TOPIC 2

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION

General Rules
1. Literal rule
2. Golden rule
3. Mischief Rule (rule in the Heydon's case)
4. Rule of harmonious construction
5. Rule of Strict Interpretation
EVOLUTION OF PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION
In the early days of English law the interpretation of a statute presented no great
difficulty. The judges, as members of the King's Council, took part in the process of
making statutes, and from the knowledge which they gained in so doing they were
able to interpret the statutes with confidence.
But in the sixteenth century, when the King was regarded as a personal legislator
(albeit with the advice and consent of Parliament) and the judges as Royal servants.
Since the statute merely expressed the King's will, in case of doubt all that the judge
had to do was to find out his master's will and apply it to the situation before him.
EARLIEST THEORY OF INTERPRETATION
Equitable theory. - Equitable interpretation thus centred on the spirit or intent of the
statute, and applied that spirit in disregard of the letter whenever necessary. It was
during this period that the first (in time) of the three great modern guides to statutory
interpretation was formulated, in Heydon's Case. - Literal Rule, Golden Rule and
Mischief Rule.
It was laid down that the judge should consider the previous state of the law and the
mischief for which it had failed to provide, the remedy given by the statute for that
mischief, and the true reason for that remedy; and that thus equipped the judge should
make such construction as should suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.
Whether in this process the judge could run counter to the express words of the statute
was not clear.
The Revolution of 1688 put an end to the idea that -the King's will was the deciding
factor in the government of the country. Thereafter the doctrine of the 'separation of
powers came into vogue, and it became the judge's function to counter balance the
legislature.
Instead of enforcing his master's will on the people, he now stood between Parliament

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and the people. But the laws made by Parliament still had to be enforced, and the
judges were bound, whenever the necessity arose, to find out the meaning of those
laws.
But as time went on, some wider statement of principle was needed. Then there arose,
at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the remaining two guides to the
interpretation of statutes-the literal rule and the golden rule.
The literal rule declares that the literal or ordinary meaning of the words used must be
followed, whatever the result.
The golden rule starts from the same premise, but allows the judge to depart from the
literal meaning of the words to the extent necessary to avoid any kind of absurdity or
inconsistency.
In recent times, the golden rule has been in less favour than it was in the nineteenth
century, and the choice to-day is usually between the literal rule and the rule in
Heydon's Case.
UNDERSTANDING LITERAL RULE
Crawford v Spooner, (1846) 4 Moo Ind App 179, p 181
The words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense
and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning,
unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context, or in
the object of the statute to suggest the contrary.
Lord Atkinson in Corp of the City of Victoria v Bishop of Vancouver Island,
AIR 1921 PC 240,
In the construction of statutes, their words must be interpreted in their ordinary
grammatical sense unless there be something in the context, or in the object of the
statute in which they occur or in the circumstances in which they are used, to show
that they were used in a special sense different from their ordinary grammatical sense.
Literal Rule
The "literal rule" emphasizes the text of the statutory provision. The literal rule of
statutory interpretation should be the first rule applied by judges.
It is not for the Judge to invent "fancied ambiguities”. - Lord Diplock in Duport
Steels Ltd. v Sire, (1980) 1 All E.R. 527, 541.
Under the literal rule, the words of the statute are given their natural or ordinary
meaning and applied without the judge seeking to put a gloss on the words or seek to
make sense of the statute. A focus is on the plain or ordinary meaning of particular

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words. The court’s approach is textualist, in the sense that it generally begins its
inquiry with the written text of the Constitution.
Lord Scarman observed:-
"In this field (of statute law), Parliament makes and unmakes the law (and) the
Judge's duty is to interpret and to apply the law."
As stated by Krishna Iyer J "to be literal in meaning is to see the skin and miss the
soul. - Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines v
Ramjee, AIR 1977 SC 965. So, The Court shall avoid to re interpret the statute.
Brett, MR in Lion Insurance Association v Tucker, (1883-84) 12 QBD 176,
called it a "cardinal rule" that "Whenever you have to understand or interpret a
statute or document you do not interpret it according to the mere ordinary general
meaning of the words, but according to the ordinary meaning of the words as applied
to the subject matter with regard to which they are used.
Professor HA Smith - no words can be defined in vacuum, or without reference to
some context".
Popular Meaning
"What is the natural or ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in its context in the
statute? It is only when that meaning leads to some result which cannot reasonably be
supposed to have been the intention of the Legislature, that it is proper to look for
some other possible meaning of the word or phrase". - This is called Popular meaning.
For example, suppose there is a statute framed in the year 1980s where there is a
provision when a man commits cruelty against his wife during the marriage, he will
be liable for punishment. Here, whether the word during the marriage includes “live
in relationship”?
So you have to interpret in accordance with the current scenario of society.
In the Australian constitutional context, a constitutional interpretation that gives
the textual mode priority over other modes has been called “literalism”.
This approach derives from the Engineers’ Case,[Amalgamated Society of
Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Company Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129].
In which the court drew on a conventional rule of statutory construction in saying that
the words of the Constitution should be given their “natural” or “ordinary” meaning.
In Australian constitutional law, the primacy of the literalist approach is said to
derive from the character of the text of the Constitution itself.
As McHugh J observed in Singh v Commonwealth (2004) 209 ALR 355 at 372

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“Because the Constitution is contained in a statute of the Imperial Parliament and
the people of the Constitution have agreed to be governed under the Constitution, it
seems obvious that the best guides to its interpretation are the general rules of
statutory interpretation.”
R v Harris (1836) 7 C & P 446
The defendant bit off his victim's nose. The statute made it an offence 'to stab cut or
wound' the court held that under the literal rule the act of biting did not come within
the meaning of stab cut or wound as these words implied an instrument had to be
used. Therefore the defendant's conviction was quashed.
Fisher v Bell [1961] 1 QB 394
The defendant had a flick knife displayed in his shop window with a price tag on it.
Statute made it a criminal offence to 'offer' such flick knives for sale. His conviction
was quashed as goods on display in shops are not 'offers' in the technical sense but an
invitation to treat. The court applied the literal rule of statutory interpretation.
INDIAN CASES ON LITERAL INTERPRETATION
Siraj-ul-Haq v Sunni Central Board, UP, AIR 1959 SC 198 - where literal
meaning of the words used in a statutory provision would manifestly defeat its object
by making a part of it meaningless and ineffective, it is legitimate and even necessary
to adopt the rule of liberal construction so as to give meaning to all parts of the
provision and to make the whole of it effective and operative.
Jugalkishore Saraf v Raw Cotton Co Ltd, AIR 1955 SC 376 -
Application for execution by transferee of decree - In dealing with O 21, rule 16 of
the CPC, 1908, the Supreme Court applied the rule of literal construction and held
that the said provision contemplates actual transfer of a decree by an assignment in
writing after the decree is passed.
Further, SR Das J, referring to the rule under discussion said:
The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statutes literally, that is, by
giving to the words their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however,
such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning,
the Court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the
court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. In the present case the
literal construction leads to no apparent absurdity.
Deepak Aggarwal v Keshav Kaushik, (2013) 5 SCC 277, p 331. -
Article 233(2) of the Constitution of India, provides that a person shall only be

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eligible to be appointed as a District Judge if he has been, for not less than seven
years, an advocate or pleader, and is recommended by the High Court for
appointment.
Literal Interpretation - Supreme Court held that it is clear from the expression "has
been" that the present perfect continuous tense is used for a position which began
sometime in the past and is still continuing, and that therefore such person must, with
the requisite period, still be continuing as an advocate on the date of his application.
State of Kerala v Mathai Verghese, (1986) 4 SCC 746
Issue - Interpretation of expression “any currency note or bank note”.
Kerala High Court - "any currency note or banknote" used in section 489A of the
India Penal 11Code of 1860 refers to Indian Currency notes and bank notes.
Supreme Court - "any currency note or banknote" used in section 489A of the India
Penal Code of 1860 are large enough in amplitude to cover currency notes and bank
notes of all countries.

Conclusion
According to Gray -
Grammatical interpretation is the application to a statute of the laws of speech;
logical interpretation calls for the comparison of the statute with other statutes and
with the whole system of law, and for the consideration of the time and circumstances
in which the statute was passed.
It is the duty of the judicature to ascertain the true legal meaning of the words used by
the legislature.