56.) G.R. No.

L-20914      December 24, 1965

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR, ENGRACIO GULIGADO, JR. MRS.
DINTOY TAN SUAREZ, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant

FACTS:

The minor Engracio Guligado, Jr. is the son of Capt. Engracio Guligado and Guneng T. Guligado. The latter is a
younger sister of petitioner herein. Engracio Guligado is, in turn, half-brother of petitioner's husband, Col.
Alejandro Suarez, Ret., who has several children by a previous marriage and has expressly consented to the
adoption of said child by his wife. Shortly after the birth of Engracio Guligado, Jr. in Jolo, Sulu, on May 28,
1951, his parents left him in the custody of petitioner herein, a resident of said island. Since then, the child had
lived continuously with petitioner, whom he regards as his mother, who, in turn, has treated him as such, and
supported him, as well as sent him to school. Meanwhile, his natural parents had left Jolo and are now residing
in San Juan del Monte, Rizal. Petitioner testified that she had written to them about her intention to apply for the
adoption of the minor and that they had given their consent thereto. In fact, petitioner has attached to the
petition a statement, subscribed and sworn to before a notary public, on February 4, 1958, by Captain Engracio
Guligado and his wife Guneng T. Guligado, confirming the foregoing facts, and expressing their conformity to
the adoption of Engracio Guligado, Jr. by petitioner herein, not only for the reasons already adverted to, but,
also, because the affiants now have several other children, whereas petitioner has none. However, no
testimonial evidence, identifying the signatures on said statement, was introduced by petitioner herein and,
hence, the assistant provincial fiscal who appeared at the hearing of this case in the lower court, objected to the
admission of said statement, when petitioner offered it as part of her evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Frist Instance of Sulu correctly granting the petition of Mrs. Dintoy Tan Suarez, for
the adoption of the minor Engracio Guligado, Jr., and declaring that the latter shall hereafter be known as
Engracio Tan Suarez.

RULING:

Yes. The lower court did not err in overruling said objection, admitting said statement in evidence, and
considering, as a proven fact, that the natural parents of the minor being adopted had given their written consent
to the adoption. Apart from the fact that said statement was duly authenticated by a Notary Public, the other
evidence on record strongly indicate that it is what it purports to be. The Court agreed that the minor cannot
bear petitioner's surname as a married woman, for her husband has not joined in this petition for adoption and
cannot join it, because he has children by a previous marriage. Since the adoption gives the person adopted the
same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter (Art. 341, par. 1, Civil Code), much
confusion would indeed result, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, if the minor child herein were
allowed to use the surname of the spouse who did not join in the adoption.
57.) DE BORJA VS. ONGSINCO, 24322-R, October 1, 1962

FACTS:

It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco, on 6 October 1940, filed a
petition for the probate of her will of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I.  The will was probated on 2
April 1941.  In 1946, Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and administrator. in 1952, their son, Jose de
Borja, was appointed co-administrator.  When Francisco died, on 14 April 1954, Jose became the sole
administrator of the testate estate of his mother, Josefa Tangco.  While a widower Francisco de Borja allegedly
took unto himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco.  Upon Francisco's death, Tasiana instituted testate
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where she was appointed special administratrix.  The
validity of Tasiana's marriage to Francisco was questioned in said proceeding.

The testate estate of Josefa Tangco alone has been unsettled for more than a quarter of a century.  In order to put
an end to all these litigations, a compromise agreement was entered into on 12 October 1963 by and between
the heir and son of Francisco de Borja namely, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate
Estate of Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage,
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton, Jr."

The Rizal court approved the compromise agreement, but the Nueva Ecija court declared it void and
unenforceable.  Special administratrix Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja appealed the Rizal Court's order of
approval (now Supreme Court G. R. case No. L-28040), while administrator Jose de Borja appealed the order of
disapproval (G. R. case No. L-28568) by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.

In claiming the validity of the compromise agreement, Jose de Borja stresses that at the time it was entered into
the governing provision was Section 1, Rule 74 of the original Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or not.

Issues:

Whether or not the heirs cannot enter into such compromise agreement without first probating the will of
Francisco de Borja;

Ruling:

There was no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto before the
probate of his will.  The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any
and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in the estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa
Tangco.  There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee. 

It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana
Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under articles 995 of the present Civil Code.

Since the compromise contract was entered into by and between "Jose de Borja personally and as administrator
of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco" on the one hand, and on the other, "the heir and surviving spouse of
Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", it is clear that the transaction
was binding on both in their individual capacities, upon the perfection of the contract, even without previous
authority of the Court to enter into the same.  The only difference between an extrajudicial compromise and one
that is submitted and approved by the Court, is that the latter can be enforced by execution proceedings. Art.
2037 of the Civil Code is explicit on the point:

Art. 2037.  A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no
execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.

The Court of First Instance of Rizal had no jurisdiction to approve the compromise with Jose de Borja because
Tasiana Ongsingco was not an heir in the estate of Josefa Tangco pending settlement in the Rizal Court, but she
was an heir of Francisco de Borja, whose estate was the object of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. 
Since what was sold by Tasiana Ongsingco was only her eventual share in the estate of her late husband, not the
estate itself; and as already shown, that eventual share she owned from the time of Francisco's death and the
Court of Nueva Ecija could not bar her selling it.  As owner of her undivided hereditary share, Tasiana could
dispose of it in favor of whomsoever she chose.
58.) G.R. No. 137359             September 13, 2004

EDWIN N. TRIBIANA, petitioner,

vs.
LOURDES M. TRIBIANA, respondent

FACTS:

Edwin and Lourdes are husband and wife who have lived together since 1996 but formalized their union only
on 28 October 1997. On 30 April 1998, Lourdes filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC claiming that
Edwin left their conjugal home with their daughter, Khriza Mae Tribiana ("Khriza"). Edwin has since deprived
Lourdes of lawful custody of Khriza who was then only one (1) year and four (4) months of age. Later, it turned
out that Khriza was being held by Edwin’s mother, Rosalina Tribiana ("Rosalina"). Edwin moved to dismiss
Lourdes’ petition on the ground that the petition failed to allege that earnest efforts at a compromise were made
before its filing as required by Article 151 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial and appellate courts should have dismissed the petition for habeas corpus on the ground of
failure to comply with the condition precedent under article 151 of the family code.

RULING:

No. It is true that the petition for habeas corpus filed by Lourdes failed to allege that she resorted to
compromise proceedings before filing the petition. However, in her opposition to Edwin’s motion to dismiss,
Lourdes attached a Barangay Certification to File Action dated 1 May 1998. Edwin does not dispute the
authenticity of the Barangay Certification and its contents. This effectively established that the parties tried to
compromise but were unsuccessful in their efforts. However, Edwin would have the petition dismissed despite
the existence of the Barangay Certification, which he does not even dispute. Evidently, Lourdes has complied
with the condition precedent under Article 151 of the Family Code. A dismissal under Section 1(j) of Rule 16 is
warranted only if there is a failure to comply with a condition precedent. Given that the alleged defect is a mere
failure to allege compliance with a condition precedent, the proper solution is not an outright dismissal of the
action, but an amendment under Section 1 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. in a habeas corpus
proceeding involving the welfare and custody of a child of tender age, the paramount concern is to resolve
immediately the issue of who has legal custody of the child. Technicalities should not stand in the way of giving
such child of tender age full protection. This rule has sound statutory basis in Article 213 of the Family Code,
which states, "No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise." In this case, the child (Khriza) was only one year and four months
when taken away from the mother.
59.) UDK No. 14817               January 13, 2014

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR SHANG KO VINGSON
YU SHIRLY VINGSON@ SHIRLY VINGSON DEMAISIP, Petitioner,
vs.
JOVY CABCABAN, Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner Shirly Vingson (Shirly) alleged that Shang Ko Vingson Yu (Shang Ko), her 14-year-old daughter, ran
away from home on September 23, 2011. On November 2, 2011 Shirly went to the police station in Bacolod
City upon receipt of information that Shang Ko was in the custody of respondent Jovy Cabcaban Cabcaban), a
police officer in that station. Since Cabcaban refused to release Shang Ko to her, Shirly sought the help of the
National Bureau of Investigation NBI) to rescue her child. An NBI agent, Arnel Pura Pura), informed Shirly
that Shang Ko was no longer with Cabcaban but was staying with a private organization called Calvary Kids.
Pura told her, however, that the child was fine and had been attending school. This prompted petitioner Shirly to
file a petition for habeas corpus against respondent Cabcaban and the unnamed officers of Calvary Kids before
the Court of Appeals (CA) rather than the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City citing as reason several threats
against her life in that city. Respondent Cabcaban further claimed that on the next day, a social worker sat with
the minor who said that her mother Shirly had been abusive in treating her. Respondent Cabcaban also claimed
that Shang Ko pleaded with the police and the social worker not to return her to her mother. As a result, the
Bacolod City Police filed a complaint against petitioner Shirly for violation of Republic Act 7610 or the Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Shirly, the mother of Shang Ko, entitled to the custody of the latter.

RULING:

No. The general rule is that parents should have custody over their minor children. But the State has the right to
intervene where the parents, rather than care for such children, treat them cruelly and abusively, impairing their
growth and well-being and leaving them emotional scars that they carry throughout their lives unless they are
liberated from such parents and properly counseled. Considering the presumption that the police authorities
acted regularly in placing Shang Ko in the custody of Calvary Kids, the Court believes that she should remain
there pending hearing and adjudication of this custody case. Besides, Shang, herself has expressed preference to
stay in that place.

60.) G.R. No. 169482             January 29, 2008

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF HABEAS CORPUS OF EUFEMIA E. RODRIGUEZ, filed

by EDGARDO E. VELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
LUISA R. VILLANUEVA and TERESITA R. PABELLO, respondents

FACTS:

Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow, allegedly suffering from a poor state of mental health and
deteriorating cognitive abilities. She was living with petitioner, her nephew, since 2000. He acted as her
guardian.

respondents Luisa R. Villanueva and Teresita R. Pabello took Eufemia from petitioner Veluz’ house. He made
repeated demands for the return of Eufemia but these proved futile. Claiming that respondents were restraining
Eufemia of her liberty, he filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals on January 13, 2005. The
Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to present any convincing proof that respondents were unlawfully
restraining their mother of her liberty. He also failed to establish his legal right to the custody of Eufemia as he
was not her legal guardian. respondents state that they are the legally adopted daughters of Eufemia and her
deceased spouse, Maximo Rodriguez. Prior to their adoption, respondent Luisa was Eufemia’s half-sister while
respondent Teresita was Eufemia’s niece and petitioner’s sister.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Eufemia is being restrained of her liberty..

RULING:

No. There is no proof that Eufemia is being detained and restrained of her liberty by respondents. Nothing on
record reveals that she was forcibly taken by respondents. Respondents, being Eufemia’s adopted children, are
taking care of her. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of a person is being withheld from the one
entitled thereto. It is issued when one is either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully being prevented from
exercising legal custody over another person. Thus, it contemplates two instances: (1) deprivation of a person’s
liberty either through illegal confinement or through detention and (2) withholding of the custody of any person
from someone entitled to such custody. in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of
liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.

61.) G.R. No. 197597, April 08, 2015

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO,
DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, QUEZON CITY JAIL ANNEX, BJMP
BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG DIWA, TAGUIG CITY AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON
HIS BEHALF AND/OR HAVING CUSTODY OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Respondents.

FACTS:

On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao suspected
him to be Butukan S. Malang. Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for
allegedly participating in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. He had a pending warrant of arrest
issued by the trial court in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. He explained to the
police station that he could not have participated in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre because he
was in Saudi Arabia at that time. Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off page
two of his passport that evidenced his departure for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009. They then detained
Salibo at the Datu Hofer Police Station for about three (3) days. The police officers transferred Salibo to the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Cotabato City, where he was detained for another 10 days. On
August 20, 2010, Salibo was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City, where he is currently detained.

ISSUE:

First Issue:

Whether or not the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City on petitioner Salibo's Petition
for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals;

Second Issue:

Whether petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus for his immediate released.

RULING:

As to first issue:

Yes. Respondent Warden correctly appealed before the Court of Appeals.

An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before this court or any of its
members, the Court of Appeals or any of its members in instances authorized by law, or the Regional Trial
Court or any of its presiding judges. The court or judge grants the writ and requires the officer or person having
custody of the person allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ.

As to second issue:

Yes. The Court ruled that petitioner Salibo is illegally deprived of his liberty. His Petition for Habeas Corpus
must be granted. There is evidence that petitioner Salibo was not in the country on November 23, 2009 when
the Maguindanao Massacre occurred. A Certification from the Bureau of Immigration states that petitioner
Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009 and arrived in the Philippines only on December 20,
2009.