Partosa-Jo vs.

CA Case Digest
216 SCRA 692

Facts:
Jose Jo, respondent, cohabited with three women and fathered fifteen children. The first woman, petitioner Prima
Partosa-Jo claims to be his legal wife by whom he begot a daughter.

Petitioner filed a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of conjugal property and an action for support. The
complaint for support was granted by the lower court but the judicial separation of conjugal property was never
entertained. Jo elevated the decision for support to the CA but retain its affirmation on trial court’s ruling. When their
motions for reconsideration were denied, both parties appeal to SC for the complaint of judicial separation of conjugal
property.

The SC, through the definite findings of the trial court, holds that the petitioner and respondent were legally married
and that the properties mentioned by the petitioner were acquired by Jo during their marriage although they were
registered in the name of an apparent dummy.

Issue:
Whether or not the judicial separation of conjugal property be granted to the petitioner on the ground of abandonment.

Ruling:
SC granted the petition. The record shows that respondent had already rejected the petitioner. The fact that she was not
accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. The
respondent also refuses to give financial support to the petitioner.

The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the respondent to give support to the petitioner,
sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property.

PRIMA PARTOSA-JO
vs
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HO HANG (with aliases JOSE JO and CONSING)
G.R. No. 82606 December 18, 1992

FACTS:
Prima Partosa-Jo, the petitioner was the legal wife of Jose Jo, the private respondent. Prima had an agreement
with Jose, for her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy, and for Jose to visit and
support her.

Then, in 1942, when Prima returned to their conjugal dwelling, Jose refused to accept her and denied her
admission to their conjugal hope. Likewise, prior to that, Jose refused to give financial support to Prima.

In 1980, Prima filed a complaint against her husband for judicial separation of their conjugal property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial separation of conjugal
property.

HELD:
Yes. For abandonment to exist there must be an absolute cessation of their marital, parental, and property relations.
The fact that Jose did not accept Prima in their conjugal home demonstrated that he had no intention of resuming their
conjugal relationship. From 1968 until 1988, Jose refused to provide financial support to Prima. Hence, the physical
separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner,
constitutes abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property.

Note:
*This case digest is related to article 101 of the Family Code.
BA Finance Corporation vs. CA
161 SCRA 608

Facts:
Augusto Yulo, respondent, secured a loan from the petitioner, BA Finance Corp., as evidenced by his signature on a
promissory note in behalf of the A & L Industries. About two months prior to the loan, however, Augusto Yulo had
already left Lily Yulo and their children and had abandoned their conjugal home. When the obligation became due and
demandable, Augusto Yulo failed to pay the same.

Petitioner filed its amended complaint against the spouses on the basis of the promissory note. They also prayed for the
issuance of a writ of attachment that the said spouses were guilty of fraud in contracting the debt. The trial court issued
the writ of attachment thereby enabling the petitioner to attach the properties of A & L Industries. Private respondent
Lily Yulo filed her answer with counterclaim, alleging that Augusto had already abandoned her and their children five
months before the filing of the complaint and that they were already separated when the promissory note was
executed. She also alleged that her signature was forged in the special power of attorney procured by Augusto.

Petitioner contends that even if the signature was forged or even if the attached properties were her exclusive property,
the same can be made answerable to the obligation because the said properties form part of the conjugal partnership of
the spouses Yulo.

Issue:
Whether or not the exclusive property of private respondent forms part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses and
be made answerable to the obligation.

Ruling:
SC ordered the release of the attachment of the said property. Though it is presumed that the single proprietorship
established during the marriage is conjugal and even if it is registered in the name of only one of the spouses. However,
for the said property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit of
the conjugal partnership.
In the case at bar, the obligation which the petitioner is seeking to enforce against the conjugal property managed by
the private respondent was undoubtedly contracted by Augusto Yulo for his own benefit because at the time he
incurred the obligation he had already abandoned his family and had left their conjugal home.