil Code, the teacher-in-charge of school children should be held liable
for negligence in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any
injury on their persons.

Teacher's responsibility.—A teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils should make sure that the
children are protected from all harm in his company.

Work Education.—Excavation should not be placed in the category of school gardening, planting trees, and
the like as these undertakings do not expose the children to any risk that can result in death or physical
injuries.

Existence of reckless imprudence, determination.—In determining whether or not reckless imprudence

exists, the degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to
care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should
be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience.

BENJAMIN SALVOSA and BAGUIO COLLEGES FOUNDATION, petitioners vs. THE

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, EDUARDO B. CASTRO, DIOMEDES B. CASTRO,
VIRGINIA B. CASTRO and RODOLFO B. CASTRO., respondents.

Civil Law; Torts; Damages; Liability of teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices under their custody; Rationale for their liability.—Under
the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades are liable for “damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in
their custody.” The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a
teacher, the latter “stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to
exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student].” Likewise, “the phrase used in [Art.
2180]—‘so long as (the students) remain in their custody’ means the protective and supervisory custody
that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time.”

A student not at attendance in school cannot be in recess; Word “recess” meaning of.—In line with the
case of Palisoc, a student not “at attendance in the school” cannot be in “recess” thereat. A “recess,” as the
concept is embraced in the phrase “at attendance in the school” contemplates a situation of temporary
adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not
permitted to leave the school premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by
its nature does not include dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of
a school without more does not constitute “attending school” or being in the “protective and supervisory
custody” of the school, as contemplated in the law.

Petitioner cannot be held solidarily liable with the armorer of the ROTC Unit of the College for damages
as he has not been at attendance in the school or in custody of the college when he shot the student.—Upon
the foregoing considerations, we hold that Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been “at attendance
in the school,” or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners
cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarily liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting
from his acts.

Dissenting opinion of Justice JBL Reyes in the Exconde case, that there is no sound reason for limiting Art.
1903 of the old Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones, adopted by the Court.—
The writer, however, like the ponente in the case of Palisoc, former Mr. Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee,
also manifests his concurrence “with the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes in Exconde [concurred in by Justices S. Padilla and A. Reyes] that ‘(I) can see no sound reason for
limiting Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones. What
substantial difference is there between them in so far as concerns the proper supervision and vigilance over
their pupils. It cannot be seriously contented that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching
that his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third persons, so long as they are in a position to
exercise authority and supervision over the pupil.’ ”

ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL, as represented by SPS. FERNANDO NANTES AND ROSARIO
LACANDULA, BENJAMIN ILUMIN, TIRSO DE CHAVEZ, LUISITO VINAS, CONNIE ARQUIO
AND PATRIA CADIZ, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH
DIVISION and DR. ROMULO CASTILLO and LILIA CADIZ, respondents.

Civil Law; Negligence; 4th paragraph Article 2180 of the Civil Code; When employer held liable for the
negligence of its employees; Rule.—Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his
employee, the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee
was in the performance of his assigned tasks.

Employees were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks; Case at bar.—The
teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incident happened not
within the school premises, not on a school day and most importantly while the teachers and students were
holding a purely private affair, a picnic. It is clear from the beginning that the incident happened while
some members of the IC class of St. Francis High School were having a picnic at Talaan Beach. This picnic
had no permit from the school head or its principal, Benjamin Illumin because this picnic is not a school
sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extracurricular activity.

Negligence attributed to the employees not proven; Case at bar.—Petitioners Connie Arquio, the class
adviser of IC, the section where Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic. In fact,
Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez and Luisito Vinas who are both P.E. instructors and scout
masters who have knowledge in First Aid application and swimming. Moreover, even respondents’ witness,
Segundo Vinas, testified that “the defendants (petitioners herein) had life savers especially brought by the
defendants in case of emergency.” (p. 85, Rollo) The records also show that both petitioners Chavez and
Vinas did all what is humanly possible to save the child.

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN P.

PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL. PEDRO SACRO, AND LT. M. SORIANO,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOÑEZBENITEZ, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court, Manila, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA, and
ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA, respondents.

Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that the damage should have been caused
by pupils or students of the educational institution.—Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in the aforecited cases
of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals. In all such cases, it
had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or
inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils
or students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as
earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could
be made liable.

Contracts; An academic institution enters into a contract when it accepts students for enrollment; The
contract between school and student is one "imbued with public interest". —Institutions of learning must
also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes
or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the
intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets
are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant
threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace
and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.

Human Relations; Article 21; Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.—Air France
penalized the racist policy of the airline which emboldened the petitioner's employee to forcibly oust the
private respondent to cater to the comfort of a white man who allegedly "had a better right to the seat." In
Austro-American, supra, the public embarrassment caused to the passenger was the justification for the
Circuit Court of Appeals, (Second Circuit), to award damages to the latter. From the foregoing, it can be
concluded that should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and be violative of Article 21,
then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict. In the circumstances obtaining in the case
at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been
breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial
court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a
breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would
not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual
relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to
the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently on the contract, unless the
negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

MAXIMINO SOLIMAN, JR., represented by his judicial guardian VIRGINIA C. SOLIMAN,

petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE RAMON TUAZON, Presiding Judge of Branch LXI, Regional Trial
Court of Region III, Angeles City, and the REPUBLIC CENTRAL COLLEGES, represented by its
President, respondents.

Civil Law; Damages; Contracts; It is settled that where the security agency recruits, hires and assigns the
work of its watchmen or security guards, the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen.—It is
settled that where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or
security guards, the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful
acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency, and not to the clients or customers
of such agency.

The duty to observe the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of the guards cannot in the
ordinary course of events be demanded from the client whose premises or property are protected by the
security guards.—As a general rule, a client or customer of a security agency has no hand in selecting who
among the pool of security guards or watchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to
observe the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of the guards cannot, in the ordinary
course of events, be demanded from the client whose premises or property are protected by the security
guards. The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to the security guards assigned
to it, does not, by itself, render the client responsible as an employer of the security guards concerned and
liable for their wrongful acts or omissions. Those instructions or directions are ordinarily no more than
requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into with the security agency.

Certiorari; Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no
cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. —In the PSBA case, the trial court
had denied the school's motion to dismiss the complaint against it, and both the Court of Appeals and this
Court affirmed the trial court's order. In the case at bar, the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed
by respondent Colleges, upon the assumption that petitioner's cause of action was based, and could have
been based, only on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. As PSBA, however, states, acts which are tortious or
allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual, or other legal,
obligation. Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no
cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Respondent trial judge should not
have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have, in the interest of justice, allowed petitioner to
prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of respondent Colleges.

ST. JOSEPH’S COLLEGE, SR. JOSEPHINI AMBATALI, SFIC, and ROSALINDA TABUGO,
petitioners, vs. JAYSON MIRANDA, represented by his father, RODOLFO S. MIRANDA,
respondent.

Civil Law; Negligence; Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care, caution
and foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and teachers.—As found by both lower courts,
the proximate cause of Jayson’s injury was the concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent the foreseeable
mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to
exercise the higher degree of care, caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and
teachers.
The mishap which happened during the science experiment was foreseeable by the school, its officials and
teachers. —In marked contrast, both the lower courts similarly concluded that the mishap which happened
during the science experiment was foreseeable by the school, its officials and teachers. This neglect in
preventing a foreseeable injury and damage equates to neglect in exercising the utmost degree of diligence
required of schools, its administrators and teachers, and, ultimately, was the proximate cause of the damage
and injury to Jayson. As we have held in St. Mary’s, “for petitioner [St. Mary’s Academy] to be liable, there
must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury
caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident.”