Theories of political development

Firstly, when tracing ideas of political development in the 20 th and 21st century, we
see how the study of political development was born in the 1950s as the US and the
Soviet Union contested over how economic growth could be achieved.  Academic
thinking has varied widely on how political and economic development come about. The
“state planning” of Communist states was challenged by the US led modernisation
approach with Rostow theorising about five stages of economic growth, five processes
of political development that states must undergo in order to achieve “modernity.”
(Ruttan, 1991, What happened to political development). Ideas of social evolution,
social differentiation, secularisation, cultural modernisation and moving from traditional
to modern dominated thinking about the processes of political development (Smith,
2003,  Understanding Third World Politics). Criticism of the modernisation approach
began to emerge though with the question of “whose progress” modernisation theory
was referring to and the validity of assuming “tradition” equalled “backwardness” and an
obstacle to development (Smith 2003). Modernisation theory was criticised for making
assumptions about the homogenous nature of culture and tradition, the supremacy of
Western ideals and the possibility of replicating the Western experience  – whilst all the
time failing to take into account the importance of the influence of external forces (Smith
2003).

An alternative approach to political development grew out of what became known as

dependency theory, where developing countries were seen as existing to support the
development of rich countries. World capitalism and particularly trade were not seen as
engines of economic growth, rather they were responsible for under developing the
Third World (Ruttan 1991). Dependency theory also had its critics though as similarly to
modernisation theory, it does not draw lessons from history. It doesn’t recognise that
class relationships within developing countries can change and therefore influence the
relationships with the metropolis (Smith 2003).  Dependency theory also tends to focus
on economics at the expense of politics, as well as being undermined by the empirical
evidence of the growth and development seen within previously poor countries,
particularly the East Asian tigers. Moving into the 1980s, the ascendancy of
neoliberalism meant that an interest in political culture and the politics of development
evaporated, with the importance of the role of the markets in development being
elevated to a seemingly unchallengeable position.

Cracks in the neoliberal hegemony began to show by the early 1990s though and an
interest in good governance began to appear. Thus began the rediscovery of politics in
development. Neoliberalism was criticised for presuming that all countries were the
same and underestimating the importance of a state’s political context. By the 21st-
century, a post development, grassroots politics had gained prominence, with attempts
to get politics away from the centre and put power into the hands of the people
becoming more commonplace.
In recent years, there has been increasing interest in political development – failed
states and the importance of State building are very much on donors agendas,
particularly since 9/11 and the beginning of the “war on terror”. If we can learn anything
from the past 60 years of development, it would perhaps be that development is not a
discipline in itself, it is a field of interdisciplinary studies.

Secondly when examining the importance of political development as a process,

different interpretations of its relationship with economic development and patterns of
social organisation are revealed.
North et el (Violence and the Rise of Open-Access Orders, 2009) discuss political
development in the terms of the patterns of social organisation, or social orders which
societies follow. States can be differentiated into foraging orders, limited access orders
and open access orders. The importance of politics can be seen in the way these
different orders control violence within societies, with open access orders enforcing
rules in an impersonal manner and limited access orders, being formed on the basis of
personal relationships between elites, therefore, controlling violence through power
balances and negotiations between those elites.

Both North el al and Ruttan believe that political development has a dynamic
relationship with social and economic development.  To North el al, political
development creates new forms of social, political and economic organisation, which in
turn, as illustrated in the example of open access orders, enables states to cope with
shocks better. Ruttan believes economic and political development are a collaborative
processes and therefore, the thinking should be more joined up, something which up
until now, has not really been the norm.

An interesting conclusion which  Ruttan makes is in relation to authoritarian political

organisation and economic growth. The dominant view has been that “good economics”
is liberal economics, and therefore “good” governance is Western, liberal governance.
Ruttan challenges this somewhat by concluding that when a state is at the beginning of
its development, authoritarian political organisation can facilitate rapid economic growth.
It is only when a country is developed to a point of middle-income status, that
authoritarianism becomes an obstacle to economic development.

Emotional level
The session touched on the fact that there has been a “rediscovery” of the importance
of politics in development. I do find it rather astounding that the importance of politics
was ever “lost” – ever since I gained an interest in development, within a few weeks of
starting work in Kenya, it’s always seemed evident that politics is the root of the
“poverty” problem. I remember hearing Bill Clinton’s campaign phrase from 1992 – “it’s
the economy stupid!” The same phrase comes to mind when thinking of politics, poverty
and development – my own version being “it’s politics stupid!” Reading through the
various theories and frameworks, it is comforting to know that, despite their flaws –
theories of political development actually exist! I find it frustrating though that political
development was neglected during the 80s and 90s – considering development purely
as an economic process to me seems illogical. On a human level, it can almost make
you angry, because when you look at the failures of the 80s and 90s and the billions of
dollars that were practically poured down the drain, you begin to imagine the billions of
individuals who remained in poverty because of the “economic tunnel vision” of
international financial institutions.

I also find it frustrating how the “limited access orders” which North and et al refer to
seem to be trapped somehow by the very mechanisms which enable them to exist. Yes
– elite bargaining and dominant coalitions mean that there is some level of security,
preventing anarchy from reigning, however, the rent seeking and monopolies which
emerge from such personalised systems of rule mean many countries seem unable to
cope with change or shocks or avoid those sustained periods of negative economic
growth which the authors believe must be averted in order to achieve development.
Limited access orders may bring about a good level of security but the means which
they use to do this actually prevents them from making the transition to an open access
order…it’s a frustrating circle to observe.

Interpretive level
Political development has been at the heart of social science – it is at the heart of the
great political philosophers writings – the works of Marx, Weber, Durkheim. The works
of these authors cannot be underestimated in terms of their influence, not just on social
science as a discipline, but on the way that states are run; on the way that societies
have grown and developed and on the way political and social change has occurred.
Therefore, if Marx, Weber, Durkheim and their contemporaries considered political
development as a fundamentally important concern, it would seem that the donor
community should hold it as an equally fundamental concern, with this being reflected in
their policies and programs. DFID’s development of Drivers of Change assessments
and the USAID equivalent suggest this concern has been taken on board, but it’s
important that concerns are not just reflected in the wording of policy but that they also
come out in practice.

USAID country governance assessments though reflect the donors strong association
of good governance with democracy. In Ruttan (1991), Abbas Pourgerami, has a
similarly positive view of the relationship between democracy as he believes that
“democracy has a positive impact on economic growth.” This assertion would seem to
be rather contentious as a country with one of the highest economic growth rates in the
world, China, has managed to achieve this growth rate without democracy. Additionally,
African countries which were part of the democratisation wave of the 1990s, may well
have achieved more positive rates of economic growth, but whether economic growth
can be interpreted as development is questionable when income inequality remains and
is even increasing in many countries.

What seems to be important when thinking about political development, and its
relationship with the growth of the state and economic development, is to take as
holistic and interdisciplinary approach as possible. Modernisation and
underdevelopment approaches fell short in terms of their  rather narrow focuses, to the
exclusion of the analysis of important factors which influence the processes of political
development. There is a danger that the rather overwhelming good governance agenda
could begin to repeat some of the same mistakes, with its unrelenting focus on the
requirements of the agenda overriding the importance of a particular country’s context
and the reality of historical experience.

Decision level
Applying today’s session, I’ve learnt that it’s important to consider process as well as
outcomes. There has been a good deal of disagreement over the process of political
development – from state planning to market led development; from modernisation
theory to dependency theory; from the good governance agenda playing itself out today.
Political development is a process – and ultimately must be grounded in more than
theoretical concepts, it must be grounded in relevant, historical experience, something I
will take on board whenever I consider what development interventions are appropriate
in different countries.

6 Key Factors that constitutes a Political Culture– Explained!

A Political System operates within the framework of a set of meanings and purposes-
the political culture of the society. All political activity is characterised by the values,
beliefs and orientations of the people towards political objects and actions. “Pattern of
orientations to the political action within any given society” is called the Political Culture
of the society. It is a valuable part of the general culture.

In itself, the Political Culture is determined by several historical and socio-economic-

ethnic factors which are referred to as its determinants or the elements. Changes in
Political Culture also come under the influence of these factors. Further, the general
culture influences the Political Culture and in turn gets influenced by it.

The following can be described as the key determinants or factors of

Political Culture:

1. The Historical Factor:

History plays an important role in the making and evolution of Political Culture. Historical
events always influence the shaping of political culture in a big way. French political
culture bears a deep impact on the French Revolution and the “Declaration of Rights of
Man and of Citizen.” Likewise, the American Declaration of Independence, the War of
Independence and the Civil War of mid-19th century exercised a big influence upon the
American Political Culture.
In the case of British Political Culture, the signing of the Magna Carta 1215, Petition of
Rights 1628, the 17th century struggle between the King and the Parliament over the
issue of supremacy, the Glorious Revolution of 1688, etc., have all played a
deterministic role. Soviet Political Culture (1917-1991) was determined by the Socialist
Revolution of 1917. The Indian Political Culture bears the influence of events of the
freedom struggle and the contact with western civilisation and culture. As such, the
Political Culture of each society is greatly influenced by the historical events.

2. Political Continuity or Discontinuity:

The continuity or discontinuity of a political system determines the nature of its political
culture. Continuity of political process helps the evolution of a participant political culture
and secures the linkage between the past and the present.

“The importance of political continuity in a country like Britain,” writes A.R. Ball “lies in
the fact that their older values have been allowed to merge with modern attitudes
undisturbed by violent internal strife or domination by foreign power.”
British Monarchy stands merged with Democracy. Conservatism stands supplemented
by liberalism. In the U.S.A., too, the continuity of political tradition has helped the
evolution of a developed and participant political culture.
Pakistan’s stunts with democracy between two long periods of military dictatorships
have hindered the process of development of a uniform and clear political culture.
People of Pakistan struggle for democracy while living under a military dictatorship but
fail to manage the political system when it becomes democratic. As against this,
continuity of political development in a uniform democratic way is gradually helping India
to develop a democratic political culture.

3. Geography:
Geography plays a big role in determining the political culture of the society. Favourable
location has helped Britain to meet successfully foreign invasions. Small size has
helped Britain to maintain the continuity of its political traditions. The vast size and
diversities have helped the Americans to accept the values of equality and freedom for
all.

Geography did play a role in the spread of socialism to Eastern European countries.
The Swiss political culture clearly reflects the impact of the geographical features of
Switzerland. Acceptance of’ Neutrality’ as a national value has been secured, and it
stands determined by the geographical location of Switzerland as a small country
surrounded by four big neighbours.

4. Socio-Economic Factors:
Socio-economic factors always play a deterministic role in laying down the foundations
of the political culture and in securing a change in the orientations of the people towards
political objects and actions. Levels of poverty, employment, urbanisation, literacy, etc.,
play a leading role in shaping the political culture of a society.
A.R. Ball discusses in detail the role of socio-economic factors as the determinants of
political culture. He observes, “A predominantly urban industrialised society is a more
complex society, putting a premium on rapid communications. Educational standards
are higher, groups proliferate, and participation in the decision-making process is, by
necessity, wider. Rural societies are not geared to change and innovation, and states
with a predominantly peasant population are more conservative. ”
In this age of science and technology, the development of agriculture and industry
always influences the political culture. The developments in the field of science and
technology have their impact on the process of transportation and communication,
migrations and immigrations, imports and exports, revolutions and wars.
All these factors, in turn, lead to changes in political values and beliefs of the people.
Increasing urbanisation and the rise of big metropolis cities always lead to a mixing of
the peoples with different values and orientations. These mixtures always play a big role
in introducing changes in the political culture.

5. Ethnic Factor:
The existence of ethnic differences and ethnic conflicts among several ethnic groups or
minorities which live in the society always determine the nature of political culture.
Ethnic pluralism as manifested in linguistic, cultural, religious and social diversities plays
a deterministic role in the evolution of the political culture and the regional sub-political
cultures. Ethnic differences and conflicts give rise to the emergence of strong sub-
political cultures within the national political culture.

6. Ideological Factor:
The concept of political culture refers to orientations – cognitive, affective and
evaluative, towards political objects and actions. These orientations are greatly
influenced by the ideology or ideologies that are popular with the people.
As a set of principles offering an explanation of a given phenomenon or even life in
society, an ideology plays an important role in forming and changing people’s values,
commitments and orientations.
It influences the cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations of the people towards
political objects and actions. Ideology of Marxism determined the nature of political
cultures of several states which later on adopted socialism as the value.
Influence of ideology of Liberalism has now been instrumental in changing the
orientations of the people of socialist states towards their political systems. Indian
Political Culture bears the impact of the ideology of Liberal Democratic Socialism.
All these factors are, in the main, the determinants of political culture. Together these
provide foundations to political culture of a society. Every study of the Political Culture
must involve a study of all these determinants.
“pede noting gaming reference for
discussion lang etong nasa ibaba”
Do not copy, post, or distribute
7
\\
There was a time when many said that the cultures of Japan and Germany
were incapable of sustaining democratic values. Well, they were wrong.
George W. Bush, in a speech to the American Enterprise Institute,
Washington Hilton Hotel, February 26, 2003
I am a democrat only on principle, not by instinct—nobody is that. Doubtless
some people say they are, but this world is grievously given to lying.
Mark Twain, Notebook, entry for February–March 1898
• Does democracy require a “democratic culture”? Are certain cultures
incompatible with democracy? Does culture affect the emergence and
survival of democracy?
• According to cultural modernization theory, economic development pro-
duces certain cultural changes, and it is these cultural changes that lead to
democracy. A key cultural change is the emergence of a “civic culture.” For
many, the existence of a civic culture is seen as a prerequisite for the
success- ful emergence and survival of democracy. As we demonstrate, the
empirical evidence in support of cultural modernization theory is somewhat
mixed.
• We investigate recent claims that particular religions such as Islam are
incompatible with democracy. As we indicate, all religions have some doc-
trinal elements that can be seen as compatible with democracy and others
that can be seen as incompatible; Islam is no exception. Our empirical
evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe that majority Muslim
countries cannot sustain democracy once we take account of their wealth.
• We examine evidence from a series of experiments conducted around the
world that throws light on why culture may be important for the emergence
and survival of democracy.
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permission of the publisher.
OVERVIEW
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Principles of Comparative Politics
In the previous chapter, we examined the vast literature linking economic
factors to the emergence and survival of democracy. The literature
addressing the relationship between culture and democracy is equally large
and is the subject of this chapter. The notion that cultural differences drive
significant elements of political and economic life is commonplace and has a
long history. But does democracy really require a “democratic culture”? Are
certain cultures incompatible with democracy? How does culture affect the
emergence and survival of democracy? The claim that culture plays any role
with respect to democracy obviously has important implications for those
wishing to spread democracy to regions of the world such as the Middle
East, Africa, and Asia.
Cultural arguments regarding democracy typically fall into two categories:
primordialist and constructivist (Laitin 1983, 1986; Przeworski, Cheibub, and
Limongi 1998). Primordialist arguments treat culture as some- thing that is
objective and inherited—something that has been fixed since “primordial”
times. For example, Geertz (1973, 259–260) describes primordial cultural
attach- ments, which for him include things like bloodlines, lan-
guage, race, religion, and customs, as stemming “from the givens . . . of
social existence. . . . For virtually every person, in every society, at almost
all times, some attachments seem to flow more from a sense of natural—
some would say spiritual—affinity than from social interac- tion.” According
to primordialists, culture exists prior to, and remains unchanged by, political
interaction. Put differently, it is culture that affects political behavior by
providing ideological guidelines for collective action rather than political
behavior that shapes culture. As a result, political institutions, such as
democracy, may not be compatible with all cultures. In effect, primordialist
arguments imply that democracy is not for everyone.
Constructivist arguments treat culture as something that is constructed or
invented rather than inherited. Like primordialist arguments, constructivist
arguments claim that culture has a causal effect and that a democratic
culture is required for democracy to emerge and prosper. Constructivists
recognize, however, that cultures are malleable and are not given once and
for all—cultures can change in response to social, economic, and political
actors. As a result, cultures do not necessarily represent impenetrable
barriers to democrati- zation. Although cultures may not act as impenetrable
barriers to democratization as they do in primordialist arguments,
constructivists recognize that the speed with which cultures can change is
likely to vary from culture to culture. In this sense, some cultures will find it
easier to adopt democracy than others.
CLASSICAL CULTURAL ARGUMENTS:
MILL AND MONTESQUIEU
The notion that political institutions, such as democracy and dictatorship, are
more suited to some cultures than others is not new (Przeworski, Cheibub,
and Limongi 1998). As long
Copyright ©2018 by SAGE Publications, Inc.
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means without express written permission of the publisher.
Primordialist arguments treat culture as something that is objective and
inherited—something that has been fixed since “primordial” times.
Constructivist arguments treat culture as something that is constructed or
invented rather than inherited.
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7: The Cultural Determinants of Democracy and Dictatorship

ago as 472 B.C., Aeschylus contrasted the authoritarianism associated with
the people of Asia with the democracy found in Athenian Greece in his play
The Persians (Emmerson 1995, 96). The views of Aeschylus would later be
echoed in what would become known as the Asian values debate in the
1990s. Although vague references to the compatibility of certain cultures
with democracy have been around for some time, the first person to write in
any great detail about the importance of culture to political institutions was
Montesquieu in the eighteenth century. He claimed that monarchy was most
suited to European states, that despotism was most suited to the Orient, and
that democracy was most suited to the ancient world. He believed that the
best government for a given country was that which “leads men by follow-
ing their propensities and inclinations” (Montesquieu [1721] 1899, Persian
Letter 81) and which “best agrees with the humor and disposition of the
people in whose favor it is estab- lished” (Montesquieu [1752] 1914, 1:3).
What did this entail exactly? He stated that political institutions “should be in
relation to the climate of each country, to the quality of its soil, to its
situation and extent, to the principal occupation of the natives, whether
husbandmen, huntsmen, or shepherds: they should have relation to the
degree of liberty which the consti- tution will bear; to the religion of the
inhabitants, to their inclinations, riches, numbers, commerce, manners, and
customs” (Montesquieu [1752] 1914, 1:3). He goes on to claim that it can
be only by chance that the political institutions of one country can
successfully be exported to another.
In his discussion “To What Extent Forms of Government Are a Matter of
Choice,” John Stuart Mill also argued that different cultures were suited to
different political institutions. He stated, “No one believes that every people
is capable of working every sort of institutions” (Mill [1861] 2001, 7). To
illustrate this, he claimed, “Nothing but foreign force would induce a tribe of
North American Indians to submit to the restraints of a regular and civilized
gov- ernment” (Mill [1861] 2001, 8). Mill believed that even those people
who recognized the benefits of a civilized government might still have to live
under authoritarianism if they did not have the required characteristics to
support a better system of government. These neces- sary characteristics
included “moral” or “mental habits,” such as the willingness to “co-operate
actively with the law and the public authorities in the repression of evil-
doers” (Mill [1861] 2001, 9). They also included a certain degree of
development characterized, for example, by a press capable of propagating
public opinion and a tax system “sufficient for keeping up the force
necessary to compel obedience throughout a large territory” (Mill [1861]
2001, 11). Mill ([1861] 2001) was clearly a strong believer that legislators
should take account of “pre-existing habits and feelings” when creating
political institutions in a country (11).
It is important, however, not to interpret Mill’s statements as if they are
arguments that certain cultures are incompatible with political institutions,
such as democracy. In fact, Mill was highly critical of those who believe that
culture prevents political actors from choosing the institutions they desire.
Although he thought that “people are more easily induced to do, and do
more easily, what they are already used to,” he also believed that “people . .
. learn to do things new to them. Familiarity is a great help; but much
dwelling on an idea will make it familiar, even when strange at first” (Mill
[1861] 2001, 11). Ultimately, Mill did not see
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225
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Principles of Comparative Politics
particular cultural traits as necessary conditions for democracy. This is
because he thought that culture is inherently malleable and that, as a result,
people could learn to live with democracy. As you can see, Mill asserted a
constructivist cultural argument regarding the prospects for democracy.
The cultural arguments put forth by both Montesquieu and Mill were later
incorporated into strands of cultural modernization theory. As you’ll
remember from the previous chapter, modernization theory predicts that
“immature” societies (those with large agricultural sec- tors and
authoritarian institutions) will eventually become “mature” societies (those
with large industrial
and service sectors and democratic institutions) as they develop
economically. Cultural modernization theory states that socioeconomic
development transforms societies with primitive cultures into societies with
civilized cultures—only when this happens are societies ready for democracy.
In other words, cultural modernization theory argues that socioeco- nomic
development does not directly cause democracy; instead, economic
development produces certain cultural changes, and it is these cultural
changes that produce democratic reform. As Inglehart and Welzel (2005, 15)
put it, “socioeconomic development brings roughly predictable cultural
changes . . . [and] these changes make democracy increasingly likely to
emerge where it does not yet exist, and to become stronger and more direct
where it already exists.”
The claims made by Montesquieu and Mill regarding culture and democracy
illustrate several potential problems that characterize some cultural
arguments to this day (Przeworski, Cheibub, and Limongi 1998). How would
you test the claims made by Mill and Montesquieu? What exactly would the
hypotheses be? Try to state one of them in a way that can be tested. One
obvious problem is that neither scholar specifically states exactly what it is
about cul- ture that matters for democracy. Both men provide a whole host
of cultural things that might affect the emergence and survival of democracy
—religion, customs, morals, manners, marital institutions, and so on.
Indeed, most of these things are left quite vague. For example, what
particular morals are incompatible with democracy? Which customs are
problematic? Moreover, both scholars point to numerous noncultural things
that also affect democracy such as the climate of a country, the quality of
the soil, and the economy. The key point here is that cultural arguments
must specify exactly what it is about culture that mat- ters, otherwise it will
never be possible to conclude that culture does not matter. Put simply, one
of the problems with cultural arguments such as those made by Montesquieu
and Mill is that they are so vague or nonspecific that they become
nonfalsifiable (Przeworski, Cheibub, and Limongi 1998). In effect, they
become “nonscientific” in the terms we outlined in Chapter 2.
The second problem relates to the purported causal relationship between
cultural, eco- nomic, and political factors. Does culture cause political
institutions, such as democracy, to
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means without express written permission of the publisher.
Cultural modernization theory argues that socioeconomic development does
not directly cause democracy; instead, economic development produces
certain cultural changes, such as the emergence of a civic culture, and it is
these cultural changes that ultimately produce democratic reform.
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7: The Cultural Determinants of Democracy and Dictatorship
emerge and survive? Does it also cause economic development? Or do
political institutions and economic development cause culture? In other
words, which way does the causal arrow go? If culture does cause
democracy, is it a necessary or a sufficient condition? If culture is a cause,
does it cause the emergence of democracy, or does it affect only the survival
of democ- racy? In Figure 7.1, we illustrate some of the causal arguments
that scholars have made concerning the interaction between culture,
economic development, and democracy.
Culture, Economic Development, and Democracy: Some Potential Causal
Relationships
Figure 7.1
a.
Culture
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
Democracy
Economic development
b.
Democracy
Economic development
Democracy
Democracy
Culture
Culture
Economic development
Economic development
Economic development
Economic development
Economic development
Culture
Democracy
Democracy
Democracy
Culture
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means without express written permission of the publisher.
Culture
Culture
227
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228
Principles of Comparative Politics
Mill and Montesquieu clearly believed that economic development and
culture both matter for democracy. From what they wrote, however, it is
hard to discern what they thought the exact causal relationship was between
these factors.
DOES DEMOCRACY REQUIRE A CIVIC CULTURE?
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba reopened the debate about culture and
democracy in the 1960s with their book The Civic Culture. Although they
recognized the importance of eco- nomic development for democracy, they
believed that only a “civic culture” could provide the “psychological basis of
democratization” and that without this, the prospects for demo- cratic
survival were slim (Almond and Verba [1963] 1989, 9). Almond and Verba
claimed that there were three basic types of political culture in the world—
parochial, subject, and participant/civic. According to them, the civic culture
was the only culture compatible with democracy. In contrast, parochial
cultures were compatible with the traditional political systems of African
tribes, and subject cultures were compatible with centralized authoritar- ian
institutions like those seen in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe (Almond and
Verba [1963] 1989, 20, 33).
A political culture, for Almond and Verba, was something that captured how
individuals think and feel about the political system. They believed that it
was possible to study culture by conducting surveys and asking individuals
about their feelings toward political institu- tions, actors, and processes. The
idea was that the distribution of responses to these survey questions would
identify a nation’s political culture. In this conceptualization, a political
culture simply refers to a relatively coherent cluster of attitudes in society.
According to Almond and Verba, a civic culture reflects a particular cluster of
attitudes that includes (a) the belief on the part of individuals that they can
influence political decisions, (b) positive feelings toward the political system,
(c) high levels of interpersonal trust, and (d) preferences for gradual societal
change. In contrast, parochial and subject political cultures reflect differ- ent
clusters of attitudes on these same issues. Applying their methodology to
the study of Germany, Italy, Mexico, the United States, and the United
Kingdom, Almond and Verba found that the United States and the United
Kingdom were not only the most stable democ-
racies in their sample but also the countries that most closely resembled
their ideal civic culture. As a result, they concluded that a civic culture was
necessary for democratic stability (see Box 7.1, “Does Good Democratic
Performance Require a Civic Culture?”).
Inglehart (1990) reached a similar conclusion after studying survey
responses from 25 industrial nations in the 1980s. Like Almond and Verba
([1963] 1989), he believed that “dif- ferent societies are characterized to
very different degrees by a specific syndrome of political cultural attitudes;
that these cultural differences are relatively enduring, but not immutable;
and that they can have major political consequences, one being that they
are closely linked