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Impossible Worlds
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Stanford Encyclopedia According to David Hume, the impossible cannot be conceived. Moritz
Schlick claimed that the logically impossible, such as an explicit
of Philosophy inconsistency, is simply unthinkable. Yet Hegel complained that it is “one
of the fundamental prejudices of logic as hitherto understood” that “the
contradictory cannot be imagined or thought” (Hegel 1931: 430). On this
approach, our representational capabilities are not limited to the possible:
we are able to conceive, describe, and sometimes even believe,
impossibilities.
Edward N. Zalta Uri Nodelman Colin Allen R. Lanier Anderson
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This entry is about impossibilities. In order to read it fruitfully, you might
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impossible worlds are best understood against the background of possible
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break down in important respects. (We will see one in section 4 below.)
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Impossible Worlds
Copyright c 2018 by the authors This entry is about worlds that are not possible, with “possible”
Francesco Berto and Mark Jago
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1
Impossible Worlds Francesco Berto and Mark Jago
totality of possible worlds, which capture all and only the genuine impossible world in the first sense but not in the second, for it does not
possibilities. The worlds we are interested in are not in there. These worlds violate any logical law.
are often called logically impossible worlds, as logical laws such as the
Law of Non-Contradiction or the Law of Excluded Middle are assumed to Classical Logic Violators: another definition has it that impossible worlds
be the most general and topic-neutral: they are supposed to hold at all are worlds where the laws of classical logic fail (see e.g. Priest 1997a). A
possible worlds. From now on, we are talking of impossible worlds world complying with intuitionistic logic, and where instances of the Law
simpliciter, meaning worlds that are not possible with respect to an of Excluded Middle fail, will be impossible in the third sense.
unrestricted notion of possibility, however this is further characterized.
Contradiction-Realizers: a still more specific definition has it that an
A look at the rapidly growing literature on impossible worlds (see Nolan impossible world is a world where sentences of the form A and ¬A hold,
2013 for a survey) presents us with a number of definitions. These can be against the Law of Non-Contradiction (see e.g. Lycan 1994). Impossible
reduced to four main items: worlds of the fourth kind will be impossible in the third sense, but not vice
versa. Our intuitionistic world above will have the Law of Non-
Impossible Ways: just as possible worlds are often introduced intuitively Contradiction hold unrestrictedly: it will be impossible in the third, but not
by characterising them as ways things could have been, so are impossible in the fourth sense.
worlds often characterized as ways things could not have been. The initial
insight is that not everything is possible, that is, some things just 1. Reasons for Introducing Impossible Worlds
(absolutely) cannot happen. Anything that just can’t happen must be an 2. Applications of Impossible Worlds
absolute impossibility; and these ways the world just couldn’t be are 2.1 Intentional States
impossible worlds (see e.g. Salmon 1984; Yagisawa 1988; Restall 1997; 2.2 Inconsistent Information
Beall & van Fraassen 2003). 2.3 Fiction
2.4 Propositional Content
Logic Violators: another definition has it that impossible worlds are worlds 2.5 Counterpossible Reasoning
where the laws of logic fail. This depends on what we take the laws of 3. The Metaphysics of Impossible Worlds
logic to be. Given some logic L, an impossible world with respect to the 4. The Structure of Impossible Worlds
L-laws is one in which some of those laws fail to hold (see e.g. Priest 4.1 The Granularity Issue
2001, Chapter 9). An impossible world in this second sense will be an 4.2 The Closeness of Impossible Worlds
impossible world in the first sense, given that logical necessity is 5. The Logic(s) of Impossible Worlds
unrestricted. But not vice versa. Suppose it’s metaphysically necessary 5.1 Impossible Worlds in Non-Normal Modal Logics
that the Mona Lisa (if it exists) was painted by da Vinci. Then a world in 5.2 Nonadjunctive and Nonprime Impossible Worlds
which the Mona Lisa was painted by Neil Buchanan on Art Attack is an 5.3 Impossible Worlds in Epistemic Logic
5.4 Impossible Worlds in Relevant Logic
2 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2018 Edition 3

6. Objections to Impossible Worlds goes both ways” (Beall and van Fraassen 2003: 86). If quantification on
6.1 The Exportation Principle ways the world could have been should be taken at face value as providing
6.2 Defining Possibility evidence for possible worlds, then quantification on ways the world could
6.3 The Usefulness of Impossible Worlds not have been should be taken at face value as providing evidence for
6.4 The Semantics of Negation impossible worlds.
6.5 Counterpossible Reasoning
6.6 Compositionality The argument as such is hardly convincing. Firstly, one author’s modus
Bibliography ponens is another’s modus tollens. Some have used similar considerations
Academic Tools to argue against Lewis’s modal realism (see Skyrms 1976; Naylor 1986):
Other Internet Resources if one believes in possible worlds (of the Lewisian kind) as ways things
Related Entries could have been, then by parity of reasoning one should believe in
impossible worlds (ditto) as ways things could not have been. But
impossible worlds are too much to swallow, so (by modus tollens) one
1. Reasons for Introducing Impossible Worlds should not believe in Lewis’s modal realism.
Why might one believe in impossible worlds? One argument is the so- Secondly, taking quantification over any kind of entity whatsoever at face
called “argument from ways” (Vander Laan 1997), which is related to the value, just because it is embedded in ordinary language, doesn’t look like
first definition of impossible world given above. This draws on the a promising general strategy. Lewis’s case for accepting commitment to
analogy with David Lewis’s notorious argument concerning our possible worlds did not consist just in an argument from ways. He also
quantifying over ways things could have been (see Lewis 1973: 84). The provided independent motivation for taking quantification over possible
world could have been different in so many ways: Hilary Clinton could worlds at face value. A non-reductive account of possible worlds,
have won the 2016 US election, I could be dancing on the ceiling, and according to Lewis, brings net theoretical utility. The ontological cost is
Fermat’s Last Theorem could have remained without proof. Our belief in compensated by a theoretical gain, given the variety of ontological,
possible worlds is just a paraphrase of our belief that there are many ways semantic, and conceptual explanations allowed by our taking the notion of
the world could have been. possible world seriously. This is likely to be the main motivation for
believing in impossible worlds. As we will see below, defenders of
Aren’t there also ways the world could not have been? Some authors impossible worlds claim that they are are theoretically useful.
endorse the claim that anything is possible (e.g. Mortensen 1989).
However, the majority of philosophers believe that not everything is Another argument on behalf of impossible worlds, quite pervasive in the
possible, in the sense that some things just can’t happen. If I tell you that literature, comes from counterpossible reasoning (e.g. Beall & van
my college has a cupola which is both fully round and fully square, you Fraassen 2003, Chapter 4; Nolan 1997; Restall 1997; Brogaard & Salerno
are likely to reply, “it can’t be that way!”. So it seems that “‘ways’ talk 2013). This is reasoning from suppositions, assumptions, or conditional

antecedents which are not only false, but impossible. We can reason non- position. Yet the analysis in terms of worlds does a good job for
trivially from impossible suppositions, by asking what would be the case, conditionals with possible antecedents. This motivates a semantics for
were (say) the Law of Excluded Middle false. To say that we reason non- counterpossibles in terms of impossible (as well as possible) worlds. We
trivially from an assumption means just that we accept some conclusions will get into more detail in section 2.5.
but reject others on the basis of that assumption. If we hypothetically
suppose the Law of Excluded Middle to be false, for example, then we These kinds of argument highlight the usefulness of impossible worlds as
would likely conclude that intuitionistic logic would be preferable to devices for analyzing particular linguistic, logical, and philosophical
classical logic, given that supposition. We are unlikely to conclude that issues. The point can be expanded into the general “argument from utility”
classical logic would be a satisfactory logic, or that scarlet would be a mentioned above: we should believe in impossible worlds because they
shade of green, given that supposition. The point readily generalizes to are useful tools for logicians and philosophers. Whether that general
reasoning about entire theories and to serious philosophical and logical argument is acceptable depends on how persuasive the specific impossible
debates. We often reason from suppositions about the truth of certain worlds analyses are. Let’s look at some.
logical, mathematical, or metaphysical theories which, if in fact false, are
necessarily false, because of the very nature of their subject matter. 2. Applications of Impossible Worlds
This kind of reasoning is related to our assessment of certain conditional This section briefly describes various applications of impossible worlds,
statements with impossible antecedents, often called counterpossible which collectively provide the main motivation for introducing them.
conditionals or, more simply, counterpossibles. These include statements
such as, if Excluded Middle were false, classical logic would not be an
2.1 Intentional States
acceptable logic. Let’s call a conditional like this trivially true when it is
Modelling intentional states, such as knowledge and belief, is a prominent
true and the conditional with the same antecedent and opposite (negated)
motivation for introducing impossible worlds. The intuitive idea is that
consequent is also true. Consider these examples:
one gains knowledge or belief by ruling out would-be possibilities (the
(1.1) If Hobbes had squared the circle, then mathematicians would have epistemic/doxastic possibilities for that agent). An agent’s knowledge is
been amazed. whatever is true according to all epistemically possible worlds accessible
(1.2) If Hobbes had squared the circle, then mathematicians would not to that agent, i.e., the worlds which represent ways things could be, for all
have been amazed. the agent knows (and similarly for belief).
The first is intuitively true, the second intuitively false. If that’s correct, Impossible worlds are useful within this approach because these would-be
then there are non-trivially true counterpossibles. These considerations possibilities often turn out to be impossible. Our beliefs are often
impact on our preferred semantics for such conditionals, for the possible (covertly) inconsistent with one another. Moreover, our knowledge and
worlds semantics for conditionals has trouble accommodating this belief is not closed under (classical) logical consequence: we do not know

or believe all consequences of what we know or believe. It is hard to principle that knowing that A ∧ B implies knowing that A and knowing
accommodate these features using only possible worlds. Possible worlds that B. He achieves this using impossible worlds in which conjunctions
models usually generate the problem of logical omniscience (see epistemic may be true even if their conjuncts are not.
logic), which we will discuss in section 5.3.
2.2 Inconsistent Information
One feature of rational agents’ intentional states is that they typically reject
obvious impossibility or absurdity whilst being subject to subtle Closely connected with inconsistent information is the issue of modelling
inconsistency (Lewis 2004). One attempt to capture this feature is inconsistent databases (see Barwise 1997). These may consist, for
developed through Jago 2006, 2007, 2009, 2014a. The idea is that only instance, in sets of data supplied by different sources which are
genuine possibilities and non-obvious impossibilities should be inconsistent with each other, such as incompatible evidence presented by
epistemically accessible to rational (but imperfect) agents such as us. For different witnesses in a trial. Intuitively, we are allowed to draw the logical
some agents, it may be epistemically possible that Fermat’s Last consequences of data fed in by a single source, but should not conjoin data
Theorem’s is false, but 0 being 1 shouldn’t be epistemically possible for from distinct sources which may be inconsistent with each other. The data
anyone. That’s why we know the latter but may fail to know the former, base is “compartimentalized”: occasional inconsistencies are placed in
says Jago. One worry with this approach is that it is in part proof theoretic, separate sectors and should not be asserted conjunctively (see e.g., Hyde
whereas it isn’t clear that proof length correlates well with obviousness. 1997, Brown & Priest 2004). Impossible worlds are useful in such models
Bjerring (2013) presents other objections to the view. A strategy similar to —particularly non-adjunctive worlds, where a conjunction may be false
Jago’s is adopted in Berto 2014, 2017. even if both conjuncts are true. (We discuss such worlds further in section
5.2.)
A quite different application of impossible worlds to epistemic states has
been proposed by JC Beall 2009, in relation to the Church-Fitch 2.3 Fiction
knowability paradox. The Church-Fitch reasoning is supposed to show
that is contradictory to suppose that any truth can be known (as some anti- Inconsistent information is at issue also in certain works of fiction. Lewis’s
realists claim). The reasoning is this. Suppose all truths are knowable but classic 1978 paper proposed an analysis of the expression “true in such-
some are not in fact known. Then some truth A, is not known: A ∧ ¬KA. and-such fiction” in terms of possible worlds. What holds in a certain
By assumption, it’s possible to know this: ◊K(A ∧ ¬KA). Seemingly fictional work is what holds at a set of possible worlds, properly selected
good reasoning (in classical epistemic logic) implies that it’s possible both via a series of (quite subtle and complex) clauses. But fiction can be
to know and not know that A: ◊(KA ∧ ¬KA), which of course isn’t occasionally inconsistent. Sometimes, this happens unintentionally: Conan
possible at all. The usual moral to draw is that not all truths are knowable. Doyle’s The Sign of the Four describes Watson as limping because of a
Beall’s idea, by contrast, is that the knowability principle can be war wound at his leg. In A Study in Scarlet, however, Watson has no
maintained (and the corresponding kind of anti-realism along with it). His wound at his leg (for his wound is in his shoulder and he doesn’t limp).
suggestion is to deny distribution of knowledge over conjunction: the One may claim that the set of worlds that make such stories true has to be

split into disjoint subsets, making true consistent fragments of the fiction. further impossible world w3 at which bachelors are married (but at which
This strategy won’t always work, however, for inconsistencies in fiction swans and Diophantine equations behave correctly). Ripley (2013) argues
may be intentional (as stressed in Proudfoot 2006). Suppose we write a that an account along these lines is a better strategy for addressing the
novel, and in its first chapter we have the Mad Mathematician produce a coarse-grainedness problem than resorting to structured propositions.
round square. If the intentional inconsistency is excised, the fact that
mathematicians all over the world are amazed by this result in the second One other application of impossible worlds concerns perceptual
chapter becomes unexplainable. A natural treatment of these cases, then, is impossibilities. When we see an Escher drawing or a Penrose triangle, our
obtained by admitting (appropriately selected) impossible worlds in the set experience has content. But that content is impossible: such structures
of situations that realize what is told in the story (see e.g. Priest 1997b; cannot be realised. The content of our experience in such cases is naturally
Woods 2003, Chapter 6; Berto 2012, Chapters 7 and 8, Badura and Berto captured using impossible worlds. Splitting that content into smaller
forthcoming). internally consistent parts would lose the essential feature of the whole.
This issue is explored in Mortensen 1997.
2.4 Propositional Content
2.5 Counterpossible Reasoning
Closely connected to belief is the notion of propositional content. Within
possible worlds semantics, propositions can be defined as functions from Perhaps the most important application of impossible worlds has to do
worlds to truth values, or as sets of worlds: a proposition is the set of with counterpossible reasoning, understood as counterfactual reasoning
worlds at which it is true. The account is notoriously too coarse-grained from impossible antecedents. As we saw in section 1, this kind of
(Barwise 1997). Intuitively distinct impossible propositions (that swans reasoning is often taken to provide independent motivation for believing in
are blue and not blue; that Fermat’s Last Theorem is false; that Charles is a impossible worlds. In Lewis-Stalnaker theories of counterfactuals, a
married bachelor) all hold at precisely no possible worlds. And we have a conditional of the form, “if it were the case that A, then it would be the
dual problem with (unrestrictedly) necessary propositions, which are all case that B” is true if and only if, at the closest world (or closest worlds) at
identified with the set of all possible worlds. Treating propositions as set- which A is true, B is also true. (This is a simplification of the truth
theoretic constructions out of possible worlds leads to a very coarse conditions provided in the full-fledged semantics of Lewis 1973.)
individuation of propositions, and because of this it has been subject to
While the standard conditional logics based on this idea have been quite
seemingly devastating attacks, for instance, by Scott Soames 1987.
successful in the treatment of counterfactuals, the approach entails that
However, impossible worlds allow for fine-grained distinctions
any counterfactual whose antecedent is impossible is vacuously true. For
unavailable in standard possible worlds semantics. An impossible
if there are no possible worlds at which A is true, then trivially, all closest
proposition need not be equated with the empty set of worlds, for it may
A-worlds (worlds where A is true) are B-worlds. This is unsatisfying in
be a set which includes (only) impossible worlds. We can have an
many respects, for we often need to reason nontrivially about theories that
impossible world w1 with impossibly coloured swans, a distinct
(perhaps unbeknownst to us) cannot possibly be correct; and we often
impossible world w2 at which Fermat’s Last Theorem is false, and a

need to reason from antecedents that may turn out to be not only false, but founded sets, the Continuum Hypothesis, the Axiom of Choice, the
necessarily so. (Compare the example conditionals (1.1) and (1.2) in set/(proper-)class distinction, etc. If one embraces the Platonic view
section 1 for an example.) (subscribed to, at least implicitly, by many set theorists) that there is One
True Universe of sets, then at most one of the alternative set theories can
Three contexts in which theories of this kind show up are discourses on be correct: the others are wrong, and necessarily so. But people can work
(1) alternative logics, (2) mathematical conjectures, and (3) metaphysical under the hypothesis that a necessarily false basic mathematical principle
views. We will now say a few words on each of them. holds, and reason coherently from this:
(1) A famous Quinean motto has it that “to change the logic is to change It is doubtless true that nothing sensible can be said about how
the subject”: apparently disagreeing logical parties are actually speaking things would be different if there were no number 17; that is
of different things. So when intuitionists deny that the Law of Excluded largely because the antecedent of this counterfactual gives us no
Middle holds in non-finitary contexts, they are actually changing the hints as to what alternative mathematics is to be regarded as true in
meaning of logical operators; when paraconsistentists claim that some the counterfactual situation in question. If one changes the example
formula can be true (in some weird circumstances) together with its to “Nothing sensible can be said about how things would be
negation, they are not talking of negation anymore (see e.g., Berto 2008). different if the axiom of choice were false”, it seems wrong … : if
the axiom of choice were false, the cardinals wouldn’t be linearly
But this does not make good sense of many disputes between intuitionists,
ordered, the Banach-Tarski theorem would fail and so forth. (Field
classical logicians, paraconsistentists, quantum logicians, etc. It is more
1989: 237–8)
fruitful to assume that each party generally understands the rival logics as
intelligible, albeit necessarily false, theories. Even if classical logic Field takes this as an argument to the effect that mathematical necessity is
actually is the one true logic, one can reason counterpossibly about what not coextensive with logical necessity. But we can turn the tables around:
would be the case if a certain non-classical logic were the correct one mathematical necessity is unrestricted and false mathematical theories are
(e.g., “if intuitionistic logic were correct, then the Law of Excluded just impossible theories.
Middle would fail” is true and “if intuitionistic logic were correct, then the
Law of Explosion would fail” is false). One can take into account (3) The third area in which counterpossible reasoning comes into play are
situations in which the Law of Excluded Middle fails and argue about metaphysical disputes (and more broadly, any philosophical dispute whose
what would and would not be the case in them. These situations are, by subject matter is necessarily true or necessarily false). Much metaphysical
classical standards, just impossible worlds (of the third kind: Classical talk is made with our quantifiers “wide open”, that is, aiming at stating
Logic Violators). truths about all that there was, is, or could possibly be. This is evident in
modal ontology, when people advance a theory on the totality of worlds
(2) Similar claims can be made for mathematical conjectures. Different set and on their nature. But other metaphysical debates easily come to mind.
theorists have different views on controversial subjects such as non-well- Suppose a philosopher wants to evaluate metaphysical theories which she

considers wrong (say, in order to draw unpalatable consequences by way worlds where A obtains and B fails, making the counterpossible false even
of criticism), such as Spinoza’s monism or Hegel’s metaphysics of the though the corresponding strict conditional is true.
Absolute. She must envisage situations where such metaphysics are
correct and wonder what would be the case according to them: situations The ensuing anarchy can be mitigated to some extent, e.g., by assuming
at which there is only one substance, or at which the Absolute Geist what Nolan 1997 calls the Strangeness of Impossibility Condition (SIC):
necessarily shapes the teleological development of history. These any possible world, however weird, should be closer to any possible world
situations will be, under the hypotheses we have made, impossible worlds. w than any impossible world is to w. Reality will be turned upside down
before logical laws or mathematical truths abandon us. Then it is plausible
Semantic structures for counterfactual conditionals involving impossible that the Lewis-Stalnaker principles will still hold whenever the relevant
worlds were first introduced by Routley 1989, and have been proposed e.g. antecedent is possible. For then we will consider only the closest
by Read 1995, Mares & Fuhrmann 1995, Mares 1997, Nolan 1997, antecedent-worlds when we evaluate the conditional, all of which will be
Brogaard & Salerno 2013, Bjerring 2014, Berto et al. 2018. Most of these possible worlds: the impossible ones will be too far away (Berto et al.
are natural extensions of Lewis’s 1973 semantics for counterfactuals and 2018).
capture several intuitions about counterpossible reasoning. The main task
for such theories consists in accounting for the concepts of closeness and 3. The Metaphysics of Impossible Worlds
qualitative similarity between worlds once impossible worlds enter the
stage. How to fine-tune these notions is not a trivial matter (for an Supporters of impossible worlds disagree over their metaphysical nature,
extensive discussion, see Vander Laan 2004; we will say more in section just as supporters of possible worlds do. If one accepts ontological
4.2). commitment to worlds of any kind, then one faces the follow-up question:
just what are they, metaphysically speaking?
Non-trivial treatments of counterpossibles require the failure of several
logical principles which hold in the standard Lewis-Stalnaker approach to The two main options among modal realists (philosophers who accept
counterfactuals (Williamson 2007 chapter 5, Brogaard & Salerno 2013). possible worlds in their ontology) are David Lewis’s extreme or genuine
(Williamson uses these failures to argue that counterpossibles are always modal realism and ersatzism (or actualism or abstractionism: these terms
trivially true.) One important principle that fails is the entailment from a all have slightly different connotations, which we’ll ignore here). It is a
strict conditional, “if A then-strictly B”, to the corresponding common thought among impossible worlds theorists that impossible
counterfactual, “if it were the case that A then it would be the case that B”. worlds should just inherit the ontological status of their possible mates:
Normally, the former entails the latter. A strict conditional is true when all whatever your favorite metaphysics of possible worlds is, impossible
the (accessible) possible worlds where the antecedent is true also make the worlds are of the same kind. This has been called the Parity Thesis (see
consequent true. If all the possible A-worlds are B-worlds, then in Rescher & Brandom 1980). As Graham Priest puts it:
particular all the closest possible A-worlds are B-worlds. In an account
As far as I can see, any of the main theories concerning the nature
which admits impossible worlds, however, we can have closest impossible

of possible worlds can be applied equally to impossible worlds: temporal worms extended across time: an object has a property at time t
they are existent nonactual entities; they are nonexistent objects; by having a temporal stage at time t which has that property. Analogously,
they are constructions out of properties and other universals; they for Yagisawa an object has a modal property, a property at world w , by
are just certain sets of sentences. … There is, as far as I can see, having a modal stage at world w which has that property.
absolutely no cogent (in particular, non-question-begging) reason
to suppose that there is an ontological difference between merely More moderate (Yagisawa would say: too moderate) realists treat
possible and impossible worlds. (Priest 1997b: 580–1) impossible worlds as ersatz constructions: abstract entities on a par with
ersatz possible worlds (see e.g. Mares 1997, Vander Laan 1997). Modal
Yagisawa’s extended modal realism proposes a Lewis-inspired realist ersatzism comes in various shapes (Divers 2002, Part III, is by far the best
account of impossible worlds and impossibilia (the objects exemplifying critical evaluation in the literature). If one takes possible worlds as
absolute impossibilities which inhabit impossible worlds). On this view, maximally consistent sets of propositions (as per Adams 1974), impossible
impossible worlds are concrete mereological sums of real individuals, worlds could be sets of propositions that are inconsistent and/or
which are causally and spatiotemporally interrelated within each world but incomplete. Similarly, Plantingan ersatzism (possible worlds are particular
never across worlds (see Yagisawa 1988). Yagisawa exploits the states of affairs) or Stalnakerian ersatzism (possible worlds are world-
“argument from ways” we met above: if quantification on ways the world natures or maximal properties) could be easily extended to accommodate
might be or have been commits us to possible worlds, then, by parity of impossible worlds. All hands agree that such worlds come at no great
reasoning, quantification on ways the world might not be commits us to ontological or theoretical cost, once one has accepted ersatz possible
impossible worlds. The argument is backed by Yagisawa’s considerations worlds. After all, ersatz worlds are abstract: they account for
on the additional logical and philosophical applications allowed by impossibilities, not by instantiating them as Lewisian worlds do, but by
impossible worlds, which are not available, in his view, to traditional representing them in some way or other. Jago (2012) takes both possible
Lewisian modal realism. Extended modal realism is a strong position: and impossible worlds to be constructions out of positive and negative
concrete impossible worlds represent absolute and logical impossibilities facts, such as Barack Obama’s not being French (see the entry on facts).
directly, by instantiating them. So impossibilities and, in particular, logical
inconsistencies, are “out there” in reality. The extension of ersatzism from possible to impossible worlds appears to
be particularly straightforward for linguistic ersatzism. On this approach,
In his 2010 book, Yagisawa is more distant from Lewisian modal realism. possible worlds are world-books: sets of sentences of a special
He still admits impossible worlds and impossibilia, and he rejects ersatz “worldmaking” language. (Carnap’s (1947) state-descriptions and
accounts of them. However, he now takes worlds to be points in modal Jeffrey’s (1983) complete consistent novels are examples of this strategy.)
space. Worlds are modal indices for truth, just like times are temporal It is easy to admit impossible worlds of the same kind, that is, world-
indices for it; and modal matters are treated in a way similar to how four- books which are locally inconsistent or incomplete, which fail to comply
dimensionalist philosophers, who believe in temporal parts, treat temporal with some logical law or to be closed under some notion or other of
matters. According to four-dimensionalists, material objects are like logical consequence.

However, there may be reasons to reject the Parity Thesis. If Lewis’s planet from the sun. Reinert 2018 attempts to do better by combining
criticisms of ersatzism in On the Plurality of Worlds are right, then each Lewisian possible worlds with an ersatz situation-based account of
ersatz account of impossible worlds inherits the limits of ersatz theories of impossible worlds.
possible worlds: each of these theories has to resort to intensional entities
taken as primitive (such as propositions or states of affairs) in its A metaphysical account of impossible worlds, alternative both to ersatzism
explanation of what ersatz worlds are, or to primitive modal notions (most and to Lewisian realism, has been proposed in Zalta 1997. Zalta’s
often, to both). Suppose that, instead, one wants to retain the advantages of powerful theory of abstract objects is based upon his logic of encoding,
both worlds (no pun intended), ersatz and genuine, when it comes to whose core idea consists in postulating an ambiguity in the copula of
impossibilities. Suppose, that is, that (a) one wants to employ a modal predication: “x is P” can mean that object x exemplifies property P , as per
framework including both possible and impossible worlds to retain the ordinary predication; but it may also mean that x encodes P, encoding
theoretical benefits provided by the latter; and (b) one wants to stick to being a special mode of predication. An object which encodes a property
Lewis’s project of a reductive account of intensional and modal notions to is determined by it, but without instantiating or exemplifying it. Abstract
fully extensional ones (contra ersatzism); but also (c) one wants to avoid objects encode properties, besides exemplifying them; in particular, they
the unwelcome consequences of concrete impossible worlds instantiating can encode properties they do not exemplify (see Zalta 1983). Within this
impossibilities, such as having true contradictions “out there” in reality theory, situations are defined as abstract objects that encode states of
(contra Yagisawa’s extended modal realism). One could then try the affairs (taken as 0-ary properties); and impossible worlds are taken as
following hybrid solution: (1) go realist about possible worlds, and (2) maximal situations that are not possible, that is, such that it is not possible
exploit the set-theoretic machinery of modal realism to represent different that all the states of affairs encoded by them simultaneously obtain.
impossible worlds as distinct ersatz, abstract constructions.
Zalta claims that, despite treating worlds as abstract objects, this is not an
To fulfil these desiderata, Berto 2010 sketches an intermediate account, ersatz conception of worlds. A given state of affairs p ’s obtaining at world
labeled as Hybrid Modal Realism (HMR), which dispenses with the Parity w (no matter whether w is possible or impossible) is analyzed as:
Thesis. The account follows suggestions from Divers 2002, Chapter 5, and
(Z) w encodes the property being-such-that-p,
is similar to a strategy pursued in Kiourti 2010, Chapter 3. On this view,
genuine, concrete possible worlds are the basic stuff. Atomic propositions and so being-such-that-p is ascribed, in the encoding sense, to w . As such,
are taken as sets of possible worlds. Distinct impossible situations can then w is (in the encoding sense of the copula, at least) such that p . Thus,
be represented by distinct world-books, taken as set-theoretic according to Zalta’s theory of encoding, worlds are in some sense
constructions from atomic propositions. Krakauer 2013 gives a similar metaphysically characterized or determined by such states of affairs. And
account in terms of structured propositions built out of ordinary possible according to Zalta nothing of the sort can be claimed of ersatz conceptions
worlds. Jago 2012 and Sendłak 2015 criticise Berto’s approach on the of worlds.
basis that it cannot distinguish the proposition that Hesperus is the second
planet from the sun from the proposition that Phosphorus is the second

All the ontological accounts of impossible worlds presented so far are in a standard fashion at them, whereas sentences that include just the Boolean
broad sense realist. They all accept that sentences referring to or operators of classical logic get the standard treatment. Such worlds appear
quantifying over impossible worlds can be literally true, and take the to be logically more structured than fully anarchic “open” worlds (section
entailed ontological commitment at face value, although they disagree 5.3). For, we shall see, even principles of classical logic involving only the
with each other about the metaphysical status of worlds. A deeply anti- extensional, truth-functional connectives can fail at open worlds: their
realist alternative to modal metaphysics has also been developed: modal openness consists in their not being closed under any non-trivial logical
fictionalism. The view is fictionalist (or anti-realist) about worlds. Its key consequence principle.
claim is that talk of and quantification over worlds ought to be understood
as literally false: it is only true within a “worlds fiction”. We make-believe Should we require impossible worlds to comply with any logical rules?
in the fiction because it delivers useful results in the explanation of modal And if we allow different classes of impossible worlds, each exhibiting
notions. Modal fictionalism promises the theoretical benefits of modal different degrees of logical structure, can these classes be ordered in a
realism without the ontological costs. We should not include worlds (other meaningful way? This section focuses on these two issues.
than the actual world) in our ontological catalogue. But talking as if there
4.1 The Granularity Issue
were worlds is useful. Gideon Rosen (1990), a major proponent of the
view, takes Lewisian modal realism to be the relevant fiction. But it is Are there any logical principles which impossible worlds must obey?
relatively easy to extend such modal fictionalist accounts into fictional More precisely, is there any logical inference such that, for any
treatments of possible and impossible worlds, taking e.g. Yagisawa’s (impossible) world w , if the premises are all true according to w , then so is
extended modal realism as the fiction which we make-believe. JC Beall the conclusion? There is at least one such inference: the trivial inference
(2008) proposes an approach to impossible worlds (see section 5.1), which from A to A . (For if A is true at world w , then A is true at world w!) Are
can be motivated by the idea that these are worlds where “logical fictions” there any others? This is the granularity issue.
take place.
In addressing the issue, a good starting place is Nolan’s Principle (Nolan
4. The Structure of Impossible Worlds 1997: 542):
Another issue which theories of impossible worlds disagree on concerns (NP) If it is impossible that A , then there’s an impossible world which
the amount of logical structure such worlds have. This issue affects represents that A.
impossible worlds specifically: there is no correlative issue concerning
(This is not an ‘if and only if’, since the converse is clearly false: some
possible worlds (beyond our choice of logic). Various classes of
impossible world represents your reading this article, yet that’s not at all
impossible worlds display different degrees of anarchic logical behavior:
impossible. Impossible worlds represent possible and impossible
as we shall see, non-normal worlds for non-normal modal logics (section
situations. The things they represent make for an impossible bunch, but
5.1), for instance, are such that only modal sentences behave in a non-
might each be possible when taken individually.)

The principle has some intuitive force. Nolan thinks of it as a kind of worlds are not, in general, governed by standard paraconsistent logics. A
unrestricted ‘comprehension principle’ for impossibilities. It tells paraconsistent logic is any one in which cont radictory premises A, ¬A do
something about which impossible worlds there are. There will be worlds not entail arbitrary conclusions. But standardly, paraconsistent logics
which represent that water is not H2O, that 2 + 2 = 5 , and that snow both maintain the principle that conjunctions are true just in case both conjuncts
is and is not white. One might think that (NP) entails that ‘anything goes’ are; disjunctions are true just in case at least one disjunct is; and double
with regard to impossible worlds: that any logical principle (except negations ¬¬A are true just in case A is. If we accept (4.2), then these
A ⊨ A) will be broken by some impossible world. If so, then (NP) delivers relationships will break down in some impossible worlds.
the open worlds mentioned above. However, to apply (NP), we need a
single object-language sentence A which describes an impossibility. Yet even with (4.2) in play, it doesn’t follow that ‘anything goes’ with
Logical laws, by contrast, are stated as relationships between multiple impossible worlds. No principle so far entails that some impossible world
object-language sentences. So it is not clear that (NP) does its intended breaks the Adjunction rule, from A and B to A ∧ B, simply because 4.2
work. doesn’t apply to inferences with multiple premises. (We discuss
Adjunction-violating worlds further in section 5.2 below.) To infer the
Priest (2016) adopts two principles that are similar to, but stronger than, ‘anything goes’ conclusion, that for any logically valid inference there is
(NP): ‘everything holds at some worlds, and everything fails at some some impossible world that breaks it, we’ll need this principle:
worlds’ (Priest 2016, 5) and, for any distinct A , B , ‘there are worlds where
A holds and B fails’ (Priest 2016, 7). More specifically, in our (NP+ ) If it is impossible that A1 , A2 , … but not B, then there’s an
terminology: impossible world which represents that A1 , A2 , … but not B.
(4.1) For any A, there is a world which represents that A and a world However, we can hardly claim that we’ve derived the ‘anything goes’
which does not represent that A. picture of impossible worlds from this principle, for it is, in effect, an
(4.2) For any distinct A and B, there is a world which represents that A explicit statement of that very view. Whilst the original (NP) has a good
but does not represent that B. deal of intuitive force, it’s much harder to feel that way about (NP+ ).
Priest calls these the ‘primary directive’ and ‘secondary directive’ on There may be no completely general, intuitively motivated principle
impossible worlds, respectively. The latter implies the former, which in (along the lines of (NP)) from which we can ascertain just how fine-
turn implies (NP), but neither converse holds. grained impossible worlds should be. Nevertheless, there are arguments
which support the ‘anything goes’ picture, on which there exist open
To illustrate the extra power (4.2) gives us (over (4.1) and (NP)), consider worlds (those closed under no valid inferences except A ⊨ A) . We’ll
Simplification, the inference from A ∧ B to A, or Disjunction Introduction, briefly consider three such arguments.
from A to A ∨ B . (4.2) directly entails that there are worlds where these
rules fail. So, if we find (4.2) plausible, we can infer that impossible The first is simple. If impossible worlds can break some logical rule, then
why can’t they break all of them? Suppose we fix on standard proof rules

for the connectives. Each such rule is as closely tied to the meaning of the and others who allow reality to have inconsistent features. There seems to
associated connective as the others are (to their associated connectives). be no theoretical cost in requiring A ⊨ A to hold at all worlds (impossible
Yet, as each logically impossible world breaks at least one of those rules, or otherwise). Going back to epistemic states, for example, we want to
what’s to stop some other impossible world from breaking any of the other represent inconsistent beliefs, such as someone’s believing both that A and
rules? This argument has some intuitive force, but is clearly far from that ¬A at the same time; but it would be a mistake to infer that she both
conclusive. believes and does not believe that A.
The second argument is from epistemic states. When we consider real- 4.2 The Closeness of Impossible Worlds
world finite and fallible epistemic agents, there seem to be no rules of the
form: if someone believes A1 , A2 , …, then they must believe (distinct) B If impossible worlds display different degrees of logical structure (or lack
(that’s why the logical omniscience problem discussed in 2.3 is hard!). If thereof), it may make sense to order them. A natural way to do this is via
we model their epistemic states in terms of worlds, then at least one of the an extension of the traditional “closeness” relations between possible
worlds must break the inference from A1 , A2 , … to B. So each logical worlds. How to spell out the ordering in detail, though, is far from
inference (except A ⊨ A) is broken by some world (Jago 2014a; Priest straightforward. Within standard conditional logics, and in the treatment of
2016). counterfactual conditionals in terms of possible worlds due to Robert
Stalnaker (1968) and David Lewis (1973), worlds stand in similarity
The third argument is from counterpossible reasoning. Suppose, in a class relations; and similarity comes in degrees. This is usually represented by
on alternative logics, we consider what would happen if Excluded Middle having each possible world, w , come with a system of “spheres”. If W is
(⊨ A ∨ ¬A), Double-Negation Elimination (¬¬A ⊨ A) , or the Law of the set of all worlds, let $ be a function from worlds to sets of subsets of
Explosion (A, ¬A ⊨ B) were to fail. If classical logic is the one true logic, W , so that $w = {S1 , S2 , …}, with w ∈ S1 ⊆ S2 ⊆ … = W . Worlds
and logical necessity is absolute, we’re then reasoning counterpossibly. If within a given sphere Si are more similar to w than worlds outside it.
we want to analyse counterpossibles in general using impossible worlds,
then we’ll need worlds where these principles fail. But we seem to be able If we take the special case in which w = the actual world (call it “@”), we
to reason this way, non-trivially, for any kind of logical principle, and so get a natural arrangement of possible worlds in a system of spheres that
our analysis will require open worlds (Priest 2016). mirrors their degree of (dis)similarity with respect to @, according to the
different kinds of possibilities and (relative) impossibilities they represent.
Why have we spared A ⊨ A so far? Well, it seems that in order to break For instance, a world which is exactly like @, except that Franz wears a
this, an impossible world would simultaneously have to represent that A white t-shirt instead of the black one he’s actually wearing while writing
and not represent that A. Such a world would itself be an impossible these lines, is, intuitively, closer to @ than a world at which the laws of
object, one with inconsistent features. Since most impossible worlds physics are turned upside down. Some people have a general, intuitive
theorists maintain that impossible worlds (actually) exist and that actuality depiction of such closeness relations, and set out a hierarchy of modalities
is not inconsistent, this position is ruled out. It is available to dialethists accordingly: possible worlds where the laws of physics are different from

ours are naturally seen as more eccentric than worlds where only intuitively less deviant than open worlds, where all formulas may behave
biological, but not physical, laws are different; and these are more arbitrarily. Generalizing, the view would entail arranging the respective
eccentric than possible worlds with minimal factual changes with respect spheres in such a way that any intensionally impossible world is closer to
to @, such as the white t-shirt world. @ than any extensionally impossible one.
Can such a natural view be extended to impossible worlds? First, it is This very general ordering of impossibilities, albeit intuitive, may not be
intuitive to claim that some impossible worlds are more similar to the fully satisfying. A general qualm concerns the SIC principle itself. For one
actual world @ than others. For instance, the “explosion” world (call it e) may claim that, intuitively, some slightly deviant impossible worlds may
at which everything is the case (every sentence is true) seems to be as far be more similar to the actual world @ than some possible but very weird
from @ as one can imagine, if one can actually imagine or conceive such worlds. For instance, the impossible world t above, which is like @ except
an extremely absurd situation. Now, pick the impossible world, t, at which for Franz’s wearing an inconsistent T-shirt, may look more familiar than a
everything is as in @, except that Franz wears an impossible t-shirt which world which is logically possible, but where the laws of physics are turned
is white all over and black all over. Intuitively, t is closer to @ than e . upside down. Several authors (Nolan 1997, Vander Laan 2004, Bernstein
2016) have proposed putative counterexamples to SIC along these lines.
Next, some authors (e.g. Mares 1997) favor Nolan’s SIC principle
(introduced in section 2.5). This implies that any possible world is closer Although we cannot pursue this topic further within the limits of this
to @ than any impossible world is to @. A system of spheres for entry, the discussion developed so far should show that the issue of the
impossible worlds centered on @ will just extend the intuitive possible structure, closeness, and ordering of impossible worlds is quite open.
worlds spheres described above, by adding further, larger spheres where
worlds outside (logical, or more generally unrestricted) possibility stand. 5. The Logic(s) of Impossible Worlds
But how are these latter to be internally ordered?
This section is a bit more technical than the others. None of the other
One very general option is the following. Even though we subscribe to sections presuppose this material.
some unrestricted comprehension principle for impossible worlds, we may
admit that worlds where only the intensional operators, e.g., the box and 5.1 Impossible Worlds in Non-Normal Modal Logics
diamond of necessity and possibility, behave in a non-standard fashion are
Possible worlds semantics is celebrated for providing suitable
less deviant than worlds where also the extensional operators, like
interpretations for different axiomatic systems of modal logic, such as C.I.
classical conjunction and disjunction, do. Let us call worlds of the former
Lewis’s systems S4 and S5 . In each model, sentences are evaluated as true
kind intensionally impossible and worlds of the latter kind extensionally
or false relative to a possible world. Modal sentences ◻A and ◊A (usually
impossible. This picture (inspired by Priest 2005, Chapter 1) has some
read as ‘it is necessary that A’ and ‘it is possible that A’, respectively) are
intuitive force to recommend it. Kripkean non-normal worlds, where only
evaluated in terms of A’s truth at all or some of the accessible worlds. By
the behaviour of the modal operators is non-standard (see section 5.1), are

placing various conditions on the accessibility relation between worlds, necessity ◻ and possibility ◊, but only at normal worlds. If w is non-
different modal logics can be accommodated. (Readers unfamiliar with normal, the truth conditions for the modalizers go as follows:
modal logic are advised again to read the entities on possible worlds and
modal logic before going further in this section.)
vw (◻A) = 0
vw (◊A) = 1
This approach validates the Necessitation inference rule:
where 1 stands for true, 0 for false. At non-normal worlds, formulas of the
If A is valid, then so is ◻A. (In symbols: if ⊨ A then ⊨ ◻A.) form £A, with £ a modal, are not evaluated depending on the truth value of
A at other (accessible) worlds, but get assigned their truth value directly:
To see why, suppose A is a logical truth. Then in any model, it is true at all all box-formulas are false and all diamond-formulas are true. In a sense, at
possible worlds. So given any world w in an arbitrary model, A is true at non-normal worlds nothing is necessary, and anything is possible. These
all worlds accessible from w , hence ◻A is true at w , and so ◻A too is worlds, however, are deviant only in this respect: their behavior, as far as
valid. the extensional connectives are concerned, is quite regular.
Logics in which the Necessitation rule is valid are called normal modal In some (though not all) worlds semantics, logical validity and
logics. But historically, not all of the modal logics of interest are normal consequence are defined relative to just the normal worlds. The idea is that
logics. C.I. Lewis’s systems S2 and S3 are non-normal logics, for the normal worlds behave ‘appropriately’ with respect to the logic in
example. These logics are weaker than normal modal logics, in the sense question, whereas the non-normal worlds do not. For example, ◻(A ∨ ¬A
that they support fewer valid inferences. To give a worlds-based semantics is valid in S2 and S3, but (by definition) it is false at the non-normal
for such logics, we need to look beyond possible worlds. worlds. So we need to ignore the non-normal worlds when defining
validity and consequence, which we do as follows:
In 1965, Saul Kripke introduced a special kind of world, the non-normal
worlds, in order to provide semantics for non-normal modal logics. Let us A is valid (⊨ A) if and only if, for all normal worlds w in all models,
introduce some simple semantic machinery for propositional modal logic. vw (A) = 1.
Take a non-normal interpretation of a propositional modal language,
⟨W, N, R, v⟩ , where W is a set of worlds; N is a proper subset of W , the set Premises S entail A(S ⊨ A) if and only if, for all normal worlds w in
of normal worlds; R is a binary accessibility relation between worlds; and all models: if vw (B) = 1 for all premises B ∈ S, then vw (A) = 1 .
v is a valuation function assigning truth values to formulas at worlds: “
vw (A)” denotes the truth value of A at world w . Worlds in W − N are the
Even though we have ignored the non-normal worlds in this definition,
they still play a role in invalidating Necessitation. For take any classical
non-normal worlds. The truth conditions for the extensional logical
propositional tautology, say A ∨ ¬A . This holds at all worlds of all
vocabulary (negation, conjunction, disjunction, the material conditional)
models, so ◻(A ∨ ¬A) holds at all normal worlds and hence is valid. But
are given the usual way. The same holds for the modal operators of
◻(A ∨ ¬A) holds at no non-normal world. Now suppose w is a normal

world that has access to any non-normal world. Then ◻◻(A ∨ ¬A) is false worlds w1 and w2 , a schematic world w1 ∩ w2 is one at which all and only
at w and so (since w is normal) ◻◻(A ∨ ¬A) is not valid. That’s a the states of affairs obtain, which obtain both at w1 and at w2 . Dually, a
counterexample to Necessitation. “superposed” or inconsistent world w1 ∪ w2 is one at which all and only
the states of affairs obtain, which obtain at w1 or at w2 . Rescher and
In these semantics for non-normal modal logics such as S2 and S3 , the Brandom’s inconsistent-superposed worlds are, therefore, impossible
valuation function assigns the same truth value to all box formulas (false) worlds of the fourth kind: Contradiction Realizers making both A and its
and all diamond formulas (true) at non-normal worlds. But we can do negation true, for some A (just superpose, for instance, a possible world,
things differently. In Cresswell’s (1966) semantics for the modal system w1 , at which I am 1.70m tall, and another possible world, w2 , at which I
S0.5 (due to E.J. Lemmon (1957)), sentences beginning with a modality am 1.90m tall).
are assigned arbitrary truth values. The valuation function v treats modal
sentences as if they were atomic sentences. (Interpretations for S2 or S3 The assignment of truth values at such worlds is not (obviously)
are thus special cases of the interpretations for S0.5.) The idea of compositional with respect to conjunction. The standard semantic clause
considering impossible (non-normal) worlds as worlds at which complex interprets the ‘∧ ’ symbol using our world ‘and’:
formulas are treated as atomic one is a popular one, as we will see below.
(S∧ ) vw (A ∧ B) = 1 if and only if vw (A) = 1 and vw (B) = 1
Kripke introduced non-normal worlds as a technical device in order to
treat C.I. Lewis’ non-normal modal logics; the question of the But the right-to-left direction will have to go, if w is one of Rescher and
interpretation of such structures (particularly, of the ontological status of Brandom’s impossible worlds. These worlds are nonadjunctive: they allow
impossible worlds), then, makes perfect sense — and the answer is not two sentences to be true even though their conjunction is not true.
straightforward, as have seen in section 3. (Adjunction is the principle that the truth of a conjunction follows from the
truth of its conjuncts.) Rescher and Brandom’s worlds can also be
5.2 Nonadjunctive and Nonprime Impossible Worlds nonprime: a disjunction may hold at them even though neither disjunct
does. They may also make some A and its negation ¬A both true. But the
In 1980, Nicholas Rescher and Robert Brandom published The Logic of corresponding conjunction, A ∧ ¬A, doesn’t follow. These impossible
Inconsistency. A Study in Non-Standard Possible-Worlds Semantics and worlds retain a certain amount of logical structure. They are closed under
Ontology. They introduced a modal semantics including, besides ordinary any classically valid, essentially single-premised inference (such as
possible worlds (taken as maximally consistent collections of states of Disjunction Introduction); but they are not closed under essentially
affairs), also non-standard worlds that are locally inconsistent (such that, multiple-premised inferences (such as Adjunction).
for some A, both A and ¬A hold at them), and incomplete (such that for
some A, neither A nor ¬A hold at them). These are obtained Rescher and Brandom’s approach falls in the nonadjunctive tradition (see
combinatorially, via two recursive operations having standard worlds as Berto 2007, Chapter 6) of paraconsistent logics: a tradition started by
their base, and called schematization (∩) and superposition (∪). Given two Jaskowksi’s discussive logic D2 (also labeled as J in the literature), and

based on the idea of rejecting or limiting the Adjunction principle. Such an Exactly the same holds for belief (treated with a modality ‘B’ along the
approach has been revived in works by Hyde (1997), and Varzi (1997 and lines of ‘K ’). The modal epistemic approach tells us that, as well as
2004). believing all consequences of what we believe, we must hold a perfectly
consistent set of beliefs:
5.3 Impossible Worlds in Epistemic Logic
(Consistency) ⊨ ¬(BA ∧ B¬A).
To model a concept such as knowledge, we can use a modality ‘K ’ for
‘knows that’, with semantics along the lines of ‘◻’, quantifying over all This is a hard principle to defend, as anyone who has reflected on their
epistemically possible worlds: worlds which are ways things could be, for own beliefs will appreciate.
all one knows, or given the information or evidence one has available.
A popular method of avoiding these principles (beginning with Cresswell
This is epistemic modal logic. (See the entry on epistemic logic for
1973 and Hintikka 1975) is to allow impossible worlds into the account.
background material.)
Consider again Rescher and Brandom’s nonadjunctive and nonprime
This approach has proved to be very useful. However, when epistemically worlds, at which conjunction and disjunction behave anarchically. Rantala
possible worlds confirm to the rules of logically possible worlds, the (1982a) takes the idea further, introducing worlds at which any connective
following principle is valid: may behave anarchically.
(Closure) If KA and A entails B, then KB Rantala’s approach divides the worlds into normal and non-normal ones.
Normal worlds behave like possible worlds whereas at non-normal worlds,
This principle says that one knows all the logical consequences of the every sentence is assigned an arbitrary truth value. In effect, complex
things one knows. A special case of this principle says that all valid sentences ¬A, A ∨ B, and so on, are treated as if they were atomic
formulas are known: sentences. The truth value of ¬A is independent of A; the value of A ∨ B is
independent of the values of A and B at a non-normal world; and so on for
(Validity) If A is valid, then so is KA
the other complex sentences. These non-normal worlds are thus a very
But these principles seem false. You don’t know all the logical and anarchic form of impossible world. Priest (2005, 2016) calls them open
mathematical truths, and there are truths which follow from what you worlds, since they are not closed under any rule of inference (other than
know which you don’t know. (You might be indifferent to those truths; the trivial rule allowing one to infer A from A; see also Jago 2014a).
you might even disbelieve them.) This is the problem of logical
Logical consequence and validity are defined with respect to possible
omniscience (see epistemic logic again). There is a rich literature on the
(normal) worlds only. Impossible worlds come into play only when
problem (Alechina et al. 2004, Duc 1997, Hintikka 1975, Jago 2014a,b,
evaluating knowledge claims, KA. So, ignoring K -sentences, the logic is
Rantala 1982a), including some who defend these seemingly false
classical. But the logic of K -sentences is not closed under any non-trivial
principles (Stalnaker 1991, 1999).
rule of inference, thereby dispensing with Closure, Validity, and (in the

case of belief) Consistency. An agent is modelled as having inconsistent Rasmussen 2015 and Bjerring and Skipper (forthcoming) present a
beliefs, for example, simply by treating an impossible world where both A dynamic impossible worlds solution to the logical omniscience problem.
and ¬A are true as being epistemically accessible (from the actual world) Agents’ beliefs evolve over time due to epistemic actions, on this approach
for that agent. (see the entry on dynamic epistemic logic for background). Bjerring and
Skipper focus on deductive actions. Agents count as competent insofar as
The approach has been generalized to quantified modal logics (Rantala they unfold the consequences of their beliefs, up to a certain depth of
1982b) and developed into a unified framework for epistemic logics reasoning. Their operator “⟨n⟩KA”, says: “After some n-step chain of
(Wansing 1989, 1990). Wansing has shown that various logics for logical reasoning, the agent comes to know that A”. The agent can update
knowledge and belief developed in Artificial Intelligence can find its epistemic state by kicking out choices of impossible worlds which were
equivalent models in structures including impossible worlds. Further epistemic possibilities before the deduction took place. One can show that
equivalence results in this area have been obtained in Sillari 2008, where it if a formula A follows from formulas A1 , … , An in n steps of reasoning,
is shown that impossible worlds structures using binary epistemic then K A1 , … , K An together entail ⟨n⟩KA .
accessibility relations are equivalent to structures using Montague-Scott
neighborhood semantics. 5.4 Impossible Worlds in Relevance Logic
This kind of approach faces problems, however. If there’s no logical Relevance logic (or relevant logic) is an attempt to capture the idea that
structure to impossible worlds, then we might do as well to model an good reasoning requires a genuine condition between premises and
agent’s knowledge using an arbitrary set of sentences, as in Konolige conclusions. This should go beyond a mere guarantee of truth
1986. The worry is that unconstrained impossible worlds semantics makes preservation. For when a conclusion A is guaranteed to be true (for
no real progress over this purely syntactic approach (Jago 2007, 2009). example, when it is a logical truth), any argument concluding in A will
preserve truth from premises to conclusions. But those premises may have
One may instead adopt impossible worlds that retain some logical
no genuine connection whatsoever to what A is about. The same
consideration applies when taking a conditional A → B to be valid: there
structure, e.g., worlds closed under some weaker-than-classical logical
consequence. One approach of this kind is found in Levesque 1984 (see
should be a genuine connection between A and B.
also Cresswell 1973). This employs impossible worlds of the kind used in
paraconsistent relevant logics, which can be locally inconsistent and With this in mind, relevance logic attempts to avoid the ‘fallacies of
incomplete but are well-behaved with respect to conjunction and relevance’ (also called ‘paradoxes of the material conditional’). These are
disjunction, that is, they are adjunctive and prime. Laws of classical logic conditionals that are valid in classical and modal logic, simply because the
fail at them, and by accessing them a cognitive agent can have inconsistent antecedent is a necessary falsehood or the consequent is a necessary truth,
beliefs. However, we still have a weakened form of logical omniscience: but without a guarantee of any real connection between them. Examples
the beliefs of an agent are closed under the weaker paraconsistent-relevant include A ∧ ¬A → B (ex contradictione quodlibet, or the Law of
logic at issue. This seems incorrect as an attempt to model finite agents. Explosion), A → B ∨ ¬B, and A → (B → B) (verum ex quolibet).

Contradiction-realizing impossible worlds can help us avoid ex ( →) vw (A → B) = true if and only if, for all worlds w1 and w2 such
contradictione quodlibet, if they are worlds where some contradiction that Rww1 w2 , if vw1(A) = true, then vw2(B) = true.
A ∧ ¬A is true but some other B is not true. For that reason, various
systems of relevant logic have been given semantics which include (things The key difference between (→) and the standard modal clause for the
naturally thought of as) impossible worlds. strict conditional (which is true at a world if and only if, at all accessible
worlds where the antecedent is true, the consequent is true), is that the
A Routley-Meyer interpretation (see Routley & Routley 1972; Routley & worlds of the antecedent and the consequent have been “split”.
Meyer 1973, 1976; Routley 1979) for relevant (propositional) logics is a Specifically, B → B fails at impossible worlds w when there are worlds
structure ⟨W, N, R, ∗ , v⟩, where W is a set of worlds; N is a proper subset w1 and w2 such that Rww1 w2 , B holds at the former, but fails at the latter.
of W including the normal or possible worlds (the remaining worlds are Since we do not want B → B to fail at normal/possible worlds, we can add
the non-normal or impossible worlds); R is a ternary accessibility relation a Normality Condition, saying that the accessible worlds w1 and w2 are
between worlds, and ∗ (the Routley star) is a function from worlds to one and the same:
worlds. ∗ and R figure prominently in the truth conditions for negation and
the (relevant) conditional. Their task is precisely to provide a semantics (NC) For normal worlds w, Rww1 w2 only if w1 = w2 .
for negation that allows for the truth of A and ¬A at some worlds, and a
Using the ternary relation R, one can build models for different relevant
semantics for the conditional that frees it from the fallacies of relevance.
logics. Starting with the basic relevant system B , one obtains models for
stronger logics such as R, the system of relevant implication, by adding
5.4.1 The Relevant Conditional
additional conditions on R. (This is similar to the way we may move on
In order to get rid of such entailments as A → (B → B) , we need some from basic modal logic K to the systems T, S4 , and S5 , by adding extra
world at which A holds but B → B fails. One way to achieve this may be conditions on the accessibility relation.) The constraints to be added to the
to admit “partial” or incomplete situations of the kind studied in situation ternary R are more complex than those of standard modal logic and some
semantics, at which A holds but B → B fails to hold, just because they involve the star operator ∗ (which we’ll address shortly).
carry no information about B. Another way is via impossible worlds: an
It isn’t easy to provide an intuitive reading for the ternary relation R. The
basic idea is that the truth of an entailment A → B at a world w depends
understanding of such worlds, as we have seen, is as scenarios where
logical laws may fail, and the Law of (propositional) Identity, stating that
on w ’s “seeing an accessibility” (Bremer 2005: 67) between two other
any formula entails itself, is one of them. At possible worlds, we still
worlds w1 and w2 , such that if A is true at the former, B is true at the latter.
require for the truth of conditionals A → B that at every accessible world
But what does this mean? This is perhaps the most important
where A holds, B holds, too. Consequently, A → (B → B) is not logically
philosophical issue facing semantics for relevant logics. One approach is
valid. Technically, when w is an impossible world, we state the truth
the information-based account of Mares (2004, 2009, 2010) and (Restall
conditions for the conditional, by means of the ternary R, as follows:
1995b), based on situation semantics. Another approach draws on various

interpretations of conditionality, such as those found in the literature on maximal and consistent world, where negation behaves classically: ¬A is
conditional logics (Beall et al. 2012). (See the entry on relevance logic or true if and only if A is false there.
Jago 2013c for further discussion.)
6. Objections to Impossible Worlds
5.4.2 The Routley Star
This last section discusses some difficulties for impossible worlds theories.
Given a world w , the Routley star function outputs a world w∗ which is, in
a sense, its “reverse twin”. The truth conditions for negation within the 6.1 The Exportation Principle
Routley-Meyer semantics are:
Suppose that the expression ‘at world w ’ works as a restricting modifier:
( ¬) vw (¬A) = true if and only if vw∗ (A) = false. its main task consists in restricting the quantifiers within its scope to parts
of w (Lewis 1986). If so, then it should distribute through the truth-
So ¬A is true at a world w if and only if A is false, not at w itself (as it functional connectives. This means in particular that
happens with standard negation), but at its twin w∗ . Relevant negation is
therefore an intensional operator: in order to evaluate negated sentences at At w : (A ∧ ¬A)
w , we may need to check the goings on at some other world.
will entail the contradiction
Adding appropriate constraints provides this negation with many intuitive
inferential features. If w∗∗ = w for all worlds w, for example, Double
(At w : A) ∧ ¬(at w : A).
Negation introduction and elimination is valid. This is often called De This is the exportation principle. It is disastrous for any theory of
Morgan negation, for De Morgan’s Laws hold of it. But it does not impossible worlds. It implies that an inconsistency at some impossible
validate the Law of Explosion (that a contradiction entails any sentence). world will spill over into an overt inconsistency. A true contradiction at
For a counterexample, take a model where A holds at w, B doesn’t hold at some w implies that there are true contradictions, full stop. This is hard to
w , and A doesn’t hold at w∗ . Then, both A and ¬A hold at w , whereas B swallow, unless one is a dialetheist. (And even dialethists may want to
doesn’t: w is an inconsistent but non-trivial world. reject the exportation principle for impossible worlds: see Jago 2013b.)
What is the intuitive connection between w and w∗ ? The idea is that the Avoiding the exportation principle is not difficult, however (Kiourti 2010,
twins are “mirror images one of the other reversing ‘in’ and ‘out’” (Dunn Chapter 4; Jago 2013b). For it to be valid, it seems to require genuine
1986: 191). If w is A-inconsistent (both A and ¬A hold), then w∗ is A- worlds, as in Lewis’s (1986) genuine modal realism or Yagisawa’s (1988,
incomplete (neither A nor ¬A hold), and vice versa. The ∗ takes local 2010) extended modal realism. Adopting an ersatz conception of worlds
inconsistency into local incompleteness and vice versa. It may also be the blocks the principle. If a world represents that A (say, by containing a
case that w = w∗ : the twins are in fact one. In that case, w must be a sentence or proposition expressing that A), but is not in itself such that A,

then the principle is blocked. ‘At w : (A ∧ ¬A) ’ will be interpreted as: w Note that it doesn’t matter if the hybrid account accepts the existence of
contains the sentence (or proposition) that A ∧¬A , whereas ‘at w : A’ will ersatz possible worlds in addition to her genuine possible worlds: (P∗ ) will
mean that w contains the sentence (or proposition) that A, and ‘not at still give the right result.
w : A’ will mean that w does not contain the sentence (or proposition) that
A. But an impossible world may contain both, or neither, of A and ¬A , so The ersatzist may respond by biting the bullet. Even without admitting
that containing one implies nothing about containing the other. An impossible worlds, most possible worlds accounts do not aim at providing
impossible world may (depending on how fine-grained we take them to a reductive and complete analysis of modality. (Lewis’s modal realism
be) also contain the conjunction A ∧ ¬A independently of whether it does. But it may not succeed, when so-called ‘alien’ properties, not
contains both A and ¬A. So the inference from ‘at w : (A ∧ ¬A) ’ to ‘(at instantiated by anything at the actual world nor obtainable as constructions
w : A) ∧ ¬ (at w : A)’ is blocked (possibly twice over). out of actually instantiated properties, enter the stage. See Divers 2002,
Chapter 7; Divers & Melia 2002.)
It is controversial whether any genuine account of worlds can block the
exportation principle. Jago 2013a,b argues not; Yagisawa 2015 responds in 6.3 The Usefulness of Impossible Worlds
defence of genuine impossible worlds.
Stalnaker (1996) argues that, whilst there is nothing wrong in admitting
6.2 Defining Possibility impossible worlds, not much explanatory work can be expected from
them. For instance, if one takes worlds as sets of propositions, then one
If there are impossible worlds, then we cannot accept the simple clause for cannot then analyze propositions as sets of worlds. But the same point can
possibility: be made against any account of possible worlds (such as Adams’s) that
takes them to be maximally consistent sets of propositions. And, just as
(P) It is possible that A if and only if there’s a world w such that, at w , ersatz possible worlds needn’t be constructed in this way, nor need ersatz
A. impossible worlds. Impossible worlds have found many uses in the recent
literature, as we have abundantly seen. So we don’t find Stalnaker’s worry
Once impossible worlds enter the stage, (P) becomes false from right to
convincing.
left. We therefore need a principle that restricts the quantification in the
right half of the biconditional to possible worlds. How to do that, without 6.4 The Semantics of Negation
appealing to modal notions, is not straightforward. The hybrid account
(Berto 2010) has the advantage here. If possible worlds are all and only The standard semantic clause for negation has it that ¬A is true if and only
the genuine ones, with impossible worlds as ersatz constructions of some if A is not true. So there could not be worlds at which both or neither of A
kind, then we can capture the intent of (P) as: and ¬A are true, unless we revise the semantics of negation. Stalnaker
(1996) argues that negation is such a basic operator, whose semantics is
(P∗ ) It is possible that A if and only if there’s a genuine world w such
‘learned in a first logic class’ that it had better be left alone.
that, at w , A.

To this, the impossible world theorist can reply that it is in fact the case hold the context fixed, then what does follow is just the following
that ¬A is true if and only if A is not true; for this concerns truth counterpossible:
simpliciter, that is, truth at the actual world. She may also agree that the
same holds for any possible world. But it is precisely impossible worlds 3. If 0 were 1 and the number of right answers I gave were 0, then the
that we are talking about here; how negation works at any possible world number of right answers I gave would be 1.
need not be affected by the fact that, at some impossible world or other,
Now this is intuitively true, and non-trivially so.
some sentence can hold together with its negation: this is one of the things
that makes them impossible, after all. Williamson (2007) also argues that non-trivial treatments of
counterpossibles create opaque contexts, in which the substitutivity of co-
6.5 Counterpossible Reasoning referential terms fails. Supporters of non-trivial counterpossibles will take
the following conditional as false:
Timothy Williamson (2007, Chapter 5) has objected to non-trivial
treatments of counterpossibles, in particular (though not perforce) when 4. If Hesperus had not been Phosphorus, then Phosphorus would not
they resort to impossible worlds. Consider the claim: have been Phosphorus.
1. If 5 + 7 were 13, then 5 + 6 would be 12. Given the necessity of identity, (4) is a counterpossible: as Hesperus is
Phosphorus, its antecedent can only be true at impossible worlds. That’s
Prima facie, this is a non-trivially true counterpossible. However,
false, supposedly, because even if Hesperus and Phosphorus had been
Williamson argues, other non-trivial consequences of the supposition
would then be that 5 + 5 = 11, and 5 + 4 = 10, and … , and 0 = 1.
distinct, Phosphorus would have remained self-identical. However, all
accept that
Therefore,
5. If Hesperus had not been Phosphorus, then Hesperus would not have
2. If the number of answers I gave to a given question were 0, then the
been Phosphorus
number of answers I gave would be 1.
since it is an instance of ‘if it had been that A, then it would have been that
But (2) is clearly false.
A’. Yet substituting ‘Phosphorus’ for the first occurrence of ‘Hesperus’ in
Brogaard & Salerno (2007) pose a dilemma for Williamson: either we the consequent of (5) gives (4). Since (5) is true and (4) is (supposedly)
hold the context fixed in this kind of counterpossible reasoning, or we false, substitution of identicals has failed. This failure of substitutivity,
don’t. If we don’t, then (2) does not follow from (1). In particular, the Williamson claims, is a bad result, for counterfactuals should not create
context at which (2) comes out false is one at which the closest antecedent opaque contexts.
worlds are possible and, to be sure, at those worlds, 0 is not 1. But if we
Brogaard and Salerno (2013) accept that counterpossibles do create
opaque contexts. They argue that the impossible worlds similarity

semantics for counterpossibles should be “partially epistemic” (Brogaard meanings of complex sentences are obtainable recursively from the
& Salerno 2013: 654), and this epistemic component explains the failure meanings of their constituent parts (Davidson 1965).
of substitution.
The worry is that a theory of meaning or content which includes
An alternative reply to Williamson is that the objection is question- impossible worlds will not be compositional. Consider what we said above
begging. It is clearly false that counterfactuals allow substitution of about the exportation principle (Section 6.1) and the semantics of negation
identical terms (of any type). ‘Had Aristotle never taught, Aristotle would (Section 6.4). An impossible world may represent that ¬A independently
still have been Aristotle’ is true, and Aristotle is the teacher of Alexander, of whether it represents that A. But then, for such worlds, the truth-value
yet ‘had Aristotle never taught, Aristotle would still have been the teacher of ¬A is not a function of the truth-value of A. So, the worry goes, the
of Alexander’ is clearly false. The substitution principle must be restricted content or proposition that ¬A, understood as a set of possible and
to rigid designators: terms that denote the same entity in all impossible worlds, will not be a function of the proposition that A.
metaphysically possible worlds. But one may then reply: what’s so special (Certainly, the latter is not the set-theoretic complement of the former, as it
about the class of metaphysically possible worlds, when it comes to is on the possible worlds account.) The same goes for all the other
evaluating counterfactuals? It seems question-begging (against an account logically complex sentences. This is perhaps the most serious objection to
in terms of both possible and impossible worlds) to insist the the impossible worlds approach. If it can’t be met, it may well be fatal.
metaphysically possible worlds play a special role here. (Note that if we
consider terms that are rigid with respect to the nomically possible worlds, To address the worry, defenders of impossible worlds must show that their
or to all worlds, then no problem arises for the account.) notion of content is compositional. Note that that’s not obviously the same
as giving compositional truth-conditions for the connectives and operators.
Berto et al. 2018 is an extensive discussion of a number of Williamsonian An impossible worlds account can’t do the latter in a uniform way, for at
objections to non-trivial treatments of counterpossibles. least some truth-conditions (as necessary truths) will not be respected by
some impossible worlds.
6.6 Compositionality
The only attempt we know of to address the compositionality worry is
Compositionality is the principle that the meaning or content of a complex Berto and Jago 2019, Chapter 8. They view impossible worlds as sets of
expression is a function of the meanings of its constituent expressions. It’s sentences (of some ‘worldmaking’ language), where those sentences have
commonly taken to be a mandatory feature of any adequate theory of a compositional structure. They then argue that, given any semantic
meaning and content. The argument is that, as competent speakers of a content, a grammatical structure can be recovered and analysed in terms of
language, we are in principle capable of grasping the meanings of a the syntactic structure of the underlying worldmaking sentences. Whether
potentially infinite number of sentences. And since we’ve learnt the this provides an acceptable notion of compositionality (as they claim)
meanings of a limited number of words, this is possible only if the remains to be seen.

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93–110. impossible world, entry in Wikipedia.
Wansing, H., 1989, “Bemerkungen zur Semantik nicht-normaler
möglicher Welten”, Zeitschrift für Mathematische Logik und Related Entries

Impossible Worlds
actualism | contradiction | dialetheism | fictionalism: modal | logic:

conditionals | logic: epistemic | logic: modal | logic: paraconsistent | logic:
relevance | possible worlds
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank JC Beall, JC Bjerring, Berit Brogaard,

Nicola Ciprotti, Ira Kiourti, Daniel Nolan, Graham Priest, Greg Restall,
Achille Varzi, Heinrich Wansing, and three anonymous referees, for
helpful comments, suggestions, and references.
Copyright © 2018 by the authors

Francesco Berto and Mark Jago
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actualism | contradiction | dialetheism | fictionalism: modal | logic:

The authors would like to thank JC Beall, JC Bjerring, Berit Brogaard,

Copyright © 2018 by the authors

54 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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