LABOR LAW 1 REVIEWER

ATTORNEY KRISTY M. BALINO

SECTION 16
A.Y.2020-2021

I. HISTORY, BASIC PRINCIPLES AND GENERAL CONCEPTS

Topics:

A. Constitutional Provisions/Basis
Art. II, Sec. 10 and 18, Art. III, Sec. 8, Art. XIII, Sec. 3, Art. XIII, Sec. 14

Art II. Sec 10. : The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development

Art II, Sec. 18. : The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare

Art III, Sec 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors,
to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

Art XIII. Sec. 3. : The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.
They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They
shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as
may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and
the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall
enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of
labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns
to investments, and to expansion and growth.

Art XIII. Sec 14. WOMEN. The State shall protect working women by providing safe and
healthful working conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and
opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the
service of the nation.

B. Civil Code CONTRACT OF LABOR

Arts. 1700 to 1710
Article 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so
impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good. Therefore, such
contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts,
closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.

Article 1701. Neither capital nor labor shall act oppressively against the other, or impair the
interest or convenience of the public.

Article 1702. In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in
favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.

Article 1703. No contract which practically amounts to involuntary servitude, under any guise
whatsoever, shall be valid.

Article 1704. In collective bargaining, the labor union or members of the board or committee
signing the contract shall be liable for non-fulfillment thereof.

Article 1705. The laborer's wages shall be paid in legal currency.

Article 1706. Withholding of the wages, except for a debt due, shall not be made by the employer.

Article 1707. The laborer's wages shall be a lien on the goods manufactured or the work done.

Article 1708. The laborer's wages shall not be subject to execution or attachment, except for debts
incurred for food, shelter, clothing and medical attendance.

Article 1709. The employer shall neither seize nor retain any tool or other articles belonging to
the laborer.

Article 1710. Dismissal of laborers shall be subject to the supervision of the Government, under
special laws.

C. International Conventions
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS:
ART 3. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person.
ART7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the
law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and
against any incitement to such discrimination.
ART17. 1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.
Article 22
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through
national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each
State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of
his personality.
Article 23
1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work
and to protection against unemployment.
2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his
family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social
protection.
4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
Article 24
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic
holidays with pay.
Article 25
1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself
and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services,
and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or
other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born
in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
Article 6
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to work, which includes the right
of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts, and
will take appropriate steps to safeguard this right.
2. The steps to be taken by a State Party to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of
this right shall include technical and vocational guidance and training programmes, policies and
techniques to achieve steady economic, social and cultural development and full and productive
employment under conditions safeguarding fundamental political and economic freedoms to the
individual.
Article 7
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and
favourable conditions of work which ensure, in particular:
(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular
women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal
work;
(ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in accordance with the provisions of the present
Covenant;
(b) Safe and healthy working conditions; (c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his
employment to an appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations other than those of seniority and
competence;
(d ) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay, as well as
remuneration for public holidays
Article 8
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure:
(a) The right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of his choice, subject only
to the rules of the organization concerned, for the promotion and protection of his economic and
social interests. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those
prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others;
(b) The right of trade unions to establish national federations or confederations and the right of the
latter to form or join international trade-union organizations;
(c) The right of trade unions to function freely subject to no limitations other than those prescribed
by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public
order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others;
(d) The right to strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular
country.

2. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by
members of the armed forces or of the police or of the administration of the State. 3. Nothing in this article
shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize to take legislative measures which would
prejudice, or apply the law in such a manner as would prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that
Convention.
Article 9
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security, including
social insurance.
Article 10
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that:
1. The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the
natural and fundamental group unit of society, particularly for its establishment and while it is
responsible for the care and education of dependent children. Marriage must be entered into with
the free consent of the intending spouses.
2. Special protection should be accorded to mothers during a reasonable period before and after
childbirth. During such period working mothers should be accorded paid leave or leave with
adequate social security benefits.
3. Special measures of protection and assistance should be taken on behalf of all children and young
persons without any discrimination for reasons of parentage or other conditions. Children and
young persons should be protected from economic and social exploitation. Their employment in
 work harmful to their morals or health or dangerous to life or likely to hamper their normal
development should be punishable by law. States should also set age limits below which the paid
employment of child labour should be prohibited and punishable by law.
Article 11
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of
living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous
improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of
this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international cooperation based on free
consent.
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental right of everyone to be free from
hunger, shall take, individually and through international co-operation, the measures, including specific
programmes, which are needed:
(a) To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by making full use of
technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and
by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most efficient
development and utilization of natural resources;
(b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and food-exporting countries, to
ensure an equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to need.
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
Article 8
1. No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave-trade in all their forms shall be prohibited.
2. No one shall be held in servitude.
3.
(a) No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour;
(b) Paragraph 3 (a) shall not be held to preclude, in countries where imprisonment with hard labour may be
imposed as a punishment for a crime, the performance of hard labour in pursuance of a sentence to such
punishment by a competent court;
(c) For the purpose of this paragraph the term "forced or compulsory labour" shall not include:
(i) Any work or service, not referred to in subparagraph (b), normally required of a person who is under
detention in consequence of a lawful order of a court, or of a person during conditional release from such
detention;
(ii) Any service of a military character and, in countries where conscientious objection is recognized, any
national service required by law of conscientious objectors;
(iii) Any service exacted in cases of emergency or calamity threatening the life or well-being of the
community;
(iv) Any work or service which forms part of normal civil obligations.
D. Definitions: Labor Law & its sources, Labor Standards, Labor Relations, Social
Legislation

Labor Law
Includes all the rules of law governing the conditions under which persons may work under the
control of the other persons called employer.
As a concept, it is the body of rules and principles which governs the relations between labor and
management in the collective.

SOURCES OF LABOR LAW

(1) Primary
(a) The Philippine Constitution
(b) Legislations passed by Congress
(c) Decisions of the Supreme Court
(d) Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRRs) of the Department of Labor and Employment
(e) decisions of quasi-judicial bodies such as National Labor Relations Commission; and
(f) ILO (International Law Organization) conventions
(2) Auxiliary
(a) Opinions of the Secretaries of Labor and Employment, and Justice;
(b) Reports, debates, hearings made and conducted by Congress;
(c) Labor Law Reviews;
(d) Labor Law and Social Legislation Textbooks
(e) Opinions of Legal Luminaries; and
(f) Foreign Laws and Decisions

Labor Bases of Labor and Social legislation

(1) Police Power of the State
(2) Social Justice Clause;
(3) Protection to Labor Clause;
(4) Doctrine of Incorporation Clause;
(5) Social Service Clause
(6) Full Employment Clause
(7) Freedom from Poverty Clause
(8) Freedom of Association Clause
(9) Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses

LABOR STANDARDS
prescribes the terms and conditions of employment as affecting the wages or monetary benefits,
hours of work, cost of living allowances, and occupational health, safety and welfare of the workers.

LABOR RELATIONS
used to denote all matters arising out of employer-employee relationship involving the concerted
action on the part of the workers which is usually related with right to self organization, collective
bargaining and negotiation processes.
 All - embracing to include labor standard benefits which are proper bargaining issues, that is within
the domain of labor relations.

SOCIAL LEGISLATION
It is a law governing employer- employee relationship while the latter is not “at work” due to
hazards beyond his control arising from employment and which immobilize him from working.

Labor Legislation
1. intended to protect the worker for the mighty and correct the injustices that are inherent in an
employer-employee relationship

2. provides set of restrictions upon the worker in his relationship with the employer and vice versa
in order to maintain industrial peace and harmony

3. purpose: to promote the welfare of the people based on the Latin maxim, salus populi est suprema
lex (the welfare of the people is the first law).
Police Power
1. includes everything essential to the public safety, health, and morals to justify the destruction or
abatement by summary proceeding of whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance

2. conditions:
a. (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require such interference;
b. (2) the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
widely oppressive upon individuals.

Taxonomy of labor laws

Classification of labor laws:
a. Protective Legislations. protect the weaker party in an employment contract
b. Welfare or social legislation. Those intended to remove or reduce insecurity of the workers such
as law on social security, employees compensation or laws that provide benefits to a worker while
he is “ not at work” because o the hazards of employment
c. Diplomatic Legislations. Designed to settle labor disputes through peaceful modes such as laws
providing for conciliation, mediation, grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration
d. Administrative Legislation. Laws creating labor bodies or agencies for administrative purposes
such as DOLE, POEA, NLRC or TESDA.
e. Labor relations legislations. Those passed concerning employee organization, concerted activities
or collective bargaining or negotiation activities.
i. includes unfair labor practices committed by the employer of the union.
f. Labor standards legislations. those passed prescribing minimum requirements relating to wages ,
hours of work, cost of living allowances, and other monetary and welfare benefits including
occupational, safety and health standards.
E. History & Structure of the Labor Code and the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code

The Labor Code is the brainchild of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and was promulgated
and implemented during the incumbency of Minister Blas F. Ople, the longest serving Minister of
Labor during the Martial Law years. He was considered as the Father of Labor Code of the
Philippines. To honor his contributions to Labor Laws, the POEA Office Building is now named
after him.

The Labor Code was promulgated on May 1, 1974 and took effect on November 1, 1974 or six (6)
months after its promulgation following the provision of Article 2.

F. DOLE Jurisdiction on Labor Standards

General Rule: DOLE has jurisdiction to inspect all establishments, workplaces and undertakings.

Exception: Chartered cities may be allowed to assume responsibility for technical safety
inspection upon compliance with such standards and guidelines as the Secretary of Labor may
promulgate.
“Technical safety inspection includes inspection for purposes of safety determination of boilers,
pressure, wheels, internal combustion engines, elevators (passenger and freight), dumbwaiters,
escalators, and electrical installations in all workplaces.”

Labor Arbiters have jurisdiction over the following cases

1. Unfair labor practice (ULP) cases;

2. Termination disputes (or illegal dismissal cases);
3. Cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms
and conditions of employment, if accompanied with claim for reinstatement;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the
employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions
involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and
6. Except claims for Employees’ Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity
benefits, all other claims arising from employer-employee relations, including those of
persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.

Money claims falling within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters may
be classified as follows:
 1. any money claim, regardless of amount, accompanied with a claim for reinstatement
(which involves a termination case); or c
2. any money claim, regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement,
exceeding the amount of P5,000.00 per claimant (which does not necessarily involve
termination of employment).

Note: The jurisdiction conferred upon Labor Arbiters and the NLRC would not be lost simply
because the assets of a former employer had been placed under receivership or liquidation.

Do Labor Arbiters have jurisdiction over wage distortion cases?

Labor Arbiters have jurisdiction over wage distortion cases only in unorganized establishments.
In organized establishments, jurisdiction is vested with Voluntary Arbitrators.

Labor Arbiters have jurisdiction over all monetary claims of Overseas Filipino Workers arising
from employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
workers for overseas deployment, including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms
of damages.
(NOTE: The POEA continues to have jurisdiction over recruitment or pre-employment cases
which are administrative in nature, involving or arising out of recruitment laws, rules and
regulations, including money claims arising therefrom or violation of the conditions for
issuance of license to recruit workers).

Concurrent Jurisdiction to Suspend or Cancel a License

● The SC has affirmed the concurrent jurisdiction of the DOLE Secretary and the
POEA Administrator to suspenf or cancel a license.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cases:
1. Maternity Children's Hospital vs. Sec. of Labor, 174, GR 79809, June 30, 1989.
Medialdea, J.

FACTS:

The petitioner Maternity Children’s Hospital, is a semi-government hospital that is being managed
by Antera Dorado as a holdover President and is also the is the Board of Directors of the CDO
Women’s Club and Puericulture center where the hospital gets its finances and from its paying
patients 130 per month. It is also partly subsidized by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO) and the CDO City government. Out of its 41 employees, 10 of them who are employed in
different positions filed a complaint with the Office of the Regional Director of Labor and
Employment on the ground of underpayment of their salaries and emergency cost of living
allowances (ECOLAS). Upon investigation, the Labor Standard and Welfare Officers found out
that there was indeed underpayment of wages and ECOLAS of all the employees by the petitioner
hospital. The Regional Director then issued an ORDER for the petitioner to pay all of its employees
with the total amount of P723,888.58. The Minister of LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT modified
the RD’s decision saying that the deficiency should only be computed from May 23,1983 - May
23-1986. Unsatisfied, the petitioner filed a motion to the Secretary of Labor but was denied.

ISSUE/S: WON the Regional Director had jurisdiction over the case and if so, the extent of
coverage of any award that should be forthcoming, arising from his visitorial and enforcement
powers under Article 128 of the Labor Code.

RULING: YES. According to the Supreme Court, this is a labor case standards case, and is
governed by Art. 128-b of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. No. 111. Labor standards refer to
the minimum requirements prescribed by existing laws, rules, and regulations relating to wages,
hours of work, cost of living allowance and other monetary and welfare benefits, including
occupational, safety, and health standards (Section 7, Rule I, Rules on the Disposition of Labor
Standards Cases in the Regional Office, dated September 16, 1987). Under the present rules, a
Regional Director exercises both visitorial and enforcement power over labor standards cases, and
is therefore empowered to adjudicate money claims, provided there still exists an employer-
employee relationship, and the findings of the regional office is not contested by the employer
concerned. Social justice legislation, to be truly meaningful and rewarding to our workers, must
not be hampered in its application by long-winded arbitration and litigation. Rights must be
asserted and benefits received with the least inconvenience. Labor laws are meant to promote, not
defeat, social justice.

The Regional Director correctly applied the award with respect to those employees who signed
the complaint, as well as those who did not sign the complaint, but were still connected with the
hospital at the time the complaint was filed. The justification for the award to this group of
employees who were not signatories to the complaint is that the visitorial and enforcement powers
given to the Secretary of Labor is relevant to, and exercisable over establishments, not over the
individual members/employees, because what is sought to be achieved by its exercise is the
observance of, and/or compliance by, such firm/establishment with the labor standards regulations.
It would be highly derogatory to the rights of the workers, if after categorically finding the
respondent hospital guilty of underpayment of wages and ECOLAs, we limit the award to only
those who signed the complaint to the exclusion of the majority of the workers who are similarly
situated. Indeed, this would not only render the enforcement power of the Minister of Labor and
Employment nugatory, but would be the pinnacle of injustice considering that it would not only
discriminate but also deprive them of legislated benefits. However, there is no legal justification
for the award in favor of those employees who were no longer connected with the hospital at the
time the complaint was filed. Article 129 of the Labor Code, cited by petitioner (p. 54, Rollo) is
not applicable as said article is in aid of the enforcement power of the Regional Director; hence,
not applicable where the employee seeking to be paid underpayment of wages is already separated
from the service. His claim is purely a money claim that has to be the subject of arbitration
proceedings and therefore within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.

NOTES:

· Prior to EO 111 in 1986: RD’s authority over money claims was unclear and this
complaint was filed before its promulgation. The prevailing view then was stated in the case
of Ong v. Henry Parel wherein in the RD’s exercise of his visitorial and enforcement powers
under Art. 128 of the LABOR CODE, he has no authority to award money claims as it falls in
the jurisdiction of the LABOR ARBITER.

· EO 111 even if absent, PD NO 850 that was issued in 1975 states that RDs already have
enforcement powers over money claims and transferred LABOR STANDARD CASES FROM
THE ARBITRATION SYSTEM TO THE ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM

· Prior to the promulgation of PD No. 850: ARTICLE 216 of the LABOR CODE, Labor
standard cases were an exclusive function of labor arbiters but undergone series of amendments
and other provisions of the labor code wherein it changed the jurisdiction of

PETITION IS DISMISSED.

2. PASEI vs. Drilon, GR 81958, June 30, 2018

Sarmiento,J.

FACTS:Petitioner Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) is a firm engaged

principally in the recruitment of workers, male and female, for overseas placement. The
respondent, on the other hand is the then Secretary of Labor and Employment Franklin Drilon and
Tomas Achacoso who is the administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA). PASEI challenges the validity of DO no. 1, Series of 1988 of the DOLE wherein it
suspends the deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household workers. The petitioner contends
that the measure is a (1) discrimination against males or females and that it does not apply to all
Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skill and (2) violative of
the right to travel; and (3) invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative
and not executive in character. PASEI invokes SECTION 3, ART. XIII of the Constitution,
providing for worker participation in policy and decision making processes affecting their right
and benefits as may be provided by law because the said DO was passed without prior
consultations.

The Sol. Gen filed a comment informing the COURT on March 8, 1988, THE RESPONDENT
LABOR SEC. lifted the deployment ban in the states of IRAQ, QATAR, CANADA,
HONGKONG, UNITED STATES, ITALY, NORWAY, AUSTRIA, AND SWITZERLAND and
submitted that validity of the guidelines invokes the police power of the Philippine State

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Department Order No. 1, temporarily restraining the deployment of
female Filipino domestic and household workers is a valid exercise of police power and is therefore
constitutional.

RULING:YES. It is a valid exercise of police power and therefore constitutional. The concept of
police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in
order to foster the common good. The police power of the State . . . is a power coextensive with
self-protection, and it is not inaptly termed the 'law of overwhelming necessity.' It may be said to
be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety, and welfare of society."

In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed. As a general rule, social acts enjoy a
presumed validity. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the
presumption logically stands. The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested
measure should be nullified.

There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but
it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality
before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men
and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing
conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.

The Court, of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men are superior to
women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that women domestic
workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary
yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is evidence capable indeed of unquestionable
demonstration and evidence this Court accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the same thing as
far as men are concerned. There is simply no evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to
state, then, that insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are
borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified.

There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure.
Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection
for Filipino female overseas workers.

The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply
indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself meaning to say
that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of permanency, the
ban shall be lifted.

The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas
workers. That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers" is not an argument for unconstitutionality.
Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary.
What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an
existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to
another person or group of persons

The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right
to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided
by law." Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its
basic policy to "afford protection to labor," pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-
making authority vested in it by the Labor Code. "Protection to labor" does not signify the
promotion of employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such
an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. The interest of the State is to provide a
decent living to its citizens.

PETITION is dismissed.

3. Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726, GR 47800, Dec. 2, 1940

Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice
in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice
means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures
calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of
the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the
time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded
on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society
and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force
in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the
state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest
good to the greatest number."

FACTS:

The petitioner is Maximo Calalang who is a private citizen and a taxpayer of the City of Manila.
On the other hand, the respondents are:
· A.D. Williams who is the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission
· Vicente Fragante, Director of Public Works
· Sergio Bayan, Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications
· Eulogio Rodriguez, Mayor of the City of Manila; and
· Juan Dominguez, Acting Chief of the Police of Manila

The National Traffic Commission resolved to recommend in its resolution in recommending to the
Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-
drawn vehicles should be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza
Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarinas Street from 7:30 am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 5:30
pm and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague
Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the
Colgante Bridge to traffic. Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public
Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate
rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. As a
consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up
passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding
public as well. It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the
Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and control
of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power.

ISSUE/S:Whether or not the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security
of all the people.

RULING:Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows: "SECTION 1. To promote

safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts
of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines, the Director
of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on
such roads and streets. provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director of
Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. “

The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and
regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry
out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly. The delegated power, if at all,
therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the
facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate
rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national
road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the
requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be
directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other
government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion
exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making
of the law. The proper distinction the court said was this: "The Legislature cannot delegate its
power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state
of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend...”

Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to
promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience
of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare.

The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy
towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the
State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations
of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.

Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of
all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number.

WRIT OF PROHIBITION IS HEREBY DENIED.

 4. Phil. Airlines vs. Santos, 218 SCRA 415, GR 77875, Feb. 4, 1993

FACTS:

The private respondents Alberto Santos, Jr., Houdiel Magadia, Gilbert Antonio, and Regino Duran
are all PORT STEWARD of CATERING SUB-DEPARTMENT, PASSENGER SERVICES
DEPARTMENT of the petitioner Philippine Airlines (PAL). Several deductions were made from
their salary which is represented by the losses of inventoried items that are charged to them for
mishandling company properties. This prompted the respondents represented by the union PAL
Employees Association to make a formal notice thru the petitioner Reynaldo Abad regarding the
deduction. (manager for Catering). Private respondent then filed a formal grievance on Nov. 4,
1984 pursuant to the grievance machinery STEP 1 of the COLLECTIBE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT: Illegal/questionable salary deductions and inventory of bonded goods and
merchandise being done by catering service personnel which they believed should not be their
duty.

At a grievance meeting which was attended by some union representatives, Mr. Abad resolved the
grievance by denying the petition of individual respondents and adopted the position that
inventory of bonded goods is part of their duty as catering service personnel and said that
the deductions were only proper to be charged from the employees for mishandling company
property. Since the petitioners did not conduct their tasks, a penalty of suspension ranging from
7 days to 30 days were (sic) imposed depending on the number of infractions committed. union,
however, made a demand for the reimbursement of the salaries of individual respondents during
the period of their suspension

Petitioner stood pat (o)n the validity of the suspensions. Hence, a complaint for illegal suspension
was filed before the Arbitration Branch of the Commission, . . . Labor Arbiter and ruled in favor
of petitioner by dismissing the complaint. Private respondents appealed the decision of the labor
arbiter to respondent commission which rendered the aforequoted decision setting aside the labor
arbiter's order of dismissal. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, it
interposed the present petition.

ISSUE/S: WON public respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in rendering the aforementioned decision.

RULING: NO. The COURT ruled that the NLRC did not act with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. It is a rule that judicial review by this Court in labor cases does
not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the labor officer or office
based his or its determination, but are limited to issues of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion.
It has not been shown that respondent NLRC has unlawfully neglected the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins it to perform as a duty or has otherwise unlawfully excluded
petitioner from the exercise of a right to which it is entitled.

Section 2, Article IV of the PAL- PALEA Collective Bargaining Agreement

STEP 1 — Any employee who believes that he has a justifiable grievance shall take the matter up
with his shop steward. If the shop steward feels there is justification for taking the matter up with
the Company, he shall record the grievance on the grievance form heretofore agree upon by the
parties. Two (2) copies of the grievance form properly filled, accepted, and signed shall then be
presented to and discussed by the shop steward with the division head. The division head shall
answer the grievance within five (5) days from the date of presentation by inserting his decision
on the grievance form, signing and dating same, and returning one copy to the shop steward. If the
division head fails to act within the five (5)-day regl(e)mentary period, the grievance must be
resolved in favor of the aggrieved party. If the division head's decision is not appealed to Step II,
the grievance shall be considered settled on the basis of the decision made, and shall not be eligible
for further appeal."

Before the prescriptive period of five days begins to run, two concurrent requirements must be
met, i.e., presentment of the grievance and its discussion between the shop steward and the
division head who in this case is Mr. Abad. Section 2 is not self-executing; the mere ling of the
grievance does not trigger the tolling of the prescriptive period. PETITIONER HAS SORELY
MISSED THE POINT.

Respondent NLRC aptly ruled: ". . . Based on the facts heretofore narrated, division head Reynaldo
Abad had to act on the grievance of complainants within five days from 21 November 1984.
Therefore, when Reynaldo Abad failed to act within the reglementary period, complainants,
believing in good faith that the effect of the CBA had already set in, cannot be blamed if they did
not conduct ramp inventory for the days thereafter. In this regard, respondent PAL argued that
Reynaldo Abad was on leave at the time the grievance was presented. This, however, is of no
moment, for it is hard to believe that everything under Abad's authority would have to stand still
during his absence from office. To be sure, it is to be expected that someone has to be left to attend
to Abad's duties.” Abad's failure to act on the matter may have been due to petitioner's
inadvertence, but it is clearly too much of an injustice if the employees be made to bear the dire
effects thereof.

The assailed decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED.

*NOTE:
Contrary to petitioner's submission,15 the grievance of employees is not a matter which requires the personal act of
Mr. Abad and thus could not be delegated. Petitioner could at least have assigned an officer in-charge to look into the
grievance and possibly make his recommendation to Mr. Abad. It is of no moment that Mr. Abad immediately looked
into the grievance upon returning to work, for it must be remembered that the grievants are workingmen who suffered
salary deductions and who rely so much on their meager income for their daily subsistence and survival.

5. Davao Fruits vs. Associated Labor Union, 225 SCRA 562, GR 85073, Aug. 24, 1993
QUIASON,J.

FACTS: The petitioner in this case is the Davao Fruits Corporation and the respondent is the
Associated Labor Unions (ALU) which is acting in behalf of all the rank-and-file
workers/employees of the petitioner corporation ALU and NLRC.

On December 28, 1982, respondent ALU filed a complaint (NLRC Case No. 1791-MC-XI-82)
before the Ministry of Labor and Employment, Regional Arbitration Branch XI, Davao City,
against petitioner, for "Payment of the Thirteenth-Month Pay Differentials." Respondent ALU
sought to recover from petitioner the thirteenth month pay differential for 1982 of its rank-and-file
employees, equivalent to their sick, vacation and maternity leaves, premium for work done on rest
days and special holidays, and pay for regular holidays which petitioner, allegedly in disregard of
company practice since 1975, excluded from the computation of the thirteenth month pay for 1982.

Petitioner answered that it erroneously included items subject of the complaint in the computation
of the thirteenth month pay for the years prior to 1982, upon a doubtful and difficult question of
law. Furthermore, the petitioner alleged that this mistake was discovered only in 1981 after the
promulgation of the Supreme Court decision in the case of San Miguel Corporation v. Incion.

The Labor Arbiter then rendered its decision on March 7, 1984 favoring the respondent ALU.
Unsatisfied with the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the petitioner company appealed the decision
to the NLRC but was dismissed for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not in the computation of the thirteenth month pay given by employers
to their employees under P.D. No. 851, payments for sick, vacation and maternity leaves,
premiums for work done on rest days and special holidays, and pay for regular holidays may be
excluded in the computation and payment thereof, regardless of long-standing company
practice

RULING: Presidential Decree No. 851, promulgated on December 16, 1975, mandates all
employers to pay their employees a thirteenth month pay. How this pay shall be computed is set
forth in Section 2 of the "Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851," thus:
"SECTION 2. . . .

(a) 'Thirteenth-month pay' shall mean one twelfth (1/12) of the basic

salary of an employee within a calendar year.

(b) 'Basic Salary' shall include all remunerations or earnings paid by an employer to an
employee for services rendered but may not include cost-of living allowances granted.”

The Department of Labor and Employment issued on January 16, 1976 the "Supplementary
Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 851" which in paragraph 4 thereof further
defines the term "basic salary," thus: "4. Overtime pay, earnings and other remunerations which
are not part of the basic salary shall not be included in the computation of the 13- month pay. “

In other words, whatever compensation an employee receives for an eight-hour work daily or the
daily wage rate is the basic salary. Any compensation or remuneration other than the daily wage
rate is excluded. It follows therefore, that payments for sick, vacation and maternity leaves,
premium for work done on rest days and special holidays, as well as pay for regular holidays, are
likewise excluded in computing the basic salary for the purpose of determining the thirteenth
month pay.

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION V. INCIONG: The all-embracing phrase 'earnings and other
remunerations' which are deemed not part of the basic salary includes within its meaning payments
for sick, vacation, or maternity leaves, premium for work performed on rest days and special
holidays, pay for regular holidays and night differentials. As such they are deemed not part of the
basic salary and shall not be considered in the computation of the 13th-month pay. If they were
not so excluded, it is hard to find any 'earnings and other remunerations' expressly excluded in the
computation of the 13th-month pay.

From 1975 to 1981, petitioner had freely, voluntarily and continuously included in the computation
of its employees' thirteenth month pay, the payments for sick, vacation and maternity leaves,
premiums for work done on rest days and special holidays, and pay for regular holidays. The
considerable length of time the questioned items had been included by petitioner indicates a
unilateral and voluntary act on its part, sufficient in itself to negate any claim of mistake.

A company practice favorable to the employees had indeed been established and the payments
made pursuant thereto, ripened into benefits enjoyed by them. And any benefit and supplement
being enjoyed by the employees cannot be reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated
by the employer, by virtue of Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No.
851, and Article 100 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which prohibit the diminution or
elimination by the employer of the employees' existing benefits. Solutio indebiti, therefore, is not
applicable to the instant case.
PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED.

6. Gaa vs CA, 140 SCRA 304, G.R. No. L-44169, December 3, 1985
Patajo, J.
Petitioner | Rosario A. Gaa
Respondents | CA, Europhil Industries Corporation, Cesar R. Roxas, Deputy Sheriff of
Manila

FACTS:
Respondent Europhil Industries Corporation was a former tenant in Trinity Building at T.M.
Kalaw St., Manila. Petitioner Gaa was the building administrator. Europhil commenced an action
in the CFI for damages against petitioner on the ground that the respondent perpetrated acts that
are considered by the respondent as trespass upon its right, specifically cutting electricity, and
removing the name from the building directory and gate passes of its officials and employees. CFI
rendered judgment in favor of respondent Europhil Industries and ordered for the amount of
P10,000.00 to be paid by the petitioner plus actual, moral and exemplary damages. A writ of
garnishment was then issued to the Deputy Sheriff who served such notice to the petitioner’s
working place El Grande Hotel garnishing her salaries, commission and or remuneration. Upon
filing to lift the garnishment holding that salary, commission and/or renumeration are exempted
from execution under Article 1708 of the New Civil Code and motion for reconsideration, the CFI
denied all actions. Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition for certiorari. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: WON petitioner is a laborer as contemplated under 1708 of the New Civil Code which
means that her salary, commission and remuneration are exempted from execution

RULING: No.The petitioner is not an ordinary or rank and file laborer but “a responsibly place
employee” of El Grande Hotel responsible for planning, directing, controlling, and coordinating
the activities of all housekeeping personnel so as to ensure the cleanliness, maintenance, and
orderliness of all guest rooms, function rooms, public areas, and the surroundings of the hotel.
From this fact, it is undeniable that petitioner is occupying a position equivalent to that of a
managerial or supervisory position. the word "laborer" includes everyone who performs any kind
of mental or physical labor, but as commonly and customarily used and understood, it only applies
to one engaged in some form of manual or physical labor. That is the sense in which the courts
generally apply the term as applied in exemption acts, since persons of that class usually look to
the reward of a day's labor for immediate or present support and so are more in need of the
exemption than are others.

In determining whether a particular laborer or employee is really a "laborer," the character of the
word he does must be taken into consideration. He must be classified not according to the arbitrary
designation given to his calling, but with reference to the character of the service required of him
by his employer.

Article 1708 used the word "wages" and not "salary" in relation to "laborer" when it declared what
are to be exempted from attachment and execution. The term "wages" as distinguished from
"salary", applies to the compensation for manual labor, skilled or unskilled, paid at stated times,
and measured by the day, week, month, or season, while "salary" denotes a higher degree of
employment, or a superior grade of services, and implies a position of office: by contrast, the term
"wages" indicates considerable pay for a lower and less responsible character of employment,
while "salary" is suggestive of a larger and more important service. We do not think that the
legislature intended the exemption in Article 1708 of the New Civil Code to operate in favor of
any but those who are laboring men or women in the sense that their work is manual. Persons
belonging to this class usually look to the reward of a day's labor for immediate or present support,
and such persons are more in need of the exemption than any others. Petitioner Rosario A. Gaa is
definitely not within that class.

We find the present petition to be without merit and hereby AFFIRM the decision of the Court of
Appeals, with costs against petitioner.

7. Federico Ledesma vs. NLRC, GR 174585, October 19, 2007

FACTS: On 4 December 1998, petitioner was employed as a bus/service driver by the private
respondent on probationary basis, as evidenced by his appointment. As such, he was required to
report at private respondent's training site in Dasmariñas, Cavite, under the direct supervision of
its site administrator, Pablo Manolo de Leon (de Leon).

On 11 November 2000, petitioner filed a complaint against de Leon for allegedly abusing his
authority as site administrator by using the private respondent's vehicles and other facilities for
personal ends. In the same complaint, petitioner also accused de Leon of immoral conduct
allegedly carried out within the private respondent's premises.

On 27 November 2000, de Leon filed a written report against the petitioner addressed to private
respondent's Vice-President for Administration, Ricky Ty (Ty), citing his suspected drug use.

In view of de Leon's report, private respondent's Human Resource Manager, Trina Cueva (HR
Manager Cueva), on 29 November 2000, served a copy of a Notice to petitioner requiring him to
explain within 24 hours why no disciplinary action should be imposed on him for allegedly
violating Section 14, Article IV of the private respondent's Code of Conduct. On 3 December 2000,
petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondent before the Labor
Arbiter.
The LABOR ARBITER decided in favor of the petitioner but did not grant the request of the
petitioner for reinstatement in his job since it is no longer practical, and only directed private
respondent to pay petitioner backwages.

Unsatisfied of the LA’s decision, both parties raised the issue to the NLRC. PETITIONER assailed
the portion of the LA’s decision denying reinstatement and argued that the DOCTRINE OF
STRAINED RELATIONS is applied only to confidential employees and that being a driver, he is
not covered therein. RESPONDENT argued that the petitioner was not illegally dismiss but failed
to report to work after he was asked to explain regarding his suspected drug use. NLRC granted
the appeal of both parties and declared petitioner failed to establish the fact of dismissal for his
claim that he was banned from entering the training site and that his reinstatement was granted.
Motion for RECONSIDERATION was dismissed by NLRC. Court of Appeals also dismissed
petitioner’s petition for CERTIORARI. and affirmed the NLRC Decision giving more credence to
private respondent’s stance that petitioner was not dismissed from employment, as it is more in
accord with the evidence on record and the attendant circumstances of the instant case. HENCE,
THIS PETITION.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed by his employer

RULING: NO. The Court found that the petitioner was not illegally dismissed by his employer
and affirmed the decision of NLRC and CA.

Well-entrenched is the principle that in order to establish a case before judicial and quasi-
administrative bodies, it is necessary that allegations must be supported by substantial evidence.
There is hardly any evidence on record so as to meet the quantum of evidence required, i.e.,
substantial evidence. Petitioner's claim of illegal dismissal is supported by no other than his own
bare, uncorroborated and, thus, self-serving allegations, which are also incoherent, inconsistent
and contradictory.

Petitioner was only being given the option to either resign and receive his separation pay or
not to resign but face the possible disciplinary charges against him. The final decision,
therefore, whether to voluntarily resign or to continue working still, ultimately rests with the
petitioner. In fact, by petitioner's own admission, he requested from VP for Administration
Ty more time to think over the offer. The fact alone that he was able to return to the training site
to claim his salary and benefits raises doubt as to his purported ban from the premises.

Finally, petitioner's stance that he was dismissed by private respondent was further weakened with
the presentation of private respondent's payroll bearing petitioner's name proving that petitioner
remained as private respondent's employee up to December 2000. Before the private respondent
must bear the burden of proving that the dismissal was legal, petitioner must first establish by
substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal from service. Logically, if there is no dismissal, then
there can be no question as to the legality or illegality thereof.
The rule is that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; thus, petitioners were
burdened to prove their allegation that respondents dismissed them from their employment. It
must be stressed that the evidence to prove this fact must be clear, positive and convincing.
The rule that the employer bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases finds no application
here because the respondents deny having dismissed the petitioners. It is a basic rule in evidence,
however, that the burden of proof is on the part of the party who makes the allegations – ei incumbit
probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat. If he claims a right granted by law, he must prove his claim
by competent evidence, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
weakness of that of his opponent.

The law in protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither oppression nor self-
destruction of the employer. It should be made clear that when the law tilts the scales of justice in
favor of labor, it is in recognition of the inherent economic inequality between labor and
management. The intent is to balance the scales of justice; to put the two parties on relatively equal
positions. There may be cases where the circumstances warrant favoring labor over the interests
of management but never should the scale be so tilted if the result is an injustice to the employer.
Justitia nemini neganda est - - justice is to be denied to none

THE instant petition is DENIED.

NOTES:

In reversing the Labor Arbiter’s Decision, the NLRC underscored the settled evidentiary rule that before
the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove the validity of the employee’s dismissal, the employee
must first sufficiently establish that he was indeed dismissed from employment. The petitioner, in the
present case, failed to establish the fact of his dismissal. The NLRC did not give credence to petitioner’s
allegation that he was banned by the private respondent from entering the workplace, opining that had it
been true that petitioner was no longer allowed to enter the training site when he reported for work thereat
on 2 December 2000, it is quite a wonder he was able to do so the very next day, on 3 December 2000, to
claim his salary. The Court of Appeals validated the above conclusion reached by the NLRC and further
rationated that petitioner’s positive allegations that he was dismissed from service was negated by
substantial evidence to the contrary. Petitioner’s averments of what transpired inside private respondent’s
main office on 29 November 2000, when he was allegedly already dismissed from service, and his claim
that he was effectively banned from private respondent’s premises are belied by the fact that he was able to
claim his salary for the period of 16-30 November 2000 at private respondent’s training site.

8. St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1988
Regalado,J.
Petitioner | St. Martin Funeral Home
Respondent | National Labor Relations Commission and Bienvenido Aricayos
. . . the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a
precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, and then seasonably avail of the special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65, for which said Rule has now fixed the reglementary period of
sixty days from notice of the decision. Curiously, although the 10-day period for finality of the
decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor Code,
it has been held that this Court may still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on
jurisdictional and due process considerations if filed within the reglementary period under Rule
65.

Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the
NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions
for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially 􀀴led
in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
appropriate forum for the relief desired

FACTS: Bienvenido Aricayos assisted in managing St. Martin Funeral Homes without
compensation. When Amelita took over as manager of the company, she found out that St. Martin
had arrearages in the payment of taxes, but company records show that payments were made.
Because of this, Amelita dismissed Aricayos from managing St. Martin's business.Aricayos filed
a case for illegal dismissal. The NLRC remanded the case to the LA to determine if there is an
employer-employee relationship. St. Martin insists that the Labor Arbiter actually concluded that
there was no employer-employee relationship between the parties considering the memoranda,
position papers, and the documentary evidence presented in support of their respective positions.

ISSUE/S:Whether the Supreme Court can make a determination of the presence of an employer-
employee relationship between St. Martin and Aricayos based on the evidence on record

RULING: No. The issue submitted for resolution is a question of fact which is proscribed by the
rule disallowing factual issues in appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. This is
explicit in Rule 45, Section 1 that petitions of this nature shall raise only questions of law which
must be distinctly set forth. St. Martin would like the Court to examine the pleadings and
documentary evidence extant on the records of the Labor Arbiter to determine if said official
indeed made a finding on the existence of the alleged employer-employee nexus between the
parties based on the facts contained in said pleadings and evidence. Evidently, this issue is
embraced by the circumscription.
Even if we would like to relax the rule and allow the examination of the documentary evidence as
an exception to the general rule, we are precluded by the abject failure of petitioner to attach to the
petition important and material portions of the records as would support the petition prescribed by
Rule 45, Section 4. St. Martin asks us to find out if the Labor Arbiter was correct in concluding
that respondent Aricayos was not in its employ; but committed the blunder of not attaching to the
petition even the Decision of the Labor Arbiter sought to be reviewed, the NLRC Decision, the
position papers and memoranda of the parties filed with the Labor Arbiter, the affidavits of
petitioner’s employees, and other pieces of evidence that we can consider in resolving the factual
issue on employment. Without these documents, petitioner cannot be given the relief prayed for.

Even with the inadequate information and few documents on hand, one thing is clear that
the Labor Arbiter did not set the labor case for hearing to be able to determine the veracity
of the conflicting positions of the parties. On this point alone, a remand is needed.

There are certain admissions by petitioner St. Martin that should have prodded the Labor
Arbiter to conduct a hearing for a more in-depth examination of the contrasting positions of
the parties, namely; that respondent helped Amelita’s mother manage the funeral parlor
business by running errands for her, overseeing the business from 1995 up to January 1996
when the mother died, and that after Amelita made changes in the business operation,
private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management of
St. Martin. These facts could have been examined more in detail by the Labor Arbiter in a
hearing to convince himself that there was indeed no employment relationship between the
parties as he originally found.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit