MODULE 2

Rebellion - more frequently used where the object of the movement is completely to overthrow
and supersede the existing government. It is a crime of the masses, of the multitude. It is a vast
movement of men and a complex network of intrigues and plots.

1. G.R. Nos. L-6025-26.  July 18, 1956.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. AMADO V. HERNANDEZ,
ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

Facts:

On or before March 15, 1945, Amado V. Henandez and other twelve men, officers or members
of the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), cooperates and synchronizes its activities with
the rebellious activities of the ‘Hukbong Magpalayang Bayan, (H.M.B.) and other organs,
agencies, and instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.) to assure,
facilitate, and effect the complete and permanent success of the armed rebellion against the
Republic of the Philippines. To complete their rebellious act, the accused also perpetrate
murders, arsons and robberies.

Issue:

Whether or not murder, arsons and robberies are necessary to commit rebellion.

Held:

The crime of rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government
for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of
the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or of
depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives.

The murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of
rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as means "necessary" for the perpetration of
said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is,
therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and
robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12)
years of prision mayor. Said defendant is therefore allowed to bail.
2. G.R. No. 231658 July 4, 2017
REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, GARY C.
ALEJANO, EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, AND TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR.,
Petitioners vs. HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON.
DELFIN N. LORENZANA, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEF'ENSE AND MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR; AND GEN. EDUARDO ANO,
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MARTIAL
LAW IMPLEMENTOR, Respondents

Facts:

Effective May 23rd of 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa
Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of Martial Law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus in the whole of Mindanao.

Within a timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President submitted
to Congress on May 25, 2017, his President’s Report on the factual basis of the declaration of
Martial Law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Proclamation
No. 216. The said President’s Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued
with rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time.
The Report also highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial significant role
it plays in Mindanao the entire Philippines. The Report also pointed out the possible tragic
repercussions once Marawi City falls under the control of the lawless groups.

After submission of such Report and briefings, the Senate of the Philippines issued a resolution
expressing full support to the martial law proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 to be
satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law. In the same Resolution, the Senate
declared that it found no compelling reason to revoke the same. The House of Representatives
likewise issued a resolution expressing its full support to the President, as it finds no reasons to
revoke Proclamation No. 216.

Invoking the third paragraph Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, various citizens filed
several petitions, essentially invoking the Court’s specific and special jurisdiction to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the Proclamation No. 216 and seeking to nullify Proclamation
No. 216 for being unconstitutional because it lacks sufficient factual basis.

Issues:

1. Were there sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?
2. Are the instant petitions the “appropriate proceedings” covered by Paragraph 3, Section 18,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution?

Held:

1. NO. The Constitution does not only require that government alleges facts, it must show that
the facts are sufficient. The facts are sufficient when (a) it is based on credible intelligence and
(b) taken collectively establishes that there is actual rebellion and that public safety requires the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus and the exercise of defined powers
within the rubric of martial law.

We cannot use the quantum of evidence that is used by a prosecutor or a judge. We have to
assume what a reasonable President would do given the circumstances. The facts presented are
not sufficient to reasonably conclude that the armed hostilities and lawless violence happening in
Marawi City is "for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws,
the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other
armed forces, or of depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any
of their powers or prerogatives." Based on the facts inferred by the respondents from their
intelligence sources, the perpetrators of the atrocities are not numerous or have sufficient
resources or even community support to hold any territory. Extremist beliefs by those who
adhere to Salafist Jihadism are alien to most cultures in Mindanao. It is a bastardization of Islam
as this is understood. Neither do the facts show convincingly that "public safety" requires martial
law. Respondents did not show how the available legal tools magnified by the call out of the
armed forces would not be sufficient.

Elevating the acts of a lawless criminal group which uses terrorism as tactic to the constitutional
concept of rebellion acknowledges them as a political group. Rebellion is a political crime. We
have acknowledged that if rebels are able to capture government, their rebellion, no matter how
brutal, will be justified. Hostilities and lawless violence and their consequences can be addressed
by many of the prerogatives of the President as Chief Executive and Commander-in- Chief.
There is no showing that martial law has become necessary for the safety of entire Mindanao.

2. YES. The present petitions are justiciable. The petitions are the "appropriate proceedings"
filed by "any citizen" which appropriately invokes sui generis judicial review contained in the
Constitution. However, in addition to the remedy available in Article VII, Section 18 of the
Constitution, any proper party may also file a Petition invoking Article VIII, section 1. The
remedies are not exclusive of each other. Neither does one subsume the other.

"Appropriate proceeding" under the martial law provision is a sui generis proceeding or in a class
by itself, as seen by how it is treated by the 1987 Constitution and the special mandate handed
down to the Supreme Court in response to the President's declaration of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Traditionally, the Court is not a trier of facts. However, under Article VII, Section 18, the Court
is tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis for the President's proclamation of martial
law within thirty (30) days from the time the petition is filed. The rule on standing is also
significantly relaxed when the provision allows "any citizen" to question the proclamation of
martial law. This is in stark contrast with the requirement under the Rules of Court that "every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

However, the enumeration in Article VIII Section 5 is far from exclusive as the Court was also
endowed with original jurisdiction under Section 1 of the same article and over the sui generis
proceeding under Article VII, Section 18. Notwithstanding the sui generis proceeding, a resort to
a petition for certiorari pursuant to the Court's jurisdiction under Article VIII, Section 1 or Rule
65 is also proper to question the propriety of any declaration or implementation of the suspension
of the writ of Habeas Corpus or martial law. The jurisdiction of the Court in Article VIII, section
1 was meant "to ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of
discretion by 'any branch or instrumentalities of government." It was a reaction to the abuses of
martial law under President Marcos, ensuring that the courts will not evade their duty on the
ground. of non- justiciability for being a political question.

ACCORDINGLY, petitions granted. Proclamation No.216 of May 23, 2017, General Order No.
1 of 2017, and all the issuances related to these Presidential Issuances are unconstitutional

3. G.R. NO. 175013 June 1, 2007

CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SECRETARY
RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as the Secretary of Justice and overall superior of the
Public Prosecutors, HONORABLE ENCARNACION JAJA G. MOYA, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146, and HONORABLE
ELMO M. ALAMEDA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 150,

Facts:

Following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Presidential Proclamation No.

1017 on 24 February 2006 declaring a "State of National Emergency," police officers arrested
Beltran on 25 February 2006, while he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in
Camp Crame, Quezon City. Beltran was arrested without a warrant and the arresting officers did
not inform Beltran of the crime for which he was arrested. On that evening, Beltran was
subjected to an inquest at the Quezon City Hall of Justice for Inciting to Sedition under Article
142 of the Revised Penal Code based on a speech Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in
Quezon City on 24 February 2006, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the EDSA
Revolution.

The authorities brought back Beltran to Camp Crame where, on 27 February 2006, he was
subjected to a second inquest, with 1st Lt. Lawrence San Juan (San Juan), this time for
Rebellion. A panel of State prosecutors from the DOJ conducted this second inquest. The inquest
was based on two letters, both dated 27 February 2006, of Yolanda Tanigue (Tanigue) and of
Rodolfo Mendoza (Mendoza). Tanigue is the Acting Executive Officer of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG), Philippine National Police (PNP), while Mendoza is
the Acting Deputy Director of the CIDG. The letters referred to the DOJ for appropriate action
the results of the CIDG's investigation implicating Beltran, the petitioners in G.R. NOS. 172074-
76, San Juan, and several others as "leaders and promoters" of an alleged foiled plot to overthrow
the Arroyo government. The plot was supposed to be carried out jointly by members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP),
which have formed a "tactical alliance."

Issue:

Whether or not there is probable cause to indict Beltran for Rebellion.

Held:

NO Probable Cause to Indict Beltran for Rebellion. Probable cause is the "existence of such facts
and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted." To accord respect to the discretion granted to the prosecutor and for reasons of
practicality, this Court, as a rule, does not interfere with the prosecutor's determination of
probable cause for otherwise, courts would be swamped with petitions to review the prosecutor's
findings in such investigations. However, in the few exceptional cases where the prosecutor
abused his discretion by ignoring a clear insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of
probable cause, thus denying the accused his right to substantive and procedural due process, we
have not hesitated to intervene and exercise our review power under Rule 65 to overturn the
prosecutor's findings. This exception holds true here.

Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed'

By rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the
allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any
part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive
or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.

Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done
in furtherance of a political end.
The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the inquest of Beltran for Rebellion
consisted of the affidavits and other documents attached to the CIDG letters. We have gone over
these documents and find merit in Beltran's contention that the same are insufficient to show
probable cause to indict him for Rebellion.

The allegations in these affidavits are far from the proof needed to indict Beltran for taking part
in an armed public uprising against the government. What these documents prove, at best, is that
Beltran was in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas on 20 February 2006 and that 14 years earlier, he
was present during the 1992 CPP Plenum. None of the affidavits stated that Beltran committed
specific acts of promoting, maintaining, or heading a rebellion as found in the DOJ Resolution of
27 February 2006. None of the affidavits alleged that Beltran is a leader of a rebellion. Beltran's
alleged presence during the 1992 CPP Plenum does not automatically make him a leader of a
rebellion.

Assuming that Beltran is a member of the CPP, which Beltran does not acknowledge, mere
membership in the CPP does not constitute rebellion. Such a general conclusion does not
establish probable cause.

Treason - is a breach of allegiance to a government, committed by a person who owes allegiance

to it.

4. 37 O.G. 1932
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs MATIAS ALMAZAN

Facts:

Matias Almazan was accused before the People's Court of the crime of treason on five counts.
Count 5 was not deemed by the trial court specifically proved for lack of two witnesses to the
overt acts, and the evidence on said count was considered only as proof of adhesion to the
enemy. The appellant was found guilty on the first four counts and was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of P10,000 and the costs. The
defendant appealed to this Court.

Count No. 1

The appellant was formerly a member of the subversive societies known as "Ganap" and
"Sakdal." During the Japanese occupation, he became a member of the other society known as
"Makabayang Kalipunan Ng Mga Pilipino" or "Makapili" for short. This association was
founded under the auspices of the Japanese Imperial Army, its purpose having been to help the
Japanese forces in their campaign against the United States and the Commonwealth of the
Philippine Islands and to combat the guerrilla underground movement. The members of this
society received military training from the Japanese and actually took part in the campaign
against the resistance movement of the Fil-American forces. This charge was proved by
documentary evidence and the testimony of numerous witnesses.

Count No. 2

On June 20, 1943, the appellant with one Marcelo Alatiit, accompanied several Japanese
soldiers to the barrio of Malabar, Binan, Laguna, and there arrested three guerrilla suspects,
named Gregorio Corrales, Macario Alzona, and Juan Romero, and took them to Calamba,
Laguna, delivering them to the Japanese headquarters in that town. This is proved by the
testimony of four witnesses.

Count No. 3

In the evening of August 9, 1943, the appellant Matias Almazan arrested in their house in
barrio De la Paz, Binan, Laguna, Enrique Alcabasa and his sons Bernardo and Gregorio, who
were members of the guerrilla corps under the command of Colonel Hugh Straughn and
delivered them to the Japanese headquarters in Binan, where they were tortured by the Japanese,
resulting in the death of Enrique two days afterward. This charge was proved by the testimony of
Bernardo and Gregorio Alcabasa.

Count No. 4

In the month of November, 1943, at midnight, the appellant, armed, went with Marcelo
Alatiit and a number of Japanese soldiers to the barrio of Malaban, Binan, Laguna, and there
arrested Felipe Capili, proceeding to the town of Siniloan where they apprehended three
unknown Filipinos. All of these arrested persons were guerrilla suspects. They were surrendered
by the defendant and his companions to the Japanese garrison in Calamba. This was proved by
the testimony of Angeles Vicentina, Felipe Capili, and Valentin del Monte.

The appellant admitted that he was a Filipino citizen.

Issue:

Whether or not the appellant is guilty of treason

Held

The appellant in his defense, although he admits his membership in the Ganap Party before the
war, denies his affiliation with the Makapili. He denies having given aid or comfort to the
enemy. He admits that he was present when Corrales, Alzona, and Romero were arrested on June
20, 1943, but denies having had any participation in said arrest having been only a curious
bystander.
He admits knowing Enrique Alcabasa, but says that he was even unaware that the latter had been
arrested and learned of it only when he, the appellant, was arraigned. The witness for the
defense, Barsiliso Almazan, corroborating the defendant, testifies that he was present when
Corrales, Alzona, and Romero were arrested, but the defendant Matias Almazan was not among
those who arrested them.

Felix Kalayag, another witness for the defense, testifies that the appellant was not with the group
that arrested Felipe Capili in November, 1943, and that the only civilian present on that occasion
was the Japanese named Takama.

The membership of the appellant Matias Almazan in the Makapili association has been proved
by the testimony of Angeles Vicentina, Pacifico Alzona, Bernardo Alcabasa, Marciano Gallo,
Marcial Gomez, and Calixto Martina, who were barrio mates of the appellant and knew the latter
well. They saw the appellant, fully armed when he was with the Japanese patrol on several
occasions, and when he was drilled by the Japanese together with the members of the Makapili
organization in Bifian. The appellant acted as a pro-Japanese and a leader of the Makapilis. The
evidence is sufficient to establish the fact that he was an active member of the Makapili.

The contention of the appellant that he was a mere bystander when Corrales, Alzona, and
Romero were arrested, is disproved by the testimony of Angeles Vicentina, Faustino Parao, Juan
P. Romero, and Gregorio Corrales. There is no reason to believe that his own barrio mates would
have testified against him if in fact he did not participate actively in the arrest of those persons.
They had no motive to do so; Juana Amoranto and Barsiliso Almazan, who did not take part in
the arrest, were not charged by said witnesses. The appellant himself admits that he had no
quarrel. with those witnesses.

The denial of the defendant that he took part in the arrest of Enrique Alcabasa and his sons
Bernardo and Gregorio (Count No. 3) is disproved by the victims Bernardo and Gregorio
Alcabasa. Enrique Alcabasa could not testify because he had been tortured to death by the
Japanese.

With regard to the arrest of Capili (Count No. 4), the mere denial of the accused cannot prevail
over the testimony of Angeles Vicentina, Valentin del Monte, and Felipe Capili himself, all of
whom clearly identified the appellant as one of those who arrested Capili. The appellant says that
Capili had a grudge against him because he refused to lend money to Capili at a gambling game.
This alleged motive is insufficient to lead us to believe that for that reason Capili, the victim,
testified falsely against him.

Furthermore, with regard to the respective credibility of the witnesses, we find no reason for
disregarding the conclusions of the trial court; on the contrary, we find them fully supported by
the evidence of record. In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with costs against the appellant. It is ordered.
Coup d’etat - The crime of coup d'etat is a swift attack, accompanied by violence, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth, directed against duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the
Philippines, or any military camp or installation, communications networks, public utilities or
facilities needed for the exercise and continued possession of power, singly or simultaneously
carried out anywhere in the Philippines by any person or persons, belonging to the military or
police or holding any public office or employment, with or without civilian support or
participation, for the purpose of seizing or diminishing state power.

5. G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006

LT. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES, LT. (SG) ANDY TORRATO, LT. (SG) ANTONIO
TRILLANES IV, CPT. GARY ALEJANO, LT. (SG) JAMES LAYUG, CPT. GERARDO
GAMBALA, CPT. NICANOR FAELDON, LT. (SG) MANUEL CABOCHAN, ENS.
ARMAND PONTEJOS, LT. (JG) ARTURO PASCUA, and 1LT. JONNEL
SANGGALANG, Petitioners, vs. GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, in his capacity as Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and B. GEN. MARIANO M. SARMIENTO, JR., in
his capacity as the Judge Advocate General of the Judge Advocate General’s Office
(JAGO), Respondents.

Facts:

Only July 27, 2003 at around 1:00am, more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and enlisted
men of the AFP entered the premises of Oakwood Apartments in Makati. They then announced
their grievances against the Arroyo Administration, corruption in the Military; illegal sale of
arms and ammunitions to the enemies; they demanded for the resignation of the President, the
Cabinet and AFP and PNP top brass. The President issued G.O. No. 4 declaring a state of
rebellion. Negotiates were sent to the place and the soldiers finally laid their arms. After
investigation, they were charged with coup d’ etat penalized under Article 134-A, RPC. They
were likewise charged under the Articles of War, specifically Article 96 for conduct unbecoming
an officer and a gentleman. They filed a motion with the RTC where the coup d’etat case was
pending to take over jurisdiction over all the cases pending with the military tribunal following
the doctrine of absorption. The RTC ruled that the cases before the military tribunal were not
service-connected but rather absorbed in furtherance of the crime of coup d’etat. When they were
charged under Art. 96 of the Articles of War, they filed a petition for prohibition praying that the
respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Article 96 of the Articles
of War. They maintained that Article 96 is not service connected, hence, absorbed by coup
d’etat, thus, within the jurisdiction of the RTC. The OSG contended that under RA 7055,
violation of Art. 96 is service-connected, hence, within the jurisdiction of the military tribunal.
They further contended that the offense has already prescribed since they were not arraigned
within 2 years from the date of the commission of the offense.

Issues:

1.Whether the court martial may assume jurisdiction over those who have been criminally
charged of coup d’état before the regular courts.

2. Whether the doctrine of absorption of crimes is applicable.

Held:

1.YES. Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is expressly provided in

Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge against the
petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the
Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and
disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on their professional
conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the "service- connected" nature of
the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same — dismissal from the service — imposable
only by the military court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to
cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military
discipline.

Hence, there is no merit in petitioners argument that they can no longer be charged before the
court martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same has been
declared by the RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather
absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat," hence, triable by said court
(RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests
in the court martial the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses." What the law
has conferred the court should not take away. It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows
jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an action
which can do so. And it is only through a constitutional amendment or legislative enactment that
such act can be done. The first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely to apply the law "as
they find it, not as they like it to be. Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.

2. NO. The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge
of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is absorbed and in furtherance to the
alleged crime of coup d'etat. Firstly, the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes' is peculiar to criminal
law and generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, unlike here where different
statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over
both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil
courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of
War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.

Sedation - The crime of sedition is committed by persons who rise publicly and
tumultuously in order to attain by force, intimidation, or by other means outside of legal
methods, any of the following objects:

1. To prevent the promulgation or execution of any law or the holding of any popular
election;
2. To prevent the National Government, or any provincial or municipal government, or any
public officer thereof from freely exercising its or his functions, or prevent the execution
of any administrative order;
3. To inflict any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any public officer or
employee;
4. To commit, for any political or social end, any act of hate or revenge against private
persons or any social class; and
5. To despoil, for any political or social end, any person, municipality or province, or the
National Government of all its property or any party thereof.

6. G.R. No. 17748             March 4, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GRACIANO L.
CABRERA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Facts

The Philippine Constabulary has grudges against the police of Manila and they want to inflict
revenge for the following reasons: (1) On December 13, 1920, a Manila police arrested a woman
who is a member of the household of a constabulary soldier and was allegedly abused by the said
policeman. (2) Private Macasinag of the Constabulary was shot by a Manila police and was
mortally wounded. A day after the incident, a rumor spread among the Constabulary that the
Police who shot Macasinag was back to his original duties while Macasinag was declared dead.
There were also rumors that the said shooting was ordered. On the night of December 15 some
members of the Constabulary escaped their barracks through a window (the saw out the window
bars). They had rifles and ammunitions and were organized in groups under the command of
their sergeants and corporals.

They attacked some Manila policemen in these specific instances: (1) On Calle Real, Intramuros,
a group of the Constabulary shot and killed an American Policeman and his friend. (2) The
Constabulary indiscriminately shot at a passer- by, causing a death and wounding most of the
passengers. (3) While riding a motorcycle driven by policeman Saplala, Captain William E.
Wichman (asst. chief of police in Manila) was shot and killed together with Saplala

Issues

1. Whether or not there is connivance/conspiracy between the accused.

2. Are the accused properly convicted of a violation of the Treason and Sedition Law- YES

Held

1. YES. Conspiracies are generally proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, and
circumstances which vary according to the purposes to be accomplished. If it be proved that
the defendants pursued by their acts the same object, one performing one part and another
another part of the same, so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object,
one will be justified in the conclusion that they were engaged in a conspiracy to the effect that
object. It is incontestable that all of the defendants were imbued with the same purpose, which
was to avenge themselves on the police force of Manila. A common feeling of resentment
animated all.

3. YES. Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the
State. The Philippine law on the subject makes all persons guilty of sedition who rise publicly
and tumultuously in order to obtain by force of outside of legal methods any one of five
objects, including that of inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of
any official or agent of the Insular government or of a provincial or municipal government.
The counsel contested that it is necessary that the offender should be a private citizen and the
offended party a public functionary, and what really happened was a fight between two armed
bodies of the Philippine Government. The court held that this contention is without
foundation.

The Treason and Sedition Law makes no distinction between the persons to which it applies.
What is important is that there is a public rising to incite or inflict any act of hate or revenge
upon the person or property of any official or agent of the Insular government or of a provincial
or municipal government.

7. G.R. No. L-5803            November 29, 1954

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NARCISO UMALI, ET AL., defendants.
NARCISO UMALI, EPIFANIO PASUMBAL and ISIDRO CAPINO, defendants-appellants.
Facts:

The complex crime of which appellants Narciso Umali, et. al were found guilty was said to have
been committed during the raid staged in the town of Tiaong, Quezon, between 8:00 and 9:00 in
the evening of November 14, 1951, by armed men. The raid took place resulting in the burning
down and complete destruction of the house of Mayor Marcial Punzalan including its content
valued at P24,023; the house of Valentin Robles valued at P10,000, and the house of one Mortga,
the death of Patrolman Domingo Pisigan and civilians Vicente Soriano and Leocadio Untalan,
and the wounding of Patrolman Pedro Lacorte and five civilians.

During and after the burning of the houses, some of the raiders engaged in looting, robbing one
house and two Chinese stores; and that the raiders were finally dispersed and driven from the
town by the Philippine Army soldiers stationed in the town led by Captain Alzate.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused-appellants are liable of the charges against them of complex crime of
rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery?

Held:

Yes. The appellants were guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and
physical injuries. For the crime of sedition each of the appellants is sentenced to 5 years of
prision correctional and to pay a fine of P4,000; for each of the three murders, each of the
appellants is sentenced to life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of each victim in the sum
of P6,000; and for the arson, for which we impose the maximum penalty provided in Article 321,
paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the raiders in setting fire to the
buildings, particularly the house of Punzalan they knew that it was then occupied by one or more
persons, because they even and actually saw an old lady, the mother of Punzalan, at the window,
and in view of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, each of the appellants is sentenced to
reclusion perpetua and to pay the indemnities mentioned in the decision of the lower court. It
shall be understood, however, the pursuant to the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal
Code the duration of all penalties shall not exceed 40 years. In view of the heavy penalties
already imposed and their long duration, the court finds it unnecessary to fix and impose the
prison sentences corresponding to frustrated murder and physical injuries; however, the sums
awarded the victims (Lacorte, Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector), by the court below
will stand. With these modifications, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.

8. G.R. No. L-12686            October 24, 1963

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. KAMLON HADJI, ET
AL., defendants

Facts:

One morning some two years prior to the trial of this case, the herein defendant, together with
two other armed companions, Ulluh and Angkang, set out to look for two men whom they
suspected were responsible for the disappearance of two of the followers of the defendant. The
search ended when the defendant and his companions chanced upon their quarry, Hatib Ajibun
and Jamalul Alling, in the vicinity of Buhangin Mahaba gathering vines. Thereupon, threatening
to kill unless Ajibun and Alling went with them, Kamlon and his companions seized the pair and
brought them to Tigbas, Luuk District where, at that time, Kamlon was residing. At the market
place of Tigbas, Kamlon made known to his captives the reason for their abduction, and,
although Ajibun and Alling disavowed any knowledge or responsibility for the disappearance of
the two persons Kamlon was seeking to avenge, their protestations of innocence were
disbelieved and altogether unheeded.

Issue:

Whether or not the common crimes are to be absorbed into the crime of sedition.

Held:

There is neither law nor jurisprudence which can allow this Court to uphold the
defendant's claim that acts of violence like murder and kidnapping are absorbed by sedition. The
aforecited cases of Hernandez and Geronimo, supra, cannot properly be invoked as authority for
that legal proposition since those two cases involved the crime of rebellion and not sedition.

Indeed, as this Court adheres to and is guided in great measure by the rule of stare decisis, We
deem ourselves unfree at the moment to disregard our rulings in the cases of People v. Cabrera,
43 Phil. 64, and People v. Umali, G.R. No. L-5803, Nov. 29, 1954. In the Cabrera case, this
Court held:

It is merely stating the obvious to say that sedition is not the same offense as murder. Sedition is
a crime against public order; murder is a crime against persons. Sedition is a crime directed
against the existence of the State, the authority of the government, and the general public
tranquility; murder is a crime directed against the lives of individuals. (U.S. v. Abad [1902], 1
Phil. 437.) Sedition in its more general sense is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the
state; murder at common law is where a person of sound mind and discretion unlawfully kills
any human being, in the peace of the sovereign, with malice aforethought, express or implied.

The offenses charged in the two informations for sedition and murder are perfectly distinct in
point of law however nearly they may be connected in point of fact. Not alone are the offenses
com nomine different, but the allegations in the body of the information are different. The gist of
the information for sedition is the public and tumultuous uprising of the constabulary in order to
attain by force and outside of legal methods the object of inflicting an act of hate and revenge
upon the persons of the police force of the city of Manila by firing at them in several places in
the city of Manila; that gist of the information in the murder case is that the Constabulary,
conspiring together, illegally and criminally killed eight persons and gravely wounded three
others. The crimes of murder and serious physical injuries were not necessarily included in the
information for sedition; and the defendants could not have been convicted of these crimes under
the first information.

Inciting to sedation - Punishable Acts:

1. Inciting others to commit sedition by means of speeches, proclamations, writings,

emblems
2. Uttering seditious words or speeches which tend to disturb the public peace
3. Writing, publishing, or circulating scurrilous (meaning vulgar, mean, foul) libels against
the Government or any of its duly constituted authorities

9. G.R. No. 85727 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DEOGRACIAS
ESPIRITU, petitioner, vs. BRIG. GEN.ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO
REYES, respondents.

Facts:

Deogracias Espiritu was arrested without warrant on the basis of the attestation of certain
witnesses: that about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, at the corner of
Magsaysay Boulevard and Valencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu spoke at a gathering of
drivers and sympathizers, to wit: :bukas tuloy ang welga natin… hanggang sa magkagulo na.”

Police authorities arrested Espiritu without warrant, not for subversion or any continuing offense,
but for uttering the above-quoted language which, in the perception of the arresting officers,
tantamount to inciting to sedition

Issues:

1. Whether or not those arrests made without warrant, were meted out according to the
provisions of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
2. Whether or not the decision erred in considering the admission made by the persons arrested,
inasmuch as those confessions do not comply with the requirements on admissibility of
extrajudicial admissions.

Held:

1. YES, in as much as the arrests were carried out in accordance with Section 5 of Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court. The present cases focus primarily on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of
Rule 113, which reads:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:

(a)When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually

committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it; and

. . . (Emphasis supplied).

In the case of Dural, inferring from the Court’s decision, dated 9 july 1990, Rolando Dural’s
arrest without warrant was justified as contemplated by Section 5, Rule 113, as it was determined
in the latter decision that his position as a member of the New People’s Army, where
membership is penalized,and for subversion, which, under the doctrine of Garcia v. Enrile is a
continuing offense.

It is upon the majority’s observation that Dural, notwithstanding his medical confinement, did
not cease to be, or became less of a subversive. It was also deduced by the Court that
transgressions such as subversion and rebellion are deemed to be anchored on an ideological
base which compels repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding
objective of overthrowing organized government is attained.

In G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu), it was held that in the balancing of authority and freedom, which
obviously becomes different at times, the Court has, in this case, tilted the scale in favor of
authority but only for purposes of arrest, and not conviction.

2. NO. Although the court indeed took into account the admissions of he arrested persons of their
membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as the ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions
and subversive documents in their possession. But it is to be considered that said items merely
bolstered the Court’s perception that the grounds upon which the arresting officers based their
arrests without warrant, are supported by probable cause. To note these admissions is NOT to
rule that the persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon which their warrantless
arrests were predicated. That said, determining the guilt of innocence of persons arrested without
warrant is not proper in the petition for habeas corpus.

10. G.R. No. L-2990         December 17, 1951

OSCAR ESPUELAS Y MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Facts:

On June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar
Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at
the end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when in truth and in fact, he was
merely standing on a barrel. After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of
same to Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang of general circulation and other
local periodicals in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for
their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by a
fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed wife translation of
which letter or note, stating his dismay and administration of President Roxas, pointing out the
situation in Central Luzon and Leyte, and directing his wife his dear wife to write to President
Truman and Churchill of US and tell them that in the Philippines the government is infested with
many Hitlers and Mussolinis.

Issue:

Whether the accused is liable of seditious libel under Art. 142 of the RPC against the
Government of the Philippines?

Held:

YES. The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being no question as to
the legality of the penalty imposed on him, the decision will be affirmed with costs.

Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences, the article written bybthe accused,
cannot fail to impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The
infuriating language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what with the writer's simulated suicide
and false claim to martyrdom and what with is failure to particularize. When the use irritating
language centers not on persuading the readers but on creating disturbances, the rationable of
free speech cannot apply and the speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the
constitutional guaranty.
If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure but only
President Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not only all libels against the
Government but also "libels against any of the duly constituted authorities thereof." The "Roxas
people" in the Government obviously refer of least to the President, his Cabinet and the majority
of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally directed. On
this score alone the conviction could be upheld.

Regarding the publication, it suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots and tends to stir
up people against the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition who may
seek to silence the writer. Which is the sum and substance of the offense under consideration.

The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate tendency to stir up general discontent
to the pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to induce people to resort to illegal methods other
than those provided by the Constitution, in order to repress the evils which press upon their
minds.

Illegal Assemblies -

1. Any meeting attended by armed persons for the purpose of committing any of the
crimes punishable under the Code.

2. Any meeting in which the audience, whether armed or not, is incited to the commission
of the crime of treason, rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or assault upon a person in authority.

Illegal Association - Association totally or partially organized for:

1. the purpose of committing any of the crimes punishable under the Code

2. some purpose contrary to public morals

11. G.R. No. L-36278             October 26, 1932

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CRISANTO
EVANGELISTA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Facts:

Sometime on 30th May 1931, Crisanto Evangelista, et al. affiliated themselves to become
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (Partido Komunista sa Pilipinas), an illegal
association, and gathered and congregated under the name and auspices of the Katipunan ng mga
Anak pawis sa Pilipinas (Association of the Sons of the Sweat of the Philippine Islands). Thus,
they were charged for the crime of Illegal Association under Article 147 of the Revised Penal
Code.

The appellants herein have not denied being members of the Communist Party of the Philippines
but alleged that the latter is not an illegal association in that it preaches only a social but not an
armed revolution.

Issue:

Are the accused liable for the crime of Illegal Associations under Article 147 of the Revised
Penal Code?

Held:

YES. According to the Revised Penal Code, Illegal associations are those associations totally or
partially organized for the purpose of committing any of the crimes punishable therein or for
some purpose contrary to public morals. Here, it was found that the purpose of Communist Party
of the Philippines is to incite class struggle and to overthrow the present government by peaceful
means or by armed revolution; therefore, the purpose of the party is to alter the social order and
to commit the crimes of rebellion and sedition. As such, an association having such an object
must necessarily be illegal.

12. G.R. No. 1513            February 12, 1904

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee, vs. CASIANO SADIAN, defendant-
appellant.

Facts:

Sadian, Sadang, and Sancali came to the house of Umayam’s brother in Pias and that upon the
invitation of Sadang they all went out into a cane field; that shortly after Sadian arrived and
asked the witness if he desired to join them. Whereupon, in proof of his affiliation, Casiano made
an incision in his forearm and then wrote the name of the witness with his own blood; Sadian
then told him that he was to defend his mother country and fight the Americans; that on this
occasion Sergio Sadang and the five accused were present, and that they surrounded him, all
armed with clubs; that on the following day they took him to the forest, and after Umayam
arrived in charge of Butardo, and that they made a similar incision in his arm, he being
surrounded by the accused, who were armed with bolos and clubs; that after this operation they
went with the witness to Gavino's hut, and while they were eating the latter told the witness in
private to go and report the facts to the Constabulary stationed at Badoc, which he did. This
witness also testified the Valentin Butardo, as well as Casiano, asked him if he wanted to fight
the Americans, and that he said that he did; that the leader of them was Sergio Sadang.
Sergio Sadang testified under oath that Valentin Butardo was the one who made the incision in
the arm of Aristo Umayam when the latter took the oath as a member of the party which they had
organized, but immediately afterwards testified that Casiano Sadian was the one who made the
incision in Umayam's arm while he, the witness, but not the other accused, was present. Sergio
Sancali testified that he did not know whether Ariston Umayam was a member of said party, and
only knew by hearsay that the accused were members of it.

Issue:

Whether or not Sandian is liable of rebellion against the government.

Held:

YES. The evidence plainly shows that Casiano Sadian, with Valentin Butardo, Sergio Sadang,
and others, organized a secret political society for the purpose of fomenting rebellion against the
constituted government of these Islands and to obtain the independence of the Islands by means
of revolution and war, and that with this purpose in view they endeavored to induce others to join
the party and to increase the number of members, making the incisions in their arms and obliging
them to take an oath to defend the country and to fight against the Americans. These acts, fully
established by the evidence, fall within the provisions of section 9 of the Act.

For the purpose of organizing the society he acted with criminal intent, with full knowledge and
the determined purpose of fomenting a rebellion against the government in these Islands, and
consequently he is subject to the personal and pecuniary penalty established by section 9 of Act
No. 292

13. G.R. No. L-11023        December 14, 1956

Interruption, prohibition, or dissolution of religious worship - The penalty of prision

correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who,
without legal ground, shall prohibit or interrupt the holding of a peaceful meeting, or
shall dissolve the same.

14. G.R. No. 8722           September 10, 1913

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.BUENAVENTURA BALCORTA, defendant-
appellant.

Facts:

The accused entered a private house, uninvited, where services of the Methodist Episcopal
Church were being conducted between ten and twenty persons, and threatened the group with a
club, interrupting or the disturbing the divine service. The Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
sentenced the defendant/appellant, to three years six months and twenty-one days of prision
correccional, and a fine of 625 pesetas, together with other accessory penalties provided by law.

Issue:

Whether the sentence of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija of prision correccional
against the accused was sustaining?

Held:

The Court of Appeals ordered the reversal of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija and sentenced the accused to ten days imprisonment (arresto menor) and a fine of 20
pesetas with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency not to exceed one-third of the
principal penalty, and to the payment of the costs of the cause. The decision based on the
succeeding reasons:

The Spanish Constitution provided for a state religion but also guaranteed the privilege of freely
practicing, both in private and public. However, only those followers of the state religion are
allowed to practice in public. It is under this constitution the Penal Code of Philippines of 1884
was promulgated, it provided consequences against the violation or crime against the state
religion specifically disturbing, by means of violence, threats, etc., their ceremonies when
conducted in cemeteries or other places were such ceremonies may be lawfully authorized. (Art.
225.)

The change of sovereignty and the enactment of the fourteenth paragraph of section 5 of the
Philippine Bill caused the complete separation of church and state, and the abolition of all special
privileges and all restrictions theretofore conferred or imposed upon any particular religious sect,
looking equally to all religious sects. The articles of the Penal Code referring equally to all
religious sects are of two, article 223 and 571.

This article recognizes the freedom of religion and worship of all mankind however violations
against this incur subsequent penalties. But like any other constitutions no penalty was attached
in this article. It says that "the penalty . . . shall be imposed upon any person who . . . shall force
some other person to perform an act of worship . . ."

The offense defined and punished by article 571, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code falls under the
classification of "Misdemeanors against the public order." Due to the fact that all the articles in
section 3, chapter 2, of book 2 of the code, with the exception of article 223 have become
inoperative, all offenses against religious cults which do not amount to an attempt to control the
conscience of persons must now fall within the provisions of this article.

The offense falls within the provisions of article 223 and 571. However records failed to
establish the intent of the accused in committing the act, it was not proven that religious hatred
prompted the accused to act as he did. He simply threatened to assault them with a club if they
will not stop the religious service. The offense appears to be simply that of disturbing the
religious service, punishable under article 571.

It is further alleged that the people thus dispersed by the defendant were not holding religious
services, as they were simply reading some verses out of the Bible. We have been unable to find
any provision of law which requires religious services to be conducted in approved orthodox
style in order to merit its protection against interference and disturbances. As stated in Hull vs.
State (120 Ind., 153):

It makes no difference that the method of worship of those assembled was singular or
uncommon. The protection of the statute is extended to all, irrespective of creed, opinion, or
mode of worship. Persons who meet for the purpose of religious worship, by any method which
is not indecent and unlawful, have a right to do so without being molested or disturbed.

15. G.R. No. L-12644      December 22, 1917

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEON MORALES, ET
AL., defendants. PEDRO RIGOR, MARIANO GORUSPE, and CIPRIANO
DE LOS REYES, appellants.
Facts:

That shortly after 8 o'clock of the evening of July 15, 1915, about thirty residents of the barrio of
Moriones, of the municipality of Tarlac, accompanied by a number of women and children, all of
whom belonged to the Catholic creed started out in a procession from the Catholic church of said
municipality intending to pass through some of the streets of the town, as they had already done
on previous evenings. As they went along in the procession they said prayers and carried the
image of the Virgin of the Immaculate Conception; but on arriving in front of the Aglipayan
church on Calle San Agustin, several men, among whom were Pedro Rigor, who is an Aglipayan
priest, and the residents Mariano Goruspe and Cipriano de los Reyes, there posted with others
and provided with clubs and sticks, prevented the Catholic procession from proceeding further
and compelled its members to take another route, which was not a street and was dirty and the
priest, Rigor, said to them that he had previously warned them not to say prayers during the
novenary; thereupon Maximo Cayetano, a resident who on that occasion was conducting the
procession and leading those in it who were saying prayers in novena, replied to the priest,
Rigor, that the latter ought not to prohibit them from doing a good deed, and after this reply,
gave the order for the procession to continue its march; but at this moment Rigor, Goruspe,
Reyes, and others of their companions attacked said Maximo Cayetano, some of them with sticks
and clubs while a majority of the others engaged in pushing back the people in the procession, as
a result of which aggression they started to run, the image of the Virgin fell to the ground and
was abandoned, and the procession was disbanded. During the disturbance the crown of the
image disappeared and one of its hands was broken. The foregoing facts were brought out by the
testimony of the said Cayetano and the eyewitnesses Hilario de los Santos, Roman Yamson, and
Bartolome Licu, who testified that the defendants Reyes, Rigor and Goruspe, with others, met
the members of the procession, prevented them from proceeding and passing in front of the
Aglipayan church, and maltreated Maximo Cayetano and others in the procession, and that the
priest Rigor also said to them that he had previously warned them that they should not in the
future perform the novena by a procession through the streets.

Issue:

Whether or not the provincial fiscal erred in charging the defendants with the crime defined and
punished by article 223 of the Penal Code.

Held:

Article 223 of the Penal Code provides: The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum degrees and a fine of not less than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six
thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas shall be imposed upon any person who, by means of
threats, violence, or other equivalent compulsion, shall force some other person to perform an act
of worship or prevent him from performing such act. It is seen that the defendants, by dissolving
the procession and by main force dispersing its members, proposed not only to interrupt and
disturb a religious procession, but also absolutely to prevent the person taking part therein from
being able to address their prayers to God in the manner established by the Catholic church, to
the community and confession of which they belonged.

For the foregoing reasons it is proper that, reversing the judgment appealed from in the part
thereafter relative to said three defendants and appellants, Pedro Rigor, Mariano Goruspe, and
Cipriano de los Reyes, they be, as they are hereby sentenced each to the penalty of three years
six months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, to the accessory penalties of article 61,
to the payment by each of them of a fine of 1,000 pesetas, and in case of insolvency, to the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment not to exceed one-third of the time of the principal
penalty, to pay each of them one-fourteenth of the costs of first instance and one third of the
costs of this second instance.

Offending religious feelings - “The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prison
correctional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon anyone who, in a place devoted
to religious worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony shall perform acts
notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful”.

16. CA-G.R. No. 13619, August 15, 1955

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v FATHER MIGALLOS, Respondent

Facts:

Wherein the accused was convicted by the Court of First Instance and Court of Appeals of the
offense defined under Art. 133 of the Revised Penal Code, the facts show that Minister Tagoylo
of the Iglesia ni Kristo sect was stoned by the accused while the former was preaching or
spreading his belief on a public road before a crowd of around 500 persons.

Issue:

Whether or not the act of throwing stones at the minister is an offense against religious feelings.

Held:

YES. According to Article 133 of the RPC, the acts direct against religious practice, dogma, or
ritual for the purpose of ridicule, as mocking or scoffing at or attempting to dame an object of
religious veneration. There was deliberate intent to hurt the feelings of the faithful.

17. CA- G.R. No. 12114, February 25, 1955

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner v MANDORIANO, Jr., Respondent

Facts

The Iglesia ni Cristo held a religious rally at a public place in Baguio. About 200 people attended
the meeting, about 50 of whom were members of the Iglesia ni Cristo but the rest were outsiders
and curious listeners. While Salvio, a minister of Iglesia ni Cristo, was expounding on his topic
to the efect that Christ is not God, but only man, the crowd became unruly. Some people urged
Mandoriao to go up the stage and have a debate with Salvio. Mandoriao however, was not able
to speak before the microphone because the wire connecting it was abruptly disconnected.

Issue:

Whether or not the meeting was a religious ceremony.

Held

NO. The meeting here was not a religious ceremony. A religious meeting is an “assemblage of
people meeting for the purpose of performing acts of adoration to the Supreme Being, or to
perform religious services in recognition of God as an object of worship...” The meeting here
was not limited to the members of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The supposed prayers and singing of
hymns were merely incidental because the principal object of the rally was to persuade new
converts to their religion. Assuming that the rally was a religious ceremony, the appellant cannot
be said to have performed acts or uttered words offensive to the feelings of the faithful. The act
complained of must be directed against a dogma or ritual, or upon an object of veneration. There
was no object of veneration at the meeting.

Reyes Book II, page 80: —— When the application of the Iglesia ni Cristo was to hold the
meeing at a public place and the permit expressly stated that the purpose was to hold a religious
rally, what was held on that occasion was not a religious ceremony, even if a minister was then
preaching (“that Jesus Christ was not God but only a man”). The rally was attended by persons
who are not members of the sect.

Reyes Book II, page 81:—— Remarks that those who believed that Christ is God are anti-Christ,
that all the members of the Roman Catholic Church are marked by the demon, and that the Pope
is the Commander of Satan are notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful.

Direct Assault -

I. There are two kinds the first being: Without a public uprising by employing force or
intimidation to attain any of the purposes of rebellion or sedition. This is very rare. It is the
second form which is commonly committed.

II. Second kind is committed when, without a public uprising, the offender: (i) Attacks
(ii) Employs force (iii) Seriously intimidates or seriously resists (iv) Any person in authority or
his agent (v) while engaged in the performance of official duties or on the occasion thereof (vi)
knowing him to be such.

18. People vs. Recto, G.R. No. 129069, October 17, 2001
Facts:

RTC of Romblon found Julio Recto y Robea guilty of (1) two counts of the complex crime of
qualified direct assault with frustrated homicide the complex crime of qualified direct assault
with murder and (3) homicide. accused, with intent to kill, did by means of treachery attack,
assault, and shoot with a shotgun locally called pugakang one MELCHOR RECTO, knowing
that the latter is a duly appointed barangay chief tanod of Romblon, while he was engaged in the
performance of his official duties, inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds in different parts of
his body.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is guilty of direct assault.

Held:

NO. The trial court erred in convicting appellant of qualified direct assault with frustrated
homicide

Direct assault may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a
public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes
enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or
persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or
resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official
duties.

In the case at bar, the victim, Melchor Recto -- being then the barangay chief tanod of
Ambulong, Magdiwang, Romblon -- was clearly an agent of a person in authority. However,
contrary to the findings of the trial court, he was not engaged in the performance of his official
duties at the time he was shot. Neither was he attacked on the occasion of such performance.
Thus, the attack on him did not amount to direct assault appellants liability amounted only to
attempted, not frustrated, homicide. The penalty that is lower by two degrees than that prescribed
by law for consummated homicide shall be imposed upon appellant. After applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, it shall be taken from the medium period, since there were no
aggravating or mitigating circumstances proven.

In Criminal Case No. 1971, the trial court was correct in ruling that the attack on Percival Orbe
then a barangay captain, a person in authority.

In his other criminal case, Considering that Antonio Macalipay was a kagawad who was in the
actual performance of his duties when he was shot, the attack on him constituted direct assault.
appellant should be held liable for the complex crime of qualified direct assault with homicide.
The penalty to be imposed on him should be for homicide, which is the more serious crime, to be
imposed in the maximum period.

19. G.R. No. L-48396 September 11, 1942

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELIX BENITEZ, accused-
appellant.

Facts:

In the morning of October 28, 1939, while D' Artagan Williams Division Superintendent of
Schools for Negros Occidental, was working in his office, defendant Felix Benitez, special agent
in the office of the Provincial Governor, gave the former a fist blow causing him a contusion
over the mastoid bone on the left ear.
The assault appeared to have been prompted by the defendant's desire to avenge a supposed
affront to the Provincial Governor by the Division Superintendent in connection with the
appointment of teachers. On an indictment for assault upon a person in authority, defendant was
found guilty and sentenced to from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision
correccional and to pay a fine of P500 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Issue:

Whether or not a division superintendent of schools is a person in authority within the meaning
of article 148, in connection with article 152, of the Revised Penal Code.

Held:

YES. Accordingly, the finding of the trial court that "no injury of serious nature was caused upon
the offended party by the blow of record," cannot now be disturbed. Under article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 4000, a complex crime is committed when a single
act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. In the instant case, the physical injury
inflicted upon the offended party does not appear to be a grave or less grave felony and,
therefore, there is no complex crime. (People vs. Refre, G.R. No. 39937 [unpublished], February
2, 1934; People vs. Acierto, 57 Phil., 614.)

The crime committed by the defendant is assault upon a person in authority, with the aggravating
circumstance that the crime was committed in the place where the person in authority was
engaged in the discharge of his duties (article 14, No. 5, Revised Penal Code).

The penalty provided by law is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a
fine not exceeding P1,000 to be imposed in its maximum degree. Pursuant to the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty to be imposed shall be within the
maximum period of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, and the minimum
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower, that is, arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period which may be applied in any of its periods in the
discretion of the court according to the circumstances of the case.11, 1942

20. G.R. No. 69184 March 26, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO ABLAO, defendant-
appellant.

Facts:

That on or about December 16, 1977 in the Municipality of Lumban, Province of Laguna and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping with each other, then provided with unlicensed firearms, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with evident premeditation and treachery and
with intent to kill, attack, assault and shoot at one ANDRES MANAMBIT Y MENDOZA
thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple mortal and serious gunshot wounds on the different
parts of the body which immediately caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs
of the victim, Andres Manambit y Mendoza.

Issue:

Whether or not aggravating circumstance of disregard or insult of rank.

Held:

YES. The Court finds accused MARIO ABLAO, 25 years old, of Lumban, Laguna, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER as charged in the information with
aggravating circumstance of disregard due the deceased on account of his rank as Barangay
Captain and as President of the Association of Barangay Captains of Lumban, Laguna and
hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme and extreme penalty of DEATH; to pay the heirs of
Andres Manambit, Sr., the sum of P30,000.00 with the accessory penalties provided for by law,
and to pay the costs.

Accused ALBERTO ALMARIO, ZENON SAMONTE and HECTOR SAMONTE are acquitted
of the crime of MURDER for lack of evidence against them.

Violation of Parliamentary Immunity

21. G.R. No. L-34022 March 24, 1972

MANUEL MARTINEZ Y FESTIN petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE JESUS P. MORFE
OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, and THE CITY WARDEN OF
MANILA, respondents.

Facts

The question raised in these certiorari proceedings is the scope to be accorded the constitutional
immunity of senators and representatives from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of
Congress and in going to and returning from the same except in cases of treason, felony and
breach of the peace.

Petitioners Manuel Martinez y Festin and Fernando Bautista, Sr., as delegate of the present
Constitutional Convention would invoke what they consider to be the protection of the above
constitutional provision, if considered in connection with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code
penalizing a public officer or employee who shall, during the sessions of Congress, "arrest or
search any member thereof, except in case such member has committed a crime punishable
under [such] Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor."

Both petitioners are facing criminal prosecutions, for falsification of a public document and for
violation of the Revised Election Code.

The Solicitor General dispute such a contention on the ground that the constitutional provision
does not cover any criminal prosecution being merely an exemption from arrest in civil cases, the
logical inference being that insofar as a provision of the Revised Penal Code would expand such
an immunity, it would be unconstitutional.

Issue:

Whether or not senators should be immune from the criminal charges.

Held:

NO. As is made clear in Section 15 of Article VI of the Constitution, the immunity from arrest
does not cover any prosecution for treason, felony and breach of the peace. Treason exists when
the accused levies war against the Republic or adheres to its enemies giving them aid and
comfort. Breach of the peace covers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or
any special statute.

It is a well-settled principle in public law that the public peace must be maintained and any
breach thereof renders one susceptible to prosecution. There is a full recognition of the necessity
to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled
to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities.

When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged
class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they
would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning
from the same. There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate
can perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression of the
criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other
citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go
unpunished.

Evasion of Service of Sentence - The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and

maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by
escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment.

22. Curiano vs. CFI, G.R. No. l-8104, April 15, 1955
23. Parulan vs. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-28519, February 17, 1968
RICARDO PARULAN, petitioner v DIRECTOR OF PRISON, respondent

Facts:

Petitioner was confined in the state penitentiary at Muntinglupa, Rizal, serving a sentence of life
imprisonment which, however, was commuted to twenty (20) years by the President of the
Philippines.

In October, 1964, he was transferred to the military barracks of Fort Bonifacio. In the same
month, while still serving his prison term as aforesaid, he effected his escape from his
confinement. Petitioner was recaptured in the City of Manila. Court of First Instance of Manila,
after due trial, petitioner was found guilty of the offense charged and sentenced accordingly.

A petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed by Ricardo Parulan, directed to the Director of
the Bureau of Prisons, to order his release.

Issue:

1.) Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila with jurisdiction to try and decide the
case and to impose the sentence upon the petitioner, for the offense with which he was charged
— evasion of service of sentence?

Held:

YES. The offense of evasion of service of sentence being a continuing crime, CFI of Manila has
jurisdiction to try the case.

Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that criminal actions shall
be instituted where the offense was committed.

There are, however, crimes which although all the elements thereof for its consummation may
have occurred in a single place, yet by reason of the very nature of the offense committed, the
violation of the law is deemed to be continuing

The crime of evasion of service of sentence may be regarded as a continuing crime, when the
prisoner in his attempt to evade the service of the sentence imposed upon him by the courts and
thus defeat the purpose of the law, moves from one place to another.

The act of the escaped prisoner is a continuous or series of acts, set on foot by a single impulse
and operated by an unintermittent force, however long it may be. It may not be validly said that
after the convict shall have escaped from the place of his confinement the crime is fully
consummated, for, as long as he continues to evade the service of his sentence, he is deemed to
continue committing the crime, and may be arrested without warrant.
Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoners - Conniving with or consenting to evasion. — Any
public officer who shall consent to the escape of a prisoner in his custody or charge, shall be
punished:

1. By prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and temporary special
disqualification in its maximum period to perpetual special disqualification, if the fugitive shall
have been sentenced by final judgment to any penalty.

2. By prision correccional in its minimum period and temporary special disqualification,

in case the fugitive shall not have been finally convicted but only held as a detention prisoner for
any crime or violation of law or municipal ordinance.

24. U.S. vs. Bandino, G.R. No. L-9964, February 111, 1915
Facts:

On December 4, 1912, the municipal president of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, filed a written
complaint in the justice of the peace court of the said pueblo, charging Leon Bandino with the
crime of faithlessness in the custody of prisoners committed with reckless negligence. After
making the proper investigation, the justice of the peace transmitted the record of the
proceedings to the Court of First Instance. Thereafter the provincial fiscal, on July 30, 1913, filed
an information wherein he charged the said Leon Bandino with the aforementioned crime,
alleging that the accused, a municipal policeman having under his care and guard one Juan
Lescano, who was serving a sentence in the municipal jail of the said pueblo, did, with great
carelessness and unjustified negligence, grant him permission to go and buy some cigarettes near
the place where he was held in custody; that the prisoner, taking advantage of the confusion in
the crowd there, fled from the custody of the accused; with violation of article 358 in connection
with article 568 of the Penal Code.

Issue:

Whether or not the decision of the trial court to dismissed the case and release the accused is
valid.

Held:

NO. In the existence and commission of the crime of faithlessness in the custody of prisoners, it
is essential that there should have been, on the part of the custodian, connivance in the escape of
the prisoner. If the public officer charged with guarding the fugitive did not connive with him,
then he did not violate the law and is not guilty of the crime of faithlessness in the discharge of
his duty to guard the prisoner. It may perhaps be true that the accused had no knowledge that the
prisoner Lescano would escape, and that he did not permit him to do so, but it is unquestionable
that he did permit him to go out of the municipal jail, thus affording him an opportunity to get
away with ease. Therefore, the prisoner’s escape was effected through the tolerance of his
custodian, and is deemed also to have been by connivance with the latter.

According to the rules established by the courts, there is real and actual evasion of service of a
sentence when the custodian, failing intentionally or maliciously to perform the duties of his
office, and conniving with the prisoner, permits him to obtain a relaxation of his imprisonment
and to escape the punishment of being deprived of his liberty, thus making the penalty
ineffectual, although the convict may not have fled, and where the prisoner’s leaving the jail and
his evasion of service of the sentence were effected with the consent and tolerance of the
custodian, or rather in agreement and connivance with him.

Even though the accused committed the crime of faithlessness with carelessness, in violation of
regulations or with culpable negligence, the case should not be dismissed nor should the crime
go unpunished.

Crimes against Public Interest - Forging the Seal of the Government of the Philippine Islands,
the signature or stamp of the Chief Executive

1. Falsification of Document - The crime of falsification of document may be committed,

among other things, by counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric or
causing it to appear that persons have participated in an act or proceeding when they did not in
fact so participate.

The penalty for the crime of falsification is imprisonment of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000. The imprisonment that is
imposed for a period ranges from two years, four months and one day to six years.

A complaint for falsification of document may be filed against your older brother if your
sister is certain that the signature appearing in the deed of conveyance is not hers. On the other
hand, it is necessary to file a separate civil action in court in order for your sister to recover the
ownership of her property.

25. G.R. No. 12127 - October 13, 1917

UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELADIO CINCO and EUSEBIO REDOÑA,
Defendants-Appellants.

Facts:
It appears that Eusebio Redoña had been deputized to conduct a sale under an execution issuing
from the Court of First Instance of said province, which sale was advertised to take place at the
municipal building in Borongan, Samar, on the 10th day of October, 1914. On that day the
property was properly put up at auction, but according to the testimony of the witnesses for the
prosecution, no bid or offer for the same, or any part thereof, was made by any person during the
lawful hours of sale, and as a result the property remained unsold. On the other hand the
witnesses for the defense testify that the defendant Eladio Cinco made a bid and became the
purchaser of the property as sole bidder.

The theory of the prosecution is that no such sale took place and that by collusion between the
defendants a false return was made showing that Eladio Cinco had become the purchaser of the
property. The trial court so found, and we see no reason for disturbing this finding. At any rate
the defendant Redoña, as deputy sheriff, prepared a return of the execution showing that Cinco
had become purchaser at the execution sale, and that the purchase price (P160) had been paid by
him to Redoña.

Issue:

Whether or not the decision of the Court of First Instance to find the defendant guilty of the
falsification of a private document is valid.

Held:

YES. In order to sustain a conviction for the falsification of a private document it is necessary to
prove that the falsification was committed to the damage of another, or with the intent to cause
such damage. That this condition is fulfilled in the present case appears obvious for two reasons
In the first place the falsification was effected for the purpose of giving the appearance of legal
validity to the sale, whereby the debtors in the execution, being the owners of the land, were
wrongfully dispossessed; and in the second place the receipt itself purported to extinguish an
obligation which had not been in fact satisfied. It will be noted that the receipt to Redoña was not
a counterfeit of the receipt originally given to Cinco but was a new receipt to Redoña. Besides as
we have already seen, Eladio Cinco had paid only P50 to the judgment creditors when the first
receipt was taken by himself; and consequently the debt in any event had been only in part
extinguished.

Furthermore, the case for the prosecution is evidently not affected by the fact that the whole
transaction was probably fraudulent and that the sale could have been avoided in a proper
proceeding. The falsification of a receipt may clearly sustain a conviction notwithstanding the
fact that the principal debt may be voidable; for the receipt shows the absolute extinguishment of
the liability to the extent of the amount stated therein.
26. G.R. Nos. L-39047-39052             October 31, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VIRGILIO L.
VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.

Facts:

On December 7, 1931, there was sent from Honokaa, Hawaii, a postal money order for the sum
of P200 in favor of Irene Sanchez, resident of Santa Lucia, Ilocos Sur. On January 14, 1932,
there were likewise sent from Watsonville, California, five postal money orders, four of which
were for the sum of P200 each and one for the sum of P100, in favor of Feliciano Isidro
residence of the same municipality of Santa Lucia, Ilocos Sur. The postal money order in favor
of Irene Sanchez was sent her by her son Conde E. Aceta and the ones sent to Feliciano Isidro,
by his son Victor.

The defendant Virgilio Villanueva informed them that the money orders had not yet been
received, Irene Sanchez and Feliciano Isidro returned to the same office twice to make the same
inquiry but they were given the same information that the money orders had not been received.
In April of the same year, when Feliciano Isidro went there again, the defendant informed him
that he had already received the money orders and that he had appropriated the amount thereof.
Consequently, through the intervention of Pedro Callejo, principal of the Santa Lucia Primary
School, the defendant signed two documents wherein he admitted having received the money
orders, forged the signatures of Irene Sanchez and Feliciano Isidro thereon, collected and
appropriated the respective amounts thereof. Furthermore, we find that this admission by the
defendant was made voluntarily.

Issue:

Whether the defendant committed the crime of falsification of documents?

Held:

The defendant is guilty of six crimes of malversation in the sum of P200 in each and every one
of the cases and in the sum of P100 another case and of six crimes of falsification of public
documents in each and every one of the aforesaid cases.

Hence, the accused is sentenced in each and every one of the six aforesaid cases fro the crime of
falsification of public documents to eight years and one day of prision mayor and for
malversation of public funds to one year, eight months and twenty-one days of prision
correccional, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with the costs.

Use of Falsified Document - Introducing in a judicial proceeding-

 1. that the offender knew that the document was falsified by another person

2. that he false document was embraced in Art. 171 or in any subdivisions No.1 or 2 of
art. 172 3. that he introduced said document in evidence in any judicial proceeding

27.A. M. No. OCA-01-5 August 1, 2002

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, NCR, represented by Nelson L. Acebedo,
Dir. IV, Office of the Legal Affairs, complainant, vs. REYNALDO B. STA.
ANA, HRMO I, Leave Division, OCA, respondent.
Facts:

Respondent gained employment in the Office of the Court Administrator, Supreme Court in
1976. He started as a Laborer and was later promoted to the position of Human Resource
Management Officer I. Sometime in 1996, respondent applied for promotion as Human Resource
Management Officer III. In support of his application for promotion to the said position, he
submitted the following documents:

(1) a Certificate of Eligibility purportedly issued by the Civil Service Commission

certifying that respondent Sta. Ana passed the Career Service Professional examination on
February 18, 1996 with a rating of 83.8%; and

(2) a Personal Data Sheet (PDS) dated August 5, 1996 stating, under Item 18, that he
passed the Career Service Professional examination on February 18, 1996 with a rating of
83.8%.

Upon verification by Atty. Dante Huerta, Field Officer of the Civil Service Commission in the
Supreme Court, it was found that respondent Sta. Ana was not in the CSC-NCR Master List of
those who passed the MOWE Career Service Professional Examination given by the Civil
Service Commission on February 18, 1996 at Ramon Magsaysay High School. Atty. Huerta
recommended the filing of a formal charge against respondent.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent should be dismissed from service due to falsification of
documents.

Held:

YES. On numerous occasions, the Court did not hesitate to impose such extreme punishment on
employees found guilty of these offenses. There is no reason why respondent should be treated
differently. The Court takes note of the fact that initially, respondent did not controvert this
evidence against him. Neither did he admit the charge. In fact, deliberately or otherwise,
respondent did not participate in the proceedings before the CSC. He did not file any answer and
failed to appear in the scheduled hearings despite due notice. When he was found guilty of the
charge by the CSC-OLA and was recommended for dismissal, he filed a petition to transfer
jurisdiction to the Office of the Court Administrator and/or motion to dismiss the case. It was
only when his case was transferred to the OCA did he confess his guilt, more than three years
after he was first charged in the CSC.

While we recognize that respondent committed the acts complained of out of an extreme desire
to be promoted for the benefit of his family, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to what is clearly a
transgression of the law. Dishonesty and falsification are malevolent acts that have no place in
the judiciary. Because of his conduct, the Court seriously doubts respondent's ability to perform
his duties with the integrity, uprightness and honesty demanded of an employee in the judiciary.

28. Union Bank of the Philippines vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 192565,
February 28, 2012
Facts:

Desi Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Then, she was
charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC (perjury) “by falsely declaring under
oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not
commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or
agency”. The Certification was notarized in Makati City but was submitted and used in Pasay
City, while the Information against Union Bank and Tomas was filed in Makati.

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash. She argued that the venue was improperly laid since it is the
Pasay City Court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and
not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that
has jurisdiction over the perjury case.

The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case
since the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized in Makati City. The MeTC-Makati
City also ruled that the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury.

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul and set aside
the MeTC- Makati City orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners
anchored their petition on the rulings in United States v. Canet and Ilusorio v. Bildner which
ruled that venue and jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was presented.

Issue:
Whether or not the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should be – Makati
City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the
Certification was presented to the trial court.

Held:

The SC denied the petition and held that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the
proper court to take cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners.

The criminal charged was for the execution by Tomas of an affidavit that contained a falsity.
Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision; thus, jurisdiction and venue should be
determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who “makes an affidavit, upon any
material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the
law so requires.” The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit; thus, the
criminal act is consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn
before a duly authorized person.

Based on these considerations, SC held that its ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with Article
183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
To reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through
the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant
subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the
crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through false testimony under oath
in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under
oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is
neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the
place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the
oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases,
determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of
the crime committed.

Machination in Public auctions - Acts Punishable:

1. Soliciting any gift or promise as a consideration for refraining from taking part in the
public auction
2. Attempting to cause bidders to stay away from an auction by threats, gifts, promises or
any artifice

There should be an intention to reduce the price

30. Ouano vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 40203, August 21, 1990
Facts:

A parcel of land with an area of about 3,710 square meters, situated in Mandawe, Cebu, in the
name of the registered owner, Rehabilitation 'Finance Corporation (RFC), now the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Adjoining Lot 3-A-1 are lands belonging to Francisco Echavez,
private respondent herein, and petitioner Paterno J. Ouano.

The property was offered for sale by public bidding by the RFC. Now, it appears that prior to the
second bidding, Ouano and Echavez orally agreed that only Echavez would make a bid, and that
if it was accepted, they would divide the property in proportion to their adjoining properties.

As expected, the highest bid submitted, and thus accepted by the RFC, was that of Francisco
Echavez.

That they both orally agreed that only Echavez would make a bid at the second bidding called by
the RFC, and that if it was accepted, they would divide the property in proportion to their
adjoining properties; and that to ensure success of their scheme, they had also agreed to induce
the only other party known they did succeed in inducing Mrs. Bonsucan's group to withdraw
from the sale, paying said group P2,000

Issue

Whether or not the "action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence ... does prescribe."

Held:

NO. These acts constitute a crime, as the Trial Court has stressed. Ouano and Echavez had
promised to share in the property in question as a consideration for Ouano's refraining from
taking part in the public auction, and they had attempted to cause and in fact succeeded in
causing another bidder to stay away from the auction. In order to cause reduction of the price of
the property auctioned. In so doing, they committed the felony of machinations in public
auctions defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code.

That both Ouano and Echavez did these acts is a matter of record, as is the fact that thereby only
one bid that of Echavez was entered for the 'land in consequence of which Echavez eventually
acquired it. The agreement therefore being criminal in character, the parties not only have no
action against each other but are both liable to prosecution and the things and price of their
agreement subject to disposal according to the provisions of the criminal code. This, in
accordance with the so-called pari delicto principle set out in the Civil Code.

Article 1409 of said Code declares as "inexistent and void from the beginning" those contracts,
among others, "whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy," or "expressly prohibited ... by law." Such contracts "cannot be ratified
"the right to set up the defense of illegality (cannot) be waived;" and, Article 1410 adds, the
"action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence ... (thereof) does not prescribe."
Furthermore, according to Article 1411 of

the same Code

When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the act
constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no action against
each other, and both shall be prosecuted.

Monopolies and combination - Acts Punishable:

1. Combination or conspiracy to prevent free competition in market

2. Monopoly to restrain free competition in market
3. Making transactions prejudicial to lawful commerce or to increase the market price of
merchandise

31. G.R. No. 124360 November 5, 1997

FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents.

Facts:

In December 9, 1992, the Department of Energy was created (through the enactment of R.A. No.
7638) to control energy-related government activities. In March 1996, R.A. No. 8180
(Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996) was enacted in pursuance to the
deregulation of the power and energy thrust under R.A. 7638. Under the R.A. No. 8180, any
person or entity was allowed to import and market crude oil and petroleum products, and to lease
or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities.

Petitioner Francisco Tatad questions the constitutionality of Section 5 of R.A. No. 8180 since the
imposition of tarrif violates the equal protection clause and bars the entry of others in the oil
industry business. Also, the inclusion of tarrif violates Section 26 (1) of Article VI of the
constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title.

In a separate petition (G.R. 127867), petitioners Edcel Lagman, Joker Arroyo, Enrique Garcia,
Wigberto Tanada, Flag Human Rights Foundation, Inc., Freedom from Debt Coalition and
Sanlakas argued that R.A. No. 8180, specifically Section 15 is unconstitutional because it: (1)
gives undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Secretary of Energy by not
providing a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining
when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry; (2) Executive Order No.
392, an order declaring the implementation of the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry, is arbitrary and unreasonable because it was enacted due to the alleged depletion of the
Oil Price Stabilization Plan- a condition not found in R.A. No. 8180; and (3) Section 15 of R.A.
No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392 allow the formation of a de facto cartel among Petron, Caltex and
Shell in violation of constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of
trade and unfair competition.

Respondents, on the other hand, declares the petitions not justiciable (cannot be settled by the
court) and that the petitioners have no locus standi since they did not sustain direct injury as a
result of the implementation of R.A. No. 8180.

Issues:

1. Whether or not R.A. no. 8180 is unconstitutional.

2. Whether or not E. O. no. 392 is arbitrary and unreasonable.

3. Whether or not Section 5 of R.A. no. 8180 violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution. 4. Whether or not Section 15 of R.A. no. 8180 constitutes undue delegation of
legislative power.

Held:

1. NO. R.A. No. 8180 is unconstitutional. It violated Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution
prohibiting monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition. The
deregulation act only benefits Petron, Shell and Caltex, the three major league players in the oil
industry.

2. YES. Executive Order No. 392 was arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore considered void.
The depletion of OFSP is not one of the factors enumerated in R.A. No. 8180 to be considered in
declaring full deregulation of the oil industry. Therefore, the executive department, in its
declaration of E.O. No. 392, failed to follow faithfully the standards set in R.A. No. 8180,
making it void.

3. NO. Section 5 of R.A. No. 8180 does not violate Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions
as long as they are not inconsistent with the foreign subject. Section 5 providing for tariff
differential is germane to the subject of the deregulation of the downstream industry which is
R.A. No 8180, therefore it does not violate the one title-one subject rule 4. No, Section 15 did
not violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of legislative power. The tests to
determine the validity of delegation of legislative power are the completeness test and the
sufficiency test. The completeness test demands that the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions such that when it reaches the delegate, all it must do is enforce it. The sufficiency
test demand an adequate guideline or limitation in the law to delineate the delegate’s authority.
Section 15 provides for the time to start the full deregulation, which answers the completeness
test. It also laid down standard guide for the judgement of the President- he is to time it as far as
practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are
declining and when the exchange rate of peso to dollar is stable- which answers the sufficiency
test.

WHEREFORE, the petitions were granted. R.A. No. 8180 was declared unconstitutional and
E.O. No. 372 void.