S T R A T E G Y : Seth Klarman

Summary
The Value of Not Being Sure
42 annotations on 2 pages by Mittal & Co Research x42

In these excerpts from his latest annual letter, Seth Klarman describes the biggest challenge in investing today,
how he’s responding to the market’s turmoil and why he considers fear of the unknown such a great motivator.

Editors’ Note: With the possible excep-
tion of Warren Buffett, no investor plying
the trade today commands more respect
than Baupost Group’s Seth Klarman.
Since founding his investment partnership
in 1983, Klarman has not only produced
peerless returns, but he has also from time
to time offered wise and timeless com-
mentary on markets and the craft of
investing. With his permission, we repro-
duce here various excerpts from his latest
annual letter, published late last month.
Erratic Mr. Market
It is easy for the volatility of one’s
thinking to match the volatility of prevail-
ing conditions. Time horizons have short-
ened even more than usual, to the point
where the market’s 4:00 p.m. close seems
to many like a long-term commitment. To
maintain a truly long-term view, investors
must be willing to experience significant
short-term losses; without the possibility
of near-term pain, there can be no long-
term gain. The ability to remain an
investor (and not become a day-trader or
a bystander) confers an almost unprece-
dented advantage in this environment.
The investor’s problem is that this per-
spective will seem a curse rather than a
blessing until the selloff ends and some
semblance of stability is restored.
The greatest challenge of investing in
this environment is neither the punishing
price declines nor the extraordinary
volatility. Rather, it is the sharply declin-
ing economy, which makes analysis of
company fundamentals extremely diffi-
cult. When securities decline, it is crucial
to distinguish, as possible causes, legiti-
mate reaction to fundamental develop-
ments from extreme overreaction. At
Baupost, we are always on the lookout for
such overreactions, whether due to the
disappointing earnings of a failed growth
stock, a ratings downgrade of a bond, the
deletion of a stock from an index or its
delisting from an exchange, or the forced
sale resulting from a margin call. Usually,
fearful overreaction equals opportunity.
In today’s market, however, where
almost everything is down sharply, distin-
guishing legitimate reaction from emo-
tional overreaction is much more diffi-
cult. This is because there is a vicious cir-
cle in effect (the reverse of the taken-for-
granted virtuous circle that buoyed the
markets and economy in good times).
This vicious circle results from the feed-
back effects on the economy of lower
securities and home prices and a severe
credit contraction, and, in turn, effects of
a plunging economy on credit availability
and securities and home prices.
With residential and commercial real
estate prices collapsing and global stock
markets down 40%, 50%, and more this
year alone, tremendous damage has been
done to individual and institutional
wealth. Suddenly, new corporate, univer-
sity, and hospital facilities are on hold,
and big ticket items like automobiles,
consumer electronics, and luxury goods
are going unsold. The worsening econo-
my and rising unemployment portend a
possibly protracted period of falling sales
volumes, with industry overcapacity lead-
ing to pricing pressures, and thus sharply
lower earnings and cash flows. Consumer
spending declines could be more secular
than cyclical; consumption patterns may
have changed in semi-permanent ways.
Some of the lost demand simply may not
come back. Municipal governments face
a severe crunch as tax receipts fall while
entitlement spending rises. Ultimately,
this vicious cycle will be broken and nei-
ther securities prices nor the economy will
go to zero, just as they did not go to infin-
ity when the virtuous cycle was in place.
But throughout 2008, prudent investors
sifting through the rubble for opportuni-
ty were repeatedly surprised by the mag-
nitude of the selling pressure, and, in
many cases, by the extent to which the
deterioration in business fundamentals
has come to justify the lower market
prices. Many forced sellers, through their
early exits, inadvertently achieved better
outcomes than the value-oriented bargain
hunters who bought from them.
Warren Buffett has said – and others
have endlessly repeated – that you can’t
tell who is swimming naked until after the
tide goes out. This turns out to be only
partially true. The tide has receded, and
most portfolios are down. But not all
declines are equal. Some investors have
lost money and locked in those losses by
going to cash. Some have made invest-
ments in failed or failing banks, brokers,
and homebuilders, or toxic subprime
mortgage securities; these losses are large-
ly permanent and irreversible. But the
investment baby has been thrown out
with the bathwater, and some who invest-
ed wisely aren’t naked, it just seems that
way. Buying early on the way down looks
a great deal like being wrong, but it isn’t.
It turns out you won’t be able to accurate-
ly tell who’s been swimming naked until
after the tide comes back in.
As Benjamin Graham and David Dodd
taught us, financial markets are manic and
best thought of as an erratic counterparty
with whom to transact, rather than as an
arbiter of the accuracy of one’s investment
judgments. There are days when the mar-
ket will overpay for what you own, and
other days when it will offer you securities
at a great discount from underlying value.
If you look to “Mr. Market” for advice, or
if you imbue him with wisdom, you are
destined to fail. But if you look to Mr.
Market for opportunity, if you attempt to
take advantage of the emotional extremes,
then you are very likely to succeed over
time. If you see stocks as blips on a ticker
tape, you will be led astray. But if you
regard stocks as fractional interests in
businesses, you will maintain proper per-
spective. This necessary clarity of thought
is particularly important in times of
extreme market fluctuations.

February 23, 2009 www.valueinvestorinsight.com Value Investor Insight 19

#1 p.1

S T R A T E G Y : Seth Klarman

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There have been days recently where is absolutely crucial to long-term invest- wrong. S T R A T E G Y : Seth Klarman
fear has completely dominated greed. ment success in any market environment. Robert Rubin once observed that some
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Seth Klarman
imal
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phy, investment process, and the nature of dose of humility,
investment will accepting that despite and to be endlessly vigilant. VII
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to
February 23, 2009 www.valueinvestorinsight.com Value Investor Insight
#3 ment, money managers must
ket, appreciating that things will likely keep firmlyget too resolute are hell-bent
You can never be sure if the economy will on destruction. risk, we know that we can
reflect full value, because we are never never be fully p.2
in mind
worse that they
before the only things they really
get better. Successful
grow or shrink, investors
whether must temper will
the markets the certain,
sure thatsoour wethesis
diversify.
will And, in the end,
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rise or sink, or whether a particularstand with a large our uncertainty prods us
rect. While we typically concentrate to work harder
our
phy, investment
Process, process, and the nature of
Not Outcome dose of humility,
investment will meet accepting that despite
your expectations. and to be endlessly
investments in the mostvigilant. VII
compelling situa-
Especially in today’s difficult environ- Amidst such uncertainty, people who are tions measured by reward compared to
February 23, 2009 www.valueinvestorinsight.com Value Investor Insight 20
ment, money managers must keep firmly too resolute are hell-bent on destruction. risk, we know that we can never be fully
in mind that the only things they really Successful investors must temper the certain, so we diversify. And, in the end,
can control are their investment philoso- arrogance of taking a stand with a large our uncertainty prods us to work harder
phy, investment process, and the nature of dose of humility, accepting that despite and to be endlessly vigilant. VII

February 23, 2009 www.valueinvestorinsight.com Value Investor Insight 20

#4 p.2

The Value of Not Being Sure
In these excerpts from his latest annual letter, Seth Klarman describes the biggest challenge in investing today,
how he’s responding to the market’s turmoil and why he considers fear of the unknown such a great motivator.
Editors’ Note: With the possible excep-
tion of Warren Buffett, no investor plying
the trade today commands more respect
than Baupost Group’s Seth Klarman.
Since founding his investment partnership
in 1983, Klarman has not only produced
peerless returns, but he has also from time
to time offered wise and timeless com-
mentary on markets and the craft of
investing. With his permission, we repro-
duce here various excerpts from his latest
annual letter, published late last month.
Erratic Mr. Market
It is easy for the volatility of one’s
thinking to match the volatility of prevail-
ing conditions. Time horizons have short-
ened even more than usual, to the point
where the market’s 4:00 p.m. close seems
to many like a long-term commitment. To
maintain a truly long-term view, investors
must be willing to experience significant
short-term losses; without the possibility
of near-term pain, there can be no long-
term gain. The ability to remain an
investor (and not become a day-trader or
a bystander) confers an almost unprece-
dented advantage in this environment.
The investor’s problem is that this per-
spective will seem a curse rather than a
blessing until the selloff ends and some
semblance of stability is restored.
The greatest challenge of investing in
this environment is neither the punishing
price declines nor the extraordinary
volatility. Rather, it is the sharply declin-
ing economy, which makes analysis of
company fundamentals extremely diffi-
cult. When securities decline, it is crucial
to distinguish, as possible causes, legiti-
mate reaction to fundamental develop-
ments from extreme overreaction. At
Baupost, we are always on the lookout for
such overreactions, whether due to the
disappointing earnings of a failed growth
stock, a ratings downgrade of a bond, the
deletion of a stock from an index or its
delisting from an exchange, or the forced
February 23, 2009
sale resulting from a margin call. Usually,
fearful overreaction equals opportunity.
In today’s market, however, where
almost everything is down sharply, distin-
guishing legitimate reaction from emo-
tional overreaction is much more diffi-
cult. This is because there is a vicious cir-
cle in effect (the reverse of the taken-for-
granted virtuous circle that buoyed the
markets and economy in good times).
This vicious circle results from the feed-
back effects on the economy of lower
securities and home prices and a severe
credit contraction, and, in turn, effects of
a plunging economy on credit availability
and securities and home prices.
With residential and commercial real
estate prices collapsing and global stock
markets down 40%, 50%, and more this
year alone, tremendous damage has been
done to individual and institutional
wealth. Suddenly, new corporate, univer-
sity, and hospital facilities are on hold,
and big ticket items like automobiles,
consumer electronics, and luxury goods
are going unsold. The worsening econo-
my and rising unemployment portend a
possibly protracted period of falling sales
volumes, with industry overcapacity lead-
ing to pricing pressures, and thus sharply
lower earnings and cash flows. Consumer
spending declines could be more secular
than cyclical; consumption patterns may
have changed in semi-permanent ways.
Some of the lost demand simply may not
come back. Municipal governments face
a severe crunch as tax receipts fall while
entitlement spending rises. Ultimately,
this vicious cycle will be broken and nei-
ther securities prices nor the economy will
go to zero, just as they did not go to infin-
ity when the virtuous cycle was in place.
But throughout 2008, prudent investors
sifting through the rubble for opportuni-
ty were repeatedly surprised by the mag-
nitude of the selling pressure, and, in
many cases, by the extent to which the
deterioration in business fundamentals
www.valueinvestorinsight.com
S T R A T E G Y : Seth Klarman
has come to justify the lower market
prices. Many forced sellers, through their
early exits, inadvertently achieved better
outcomes than the value-oriented bargain
hunters who bought from them.
Warren Buffett has said – and others
have endlessly repeated – that you can’t
tell who is swimming naked until after the
tide goes out. This turns out to be only
partially true. The tide has receded, and
most portfolios are down. But not all
declines are equal. Some investors have
lost money and locked in those losses by
going to cash. Some have made invest-
ments in failed or failing banks, brokers,
and homebuilders, or toxic subprime
mortgage securities; these losses are large-
ly permanent and irreversible. But the
investment baby has been thrown out
with the bathwater, and some who invest-
ed wisely aren’t naked, it just seems that
way. Buying early on the way down looks
a great deal like being wrong, but it isn’t.
It turns out you won’t be able to accurate-
ly tell who’s been swimming naked until
after the tide comes back in.
As Benjamin Graham and David Dodd
taught us, financial markets are manic and
best thought of as an erratic counterparty
with whom to transact, rather than as an
arbiter of the accuracy of one’s investment
judgments. There are days when the mar-
ket will overpay for what you own, and
other days when it will offer you securities
at a great discount from underlying value.
If you look to “Mr. Market” for advice, or
if you imbue him with wisdom, you are
destined to fail. But if you look to Mr.
Market for opportunity, if you attempt to
take advantage of the emotional extremes,
then you are very likely to succeed over
time. If you see stocks as blips on a ticker
tape, you will be led astray. But if you
regard stocks as fractional interests in
businesses, you will maintain proper per-
spective. This necessary clarity of thought
is particularly important in times of
extreme market fluctuations.
Value Investor Insight 19

Age-Old Showdown
There have been days recently where
fear has completely dominated greed.
While business fundamentals remain
awful, the moment will arrive when some
of the cash on the sidelines will creep
back into the markets, rejecting infinites-
imal yields and seeking better returns.
The contrast between the exceptionally
attractive yield and low purchase price
for “risky” corporate debt or mortgage
securities, and the extremely low yields
and very full price for “safe” U.S.
Government bonds, is yet another
demonstration of Mr. Market’s manic
behavior. When economic recovery is
anticipated, when investors decide to take
a bit more risk, “safe” government bonds
will fall significantly in price and fright-
ened investors who overpaid for safety
will be tallying their losses. As 2009 gets
under way, we expect a steady diet of
bear market rallies and financial market
volatility, as economic woes and contin-
ued deleveraging vie with government
intervention and bargain-hunting in a
continuation of the age-old showdown
between greed and fear.
Timing the Market
Baupost built numerous new positions
as the markets fell in 2008. While it is
always tempting to try to time the market
and wait for the bottom to be reached (as
if it would be obvious when it arrived),
such a strategy has proven over the years
to be deeply flawed. Historically, little
volume transacts at the bottom or on the
way back up and competition from other
buyers will be much greater when the
markets settle down and the economy
begins to recover. Moreover, the price
recovery from a bottom can be very swift.
Therefore, an investor should put money
to work amidst the throes of a bear mar-
ket, appreciating that things will likely get
worse before they get better.
Process, Not Outcome
Especially in today’s difficult environ-
ment, money managers must keep firmly
in mind that the only things they really
can control are their investment philoso-
phy, investment process, and the nature of
February 23, 2009
their client base. Controlling your process
is absolutely crucial to long-term invest-
ment success in any market environment.
James Montier, Société Générale’s market
strategist, recently pointed out that when
athletes were asked what went through
their minds just before competing in the
Beijing Olympics, the consistent response
was a focus on process, not outcome. The
same ought to be true for investors.
It is so easy for one’s investment
process to break down. When an invest-
ment manager focuses on what a client
will think rather than what they them-
selves think, the process is bad. When an
investment manager worries about their
firm’s viability, about possible redemp-
tions, about avoiding loss to the exclusion
of finding legitimate opportunities, the
process fails. When the manager’s time
horizon becomes overly short-term, the
process is compromised. When tempers
flare, recriminations abound, and second
guessing proliferates, the process cannot
work properly. When investment man-
agers worry about maximizing the value
of their firm – or, if publicly traded, its
share price – rather than the long-term
best interest of clients, the process is cor-
rupted. Investing is hard enough. Success
virtually requires that a process be in
place that enables intellectual honesty,
rigor, creativity, and integrity.
In Defense of Uncertainty
Successful investing requires resolve.
When taking a contrary approach, one
has to be able to stand one’s ground, be
unwavering when others vacillate, and
take advantage of others’ fear and panic
to pick up bargains. But successful
investing also requires flexibility and
open-mindedness. Investments are typi-
cally a buy at one price, a hold at a high-
er price, and a sale at a still higher price.
You can never be sure if the economy will
grow or shrink, whether the markets will
rise or sink, or whether a particular
investment will meet your expectations.
Amidst such uncertainty, people who are
too resolute are hell-bent on destruction.
Successful investors must temper the
arrogance of taking a stand with a large
dose of humility, accepting that despite
www.valueinvestorinsight.com
S T R A T E G Y : Seth Klarman
their efforts and care, they may in fact be
wrong.
Robert Rubin once observed that some
people are more certain of everything
than he is of anything. We feel the same
way. One can see the investment universe
as full of certainties, or one can see it as
replete with probabilities. Those who
reflect and hesitate make far less in a bull
market, but those who never question
themselves get obliterated when the bear
market comes. In investing, certainty can
be a serious problem, because it causes
one not to reassess flawed conclusions.
Nobody can know all the facts. Instead,
one must rely on shreds of evidence, ker-
nels of truth, and what one suspects to be
true but cannot prove. One must also bal-
ance one’s own perception of the truth
with one’s best assessment of what others
believe. In investing, other people’s per-
ception of reality influences price more
than any underlying truth; your own
assessment, even if correct, is valueless if
it is already reflected in the market price.
It is much harder psychologically to be
unsure than to be sure; certainty builds
confidence, and confidence reinforces cer-
tainty. Yet being overly certain in an
uncertain, protean, and ultimately
unknowable world is hazardous for
investors. To be sure, uncertainty breeds
doubt, which can be paralyzing. But
uncertainty also motivates diligence, as
one pursues the unattainable goal of elim-
inating all doubt. Unlike premature or
false certainty, which induces flawed
analysis and failed judgments, a healthy
uncertainty drives the quest for justifiable
conviction.
Always remembering that we might be
wrong, we must contemplate alternatives,
concoct hedges, and search vigilantly for
validation of our assessments. We always
sell when a security’s price begins to
reflect full value, because we are never
sure that our thesis will be precisely cor-
rect. While we typically concentrate our
investments in the most compelling situa-
tions measured by reward compared to
risk, we know that we can never be fully
certain, so we diversify. And, in the end,
our uncertainty prods us to work harder
and to be endlessly vigilant. VII
Value Investor Insight 20