1112.CO1 MODULE 6: LEGISLATIVE (Art.

VI) part1of2

MODULE 6 – LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

A political party refers to an organized group
Section 5 of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
2. R.A. No. 7941 principles and policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most immediate
(Party-List System) means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders
and members as candidates for public office.
Republic Act No. 7941
Approved: 03 March 1995
It is a national party when its constituency is
spread over the geographical territory of at least
Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the
a majority of the regions. It is a regional party
"Party-List System Act".
when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall
cities and provinces comprising the region.
promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of
A sectoral party refers to an organized group
Representatives through a party-list system of
of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
registered national, regional and sectoral parties
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal
or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will
advocacy pertains to the special interests and
enable Filipino citizens belonging to the
concerns of their sector.
marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-
A sectoral organization refers to a group of
defined political constituencies but who could
citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who
contribute to the formulation and enactment of
share similar physical attributes or
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation
characteristics, employment, interest or
as a whole, to become members of the House of
concerns.
Representatives. Towards this end, the State
shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open
A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly
party system in order to attain the broadest
registered national, regional, sectoral parties or
possible representation of party, sectoral or
organizations for political and/or election
group interests in the House of Representatives
purposes.
by enhancing their chances to compete for and
win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the
Section 4. Manifestation to Participate in the
simplest scheme possible.
Party-List System. - Any party, organization, or
coalition already registered with the Commission
Section 3. Definition of Terms. -
need not register anew. However, such party,
organization or coalition shall file with the
The party-list system is a mechanism of
Commission, not later than ninety (90) days
proportional representation in the election of
before the election, a manifestation of its desire
representatives to the House of Representatives
to participate in the party-list system.
from national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof registered
Section 5. Registration. - Any organized group of
with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
persons may register as a party, organization or
Component parties or organizations of a
coalition for purposes of the party-list system by
coalition may participate independently provided
filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety
the coalition of which they form part does not
(90) days before the election a petition verified
participate in the party-list system.
by its president or secretary stating its desire to
participate in the party-list system as a national,
A party means either a political party or a
regional or sectoral party or organization or a
sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
coalition of such parties or organizations,
1112.CO1
attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws,
platform or program of government, list of
officers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require:
provided, that the sectors shall include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals.
The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at
least two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation.
The COMELEC shall, after due notice and
hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15)
days from the date it was submitted for decision
but in no case not later than sixty (60) days
before election.
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of
Registration. - The COMELEC may motu proprio
or upon verified complaint of any interested
party, remove or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional
or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any
of the following grounds:
It is a religious sect or denomination,
organization or association organized for
religious purposes;
It advocates violence or unlawful means to
seek its goal;
It is a foreign party or organization;
It is receiving support from any foreign
government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of
its officers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes;
It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections;
It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year;
or
MODULE 6: LEGISLATIVE (Art. VI) part1of2
It fails to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two
percentum (2%) of the votes cast under the
party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has
registered.
Section 7. Certified List of Registered Parties. -
The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60)
days before election, prepare a certified list of
national, regional, or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions which have applied or
who have manifested their desire to participate
under the party-list system and distribute copies
thereof to all precincts for posting in the polling
places on election day. The names of the party-
list nominees shall not be shown on the certified
list.
Section 8. Nominations of Party-List
Representatives. - Each registered party,
organization or coalition shall submit to the
COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days
before the election a list of names, not less than
five (5) from which party-list representatives shall
be chosen in case it obtains the required number
of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only.
Only persons who have given their consent in
writing may be named in the list. The list shall not
include any candidate for any elective office or
person who has lost his bid for an elective office
in the immediately preceding election. No
change of names or alteration of the order of
nominees shall be allowed after the same shall
have been submitted to the COMELEC except in
cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in
writing, his nomination, becomes incapacitated
in which case the name of the substitutes
nominee shall be placed last in the list.
Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House
of Representatives who are nominated in the
party-list system shall not be considered
resigned.
Section 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. -
No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural born citizen
of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident
of the Philippines for a period of not less than one
1112.CO1
(1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election, able to read and write, bona fide
member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election. In case of a nominee of the youth
sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but
not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day
of the election. Any youth sectoral representative
who attains the age of thirty during his term shall
be allowed to continue until the expiration of his
term.
Section 10. Manner of Voting. - Every voter shall
be entitled to two (2) votes. The first is a vote for
candidate for member of the House of
Representatives in his legislative district, and the
second, a vote for the party, organization, or
coalition he wants represented in the House of
Representatives: provided, that a vote cast for a
party, sectoral organization, or coalition not
entitled to be voted for shall not be counted:
provided, finally that the first election under the
party-list system shall be held in May 1998. The
COMELEC shall undertake the necessary
information campaign for purposes of educating
the electorate on the matter of the party-list
system.
Section 11. Number of Party-List
Representatives. - The party-list representatives
shall constitute twenty percentum (20%) of the
total number of the members of the House of
Representatives including those under the party-
list. For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the
first five (5) major political parties on the basis of
party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth
Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled
to participate in the party-list system. In
determining the allocation of seats for the
second vote, the following procedure shall be
observed: The parties, organizations, and
coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes garnered
during the elections. The parties, organizations,
and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that
those garnering more than two percent (2%) of
MODULE 6: LEGISLATIVE (Art. VI) part1of2
the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes:
provided, finally, that each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for
Party-List Representatives. - The COMELEC
shall tally all the votes for the parties,
organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide
basis, rank them according to the number of
votes received and allocate party-list
representatives proportionately according to the
percentage of votes obtained by each party,
organization, or coalition as against the total
nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.
Section 13. How Party-List Representatives are
Chosen. - Party-list representatives shall be
proclaimed by the COMELEC based on the list
of names submitted by the respective parties,
organizations, or coalitions to the COMELEC
according to their ranking in the said list.
Section 14. Term of Office. - Party-list
representatives shall be elected for a term of
three (3) years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No party-list representatives shall serve for more
than three (3) consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which
he was elected.
Section 15. Change of Affiliation Effect. - Any
elected party-list representative who changes his
political party or sectoral affiliation during his
term of office shall forfeit his seat: provided, that
if he changes his political party or sectoral
affiliation within six (6) months before an
election, he shall not be eligible for nomination
as party-list representative under his new party
or organization.
Section 16. Vacancy. - In case of vacancy in
seats reserved for party-list representatives, the
vacancy shall be automatically filled by the next
representative from the list of nominees in the
order submitted to the COMELEC by the same
1112.CO1 MODULE 6: LEGISLATIVE (Art. VI) part1of2

party, organization, or coalition, who shall serve

for the unexpired term. If the list is exhausted, the
party, organization, or coalition concerned shall
submit additional nominees.

Section 17. Rights of Party-List Representatives.

- Party-list representatives shall be entitled to the
same salaries and emoluments as regular
members of the House of Representatives.

Section 18. Rules and Regulations. - The

COMELEC shall promulgate the necessary rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the purpose of this Act.

Section 19. Appropriations. - The amount

necessary for the implementation of this Act shall
be provided in the regular appropriations for the
Commission on Elections starting fiscal year
1996 under the General Appropriations Act.
Starting 1995, the COMELEC is hereby
authorized to utilize savings and other available
funds for purposes of its information campaign
on the party-list system.

Section 20. Separability Clause. - If any part of

this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the
other parts or provisions thereof shall remain
valid and effective.

Section 21. Repealing Clause. - All laws,

decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations,
or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions
of this Act are hereby repealed.

Section 22. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect

fifteen (15) days after its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation.

Approved: March 3, 1995

1112.CO1
3. Tobias v. Abalos 239
SCRA 106
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN,
TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and
ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR. petitioners,
vs.
HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS,
CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and
THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the
City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,
respondents.
Estrella, Bautista & Associates for petitioners.
BIDIN, J.:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as
residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners
assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting
the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the
municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan
belonged to only one legislative district. Hon.
Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional
representative of this legislative district,
sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A.
No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No.
7675 into law on February 9, 1994.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of
1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994.
The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether
they approved of the conversion of the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675.
The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of
the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621
voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue
MODULE 6: LEGISLATIVE (Art. VI) part1of2
of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed
ratified and in effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court,
contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically
Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is
unconstitutional for being violative of three
specific provisions of the Constitution.
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:
As a highly-urbanized city, the City of
Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative
district with the first representative to be elected
in the next national elections after the passage
of this Act. The remainder of the former
legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong
shall become the new legislative district of San
Juan with its first representative to be elected at
the same election.
Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted
provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes
the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in
Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to
wit:
Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the
assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in
the latter embracing two principal subjects,
namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into
a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the
congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong
into two separate districts.
Petitioners contend that the second aforestated
subject is not germane to the subject matter of
R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats of the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the
law. Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a
subject distinct from that stated in the title of the
law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been
complied with.
1112.CO1
Petitioners' second and third objections involve
Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the
Constitution, which provide, to wit:
Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall
be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return
of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on
the standard provided in this section.
Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan
and Mandaluyong into separate congressional
districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has
resulted in an increase in the composition of the
House of Representatives beyond that provided
in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution.
Furthermore, petitioners contend that said
division was not made pursuant to any census
showing that the subject municipalities have
attained the minimum population requirements.
And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has
the effect of preempting the right of Congress to
reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec.
5(4) as aforecited.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
Anent the first issue, we agree with the
observation of the Solicitor General that the
statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city with a population of not less
than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably
ordains compliance with the "one city-one
representative" proviso in the Constitution:
. . . Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative" (Article VI,
Section 5(3), Constitution).
MODULE 6: LEGISLATIVE (Art. VI) part1of2
Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated
constitutional mandate that the creation of a
separate congressional district for the City of
Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII,
Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of
a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and
distinct from the subject of its conversion into a
highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical
consequence of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675,
"An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of
Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and
contemplates the subject treated under Section
49 regarding the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-
one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by
this court so as not to cripple or impede
legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73
Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional
requirement as now expressed in Article VI,
Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather
than a technical construction. It should be
sufficient compliance with such requirement if
the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions are germane to that general subject."
The liberal construction of the "one title-one
subject" rule had been further elucidated in
Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to
wit:
Of course, the Constitution does not require
Congress to employ in the title of an enactment,
language of such precision as to mirror, fully
index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. It suffices if the title should
serve the purpose of the constitutional demand
that it inform the legislators, the persons
interested in the subject of the bill and the public,
of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation" (emphasis
supplied).
Proceeding now to the other constitutional
issues raised by petitioners to the effect that
1112.CO1
there is no mention in the assailed law of any
census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan
had each attained the minimum requirement of
250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation
into two legislative districts, the same does not
suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No.
7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of
having passed through the regular congressional
processes, including due consideration by the
members of Congress of the minimum
requirements for the establishment of separate
legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required
that all laws emanating from the legislature must
contain all relevant data considered by Congress
in the enactment of said laws.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates
the present limit on the number of
representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a
reading of the applicable provision, Article VI,
Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the
present limit of 250 members is not absolute.
The Constitution clearly provides that the House
of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than 250 members, "unless otherwise
provided by law." The inescapable import of the
latter clause is that the present composition of
Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so
mandates through a legislative enactment.
Therefore, the increase in congressional
representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not
unconstitutional.
Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong
and San Juan do not qualify to have separate
legislative districts, the assailed Section 49 of
R.A.
No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No.
7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to
reapportion legislative districts, the said
argument borders on the absurd since
petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was
Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon
and enacted the assailed law, including Section
49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt
itself on a right which pertains to itself.
MODULE 6: LEGISLATIVE (Art. VI) part1of2
Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A.
No. 7675, petitioners present further arguments
against the validity thereof.
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan
should have been made to participate in the
plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved
a change in their legislative district. The
contention is bereft of merit since the principal
subject involved in the plebiscite was the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city. The matter of separate district
representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus,
the inhabitants of San Juan were properly
excluded from the said plebiscite as they had
nothing to do with the change of status of
neighboring Mandaluyong.
Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that
the subject law has resulted in "gerrymandering,"
which is the practice of creating legislative
districts to favor a particular candidate or party,
is not worthy of credence. As correctly observed
by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that
Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed
law, is the incumbent representative of the
former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having
consistently won in both localities. By dividing
San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's
constituency has in fact been diminished, which
development could hardly be considered as
favorable to him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave
1112.CO1 MODULE 6: LEGISLATIVE (Art. VI) part1of2

PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES

4. Veterans Federation (APEC), petitioners,
Party v. Comelec October vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC),
6, 2000 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented
by Speaker Manuel B. Villar, PAG-ASA,
SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON,
PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, MAHARLIKA,
NOTE: Please refer to the full case on the net to
OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN,
view the tables in this case. They do not format
KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS
correctly in msword.
OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP,
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_1
VETERANS CARE, FOUR "L", AWATU, PMP,
36781_2000.html
ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN,
ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL
EN BANC
COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY
PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 136781 October 6, 2000
x-----------------------x
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY,
ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA
G.R. No. 136795 October 6, 2000
MAGSASAKA, MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT
MANGINGISDA, ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG
ALAGAD (PARTIDO NG MARALITANG-
ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA,
LUNGSOD), NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF
PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN, and LUZON
SMALL COCONUT FARMERS'
FARMERS PARTY, petitioners,
ORGANIZATIONS (NCSFCO), and LUZON
vs.
FARMERS' PARTY (BUTIL), petitioners,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PAG-ASA,
vs.
SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP AKSYON,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENIOR
PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA,
CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO,
MAHARLIKA, OCW-UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-
NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA,
KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW,
OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN,
ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMEN-POWER, INC.,
KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS
FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L,
OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP,
AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS,
VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP,
COPRA, GREEN, ANAKBAYAN, ARBA, MINFA,
NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-
AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN,
BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP,
ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS --
PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT,
All Being Party-List Parties/Organizations -- and
and AABANTE KA PILIPINAS, respondents.
Hon. MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. in His Capacity
as Speaker of the House of Representatives,
DECISION
respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:*
x-----------------------x
Prologue
G.R. No. 136786 October 6, 2000
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style
AKBAYAN! (CITIZENS' ACTION PARTY),
party-list election, the Constitution and Republic
ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG
Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four
TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT
inviolable parameters. These are:
KAUNLARAN (AKO), and ASSOCIATION OF
1112.CO1
First, the twenty percent allocation - the
combined number of all party-list congressmen
shall not exceed twenty percent of the total
membership of the House of Representatives,
including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those
parties garnering a minimum of two percent of
the total valid votes cast for the party-list system
are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party,
regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats;
that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the
additional seats which a qualified party is entitled
to shall be computed "in proportion to their total
number of votes."
Because the Comelec violated these legal
parameters, the assailed Resolutions must be
struck down for having been issued in grave
abuse of discretion. The poll body is mandated
to enforce and administer election-related laws.
It has no power to contravene or amend them.
Neither does it have authority to decide the
wisdom, propriety or rationality of the acts of
Congress.
Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations,
methods and formulas to implement election
laws -- not to reject, ignore, defeat, obstruct or
circumvent them.
In fine, the constitutional introduction of the
party-list system - a normal feature of
parliamentary democracies - into our presidential
form of government, modified by unique Filipino
statutory parameters, presents new paradigms
and novel questions, which demand innovative
legal solutions convertible into mathematical
formulations which are, in turn, anchored on
time-tested jurisprudence.
The Case
Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions
for Certiorari (with applications for the issuance
MODULE 6: LEGISLATIVE (Art. VI) part1of2
of a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, assailing (1) the October 15,
1998 Resolution1 of the Commission on
Elections (Comelec), Second Division, in
Election Matter 98-065;2 and (2) the January 7,
1999 Resolution3 of the Comelec en banc,
affirming the said disposition. The assailed
Resolutions ordered the proclamation of thirty-
eight (38) additional party-list representatives "to
complete the full complement of 52 seats in the
House of Representatives as provided under
Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
R.A. 7941."
The Facts and the Antecedents
Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature
into our presidential system of government -- the
party-list method of representation. Under this
system, any national, regional or sectoral party
or organization registered with the Commission
on Elections may participate in the election of
party-list representatives who, upon their
election and proclamation, shall sit in the House
of Representatives as regular members.4 In
effect, a voter is given two (2) votes for the
House -- one for a district congressman and
another for a party-list representative.5
Specifically, this system of representation is
mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall
be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
by a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-
list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one half of the
1112.CO1
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall
be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector."
Complying with its constitutional duty to provide
by law the "selection or election" of party-list
representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on
March 3, 1995. Under this statute’s policy
declaration, the State shall "promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives
to the House of Representatives through a party-
list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives.
Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in
order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by
enhancing their chances to compete for and win
seats in the legislature, and shall provide the
simplest scheme possible." (italics ours.)
The requirements for entitlement to a party-list
seat in the House are prescribed by this law (RA
7941) in this wise:
"Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives.
-- The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of
the members of the House of Representatives
including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first
five (5) major political parties on the basis of
party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth
Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled
to participate in the party-list system.
MODULE 6: LEGISLATIVE (Art. VI) part1of2
In determining the allocation of seats for the
second vote, the following procedure shall be
observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions
shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered
during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes;
Provided, finally, That each party, organization,
or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.
Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec
en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2847,
prescribing the rules and regulations governing
the election of party-list representatives through
the party-list system.
Election of the Fourteen Party-List
Representatives
On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list
representation was held simultaneously with the
national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-
three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions
participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en
banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list
representatives from twelve (12) parties and
organizations, which had obtained at least two
percent of the total number of votes cast for the
party-list system. Two of the proclaimed
representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC,
which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes. The
proclaimed winners and the votes cast in their
favor were as follows:6
Party/Organization/
Coalition Number of
Votes Obtained Percentage
Total Votes Nominees
1. APEC 503,487 5.5% Rene M.
Silos
Melvyn D. Eballe
1112.CO1 MODULE 6: LEGISLATIVE (Art. VI) part1of2

2. ABA 321,646 3.51% Leonardo the 52 party-list representatives who should

Q. Montemayor actually sit in the House.
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% Diogenes
S. Osabel Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations8
4. VETERANS filed their respective Motions for Intervention,
FEDERATION 304,802 3.33% seeking the same relief as that sought by PAG-
Eduardo P. Pilapil ASA on substantially the same grounds.
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% Joy A.G. Likewise, PAG-ASA’s Petition was joined by
Young other party-list organizations in a Manifestation
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% Ariel A. they filed on August 28, 1998. These
Zartiga organizations were COCOFED, Senior Citizens,
7. NCSCFO 238,303 2.60% Gorgonio AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP,
P. Unde AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 2.57% UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women
Patricia M. Sarenas Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP,
9. AKBAYAN 232,376 2.54% Loreta Ann Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU,
P. Rosales PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% Benjamin
A. Cruz On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% Division promulgated the present assailed
Renato B. Magtubo Resolution granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 2.07% ordered the proclamation of herein 38
Cresente C. Paez respondents who, in addition to the 14 already
sitting, would thus total 52 party-list
After passing upon the results of the special representatives. It held that "at all times, the total
elections held on July 4, 18, and 25, 1998, the number of congressional9 seats must be filled up
Comelec en banc further determined that by eighty (80%) percent district representatives
COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters’ and twenty (20%) percent party-list
Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one party-list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it
seat for having garnered 186,388 votes, which disregarded the two percent-vote requirement
were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the total votes prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
cast for the party-list system. Thus, its first Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-
nominee, Emerito S. Calderon, was proclaimed list system," which should supposedly determine
on September 8, 1998 as the 14th party-list "how the 52 seats should be filled up." First, "the
representative.7 system was conceived to enable the
marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People’s be represented in the House of
Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Representatives." Second, "the system should
Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine
Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a society." Third, "it should encourage [the] multi-
"Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party- party system." (Boldface in the original.)
List Representatives provided by the Considering these elements, but ignoring the two
Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the percent threshold requirement of RA 7941, it
twenty percent membership of party-list concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos.
representatives in the House of Representatives, 1 to 51 x x x should have at least one
as provided under the Constitution, was representative." It thus disposed as follows:
mandatory. It further claimed that the literal
application of the two percent vote requirement "WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested
and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election
defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 Code (B.P. 881), Republic Act No. 7941 and
nominees would be declared winners, short of other election laws, the Commission (Second
1112.CO1 MODULE 6: LEGISLATIVE (Art. VI) part1of2

Division) hereby resolves to GRANT the instant

petition and motions for intervention, to include 22. AWATU
those similarly situated.
23. PMP
ACCORDINGLY, the nominees from the party-
list hereinbelow enumerated based on the list of 24. ATUCP
names submitted by their respective parties,
organizations and coalitions are PROCLAIMED 25. NCWP
as party-list representatives, to wit:
26. ALU
1. SENIOR CITIZENS
27. BIGAS
2. AKAP
28. COPRA
3. AKSYON
29. GREEN
4. PINATUBO
30. ANAKBAYAN
5. NUPA
31. ARBA
6. PRP
32. MINFA
7. AMIN
33. AYOS
8. PAG-ASA
34. ALL COOP
9. MAHARLIKA
35. PDP-LABAN
10. OCW-UNIFIL
36. KATIPUNAN
11. FCL
37. ONEWAY PRINT
12. AMMA-KATIPUNAN
38. AABANTE KA PILIPINAS
13. KAMPIL
to complete the full complement of 52 seats in
14. BANTAY BAYAN the House of Representatives as provided in
Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
15. AFW R.A. 7941."

16. ANG LAKAS OCW The foregoing disposition sums up a glaring bit
of inconsistency and flip-flopping. In its
17. WOMENPOWER, INC. Resolution No. 2847 dated June 25, 1996, the
Comelec en banc had unanimously promulgated
18. FEJODAP a set of "Rules and Regulations Governing the
Election of x x x Party-List Representatives
19. CUP Through the Party-List System." Under these
Rules and Regulations, one additional seat shall
20. VETERANS CARE be given for every two percent of the vote, a
formula the Comelec illustrated in its Annex "A."
21. 4L It apparently relied on this method when it
1112.CO1
proclaimed the 14 incumbent party-list solons
(two for APEC and one each for the 12 other
qualified parties). However, for inexplicable
reasons, it abandoned said unanimous
Resolution and proclaimed, based on its three
"elements," the "Group of 38" private
respondents.10
The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which
had earlier been proclaimed winners on the
basis of having obtained at least two percent of
the votes cast for the party-list system, objected
to the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed
separate Motions for Reconsideration. They
contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA
7941, only parties, organizations or coalitions
garnering at least two percent of the votes for the
party-list system were entitled to seats in the
House of Representatives; and (2) additional
seats, not exceeding two for each, should be
allocated to those which had garnered the two
percent threshold in proportion to the number of
votes cast for the winning parties, as provided by
said Section 11.
Ruling of the Comelec En Banc
Noting that all the parties -- movants and
oppositors alike - had agreed that the twenty
percent membership of party-list representatives
in the House "should be filled up," the Comelec
en banc resolved only the issue concerning the
apportionment or allocation of the remaining
seats. In other words, the issue was: Should the
remaining 38 unfilled seats allocated to party-list
solons be given (1) to the thirteen qualified
parties that had each garnered at least two
percent of the total votes, or (2) to the Group of
38 - herein private respondents - even if they had
not passed the two percent threshold?
The poll body held that to allocate the remaining
seats only to those who had hurdled the two
percent vote requirement "will mean the
concentration of representation of party, sectoral
or group interests in the House of
Representatives to thirteen organizations
representing two political parties, three coalitions
and four sectors: urban poor, veterans, women
and peasantry x x x. Such strict application of the
2% 'threshold' does not serve the essence and
MODULE 6: LEGISLATIVE (Art. VI) part1of2
object of the Constitution and the legislature -- to
develop and guarantee a full, free and open party
system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives x x x."
Additionally, it "will also prevent this Commission
from complying with the constitutional and
statutory decrees for party-list representatives to
compose 20% of the House of Representatives."
Thus, in its Resolution dated January 7, 1999,
the Comelec en banc, by a razor-thin majority --
with three commissioners concurring11 and two
members12 dissenting -- affirmed the Resolution
of its Second Division. It, however, held in
abeyance the proclamation of the 51st party
(AABANTE KA PILIPINAS), "pending the
resolution of petitions for correction of manifest
errors."
Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional
or void the two percent vote requirement
imposed by RA 7941, the Commission blithely
rejected and circumvented its application,
holding that there were more important
considerations than this statutory threshold.
Consequently, several petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for the
issuance of temporary restraining orders or writs
of preliminary injunction, were filed before this
Court by the parties and organizations that had
obtained at least two per cent of the total votes
cast for the party-list system.13 In the suits,
made respondents together with the Comelec
were the 38 parties, organizations and coalitions
that had been declared by the poll body as
likewise entitled to party-list seats in the House
of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners
sought the proclamation of additional
representatives from each of their parties and
organizations, all of which had obtained at least
two percent of the total votes cast for the party-
list system.
On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status
Quo Order directing the Comelec "to CEASE and
DESIST from constituting itself as a National
Board of Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or on
any other date and proclaiming as winners the
nominees of the parties, organizations and
1112.CO1
coalitions enumerated in the dispositive portions
of its 15 October 1998 Resolution or its 7
January 1999 Resolution, until further orders
from this Court."
On July 1, 1999, oral arguments were heard from
the parties. Atty. Jeremias U. Montemayor
appeared for petitioners in GR No. 136781; Atty.
Gregorio A. Andolana, for petitioners in GR No.
136786; Atty. Rodante D. Marcoleta for
petitioners in GR No. 136795; Attys. Ricardo
Blancaflor and Pete Quirino Quadra, for all the
private respondents; Atty. Porfirio V. Sison for
Intervenor NACUSIP; and Atty. Jose P.
Balbuena for Respondent Comelec. Upon
invitation of the Court, retired Comelec
Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong acted as
amicus curiae. Solicitor General Ricardo P.
Galvez appeared, not for any party but also as a
friend of the Court.
Thereafter, the parties and the amici curiae were
required to submit their respective Memoranda
in amplification of their verbal arguments.14
The Issues
The Court believes, and so holds, that the main
question of how to determine the winners of the
subject party-list election can be fully settled by
addressing the following issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it
merely a ceiling? In other words, should the
twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be
filled up completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and
the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of
RA 7941 constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative,
how should the additional seats of a qualified
party be determined?
The Court’s Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court
agrees with petitioners that the assailed
MODULE 6: LEGISLATIVE (Art. VI) part1of2
Resolutions should be nullified, but disagrees
that they should all be granted additional seats.
First Issue: Whether the Twenty Percent
Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory
The pertinent provision15 of the Constitution on
the composition of the House of Representatives
reads as follows:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall
be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
by a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-
list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one half of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall
be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector."
Determination of the Total Number of Party-List
Lawmakers
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of
district representatives the determinant in
arriving at the number of seats allocated for
party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty
per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-
list." We thus translate this legal provision into a
mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives.80 x .20 = No.
of party-list representatives
This formulation16 means that any increase in
the number of district representatives, as may be
provided by law, will necessarily result in a
1112.CO1
corresponding increase in the number of party-
list seats. To illustrate, considering that there
were 208 district representatives to be elected
during the 1998 national elections, the number of
party-list seats would be 52, computed as
follows:
208.80 x .20 = 52
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is
easy enough to comprehend. The problematic
question, however, is this: Does the Constitution
require all such allocated seats to be filled up all
the time and under all circumstances? Our short
answer is "No."
Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling
The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-
list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list."
According to petitioners, this percentage is a
ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to be filled
up has been left to Congress. In the exercise of
its prerogative, the legislature enacted RA 7941,
by which it prescribed that a party, organization
or coalition participating in the party-list election
must obtain at least two percent of the total votes
cast for the system in order to qualify for a seat
in the House of Representatives.
Petitioners further argue that the constitutional
provision must be construed together with this
legislative requirement. If there is no sufficient
number of participating parties, organizations or
coalitions which could hurdle the two percent
vote threshold and thereby fill up the twenty
percent party-list allocation in the House, then
naturally such allocation cannot be filled up
completely. The Comelec cannot be faulted for
the "incompleteness," for ultimately the voters
themselves are the ones who, in the exercise of
their right of suffrage, determine who and how
many should represent them.
On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec,
together with the respondent parties, avers that
the twenty percent allocation for party-list
lawmakers is mandatory, and that the two
percent vote requirement in RA 7941 is
MODULE 6: LEGISLATIVE (Art. VI) part1of2
unconstitutional, because its strict application
would make it mathematically impossible to fill
up the House party-list complement.
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally
simple message that Congress was vested with
the broad power to define and prescribe the
mechanics of the party-list system of
representation. The Constitution explicitly sets
down only the percentage of the total
membership in the House of Representatives
reserved for party-list representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative,
Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier,
Congress declared therein a policy to promote
"proportional representation" in the election of
party-list representatives in order to enable
Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to contribute
legislation that would benefit them. It however
deemed it necessary to require parties,
organizations and coalitions participating in the
system to obtain at least two percent of the total
votes cast for the party-list system in order to be
entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering
more than this percentage could have "additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes."
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or
coalition can have more than three seats in the
House of Representatives. Thus the relevant
portion of Section 11(b) of the law provides:
"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes;
Provided, finally, That each party, organization,
or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats."
Considering the foregoing statutory
requirements, it will be shown presently that
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not
mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-
list seats in Congress.
1112.CO1
On the contention that a strict application of the
two percent threshold may result in a
"mathematical impossibility," suffice it to say that
the prerogative to determine whether to adjust or
change this percentage requirement rests in
Congress.17 Our task now, as should have been
the Comelec’s, is not to find fault in the wisdom
of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of
clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative
mathematical formula that can, as far as
practicable, implement it within the context of the
actual election process.
Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as
well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial agencies,
is to apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent or
second-guess it. Unless declared
unconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient or
otherwise void by the proper tribunal, a statute
remains a valid command of sovereignty that
must be respected and obeyed at all times. This
is the essence of the rule of law.
Second Issue: The Statutory Requirement and
Limitation
The Two Percent Threshold
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress
wanted to ensure that only those parties,
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient
number of constituents deserving of
representation are actually represented in
Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the
deliberations on the proposed bill. We quote
below a pertinent portion of the Senate
discussion:
"SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of
continuity, I would want to follow up a point that
was raised by, I think, Senator Osmeña when he
said that a political party must have obtained at
least a minimum percentage to be provided in
this law in order to qualify for a seat under the
party-list system.
They do that in many other countries. A party
must obtain at least 2 percent of the votes cast,
5 percent or 10 percent of the votes cast.
Otherwise, as I have said, this will actually
proliferate political party groups and those who
MODULE 6: LEGISLATIVE (Art. VI) part1of2
have not really been given by the people
sufficient basis for them to represent their
constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get
to the Parliament through the backdoor under
the name of the party-list system, Mr.
President."18
A similar intent is clear from the statements of the
bill sponsor in the House of Representatives, as
the following shows:
"MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical
formula which this computation is based at,
arriving at a five percent ratio which would
distribute equitably the number of seats among
the different sectors. There is a mathematical
formula which is, I think, patterned after that of
the party list of the other parliaments or
congresses, more particularly the Bundestag of
Germany."19
Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution
had in mind a minimum-vote requirement, the
specification of which they left to Congress to
properly determine. Constitutional
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod explained:
"MR. MONSOD. x x x We are amenable to
modifications in the minimum percentage of
votes. Our proposal is that anybody who has
two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets a seat.
There are about 20 million who cast their votes
in the last elections. Two-and-a-half percent
would mean 500,000 votes. Anybody who has a
constituency of 500,000 votes nationwide
deserves a seat in the Assembly. If we bring that
down to two percent, we are talking about
400,000 votes. The average vote per family is
three. So, here we are talking about 134,000
families. We believe that there are many sectors
who will be able to get seats in the Assembly
because many of them have memberships of
over 10,000. In effect, that is the operational
implication of our proposal. What we are trying to
avoid is this selection of sectors, the reserve seat
system. We believe that it is our job to open up
the system and that we should not have within
that system a reserve seat. We think that people
should organize, should work hard, and should
earn their seats within that system."20
1112.CO1
The two percent threshold is consistent not only
with the intent of the framers of the Constitution
and the law, but with the very essence of
"representation." Under a republican or
representative state, all government authority
emanates from the people, but is exercised by
representatives chosen by them.21 But to have
meaningful representation, the elected persons
must have the mandate of a sufficient number of
people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features
the party-list system, the result might be the
proliferation of small groups which are incapable
of contributing significant legislation, and which
might even pose a threat to the stability of
Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are
apportioned according to "the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio"22 to ensure
meaningful local representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on
this two percent requirement is precise and
crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of
courts is simple application, not interpretation or
circumvention.23
The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit
An important consideration in adopting the party-
list system is to promote and encourage a
multiparty system of representation. Again, we
quote Commissioner Monsod:
"MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to
say that we suggested or proposed the party list
system because we wanted to open up the
political system to a pluralistic society through a
multiparty system. But we also wanted to avoid
the problems of mechanics and operation in the
implementation of a concept that has very
serious shortcomings of classification and of
double or triple votes. We are for opening up the
system, and we would like very much for the
sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways
to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of
representatives from any single party that can sit
within the 50 allocated under the party list
system. This way, we will open it up and enable
sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to
earn their seats among the fifty. x x x."24
MODULE 6: LEGISLATIVE (Art. VI) part1of2
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's
pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to
three (3) for each qualified party, organization or
coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the
two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit
ensures the entry of various interest-
representations into the legislature; thus, no
single group, no matter how large its
membership, would dominate the party-list
seats, if not the entire House.
We shall not belabor this point, because the
validity of the three-seat limit is not seriously
challenged in these consolidated cases.
Third Issue: Method of Allocating Additional
Seats
Having determined that the twenty percent seat
allocation is merely a ceiling, and having upheld
the constitutionality of the two percent vote
threshold and the three-seat limit imposed under
RA 7941, we now proceed to the method of
determining how many party-list seats the
qualified parties, organizations and coalitions are
entitled to. The very first step - there is no dispute
on this - is to rank all the participating parties,
organizations and coalitions (hereafter
collectively referred to as "parties") according to
the votes they each obtained. The percentage of
their respective votes as against the total
number of votes cast for the party-list system is
then determined. All those that garnered at least
two percent of the total votes cast have an
assured or guaranteed seat in the House of
Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering
more than two percent of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes." The problem is how to
distribute additional seats "proportionally,"
bearing in mind the three-seat limit further
imposed by the law.
One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment
One proposed formula is to allocate one
additional seat for every additional proportion of
the votes obtained equivalent to the two percent
vote requirement for the first seat.25 Translated
in figures, a party that wins at least six percent of
the total votes cast will be entitled to three seats;
1112.CO1 MODULE 6: LEGISLATIVE (Art. VI) part1of2

another party that gets four percent will be distribution of party-list seats under the
entitled to two seats; and one that gets two Niemeyer method would be as follows:
percent will be entitled to one seat only. This Party Number of
proposal has the advantage of simplicity and Votes Guaranteed
ease of comprehension. Problems arise, Seats Additional
however, when the parties get very lop-sided Extra
votes -- for example, when Party A receives 20 Seats Total
percent of the total votes cast; Party B, 10 1. APEC 503,487 1 5.73 1
percent; and Party C, 6 percent. Under the 7
method just described, Party A would be entitled 2. ABA 321,646 1 3.66 1
to 10 seats; Party B, to 5 seats and Party C, to 3 5
seats. Considering the three-seat limit imposed 3. ALAGAD 312,500 1 3.55
by law, all the parties will each uniformly have 4
three seats only. We would then have the 4. VETERANS
spectacle of a party garnering two or more times FEDERATION 304,802 1
the number of votes obtained by another, yet 3.47
getting the same number of seats as the other 4
one with the much lesser votes. In effect, 5. PROMDI 255,184 1 2.90 1
proportional representation will be contravened 4
and the law rendered nugatory by this suggested 6. AKO 239,042 1 2.72 1
solution. Hence, the Court discarded it. 4
7. NCSCFO 238,303 1 2.71 1
The Niemeyer Formula 4
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 1
Another suggestion that the Court considered 2.68 1 4
was the Niemeyer formula, which was developed 9. AKBAYAN 232,376 1 2.64
by a German mathematician and adopted by 4
Germany as its method of distributing party-list 10. BUTIL 215,643 1 2.45
seats in the Bundestag. Under this formula, the 3
number of additional seats to which a qualified 11. SANLAKAS 194,617 1
party would be entitled is determined by 2.21
multiplying the remaining number of seats to be 3
allocated by the total number of votes obtained 12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 1
by that party and dividing the product by the total 2.16
number of votes garnered by all the qualified 3
parties. The integer portion of the resulting 13. COCOFED 186,388 1
product will be the number of additional seats 2.12
that the party concerned is entitled to. Thus: 3
No. of remaining seats Total 3,429,338 13 32 7 52
to be allocatedTotal no. of votes of
qualified parties x No. of votes of However, since Section 11 of RA 7941 sets a
party concerned = No. of additional limit of three (3) seats for each party, those
seats of party obtaining more than the limit will have to give up
concerned their excess seats. Under our present set of
(Integer.decimal) facts, the thirteen qualified parties will each be
entitled to three seats, resulting in an overall total
The next step is to distribute the extra seats left of 39. Note that like the previous proposal, the
among the qualified parties in the descending Niemeyer formula would violate the principle of
order of the decimal portions of the resulting "proportional representation," a basic tenet of
products. Based on the 1998 election results, the our party-list system.
1112.CO1
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable
for Germany, finds no application in the
Philippine setting, because of our three-seat limit
and the non-mandatory character of the twenty
percent allocation. True, both our Congress and
the Bundestag have threshold requirements --
two percent for us and five for them. There are
marked differences between the two models,
however. As ably pointed out by private
respondents,26 one half of the German
Parliament is filled up by party-list members.
More important, there are no seat limitations,
because German law discourages the
proliferation of small parties. In contrast, RA
7941, as already mentioned, imposes a three-
seat limit to encourage the promotion of the
multiparty system. This major statutory
difference makes the Niemeyer formula
completely inapplicable to the Philippines.
Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in
the Philippines or Guimaras mangoes in the
Arctic because of fundamental environmental
differences, neither can the Niemeyer formula be
transplanted in toto here because of essential
variances between the two party-list models.
The Legal and Logical Formula for the
Philippines
It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-
list system is a unique paradigm which demands
an equally unique formula. In crafting a legally
defensible and logical solution to determine the
number of additional seats that a qualified party
is entitled to, we need to review the parameters
of the Filipino party-list system.
As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as
follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the
combined number of all party-list congressmen
shall not exceed twenty percent of the total
membership of the House of Representatives,
including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those
parties garnering a minimum of two percent of
the total valid votes cast for the party-list system
MODULE 6: LEGISLATIVE (Art. VI) part1of2
are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party,
regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats;
that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the
additional seats which a qualified party is entitled
to shall be computed "in proportion to their total
number of votes."
The problem, as already stated, is to find a way
to translate "proportional representation" into a
mathematical formula that will not contravene,
circumvent or amend the above-mentioned
parameters.
After careful deliberation, we now explain such
formula, step by step.
Step One. There is no dispute among the
petitioners, the public and the private
respondents, as well as the members of this
Court, that the initial step is to rank all the
participating parties, organizations and coalitions
from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they each received. Then the
ratio for each party is computed by dividing its
votes by the total votes cast for all the parties
participating in the system. All parties with at
least two percent of the total votes are
guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties
shall be considered in the computation of
additional seats. The party receiving the highest
number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to
as the "first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the
number of seats the first party is entitled to, in
order to be able to compute that for the other
parties. Since the distribution is based on
proportional representation, the number of seats
to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly
exceed that to which the first party is entitled by
virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
For example, the first party received 1,000,000
votes and is determined to be entitled to two
additional seats. Another qualified party which