G.R. No.

164435

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VICTORIA S. JARILLO, VELASCO, JR.,
Petitioner, NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

- versus - September 29, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

[1]
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Decision of
[2]
the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution dated July 8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.

On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch

117 under the following Information in Criminal Case No. 00-08-11:

INFORMATION

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S. JARILLO of the crime
of BIGAMY, committed as follows:
th
That on or about the 26 day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo,
being previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the said marriage
having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered on January
12, 1999.

Contrary to law.

On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and, thereafter, trial proceeded.

The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.

 On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony
solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H, H-
1, H-2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN dated November 17, 2000).

On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church wedding
ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN dated
November 17, 2000). Out of the marital union, appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle J. Alocillo on
October 29, 1975 (Exhs. F, R, R-1).

Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos
Uy, at theCity Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on November
26, 1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1, pp. 15-18, TSN dated November 22, 2000).

On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a church wedding
in Manila(Exh. E).

In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for annulment of
marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City x x x.

xxxx

Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of their marriage.

On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the dispositive portion
of which states:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby finds
accused Victoria Soriano Jarillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of BIGAMY.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10)
YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum.

This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case, such
as the nullity of accuseds bigamous marriage to Uy and its effect on their children
and their property. This aspect is being determined by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila in Civil Case No. 99-93582.

Costs against the accused.

The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in that assailed Order
[3]
dated 2 August 2001.

For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were null and void

because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage;

(2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had

prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978.
On appeal to the CA, petitioners conviction was affirmed in toto. In its Decision dated July 21, 2003, the CA

held that petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that

time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the court.This being so, the

presumption is, her previous marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also
struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioners contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a

marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous marriage as far back as 1978.

In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated March 28, 2003, declaring
petitioners 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillos psychological

incapacity. Said decision became final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner

invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction. However, in its Resolution dated July
[4]
8, 2004, the CA, citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, denied reconsideration and ruled that [t]he subsequent

declaration of nullity of her first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the

celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, the said marriage is not
[5]
without legal consequences, among which is incurring criminal liability for bigamy.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where petitioner

alleges that:

V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN PROCEEDING

WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE
OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.

V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE

CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE SUPERVENING
PROOF THAT THE FIRST TWO MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO ALOCILLO HAD BEEN
DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.

V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT

CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS A PENDING ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT BRANCH 38 BETWEEN EMMANUEL SANTOS AND VICTORIA S. JARILLO.

V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT

CONSIDERING THAT THE INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.

V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT

CONSIDERING THAT THE MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO AND EMMANUEL SANTOS UY
HAS NO VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE.

V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT

ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUS PENALTY UNDER THE
REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.

The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be discussed jointly. It is true that right

after the presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of the proceedings on the ground

of the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioners marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed

involved a prejudicial question. In her appeal, she also asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of her

marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a ground for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her motion
[6]
for suspension, while the CA struck down her arguments. InMarbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court categorically stated

that:
 x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in
such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil
case for declaration of nullity. x x x

xxxx

x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is
presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes
regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against
this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that
respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a
decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is,
[7]
therefore, not a prejudicial question. x x x
[8]
The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People, where it was held thus:

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been
consummated. Moreover, petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases
considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and
invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow
that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private
complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the
criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is
that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid
until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a
declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second
[9]
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.

For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioners conviction of the crime of bigamy must

be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioners two marriages to Alocillo cannot be

considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the

previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because
at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioners marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been

declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial
[10]
declaration of the nullity of petitioners marriage to Uy make any difference. As held in Tenebro, [s]ince a marriage

contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is
notper se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the

Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or
[11]
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

Petitioners defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.

 Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision mayor, which is classified

under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90 thereof provides that [c]rimes punishable by other
afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years, while Article 91 states that [t]he period of prescription shall

commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their

agents x x x .

Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978; hence, prescription

began to run from that time. Note that the party who raises a fact as a matter of defense has the burden of proving

it. The defendant or accused is obliged to produce evidence in support of its defense; otherwise, failing to establish
[12]
the same, it remains self-serving. Thus, for petitioners defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon

her to adduce evidence that as early as the year 1978, Uy already obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.

A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly failed to present sufficient

evidence to support her allegation. Petitioners testimony that her own mother told Uy in 1978 that she (petitioner) is

already married to Alocillo does not inspire belief, as it is totally unsupported by any corroborating evidence. The trial

court correctly observed that:

x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother the person who allegedly actually told Uy about
her previous marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious that without the confirmatory testimony of her
[13]
mother, the attribution of the latter of any act which she allegedly did is hearsay.

[14]
As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals, the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should
be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or
[15]
their [agents], as opposed to being counted from the date of registration of the bigamous marriage. Since petitioner

failed to prove with certainty that the period of prescription began to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore,

ineffectual.

Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under the Revised Penal

Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken.

The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty,

the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed

under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than

that prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the

commission of the crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves it entirely within the sound discretion of the court to
determine the minimum penalty, as long as it is anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any
reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the
[16]
imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.

Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner is proper. Under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. The penalty next lower is prision

correccional, which ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. The minimum penalty of six years imposed by the

trial court is, therefore, correct as it is still within the duration ofprision correccional. There being no mitigating or

aggravating circumstances proven in this case, the prescribed penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in its

medium period, which is from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Again, the trial court correctly imposed a maximum

penalty of 10 years.

However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioners marriage to Alocillo has after all been
[17]
declared by final judgment to be void ab initio on account of the latters psychological incapacity, by reason of

which, petitioner was subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to reduce the penalty imposed by

the lower courts. Thus, petitioner should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two
(2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision

mayor, as maximum.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution dated July 8, 2004 are hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed,

but AFFIRMED in all other respects. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from

Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One (1)

day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.