G.R. No.
L-3714             January 26, 1909 pointed out that under the decision of the Supreme
ISABELO MONTANO Y MARCIAL, petitioner-
appellee,
vs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, ET
AL., respondents.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, appellant.
Facts:
Isabelo Montano presents a petition to the Court of
Land Registration for the inscription of a piece of
land in the barrio of Libis, municipality of Caloocan,
used as a fishery having a superficial area of 10,805
square meters, and bounded as set out in the
petition; its value according to the last assessment
being $505.05, United States currency.
This petition was opposed by the Solicitor-General
in behalf of the Director of Lands, and by the entity
known as Obras Pias de la Sagrada Mitra, the
former on the ground that the land in question
belonged to the Government of the United States,
and the latter, that it was the absolute owner of all
the dry land along the eastern boundary of the said
fishery.
The Court of Land Registration in its decision of
December 1, 1906, dismissed the said oppositions
without costs and decreed, after a general entry by
default, the adjudication and registration of the
property described in the petition, in favor of Isabelo
Montano y Marcial.
From this decision only counsel for the Director of
Public Lands appealed to this court. It is a kindred
case to Cirilo Mapa vs. The Insular
Government, decided by this court on February 19,
1908, reported in 10 Phil. Rep., 175.
As some discussion has arisen as to the scope of
that decision, it appears opportune to reaffirm the
principle there laid down. The issue was, whether
the lands used as a fishery , for the growth of nipa,
and as salt deposits, inland some distance from the
sea, and asserted, though not clearly proved to be
overflowed at high tide could be registered as
private property on the strength of ten years'
occupation, under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act
No. 926 of the Phil. Commission. The point decided
was that such land within the meaning of the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, was agricultural, the
reasoning leading up to the conclusion being that
congress having divided all the public lands of the
Islands into three classes it must be included in one
of the three, and being clearly neither forest nor
mineral, it must of necessity fall into two division of
agricultural land. In the concurring opinion, in order
to avoid misapprehension on the part of those not
familiar with United States land legislation and a
misunderstanding of the reach of the doctrine, it was
Court of the United States the phrase "public lands"
is held to be equivalent to "public domain," and dos
not by any means include all lands of Government
ownership, but only so much of said lands as are
thrown open to private appropriation and settlement
by homestead and other like general laws.
Accordingly, "government land" and "public domain"
are not synonymous items; the first includes not
only the second, but also other lands of the
Government already reserved or devoted to public
use or subject to private right. In other words, the
Government owns real estate which is part of the
"public lands" and other real estate which is not part
thereof.
This meaning attached to the phrase "public lands"
by Congress in its land legislation is settled by
usage and adjudication beyond a doubt, and without
variation. It is therefore doing the utmost violence to
all rules of construction to contend that in this law,
dealing with the same subject-matter in connection
with these Islands, a different meaning had, without
indication or motive, been imported into the words.
They cannot have one meaning in any other statute
and a different and conflicting meaning in this
statute. Where property in general is referred to
therein, other and apt phrases are used in order to
include it; for instance, section 12 provides "that all
the property and rights which have been acquired in
the Phil. Islands by the United States ... are hereby
placed under the control of the Government of the
said Islands." Therefore, there is much real property
belonging to the Government which is not affected
by statutes for the settlement, prescription or sale of
public lands. Examples in point are properties
occupied by public buildings or devoted to municipal
or other governmental uses.
Among the authorities cited in the Mapa case are
two, Shively vs. Bowlby (152 U.S., 1), and
Mann vs. Tacoma Land Co. (153 U.S., 273), in
which it was held that general public land laws did
not apply to land over which the tide ebbs and flows.
Mr. Justice Gray, in Shively vs. Bowlby, which is in
itself an epitome of the American Law of Waters,
speaking of the tide lands, said:
But Congress has never undertaken by general
laws to dispose of such lands. . . .
The Congress of the United States, in disposing of
the public lands, has constantly acted upon the
theory that those lands, whether in the interior, or on
the coast, above high- water mark, may be taken up
by actual occupants, in order to encourage the
settlement of the country, but that the navigable
water and the soils under them. whether within the
above the ebb and flow of the tide, shall be and
remain public highways; and being chiefly valuable
for the public purposes of commerce, navigation,
and fishery, and for the improvement necessary to
secure and promote those purposes, shall not be
granted away during the period of territorial
government. (Pp. 48 and 49.)
The conclusions of the court are in part stated as
follows:
Lands under tide waters are incapable of cultivation
or improvement in the manner of lands above high-
water mark. They are of great value to the public for
the purposes of commerce, navigation, and fishery.
Their improvement by individuals, when permitted,
is incidental or subordinate to the public use and
right. Therefore the title and the control of them are
vested in the sovereign for the benefit of the whole
people . . . .
Upon the acquisition of a territory by the United
States, whether by cession from one of the States,
or by treaty with a foreign country, or by discovery
and settlement, the same title and dominion passed
to the United States, for the benefit of whole people,
and in trust for the several States to be ultimately
created out of the territory . . . .
The United States, while hold the country as a
territory, having all the powers both of national and
municipal government, may grant, for appropriate
purposes, titles or rights in the soil below high-water
mark of tide waters. But that have never done so in
general laws. (Pp. 57 and 58.)
In Mann vs. Tacoma Land Co., it was said by Mr.
Justice Brewer (p. 284);
It is settled that the general legislation of Congress
in respect to public lands does not extend to tide
lands .... It provided that the scrip might be located
on the unoccupied and unappropriated public lands.
As said in Newhall vs. Sanger (92 U.S., 761, 763.)
"The words "public lands" are habitually used in our
legislation to described such as are subject to sale
or other disposal under general laws."
In Illinois Central R.R. Company vs. Illinois (146
U.S., 387) Mr. Justice Field, delivering the opinion of
the court, said:
That the State holds the title tot he lands under the
navigable waters of lake Michigan within its limits, in
the same manner that the State hold title to soils
under tide water, by the common law, we have
already shown, and that title necessarily carries with
it control over the waters above them whenever the
lands are subjected to use. But it is a title different in
character from that which the States holds in lands
intended for sale. It is different from the title which
the United States hold in the public lands which are
open to preemption and sale. It is a title held in trust
for the people of the States that they may enjoy the
navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over
them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from
the obstruction or interference of private parties.
The interest of the people in the navigation of the
waters and in commerce over them may be
improved in many instances by the erection of
wharves, docks, and piers therein, for which
purpose the State may grant parcels of the
submerged lands; and so long as their disposition is
made for such purposes, no valid objections can be
made to the grants .... The control of the State for
the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except
as to such parcels as are used in promoting the
interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of
without any substantial impairment of the public
interest in the lands and waters remaining .... The
State can no more abdicate its trust over property in
which the whole people are interested, like
navigable waters and soils under them, so as to
leave them entirely under the use and control of
private parties, except in the instance of parcels
mentioned for the improvement of the navigation
and use of the waters, or when parcels can be
disposed of without impairment of the public interest
in what remains, that can abdicate its police powers
in the administration of government and the
preservation of the peace .... So with trusts
connected with public property, or property of a
special character, like lands under navigable waters,
they can not be placed entirely beyond the direction
and control of the State.
The ownership of the navigable waters of the harbor
and the lands under them is a subject of public
concern to the whole people of the State. The trust
with which they are held, therefore, is governmental
and can not be alienated, except in those instances
mentioned of parcels used in the improvement of
the interest thus held, or when parcels can be
disposed of without detriment to the public interest
in the lands and waters remaining. . . . . (Pp. 452-
455.)
Mr. Justice Fields quotes from an opinion by Mr.
Justice Bradley, delivered in a case in the Circuit
Court, speaking of lands under water, as follows (p.
457):
Being subject to this trust, they were publici juris; in
other words, they were held for the use of the
people at large. It is true that to utilize the fisheries,
especially those of shellfish, it was necessary to
parcel them out to particular operators, and employ
the rent or consideration for the benefit of the whole
people; but this did not alter the character of the
title. The land remained subject to all other public
uses as before, especially to those of navigation
and commerce, which are always paramount to
those of public fisheries. It is also true that portions
of the submerged shoals and flats, which really
interfered with navigation, and could better subserve
the purposes of commerce by being filled up and
reclaimed, were disposed of to individuals for that
purpose. But neither did these dispositions of
useless parts affect the character of the title to the
remainder.
These citations are thus given at length in order to
make clear, first, the lands under the ebb and flow
of the tide of navigable waters are not in America
understood to be included in the phrase "public
lands" in Acts of Congress of United States; nor,
perforce, can they best understood in laws of the
Philippine Commission drawn immediately under
the sanction of those Acts; and second, that such
lands are under existing Congressional legislation
the subject of private ownership, any occupation
therefore be subordinate to the public purpose of
navigation and fishery. While as well in the original
thirteen States in which there was never a national
public domain to which the land laws of Congress
could apply as in States more recently created out
of that domain and which upon their formation
became masters of their own land policy the local
laws govern riparian and littoral rights, subject only
to Congressional control in matters of foreign and
interstate commerce ( U.S. vs. Mission Rock Co.,
189 U. S., 391), yet, as to the unappropriated public
lands constituting the public domain the sole power
of legislation is vested in Congress, which are
uniformly and consistently declined to assume the
function of authorizing or regulating private
appropriation of such rights. Therefore, in the
absence of specific Congressional legislation, it is
impossible for individuals to acquire title under the
ten years provision of Act No. 926 or even through a
definite grants from the local legislature of lands
beneath navigable waters in which the tide ebbs
and flows, except for wharf-age or other purposes
auxiliary to navigation or other public uses, unless in
conformity with the preexisting local law of the
Archipelago.
The matter is dwelt is upon for the reason that the
late Attorney-General in his very able brief calls
attention to the effect apprehended from the
extension of the words "agricultural lands" as used
in Act No. 926 to include all public lands not forest
or mineral in character, specifying two acts of the
Philippine Commission, the validity of which he
fears might thereby be called into question. The first
of these, Act No. 1039, dedicates to use of the Navy
Department of the United States Government
certain ground and buildings in Cavite, while the
other, Act No. 1654, is a fore-shore law regulating
the control and disposal of filled Government lands.
If the term "agricultural lands" be held to include all
government property not forest or mineral in
character, he suggests that these Acts, not being in
conformity with the procedure of Act No. 926, as
approved by Congress, would be invalid, and
moreover, that the Philippine Government would be
seriously tied up in the management and disposition
of other lands owned by it.
Without finally passing on this question in relation to
lands the owners of which are not before us parties
to this action, it is appropriate, in answering the
argument of the law officer of the State, to point out
that this consequence appears to be avoided by the
restricted sense given to the words "public lands" or
"public domain" in the Act of Congress and in Act
No. 926, as hereinbefore noted. Neither the property
affected by Act No. 1039, already in use by the
Navy Department of the United States, nor the
foreshore land mentioned in Act No. 1654, which is
under the ebb and flow of the tide, was, in so far as
appears in the Acts before us, part of the public
domain to be disposed of under sections 13, 14, 15,
and 16 of the Act of congress of July 1, 1902, and
for that reason it is not included in any of the three
subdivisions of "public lands" as agricultural or
otherwise, although it was part of the property
acquired in the Philippine Islands by the United
States by the treaty of peace with Spain, which by
section 12 of that Act was "placed under the control
of the Government of said Islands, to be
administered for the benefit of the inhabitants
thereof." It would seem that the validity of the Cavite
Act can not be successfully assailed on this ground,
while it may well be that The Fore-shore Act on
examination will be found to fall, as to its general
purpose, within the authorization of section 11 of the
Act of Congress, whereby the duty is imposed upon
the Island government of improving the harbors and
navigable waters in the interest of commerce.
As a consequence, it follows that The Public Land
Act did not apply to the fisheries in the Mapa case, if
they are to be regarded as constituting, in a general
sense, land under tidal waters. It becomes
necessary, therefore, to refer to the character of the
lands.
Although argued at different times, five of these
cases have been presented substantially together,
all being covered by one brief of the late Attorney-
General in behalf of the Government in which, with
many interesting historical and graphic citations he
describes that part of the marginal seashore of the
Philippine Islands known as manglares, with their
characteristic vegetation. In brief, it may be said that
they are mud flats, alternately washed and exposed
by the tide, in which grow various kindred plants
which will not live except when watered by the sea,
extending their roots deep into the mud and casting
their seeds, which also germinate there. These
constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which
exist naturally, but which are also, to some extent,
cultivated by man for the sake of the combustible
wood of the mangrove and like trees as well as for
the useful nipa palm propagated thereon. Although
these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the
opinion that they can not be so regarded in the
sense in which that term is used in the cases cited
or in general American Jurisprudence. The waters
flowing over them are not available for purpose of
navigation, and they "may be disposed of without
impairment of the public interest in what remains."
Mr. Justice Bradley, in the passage quoted by Mr.
Justice Field, makes an exception of submerged
shoals and flats. In Railroad
Company vs. Schurmeir (74 U.S., 272) , a
Government patent of public land bordering upon a
river was held to include a parcel submerge at very
high water and separated from the mainland by a
slough in which the water ran when ordinarily high.
In Mobile vs. Hallett (41 U.S., 260), at page 266. Mr.
Justice Catron remarked in his dissenting opinion:
. . . and that a mud flat, flowed by tide water, is the
subject of grant by the Government to an individual,
I think can not well be doubted by anyone
acquainted with the southern country; when such
valuable portions of it are mud flats, in the constant
course of reclamation.
In several of the older States along the Atlantic
coast such flats, either by force of ordinance,
custom, judicial construction, or local laws are held
to pass under private grants as appurtenant to the
uplands. (Winslow vs. Patten, 34 Maine, 25;
Litchfield vs. Scituate, 135 Mass., 39;
People vs. New York and Staten Island Ferry Co.,
68 N.Y., 71; Stevens vs. P.& N. Railroad, 5 Vroom,
34 N.J. Law, 532.) There is even stronger reason for
excepting mud flats from the rule of tide lands in
these Islands, owing to the peculiarities of their
configuration and to the nature of the tropical growth
thereon, and whatever may be action of the tide, we
do not think that in the Philippines such of the
shoals covered by this vegetation, whether
spontaneously or by cultivation, as are not available
for free navigation, or required for any other purpose
of general benefit, can be considered tidal land
reserved for public use alone, under the
governmental trust for commerce and public fishery,
but on the contrary, we regard them as public
property, susceptible of a sort of cultivation and of
improvement, and as such, subject to occupation
under paragraph 6 of section 54 of the Land Law.
Instances may hereafter arise of fisheries unduly
established in what are clearly navigable waters
which would constitute a nuisance, and not be the
subject of prescription or of grant. A brief reference
to the five cases under consideration in this court,
however, will serve to show that they all fairly fall
within the benefits of the law. In the Mapa case1 the
property was far from the the sea, partly occupied
as fish pond, as nipa land, and as a salt pit. It does
not appear whether it was connected with the sea
by nature or by art, or whether the tide ebbed or
flowed upon it, or whether the salt was sufficient to
impart to any portion of it a mineral character. In the
Santiago case2 there was a fishery about two
thousand yards from the sea, with which it
communicated by a river, and a portion of the
inclosure was dedicated to growing the aquatic tree
called bacawan. The fishery had been constructed
by man, upon land heretofore sown with this tree. In
the Gutierrez case3 it was shown that the land was
partly highland, growing fruit trees, and partly
lowland , converted by the occupant of the upland
into a fishery by this labor. In the Baello case, 4 the
river running to the sea was a hundred meters
away, the salt water therefrom reaching the lowland
by means of an artificial canal cut by the owner of
the land when he gave up
cultivating bacawan thereon, an made it into a
fishery. In the Montano case, although there was a
considerable depth of water over the soil, yet before
the fishery was made, some thirty years before the
trial, bacawan had been sown and propagated in
the mud by the owner who finally sold the entire cut
when he built the dikes.
All these lots, in their original state, whether near
the sea or at a distance from it inland, and whether
bare or washed by the tides, were not covered by
waters practically navigable and were filled, whether
naturally or artificially, with vegetation sometimes
cultivated and in common use for fuel and for
building purposes, and they were all adapted to
fisheries or fish hatcheries by the labor of man
introducing or regulating the access of salt water
thereto. It is obvious that that all five cases are of
the same general nature and that one rule must be
applied to them all.
In this discussion of the meaning which the
Congress of the United States attached to the
phrase "public lands" in the Philippine Bill, we have
assumed that it was used in the same sense as in
other laws enacted by that body. If, however, it can
be considered as employed with reference to the
peculiar conditions of the territory to which it was to
be applied and to the local law or usage prevailing
therein, the result would not be different. In many of
its general features the Spanish law of public lands
in the Philippines resembled the American.
Government property was of two kinds — first, that
of public use or service, said to be of public
ownership, and second, that of having a private
character or use. (Civil Code, arts. 339 and 340.)
Lands of the first class, while they retain their public
character are inalienable; those of the second are
not.
By the royal decree of February 13, 1894, it was
enacted that all "the land, soil, ground not under
cultivation, and forests in the Philippine Islands
should be considered saleable crown lands," which
are not included in the four exceptions stated,
among which were "those which belonged to the
forest zones which the State desires to hold for the
Commonwealth." This corresponds in the main to
the American classification into Government
property, public lands, and forest reserve. Mineral
lands are elsewhere defined. It is to be noted,
however, that in the two languages terms ordinarily
equivalent are not in this relation employed in the
same sense and that lands de dominio
publico signify quite a different thing from the
arbitrary English Phrases "public lands" or "public
domain."
The Law of Waters of 1866, which was the latest
Spanish Law of Waters extended to these Islands,
provides that private property can not be acquired in
lands preserving the character of public ownership
(title 1, art. 1, par. 29), and among the lands
declared of public ownership and use by article 1 of
chapter 1 of title 5 of the same law are:
The seashore. — By shore is understood the land
alternately covered and uncovered by the sea in its
tidal movement. Its interior, or land limit, is the point
reached by the highest and equinoctial tides. At
those places not affected by tides, the land limit is
the highest point reached by sea water in ordinary
storms or hurricanes. (Par. 3.)
So that under this legislation the same question also
presented itself as to what constituted seashore,
which was of public use and trust and therefore not
alienable. This question can not be said to have
been settled by official ruling at the time of the
American occupation. From the official records it
appears that there were then pending for
registration a great number of
possessory expedientes, twenty-two of which, made
before April 17, 1895, were from the Province of
Pampanga alone, in which the land was described
as manglares. Under the royal decree of 1894
such manglares appear at the outset to have been
registered and considered alienable and numbers of
them were conceded by adjustment, including
considerable tracts in the town of Sexmoan and
Lubao in Pampanga. Claims having been made that
on account of the trees growing thereon they formed
part of the forest reserve and also because, being
covered and uncovered by the tide, they were part
of the shore, and in either case were inalienable, the
engineer in chief of the forestry district of the center
of Luzon addressed, on January 7, 1893, a
communication to the inspector general de montes (
Forestry Department) in which he expressed an
opinion that as part of the shore they were not
subject to private ownership and asked for an early
decision of the question. On November 26, 1893,
the acting inspector-general notified the chief of the
district of the Visayas in Mindanao that his
excellency, the governor-general, had that they
ordered all action suspended
on expedientes of manglar and nipa lands and salt
marshes until the questions involved in regard
thereto should be determined. In this condition the
matter remained until the expiration of the Spanish
sovereignty.
By article 14 of the Law of Waters the right of shore
fishery was declared public, but by article 23
authority might be granted individuals to establish
shore hatcheries for fish and shellfish, and by article
15 salt-water ponds on private ground not
communicating with the sea by water navigable by
boats were recognized as private property, while
chapter 10 permitted and regulated the draining of
swamps and marshes, both of private and of public
ownership.
Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory
condition of the law the custom had grown up of
converting manglares and nipa lands into fisheries
which became common feature of settlements along
the coast and at the time of the change of
sovereignty constituted one of the most productive
industries of the Islands, the abrogation of which
would destroy vested interests and prove a public
disaster. In our opinion it was the object of
Congress not to work such a result but, on the
contrary, in furtherance of the purposes of the treaty
of Paris, to recognize and safeguard such property.
Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Land
Registration is affirmed, without costs.
Torres, Mapa, and Carson, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ARELLANO, C.J., concurring:
I concur in the foregoing decision, but reserve my
opinion as to the scope of the phrase "public lands"
in the Act of Congress referred to.
WILLIARD, J., concurring in the result.
In the case of Mapa vs. The Insular
Government ( 10 Phil. Rep., 175 ) it is stated in the
opinion, page 176, that —
The only question submitted tot he court below or to
this court by the Attorney-General is the question
whether the land in controversy is agricultural land
within the meaning of the section above quoted.
The section quoted is section 54, paragraph 6, Act
No. 926, in which the phrase used is "agricultural
public lands."
Throughout the opinion the phrase "public lands" is
repeatedly and exclusively used. The entire
discussion was directed to the question as to
whether the property there in question being "public
land," it could be considered as agricultural public
land, and the conclusion reached is stated at page
182, as follows:
In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land,"
as used in Act No. 926, means those public lands
acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral
lands.
In that case the land in question was a long distance
from the sea. In fact, the entire town of Molo was
between it and the water. It could in no sense be
called tidal land. Therefore, the opinion was devoted
to a consideration of not what were "public lands"
but whether this particular tract was or was not
agricultural public land. The question what the
phrase "public lands" meant neither considered nor
decided in that opinion, for its resolution was not
necessary. In the concurring opinion, however, that
question was discussed and it was stated that the
phrase "public lands" used in Act No. 926 must be
interpreted according to the American
understanding of the words employed and the
meaning of the terms as definitely fixed by the
decrees of the United States Supreme Court.
This statement was not necessary to the decision of
the case then under discussion and was moreover,
as shall attempt to show hereafter, not a correct
statement made in that opinion, to the effect that
there may be real property belonging to the
Government which would not be included in the
phrase "public lands," there can be no doubt
concerning its correctness. This is and always has
been apparent. It is indicated by articles 339 and
340 of the Civil Code, which are as follows:
ART. 339. Property of public ownership is —
1. That destined to the public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges
constructed by the State, and banks, shores,
roadsteads, and that of a similar character.
2. That belonging exclusively to the State without
being for public use which is destined to some
public service, or to the development of the national
wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works
for the defense of the territory, and mines, until
concession has been granted.
ART. 340. All other property belonging to the State
which has not the conditions stated in the preceding
article is considered as private property.
Articles 24 and 25 of the Regulations for the
Execution of the Mortgage Law also indicate it.
These articles are as follows:
ART. 24. All real estate and property rights thereto
may be recorded, without exception, whether
belonging to private parties, to the State, to the
province, to the municipality, or to civil or
ecclesiastical corporations.
ART. 25. Exceptions to the record required by
article 2 of the law are:
First. Property which belongs exclusively to the
eminent domain of the State, and which is for the
use of all, such as the shores of the sea, islands,
rivers and their borders, wagon roads, and roads of
all kinds, with the exception of railroads; streets,
parks, public promenades, and commons of towns.
provided they are not lands of common profit to the
inhabitants; walls of cities and parks, ports, and
roadsteads, any other analogous property during
the time they are in common and general use,
always reserving the servitudes established by law
on the shores of the sea and borders of navigable
rivers.
Second. Public temples dedicated to the Catholic
faith.
In the Mapa case it was not necessary to decide,
nor was it there decided, what the real property was
which, belonging to the government, still would not
come within the phrase "public lands," nor how
private persons could acquire rights in such
property, nor whether that phrase should have the
same meaning here as it has in the United states. In
the present case, it is said in the opinion that "all
these five cases are of the same general character,
and that the same rule should be applied to all." If it
was not necessary to decide in the Mapa case the
questions above mentioned, why is it necessary to
discuss and decide them here? We are all agreed
(1) that these lands are not tidal lands and are
public lands, and (2) that they are agricultural lands.
Having arrived at these conclusions, I see no
reason for the question as to what the result would
be if they were tidal lands. It is apparent that
anything said upon that question is not necessary to
the decision of these cases and is obiter dictum.
Whether Act. No. 1654, relating to the reclaimed
land in Manila near the Luneta, is authorized by
section 11 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or
by section 12, is a question outside of the issues in
the case at bar, and it seems unnecessary now to
commit the court to any definite resolution thereof. If
it is the purpose of the decision to announce the
doctrine that rights in tidal waters in the Philippines
must be governed by the principles already
announced by the Supreme Court in the decisions
cited, this objection attains greater force. Thus
construed, it decides the rights of innumerable
persons in the Islands who have reclaimed land
from the sea and built upon it, none of whom has
had an opportunity to be heard before his rights are
thus decided.
These objections to the decision, on the ground that
it discusses and apparently decides questions not
before the court, and which affect parties not before
it, would not be so serious if the conclusions
reached were sound. But they are, as I believe,
erroneous. The decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States cited the opinion have nothing to
do either with the question as to what rights private
persons can acquire in tidal lands in the Philippines
or with the meaning which should be given to the
phrase "public lands" found in the Act of Congress
of July 1, 1902.
1. Upon the first question as to private rights in tidal
lands, it has been definitely settled by the Supreme
Court at Washington in many decisions, which are
collected in the case of Shively vs. Bowlby (152
U.S., 1 ), cited in the opinion, that the rights of
private persons in such lands depend upon the law
of the State where the lands are. The court said in
that case (p. 40) :
VII. The later judgments of this court clearly
establish that the title and rights of riparian or littoral
proprietors in the soil below high water mark of
navigable waters are governed by the local laws of
the several States, subject, of course, to the rights
granted to the United States by the Constitution.
It also appears from that case that these laws vary
in different States. The court said, at page 26:
The foregoing summary of the laws of the original
States shows that there is no universal and uniform
law upon the subject; but that each State has dealt
with the lands under the tide waters within its
borders according to its own views of justice and
policy, reserving its own control over such lands, or
granting rights therein to individuals or corporations,
whether owners of the adjoining upland or not, as it
considered for the best interests of the public. Great
caution, therefore, is necessary in applying
precedents in one State to cases arising in another.
In Massachusetts the owner of the upland is the
owner in fee to the low-water mark if not beyond
100 rods. In other States he is the owner in fee only
to high-water mark. In Minnesota the owner of the
upland has the exclusive right to occupy the shore
in front of his land, not only to low-water mark but
even into the water to the point of navigability, and
to occupy it for purely private purposes. And he is
so far the owner of the land under water to the point
of navigability that he can sell portions thereof and
retain himself the shore line. ( Hanford vs. St. Paul
& D.R. Co., 43 Minn., 104.) It will be observed that
some of the cases cited in support of the decision in
the case at bar arose in Massachusetts and
Minnesota. The result is that when the Supreme
Court of the United States decides a case relating to
such lands it necessarily decides it according to the
law of the State from which it comes. So that if any
law of American origin is to be applied here it can
not be a national law of waters for none exists. It
must be necessarily be the law of some one of the
different States. This would require a selection of
the jurisprudence of one of those States which this
court should not attempt to make.
At the cession of the Islands to the United States
there was in force here a body of laws relating to
this subject. These laws are still in force. They are
found in the Law of Waters of 1866 and in articles
407 to 425 of the Civil Code. Cases which have
heretofore arisen in this court have been decided
with reference to these laws and not with reference
to the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States relating to cases arising there. Among others
are the cases of Ker & Co. vs. Cuden (6 Phil. Rep.,
732), and Jover vs. Insular Government1 (No. 2674,
decided March 25, 1908). That questions relating to
tidal lands should continue to be so decided seems
to me free from doubt. It may be said that the
decision does not intend to announce a contrary
doctrine. If it does not, I see no purpose, for
example, in the long citation from the case of Illinois
Central R. Co. vs. Illinois (146 U.S., 387), nor in the
declaration that the purpose of the citation of these
decisions is to show in the second place that the
rights in tidal lands are not under the legislation of
Congress the subject of private property.
2. The second question relates to the meaning
which should be given to the phrase "public lands"
in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. In the
concurring opinion in the Mapa case it was stated,
as has been seen, that it has the same meaning
here as in the United States. This doctrine seems to
be reiterated in the opinion in this case. After
announcing it in equivocal terms, it is said, to be
sure that the result would be the same if the words
were to be construed with reference to the local law.
This would be true if the laws of the other two
jurisdictions were the same. But it is easily
demonstrated that they are not.
With reference to tidal lands, we have seen that in
some of the States private persons are the owners
of the land between high and low water mark. By
the Law of Waters of 1866, and article 339 of the
Civil Code, the shore or beach is public property. It
not only does not belong to private persons, but it is
not even the private property of the State.
The difference between the two systems is more
marked when we consider public roads and streets
and the beds of non-navigable rivers. By the
common law of England, which has been followed
by and is now in force in a great many of the States,
the beds of such rivers belong to the owners of the
adjoining land. But by the law here in force (arts.
339 and 407, Civil Code) they are public property
and can not be considered even as the private
property of the State. The same is true of streets
and roads. (Arts. 339 and 344, Civil Code.) When
the United States issues a patent for public land
owned by it situated in the State of Minnesota, for
example, and bounded by a non-navigable river. the
patentee becomes the owner of one-half of the bed
of the river. When the Spanish Government issued
a patent for land in the Philippines bounded by river,
the patentee did not become the owner of the bed of
the river. His ownership extended only to low-water
mark.
What has been said of rivers is true of roads. If the
phrase "public lands" be given the meaning here
that it has in the United States, whenever the
Director of Public Lands grants a patent for land
bounded by a non-navigable river or road the
patentee will become the owner of one-half of the
bed of the river and one-half of the road. This result
would be in direct conflict with the articles of the
Civil Code above cited, and would amount to a
repeal thereof. Such a result Congress never could
have intended. Prior to the treaty of Paris the
Spanish Government was the owner of the roads
and the beds of streams in the Philippines in trust
for the benefit of the people. The treaty itself did not
change this status. On the contrary, it preserved
rights of property as they then existed. By the treaty,
the United States acquired interest which the
Spanish Government had in roads and the beds of
Republic of the Philippines
streams. It did not become the absolute owner
SUPREME COURT
thereof.
Manila
The laws of Spain relating to this matter were
EN BANC
continued in force by the proclamation of General
Merritt. This would have been the result even
without any proclamation.(American Ins. G.R. No. L-8936             October 2, 1915
Co. vs. Canter, 1 Pet., 511.) They are in force now,
and the Government is still the owner of roads and CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband
the beds of rivers unless Congress by the use of the MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants,
phrase "public lands" in the Act of July 1, 1902, has vs.
repealed the articles of the Civil Code above cited. I N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
do not think that such an intention can be attributed
to it . It is more reasonable to say that it is intended Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.
to give to the phrase the meaning which was given D.R. Williams for appellee.
to it by the laws in force in the territory where the
Act was to take effect. And this intention is more
apparent when we consider that there then existed
article 340 of the Civil Code, which contained a
complete definition of these lands belonging to the JOHNSON, J.:
Government, which it had the right to dispose of as
private property. It had no intention of disposing of
From the record the following facts appear:
property which it held in trust. The property which
the Commission intended to dispose of by Act No.
926 was undoubtedly the private property of the First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy,
State as defined by article 340. as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in
the city of Manila.
To say that Congress had a different purpose would
be to attribute to it an intention to discriminate Second. That there exists and has existed a number
against the Philippines and to impose upon the of years a stone wall between the said lots. Said
Islands laws other than those there in force, a thing wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
which it has never done when legislating in regard
to its land situated within a particular State. As we Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March,
have seen, it has always allowed each State to 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land
determine for itself the laws which shall govern real Registration for the registration of their lot. After a
State to determine for itself the laws which shall consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th
govern real estate within its borders. When this day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the
court is called upon to define the phrase "public plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them
lands" as used in the Act of Congress and in Act No. the original certificate provided for under the torrens
926, it should in my opinion say that it includes the system. Said registration and certificate included the
property described in article 340 of the Civil Code. wall.

For the reasons above stated, I agree with the result
in this case, but I dissent from those parts of the
opinion which I have discussed.
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant
presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of the lot now
occupied by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912,
the court decreed the registration of said title and
issued the original certificate provided for under the
torrens system. The description of the lot given in
the petition of the defendant also included said wall.
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of
December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the
wall which had been included in the certificate
granted to them had also been included in the
certificate granted to the defendant .They
immediately presented a petition in the Court of
Land Registration for an adjustment and correction
of the error committed by including said wall in the
registered title of each of said parties. The lower
court however, without notice to the defendant,
denied said petition upon the theory that, during the
pendency of the petition for the registration of the
defendant's land, they failed to make any objection
to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in
the name of the defendant.
Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is
registered in the name of each of the owners of the
adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.
Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and
the land occupied by it?
The decision of the lower court is based upon the
theory that the action for the registration of the lot of
the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the
judgment or decree was binding upon all parties
who did not appear and oppose it. In other words,
by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not
opposed the registration of that part of the lot on
which the wall was situate they had lost it, even
though it had been theretofore registered in their
name. Granting that theory to be correct one, and
granting even that the wall and the land occupied by
it, in fact, belonged to the defendant and his
predecessors, then the same theory should be
applied to the defendant himself. Applying that
theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he
had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the
same registered in their name, more than six years
before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be
permitted to regain it by simply including it in a
petition for registration? The plaintiffs having
secured the registration of their lot, including the
wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert
and to watch all the proceedings in the land court to
see that some one else was not having all, or a
portion of the same, registered? If that question is to
be answered in the affirmative, then the whole
scheme and purpose of the torrens system of land
registration must fail. The real purpose of that
system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever
to any question of the legality of the title, except
claims which were noted at the time of registration,
in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent
thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would
seem that once a title is registered the owner may
rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the
portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su
casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of
course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for
the registration of land under the torrens system is
judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil.
Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the forms of an
action and the result is final and binding upon all the
world. It is an action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of
Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil.
rep., 49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31;
Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land
Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in
its consequences than does an ordinary action. All
the world are parties, including the government.
After the registration is complete and final and there
exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties
who may claim an interest. The rights of all the
world are foreclosed by the decree of registration.
The government itself assumes the burden of giving
notice to all parties. To permit persons who are
parties in the registration proceeding (and they are
all the world) to again litigate the same questions,
and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the
registered title, would destroy the very purpose and
intent of the law. The registration, under the torrens
system, does not give the owner any better title than
he had. If he does not already have a perfect title,
he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only
may be registered. The certificate of registration
accumulates in open document a precise and
correct statement of the exact status of the fee held
by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud,
is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real
interest of its owner. The title once registered, with
very few exceptions, should not thereafter be
impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or
diminished, except in some direct proceeding
permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered
titles would be lost. A registered title can not be
altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in
a collateral proceeding and not even by a direct
proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed
by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act
(No. 496) providing for the registration of titles under
the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is
no provision in said Act giving the parties relief
under conditions like the present. There is nothing in
the Act which indicates who should be the owner of
land which has been registered in the name of two
different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree
ordering the registration of a particular parcel of land
is a bar to future litigation over the same between
the same parties .In view of the fact that all the
world are parties, it must follow that future litigation
over the title is forever barred; there can be no
persons who are not parties to the action. This, we
think, is the rule, except as to rights which are noted
in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and
with certain other exceptions which need not be
dismissed at present. A title once registered can not
be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and
notorious possession. Registered title under the
torrens system can not be defeated by prescription
(section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered,
is notice to the world. All persons must take notice.
No one can plead ignorance of the registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in
the name of two different persons, has been
presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In
some jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has
been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by
express statutory provision. In others it has been
settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent
discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at
page 823, says: "The general rule is that in the case
of two certificates of title, purporting to include the
same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the
land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or
only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate.
(Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy,
7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48;
Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register of
Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)"
Hogg adds however that, "if it can be very clearly
ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction
relating to written documents, that the inclusion of
the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a
mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the
latter of the two certificates of title to be conclusive."
(See Hogg on the "Australian torrens
System," supra, and cases cited. See also the
excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the
Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing
the general question, said: "Where two certificates
purport to include the same land the earlier in date
prevails. ... In successive registrations, where more
than one certificate is issued in respect of a
particular estate or interest in land, the person
claiming under the prior certificates is entitled to the
estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold
under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or
whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the
person who was the holder of the earliest certificate
issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this
country do not expressly cover the case of the issue
of two certificates for the same land, they provide
that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the
effect of this undoubtedly is that where two
certificates purport to include the same registered
land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold
the title" (p. 237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the
decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon and
against all persons, including the Insular
Government and all the branches thereof, whether
mentioned by name in the application, notice, or
citation, or included in the general description "To all
whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be
opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other
disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or
decrees; subject, however, to the right of any
person deprived of land or of any estate or interest
therein by decree of registration obtained
by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a
petition for review within one year after entry of the
decree (of registration), provided no innocent
purchaser for value has acquired an interest.
It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of
registration" shall not be opened, for any reason, in
any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud,
after the lapse of one year. If then the decree of
registration can not be opened for any reason,
except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that
purpose, may such decree be opened or set aside
in a collateral proceeding by including a portion of
the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of
registration? We do not believe the law
contemplated that a person could be deprived of his
registered title in that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory
provision which governs the right of the ownership
of land when the same is registered in the ordinary
registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of
the Civil Code provides, among other things, that
when one piece of real property had been sold to
two different persons it shall belong to the person
acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This
rule, of course, presupposes that each of the
vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the
land. The real ownership in such a case depends
upon priority of registration. While we do not now
decide that the general provisions of the Civil Code
are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even
though we see no objection thereto, yet we think, in
the absence of other express provisions, they
should have a persuasive influence in adopting a
rule for governing the effect of a double registration
under said Act. Adopting the rule which we believe
to be more in consonance with the purposes and
the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the
opinion and so decree that in case land has been
registered under the Land Registration Act in the
name of two different persons, the earlier in date
shall prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not
overlooked the forceful argument of the appellee.
He says, among other things; "When Prieto et al.
were served with notice of the application of Teus
(the predecessor of the defendant) they became
defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was
seeking to foreclose their right, and that of orders, to
the parcel of land described in his application.
Through their failure to appear and contest his right
thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default
judgment against them, they became irrevocably
bound by the decree adjudicating such land to Teus.
They had their day in court and can not set up their
own omission as ground for impugning the validity
of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent
jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to hold
that lands with torrens titles are above the law and
beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".
As was said above, the primary and fundamental
purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the
holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this
registered title then the purpose of the law is
defeated. If those dealing with registered land
cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has
been gained by the registration and the expense
incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may
lose a strip of his registered land by the method
adopted in the present case, he may lose it all.
Suppose within the six years which elapsed after
the plaintiff had secured their title, they had
mortgaged or sold their right, what would be the
position or right of the mortgagee or vendee? That
mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied, and
sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable.
It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the
parties under such circumstances so as to minimize
such damages, taking into consideration al of the
conditions and the diligence of the respective
parties to avoid them. In the present case, the
appellee was the first negligent (granting that he
was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner
he can not complain) in not opposing the
registration in the name of the appellants. He was a
party-defendant in an action for the registration of
the lot in question, in the name of the appellants, in
1906. "Through his failure to appear and to oppose
such registration, and the subsequent entry of a
default judgment against him, he became
irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such
land to the appellants. He had his day in court and
should not be permitted to set up his own omissions
as the ground for impugning the validity of a
judgment duly entered by a court of competent
jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the
land upon which the wall is located, his failure to
oppose the registration of the same in the name of
the appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever
closes his mouth against impugning the validity of
that judgment. There is no more reason why the
doctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied
to the appellants than to him.
We have decided, in case of double registration
under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of
the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That
is the rule between original parties. May this rule be
applied to successive vendees of the owners of
such certificates? Suppose that one or the other of
the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers
his original certificate to an "innocent purchaser."
The general rule is that the vendee of land has no
greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that
he acquires the right which his vendor had, only.
Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate
would be the owner as against the vendee of the
owner of the later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first
reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the rule that
the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only.
Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate
that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected
against defenses which the vendor would not. Said
sections speak of available rights in favor of third
parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the
land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say,
persons who had had a right or interest in land
wrongfully included in an original certificate would
be unable to enforce such rights against an
"innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of
said sections. In the present case Teus had his
land, including the wall, registered in his name. He
subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the
appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that phrase is
used in said sections? May those who have been
deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the
original certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of
their right to the same, by virtue of the sale by him
to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold
their lot, including the wall, to an "innocent
purchaser," would such purchaser be included in
the phrase "innocent purchaser," as the same is
used in said sections? Under these examples there
would be two innocent purchasers of the same land,
is said sections are to be applied .Which of the two
innocent purchasers, if they are both to be regarded
as innocent purchasers, should be protected under
the provisions of said sections? These questions
indicate the difficulty with which we are met in giving
meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent
purchaser," in said sections.
May the purchaser of land which has been included
in a "second original certificate" ever be regarded as
an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or
interest of the owner of the first original certificate,
his heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original
certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is
never issued until it is recorded. The record notice
to all the world. All persons are charged with the
knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing
with the land so recorded, or any portion of it, must
be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The
purchaser is charged with notice of every fact
shown by the record and is presumed to know every
fact which the record discloses .This rule is so well
established that it is scarcely necessary to cite
authorities in its support (Northwestern National
Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin on
Real Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]).
When a conveyance has been properly recorded
such record is constructive notice of its contents and
all interests, legal and equitable, included therein.
(Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289;
Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97;
Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500;
Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey,
20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of
Lords Cases, 341.)
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the
purchaser has examined every instrument of record
affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable.
He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the
record and is presumed to know every fact which an
examination of the record would have disclosed.
This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of
innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose
and object of the law requiring a record would be
destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by
proof of want of knowledge of what the record
contains any more than one may be permitted to
show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the
law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the
facts which the public record contains is a rule of
law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would
lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here
requiring that original deeds of conveyance of real
property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring
mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of
the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is
indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face
of that statute would the courts allow a mortgage to
be valid which had not been recorded, upon the
plea of ignorance of the statutory provision, when
third parties were interested? May a purchaser of
land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead
ignorance of its existence, and by reason of such
ignorance have the land released from such lien?
Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded
mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the
plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there
be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in
the sense that he had no knowledge of the
existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that
all persons must take notice of what the public
record contains in just as obligatory upon all
persons as the rule that all men must know the law;
that no one can plead ignorance of the law. The fact
that all men know the law is contrary to the
presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows
clearly that they do not know the law. The rule,
however, is mandatory and obligatory,
notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow
the defense of ignorance of the existence and
contents of a public record.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may
the purchaser of land from the owner of the second
original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when
a part or all of such land had theretofore been
registered in the name of another, not the vendor?
We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55, and
112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We
do not believe that the phrase "innocent purchaser
should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot
be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because of
the facts contained in the record of the first original
certificate. The rule should not be applied to the
purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is
not the owner of the original certificate, or his
successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent
purchaser" of the portion of the land included in
another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice
of what the record contains precludes the idea of
innocence. By reason of the prior registry there
cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in
a prior original certificate and in a name other than
that of the vendor, or his successors. In order to
minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule
to establish. We believe the phrase "innocent
purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited
only to cases where unregistered land has been
wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens
system. When land is once brought under the
torrens system, the record of the original certificate
and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all
the world. That being the rule, could Teus even
regarded as the holder in good fifth of that part of
the land included in his certificate of the appellants?
We think not. Suppose, for example, that Teus had
never had his lot registered under the torrens
system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee
and had included in his deed of transfer the very
strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be
regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip?
Would his vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of
said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original
certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility.
Has the appellee gained any right by reason of the
registration of the strip of land in the name of his
vendor? Applying the rule of notice resulting from
the record of the title of the appellants, the question
must be answered in the negative. We are of the
opinion that these rules are more in harmony with
the purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule contended
for by the appellee. We believe that the purchaser
from the owner of the later certificate, and his
successors, should be required to resort to his
vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like the
present, rather than to molest the holder of the first
certificate who has been guilty of no negligence.
The holder of the first original certificate and his
successors should be permitted to rest secure in
their title, against one who had acquired rights in
conflict therewith and who had full and complete
knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land
included in the second original certificate, by reason
of the facts contained in the public record and the
knowledge with which he is charged and by reason
of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any,
resulting from such purchase, rather than he who
has obtained the first certificate and who was
innocent of any act of negligence.
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend
to solve, all the difficulties resulting from double
registration under the torrens system and the
subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we now
attempt to decide the effect of the former
registration in the ordinary registry upon the
registration under the torrens system. We are
inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the
record under the torrens system, supersede all
other registries. If that view is correct then it will be
sufficient, in dealing with land registered and
recorded alone. Once land is registered and
recorded under the torrens system, that record
alone can be examined for the purpose of
ascertaining the real status of the title to the land.
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when
two persons have acquired equal rights in the same
thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and
who has complied with all the requirements of the
law should be protected.
In view of our conclusions, above stated, the
judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby
revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court
now having and exercising the jurisdiction
heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction
to make such orders and decrees in the premises
as may correct the error heretofore made in
including the land in the second original certificate
issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee,
as well as in all other duplicate certificates issued.
Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torrens, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
TRENT, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
In cases of double or overlapping registration, I am
inclined to agree with the reasoning and authority on
which it is held in the majority opinion (first) that the
original holder of the prior certificate is entitled to the
land as against the original holder of the later
certificate, where there has been no transfer of title
by either party to an innocent purchaser; both, as is
shown in the majority opinion, being at fault in
permitting the double registration to take place;
(second) that an innocent purchaser claiming under
the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against
the original holder of the later certificate, and also as
against innocent purchasers from the holder of the
later certificate; the innocent purchaser being in no
wise at fault in connection with the issuance of the
later certificate.
But I am of opinion that neither the authorities cited,
nor the reasoning of the majority opinion sustains
the proposition that the original holder of the prior
certificate is entitled to the land as against an
innocent purchaser from the holder of the later
certificate.
As to the text-book authorities cited in the majority
opinion, it is sufficient to say that the rules laid down
by both Hogg and Niblack are mere general rules,
admittedly subject to exception, and of course of no
binding force or authority where the reasoning upon
which these rules are based is applicable to the
facts developed in a particular case.
In its last analysis the general rule laid down in the
majority opinion rests upon the proposition set forth
in the last page of the opinion wherein it is said that
"it would seem to be a just and equitable rule, when
two persons have acquired equal rights in the same
thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and
who has complied with all the requirements of the
law should be protected." The rule, as applied to the
matter in hand, may be stated as follows: It would
seem to be a just and equitable rule when two
persons have acquired separate and independent
registered titles to the same land, under the Land
Registration Act, to hold that the one who first
acquired registered title and who has complied with
all the requirements of the law in that regard should
be protected, in the absence of any express
statutory provision to the contrary.
Thus stated I have no quarrel with the doctrine as a
statement of the general rule to be applied in cases
of double or overlapping registration under the Land
Registration Act; for it is true as stated in the
majority opinion that in the adjudication and
registration of titles by the Courts of Land
Registration "mistakes are bound to occur, and
sometimes the damage done thereby is
irreparable;" and that in the absence of statutory
provisions covering such cases, "it is the duty of the
courts to adjust the rights of the parties, under such
circumstances, so as to minimize such damages,
taking into consideration all of the conditions, and
the diligence of the respective parties to avoid
them."
But like most such general rules, it has its
exceptions and should not be applied in a case
wherein the reasons on which it is based do not
exist, or in cases wherein still more forceful reasons
demand the application of a contrary rule.
The general rule relied upon in the majority opinion
is a mere application of a well settled equity rule
that: "Where conflicting equities are otherwise equal
in merit, that which first occurred will be given the
preference." But it is universally laid down by all the
courts which have had occasion to apply this equity
rule that "it should be the last test resorted to," and
that "it never prevails when any other equitable
ground for preference exists." (See 19 Cent. Dig.,
tit. Equity, par. 181; and may cases cited in 16 Cyc.,
139, note 57.) It follows that the general rules, that
in cases of double or overlapping registration the
earlier certificate should be protected, ought not to
prevail so as to deprive an innocent purchaser
under the later certificate of his title of the earlier
certificate contributed to the issuance of the later
certificate. Hence the holder of the earlier certificate
of title should not be heard to invoke the "just and
equitable rule" as laid down in the majority opinion,
in order to have his own title protected and the title
of an innocent purchaser of a later certificate
cancelled or annulled, in any case wherein it
appears that the holder of the later certificate was
wholly without fault, while the holder of the issuance
of the later certificate, in that he might have
prevented its issuance by merely entering his
appearance in court in response to lawful summons
personally served upon him in the course of the
proceedings for the issuance of the second
certificate, and pleading his superior rights under
the earlier certificate, instead of keeping silent and
by his silence permitting a default judgment to be
entered against him adjudicating title in favor of the
second applicant.
The majority opinion clearly recognizes the
soundness of the principles I am contending for by
reasoning (with which I am inclined to agree)
whereby it undertakes to demonstrate that as
between the original holders of the double or
overlapping registration the general rule should
prevail, because both such original parties must
held to have been fault and, their equities being
equal, preference should be given to the earlier title.
The majority opinion further recognizes the
soundness of my contention by the reasoning
whereby it undertakes to sustain the application of
the general rule in favor of the original holder of the
earlier certificate against purchasers from the
original holder of the later certificate, by an attempt
to demonstrate that such purchasers can in no
event be held to be innocent purchasers; because,
as it is said, negligence may and should always be
imputed to such a purchaser, so that in no event
can he claim to be without fault when it appears that
the lands purchased by him from the holder of a
duly registered certificate of title are included within
the bounds of the lands described in a certificate of
title of an earlier date.
At considerable length the majority opinion (in
reliance upon the general rule laid down under the
various systems of land registration, other than
those based on the torrens system) insists that a
purchaser of land land duly registered in the Land
Registration Court, is charged with notice of the
contents of each and every one of the thousands
and tens of thousands of certificates of registry on
file in the land registry office, so
that negligence may be imputed to him if he does
not ascertain that all or any part of the land
purchased by him is included within the boundary
lines of any one of the thousands or tens of
thousands of tracts of land whose original registry
bears an earlier date than the date of the original
registry of the land purchased by him. It is
contended that he cannot claim to be without fault
should he buy such land because, as it is said, it
was possible for him to discover that the land
purchased by him had been made the subject of
double or overlapping registration by a comparison
of the description and boundary lines of the
thousands of tracts and parcels of land to be found
in the land registry office.
But such ruling goes far to defeat one of the
principal objects sought to be attained by the
introduction and adoption of the so-called torrens
system for the registration of land. The avowed
intent of that system of land registration is to relieve
the purchase of registered lands from the necessity
of looking farther than the certificate of title of the
vendor in order that he may rest secure as to the
validity of the title to the lands conveyed to him. And
yet it is said in the majority opinion that he
is charged with notice of the contents of every other
certificate of title in the office of the registrar so that
his failure to acquaint himself with its contents may
be imputed to him as negligence.
If the rule announced in the majority opinion is to
prevail, the new system of land registration, instead
of making transfers of real estate simple,
expenditious and secure, and instead of avoiding
the necessity for expensive and oftimes uncertain
searches of the land record and registries, in order
to ascertain the true condition of the title before
purchase, will, in many instances, add to the labor,
expense and uncertainty of any attempt by a
purchaser to satisfy himself as to the validity of the
title to lands purchased by him.
As I have said before, one of the principal objects, if
not the principal object, of the torrens system of land
registration upon which our Land Registration Act is
avowedly modelled is to facilitate the transfer of real
estate. To that end the Legislature undertakes to
relieve prospective purchasers and all others
dealing in registered lands from the necessity of
looking farther than the certificate of title to such
lands furnished by the Court of Land Registration,
and I cannot, therefore, give my consent to a ruling
which charges a purchaser or mortgage of
registered lands with notice of the contents of every
other certificate of title in the land registry, so that
negligence and fault may be imputed to him should
he be exposed to loss or damages as a result of the
lack of such knowledge.
Suppose a prospective purchaser of lands
registered under the Land Registration Act desires
to avoid the imputation of negligence in the event
that, unknown to him, such lands have been made
the subject of double or overlapping registration,
what course should he pursue? What measures
should he adopt in order to search out the
information with notice of which he is charged?
There are no indexes to guide him nor is there
anything in the record or the certificate of title of the
land he proposes to buy which necessarily or even
with reasonable probability will furnish him a clue as
to the fact of the existence of such double or
overlapping registration. Indeed the only course
open to him, if he desires to assure himself against
the possibility of double or overlapping registration,
would even seem to be a careful, laborious and
extensive comparison of the registered boundary
lines contained in the certificate of title of the tract of
land he proposes to buy with those contained in all
the earlier certificates of title to be found in the land
registry. Assuredly it was never the intention of the
author of the new Land Registration Act to impose
such a burden on a purchaser of duly registered real
estate, under penalty that a lack of the knowledge
which might thus be acquired may be imputed to
him by this court as negligence in ruling upon the
respective equities of the holders of lands which
have been the subject of double or overlapping
registration.
On the other hand, I think that negligence and fault
may fairly be imputed to a holder of a registered
certificate of title who stood supinely by and let a
default judgment be entered against him,
adjudicating all or any part of his registered lands to
another applicant, if it appears that he was served
with notice or had actual notice of the pendency of
the proceedings in the Court of Land Registration
wherein such default judgment was entered.
The owner of land who enjoys the benefits secured
to him by its registry in the Court of Land
Registration may reasonably be required to appear
and defend his title when he has actual notice that
proceedings are pending in that court wherein
another applicant, claiming the land as his own, is
seeking to secure its registry in his name. All that is
necessary for him to do is to enter his appearance
in those proceedings, invite the court's attention to
the certificate of title registered in his name, and
thus, at the cost of the applicant, avoid all the
damage and inconvenience flowing from the double
or overlapping registration of the land in question.
There is nothing in the new system of land
registration which seems to render it either
expedient or necessary to relieve a holder of a
registered title of the duty of appearing and
defending that title, when he has actual notice that it
is being attacked in a court of competent
jurisdiction, and if, as a result of his neglect or
failure so to do, his lands become subject to double
or overlapping registration, he should not be
permitted to subject an innocent purchaser, holding
under the later certificate, to all the loss and
damage resulting from the double or overlapping
registration, while he goes scot free and holds the
land under a manifest misapplication of the
equitable rule that "where conflicting equities are
otherwise equal in merit, that which first accrued will
be given the preference." It is only where both or
neither of the parties are at fault that the rule is
properly applicable as between opposing claimants
under an earlier and a later certificate of registry to
the same land.
Of course all that is said in the briefs of counsel and
the majority opinion as to the right of the holder of a
certificate to rest secure in his registered title so that
those dealing with registered lands can confidently
rely upon registry certificates thereto is equally
forceful by way of argument in favor of the holder of
one or the other certificate in case of double or
overlapping registration. The problem is to
determine which of the certificate holders is entitled
to the land. The decision of that question in favor of
either one must necessarily have the effect of
destroying the value of the registered title of the
other and to that extent shaking the public
confidence in the value of the whole system for the
registration of lands. But, in the language of the
majority opinion, "that mistakes are bound to occur
cannot be denied and sometimes the damage done
thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to
adjust the rights of the parties under such
circumstances so as to minimize the damages,
taking into consideration all the conditions and the
diligence of the respective parties to avoid them." lawphil.net
It will be observed that I limit the exception to the
general equitable rule, as laid down in the majority
opinion, to case wherein the holder of the earlier
certificate of title has actual notice of the pendency
of the proceedings in the course of which the latter
certificate of title was issued, or to cases in which he
has received personal notice of the pendency of
those proceedings. Unless he has actual notice of
the pendency of such proceedings I readily agree
with the reasoning of the majority opinion so far as it
holds that negligence, culpable negligence, should
not be imputed to him for failure to appear and
defend his title so as to defeat his right to the benefit
of the equitable rule. It is true that the order of
publication in such cases having been duly
complied with, all the world is charged with notice
thereof, but it does not necessarily follow that, in the
absence of actual notice, culpable negligence in
permitting a default judgment to be entered against
him may be imputed to the holder of the earlier
certificate so as to defeat his right to the land under
the equitable rule favoring the earlier certificate.
Such a holding would have the effect (to quote the
language of the majority opinion) of requiring the
holder of a certificate of title to wait indefinitely "in
the portals of the court" and to sit in the "mirador de
su casa" in order to avoid the possibility of losing his
lands; and I agree with the writer of the majority
opinion that to do so would place an unreasonable
burden on the holders of such certificate, which was
not contemplated by the authors of the Land
Registration Act. But no unreasonable burden is
placed upon the holder of a registered title by a rule
which imputes culpable negligence to him when he
sits supinely by and lets a judgment in default be
entered against him adjudicating title to his lands in
favor of another applicant, despite the fact that he
has actual knowledge of the pendency of the
proceedings in which such judgment is entered and
despite the fact that he has been personally served
with summons to appear and default his title.
"Taking into consideration all of the conditions and
the diligence of the respective parties," it seems to
me that there is no "equality in merit" between the
conflicting equities set up by an innocent purchaser
who acquires title to the land under a registered
certificate, and the holder of an earlier certificate
who permitted a default judgment to be entered
against him, despite actual notice of the pendency
of the proceedings in the course of which the later
certificate was issued.
I am convinced, furthermore, that aside from the
superior equities of the innocent purchaser in cases
such as that now under discussion, there are strong
reasons of convenience and public policy which
militate in favor of the recognition of his title rather
than that of the holder of the earlier title.
One ruling exposes all persons purchasing or
dealing in registered lands to unknown, unspecified
and uncertain dangers, to guard against which all
such persons will be put to additional cost,
annoyance and labor on every occasion when any
transaction is had with regard to such lands; while
the other ruling tends to eliminate consequences so
directly adverse to the purpose and object for which
the land registration law was enacted, and imposes
no burden upon any holder of a certificate of
registered lands other than that of defending his title
on those rare, definite and specific occasions
wherein he has actual notice that his title is being
challenged in a Court of Land Registration, a
proceeding in which the cost and expense is
reduced to the minimum by the conclusive character
of his certificate of title in support of his claim of
ownership. Furthermore, judgment against the
innocent purchaser and in favor of the holder of the
earlier certificate in a case such as that under
consideration must inevitably tend to increase the
danger of double or overlapping registrations by
encouraging holders of registered titles, negligently
or fraudulently and conclusively, to permit default
judgments to be entered against them adjudicating
title to all or a part of their registered lands in favor
of other applicants, despite actual notice of the
pendency of judicial proceedings had for that
purpose, and this, without adding in any appreciable
degree to the security of thir titles, and merely to
save them the very slight trouble or inconvenience
incident to an entry of appearance in the court in
which their own titles were secured, and inviting
attention to the fact that their right, title and
ownership in the lands in questions has already
been conclusively adjudicated.
The cases wherein there is a practical possibility of
double or overlapping registration without actual
notice to the holder of the earlier certificate must in
the very nature of things to be so rare as to be
practically negligible. Double or overlapping
registration almost invariably occurs in relation to
lands held by adjoining occupants or claimants. It is
difficult to conceive of a case wherein double
registration can take place, in the absence of fraud,
without personal service of notice of the pendency
of the proceedings upon the holder of the earlier
certificate, the statute requiring such notice to be
served upon the owner or occupant of all lands
adjoining those for which application for registration
is made; and the cases wherein an adjoining land
owner can, even by the use of fraud, conduct
proceedings for the registration of his land to a
successful conclusion without actual notice to the
adjoining property owners must be rare indeed.
In the case at bar the defendant purchased the land
in question from the original holder of a certificate of
title issued by the Court of Land Registration, relying
upon the records of the Court of Land Registration
with reference thereto and with no knowledge that
any part of the land thus purchased was included in
an earlier certificate of title issued to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff, the holder of the earlier certificate of
title, negligently permitted a default judgment to be
entered against him in the Court of Land
Registration, adjudicating part of the lands included
in his own certificate of title in favor of another
applicant, from whom the defendant in this action
acquired title, and this despite the fact that he was
an adjoining land owner, had actual notice of the
pendency of the proceedings and was personally
served with summons to appear and defends his
rights in the premises. It seems to me that there can
be no reason for doubt as to the respective merits of
the equities of the parties, and further that the
judgment of the majority in favor of the plaintiff will
inevitably tend to increase the number of cases
wherein registered land owners in the future will fail
to appear and defend their titles when challenged in
other proceedings in the Courts of Land
Registration, thereby enormously increasing the
possibility and probability of loss and damage to
innocent third parties and dealers in registered
lands generally, arising out of erroneous, double or
overlapping registration of lands by the Courts of
Land Registration.
Carson, J., concurs.
 The issue in the case at bar pertains to ownership of
15 parcels of land in Tiwi, Albay which form part of
the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park." The facts of the
case are as follows.

On June 13, 1913, then Governor General of the

Philippine Islands, William Cameron Forbes issued
Executive Order No. 40 which reserved for
provincial park purposes some 440,530 square
meters of land situated in Barrio Naga, Municipality
of Tiwi, Province of Albay pursuant to the provisions
of Act 648 of the Philippine Commission.  1

Subsequently, the then Court of First Instance of

Albay, 15th Judicial District, United States of
America, ordered the registration of 15 parcels of
land covered by Executive Order No. 40 in the
name of Diego Palomo on December 9,
1916;   December
2
28,   and
3
January 17,
1917.   Diego Palomo donated these parcels of land
4

consisting of 74,872 square meters which were

allegedly covered by Original Certificates of Title
Nos. 513, 169, 176 and 173   to his heirs, herein
5

petitioners, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two

months before his death in April 1937.  6

Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of

title were lost during the Japanese occupation,
Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with
the Court of First Instance of Albay on May 30,
1950.   The Register of Deeds of Albay issued
7

Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913

and 3914 sometime in October 1953.  8

On July 10, 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay

issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area
embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi
Republic of the Philippines Hot Spring National Park," under the control,
SUPREME COURT management, protection and administration of the
Manila defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a
division of the Bureau of Forest Development. The
SECOND DIVISION area was never released as alienable and
disposable portion of the public domain and,
  therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under
the provisions of the Public Land Law (CA 141) nor
registrable under the Land Registration Act (Act No.
G.R. No. 95608 January 21, 1997
496).
SPOUSES IGNACIO PALOMO and TRINIDAD
The Palomos, however, continued in possession of
PASCUAL, and CARMEN PALOMO VDA. DE
the property, paid real estate taxes thereon   and 9

BUENAVENTURA, petitioners,
introduced improvements by planting rice,
vs.
bananas, pandan and coconuts. On April 8, 1971,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
petitioner Carmen vda. de Buenaventura and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, FAUSTINO J.
spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual
PERFECTO, RAFFY SANTILLAN, BOY ARIADO,
mortgaged the parcels of land covered by TCT
LORENZO BROCALES, SALVADOR DOE, and
3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 to guarantee a loan of
other DOES, respondents.
P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine Islands.

In May 7, 1974 petitioner Carmen vda. de

ROMERO, J.: Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and
Trinidad Pascual filed Civil Case No. T-143 before
the then Court of First Instance of Albay for
Injunction with damages against private
respondents Faustino J. Perfecto, Raffy Santillan,
Boy Ariado, Lorenzo Brocales, Salvador Doe and
other Does who are all employees of the Bureau of
Forest Development who entered the land covered
by TCT No. 3913 and/or TCT 3914 and cut down
bamboos thereat, totally leveling no less than 4
groves worth not less than P2,000.00.
On October 11, 1974, the Republic of the
Philippines filed Civil Case No. T-176 for annulment
and cancellation of Certificates of Title involving the
15 parcels of land registered in the name of the
petitioners and subject of Civil Case T-143.
Impleaded with the petitioners as defendants were
the Bank of the Philippine Islands, Legazpi Branch
and the Register of Deeds of Albay.
The case against the Bank of Philippine Islands was
dismissed because the loan of P200,000 with the
Bank was already paid and the mortgage in its favor
cancelled.
A joint trial of Civil Case T-143 and T-176 was
conducted upon agreement of the parties and on
July 31, 1986, the trial court rendered the following
decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered:
IN CIVIL CASE No. T-143, in favor of the
defendants and against the plaintiffs, dismissing the
complaint for injunction and damages, as it is
hereby DISMISSED.
Costs against the plaintiffs.
In CIVIL CASE No. T-176, in favor of the plaintiffs
and against the defendants:
(1) Declaring null and void and no force and effect
the Order dated September 14, 1953, as well as the
Original Certificate of Titles Nos. 153,   169, 173
10
and 176 and Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos.
3911, T-3912, T-3913, and T-3914, all of the
Register of Deeds of Albay and all transactions
based on said titles.
(2) Forfeiting in favor of the plaintiff Government any
and all improvements on the lands in question that
are found therein and introduced by the defendants;
(3) Declaring Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 8, 9,10, 11
and 12, Plan II-9299 and Lots 1, 21,   3 and 4 of
11
Plan II-9205 as part of the Tiwi Hot Spring National
Park;
(4) and Finally, the Register of Deeds of Albay is
hereby ordered to cancel the alleged Original
Certificates of Titles Nos. 513, 169, 173 and 176,
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-3911, T-3912,
T-3913 and T-3914.
Costs against the defendants.
So Ordered.  12
The court a quo in ruling for the Republic found no
sufficient proof that the Palomos have established
property rights over the parcels of land in question
before the Treaty of Paris which ended the Spanish-
American War at the end of the century. The court
further stated that assuming that the decrees of the
Court of First Instance of Albay were really issued,
the Palomos obtained no right at all over the
properties because these were issued only when
Executive Order No. 40 was already in force. At this
point, we take note that although the Geodetic
Engineer of the Bureau of Lands appointed as one
of the Commissioners in the relocation survey of the
properties stated in his reamended report that of the
3,384 square meters covered by Lot 2, Plan II-9205,
only 1,976 square meters fall within the reservation
area,  the RTC ordered TCT 3913 covering the
13
entire Lot 21 (sic) Plan II-9205 cancelled.
The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed in toto the findings of the lower
Court; hence this petition raising the following
issues:
1. The respondent Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion in affirming in toto the
decision of the lower court.
2. The declaration of nullity of the original
certificates of title and subsequent transfer
certificates of titles of the petitioners over the
properties in question is contrary to law and
jurisprudence on the matter.
3. The forfeiture of all improvements introduced by
the petitioners in the premises in favor of the
government is against our existing law and
jurisprudence.
The issues raised essentially boil down to whether
or not the alleged original certificate of titles issued
pursuant to the order of the Court of First Instance
in 1916-1917 and the subsequent TCTs issued in
1953 pursuant to the petition for reconstitution are
valid.
Petitioners contend that the Treaty of Paris which
ended the Spanish-American War at the end of the
19th century recognized the property rights of
Spanish and Filipino citizens and the American
government had no inherent power to confiscate
properties of private citizens and declare them part
of any kind of government reservation. They allege
that their predecessors in interest have been in
open, adverse and continuous possession of the
subject lands for 20-50 years prior to their
registration in 1916-1917. Hence, the reservation of
the lands for provincial purposes in 1913 by then
Governor-general Forbes was tantamount to
deprivation of private property without due process
of law.
In support of their claim, the petitioners presented
copies of a number of decisions of the Court of First
Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District of the United
States of America which state that the predecessors
in interest of the petitioners' father Diego Palomo,
were in continuous, open and adverse possession
of the lands from 20 to 50 years at the time of their
registration in 1916.
We are not convinced.
The Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown by
discovery and conquest in the 16th century. Before
the Treaty of Paris in April 11, 1899, our lands,
whether agricultural, mineral or forest were under
the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the
Spanish Crown. Hence, private ownership of land
could only be acquired through royal concessions
which were documented in various forms, such as
(1) Titulo Real or Royal Grant," (2) Concesion
Especial or Special Grant, (3) Titulo de Compra or
Title by Purchase and (4) Informacion Posesoria or
Possessory Information title obtained under the
Spanish Mortgage Law or under the Royal Decree
of January 26, 1889.
Unfortunately, no proof was presented that the
petitioners' predecessors in interest derived title
from an old Spanish grant. Petitioners placed much
reliance upon the declarations in Expediente No. 5,
G.L.R.O. Record Decision No. 9820, dated January
17, 1917; Expediente No. 6, G.L.R.O. Record No.
9821, dated December 28, 1916; Expediente No. 7,
G.L.R.O. Record No. 9822, dated December 9,
1916; Expediente No. 8, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9823,
dated December 28, 1916 and Expediente No. 10,
G.L.R.O. Record No. 9868, dated December 9,
1916 of the Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th
Judicial District of the United States of America
presided by Judge Isidro Paredes that their
predecessors in interest were in open, adverse and
continuous possession of the subject lands for 20-
50 years.   The aforesaid "decisions" of the Court of
14
First Instance, however, were not signed by the
judge but were merely certified copies of notification
to Diego Palomo bearing the signature of the clerk
of court.
Moreover, despite claims by the petitioners that their
predecessors in interest were in open, adverse and
continuous possession of the lands for 20 to 50
years prior to their registration in 1916-1917, the
lands were surveyed only in December 1913, the
very same year they were acquired by Diego
Palomo. Curiously , in February 1913 or 10 months
before the lands were surveyed for Diego Palomo,
the government had already surveyed the area in
preparation for its reservation for provincial park
purposes. If the petitioners' predecessors in interest
were indeed in possession of the lands for a number
of years prior to their registration in 1916-1917, they
would have undoubtedly known about the inclusion
of these properties in the reservation in 1913. It
certainly is a trifle late at this point to argue that the
government had no right to include these properties
in the reservation when the question should have
been raised 83 years ago.
As regards the petitioners' contention that inasmuch
as they obtained the titles without government
opposition, the government is now estopped from
questioning the validity of the certificates of title
which were granted. As correctly pointed out by the
respondent Court of Appeals, the principle of
estoppel, does not operate against the Government
for the act of its agents. 
15
Assuming that the decrees of the Court of First
Instance were really issued, the lands are still not
capable of appropriation. The adverse possession
which may be the basis of a grant of title in
confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to
alienable lands of the public domain.
There is no question that the lands in the case at
bar were not alienable lands of the public domain.
As testified by the District Forester, records in the
Bureau of Forestry show that the subject lands were
never declared as alienable and disposable and
subject to private alienation prior to 1913 up to the
present.   Moreover, as part of the reservation for
16
provincial park purposes, they form part of the forest
zone.
It is elementary in the law governing natural
resources that forest land cannot be owned by
private persons. It is not registrable and possession
thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it
into private property,   unless such lands are
17
reclassified and considered disposable and
alienable.
Neither do the tax receipts which were presented in
evidence prove ownership of the parcels of land
inasmuch as the weight of authority is that tax
declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership
in land registration cases.  18
Having disposed of the issue of ownership, we now
come to the matter regarding the forfeiture of
improvements introduced on the subject lands. It
bears emphasis that Executive Order No. 40 was
already in force at the time the lands in question
were surveyed for Diego Palomo. Petitioners also
apparently knew that the subject lands were
covered under the reservation when they filed a
petition for reconstitution of the lost original
certificates of title inasmuch as the blueprint of
Survey Work Order Number 21781 of Plan II-9299
approved by the Chief of the Land Registration
Office Enrique Altavas in 1953 as a true and correct
copy of the Original Plan No. II-9299 filed in the
Bureau of Lands dated September
1948   contains the following note, "in conflict with
19
provincial reservation."   In any case, petitioners are
20
presumed to know the law and the failure of the
government to oppose the registration of the lands
in question is no justification for the petitioners to
plead good faith in introducing improvements on the
lots.
Finally, since 1,976 square meters of the 3,384
square meters covered by TCT 3913 fall within the
reservation, TCT 3913 should be annulled only with
respect to the aforesaid area. Inasmuch as the
bamboo groves leveled in TCT 3913 and subject of
Civil Case T-143,   were within the perimeter of the
21
national park,   no pronouncement as to damages is
22
in order.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that TCT
3913 be annulled with respect to the 1,976 square
meter area falling within the reservation zone.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
11, Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 155450             August 6, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by
the Regional Executive Director, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Regional
Office No. 2, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF ANTONIO CARAG
AND VICTORIA TURINGAN, THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF CAGAYAN, and the COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF CAGAYAN, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the 21 May 20012 and
25 September 20023 Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47965. The
21 May 2001 Resolution dismissed petitioner Republic
of the Philippines’ (petitioner) amended complaint for
reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and
declaration of nullity of titles. The 25 September 2002
Resolution denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The Facts
On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of
Cagayan (trial court) issued Decree No. 3819284 in
favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan
(spouses Carag), predecessors-in-interest of private
respondents Heirs of Antonio Carag and Victoria
Turingan (private respondents), covering a parcel of
land identified as Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151, containing
an area of 7,047,673 square meters (subject property),
situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. On 19 July 1938,
pursuant to said Decree, the Register of Deeds of
Cagayan issued Original Certificate of Title No.
115855 (OCT No. 11585) in the name of spouses
Carag.
On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to
discharge the encumbrance expressly stated in
Decree No. 381928. Two transfer certificates of title
were issued: Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
1277,6 issued in the name of the Province of Cagayan,
covering Lot 2472-B consisting of 100,000 square
meters and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
1278,7 issued in the name of the private respondents,
covering Lot 2472-A consisting of 6,997,921 square
meters.
On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag
and others filed with the Regional Office No. 2 of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-petition
requesting the DENR to initiate the filing of an action
for the annulment of Decree No. 381928 on the ground
that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to
adjudicate a portion of the subject property which was
allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of the
issuance of Decree No. 381928.
The Regional Executive Director of the DENR created
an investigating team to conduct ground verification
and ocular inspection of the subject property.
The investigating team reported that:
A) The portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 as shown in the
Plan prepared for spouses Carag, and covered under
LC Project 3-L of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, was found to
be still within the timberland area at the time of the
issuance of the Decree and O.C.T. of the spouses
Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and the same
was only released as alienable and disposable on
February 22, 1982, as certified by USEC Jose G. Solis
of the NAMRIA on 27 May 1994.
B) Petitioner Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and
others have possessed and occupied by themselves
and thru their predecessors-in-interest the portion of
Lot 2472 Cad-151, covered by LC Project 3-L of LC
Map 2999, since time immemorial.8
Thus, the investigating team claimed that "a portion of
Lot 2472 Cad-151" was "only released as alienable
and disposable on 22 February 1982."
In a Memorandum dated 9 September 1996, the Legal
Division of the Land Management Bureau
recommended to the Director of Lands that an action
for the cancellation of OCT No. 11585, as well as its
derivative titles, be filed with the proper court. The
Director of Lands approved the recommendation.
On 10 June 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of
Decree No. 381928, petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals a complaint for annulment of judgment,
cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles9 on the
ground that in 1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction to
adjudicate a portion of the subject property, which
portion consists of 2,640,000 square meters (disputed
portion). The disputed portion was allegedly still
classified as timber land at the time of issuance of
Decree No. 381928 and, therefore, was not alienable
and disposable until 22 February 1982 when the
disputed portion was classified as alienable and
disposable.
On 19 October 1998, private respondents filed a
motion to dismiss.10 Private respondents alleged that
petitioner failed to comply with Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court because the real ground for the complaint was
mistake, not lack of jurisdiction, and that petitioner, as
a party in the original proceedings, could have availed
of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition
for relief or other appropriate remedies but failed to do
so. Private respondents added that petitioner did not
attach to the complaint a certified true copy of the
decision sought to be annulled. Private respondents
also maintained that the complaint was barred by the
doctrines of res judicata and law of the case and by
Section 38 of Act No. 496.11 Private respondents also
stated that not all the heirs of spouses Carag were
brought before the Court of Appeals for an effective
resolution of the case. Finally, private respondents
claimed that the real party in interest was not petitioner
but a certain Alfonso Bassig, who had an ax to grind
against private respondents.12
On 3 March 1999, petitioner filed an amended
complaint for reversion, annulment of decree,
cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles.13
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 21 May 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
complaint because of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case. The Court of Appeals
declared:
The rule is clear that such judgments, final orders and
resolutions in civil actions which this court may annul
are those which the "ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
are no longer available." The Amended Complaint
contains no such allegations which are jurisdictional
neither can such circumstances be divined from its
allegations. Furthermore, such actions for Annulment
may be based only on two (2) grounds: extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction. Neither ground is alleged in the
Amended Complaint which is for Reversion/Annulment
of Decree, Cancellation and Declaration of Nullity of
Titles. It merely alleges that around 2,640,000 square
meters of timberland area within Lot 2472 Cad. 151,
had been erroneously included in the title of the
Spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan under
Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 issued on
June 2, 1930 and July 19, 1938, respectively; that
hence, such adjudication and/or Decree and Title
covering a timberland area is null and void ab initio
under the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions.
Finally, it is clear that the issues raised in the
Amended Complaint as well as those in the Motion to
dismiss are factual in nature and should be threshed
out in the proper trial court in accordance with Section
101 of the Public Land Act.14 (Citations omitted)
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 25
September 2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
1. Whether the allegations of the complaint clearly
stated that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief and other appropriate remedies are
no longer available;
2. Whether the amended complaint clearly alleged the
ground of lack of jurisdiction;
3. Whether the Court of Appeals may try the factual
issues raised in the amended complaint and in the
motion to dismiss;
4. Whether the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan
had jurisdiction to adjudicate a tract of timberland in
favor of respondent spouses Antonio Carag and
Victoria Turingan;
5. Whether the fact that the Director of Lands was a
party to the original proceedings changed the nature of
the land and granted jurisdiction to the then Court of
First Instance over the land;
6. Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies in this
case; and
7. Whether Section 38 of Act No. 496 is applicable in
this case.
The Ruling of the Court
While the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the
complaint on procedural grounds, we will still deny the
petition because the complaint for annulment of decree
has no merit.
Petitioner Complied with Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court
First, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to
allege either of the grounds of extrinsic fraud or lack of
jurisdiction in the complaint for annulment of decree.15
We find otherwise. In its complaint and amended
complaint, petitioner stated:
11. In view of the fact that in 1930 or in 1938, only the
Executive Branch of the Government had the authority
and power to declassify or reclassify land of the public
domain, the Court did not, therefore, have the
power and authority to adjudicate in favor of the
spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan the
said tract of timberland, portion of the Lot 2472
Cad-151, at the time of the issuance of the Decree
and the Original Certificate of Title of the said
spouses; and such adjudication and/or Decree and
Title issued covering the timberland area is null and
void ab initio considering the provisions of the 1935,
1973 and 1987 Philippine constitution.
xxxx
15. The issuance of Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T.
No. 11585 in the name of spouses Antonio Carag and
Victoria Turingan, and all the derivative titles thereto in
the name of the Heirs and said spouses, specifically
with respect to the inclusion thereto of timberland area,
by the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional
Trial Court), and the Register of Deeds of Cagayan is
patently illegal and erroneous for the reason that
said Court and/or the Register of Deeds of Cagayan
did not have any authority or jurisdiction to decree
or adjudicate the said timberland area of Lot 2472
Cad-151, consequently, the same are null and void ab
initio, and of no force and effect
whatsoever.16 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Petitioner clearly alleged in the complaint and
amended complaint that it was seeking to annul
Decree No. 381928 on the ground of the trial court’s
lack of jurisdiction over the subject land, specifically
over the disputed portion, which petitioner maintained
was classified as timber land and was not alienable
and disposable.
Second, the Court of Appeals also dismissed the
complaint on the ground of petitioner’s failure to allege
that the "ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available."
In Ancheta v. Ancheta,17 we ruled:
In a case where a petition for annulment of judgment
or final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant/respondent or over the
nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not
allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new
trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or
appeal therefrom are no longer available through no
fault of her own. This is so because a judgment
rendered or final order issued by the RTC without
jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any
time either collaterally or in a direct action or by
resisting such judgment or final order in any action or
proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by
laches.18
Since petitioner’s complaint is grounded on lack of
jurisdiction over the subject of the action, petitioner
need not allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
are no longer available through no fault of petitioner.
Third, the Court of Appeals ruled that the issues raised
in petitioner’s complaint were factual in nature and
should be threshed out in the proper trial court in
accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act.19
Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 6. Procedure. - The procedure in ordinary civil
cases shall be observed. Should a trial be necessary,
the reception of evidence may be referred to a
member of the court or a judge of a Regional Trial
Court.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals may try the factual
issues raised in the complaint for the complete and
proper determination of the case.
However, instead of remanding the complaint to the
Court of Appeals for further proceedings, we shall
decide the case on the merits.
Complaint for Annulment of Decree Has No Merit
Petitioner contends that the trial court had no
jurisdiction to adjudicate to spouses Carag the
disputed portion of the subject property. Petitioner
claims that the disputed portion was still classified as
timber land, and thus not alienable and disposable,
when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930. In
effect, petitioner admits that the adjacent 4,407,673
square meters of the subject property, outside of the
disputed portion, were alienable and disposable in
1930. Petitioner argues that in 1930 or in 1938, only
the Executive Branch of the Government, not the trial
courts, had the power to declassify or reclassify lands
of the public domain.
Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of
judgment, refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defending party or over the subject
matter of the claim.20 Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred by law and is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the filing of the action.21
Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per
se alienable. In Aldecoa v. Insular Government,22 we
ruled:
From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it
is deduced that, with the exception of those comprised
within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned
by the State or by the sovereign nation are public
in character, and per se alienable and, provided they
are not destined to the use of the public in general or
reserved by the Government in accordance with law,
they may be acquired by any private or juridical person
x x x23 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest
zone, or reserved by the State for some public purpose
in accordance with law, all Crown lands were deemed
alienable.
In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the
disputed portion had been declared as mineral or
forest zone, or reserved for some public purpose in
accordance with law, during the Spanish regime or
thereafter. The land classification maps24 petitioner
attached to the complaint also do not show that in
1930 the disputed portion was part of the forest zone
or reserved for some public purpose. The certification
of the National Mapping and Resources Information
Authority, dated 27 May 1994, contained no statement
that the disputed portion was declared and classified
as timber land.25
The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was
issued in 1930 was Act No. 2874,26 which provides:
SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the
lands of the public domain into -
(a) Alienable or disposable
(b) Timber and
(c) Mineral lands
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such
lands from one class to another, for the purposes of
their government and disposition.
Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General
had declared the disputed portion of the subject
property timber or mineral land pursuant to Section 6
of Act No. 2874.
It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to
disposition only those lands which have been declared
alienable or disposable. Section 8 provides:
SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open
to disposition or concession which have been officially
delimited and classified and, when practicable,
surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public
or quasi-public uses, not appropriated by the
Government, nor in any manner become private
property, nor those on which a private right
authorized and recognized by this Act or any other
valid law may be claimed, or which, having been
reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so.
However, the Governor-General may, for reasons of
public interest, declare lands of the public domain
open to disposition before the same have had their
boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for
the same reasons, suspend their concession or
disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of
the Legislature. (Emphasis supplied)
However, Section 8 provides that lands which are
already private lands, as well as lands on which a
private claim may be made under any law, are not
covered by the classification requirement in Section 8
for purposes of disposition. This exclusion in Section 8
recognizes that during the Spanish regime, Crown
lands were per se alienable unless falling under
timber or mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for
some public purpose in accordance with law.
Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the
classification requirement in Section 8, trial courts had
jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to private parties.
Petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had
not become private property prior to the enactment of
Act No. 2874. Neither has petitioner alleged that the
disputed portion was not land on which a private right
may be claimed under any existing law at that time.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,27 the energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines
Republic sought to annul the judgment of the Court of belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, sitting as a land development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of
registration court, because when the application for the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at
land registration was filed in 1927 the land was alleged least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned
to be unclassified forest land. The Republic also by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
alleged that the CFI of Rizal had no jurisdiction to lease, or concession at the time of the
determine whether the land applied for was forest or inauguration of the Government established under
agricultural land since the authority to classify lands this Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
was then vested in the Director of Lands as provided in
Act Nos. 92628 and 2874. The Court ruled: Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all
agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public
We are inclined to agree with the respondent that it is domain belong to the State, it recognized that these
legally doubtful if the authority of the Governor General lands were "subject to any existing right, grant,
to declare lands as alienable and disposable would lease or concession at the time of the inauguration
apply to lands that have become private property or of the Government established under this
lands that have been impressed with a private right Constitution."29 When the Commonwealth
authorized and recognized by Act 2874 or any valid Government was established under the 1935
law. By express declaration of Section 45 (b) of Act Constitution, spouses Carag had already an existing
2874 which is quoted above, those who have been in right to the subject land, including the disputed portion,
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession pursuant to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by the
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public trial court.
domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership since July 26, 1894 may file an application WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition.
with the Court of First Instance of the province where We DISMISS petitioner Republic of the Philippines’
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and complaint for reversion, annulment of decree,
these applicants shall be conclusively presumed to cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles for lack
have performed all the conditions essential to a of merit.
government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title. When the land registration court issued a SO ORDERED.
decision for the issuance of a decree which was
the basis of an original certificate of title to the
land, the court had already made a determination ANTONIO T. CARPIO
that the land was agricultural and that the Associate Justice
applicant had proven that he was in open and
exclusive possession of the subject land for the
prescribed number of years. It was the land
registration court which had the jurisdiction to
determine whether the land applied for was
agricultural, forest or timber taking into account WE CONCUR:
the proof or evidence in each particular
case. (Emphasis supplied) REYNATO S.
Chief
As with this case, when the trial court issued the
decision for the issuance of Decree No. 381928 in
1930, the trial court had jurisdiction MA. ALICIA
to determine AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C.
whether the subject property, includingAssociate Justice
the disputed Associate Justice
portion, applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral
land. The trial court determined that TERESITA
the land was J. LEONARDO-DE
agricultural and that spouses Carag proved Associate Justice
that they
were entitled to the decree and a certificate of title. The
government, which was a party in the original
CERTIFICATION
proceedings in the trial court as required by law, did
not appeal the decision of the trial court declaring the
subject land as agricultural. Since the trial court had Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, its I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now been reached in consultation before the case was
final and beyond review. assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
The finality of the trial court’s decision is further
recognized in Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 REYNATO S. PUNO
Constitution which provides: Chief Justice

SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands Republic of the Philippines
of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, SUPREME COURT
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 167707              October 8, 2008
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR-
REGION VI, REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR
FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU,
REGION VI PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO,
AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, DIRECTOR OF
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY,
DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM SECRETARY,
DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE TOURISM
AUTHORITY, petitioners,
vs.
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN,
MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and ANICETO YAP, in their
behalf and in behalf of all those similarly
situated, respondents.
x-------------------------------------
- - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. G.R. No. 173775              October 8, 2008
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO,
joined by THE LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY
SIMILARLY SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST,
ANNEX "A" OF THIS PETITION, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
THE REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR
LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU,
REGION VI, PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,
AKLAN, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of
the present occupants of Boracay Island to secure
titles over their occupied lands.
There are two consolidated petitions. The first is
G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review
on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirming that2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition
for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of
Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No.
173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 10645">[3] issued
by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying
Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan,
with its powdery white sand beaches and warm
crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine
tourist destination. The island is also home to
12,003 inhabitants4 who live in the bone-shaped
island’s three barangays.5
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) approved the
National Reservation Survey of Boracay
Island,6 which identified several lots as being
occupied or claimed by named persons.7
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand
Marcos issued Proclamation No. 18018 declaring
Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and
peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and
marine reserves under the administration of the
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President
Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA
Circular 3-829 dated September 3, 1982, to
implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an
application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-
claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y.
Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82
raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their
occupied lands. They declared that they
themselves, or through their predecessors-in-
interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation in
Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
immemorial. They declared their lands for tax
purposes and paid realty taxes on them.10
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation
No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place
Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the
Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was
susceptible of private ownership. Under Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had
the right to have the lots registered in their names
through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory
relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was
an unclassified land of the public domain. It
formed part of the mass of lands classified as
"public forest," which was not available for
disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry
Code,11 as amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’
reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82
was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of
title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705.
Since Boracay Island had not been classified as
alienable and disposable, whatever possession they
had cannot ripen into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the
OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1)
respondents-claimants were presently in possession
of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these
parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and
other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees
had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and
were planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and
(4) respondents-claimants declared the land they
were occupying for tax purposes.12
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for
resolution was purely legal: whether Proclamation
No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment
to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided
to forego with the trial and to submit the case for
resolution upon submission of their respective
memoranda.13
The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of
land in Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1 and
30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name
of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were
involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed
before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.15 The titles were
issued on
August 7, 1933.16
RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in
favor of respondents-claimants, with a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court
declares that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the
petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire
title to their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the
applicable laws and in the manner prescribed
therein; and to have their lands surveyed and
approved by respondent Regional Technical
Director of Lands as the approved survey does not
in itself constitute a title to the land.
SO ORDERED.17
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants’ right to
have their occupied lands titled in their name. It
ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA
Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay
were inalienable or could not be the subject of
disposition.18 The Circular itself recognized private
ownership of lands.19 The trial court cited Sections
8720 and 5321 of the Public Land Act as basis for
acknowledging private ownership of lands in
Boracay and that only those forested areas in public
lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.22
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion
was denied.23 The Republic then appealed to the
CA.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court
affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises,
judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the
appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the
decision of the lower court.24
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not
be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they
occupied since time immemorial were part of a
forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was
similarly denied.25 Hence, the present petition under
Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No.
167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 106426 classifying Boracay Island
into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest
land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-
eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural
land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation
likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on
each side of the centerline of roads and trails,
reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part
of the area reserved for forest land protection
purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr.
Orlando Sacay,27 Wilfredo Gelito,28 and other
landowners29 in Boracay filed with this Court an
original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.30 They allege
that the Proclamation infringed on their "prior vested
rights" over portions of Boracay. They have been in
continued possession of their respective lots in
Boracay since time immemorial. They have also
invested billions of pesos in developing their lands
and building internationally renowned first class
resorts on their lots.31
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no
need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into
agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral
nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural
pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No.
926, known as the first Public Land Act.32 Thus, their
possession in the concept of owner for the required
period entitled them to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that
petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over
their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an
unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section
3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed
portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be
the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
It is only the executive department, not the courts,
which has authority to reclassify lands of the public
domain into alienable and disposable lands. There
is a need for a positive government act in order to
release the lots for disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the
consolidation of the two petitions as they principally
involve the same issues on the land classification of
Boracay Island.33
Issues
G.R. No. 167707
The OSG raises the lone issue of whether
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82
pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all
those similarly situated, to acquire title to their
occupied lands in Boracay Island.34
G.R. No. 173775
Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:
I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED
POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT
OF OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS
IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT
THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE
FILING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY
RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS
OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL
LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT
TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY
SEC. 3a, PD 705?
II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED
PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED
PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT
TITLE?
III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR
AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN]
INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR
PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLE UNDER THE
TORRENS SYSTEM?
IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON
MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR
VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF
PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN
BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR IS
PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8,
CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.
V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY
MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO
APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR
PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING
OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?
35
 (Underscoring supplied)
In capsule, the main issue is whether private
claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No.
167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No.
173775) have a right to secure titles over their
occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions
pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They
do not involve their right to secure title under other
pertinent laws.
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and
executive acts in their bid for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 190236 in
relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or
superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141; 37 (b)
Proclamation No. 180138 issued by then President
Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 106439 issued by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall
proceed to determine their rights to apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under these laws and
executive acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the
power of the executive to reclassify lands of the
public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public
domain into agricultural, forest or
timber.40 Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided
the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral,
timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other
classes as may be provided by law,41 giving the
government great leeway for classification. 42 Then
the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935
Constitution classification with one addition: national
parks.43 Of these, only agricultural lands may be
alienated.44 Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May
22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly
and administratively classified under any of these
grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of
the public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, that the State is
the source of any asserted right to ownership of
land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.45 The doctrine has been consistently
adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions.46
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State.47 Thus, all lands that have not been
acquired from the government, either by purchase
or by grant, belong to the State as part of the
inalienable public domain.48 Necessarily, it is up to
the State to determine if lands of the public domain
will be disposed of for private ownership. The
government, as the agent of the state, is possessed
of the plenary power as the persona in law to
determine who shall be the favored recipients of
public lands, as well as under what terms they may
be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing
of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what
otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.49
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian
Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of the
Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and
possessions in the Philippines passed to the
Spanish Crown.50 The Regalian doctrine was first
introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of
the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the
foundation that "all lands that were not acquired
from the Government, either by purchase or by
grant, belong to the public domain."51
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley
Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The
Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic
registration of titles and deeds as well as
possessory claims.52
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53 partly
amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws
of the Indies. It established possessory information
as the method of legalizing possession of vacant
Crown land, under certain conditions which were set
forth in said decree. 54 Under Section 393 of the
Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory
information title,55 when duly inscribed in the
Registry of Property, is converted into a title of
ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years
of uninterrupted possession which must be actual,
public, and adverse,56 from the date of its
inscription.57 However, possessory information title
had to be perfected one year after the promulgation
of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise,
the lands would revert to the State.58
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish
regime could only be founded on royal concessions
which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or
royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant;
(3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title;
(4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and
(5) informacion posesoria or possessory information
title.59>
The first law governing the disposition of public
lands in the Philippines under American rule was
embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.60 By this law,
lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands
were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit:
agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest
lands.61 The act provided for, among others, the
disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute
grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold
system).62 It also provided the definition by exclusion
of "agricultural public lands."63 Interpreting the
meaning of "agricultural lands" under the Philippine
Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular
Government:64
x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural
land" as used in Act No. 926 means those public
lands acquired from Spain which are not timber
or mineral lands. x x x65 (Emphasis Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature
passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act. The act established a system of
registration by which recorded title becomes
absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is
known as the Torrens system.66
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine
Commission passed Act No. 926, which was the
first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the
homestead system and made provisions for judicial
and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles
and for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted
corporations regardless of the nationality of persons
owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase
lands of the public domain.67 Under the Act, open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten
(10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title.68
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926
was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known
as the second Public Land Act. This new, more
comprehensive law limited the exploitation of
agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and
citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the
same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title,
possession and occupation en concepto
dueño since time immemorial, or since July 26,
1894, was required.69
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No.
141 amended Act No. 2874 on December 1,
1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as
amended, remains as the existing general law
governing the classification and disposition of lands
of the public domain other than timber and mineral
lands,70 and privately owned lands which reverted to
the State.71
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the
requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain since time
immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this
provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No.
1942,72 which provided for a simple thirty-year
prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The provision was last amended
by PD No. 1073,73 which now provides for
possession and occupation of the land applied
for since June 12, 1945, or earlier. 74
The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976
discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in
land registration proceedings.76 Under the decree,
all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply
for registration of their lands under Act No. 496
within six (6) months from the effectivity of the
decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the
recording of all unregistered lands77 shall be
governed by Section 194 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and
updated by PD No. 1529, known as the Property
Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the
various laws relative to registration of property.78 It
governs registration of lands under the Torrens
system as well as unregistered lands, including
chattel mortgages.79
A positive act declaring land as alienable and
disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, the Court has time
and again emphasized that there must be a
positive act of the government, such as an official
proclamation,80 declassifying inalienable public land
into disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes.81 In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits
alienable or disposable lands only to those lands
which have been "officially delimited and
classified."82
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption
of State ownership of the lands of the public domain
is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable or
disposable.83 To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that
the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable.84 There must still be a
positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable,
the applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act
or a statute.85 The applicant may also secure a
certification from the government that the land
claimed to have been possessed for the required
number of years is alienable and disposable.86
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive
order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The
records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to
2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private
claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission
that lands occupied by private claimants were
already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of
land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. They call for proof.87
Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole
of Boracay Island, or portions of it, agricultural
lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay was
already an agricultural land pursuant to the old
cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine
Islands (1919)88 and De Aldecoa v. The Insular
Government (1909).89 These cases were decided
under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old
cases that "in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural
lands until the contrary is shown."90
Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De
Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not have the
effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or
portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be
stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No.
926 merely provided the manner through which land
registration courts would classify lands of the public
domain. Whether the land would be classified as
timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof
presented in each case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time
when the President of the Philippines had no power
to classify lands of the public domain into mineral,
timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were
free to make corresponding classifications in
justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power
to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the
evidence.91 This was the Court’s ruling in Heirs of
the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea
Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic,92 in which it
stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:
x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular
land need not be formally released by an act of the
Executive before it can be deemed open to private
ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of
Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine
Islands.
xxxx
Petitioner’s reliance upon Ramos v. Director of
Lands and Ankron v. Government is misplaced.
These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill
of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926
enacted by the Philippine Commission on October
7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision
vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the
Philippines the power to classify lands of the public
domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so that
the courts then were free to make corresponding
classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested
with implicit power to do so, depending upon the
preponderance of the evidence.93
To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases
under Act No. 926, it was then necessary to devise
a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved
the dictum in Ankron that "the courts have a right to
presume, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural
lands until the contrary is shown."94
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption
in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument that all
lands of the public domain had been automatically
reclassified as disposable and alienable agricultural
lands. By no stretch of imagination did the
presumption convert all lands of the public domain
into agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would have
automatically made all lands in the Philippines,
except those already classified as timber or mineral
land, alienable and disposable lands. That would
take these lands out of State ownership and worse,
would be utterly inconsistent with and totally
repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De
Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases
brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or
more specifically those cases dealing with judicial
and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles.
The presumption applies to an applicant for judicial
or administrative conformation of imperfect title
under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to
landowners, such as private claimants or their
predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail
themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to
them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue
of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by
the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De
Aldecoa was not absolute. Land classification was,
in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof
that the land was better suited for non-agricultural
uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or
timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this
Court stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of
Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted in
effect that whether the particular land in question
belongs to one class or another is a question of fact.
The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it
or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to
declare that one is forestry land and the other,
mineral land. There must be some proof of the
extent and present or future value of the forestry
and of the minerals. While, as we have just said,
many definitions have been given for "agriculture,"
"forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in each
case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say
that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof
must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or
the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural
purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient
to show that there exists some trees upon the land
or that it bears some mineral. Land may be
classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by
reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be
classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-
versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the
discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as
agricultural today may be differently classified
tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the
proof in that particular case, having regard for
its present or future value for one or the other
purposes. We believe, however, considering the
fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a
majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are
agricultural lands that the courts have a right to
presume, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural
lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the
land involved in a particular land registration
case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore,
be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one
purpose or the other is a question of fact to be
settled by the proof in each particular case. The
fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is
not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is
agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may
perchance belong to one or the other of said
classes of land. The Government, in the first
instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may,
by reservation, decide for itself what portions of
public land shall be considered forestry land, unless
private interests have intervened before such
reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the
land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question
of proof. Until private interests have intervened, the
Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No.
1148), may decide for itself what portions of the
"public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as
forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of
Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of
Forestry, supra)95 (Emphasis ours)
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine
the classification of lands from the facts of each
case, except those that have already became
private lands.96 Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919
and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave
the Executive Department, through the President,
the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify
public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or
forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the
authority, whether express or implied, to determine
the classification of lands of the public domain.97
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco
Tirol who were issued their title in 1933,98 did not
present a justiciable case for determination by the
land registration court of the property’s land
classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity
for the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay
occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands.
When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874
in 1919, without an application for judicial
confirmation having been filed by private claimants
or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no
longer authorized to determine the property’s land
classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank
on Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision99 in G.R. No. 167707
mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of
Manila,100 which was decided in 1947 when CA No.
141, vesting the Executive with the sole power to
classify lands of the public domain was already in
effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular
Government,101 De Aldecoa v. The Insular
Government,102 and Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands.103
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it
involved a totally different issue. The pertinent issue
in Krivenko was whether residential lots were
included in the general classification of agricultural
lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a
residential lot. This Court ruled that as an
alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935
Constitution104 from acquiring agricultural land, which
included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether
unclassified lands of the public domain are
automatically deemed agricultural.
Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands"
mentioned in Krivenko relied on the old cases
decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874,
including Ankron and De Aldecoa.105 As We have
already stated, those cases cannot apply here,
since they were decided when the Executive did not
have the authority to classify lands as agricultural,
timber, or mineral.
Private claimants’ continued possession under
Act No. 926 does not create a presumption that
the land is alienable. Private claimants also
contend that their continued possession of portions
of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10)
years under Act No. 926106 ipso facto converted the
island into private ownership. Hence, they may
apply for a title in their name.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the
Court in Collado v. Court of
Appeals.107 Collado, citing the separate opinion of
now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v.
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 107-
a
 ruled:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed
in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill
of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands
of the public domain. It prescribed rules and
regulations for the homesteading, selling and
leasing of portions of the public domain of the
Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and
conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to
public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the
"issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon
public lands," for the establishment of town sites
and sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or
confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in
the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated
on the assumption that title to public lands in the
Philippine Islands remained in the government; and
that the government’s title to public land sprung
from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent
treaties between Spain and the United States. The
term "public land" referred to all lands of the public
domain whose title still remained in the government
and are thrown open to private appropriation and
settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of
the government and the friar lands."
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land
Act No. 926, mere possession by private
individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.108 (Emphasis Ours)
Except for lands already covered by existing
titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the
public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064.
Such unclassified lands are considered public
forest under PD No. 705. The DENR109 and the
National Mapping and Resource Information
Authority110 certify that Boracay Island is an
unclassified land of the public domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized
all unclassified lands of the public domain as public
forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public
forest as "a mass of lands of the public domain
which has not been the subject of the present
system of classification for the determination of
which lands are needed for forest purpose and
which are not." Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified
lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso
facto considered public forests. PD No. 705,
however, respects titles already existing prior to its
effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as
a forest land under PD No. 705 may seem to be out
of touch with the present realities in the island.
Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its
forest cover to pave the way for commercial
developments. As a premier tourist destination for
local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of
a commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have
built multi-million peso beach resorts on the
island;111 that the island has already been stripped of
its forest cover; or that the implementation of
Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the island’s
tourism industry, do not negate its character as
public forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act
and the Constitution112 classifying lands of the public
domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks," do not necessarily refer
to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered
by dense growths of trees and underbrushes. 113 The
discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of
Forestry114 is particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public
domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of
its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest
land may actually be covered with grass or planted
to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers.
"Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in
out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees
growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does
not have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as "forest" is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of
the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title
do not apply.115 (Emphasis supplied)
There is a big difference between "forest" as defined
in a dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a
classification of lands of the public domain as
appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what
appears on the land while the other is a legal status,
a classification for legal purposes.116 At any rate, the
Court is tasked to determine the legal status of
Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout.
Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by
beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial
establishments, it has not been automatically
converted from public forest to alienable agricultural
land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation
No. 1801 as basis for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert
Boracay into an agricultural land. However,
private claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801
issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles
them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
Proclamation classified Boracay, among other
islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants assert
that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of
private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did
not convert the whole of Boracay into an agricultural
land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular
which made Boracay Island an agricultural land.
The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to "private
lands"117 and "areas declared as alienable and
disposable"118 does not by itself classify the entire
island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82
makes reference not only to private lands and areas
but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3
provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut
without prior authority from the PTA. All
forested areas in public lands are declared forest
reserves. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both
private and public lands merely recognizes that the
island can be classified by the Executive
department pursuant to its powers under CA No.
141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the
then Bureau of Forest Development’s authority to
declare areas in the island as alienable and
disposable when it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable
and disposable by the Bureau of Forest
Development.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be
deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay
Island as alienable and disposable land. If President
Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable
and disposable or forest, or both, he would have
identified the specific limits of each, as President
Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not
done in Proclamation No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801
also explain the rationale behind the declaration of
Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves
and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone
and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA –
to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and
private sectors in the development of the areas’
tourism potential with due regard for ecological
balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the
proclamation is aimed at administering the islands
for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not
address the areas’ alienability.119
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not
only Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64) other
islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines,
such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas,
Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and
Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto
Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan,
Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis
Oriental, to name a few. If the designation of
Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable
and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801,
all the other areas mentioned would likewise be
declared wide open for private disposition. That
could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the
intent of the proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which
positively declared part of Boracay as alienable
and opened the same to private
ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No.
141120 provide that it is only the President, upon the
recommendation of the proper department head,
who has the authority to classify the lands of the
public domain into alienable or disposable, timber
and mineral lands.121
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority
granted to her to classify lands of the public domain,
presumably subject to existing vested rights.
Classification of public lands is the exclusive
prerogative of the Executive Department, through
the Office of the President. Courts have no authority
to do so.122 Absent such classification, the land
remains unclassified until released and rendered
open to disposition.123
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400
hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96
hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation
likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on
each side of the center line of roads and trails,
which are reserved for right of way and which shall
form part of the area reserved for forest land
protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants’ argument, there was
nothing invalid or irregular, much less
unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay
Island made by the President through Proclamation
No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such
classification, subject to existing vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private
claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064
violates the provision of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657
barring conversion of public forests into agricultural
lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public
forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no
longer convert it into an agricultural land without
running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. – The Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all
public and private agricultural lands as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229,
including other lands of the public domain suitable
for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture.
No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to
agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the
approval of this Act until Congress, taking into
account ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law, the
specific limits of the public domain.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest
under PD No. 705 did not bar the Executive from
later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay
Island still remained an unclassified land of the
public domain despite PD No. 705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and
Soterranea Rafols v. Republic, 124 the Court stated
that unclassified lands are public forests.
While it is true that the land classification map
does not categorically state that the islands are
public forests, the fact that they were
unclassified lands leads to the same result. In
the absence of the classification as mineral or
timber land, the land remains unclassified land until
released and rendered open to
disposition.125 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies
only to a "reclassification" of land. If the land had
never been previously classified, as in the case of
Boracay, there can be no prohibited reclassification
under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of
the Department of Justice126 on this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of
the prohibition in Section 4(a) is the word
"reclassification." Where there has been no
previous classification of public forest [referring, we
repeat, to the mass of the public domain which has
not been the subject of the present system of
classification for purposes of determining which are
needed for forest purposes and which are not] into
permanent forest or forest reserves or some other
forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code, there
can be no "reclassification of forest lands" to speak
of within the meaning of Section 4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of
the CARL against the reclassification of forest lands
to agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting the
limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot,
apply to those lands of the public domain,
denominated as "public forest" under the Revised
Forestry Code, which have not been previously
determined, or classified, as needed for forest
purposes in accordance with the provisions of the
Revised Forestry Code.127
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA
No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over
the occupied lands under the said law. There are
two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1)
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest
under a bona fide claim of ownership since time
immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the
classification of the land as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.128
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No.
926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert
portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land.
The island remained an unclassified land of the
public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine,
is considered State property.
Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902,
Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail
because of the absence of the second element of
alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a
government grant under our present Public Land
Act presupposes that the land possessed and
applied for is already alienable and disposable. This
is clear from the wording of the law itself.129 Where
the land is not alienable and disposable, possession
of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer
ownership or possessory rights.130
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation
No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were
classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants
failed to prove the first element of open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in
Boracay since June 12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in
the petition for declaratory relief that private
claimants complied with the requisite period of
possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private
claimants are insufficient to prove the first element
of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax
declarations in the name of private claimants were
issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax
declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court
that the period of possession and occupation
commenced on June 12, 1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right
in Boracay, having been in possession of the island
for a long time. They have invested millions of
pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot.
They say their continued possession and
investments give them a vested right which cannot
be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable
investment of private claimants do not automatically
give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these
give them a right to apply for a title to the land they
are presently occupying. This Court is
constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the
evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the
law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are
ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title
over their occupied portions in Boracay even with
their continued possession and considerable
investment in the island.
One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been
invested for the development of Boracay Island,
making it a by-word in the local and international
tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a
number of years, thousands of people have called
the island their home. While the Court
commiserates with private claimants’ plight, We are
bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously. This
is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito
ang dapat umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As
they may not be eligible to apply for judicial waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed
CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their away; geological erosion results. With erosion come
automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and
and other areas they possess now classified as destruction to property – crops, livestock, houses,
agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their and highways – not to mention precious human
substantial investments on their occupied alienable lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be
lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack written down in a lumberman’s decalogue.135
of right to possess.
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
For one thing, those with lawful possession may
claim good faith as builders of improvements. They 1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707
can take steps to preserve or protect their is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals Decision in
possession. For another, they may look into other CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET
modes of applying for original registration of title, ASIDE.
such as by homestead131 or sales patent,132 subject
to the conditions imposed by law. 2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to
entitle private claimants to acquire title to their SO ORDERED.
occupied lots or to exempt them from certain
requirements under the present land laws. There is
RUBEN T. REYES
one such bill133 now pending in the House of
Associate Justice
Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill
will become a law is for Congress to decide.
WE CONCUR:.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government
has taken the step necessary to open up the island REYNATO S. PUNO
to private ownership. This gesture may not be Chief Justice
sufficient to appease some sectors which view the Chairperson
classification of the island partially into a forest
reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer CONSUELO
overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the LEONARDO A.
YNARES-
vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to QUISUMBING
SANTIAGO
strike a healthy balance between progress and Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as
economic progress.
MA. ALICIA
ANTONIO T.
AUSTRIA-
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our CARPIO
MARTINEZ
nation’s survival. Their promotion and protection are Associate Justice
Associate Justice
not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists.
These are needs that become more urgent as
destruction of our environment gets prevalent and (On official leave) CONCHITA
difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice RENATO C. CARPIO
Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. CORONA* MORALES
Munoz:134 Associate Justice Associate Justice

The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but ADOLFO S.
DANTE O. TINGA
in adherence to public policy that should be followed AZCUNA
Associate Justice
with respect to forest lands. Many have written Associate Justice
much, and many more have spoken, and quite
often, about the pressing need for forest MINITA V. CHICO- PRESBITERO J.
preservation, conservation, protection, development NAZARIO VELASCO, JR.
and reforestation. Not without justification. For, Associate Justice Associate Justice
forests constitute a vital segment of any country's
natural resources. It is of common knowledge by ANTONIO TERESITA J.
now that absence of the necessary green cover on EDUARDO B. LEONARDO-DE
our lands produces a number of adverse or ill NACHURA** CASTRO
effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, Associate Justice Associate Justice
watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they
supply are emptied of their contents. The fish
ARTURO D. BRION REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
Associate Justice vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN FABIO, namely: DOMINGA C.
FABIO, SOCORRO D. FABIO, LYDIA D. FABIO,
ROLANDO D. FABIO, NORMA D. FABIO, NORMA
L. FABIO, ANGELITA FABIO, ROSALIE FABIO,
CERTIFICATION DANILO FABIO, RENATO FABIO, LEVITA FABIO,
IRENE FABIO, TERESITA MOLERA, ROSEMARIE
C. PAKAY, LIGAYA C. MASANGKAY, ALFREDO
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the F. CASTILLO, MELINDA F. CASTILLO,
Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the MERCEDITA F. CASTILLO, ESTELA DE JESUS
above Decision had been reached in consultation AQUINO, FELECITO FABIO, and ALEXANDER
before the case was assigned to the writer of the FABIO, represented herein by ANGELITA F.
opinion of the Court. ESTEIBAR as their Attorney-in-Fact, respondent.

REYNATO S. PUNO DECISION

Chief Justice
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review on

certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated 29 August
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
66522, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15, in LRC Case
No. NC-96-782 granting respondents’ application for
registration of title to Lot No. 233 (Lot), Cad-617-D,
Ternate Cadastre.

The Facts

On 21 November 1996, respondents, who are the

heirs of Juan Fabio, represented by Angelita F.
Esteibar (Esteibar) as their Attorney-in-Fact, filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch
15, an application for registration of title3 to the Lot
with an approximate area of 1,096,866 square
meters or 109.6 hectares. The Lot is situated in
Barangay Sapang, Ternate, Cavite. The
respondents sought the registration of title under the
provisions of Act No. 496 or the Land Registration
Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529
(PD 1529).4

In the application, respondents alleged that they are

the owners of the Lot, including all the
improvements, having acquired the same through
a bona fide claim of ownership. They declared that
they and their predecessors-in-interest were in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the Lot in the concept of an owner for
more than 100 years.5

Republic of the Philippines Together with the application for registration,

SUPREME COURT respondents submitted the following documents:
Manila
1. Certificate of Death proving the fact of death of
FIRST DIVISION Juan Fabio;6

G.R. No. 159589             December 23, 2008 2. Special Power of Attorney showing that the heirs
authorized Esteibar to file the application;7
3. Order dated 25 November 1994 of Sydicious F.
Panoy, Regional Technical Director, Regional Office
No. IV-A, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), giving authority to survey the
Lot, which survey was numbered SWO-042121-
003369-D;8
4. Surveyor’s Certificate and Transmittal of Survey
Returns signed by Geodetic Engineer Susipatro
Mancha proving that the Lot was surveyed;9
5. Sepia copies of the survey plan establishing that
the land area is more or less 109 hectares and that
the Lot was already surveyed and the boundaries
determined;10
6. Letter of Authority dated 30 June 1997
authorizing Engineer Roberto C. Pangyarihan
(Pangyarihan) to represent the Land Management
Sector, DENR-Region IV, and to testify on plan
SWO-042121-003369-D covering the Lot;11
7. Technical Description signed by Pangyarihan
proving the boundaries of the Lot as surveyed;12
8. Letter dated 22 April 1991 of Arnaldo Conlu
(Conlu), Land Management Inspector, DENR-
Region IV establishing that the Lot is alienable and
disposable;13
9. First Indorsement dated 22 April 1991 of Rufo F.
Lorenzo, Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer, forwarding to the Regional
Technical Director, Land Management Division,
through the Chief, Surveys Division, DENR-Region
IV the investigation report of Land Management
Inspector, Conlu;14
10. Certifications dated 4 July 1995 and 23
November 1995 of Conrado C. Lindo, Municipal
Mayor, and Flordeliza C. Soberano, Municipal
Assessor of Ternate, Cavite, respectively,
establishing that Juan Fabio was the declared
owner of the Lot under Tax Declaration No. 1385
having an area of 200 hectares and situated in
Calumpang and Caybangat, Zapang, Ternate,
Cavite;15
11. Tax Declarations corresponding to different
years showing that the Lot has been declared under
the name of Juan Fabio for tax purposes: Tax
Declaration No. 428 for the year 1947, Tax
Declaration No. 302 for the year 1961; Tax
Declaration No. 227 for the year 1969, Tax
Declaration No. 210 for the year 1974, Tax
Declaration No. 173 for the year 1980, Tax
Declaration No. 1543 for the year 1985, and Tax
Declaration No. 1385 for the year 1994;16 and
12. Certifications of the Assistant Municipal
Treasurer of Ternate, Cavite stating that the real
estate taxes for the years 1994 to 1997 were paid.17
After the presentation of exhibits establishing the
jurisdictional facts, the trial prosecutor assigned to
the case interposed no objection. Thus, the trial
court ordered a general default against the public
except the government.
On 1 July 1997, respondents presented their
evidence consisting of documentary exhibits and the
testimonies of witnesses Esteibar, Pangyarihan,
Dominga Fabio Lozano, Mariano Huerto, and
Raymundo Pakay.
Esteibar, the duly appointed representative of the
heirs of Juan Fabio, testified that her grandfather,
Juan, died in 1959 when she was only 13 years old.
She attested that she was born on the Lot and
knows that her grandfather owned, possessed and
occupied the Lot until his death. Esteibar claimed
that they and their predecessors-in-interest have
possessed and occupied the Lot openly, publicly,
continuously, peacefully, without interruption in the
concept of an owner and adverse to the public since
time immemorial up to the present or for more than
100 years. They had paid real estate taxes; planted
trees, vegetables, rice, and banana plants; and
raised animals on the Lot. Further, she stated that
the Lot is neither mortgaged nor encumbered and
that no other person other than her and her co-heirs
are in possession of the Lot.
The next witness, Pangyarihan of the Land
Management Sector, DENR-Region IV, testified that
he had been connected with DENR-Region IV since
1956. He was formerly the Chief of the Survey
Division of DENR-Region IV from 1991 until his
designation as Special Assistant to the Regional
Director in 1995. Pangyarihan affirmed that the Lot
is 1,096,866 square meters or 109.6 hectares and
that he recommended the approval of the survey
plan, SWO-042121-003369-D, which includes the
Lot, on the basis of submission of certain
requirements like tax declarations, report of
investigation by the land investigator and survey
returns prepared by the geodetic engineer. He
verified that the survey plan and the technical
descriptions matched with each other and stated
that there is no overlap or encroachment on other
surrounding claims on adjacent or adjoining lots.
Further, he confirmed that there is a notation at the
left hand footnote of the approved survey plan which
reads "this survey falls within the Calumpang
Point Naval Reservation and disposition hereof
shall be subject to the final delimitation thereof
as per Proc. No. 1582-A dated September 6,
1976."
Dominga Fabio Lozano, the only living and
youngest child of Juan Fabio and who was then 63
years of age, testified that she was born in 1934 in
Calumpang, Ternate, Cavite. She alleged that she
was born and has lived on the Lot, owned by her
father Juan Fabio, who in turn inherited the land
from his father Ignacio Fabio. She narrated that her
father was born in 1887 and died in 1959 at the age
of 72 as evidenced by his death certificate. She
stated further that no one has ever questioned their
ownership or disturbed their peaceful possession
and occupation of the Lot. As a result, their
possession of the Lot covers more than 100 years
of continuous, uninterrupted, public, open and
peaceful possession.
Mariano Huerto, a helper of the late Juan Fabio,
testified that since 1935, when he was only 12 years
old, he had helped cultivate the Lot until he left the
place in 1955. He stated that at the time he served
as helper, Juan Fabio and his family were the ones
who possessed and occupied the Lot. He helped
plant vegetables, banana plants, papaya trees and
upland rice and was familiar with the boundaries of
the Lot.
Raymundo Pakay, 70 years of age at the time and a
resident of Ternate, Cavite, testified that he knew
Juan Fabio as the owner of the Lot, which has an
area of 200 hectares, more or less. He stated that
Juan built a house there and could not recall of
anyone else who claimed ownership of the Lot.
On 7 August 1997, the Assistant City Prosecutor of
Tagaytay City filed his Manifestation and Comment
dated 28 July 1997:
COMES NOW the government, through the
undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor of Tagaytay
City, assisting the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of the Province of Cavite, by way of
comment to petitioner’s formal offer of evidence
dated July 3, 1997 hereby manifest that the
government interposes no objection to Exhibit ‘A’ up
to ‘PP’ together with its sub markings, the same
being material and relevant to the instant petition.
The government further manifests that considering
the fact that it has no controverting evidence in its
possession to refute the material allegations of the
herein petitioner, the government is submitting the
instant case for the immediate resolution of this
Honorable Court on the basis of the evidence
adduced by the petitioner and the cross examination
propounded by the Trial Prosecutor.18
On 29 September 1997, the trial court rendered a
Decision ordering the registration of the Lot in the
name of Juan Fabio. The dispositive portion states:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, finding
the application for registration and grant of title
under Act 496, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1529 to be meritorious and fully substantiated
by evidence sufficient and requisite under the law,
this Court, confirming its previous Order of general
default as against the general public, hereby
decrees and adjudges and hereby orders the
registration of the parcel of land as hereinabove
described, identified, and bounded and now the
subject matter of the present application for
registration of title in the above-entitled case, in
favor of, and in the name of JUAN FABIO, of
Barangay Sapang, Municipality of Ternate, Province
of Cavite.
FURTHER, upon the finality of this DECISION, the
Administrator, Land Registration Authority, is hereby
ordered to issue the corresponding decree of
registration and the Original Certificate of Title in
favor of, and in the name of JUAN FABIO, of
Barangay Sapang, Municipality of Ternate, Province
of Cavite, over the parcel of land described,
identified and bounded as hereinabove-mentioned
and subject matter of this Decision which decreed
and adjudged the registration of its title in his name.
SO ORDERED.19
The Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), through
the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an appeal
with the Court of Appeals. Petitioner claimed that
the trial court erred in ruling that respondents have
acquired a vested right over the Lot which falls
within the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation.
Petitioner asserted that the trial court disregarded
the testimony of Pangyarihan who recommended
the approval of the survey plan with the following
notation:
This survey falls within the Calumpang Point Naval
Reservation and disposition hereof shall be subject
to the final delimitation thereof as per Proc. No.
1582-A dated September 6, 1976. x x x
In essence, petitioner argued that the trial court’s
grant of registration is contrary to the provisions of
Section 88 of Commonwealth Act No. 14120 and
Proclamation No. 1582-A.21
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 29 August 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the ruling of the trial court.22 The appellate court
ruled that the mode of appeal filed by petitioner was
wrong. Since the lone question involved was one of
law, petitioner should have filed a petition for review
with this Court under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure instead of filing an appeal under
Rule 41. Nevertheless, the appellate court looked
into the merits of the case and sustained the
findings of the trial court:
On the merits of the case, it may be true that the
General Order 56 of the United States War
Department dated 25 March 1904 reserved the
subject property as a military reservation, however,
President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation
307 on 20 November 1967 which provides x x x.
In other words, Presidential Proclamation 307
provides for an exception – those properties subject
to private rights or those on which private individuals
can prove ownership by any mode acceptable under
our laws and Torrens system.
Proclamation 1582-A issued by President Marcos
on 6 September 1976 again provided the following x
x x.
Without doubt, this complements and recognizes
the rights acquired by private individuals under
Proclamation 307, over the portion of the properties
reserved under General Order 56 of the United
States War Department dated 25 March 1904.
Considering that the annotation appearing in the
survey plan merely provides that the controversial
portion shall be subject to final delimitation as per
Proclamation 1582-A, the same is consistent with
the provisions of Proclamation 307.
For wrong remedy and for lack of merit, the Court
holds and so rules that the trial court erred not in
granting petitioners’ application for registration of
title.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
DISMISSED and the challenged 29 September
1997 Decision of the court a quo is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 23
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
The issues for our resolution are (1) whether
petitioner correctly appealed the ruling of the trial
court to the Court of Appeals, and (2) whether the
respondents have acquired a right over the Lot.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has merit.
First Issue: Mode of Appeal
Petitioner contends that the jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals over the appeal is determined on the
basis of the averments in the notice of appeal. Since
the appeal involves questions of fact and law,
petitioner correctly appealed the ruling of the trial
court to the Court of Appeals and not directly to this
Court.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the
remedy resorted to by petitioner before the Court of
Appeals was not correct. Respondents contend that
the issues actually raised in the appellant’s brief
determine the appropriate mode of appeal, not the
averments in the notice of appeal. Since the
appellate court found that petitioner only raised
questions of law, the appeal is dismissible under the
Rules.
Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, which governs appeals
from judgments and final orders of the Regional
Trial Court to the Court of Appeals, provides:
Section 2. Modes of appeal. –
(a) Ordinary appeal. – The appeal to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall
be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse
party. No record on appeal shall be required except
in special proceedings and other cases of multiple
or separate appeals where the law or these Rules
so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall
be filed and served in like manner.
(b) Petition for review. – The appeal to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
shall be by petition for review in accordance with
Rule 42.
(c) Appeal by certiorari. – In all cases where only
questions of law are raised or involved, the
appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition
for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule
45. (Emphasis supplied)
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to
what the law is on a certain state of facts, while
there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as
to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For
questions to be one of law, the same must not
involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants. The resolution
of the issue must rest solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances.24
In its appellant’s brief filed with the Court of
Appeals, petitioner interposed a lone assignment of
error:
The trial court erred in ruling that appellees have
acquired a vested right over the subject property
despite the fact that it falls within the Calumpang
Point Naval Reservation.25
Clearly, the issue stated by petitioner provides no
confusion with regard to the truth or falsity of the
given facts pertaining to the Lot and its location as
established during the trial. It had been duly
established that the Lot falls within the Calumpang
Point Naval Reservation as shown in the survey
conducted and attested to by the DENR. Here, the
only issue involved is the interpretation of a relevant
order and proclamations denominating the Lot as
part of a military reservation subject to the limitation
that private rights should be respected.
Undoubtedly, this is a pure question of law.
Thus, petitioner’s appeal under Rule 41 having been
improperly brought before the Court of Appeals, it
should have been dismissed by the appellate court
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of
Appeals. An appeal under Rule 41 taken from the
Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising
only questions of law shall be dismissed, issues
purely of law not being reviewable by the said court.
x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Nonetheless, the appellate court in resolving that
petitioner’s appeal constituted a wrong remedy,
looked into the merits of the case and found that the
laws involved recognize the rights of respondents.
As such, equity considerations require that we take
a similar course of action in order to put a rest to
this case.
Second Issue: Validity of Respondents’ Title
Petitioner asserts that both the trial and appellate
courts failed to recognize the import of the notation
in the survey plan stating that the Lot falls within the
Calumpang Point Naval Reservation. At the time the
application for registration of title was filed, the Lot
was no longer open to private ownership as it had
been classified as a military reservation for public
service. Thus, respondents are not entitled to have
the Lot registered under the Torrens system.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that they
have acquired a vested right over the Lot. The
Presidential Proclamations, which declared the Lot
part of a naval reservation, provided for an
exception that private rights shall be respected,
taking the portion covered by private rights out of
the reservation. Thus, respondents claim they are
entitled to have the Lot registered under their
names.
The three proclamations cited reserving the
Calumpang Point Naval Reservation for the
exclusive use of the military are the following: (1)
U.S. War Department Order No. 56 issued on 25
March 1904, (2) Proclamation No. 30726 issued on
20 November 1967, and (3) Proclamation No. 1582-
A issued on 6 September 1976. Such proclamations
state:
U.S. War Department General Order No. 5627
U.S. War Department General Order No. 56
Washington, March 25, 1904.
For the knowledge and governance of all interested
parties, the following is hereby announced:
The President of the United States, by the Order
dated March 14, 1904, which provides that the
reservations made by Executive Order of April 11,
1902 (General Order No. 38, Army Headquarters,
Office of the Adjutant General, April 17, 1902), at
the entrance of Manila Bay, Luzon, Philippine
Islands, are arranged in such a way that will include
only these lands as later described, whose lands
were reserved by the Order of March 14, 1904 for
military purposes, by virtue of Article 12 of the Act of
Congress approved on July 1, 1902, entitled "Act
providing for the Temporary Administration of Civil
Affairs of the Government of the Philippine Islands
and for Other Purposes" (32 Stat. L., 691); namely:
1. In the northern side of the entrance to Manila
Bay, in the province of Bataan, Luzon (Mariveles
Reservation), all public lands within the limits that
are described as follows:
"Starting from the mouth of the Mariveles River in
the eastern border and from here straight North to a
distance of 5,280 feet; from this point straight to the
East to intercept a line, in a straight direction to the
South from a stone monument marked U.S. (Station
4); from there straight from the North until the
aforementioned Station 4; from here straight to the
East to a distance of 6,600 feet until a stone
monument marked U.S. (Station 5); from here
straight South to a distance of 6,600 feet until a
stone monument marked U.S. (Station 6); from here
straight to the East to a distance of 8,910 feet until a
stone monument marked U.S. (Station 7); from here
straight to the South to a distance of 7,730 feet until
a stone monument marked U.S. (Station 8), situated
at the northwest corner of the second creek to the
east of Lasisi Point, 30 feet North of the high-tide
mark; from there in the same direction until the high-
tide mark; from here towards the East following the
shoreline up to the starting point."
2. In the southern side of the Manila Bay
entrance, in the province of Cavite, Luzon
(Calumpan Point Reservation), all public lands
within the limits that are described as follows:
"Starting from a stone monument marked U.S.
(Station 1) situated in the cliff on the Eastern
side of Asubig Point, 20 feet above the high-tide
mark and about 50 feet from the edge of the cliff
and continuing from there to the South 28 ° 10’
West, a distance of up to 22,000 feet until a
stone monument marked U.S. (Station 2); from
here to North 54 ° 10' West at a distance of 5,146
feet until a stone monument marked U.S.
(Station 3); from here towards South 85 ° 35 ' 30
"West, at a distance of 2,455 feet until a stone
monument marked U.S. (Station 4), situated on
the beach near the Northeast corner of
Limbones Bay, about 50 feet from the high-tide
mark and following in the same direction until
the high-tide mark; from here towards North and
East following the shoreline until North 28° 10 '
East from the starting point and from there
encompassing more or less 5,200 acres. The
markers are exact."
3. The islands of Corregidor, Pulo Caballo, La
Monja, El Fraile, and Carabao, and all other islands
and detached rocks lying between Mariveles
Reservation on the north side of the entrance to
Manila Bay and Calumpan Point Reservation on the
south side of said entrance.
4. The jurisdiction of the military authorities in the
case of reservations in the northern and southern
beaches of the entrance to Manila Bay and all the
islands referred to in paragraph 3, are extended
from the high-tide marker towards the sea until a
distance of 1,000 yards.
By Order of the Secretary of War:
GEORGE L. GILLESPIE,
General Commander, Chief of Internal General
Staff,
Official copy.
W.P. HALL, Internal Adjutant General. (Emphasis
supplied)
Proclamation No. 307
x x x do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement
and reserve for military purposes under the
administration of the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of
the Philippines, subject to private rights, if any there
be, a certain parcel of land of the public domain
situated in the municipality of Ternate, province of
Cavite, Island of Luzon, more particularly described
as follows:
Proposed Naval Reservation
Calumpang Point
A parcel of land (the proposed Calumpang Point
Naval Reservation), situated in the municipality of
Ternate, province of Cavite. Bounded on the NW.,
N. and E., by Manila Bay; on the SE. and S., by
municipality of Ternate; and on the W., by Manila
Bay. Beginning at a point marked "1" on the
attached Sketch Plan traced from Coastal
Hydrography of Limbones Island.
thence N. 54 deg. 30’ E., 750.00 m. to point 2;
thence N. 89 deg. 15’E., 1780.00 m. to point 3;
thence N. 15 deg. 10’ E., 6860.00 m. to point 4;
thence N. 12 deg. 40’ W., 930.00 m. to point 5;
thence S. 77 deg. 20’ W., 2336.00 m. to point 6;
thence S. 49 deg. 30’ W., 4450.00 m. to point 7;
thence S. 12 deg. 40’ E., 2875.00 m. to point 8;
thence S. 30 deg. 30’ E., 2075.00 m. to the point of
beginning; containing an approximate area of twenty
eight million nine hundred seventy three thousand
one hundred twelve (28, 973,112) square meters.
NOTE: All data are approximate and subject to
change based on future surveys."
Proclamation No. 1582-A
WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 307 dated
November 20, 1967 and U.S. War Department
Order No. 56 dated March 25, 1904 reserved for
military purposes, and withdrew from sale or
settlement, a parcel of land of the public domain
situated in the Municipality of Ternate, Province
of Cavite, more particularly described as follows: x
xx
WHEREAS, the Philippine Navy and the Philippine
Marines now need that portion of this area reserved
under Proclamation No. 307, particularly, Cayladme
Cove, Caynipa Cove, Calumpang Cove and
Sinalam Cove, for their use as official station, not
only to guard and protect the mouth of Manila Bay
and the shorelines of the Province of Cavite,
Batangas and Bataan, but also to maintain peace
and order in the Corregidor area, which is now one
of the leading tourist attractions in the country; x x x
x x x containing an approximate area of EIGHT
MILLION EIGHTY NINE THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED NINETY (8,089,990) SQUARE
METERS, more or less.
The portion that remains after the segregation which
are occupied shall be released to bona
fide occupants pursuant to existing laws/policies
regarding the disposition of lands of the public
domain and the unoccupied portions shall be
considered as alienable or disposable lands.
(Emphasis supplied)
The proclamations established that as early as 1904
a certain parcel of land was placed under the
exclusive use of the government for military
purposes by the then colonial American
government. In 1904, the U.S. War Department
segregated the area, including the Lot, for military
purposes through General Order No. 56.
Subsequently, after the Philippines regained its
independence in 1946, the American government
transferred all control and sovereignty to the
Philippine government, including all the lands
appropriated for a public purpose. Twenty years
later, two other presidential proclamations followed,
both issued by former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, restating that the same property is a naval
reservation for the use of the Republic.
There is no question that the Lot is situated within a
military reservation. The only issue to be resolved is
whether the respondents are entitled to have the Lot
registered under the Torrens systems based on the
limitation clause cited in the proclamations:
(1) "subject to private rights, if any there be" in
Proclamation No. 307, and (2) "the portion that
remains after the segregation which are occupied
shall be released to bona fide occupants pursuant
to existing laws/policies regarding the disposition of
lands of the public domain and the unoccupied
portions shall be considered as alienable or
disposable lands" in Proclamation No. 1582-A. This
proviso means that persons claiming rights over the
reserved land are not precluded from proving their
claims. In effect, the State gives respect and
recognizes the rights of private persons who may
have acquired any vested interest to the Lot before
the issuance of the General Order or proclamations.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141), also known
as the Public Land Act, remains to this day the
existing general law governing the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain, other than
timber and mineral lands.28 Under the Regalian
doctrine embodied in our Constitution, land that has
not been acquired from the government, either by
purchase, grant or any other mode recognized by
law, belongs to the State as part of the public
domain.29 No public land can be acquired by private
persons through any other means, and it is
indispensable that the person claiming title to public
land should show that his title was acquired through
purchase or grant from the State, or through any
other mode of acquisition recognized by law.30
Section 48(b) of CA 141, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1073 (PD 1073),31 provides:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such land or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title, except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter.32
Similarly, Section 14 of PD 1529 or the Property
Registration Decree, governing original registration
through registration proceedings, provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. - The following
persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxx
To put it simply, Section 14(1) of PD 1529 states
that there are three requisites for the filing of an
application for registration of title: (1) that the
property in question is alienable and disposable
land of the public domain; (2) that the applicants by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation; and (3) that
such possession is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
To prove that the Lot is alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, respondents presented in
evidence a letter33 dated 22 April 1991 of Conlu, a
Land Management Inspector of the DENR-Region
IV. The relevant portion of the letter states:
In examination [of] the above-noted subject, please
be [informed] that I have examined the land x x x
and the following findings [were] ascertained;
That the land covers a portion of 3 (three)
barangays, namely: Calumpang, Cabangat and
Zapang, all within the municipality of Ternate,
Cavite;
That the land is within alienable and disposable
zone under Project No. 22-B, L.C. Map No. 3091;
That the land was declared for taxation purposes
since 1945, the latest of which is Tax Declaration
No. 1543 with a market value of P1,250,000.00 in
favor of Juan Fabio x x x (Emphasis supplied)
This letter-certification is insufficient. Conlu is
merely a land investigator of the DENR. It is not
enough that he alone should certify that the Lot is
within the alienable and disposable zone. Under
Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of
classifying or reclassifying lands of the public
domain belongs to the President. 34 The President,
through a presidential proclamation or executive
order, can classify or reclassify a land to be included
or excluded from the public domain. The DENR
Secretary is the only other public official empowered
by law to approve a land classification and declare
such land as alienable and disposable.35
From the records, this letter was the only evidence
presented by respondents to prove that the Lot is
alienable and disposable. In fact, not even the
Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) certified as correct the investigation
report of the Land Management Inspector. The most
that the CENRO officer did was to indorse the report
to the Regional Technical Director of the
DENR.36 In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,37 we
ruled that it is not enough for the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office
(PENRO) or CENRO to certify that a land is
alienable and disposable. The applicant for land
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary
had approved the land classification and released
the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved
area per verification through survey by the PENRO
or CENRO. In addition, the applicant must present a
copy of the original classification of the land into
alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR
Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President. Such
copy of the DENR Secretary’s declaration or the
President’s proclamation must be certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian of such official record.
These facts must be established to prove that the
land is alienable and disposable.
Respondents have failed to present any of these
documents. No document was presented to show
that the DENR Secretary or the President has
classified the Lot as alienable and disposable. No
CENRO or PENRO certification was presented that
the Lot, per verification through survey, falls within
the alienable and disposable zone. The 22 April
1991 letter of Land Management Inspector Conlu is
not proof that the DENR Secretary or the President
has classified the Lot as alienable and disposable,
or that the Lot falls within the alienable and
disposable zone. The mere issuance of the letter
does not prove the facts stated in such letter.38
Further, the burden is on respondents to prove that
the Lot ceased to have the status of a military
reservation or other inalienable land of the public
domain. No proof was ever submitted by
respondents that the Calumpang Point Naval
Reservation, or the Lot, ceased as a military
reservation. Even if its ownership and control had
been transferred by the Americans to the Philippine
government, the Calumpang Point Naval
Reservation remained as an official military
reservation. Thus, being a military reservation at the
time, the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation, to
which the Lot is a part of, can not be subject to
occupation, entry or settlement.39 This is clear from
Sections 83 and 88 of CA 141, which provide:
SECTION 83. Upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, the
President may designate by proclamation any tract
or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations
for the use of the Commonwealth of the Philippines
or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants
thereof, in accordance with regulations prescribed
for this purpose, or for quasi-public uses or
purposes when the public interest requires it,
including reservations for highways, rights of way for
railroads, hydraulic power sites, irrigation systems,
communal pastures or leguas comunales, public
parks, public quarries, public fishponds, working-
men’s village and other improvements for the public
benefit.
SECTION 88. The tract or tracts of land reserved
under the provisions of section eighty-three shall be
non-alienable and shall not be subject to
occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other
disposition until again declared alienable under
the provision of this Act or by proclamation of
the President. (Emphasis supplied)
Well-entrenched is the rule that unless a land is
reclassified and declared alienable and disposable,
occupation in the concept of an owner, no matter
how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title.40 Consequently, respondents
could not have occupied the Lot in the concept of an
owner in 1947 and subsequent years when
respondents declared the Lot for taxation purposes,
or even earlier when respondents’ predecessors-in-
interest possessed the Lot, because the Lot was
considered inalienable from the time of its
declaration as a military reservation in 1904.
Therefore, respondents failed to prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the Lot is alienable and
disposable.
Public lands not shown to have been classified as
alienable and disposable land remain part of the
inalienable public domain.41 In view of the lack of
sufficient evidence showing that the Lot was already
classified as alienable and disposable, the Lot
applied for by respondents is inalienable land of the
public domain, not subject to registration under
Section 14(1) of PD 1529 and Section 48(b) of CA
141, as amended by PD 1073. Hence, there is no
need to discuss the other requisites dealing with
 respondents’ occupation and possession of the Lot before the case was assigned to the writer of the
in the concept of an owner. opinion of the Court’s Division.

While it is an acknowledged policy of the State to REYNATO S. PUNO

promote the distribution of alienable public lands to Chief Justice
spur economic growth and in line with the ideal of
social justice, the law imposes stringent safeguards
upon the grant of such resources lest they fall into
the wrong hands to the prejudice of the national
patrimony.42 We must not, therefore, relax the
stringent safeguards relative to the registration of
imperfect titles.43

In Republic v. Estonilo,44 we ruled that persons

claiming the protection of "private rights" in order to
exclude their lands from military reservations must
show by clear and convincing evidence that the
properties in question have been acquired by a legal
method of acquiring public lands. Here, respondents
failed to do so, and are thus not entitled to have the
Lot registered in their names. Clearly, both the trial
and appellate courts gravely erred in granting
respondents’ application for registration of title.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET

ASIDE the 29 August 2003 Decision of the Court of Republic of the Philippines
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66522. SUPREME COURT
We DISMISS respondents’ application for Manila
registration and issuance of title to Lot No. 233,
Cad-617-D, Ternate Cadastre in LRC Case No. NC- THIRD DIVISION
96-782 filed with the Regional Trial Court of Naic,
Cavite, Branch 15. G.R. No. 180067               June 30, 2009

SO ORDERED. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO IGLESIA NI CRISTO, Trustee and APPLICANT,
Associate Justice with its Executive Minister ERAÑO MANALO as
Corporate Sole Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:
WE CONCUR:
The Case
S. PUNO
In this Justice
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45, the Republic of the Philippines assails the
October 11, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
V. CHICO-NAZARIO **PRESBITERO J. (CA) in CA-G.R.
VELASCO, JR. CV No. 85348, which affirmed the
stice Associate Justice April 26, 2005 Decision2 of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) in Paoay-Currimao, Ilocos Norte, in
J. LEONARDO-DE LandCASTRO
Registration Case No. 762-C for Application
stice for Registration of Title, entitled Iglesia Ni Cristo,
Trustee and Applicant with its Executive Minister
Eraño Manalo as Corporate Sole v. Republic of the
Philippines as oppositor.

CERTIFICATION The Facts

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the

Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation
Subject of the instant controversy is Lot No. 3946 of
the Currimao Cadastre, particularly described as
follows:
A parcel of land (Plan Swo-I-001047, L.R.C. Rec.
No. ______) situated in the Barrio of Baramban,
Municipality of Currimao, Province of Ilocos Norte,
Island of Luzon. Bounded on the SE., along line 1-2
by the National Road (20.00 m. wide); on the SW. &
NW., along lines 2-3-4 by lot 3946, Cads-562-D,
Currimao Cadastral Sketching, Bernardo
Badanguio; on the NE., along line 4-1 by lot 3947,
portion, Cads-562-D; (Pacita B. Lazaro) and lot
3948, Pacita B. Lazaro, Cads-562-D, Currimao
Cadastral Sketching x x x containing an area of
FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED AND ONE
(4201) SQUARE METERS. x x x
On November 19, 1998, Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC),
represented by Eraño G. Manalo, as corporate sole,
filed its Application for Registration of Title before
the MCTC in Paoay-Currimao. Appended to the
application were the sepia or tracing cloth of plan
Swo-1-001047, the technical description of subject
lot,3 the Geodetic Engineer’s Certificate,4 Tax
Declaration No. (TD) 5080265 covering the subject
lot, and the September 7, 1970 Deed of
Sale6 executed by Bernardo Bandaguio in favor of
INC.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), entered its appearance and
deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Laoag City to
appear on its behalf. It also filed an Opposition to
INC’s application.
The Ruling of the Cadastral Court
After the required jurisdictional publication,
notification, and posting, hearing ensued where the
INC presented three testimonial witnesses,7 the
MCTC, acting as cadastral court, rendered its
Decision on April 26, 2005, granting INC’s
application. The decretal portion reads:
Wherefore, the application for registration is hereby
granted. Upon finality of this decision, let an Order
be issued directing the Land Registration Authority
to register and issue an Original Certificate of Title
to the applicant Iglesia Ni Cristo, as Corporation
Sole, with official address at No. 1 Central Avenue,
New Era, Diliman Quezon City.
SO ORDERED.
The cadastral court held that based on documentary
and testimonial evidence, the essential requisites for
judicial confirmation of an imperfect title over the
subject lot have been complied with.
It was established during trial that the subject lot
formed part of a bigger lot owned by one Dionisio
Sabuco. On February 23, 1952, Sabuco sold a
small portion of the bigger lot to INC which built a
chapel on the lot. Saturnino Sacayanan, who was
born in 1941 and became a member of INC in 1948,
testified to the sale by Sabuco and the erection of
the small chapel by INC in 1952. Subsequently,
Sabuco sold the bigger lot to Bernardo Badanguio
less the small portion where the INC chapel was
built.
Badanguio in 1954 then declared the entire bigger
lot he purchased from Sabuco for tax purposes and
was issued TD 006114.8 In 1959, Badanguio also
sold a small portion of the bigger lot to INC for which
a Deed of Absolute Sale9 was executed on January
8, 1959. Jaime Alcantara, the property custodian of
INC, testified to the purchases constituting the
subject lot and the issuance of TDs covering it as
declared by INC for tax purposes. Thus, these two
purchases by INC of a small portion of the bigger lot
originally owned by Sabuco, who inherited it from
his parents and later sold it to Badanguio,
constituted the subject lot.
On September 7, 1970, a Deed of Sale was
executed by Badanguio in favor of INC formally
ceding and conveying to INC the subject lot which
still formed part of the TD of the bigger lot under his
name. This was testified to by Teofilo Tulali who
became a tenant of the bigger lot in 1965 and
continued to be its tenant under Badanguio. Tulali
testified further that the ownership and possession
of Sabuco and Badanguio of the bigger lot were
never disturbed.
Subsequently, TD 648510 was issued in 1970 in the
name of INC pursuant to the September 7, 1970
Deed of Sale. This was subsequently replaced by
TD No. 40605611 in 1974, TD 508026 in 1980, and
TD 605153 in 1985.
For the processing of its application for judicial
confirmation of title, subject Lot No. 3946 of the
Currimao Cadastre was surveyed and consisted of
4,201 square meters. With the presentation of the
requisite sepia or tracing cloth of plan Swo-1-
001047, technical description of the subject lot,
Geodetic Engineer’s Certificate, and Report given
by the City Environment and Natural Resources
Office special investigator showing that the subject
lot is within alienable and disposable public zone,
the MCTC found and appreciated the continuous
possession by INC of the subject lot for over 40
years after its acquisition of the lot. Besides, it noted
that Badanguio and Sabuco, the predecessors-in-
interest of INC, were never disturbed in their
possession of the portions they sold to INC
constituting the subject lot.
Aggrieved, the Republic seasonably interposed its
appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
85348.
The Ruling of the CA
On October 11, 2007, the appellate court rendered
the assailed Decision affirming the April 26, 2005
MCTC Decision. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the
instant appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed
decision AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
In denying the Republic’s appeal, the CA found that
the documentary and testimonial evidence on
record sufficiently established the continuous, open,
and peaceful possession and occupation of the
subject lot in the concept of an owner by INC of
more than 40 years and by its predecessors-in-
interest prior to the conveyance of the lot to INC.
Hence, we have this petition.
The Issue
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A
QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE [MCTC]
DECISION GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR
LAND REGISTRATION DESPITE EVIDENCE
THAT THE LAND WAS DECLARED ALIENABLE
AND DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN ONLY ON MAY 16, 1993, OR FIVE (5)
YEARS BEFORE THE FILING OF THE
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION ON
NOVEMBER 19, 1998.12
The Court’s Ruling
May a judicial confirmation of imperfect title prosper
when the subject property has been declared as
alienable only after June 12, 1945? This is the sole
issue to be resolved.
The petition is bereft of merit. The sole issue raised
is not novel.
The Republic’s Contention
The Republic contends that subject Lot No. 3946
was certified as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain only on May 16, 1993. Relying
on Republic v. Herbieto,13 it argues that prior to said
date, the subject lot remained to be of the public
dominion or res publicae in nature incapable of
private appropriation, and, consequently, INC and
its predecessors-in-interest’s possession and
occupation cannot confer ownership or possessory
rights and "any period of possession prior to the
date when the lot was classified as alienable and
disposable is inconsequential and should be
excluded in the computation of the period of
possession."14
The Republic maintains further that since the
application was filed only on November 19, 1998 or
a scant five years from the declaration of the subject
lot to be alienable and disposable land on May 16,
1993, INC’s possession fell short of the 30-year
period required under Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. (CA) 141, otherwise known
as the Public Land Act.
The Argument of INC
Respondent INC counters that the Court has
already clarified this issue in Republic v. Court of
Appeals (Naguit case), in which we held that what is
merely required by Sec. 14(1) of Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, is that the "property
sought to be registered [is] already alienable and
disposable at the time of the application for
registration of title is filed."15 Moreover, INC asserts
that the Herbieto pronouncement quoted by the
Republic cannot be considered doctrinal in that it is
merely an obiter dictum, stated only after the case
was dismissed for the applicant’s failure to comply
with the jurisdictional requirement of publication.
Necessity of declaration of public agricultural
land as alienable and disposable
It is well-settled that no public land can be acquired
by private persons without any grant, express or
implied, from the government, and it is
indispensable that the persons claiming title to a
public land should show that their title was acquired
from the State or any other mode of acquisition
recognized by law.16 In the instant case, it is
undisputed that the subject lot has already been
declared alienable and disposable by the
government on May 16, 1993 or a little over five
years before the application for registration was filed
by INC.
Conflicting rulings in Herbieto and Naguit
It must be noted that this Court had conflicting
rulings in Naguit and Herbieto, relied on by the
parties’ contradictory positions.
Herbieto essentially ruled that reckoning of the
possession of an applicant for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title is counted from the date when the
lot was classified as alienable and disposable, and
possession before such date is inconsequential and
must be excluded in the computation of the period
of possession. This ruling is very stringent and
restrictive, for there can be no perfection of title
when the declaration of public agricultural land as
alienable and disposable is made after June 12,
1945, since the reckoning of the period of
possession cannot comply with the mandatory
period under Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529.
In Naguit, this Court held a less stringent
requirement in the application of Sec. 14(1) of PD
1529 in that the reckoning for the period of
possession is the actual possession of the property
and it is sufficient for the property sought to be
registered to be already alienable and disposable at
the time of the application for registration of title is
filed.
A review of subsequent and recent rulings by this
Court shows that the pronouncement
in Herbieto has been applied to Buenaventura v.
Republic,17 Republic v. Diloy,18 Ponciano, Jr. v.
Laguna Lake Development
Authority,19 and Preciosa v. Pascual.20 This Court’s
ruling in Naguit, on the other hand, has been
applied to Republic v. Bibonia.21
Core issue laid to rest in Heirs of Mario
Malabanan v. Republic
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic (Malabanan),22 the Court
upheld Naguit and abandoned the stringent ruling
in Herbieto.
Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 pertinently provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply.—The following persons
may file in the proper Court of First Instance [now
Regional Trial Court] an application for registration
of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
In declaring that the correct interpretation of Sec.
14(1) of PD 1529 is that which was adopted
in Naguit, the Court ruled that "the more
reasonable interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD
1529 is that it merely requires the property
sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed."
The Court in Malabanan traced the rights of a
citizen to own alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain as granted under CA 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, as amended by PD
1073, and PD 1529. The Court observed that Sec.
48(b) of CA 141 and Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 are
virtually the same, with the latter law specifically
operationalizing the registration of lands of the
public domain and codifying the various laws
relative to the registration of property. We
cited Naguit and ratiocinated:
Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended and Section 14(a) of the
Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted
the position that for one to acquire the right to seek
registration of an alienable and disposable land of
the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant
and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership
since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable
character of the property must have been declared
also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSG’s
approach, all lands certified as alienable and
disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered
either under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an
implication was discussed in Naguit.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the
alienable and disposable character of the land
should have already been established since June
12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain
meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as
used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent
phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership."
Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or
modify only the words or phrases to which they are
immediately associated, and not those distantly or
remotely located. Ad proximum antecedents fiat
relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
lavvphi1.net
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would
result if we adopt petitioner’s position. Absent a
legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting
the OSG’s view, that all lands of the public domain
which were not declared alienable or disposable
before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to
original registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14
virtually inoperative and even precludes the
government from giving it effect even as it decides
to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable
and disposable. The unreasonableness of the
situation would even be aggravated considering that
before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet
even considered an independent state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section
14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought
to be registered as already alienable and disposable
at the time the application for registration of title is
filed. If the State, at the time the application is
made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the
property for alienation or disposition, the
presumption is that the government is still reserving
the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to
preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of
the length of adverse possession even if in good
faith. However, if the property has already been
classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this
case, then there is already an intention on the part
of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative
over the property.
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of
Section 14(1) is that which was adopted in Naguit.
The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed
out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the
provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would
only cover lands actually declared alienable and
disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current
possessor is able to establish open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession under a bona
fide claim of ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more
possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to
avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles
than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This
balancing fact is significant, especially considering
our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach
of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the
contradictory passages from Herbieto are obiter
dicta since the land registration proceedings therein
is void ab initio in the first place due to lack of the
requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing.
There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it
suffices that the Court’s acknowledgment that the
particular line of argument used therein concerning
Section 14(1) is indeed obiter.
Naguit as affirmed in Malabanan more in accord
with the State’s policy
Moreover, we wish to emphasize that our affirmation
of Naguit in Malabanan––as regards the correct
interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 relative to
the reckoning of possession vis-à-vis the declaration
of the property of the public domain as alienable
and disposable––is indeed more in keeping with the
spirit of the Public Land Act, as amended, and of PD
1529. These statutes were enacted to conform to
the State’s policy of encouraging and promoting the
distribution of alienable public lands to spur
economic growth and remain true to the ideal of
social justice.23 The statutes’ requirements, as
couched and amended, are stringent enough to
safeguard against fraudulent applications for
registration of title over alienable and disposable
public land. The application of the more stringent
pronouncement in Herbieto would indeed stifle and
repress the State’s policy.
Finally, the Court in Malabanan aptly synthesized
the doctrine that the period of possession required
under Sec. 14(1) of PD 1527 is not reckoned from
the time of the declaration of the property as
alienable and disposable, thus:
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case,
as follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act recognizes and confirms that "those who
by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945" have acquired ownership of,
and registrable title to, such lands based on the
length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession
since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the
lands should have been alienable and disposable
during the entire period of possession, the
possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation
of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable
and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed
by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
INC entitled to registrable right over subject lot
With the resolution of the core issue, we find no
error in the findings of the courts a quo that INC had
indeed sufficiently established its possession and
occupation of the subject lot in accordance with the
Public Land Act and Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529, and
had duly proved its right to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title over subject lot.
As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court when
affirmed by the CA are final and conclusive on, and
cannot be reviewed on appeal by, this Court as long
as they are borne out by the record or are based on
substantial evidence. The Court is not a trier of
facts, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only
errors of law that may have been committed by the
lower courts.24 This is applicable to the instant case.
The possession of INC has been established not
only from 1952 and 1959 when it purchased the
respective halves of the subject lot, but is also
tacked on to the possession of its predecessors-in-
interest, Badanguio and Sabuco, the latter
possessing the subject lot way before June 12,
1945, as he inherited the bigger lot, of which the
subject lot is a portion, from his parents. These
possessions and occupation––from Sabuco,
including those of his parents, to INC; and from
Sabuco to Badanguio to INC––had been in the
concept of owners: open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of property. These had not
been disturbed as attested to by respondent’s
witnesses.

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DENIED.

Accordingly, the October 11, 2007 CA Decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 85348 is hereby AFFIRMED IN
TOTO.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO- ANTONIO EDUARDO

NAZARIO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
ATTESTATION
SUPREME COURT
Manila
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case
THIRD DIVISION
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
G.R. No. 163551               July 18, 2011
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice DATU KIRAM SAMPACO, substituted by HADJI
Chairperson SORAYA S. MACABANDO, Petitioner,
vs.
HADJI SERAD MINGCA LANTUD, Respondent.
CERTIFICATION
DECISION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the PERALTA, J.:
above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court
opinion of the Court’s Division. of Appeals’ Decision dated August 15, 2003 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 63801 and its Resolution dated May
REYNATO S. PUNO 13, 2004, denying petitioner’s motion for
Chief Justice reconsideration.

The facts, as stated by the Court of Appeals, are as

follows:

On September 14, 1984, respondent Hadji Serad

Mingca Lantud, the plaintiff in the lower court, filed
an action to quiet title with damages1 with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur,
Branch 8, Marawi City (trial court), against petitioner
Datu Kiram Sampaco (deceased), the defendant in
the lower court, who has been substituted by his
heirs, represented by Hadji Soraya Sampaco-
Macabando.2
Respondent alleged in his Complaint3 that he is the
owner in fee simple of a parcel of residential lot
located at Marinaut, Marawi City, with an area of
897 square meters covered by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. P-658. On August 25, 1984,
petitioner Datu Kiram Sampaco, through his
daughter Soraya Sampaco-Macabando with several
armed men, forcibly and unlawfully entered his
property and destroyed the nursery buildings,
cabbage seedlings and other improvements therein
worth ₱10,000.00. On August 30, 1984, Barangay
Captain Hadji Hassan Abato and his councilmen
prepared and issued a decision4 in writing stating
that petitioner Datu Kiram Sampaco is the owner of
the subject parcel of land. Respondent stated that
the acts of petitioner and the said decision of the
Barangay Captain may cast a cloud over or
otherwise prejudice his title. Respondent stated that
he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, public and exclusive possession of the
subject property. He prayed that the acts of
petitioner and the decision of Barangay Captain
Hadji Hassan Abato and his councilmen be declared
invalid, and that petitioner be ordered to pay
respondent damages in the amount of ₱10,000.00
and attorney’s fees.
In his Answer,5 defendant Datu Kiram Sampaco,
petitioner herein, denied the material allegations of
the Complaint. Petitioner asserted that he and his
predecessors-in-interest are the ones who had been
in open, public, continuous, and exclusive
possession of the property in dispute. Petitioner
alleged that OCT No. P-658 was secured in
violation of laws and through fraud, deception and
misrepresentation, considering that the subject
parcel of land is a residential lot and the title issued
is a free patent. Moreover, respondent and his
predecessors-in-interest had never taken actual
possession or occupied the land under litigation. On
the contrary, petitioner has all the evidence of actual
possession and ownership of permanent
improvements and other plants on the land in
dispute.
Petitioner filed a counterclaim for actual and moral
damages, and attorney's fees for the unfounded
complaint and prayed for its dismissal. He also
sought the cancellation of respondent’s OCT No. P-
658 and the reconveyance of the subject parcel of
land.
During the trial, respondent Hadji Lantud testified
that he acquired the subject lot from his
grandmother, Intumo Pagsidan, a portion thereof
from his grandmother’s helper, Totop Malacop,
pursuant to a court decision after litigating with
him.6 Respondent had been residing on the lot for
more than 30 years, applied for a title thereto and
was issued OCT No. P-658.7 He paid the
corresponding real estate taxes for the land.8 He
planted assorted trees and plants on the lot like
bananas, jackfruits, coconuts and others.9 He
testified that he was not aware of the alleged
litigation over the lot before Barangay Captain Hadji
Hassan Abato, although he was furnished a copy of
the decision.10
On the other hand, petitioner Datu Kiram Sampaco
testified that the land under litigation is only a
portion of the 1,800 square meters of land that he
inherited in 1952 from his father, Datu Sampaco
Gubat.11 Since then, he had been in adverse
possession and ownership of the subject lot,
cultivating and planting trees and plants through his
caretaker Hadji Mustapha Macawadib.12 In 1962, he
mortgaged the land (1,800 square meters) with the
Development Bank of the Philippines, Ozamis
branch.13 He declared the land (1,800 square
meters) for taxation purposes14 and paid real estate
taxes, and adduced in evidence the latest Tax
Receipt No. 1756386 dated September 15,
19[9]3.15 Petitioner presented four corroborating
witnesses as regards his possession of the subject
property.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a
Decision on March 31, 1999 in favor of petitioner,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the court is of
the opinion and so holds that the preponderance of
evidence is in favor of the defendant and against the
plaintiff. Judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Dismissing plaintiff’s complaint for lack of merit;
2. Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. P-658
(Exh. A) null and void and of no legal effect;
3. Declaring the defendant the absolute or true
owner and possessor of the land in dispute; and
4. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant the
sum of ₱10,000.00 for attorney’s fees plus ₱500.00
per appearance.16
The trial court held that the issuance of
respondent’s title, OCT No. P-658, was tainted with
fraud and irregularities and the title is, therefore,
spurious; hence, it is null and void, and without any
probative value. The finding of fraud was based on:
(1) the Certification issued by Datu Samra Andam,
A/Adm. Assistant II, Natural Resources District No.
XII-3, Marawi City, stating that the data contained in
respondent’s title were verified and had no record in
the said office; (2) the said Certification was not
refuted or rebutted by respondent; (3) while free
patents are normally issued for agricultural lands,
respondent’s title is a free patent title issued over a
residential land as the lot is described in the
Complaint as a residential lot; and (4) Yusoph
Lumampa, an employee of the local Bureau of
Lands, to whom respondent allegedly entrusted the
paperwork of the land titling, was not presented as a
witness.
Moreover, the trial court stated that respondent
failed to establish with competent and credible
evidence that he was in prior possession of the
subject property. No corroborative witness was
presented to further prove his prior possession.
On the other hand, the trial court stated that
petitioner offered documentary evidence, consisting
of a contract of real estate mortgage of the subject
property, tax declarations, an official tax receipt, and
testimonial evidence to prove that he had been in
open, public, continuous, and lawful possession of
the subject property in the concept of owner.
Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court
to the Court of Appeals.
On August 15, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered
a Decision reversing the decision of the trial court,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE:
1. The appeal is granted and the appealed judgment
is hereby totally REVERSED.
2. To quiet his title, plaintiff-appelant Hadji Serad
Mingca Lantud is confirmed the owner of the parcel
of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-
658;
3. The defendant-appellee is ordered to pay
₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees to the plaintiff-
appellant; and
4. Costs against the defendant-appellee.17
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied
by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution18 dated
May 13, 2004.
The Court of Appeals held that there is no
controversy that respondent is a holder of a Torrens
title; hence, he is the owner of the subject property.
The appellate court stressed that Section 4719 of the
Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) provides that
the certificate of title covering registered land shall
be received as evidence in all courts of the
Philippines and shall be conclusive as to all matters
stated therein.
The Court of Appeals stated that the Torrens title
has three attributes: (1) a Torrens title is the best
evidence of ownership over registered land and,
unless annulled in an appropriate proceeding, the
title is conclusive on the issue of ownership; (2) a
Torrens title is incontrovertible and indefeasible
upon the expiration of one year from the date of the
entry of the decree of registration;20 and (3) a
Torrens title is not subject to collateral attack.21
The Court of Appeals held that petitioner’s
counterclaim filed on October 15, 1984 for
cancellation of respondent’s original certificate of
title issued on May 22, 1981 was filed beyond the
statutory one-year period; hence, petitioner’s title
had become indefeasible, and cannot be affected by
the decision made by Barangay Captain Hadji
Hassan Abato and his councilmen. Moreover, the
appellate court held that petitioner’s prayer for the
cancellation of respondent’s title, OCT No. P-658,
through a counterclaim included in his Answer is a
collateral attack, which the law does not allow,
citing Cimafranca v. Court of Appeals22 and Natalia
Realty Corporation v. Valdez.23
The allegation of fraud in securing OCT No. P-658
on the ground that the property in dispute is a
residential lot and not subject of a free patent was
not given weight by the appellate court as it was
supported only by testimonial evidence that did not
show how (by metes and bounds) and why the
property in dispute could not have been the subject
of a free patent. The appellate court stated that a
mere preponderance of evidence is not adequate to
prove fraud;24 it must be established by clear and
convincing evidence.
The Court of Appeals also noted that petitioner
claimed that the subject property is only part of his
larger property. Although petitioner introduced proof
of payment of the real estate taxes of the said
property, as well as a previous mortgage of the
property, petitioner did not show that the disputed
property is part of his larger property. Hence, the
appellate court stated that under such
circumstances, it cannot rule that petitioner owned
the land under litigation, since petitioner failed to
show that it is part of his larger property.
The Court of Appeals did not award actual and
moral damages, because respondent failed to prove
the amount of any actual damages sustained, and
the instances enumerated under Article 2219 of the
Civil Code warranting the award of moral damages
were not present.
However, the Court of Appeals awarded attorney's
fees in the amount of ₱50,000.00, considering that
respondent was forced to incur expenses to protect
his right through the action to quiet title.
Petitioner filed this petition raising the following
issues:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS MISERABLY FAILED
TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT THE TORRENS
TITLE INVOLVED HEREIN WAS ISSUED
PURSUANT TO A FREE PATENT WHICH COULD
NOT BE VALIDLY ISSUED OVER A PRIVATE
LAND.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DISREGARDING THE FACT THAT AS CERTIFIED
TO BY THE BUREAU OF LANDS ITSELF NO
SUCH FREE PATENT OVER THE SUBJECT LAND
WAS ISSUED BY IT; HENCE, SAID FREE PATENT
IS SPURIOUS.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT THAT THE SUBJECT LOT HAD LONG
BEEN OWNED, POSSESSED AND CULTIVATED
BY THE DEFENDANT (PETITIONER HEREIN) OR
HIS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST SINCE TIME
IMMEMORIAL IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE PETITIONER’S COUNTERCLAIM FOR
CANCELLATION OF RESPONDENT’S TITLE IS
BARRED.
V
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE COUNTERCLAIM IN THE INSTANT
CASE IS A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON
RESPONDENT-PLAINTIFF’S TITLE.
VI
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING
PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION.25
The main issue is whether or not the Court of
Appeals erred in sustaining the validity of OCT No.
P-658 and confirming respondent as owner of the
property in dispute.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred
in disregarding the fact that the Torrens title was
issued to respondent by virtue of a free patent
covering a residential lot that is private land as it has
been acquired by petitioner through open, public,
continuous and lawful possession of the land in the
concept of owner. Petitioner thus prayed for the
cancellation of respondent’s title and the
reconveyance of the subject property. Hence, the
Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the subject
lot belongs to respondent.
The contention is without merit.
The Torrens title is conclusive evidence with respect
to the ownership of the land described therein, and
other matters which can be litigated and decided in
land registration proceedings.26 Tax declarations
and tax receipts cannot prevail over a certificate of
title which is an incontrovertible proof of
ownership.27 An original certificate of title issued by
the Register of Deeds under an administrative
proceeding is as indefeasible as a certificate of title
issued under judicial proceedings.28 However, the
Court has ruled that indefeasibility of title does not
attach to titles secured by fraud and
misrepresentation.29
In this case, petitioner alleged in his Answer to
respondent’s Complaint in the trial court that
respondent’s title, OCT No. P-658, was secured in
violation of the law and through fraud, deception
and misrepresentation, because the subject parcel
of land is a residential lot, which cannot be subject
of a free patent, since only agricultural lands are
subject of a free patent.
The trial court found that "[t]he lot under litigation as
clearly described in the complaint is a residential lot
and a free patent title thereto cannot validly be
issued." This finding was one of the bases for the
trial court’s declaration that the issuance of OCT
was tainted with fraud and irregularities and is,
therefore, spurious; thus, OCT No. P-658 is null and
void.
It should be pointed out that the allegation in the
Complaint that the land is residential was made only
by respondent, but the true classification of the
disputed land as residential was not shown to have
been made by the President, upon recommendation
by the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources, pursuant to Section 9 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, otherwise known as The Public Land
Act.30 Hence, the trial court erred in concluding that
there was fraud in the issuance of respondent’s free
patent title on the ground that it covered residential
land based only on the Complaint which stated that
the property was residential land when it was not
shown that it was the President who classified the
disputed property as residential, and OCT No. P-
658 itself stated that the free patent title covered
agricultural land. It has been stated that at present,
not only agricultural lands, but also residential lands,
have been made available by recent legislation for
acquisition by free patent by any natural born
Filipino citizen.31 Nevertheless, the fact is that in this
case, the free patent title was granted over
agricultural land as stated in OCT No. P-658.
Moreover, petitioner contends in his petition that the
Certification32 dated July 24, 1987 issued by Datu
Samra I. Andam, A/Adm. Assistant II, Natural
Resources District No. XII-3, Bureau of Lands,
Marawi City, certifying that the data contained in
OCT No. P-658 in respondent’s name had no
records in the said office, showed that respondent’s
Torrens title was spurious.
The Court holds that the certification, by itself, is
insufficient to prove the alleged fraud. Fraud and
misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of
patent and annulment of title, should never be
presumed, but must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence, mere preponderance of
evidence not being adequate.33 Fraud is a question
of fact which must be proved. 34 The signatory of the
certification, Datu Samra Andam, A/Adm. Assistant
II, Natural Resources District No. XII-3, Marawi City,
was not presented in court to testify on the due
issuance of the certification, and to testify on the
details of his certification, particularly the reason
why the said office had no records of the data
contained in OCT No. P-658 or to testify on the fact
of fraud, if any.
Thus, the Court holds that the evidence on record is
insufficient to prove that fraud was committed in the
issuance of respondent’s Torrens title. Hence,
respondent’s Torrens title is a valid evidence of his
ownership of the land in dispute.
On the other hand, petitioner claims ownership of
the subject lot, which is merely a portion of a larger
property (1,800 square meters) that he allegedly
inherited from his father in 1952, by virtue of open,
public and continuous possession of the land in the
concept of owner making it petitioner’s private
property. Hence, petitioner prays for reconveyance
of the said property.
Article 434 of the Civil Code governs an action for
reconveyance, thus:
Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must
be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the
strength of his title and not on the weakness of the
defendant’s claim.
Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, to successfully
maintain an action to recover the ownership of a
real property, the person who claims a better right to
it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the
land claimed; and second, his title thereto.35
In regard to the first requisite, in an accion
reinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he has
a better right to the property must first fix the identity
of the land he is claiming by describing the location,
area and boundaries thereof.36
In this case, petitioner claims that the property in
dispute is part of his larger property. However,
petitioner failed to identify his larger property by
providing evidence of the metes and bounds
thereof, so that the same may be compared with the
technical description contained in the title of
respondent, which would have shown whether the
disputed property really formed part of petitioner’s
larger property. The appellate court correctly held in
its Resolution dated May 13, 2004 that petitioner’s
claim is solely supported by testimonial evidence,
which did not conclusively show the metes and
bounds of petitioner’s larger property in relation to
the metes and bounds of the disputed property;
thus, there is no sufficient evidence on record to
support petitioner’s claim that the disputed property
is part of his larger property.
In regard to the second requisite of title to property,
both petitioner and respondent separately claim that
they are entitled to ownership of the property by
virtue of open, public, continuous and exclusive
possession of the same in the concept of owner.
Petitioner claims that he inherited the subject
property from his father in 1952, while respondent
claims that he acquired the property from his
grandmother Intumo Pagsidan, a portion thereof
from his grandmother’s helper Totop Malacop
pursuant to a court decision after litigating with
him.37 Respondent has OCT No. P-658 to prove his
title to the subject property, while petitioner merely
claims that the property is already his private land
by virtue of his open, public, continuous possession
of the same in the concept of owner.
The Court holds that petitioner failed to prove the
requisites of reconveyance as he failed to prove the
identity of his larger property in relation to the
disputed property, and his claim of title by virtue of
open, public and continuous possession of the
disputed property in the concept of owner is
nebulous in the light of a similar claim by
respondent who holds a free patent title over the
subject property. As stated in Ybañez v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,38 it is relatively easy to
declare and claim that one owns and possesses
public agricultural land, but it is entirely a different
matter to affirmatively declare and to prove before a
court of law that one actually possessed and
cultivated the entire area to the exclusion of other
claimants who stand on equal footing under the
Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended) as any other pioneering claimants.
Further, petitioner contends that the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner’s counterclaim
is time-barred, since the one-year prescriptive
period does not apply when the person seeking
annulment of title or reconveyance is in possession
of the lot, citing Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs
of Mariano E. Santiago.39 Petitioner also contends
that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
counterclaim in this case is a collateral attack on
respondent’s title, citing Cimafranca v. Intermediate
Appellate Court.40 Petitioner cites the case of Heirs
of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E.
Santiago,41 which held that a counterclaim can be
considered a direct attack on the title.
The Court notes that the case
of Cimafranca v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,42 cited by the Court of Appeals to support its
ruling that the prayer for the cancellation of
respondent’s title through a counterclaim included in
petitioner’s Answer is a collateral attack on the said
title, is inapplicable to this case. In Cimafranca,
petitioners therein filed a complaint for Partition and
Damages, and respondents therein indirectly
attacked the validity of the title involved in their
counterclaim. Hence, the Court ruled that a Torrens
title cannot be attacked collaterally, and the issue on
its validity can be raised only in an action expressly
instituted for that purpose.
Here, the case cited by petitioner, Heirs of Simplicio
Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago, declared
that the one-year prescriptive period does not apply
when the party seeking annulment of title or
reconveyance is in possession of the lot, as well as
distinguished a collateral attack under Section 48 of
PD No. 1529 from a direct attack, and held that a
counterclaim may be considered as a complaint or
an independent action and can be considered a
direct attack on the title, thus:
The one-year prescriptive period, however, does not
apply when the person seeking annulment of title or
reconveyance is in possession of the lot. This is
because the action partakes of a suit to quiet title
which is imprescriptible. In David v. Malay, we held
that a person in actual possession of a piece of land
under claim of ownership may wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before
taking steps to vindicate his right, and his
undisturbed possession gives him the continuing
right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain
and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a
third party and its effect on his title.
xxxx
Section 48 of P.D. 1529, the Property Registration
Decree, provides that a certificate of title shall not
be subject to collateral attack and cannot be altered,
modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding.
An action is an attack on a title when the object of
the action is to nullify the title, and thus challenge
the judgment or proceeding pursuant to which the
title was decreed. The attack is direct when the
object of an action is to annul or set aside such
judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other
hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an
action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the
judgment or proceeding is nevertheless made as an
incident thereof.
x x x A counterclaim can be considered a direct
attack on the title. In Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Court Appeals, we ruled on the
validity of a certificate of title despite the fact that the
nullity thereof was raised only as a counterclaim. It
was held that a counterclaim is considered a
complaint, only this time, it is the original defendant
who becomes the plaintiff.  It stands on the same
1avvphi1
footing and is to be tested by the same rules as if it
were an independent action. x x x43
The above ruling of the court on the definition of
collateral attack under Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529
was reiterated in Leyson v. Bontuyan, 44 Heirs of
Enrique Diaz v. Virata,45 Arangote v.
Maglunob,  and Catores v. Afidchao.47
46
Based on the foregoing, the Court holds that
petitioner’s counterclaim for cancellation of
respondent’s title is not a collateral attack, but a
direct attack on the Torrens title of petitioner.
However, the counterclaim seeking for the
cancellation of title and reconveyance of the subject
property has prescribed as petitioner has not proven
actual possession and ownership of the property
due to his failure to prove the identity of his larger
property that would show that the disputed property
is a part thereof, and his claim of title to the subject
property by virtue of open, public and continuous
possession in the concept of owner is nebulous in
the light of a similar claim by respondent who holds
a Torrens title to the subject property.
Respondent’s original certificate of title was issued
on May 22, 1981, while the counterclaim was filed
by petitioner on October 15, 1984, which is clearly
beyond the one-year prescriptive period.
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in confirming
that respondent is the owner of the parcel of land
covered by OCT No. P-658.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of
Appeals’ decision dated August 15, 2003, and its
Resolution dated May 13, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No.
63801, are hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO*
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. ROBERTO A. ABAD
VELASCO, JR.
 Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Chairperson

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision Manila
had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the FIRST DIVISION
Court’s Division.
G.R. No. 175485               July 27, 2011
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice CASIMIRO DEVELOPMENT
Third Division, Chairperson CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
CERTIFICATION RENATO L. MATEO, Respondent.

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the DECISION

Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
BERSAMIN, J.:
The focus of this appeal is the faith that should be
accorded to the Torrens title that the seller holds at
the time of the sale.
In its decision promulgated on August 31, 2006,1 the
Court of Appeals (CA) declared that the respondent
and his three brothers were the rightful owners of
the land in litis, and directed the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City to cancel the
transfer certificate of title (TCT) registered under the
name of petitioner Casimiro Development
Corporation (CDC) and to issue in its place another
TCT in favor of the respondent and his three
brothers. Thereby, the CA reversed the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered on May 9,
2000 (dismissing the respondent’s complaint for
quieting of title and reconveyance upon a finding
that CDC had been a buyer in good faith of the land
in litis and that the respondent’s suit had already
been time-barred).

Aggrieved, CDC brought its petition for review on

certiorari.

Antecedents

The subject of this case is a registered parcel of

land (property) with an area of 6,693 square meters,
more or less, located in Barrio Pulang Lupa, Las
Piñas City, that was originally owned by Isaias
Lara,2 the respondent’s maternal grandfather. Upon
the death of Isaias Lara in 1930, the property
passed on to his children, namely: Miguela, Perfecta
and Felicidad, and a grandson, Rosauro (son of
Perfecta who had predeceased Isaias in 1920). In
1962, the co-heirs effected the transfer of the full
and exclusive ownership to Felicidad (whose
married surname was Lara-Mateo) under an
agreement denominated as Pagaayos Na Gawa Sa
Labas Ng Hukuman.
Felicidad Lara-Mateo had five children, namely:
Laura, respondent Renato, Cesar, Candido, Jr. and
Leonardo. With the agreement of the entire Lara-
Mateo family, a deed of sale covering the property
was executed in favor of Laura, who, in 1967,
applied for land registration. After the application
was granted, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
6386 was issued in Laura’s sole name.
In due course, the property now covered by OCT
No. 6386 was used as collateral to secure a
succession of loans. The first loan was obtained
from Bacoor Rural Bank (Bacoor Bank). To repay
the loan to Bacoor Bank and secure the release of
the mortgage, Laura borrowed funds from
Parmenas Perez (Perez), who, however, required
that the title be meanwhile transferred to his name.
Thus, OCT No. 6386 was cancelled and Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 438959 was issued in
the name of Perez. Subsequently, Laura recovered
the property by repaying the obligation with the
proceeds of another loan obtained from Rodolfo Pe
(Pe), resulting in the cancellation of TCT No.
438595, and in the issuance of TCT No. S-91595 in
Laura’s name. She later executed a deed of sale in
favor of Pe, leading to the issuance of TCT No. S-
91738 in the name of Pe, who in turn constituted a
mortgage on the property in favor of China Banking
Corporation (China Bank) as security for a loan. In
the end, China Bank foreclosed the mortgage, and
consolidated its ownership of the property in 1985
after Pe failed to redeem. Thus, TCT No. (99527) T-
11749-A was issued in the name of China Bank.
In 1988, CDC and China Bank negotiated and
eventually came to terms on the purchase of the
property, with China Bank executing a deed of
conditional sale for the purpose. On March 4, 1993,
CDC and China Bank executed a deed of absolute
sale over the property. Resultantly, on March 29,
1993, CDC was issued TCT No. T-34640 in its own
name.
In the meanwhile, on February 28, 1991, Felicidad
died intestate.
On June 6, 1991, CDC brought an action for
unlawful detainer in the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) in Las Piñas City against the respondent’s
siblings, namely: Cesar, Candido, Jr., and
Leonardo, and the other occupants of the property.
Therein, the defendants maintained that the MeTC
did not have jurisdiction over the action because the
land was classified as agricultural; that the
jurisdiction belonged to the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB); that they had
been in continuous and open possession of the land
even before World War II and had presumed
themselves entitled to a government grant of the
land; and that CDC’s title was invalid, considering
that the land had been registered before its being
declared alienable.3
On October 19, 1992, the MeTC ruled in favor of
CDC, viz:
The Court, after careful consideration of the facts
and the laws applicable to this case[,] hereby
resolves:
1. On the issue of jurisdiction.
The defendants alleged that the land in question is
an agricultural land by presenting a Tax Declaration
Certificate classifying the land as "FISHPOND." The
classification of the land in a tax declaration
certificate as a "fishpond" merely refers to the use of
the land in question for the purpose of real property
taxation. This alone would not be sufficient to bring
the land in question under the operation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
2. On the issue of open and adverse possession by
the defendants.
It should be noted that the subject land is covered
by a Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of
plaintiffs’ predecessor-in-interest China Banking
Corporation. Certificates of Title under the Torrens
System is indefeasible and imprescriptible. As
between two persons claiming possession, one
having a [T]orrens title and the other has none, the
former has a better right.
3. On the issue of the nullity of the Certificate of
Title.
The defense of the defendants that the subject
property was a forest land when the same was
originally registered in 1967 and hence, the
registration is void[,] is not for this Court to decide[,]
for lack of jurisdiction. The certificate of title over the
property must be respected by this Court until it has
been nullified by a competent Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff[,] ordering
the defendants
1. [sic] and all persons claiming right[s] under it to
vacate the subject premises located at Pulang Lupa
I, Las Piñas, Metro Manila and surrender the
possession of the same to herein plaintiff;
2. to pay the plaintiff reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the subject premises
hereby fixed at (₱100.00) one hundred pesos a
month starting November 22, 1990 (the time when
the demand letter to vacate was given) until
defendants actually vacate the property;
No pronouncement as to costs and attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.4
The decision of the MeTC was assailed in the RTC
via petition for certiorari and prohibition. The RTC
resolved against CDC, and held that the MeTC had
acted without jurisdiction because the land, being a
fishpond, was agricultural; hence, the dispute was
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988).5
CDC appealed to the CA, which, on January 25,
1996, found in favor of CDC, declaring that the
MeTC had jurisdiction. As a result, the CA
reinstated the decision of the MeTC.6
On appeal (G.R. No. 128392), the Court affirmed
the CA’s decision in favor of CDC, ruling thusly:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the
Court of Appeals’ Decision and Resolution in CA-
G.R. SP No. 34039, dated January 25, 1996 and
February 21, 1997 respectively, are AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.7
The decision in G.R. No. 128392 became final.
Nonetheless, on June 29, 1994, the respondent
brought an action for quieting of title, reconveyance
of four-fifths of the land, and damages against CDC
and Laura in the RTC in Las Piñas City entitled
Renato L. Mateo v. Casimiro Development
Corporation and Laura Mateo de Castro. In
paragraph 4 of his complaint, he stated that he was
"bringing this action to quiet title on behalf of himself
and of his three (3) brothers – Cesar, Leonardo, and
Candido, Jr., all surnamed MATEO – in his capacity
as one of the co-owners of a parcel of land situated
at Barrio Pulang Lupa, Municipality of Las Piñas,
Metro Manila."
On May 9, 2001, the RTC held in favor of CDC,
disposing:
WHEREFORE, and by strong preponderance of
evidence, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the defendant Casimiro Development Corporation
and against the plaintiff Renato L. Mateo by (1)
Dismissing the complaint, and upholding the validity
and indefeasibility of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-34640 in the name of Casimiro Development
Corporation; (2) Ordering the plaintiff Renato Mateo
to pay defendant Casimiro Development
Corporation the sum of [a] ₱200,000.00 as
compensatory damages; [b] ₱200,000.00 as
attorney’s fees; and [c] to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.8
On appeal (C.A.-G.R. CV No. 71696), the CA
promulgated its decision on August 31, 2006,
reversing the RTC and declaring CDC to be not a
buyer in good faith due to its being charged with
notice of the defects and flaws of the title at the time
it acquired the property from China Bank, and
decreeing:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 9, 2001 of
Branch 225, Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City in
Civil Case No. 94-2045 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and a new one rendered:
(1) Declaring appellant Renato Mateo and his
brothers and co-owners Cesar, Candido, Jr., and
Leonardo, all surnamed Mateo as well as his sister,
Laura Mateo de Castro as the rightful owners of the
parcel of land, subject of this case; and
(2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas
City, Metro-Manila to cancel Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-34640 under the name of appellee
Casimiro Development Corporation, and that a new
one be issued in favor of the appellant and his co-
heirs and siblings, mentioned above as co-owners
pro indiviso of the said parcel.
(3) No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.9
The CA denied CDC’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal, in which CDC urges that the CA
committed serious errors of law,10 as follows:
(A) xxx in failing to rule that the decree of
registration over the Subject Property is
incontrovertible and no longer open to review or
attack after the lapse of one (1) year from entry of
such decree of registration in favor of Laura Mateo
de Castro.
(B) xxx in failing to rule that the present action is
likewise barred by res judicata.
(C) xxx in failing to rule that the instant action for
quieting of title and reconveyance under PD No.
1529 cannot prosper because the Subject Property
had already been conveyed and transferred to third
parties who claimed adverse title for themselves.
(D) xxx in failing to rule that the action of respondent
for "quieting of title, reconveyance and damages" is
barred by laches.
(E) xxx in ruling that the Subject Property must be
reconveyed to respondent because petitioner
Casimiro Development Corporation is not a
"purchaser in good faith."
CDC argues that it was a buyer in good faith; and
that the CA did not rule on matters that fortified its
title in the property, namely: (a) the incontrovertibility
of the title of Laura; (b) the action being barred by
laches and res judicata; and (c) the property having
been conveyed to third parties who had then
claimed adverse title.
The respondent counters that CDC acquired the
property from China Bank in bad faith, because it
had actual knowledge of the possession of the
property by the respondent and his siblings; that
CDC did not actually accept delivery of the
possession of the property from China Bank; and
that CDC ignored the failure of China Bank to
warrant its title.
Ruling
We grant the petition.
1.
Indefeasibility of title in the name of Laura
As basis for recovering the possession of the
property, the respondent has assailed the title of
Laura.
We cannot sustain the respondent.
There is no doubt that the land in question, although
once a part of the public domain, has already been
placed under the Torrens system of land
registration. The Government is required under the
Torrens system of registration to issue an official
certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person
named in the certificate is the owner of the property
therein described, subject to such liens and
encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law
warrants or reserves.11 The objective is to obviate
possible conflicts of title by giving the public the right
to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and to
dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring
further. The Torrens system gives the registered
owner complete peace of mind, in order that he will
be secured in his ownership as long as he has not
voluntarily disposed of any right over the covered
land.12
The Government has adopted the Torrens system
due to its being the most effective measure to
guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect
their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is
established and recognized. If a person purchases a
piece of land on the assurance that the seller’s title
thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being
told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all,
which will not only be unfair to him as the purchaser,
but will also erode public confidence in the system
and will force land transactions to be attended by
complicated and not necessarily conclusive
investigations and proof of ownership. The further
consequence will be that land conflicts can be even
more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government,
recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens
system, should be the first to accept the validity of
titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid
down by the law are satisfied.13
Yet, registration under the Torrens system, not
being a mode of acquiring ownership, does not
create or vest title.14 The Torrens certificate of title is
merely an evidence of ownership or title in the
particular property described therein.15 In that sense,
the issuance of the certificate of title to a particular
person does not preclude the possibility that
persons not named in the certificate may be co-
owners of the real property therein described with
the person named therein, or that the registered
owner may be holding the property in trust for
another person.16
Nonetheless, it is essential that title registered under
the Torrens system becomes indefeasible and
incontrovertible.17
The land in question has been covered by a Torrens
certificate of title (OCT No. 6386 in the name of
Laura, and its derivative certificates) before CDC
became the registered owner by purchase from
China Bank. In all that time, neither the respondent
nor his siblings opposed the transactions causing
the various transfers. In fact, the respondent
admitted in his complaint that the registration of the
land in the name of Laura alone had been with the
knowledge and upon the agreement of the entire
Lara-Mateo family. It is unthinkable, therefore, that
the respondent, fully aware of the exclusive
registration in her sister Laura’s name, allowed
more than 20 years to pass before asserting his
claim of ownership for the first time through this
case in mid-1994. Making it worse for him is that he
did so only after CDC had commenced the
ejectment case against his own siblings.
Worthy of mention is that Candido, Jr., Leonardo,
and Cesar’s defense in the ejectment case brought
by CDC against them was not predicated on a claim
of their ownership of the property, but on their being
agricultural lessees or tenants of CDC. Even that
defense was ultimately rejected by this Court by
observing in G.R. No. 128392 as follows:
With regard to the first element, the petitioners have
tried to prove that they are tenants or agricultural
lessees of the respondent corporation, CDC, by
showing that the land was originally owned by their
grandfather, Isaias Lara, who gave them permission
to work the land, and that CDC is merely a
successor-in-interest of their grandfather. It must be
noted that the petitioners failed to adequately prove
their grandfather’s ownership of the land. They
merely showed six tax declarations. It has been held
by this Court that, as against a transfer certificate of
title, tax declarations or receipts are not adequate
proofs of ownership. Granting arguendo that the
land was really owned by the petitioners’
grandfather, petitioners did not even attempt to
show how the land went from the patrimony of their
grandfather to that of CDC. Furthermore, petitioners
did not prove, but relied on mere allegation, that
they indeed had an agreement with their
grandfather to use the land.
As for the third element, there is apparently no
consent between the parties. Petitioners were
unable to show any proof of consent from CDC to
work the land. For the sake of argument, if
petitioners were able to prove that their grandfather
owned the land, they nonetheless failed to show any
proof of consent from their grandfather to work the
land. Since the third element was not proven, the
fourth element cannot be present since there can be
no purpose to a relationship to which the parties
have not consented.18
The respondent’s attack against the title of CDC is
likewise anchored on his assertion that the only
purpose for having OCT No. 6386 issued in the sole
name of Laura was for Laura to hold the title in trust
for their mother. This assertion cannot stand,
however, inasmuch as Laura’s title had long ago
become indefeasible.
Moreover, the respondent’s suit is exposed as
being, in reality, a collateral attack on the title in the
name of Laura, and for that reason should not
prosper. Registration of land under the Torrens
System, aside from perfecting the title and rendering
it indefeasible after the lapse of the period allowed
by law, also renders the title immune from collateral
attack.19 A collateral attack occurs when, in another
action to obtain a different relief and as an incident
of the present action, an attack is made against the
judgment granting the title. This manner of attack is
to be distinguished from a direct attack against a
judgment granting the title, through an action whose
main objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the
enforcement of such judgment if not yet
implemented, or to seek recovery if the property
titled under the judgment had been disposed of.20
2.
CDC was an innocent purchaser for value
The CA found that CDC acquired the property in
bad faith because CDC had knowledge of defects in
the title of China Bank, including the adverse
possession of the respondent’s siblings and the
supposed failure of China Bank to warrant its title by
inserting an as-is, where-is clause in its contract of
sale with CDC.
The CA plainly erred in so finding against CDC.
To start with, one who deals with property registered
under the Torrens system need not go beyond the
certificate of title, but only has to rely on the
certificate of title.21 He is charged with notice only of
such burdens and claims as are annotated on the
title.22 The pertinent law on the matter of burdens
and claims is Section 44 of the Property
Registration Decree,23 which provides:
Section 44. Statutory liens affecting title. — Every
registered owner receiving a certificate of title in
pursuance of a decree of registration, and every
subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a
certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall
hold the same free from all encumbrances except
those noted on said certificate and any of the
following encumbrances which may be subsisting,
namely:
First. Liens, claims or rights arising or existing under
the laws and Constitution of the Philippines which
are not by law required to appear of record in the
Registry of Deeds in order to be valid against
subsequent purchasers or encumbrances of record.
Second. Unpaid real estate taxes levied and
assessed within two years immediately preceding
the acquisition of any right over the land by an
innocent purchaser for value, without prejudice to
the right of the government to collect taxes payable
before that period from the delinquent taxpayer
alone.
Third. Any public highway or private way
established or recognized by law, or any
government irrigation canal or lateral thereof, if the
certificate of title does not state that the boundaries
of such highway or irrigation canal or lateral thereof
have been determined.
Fourth. Any disposition of the property or limitation
on the use thereof by virtue of, or pursuant to,
Presidential Decree No. 27 or any other law or
regulations on agrarian reform.
In short, considering that China Bank’s TCT No.
99527 was a clean title, that is, it was free from any
lien or encumbrance, CDC had the right to rely,
when it purchased the property, solely upon the face
of the certificate of title in the name of China Bank.24
The CA’s ascribing of bad faith to CDC based on its
knowledge of the adverse possession of the
respondent’s siblings at the time it acquired the
property from China Bank was absolutely
unfounded and unwarranted. That possession did
not translate to an adverse claim of ownership that
should have put CDC on actual notice of a defect or
flaw in the China Bank’s title, for the respondent’s
siblings themselves, far from asserting ownership in
their own right, even characterized their possession
only as that of mere agricultural tenants. Under no
law was possession grounded on tenancy a status
that might create a defect or inflict a flaw in the title
of the owner. Consequently, due to his own
admission in his complaint that the respondent’s
own possession was not any different from that of
his siblings, there was really nothing – factually or
legally speaking – that ought to have alerted CDC
or, for that matter, China Bank and its
predecessors-in-interest, about any defect or flaw in
the title.
buys the property with the belief that the person
from whom he receives the thing was the owner and
could convey title to the property. A purchaser
cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man on his guard and still claim he
acted in good faith.
WHEREFORE, we grant the petition for review on
certiorari; set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 71696; dismiss the
complaint in Civil Case No. 94-2045; and declare
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-34640 in the name
of Casimiro Development Corporation valid and
subsisting.
The respondent shall pay the costs of suit.

The vendee’s notice of a defect or flaw in the title of SO ORDERED.

the vendor, in order for it to amount to bad faith,
should encompass facts and circumstances that
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
would impel a reasonably cautious person to make
Associate Justice
further inquiry into the vendor’s title,25 or facts and
circumstances that would induce a reasonably
prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of WE CONCUR:
the property in litigation.26 In other words, the
presence of anything that excites or arouses RENATO C. CORONA
suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look Chief Justice
beyond the certificate and to investigate the title of Chairperson
the vendor appearing on the face of said
certificate.27 TERESITA J.
MARIANO C. DEL
LEONARDO-DE
And, secondly, the CA grossly erred in construing CASTILLO
the as-is, where-is clause contained in the deed of CASTRO
sale between CDC (as vendee) and China Bank (as Associate Justice
Associate Justice
vendor) as proof or manifestation of any bad faith on
the part of CDC. On the contrary, the as-is, where-is
clause did not affect the title of China Bank because MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
it related only to the physical condition of the Associate Justice
property upon its purchase by CDC. The clause only
placed on CDC the burden of having the occupants CERTIFICATION
removed from the property. In a sale made on an
as-is, where-is basis, the buyer agrees to take
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
possession of the things sold "in the condition
Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
where they are found and from the place where they
above Decision had been reached in consultation
are located," because the phrase as-is, where-is
before the case was assigned to the writer of the
pertains solely "to the physical condition of the thing
opinion of the Court’s Division.
sold, not to its legal situation" and is "merely
descriptive of the state of the thing sold" without
altering the seller’s responsibility to deliver the RENATO C. CORONA
property sold to the buyer.28 Chief Justice

What the foregoing circumstances ineluctably

indicate is that CDC, having paid the full and fair
price of the land, was an innocent purchaser for
value, for, according to Sandoval v. Court of
Appeals:29

A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property

of another, without notice that some other person
has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays
a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such
purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or
interest of some other persons in the property. He
 registration of title over a parcel of land located in
Ilog, Negros Occidental.

The factual milieu of this case is as follows:

On August 11, 1987, petitioners4 Pacifico, Lodovico,

Ricardo, Bienvenido, all surnamed Valiao, and
Nemesio Grandea filed with the RTC of
Kabankalan, Negros Occidental an application for
registration of a parcel of land with an area of
504,535 square meters, more or less, situated in
Barrio Galicia, Municipality of Ilog, Negros
Occidental.

On June 20, 1988, private oppositors Macario Zafra

and Manuel Yusay filed their Motion to Dismiss the
application on the following grounds: (1) the land
applied for has not been declared alienable and
disposable; (2) res judicata has set in to bar the
application for registration; and (3) the application
has no factual or legal basis.

On August 24, 1988, the Republic of the Philippines

(Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), opposed the application for
registration on the following grounds, among others:
that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the
land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior
thereto; that the muniment/s of title and/or the tax
declaration/s and tax payments/receipts of
applicants, if any, attached to or alleged in the
Republic of the Philippines
application, do/es not constitute competent and
SUPREME COURT
sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the
Manila
land applied for or of their open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
THIRD DIVISION in the concept of owner, since June 12, 1945 or
prior thereto; that the parcel of land applied for is a
G.R. No. 170757               November 28, 2011 portion of public domain belonging to the Republic,
which is not subject to private appropriation; and
PACIFICO M. VALIAO, for himself and in behalf that the present action is barred by a previous final
of his co-heirs LODOVICO, RICARDO, judgment in a cadastral case prosecuted between
BIENVENIDO, all Surnamed VALIAO and the same parties and involving the same parcel of
NEMESIO M. GRANDEA, Petitioners, land.
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, MACARIO On July 3, 1989, the RTC denied private oppositors'
ZAFRA, and MANUEL YUSAY, Respondents, Motion to Dismiss. Trial thereafter ensued.

DECISION In support of their application for registration,

PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to set aside the Decision1 and
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 54811, which reversed the Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan, Negros
Occidental, Branch 61, in Land Registration Case
No. 03, granting petitioners' application for
petitioners alleged that they acquired the subject
property in 1947, upon the death of their uncle
Basilio Millarez (Basilio), who purchased the land
from a certain Fermin Payogao, pursuant to a Deed
of Sale5 dated May 19, 1916 entirely handwritten in
Spanish language. Basilio possessed the land in
question from May 19, 1916 until his death in 1947.
Basilio's possession was open, continuous,
peaceful, adverse, notorious, uninterrupted and in
the concept of an owner. Upon Basilio's death, the
applicants as co-heirs possessed the said land until
1966, when oppositor Zafra unlawfully and violently
dispossessed them of their property, which
compelled them to file complaints of Grave Coercion
and Qualified Theft against Zafra. In support of their
claim of possession over the subject property,
petitioners submitted in evidence Tax Declaration
No. 95626 dated September 29, 1976 under the
names of the heirs of Basilio Millarez.
The RTC, in its Decision dated December 15, 1995,
granted petitioners' application for registration of the
subject property, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court
hereby orders and decrees registration of Lot No.
2372 subject of the present proceedings and the
registration of title thereto, in favor of the applicants,
who are declared the true and lawful owners of said
Lot No. 2372, except applicant Lodovico Valiao,
who sold his right to Macario Zafra.
Upon the finality of this decision, let the
corresponding decree of registration and Certificate
of Title be issued in the name of the applicants,
Heirs of Basilio Millarez, namely: Pacifico Valiao,
Ricardo Valiao, Bienvenido Valiao and Nemesio
Grandea, subject to the rights of private oppositors,
Macario Zafra and Manuel Yusay over said lot
whose fishpond permits are declared VALID and will
expire on December 31, 2003.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved by the Decision, the private oppositors
and the Republic, through Assistant Prosecutor
Josue A. Gatin, filed an appeal with the CA, which
reversed the trial court's findings in its Decision
dated June 23, 2005. The CA ruled that the
classification of lands of the public domain is an
exclusive prerogative of the executive department of
the government and in the absence of such
classification, the lands remain as unclassified until
it is released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition. Further, there exists a prior cadastral
case involving the same parties herein and the
same Lot No. 2372, which ruled that Lot No. 2372
belongs to the Republic. The CA held that such
judgment constitutes res judicata that bars a
subsequent action for land registration. It also ruled
that the subject property is part of the inalienable
land of the public domain and petitioners failed to
prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the land in question since
June 12, 1945 or earlier. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, We REVERSE
the Decision dated December 15, 1995 of the
Regional Trial Court, DENY the application for
registration of title filed by petitioners-appellees,
DECLARE as moot and academic any and all
claims of private oppositors-appellants over Lot No.
2372, and DECLARE the subject parcel of land to
be inalienable and indisposable land belonging to
the public domain.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which
was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated
November 17, 2005. Hence, the present petition
with the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT LOT NO. 2372 OF THE ILOG
CADASTRE IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE
LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE CLAIM OF
PRESCRIPTION BY THE APPLICANT WILL LIE
ON LOT NO. 2372.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS IN CAD. CASE NO. 23,
ENTITLED LODOVICO VALIAO, ET, AL., VS.
MACARIO ZAFRA, ET, AL., AC G.R. NO. CV-
68873, CONSTITUTES RES JUDICATA AS FAR
AS THIS APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION IS
CONCERNED.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED
POSSESSION OF THE APPLICANTS THROUGH
THEIR PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST IS
SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THEIR CLAIM FOR
PRESCRIPTION.9
Petitioners claim that Lot No. 2372 is an alienable
and disposable portion of the public domain. The
possession of applicants' predecessors-in interest
since 1916 until 1966 had been open, continuous
and uninterrupted; thus, converting the said land
into a private land. The subject lot had already
become private in character in view of the length of
time the applicants and their predecessors-in-
interest had possessed the subject lot, which
entitles them to the confirmation of their title.
Petitioners further claim that prior dismissal in a
cadastral proceeding does not constitute res
judicata in a subsequent application for registration
of a parcel of land.
In its Comment, the OSG submits that the issues to
be resolved in the present petition, i.e., whether Lot
No. 2372 is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain and whether petitioners have the right
to have the said property registered in their name
through prescription of time are questions of fact,
which were already passed upon by the CA and no
longer reviewable by the Court, since findings of fact
of the CA, when supported by sufficient evidence,
are conclusive and binding on the parties. The OSG
further claims that petitioners failed to prove that the
subject lot is part of the alienable and disposable
portion of the public domain and that petitioners'
application for land registration is already barred by
a prior decision in a cadastral case. Lastly, the OSG
asserts that petitioners did not present sufficient
evidence to prove that their possession over the
subject lot applied for had been open, peaceful,
exclusive, continuous and adverse.
Anent the propriety of filing a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the principle is
well-established that this Court is not a trier of facts
and that only questions of law may be raised. The
resolution of factual issues is the function of the
lower courts whose findings on these matters are
received with respect and are, as a rule, binding on
this Court. This rule, however, is subject to certain
exceptions. One of these is when the findings of the
appellate court are contrary to those of the trial
court.10 Due to the divergence of the findings of the
CA and the RTC, the Court will now re-examine the
facts and evidence adduced before the lower courts.
Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. (PD)
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons
may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly-authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
From the foregoing, petitioners need to prove that:
(1) the land forms part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they,
by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership
from June 12, 1945 or earlier.11 These the
petitioners must prove by no less than clear,
positive and convincing evidence.12
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in
our Constitution, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, which is the source of any
asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public
lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land or alienated
to a private person by the State remain part of the
inalienable public domain.13 Unless public land is
shown to have been reclassified as alienable or
disposable to a private person by the State, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Property of the public domain is beyond the
commerce of man and not susceptible of private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription.
Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no
matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title.14 The burden of proof in
overcoming the presumption of State ownership of
the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration (or claiming ownership),
who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome
this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application
(or claim) is alienable or disposable.15
There must be a positive act declaring land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable. To
prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, the applicant must establish
the existence of a positive act of the government,
such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports
of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative
act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a
certification from the government that the land
claimed to have been possessed for the required
number of years is alienable and disposable.16
No such evidence was offered by the petitioners to
show that the land in question has been classified
as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence
to prove that the subject property is already
classified as alienable and disposable, we must
consider the same as still inalienable public
domain.17 Verily, the rules on the confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply unless and until the land
subject thereof is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of
the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain.
1âwphi1
With respect to the existence of a prior cadastral
case, it appears that on July 11, 1966, the
petitioners filed in Cadastral Case No. 23 of the then
CFI of Negros Occidental a petition to reopen the
proceedings relative to three lots, one of which is
Lot No. 2372. The lower court, in its Order 18 dated
October 20, 1980, held that Lot No. 2372 belongs to
the Republic. It found that after the subject lot was
declared public land, it was found to be inside the
communal forest. On appeal, the CA, in its
Decision19 dated August 7, 1984, found no
reversible error and affirmed the decision of the
cadastral court. Thereafter, a petition elevating the
case to this Court was dismissed for lack of
merit.20 In the present case, the CA, in its Decision
dated June 23, 2005, ruled that such judgment
constitutes res judicata that will bar a subsequent
action for land registration on the same land.
In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court
held that a judicial declaration that a parcel of land
is public, does not preclude even the same
applicant from subsequently seeking a judicial
confirmation of his title to the same land, provided
he thereafter complies with the provisions of Section
4822 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended,
and as long as said public lands remain alienable
and disposable. In the case at bar, not only did the
petitioners fail to prove that the subject land is part
of the alienable and disposable portion of the public
domain, they failed to demonstrate that they by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have possessed and occupied the subject land
since June 12, 1945 or earlier as mandated by the
law.
It is settled that the applicant must present proof of
specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim
and cannot just offer general statements which are
mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of
possession.23 Actual possession consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
nature as a party would actually exercise over his
own property.24
The testimonies of Nemesio and Pacifico as to their
own and their predecessors-in-interest's possession
and ownership over the subject lot fail to convince
Us. Petitioners claim that Basilio was in possession
of the land way back in 1916. Yet no tax declaration
covering the subject property, during the period
Basilio allegedly occupied the subject property, i.e.,
1916 to 1947, was presented in evidence. Other
than the bare allegations of Nemesio and Pacifico
that Basilio allegedly introduced improvements on
the subject property, there is nothing in the records
which would substantiate petitioners' claim that
Basilio was in possession of Lot No. 2372 since
June 12, 1945 or earlier, the period of possession
required by law. Hence, petitioners' assertion that
Basilio possessed the property in question from
1916 to 1947 is, at best, conjectural and self-
serving.
As regards petitioners' possession of the land in
question from 1947 to 1966, petitioners could only
support the same with a tax declaration dated
September 29, 1976. At best, petitioners can only
prove possession since said date. What is required
is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious
possession by petitioners and their predecessors-in-
interest, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.25 Petitioners failed to
explain why, despite their claim that their
predecessors-in-interest have possessed the
subject properties in the concept of an owner even
before June 12, 1945, it was only in 1976 that they
started to declare the same for purposes of taxation.
Moreover, tax declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to
possess land when not supported by any other
evidence. The disputed property may have been
declared for taxation purposes in the names of the
applicants for registration, or of their predecessors-
in-interest, but it does not necessarily prove
ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of
ownership.26
Evidently, since the petitioners failed to prove that
(1) the subject property was classified as part of the
disposable and alienable land of the public domain;
and (2) they and their predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation thereof under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier, their application for confirmation and
registration of the subject property under PD 1529
should be denied.
WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54811, which
reversed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, Branch 61, in Land
Registration Case No. 03, is AFFIRMED. The
application for registration of title filed by the
petitioners Pacifico Valiao, Lodovico Valiao, Ricardo
Valiao, Bienvenido Valiao, and Nemesio Grandea,
over Lot No. 2372, with a total area of 504,535
square meters, more or less, situated in Barrio
Galicia, Municipality of Ilog, Negros Occidental,
is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
JOSE CATRAL
ROBERTO A. ABAD
MENDOZA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision On January 19, 2001, petitioner DCD Construction,
had been reached in consultation before the case Inc., through its President and CEO Danilo D. Dira,
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Jr., filed a verified application for registration4 of a
Court’s Division. parcel of land situated in Taytay, Danao City with an
area of 4,493 square meters designated as
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Cadastral Lot No. 5331-part, CAD 681-D. It was
Associate Justice alleged that applicant which acquired the property
Third Division, Chairperson by purchase, together with its predecessors-in-
interest, have been in continuous, open, adverse,
CERTIFICATION public, uninterrupted, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the property for more
than thirty (30) years. Thus, petitioner prayed to
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
have its title judicially confirmed.
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation After compliance with the jurisdictional
before the case was assigned to the writer of the requirements, the trial court through its clerk of court
opinion of the Court’s Division. conducted hearings for the reception of petitioner’s
evidence. Based on petitioner’s documentary and
testimonial evidence, it appears that although
RENATO C. CORONA
designated as Cadastral Lot No. 5331-part, the
Chief Justice
approved technical description indicated the lot
number as Lot 30186, CAD 681-D which is allegedly
identical to Lot 21225-A, Csd-07-006621 consisting
of 3,781 square meters. Lot 5331-part (4,493 sq.
ms.) was subdivided into two (Lots 21225-A and
21225-B) so that the 712 square meters (Lot 21225-
B) can be segregated as salvage zone pursuant to
DENR Administrative Order No. 97-05.5

Andrea Batucan Enriquez, one of the six (6) children

of Vivencio and Paulina Batucan, testified that her
parents originally owned the subject land which was
bought by her father after the Second World War.
Vivencio and Paulina died on April 2, 1967 and
November 11, 1980, respectively. Upon the death of
their parents, she and her siblings inherited the land
Republic of the Philippines which they possessed and declared for tax
SUPREME COURT purposes. On December 22, 1993, they executed a
Manila Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement With Absolute Sale
whereby they sold the property to Danilo C. Dira,
FIRST DIVISION Sr., petitioner’s father.6

G.R. No. 179978               August 31, 2011 Danilo D. Dira, Jr. testified that the subject land
declared under Tax Declaration (TD) No. 0400583
DCD CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner, in the name of Danilo C. Dira, Sr. was among those
vs. properties which they inherited from his father, as
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. shown in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate With
Special Power of Attorney dated May 28, 1996 and
DECISION Supplemental Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
dated February 27, 1997. On June 26, 2000, his
mother, brothers and sisters executed a Deed of
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Absolute Sale whereby the subject land was sold to
petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner declared the
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari property for tax purposes and also paid realty taxes.
under Rule 45 which seeks to set aside the His father had possessed the land beginning 1992
Decision1 dated June 25, 2007 and or 1994, and presently petitioner is in possession
Resolution2 dated September 10, 2007 of the Court thereof. Petitioner also assumed the ₱3.8 million
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77868. The CA mortgage obligation with Land Bank of the
reversed the Decision3 dated August 22, 2002 of the Philippines as evidenced by the Deed of
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Danao City, Branch Undertaking/Agreement dated March 30, 2000.7
25 in LRC No. 147 (LRA Rec. No. N-73333).
On August 22, 2002, the trial court rendered its
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, from all of the foregoing undisputed
facts, this Court finds and so holds that the applicant
DCD CONSTRUCTION INC., has a registerable title
to Lot No. 5331-A with an area of 3,781 square
meters as part of Lot 5331, CAD-681-D, under Csd-
072223-003891 which is identical to Lot No. 21225-
A as part of Lot No. 21225, CAD-681-D, under Csd-
07-006621, and is covered by Tax Declaration No.
0-0400469 situated in Taytay, Danao City, hereby
confirming the same and ordering its registration
under Act 496, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1529, strictly in line with the Technical
Description of Lot 30186, Danao, CAD-681-D,
identical to Lot 21225-A, Csd-07-006621, upon
finality of this decision.
SO ORDERED.8
On appeal by respondent Republic of the
Philippines, the CA reversed the trial court. The CA
ruled that the evidence failed to show that the land
applied for was alienable and disposable
considering that only a notation in the survey plan
was presented to show the status of the property.
The CA also found that petitioner’s evidence was
insufficient to establish the requisite possession as
the land was bought by Vivencio Batucan only after
the Second World War or in 1946, further noting that
the earliest tax declaration submitted was issued
only in 1988. As to the testimony of witness Andrea
Batucan Enriquez, the CA held that it did not prove
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied,
petitioner is now before this Court raising the
following arguments:
I rule, undertake a re-examination of the evidence
IN RULING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO
PROVE THAT THE LAND APPLIED FOR IS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE, THE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED A GROSS
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, WHICH
WARRANTS A REVIEW BY THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
RULING IN MEGAWORLD AND HOLDINGS, INC.
VS. HON. JUDGE BENEDICTO G. COBARDE, ET
AL. AND SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION
COMPANY, INC. VS. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, ET AL.
(A) THE BUREAU OF LANDS VERIFIED AND
CERTIFIED THE SUBJECT LOT AS "ALIENABLE
AND DISPOSABLE".
(B) THE DENR CERTIFIED THAT ITS OWN LAND
CLASSIFICATION MAP SHOWS THAT SUBJECT
LOT IS "WITHIN THE ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE AREA".
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED THE CASE
IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
SETTLED DECISION OF THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT, WHEN IT RULED THAT
PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE
REQUIREMENT OF OPEN, CONTINUOUS,
EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION
AND OCCUPATION OF THE SUBJECT LAND FOR
THE PERIOD REQUIRED BY LAW HAS BEEN
COMPLIED WITH, DESPITE THE FACT THAT:
(A) WITNESS ANDREA ENRIQUEZ’S TESTIMONY
SHOWS THAT PETITIONER’S PREDECESSORS-
IN-INTEREST ACQUIRED AND POSSESSED
SUBJECT LOT IN 1942.
(B) IN REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. VS. SPOUSES
ENRIQUEZ, THE SUPREME COURT
CATEGORICALLY RULED THAT POSSESSION
FOR 34 YEARS IS SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE
WITH THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT FOR
REGISTRATION.9
We deny the petition.
In Megaworld Properties and Holdings, Inc. v.
Cobarde,10 the Court held that as an exception to
the binding effect of the trial court’s factual findings
which were affirmed by the CA, a review of such
factual findings may be made when the judgment of
the CA is premised on a misapprehension of facts
or a failure to consider certain relevant facts that
would lead to a completely different conclusion. In
the same vein, we declared in Superlines
Transportation Company, Inc. v. Philippine National
Construction Company,11 that while it is settled that
this Court is not a trier of facts and does not, as a
presented by the parties, a number of exceptions
have nevertheless been recognized by the Court,
such as when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts, and when the CA
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.
Petitioner invokes the foregoing exceptions urging
this Court to pass upon anew the CA’s findings
regarding the status of the subject land and
compliance with the required character and duration
of possession by an applicant for judicial
confirmation of title.
After a thorough review, we find no reversible error
committed by the CA in ruling that petitioner failed to
establish a registrable title on the subject land.
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must
prove the following: (a) that the land forms part of
the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of
the public domain and (b) that they have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same under a
bona fide claim of ownership either since time
immemorial or since June 12, 1945.12
Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,
which embodies the Regalian doctrine, all lands of
the public domain belong to the State – the source
of any asserted right to ownership of land. 13 All lands
not appearing to be clearly of private dominion
presumptively belong to the State.14 Accordingly,
public lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable and disposable agricultural
land or alienated to a private person by the State
remain part of the inalienable public
domain.15 Incontrovertible evidence must
presented to establish that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable.16
In support of its contention that Lot 5331-A, CAD-
681-D under Csd-072223-003891 is alienable and
disposable, petitioner presented the following
notation appearing in the survey plan which reads:
CONFORMED PER LC MAP NOTATION
LC Map No. 1321, Project No. 26-A certified on
June 07, 1938, verified to be within Alienable &
Disposable Area
(SGD.) CYNTHIA L. IBAÑEZ
Chief, Map Projection Section17
Petitioner assailed the CA in refusing to give weight
to the above certification, stressing that the DENR-
Lands Management Services (LMS) approved the
survey plan in its entirety, "without any reservation
as to the ‘inaccuracy’ or ‘incorrectness’ of Cynthia L.
Ibañez’[s] annotation found therein."18 Petitioner
relies on the statement of Rafaela A. Belleza, Chief,
Surveys Assistance Section, DENR-LMS, who
testified (direct examination) as follows:
Atty. Paylado continues:
Q Before this is given to the surveyor, did these two
(2) documents pass your office?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you said it passed your office, it passed
your office as you have to verify all the entries in
these documents whether they are correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Were you able to have a personal look and
verification on these Exhibits "P" and "Q" and will
you confirm that all the entries here are true and
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Based on the records in your office?
A As a whole.
x x x x19 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner contends that the foregoing declaration of
Belleza conclusively proves that the LMS itself had
approved and adopted the notation made by Ibañez
on the survey plan as its own. Such approval
amounts to a positive act of the government
indicating that the land applied for is indeed
alienable and disposable.
be
We do not agree.
First, it must be clarified that the survey plan (Exhibit
"Q") was not offered by petitioner as evidence of the
land’s classification as alienable and disposable.
The formal offer of exhibits stated that said
document and entries therein were offered for the
purpose of proving the identity of the land, its metes
and bounds, boundaries and adjacent lots; and that
the survey has passed and was approved by the
DENR-LMS. And while it was also stated therein
that the evidence is also being offered as part of the
testimony of Belleza, nowhere in her testimony do
we find a confirmation of the notation concerning the
land’s classification as correct. In fact, said witness
denied having any participation in the actual
approval of the survey plan. This can be gleaned
from her testimony on cross-examination which
immediately followed the afore-quoted portion of her
testimony that the survey plan "passed" their office,
thus:
CROSS-EXAMINATION: (FISCAL KYAMKO TO
THE WITNESS)
Q Madam Witness, you said that Exhibits "P" and
"Q" passed before your office, now, the question is,
could you possibly inform the Court whether you
have some sort of an initial on the two (2)
documents or the two (2) exhibits?
A Actually, sir, I am not a part of this approval
because this will undergo in the isolated survey and
my section is I am the Chief, Surveys Assistant
Section, which concerns of the LRA, issuance of
Certified Sketch Plans, issuance of certified
Technical Descriptions of Untitled Lots to correct the
titles for judicial purpose.
Q In other words, since Exhibits "P" and "Q" are
originals, they did not actually pass your office, is it
not?
A Our office, yes, but not in my section, sir.
Q So it passed your office but it did not pass your
section?
A Yes, sir.
Q In other words, you had [no] hand in re-naming or
renumbering of the subject lots, is it not?
A It is in the Isolated Survey Section, sir.
Q In other words, you cannot possibly testify with
authority as to the manner by which the numbering
of the subject lot was renumbered, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
x x x x20 (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the testimony of the officer from DENR-
LMS, Rafaela Belleza, did not at all attest to the
veracity of the notation made by Ibañez on the
survey plan regarding the status of the subject land.
Hence, no error was committed by the CA in finding
that the certification made by DENR-LMS pertained
only to the technical correctness of the survey
plotted in the survey plan and not to the nature and
character of the property surveyed.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 21 this Court noted
that to prove that the land subject of an application
for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or
an executive order; and administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.22 A
certification issued by a Community Environment
and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) stating
that the lots involved were found to be within the
alienable and disposable area was deemed
sufficient to show the real character of the land.23
As to notations appearing in the subdivision plan of
the lot stating that it is within the alienable and
disposable area, the consistent holding is that these
do not constitute proof required by the law.24 In
Menguito v. Republic,25 the Court declared:
x x x petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s
notation x x x indicating that the survey was inside
alienable and disposable land. Such notation does
not constitute a positive government act validly
changing the classification of the land in question.
Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to
reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying
solely on the said surveyor’s assertion, petitioners
have not sufficiently proven that the land in question
has been declared alienable.26
The above ruling equally applies in this case where
the notation on the survey plan is supposedly made
by the Chief of Map Projection Unit of the DENR-
LMS. Such certification coming from an officer of the
DENR-LMS is still insufficient to establish the
classification of the property surveyed. It is not
shown that the notation was the result of an
investigation specifically conducted by the DENR-
LMS to verify the status of the subject land. The
certifying officer, Cynthia L. Ibañez, did not testify on
her findings regarding the classification of the lot as
reflected in her notation on the survey plan. As to
the testimonial evidence presented by the petitioner,
the CA noted that Engr. Norvic Abella who prepared
the survey plan had no authority to reclassify lands
of the public domain, while Rafaela A. Belleza who
is the Chief of the Surveys Assistance Section,
admitted on cross-examination that she had no part
in the approval of the subdivision plan, and hence
incompetent to testify as to the correctness of
Ibañez’s notation. More important, petitioner failed
to establish the authority of Cynthia L. Ibañez to
issue certifications on land classification status for
purpose of land registration proceedings.
Our pronouncement in Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc.27 is instructive:
In this case, respondent submitted two certifications
issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). The 3 June 1997
Certification by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Offices (CENRO), Batangas
City, certified that "lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas
Cadastre situated at Barangay San Bartolome, Sto.
Tomas, Batangas with an area of 596,116 square
meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project No. 30, Land
Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31
December 1925." The second certification in the
form of a memorandum to the trial court, which was
issued by the Regional Technical Director, Forest
Management Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR),
stated "that the subject area falls within an alienable
and disposable land, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas,
Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No.
582."
The certifications are not sufficient. DENR
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20, dated 30 May
1988, delineated the functions and authorities of the
offices within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series
of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land
classification status for areas below 50 hectares.
The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land
classification status for lands covering over 50
hectares. DAO No. 38, dated 19 April 1990,
amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38,
series of 1990 retained the authority of the CENRO
to issue certificates of land classification status for
areas below 50 hectares, as well as the authority of
the PENRO to issue certificates of land
classification status for lands covering over 50
hectares. In this case, respondent applied for
registration of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot
10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square
meters). The CENRO certificate covered the entire
Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters
which, as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is
beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as
alienable and disposable.
The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has
no authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue
certificates of land classification. x x x
xxxx
Hence, the certification issued by the Regional
Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a
memorandum to the trial court, has no probative
value.
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO
to certify that a land is alienable and disposable.
The applicant for land registration must prove that
the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, and that the
land subject of the application for registration falls
within the approved area per verification through
survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the
applicant for land registration must present a copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. These facts must
be established to prove that the land is alienable
and disposable. Respondent failed to do so
because the certifications presented by respondent
do not, by themselves, prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondent’s Operations Manager,
identified the certifications submitted by respondent.
The government officials who issued the
certifications were not presented before the trial
court to testify on their contents. The trial court
should not have accepted the contents of the
certifications as proof of the facts stated therein.
Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued
and admissible in evidence, they have no probative
value in establishing that the land is alienable and
disposable.
xxxx
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of
public documents referred to in Section 19(a), when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested
by the officer having legal custody of the record,
or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the
official repository or legal custodian of the issuances
of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as
alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have
attached an official publication of the DENR
Secretary’s issuance declaring the land alienable
and disposable.
xxxx
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-
DENR, certifications do not fall within the class of
public documents contemplated in the first sentence
of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not
reflect "entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer," such as
entries made by the Civil Registrar in the books of
registries, or by a ship captain in the ship’s logbook.
The certifications are not the certified copies or
authenticated reproductions of original official
records in the legal custody of a government office.
The certifications are not even records of public
documents. The certifications are conclusions
unsupported by adequate proof, and thus have no
probative value. Certainly, the certifications cannot
be considered prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-
DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B
falls within the alienable and disposable land as
proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such
government certifications do not, by their mere
issuance, prove the facts stated therein. Such
government certifications may fall under the class of
documents contemplated in the second sentence of
Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications
are prima facie evidence of their due execution and
date of issuance but they do not constitute prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
x x x x28 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the light of the foregoing, it is clear that the
notation inserted in the survey plan (Exhibit "Q")
hardly satisfies the incontrovertible proof required by
law on the classification of land applied for
registration.
The CA likewise correctly held that there was no
compliance with the required possession under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.
The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public,
peaceful and in concept of owner," are mere
conclusions of law requiring evidentiary support and
substantiation. The burden of proof is on the
applicant to prove by clear, positive and convincing
evidence that the alleged possession was of the
nature and duration required by law.29 The bare
statement of petitioner’s witness, Andrea Batucan
Enriquez, that her family had been in possession of
the subject land from the time her father bought it
after the Second World War does not suffice.
Moreover, the tax declaration in the name of MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
petitioner’s father, TD No. 0400583 was issued only Associate Justice
in 1994, while TD No. 0-0400469 in its own name
was issued in 2000. Petitioner’s predecessors-in- WE CONCUR:
interest were able to submit a tax declaration only
for the year 1988, which was long after both RENATO C. CORONA
spouses Vivencio and Paulina Batucan have died. Chief Justice
Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of Chairperson
property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in
TERESITA J.
the concept of owner.30 And while Andrea Batucan
Enriquez claimed knowledge of their family’s LEONARDO-DE LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
possession since she was just ten (10) years old –
CASTRO Associate Justice
although she said she was born in 1932 -- there was
no clear and convincing evidence of such open, Associate Justice
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership. She never
mentioned any act of occupation, development, MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
cultivation or maintenance over the property Associate Justice
throughout the alleged length of possession. 31 There
was no account of the circumstances regarding their CERTIFICATION
father’s acquisition of the land, whether their father
introduced any improvements or farmed the land, Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987
and if they established residence or built any house Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
thereon. above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the
We have held that the bare claim of the applicant opinion of the Court’s Division.
that the land applied for had been in the possession
of her predecessor-in-interest for 30 years does not RENATO C. CORONA
constitute the "well-nigh inconvertible" and Chief Justice
"conclusive" evidence required in land
registration.32 
1avvphi1

As the Court declared in Republic v. Alconaba:33

The law speaks of possession and occupation.

Since these words are separated by the
conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not
to make one synonymous with the other.
Possession is broader than occupation because it
includes constructive possession. When, therefore,
the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit
the all-encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word
occupation serves to highlight the fact that for
an applicant to qualify, his possession must not
be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land
consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as a party
would naturally exercise over his own
property.34 (Emphasis supplied.)

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is

DENIED. The Decision dated June 25, 2007 and
Resolution dated September 10, 2007 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77868 are
AFFIRMED.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines covered by any certificate of title or any pending
SUPREME COURT case before the RTC of Cebu City. Respondents 12 

Manila also identified the names and complete postal

addresses of the owners of the adjoining lots. 13

FIRST DIVISION
The respondents claimed that they had acquired
G.R. No. 175177               October 24, 2012 ownership over the subject property by way of
purchase from predecessors-in-interest who had
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, been in continuous, open, adverse, public,
vs. uninterrupted, exclusive, and notorious possession
GLORIA JARALVE substituted by ALAN JESS thereof for more than thirty (30) years, or from June
JARALVE DOCUMENTO, JR., EDGARDO 12, 1945.14

JARALVE, SERAFIN UY, JR., SHELLA UY,

NIMFA LAGNADA, PANTALEON SAY A-ANG, In support of their application, respondents
STARG LAD INTERNATIONAL AND submitted the following:
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ANNIE TAN,
TEOTIMO CABARRUBIAS, JESSICA DACLAN, 1. Sepia Plan; 15

MA. EMMA RAMAS, DANILO DEEN, and ERIC

ANTHONY DEEN. Respondents. 2. Blue Print Copy of Survey Plan; 16

DECISION 3. Technical Description of SGS-07-000307; 17

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: 4. Geodetic Engineer’s Certificate (of the survey of

the subject property); 18

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing

1 

the June 28, 2006 Decision and October 27, 2006

2 
5. Certificate of Community Environment and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
3 
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) dated March
No. 78633, which affirmed the November 15, 2002 20, 1996, signed by CENR and Provincial
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
4 
Environmental and Natural Resources (PENR)
20, Cebu City, in Land Registration Case No. 1421- Officers (CENRO Certificate) that the subject
N/LRA Rec. No. N-67272. property is within the alienable and disposable
portion of Lot 18590; 19

On October 22, 1996, Gloria Jaralve, Edgardo 5 

Jaralve, Serafin Uy, Jr., Shella Uy, Nimfa Lagnada, 6. Deeds of Sale; 20

Pantaleon Saya-Ang, Starglad International and

Development Corporation, Annie Tan, Teotimo 7. Tax Clearances; and 21 

Cabarrubias, Jessica Daclan, and Ma. Emma

Ramas filed an Application with Branch 20 of the
6 

8. Department of Environment and Natural

RTC of Cebu City, for the registration in their names
Resources (DENR), Region 7 Certification that
of Lot Sgs-07-000307 (subject property), under
subject property is not covered by any subsisting
Presidential Decree No. 1529. On November 29,
land application. 22

1996 and November 7, 1997, they filed their

Amended and 7 
Second Amended Applications,
8 

respectively, to conform to the procedural The respondents’ application was opposed by the
requirements of the law, as per Order of the RTC,
9  following parties:
and to join Danilo Deen and Eric Anthony Deen as
applicants (for brevity, we will refer to all the
10  1. Gertrudes N. Tabanas-Singson, Lourdes N.
foregoing applicants as respondents). This was Tabanas, Francisco N. Tabanas, Vicente N.
docketed as LRC Case No. 1421-N/LRA Rec. No. Tabanas, Heirs of Enrique N. Tabanas, Heirs of
N-67272. Mercedes N. Tabanas-Raganas, and Heirs of
Primitiva N. Tabanas-Nadera, who claimed that they
In their original and amended applications, owned portions of the subject property, containing
respondents declared that they were the co-owners an area of 406,810 square meters, as described
in fee simple of the subject property, a parcel of land and bounded under Tax Declaration No. 97GR-11-
with an area of 731,380 square meters, belonging to 075-00581, issued in the name of their father
Cadastral Lot 18590, and situated in Barangay Agaton Tabanas; and that they and their
Quiot, City of Cebu, and all the improvements predecessors-in-interest had been in peaceful,
thereon. They alleged that they occupied the subject open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
property and to the best of their knowledge, there possession and occupation of their alleged property
was no mortgage or encumbrance affecting it, and since time immemorial. They prayed that the
no one was in possession thereof. Respondents
11  respondents’ application be dismissed with respect
further averred that the subject property was not to the portion they were claiming, and that their title
be confirmed (Opposition was filed on March 3,
1997).23
2. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Director of Lands, who argued
that: a) neither the respondents nor their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject property since June
12, 1945 or prior thereto; b) that the muniments of
title and/or the tax declarations and tax payment
receipts submitted in evidence appeared to be of
recent vintage and did not constitute competent and
sufficient proof of a bona fide acquisition of the
subject property; c) that the period for an application
based on a Spanish title or grant had already
lapsed; and d) that the subject property was part of
the public domain, which belonged to the State and
not subject to private appropriation (Opposition was
filed on March 4, 1997). 24
3. The Aznar Brothers Realty Co. and Aznar
Enterprises, Inc., that opposed the application
insofar as it might affect the fifteen-hectare portion
they claimed and owned (Opposition was filed on
March 7, 1997). 25
4. Ponciano Tabanas Ybiernas, for himself and for
the other heirs of Esteban Tabanas and Ciriaca
Gabuya, who alleged that he, his co-owners, and
their predecessors-in-interest, had been occupying
portions of the subject property in the concept of
owners, exclusively, openly, continuously, and
peacefully for many years. He prayed that the
respondents’ application for registration be denied
with respect to the portions he and his co-owners
claimed (Opposition was filed on March 10, 1997). 26
5. Rufina and Julia Ragasajo, who contended that
the respondents’ application was without legal basis
as the respondents were not the true owners of the
subject property, which also encroached on their
own land (Opposition was filed on March 10,
1997).27
6. The National Power Corporation (NPC), that
opposed the respondents’ application with respect
to a six-hectare portion of the subject property. NPC
alleged that it was in the process of finalizing with
DENR its permit/grant to occupy as a substation
office, six hectares of the subject property, which
was a public forest land in Antuanga Hills, Quiot,
Pardo, Cebu City. NPC added that the grant of
respondents’ application would cause the
government great prejudice (Opposition was filed on
March 11, 1997). 28
7. Amelia and Delia Dionaldo, who opposed the
respondents’ application on the ground that they
had interests in the subject property (Opposition
was filed on March 11, 1997). 29
8. Jeremias L. Dolino, in his official capacity as
Regional Executive Director of the DENR, Region
VII, Banilad, Mandaue City, who averred that the
subject property fell within Timberland Block 3-C
and was within the Cebu City Reforestation project,
formerly known as the Osmeña Reforestation
Project. Dolino said that there was an implied
30 
admission on the part of the respondents of this
assertion as their predecessors-in-interest had
previously filed a Petition for Reclassification of
Land of the subject property before the DENR.
31 
Dolino added that the CENRO Certificate relied on
by the respondents was discovered to have been
inadvertently and erroneously issued as it was
based on a mistaken projection (Opposition was
filed on April 10, 1997). The CENRO Certificate
32 
was subsequently recalled, cancelled, and revoked
by the Regional Executive Director of DENR via a
Memorandum dated March 12, 1998. 33
During the trial, respondents presented the
testimony of the following witnesses in support of
their application: Estanislao Nacorda, Leoncio
Llamedo, Rodolfo Amancia, Melecio Joboneita,
Regino Gabuya, Constancio Llamedo, Teotimo
Cabarrubias, Andres Alfanta, Efren Binolirao, Sergio
Paran, Gloria Jaralve, Ma. Emma Ramas, Shella Uy
Coca, Danilo Deen, and Edgardo Jaralve. 34
The foregoing witnesses testified on how the
respondents acquired their respective portions of
the subject property and how they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in actual, open,
continuous, exclusive, peaceful, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject property
in the concept of owners since before the war and
for more than 30 years. 35
The respondents also presented Forester III
Anastacio Cabalejo, a duly licensed and registered
forester connected with the CENRO, and Geodetic
Engineer Celso P. Mayol, the CENRO-DENR Chief
of Survey Unit to testify that upon the request of
Carmelina Cuizon, one of the predecessors-in-
interest of the respondents, they, with other
members of the Land Evaluation Party of the
Bureau of Forestry, using Administrative Order No.
4-642 and the Bureau of Forestry Land
Classification Map No. 2124 as references,
conducted an actual survey of Cadastral Lot 18590
on November 4, 1995, and found that the subject
property was within its alienable and disposable
portion. Engineer Mayol further testified that in
36 
connection with the foregoing survey, he had
prepared a plan, which was the subject of the
37 
CENRO Certificate made at its dorsal side.
Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-642 dated July
31, 1957 declared certain portions of the public
domain situated in Cebu City under Project No. 3-C
as alienable and disposable lands. The Bureau of
Forestry Land Classification Map No. 2124 contains
38 
the bearings and distances of the areas in Cebu square meters;
City declared as alienable and disposable lands. 39

10. STARGLAD ……… 82,023

Finding the testimonial and documentary evidence
of the respondents sufficient to show that they had INTERNATIONAL AND square meters;
acquired ownership over the subject property, the DEVELOPMENT
RTC ruled in their favor in its Decision dated
November 15, 2002. The dispositive portion reads: CORPORATION

WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing undisputed ……… 10,000

facts supported by oral and documentary evidence, 11. ANNIE TAN
square meters;
the Court finds and so holds that the applicants
have a registerable title to the parcel of land herein
applied for original registration of title, and thereby 12. TEOTIMO ……… 5,000
confirming the same and ordering its registration CABARRUBIAS square meters;
under CA 141, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1529 over the land, denominated as SGS-07-
000307, in accordance with the respective technical ……… 68,580
13. MA. EMMA RAMAS
descriptions of herein applicants. square meters;

Once this decision becomes final, let the decree and ………10,000
original certificate of title be issued in the names of 14. JESSICA DACLAN
the applicants as follows: square meters. 40

Extent of Interest The RTC held that according to jurisprudence and

Names
in Lot Sgs-07- under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141
(addresses deleted) or the Public Land Act, as amended by Republic Act
000307 No. 1942 and Republic Act No. 3872, "alienable
41  42 

public land held by a possessor personally or

……… 74,940 through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
1. GLORIA JARALVE continuously, and exclusively for the prescribed
square meters;
period of 30 years x x x is converted to private
property by mere lapse or completion of said period
2. EDGARDO ……… 44,700 ipso jure, and without need of judicial or other
JARALVE square meters; sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes
private property."
43

……… 61,210
3. SERAFIN UY, JR. The RTC also granted Starglad International and
square meters; Development Corporation’s application despite the
constitutional prohibition on acquisition of public
……… 62,632 lands of private corporations or associations,
4. SHELLA UY explaining that such prohibition does not apply when
square meters;
the corporation’s predecessors-in-interesthad
satisfied the requirements in acquiring ownership
……… 26,972 over public lands before such land was transferred
5.NIMFA LAGNADA to the corporation. 44
square meters;

The RTC stated that the private oppositors were not

6. PANTALEON SAYA- ……… 44,700
able to present any convincing evidence and/or
ANG square meters; approved survey plan that clearly identified the
portions of the subject property they were
7. ATTY. DANILO claiming. Likewise, the RTC held that the DENR
45 

……… 106,903 Region VII failed to controvert the fact that the
DEEN AND ZENAIDA subject property was within the alienable and
square meters;
DEEN disposable portion of the public domain. The RTC
added that its witnesses did not even conduct an
actual relocation or verification survey of the subject
8. ERIC ANTHONY ……… 110,660
property to determine its relative position to the
DEEN square meters; timberland area. Thus, the RTC stated, the DENR
Region VII’s conclusion with respect to the subject
9. MA. EMMA RAMAS ……… 23,060 property’s position was inaccurate and
unreliable. In giving more credit to respondents’
46 
evidence, particularly the CENRO Certificate, the
RTC explained:
As against the approved plan of [the subject
property] which has been thoroughly verified under
the Land Classification Map No. 2124 (Exhibit J-
NAMRIA) and which merely conformed to the actual
verification/relocation surveys (Exhibits K, K-1) of
the Land Evaluation Party of CENRO and PENRO,
specifically conducted by CENRO Chief of Survey
Unit Engr. Celso Mayol and the Chief of the Land
Evaluation Party Anastacio Cabalejo and Forester
Justicio Nahid (Exhibits L, L-1), the relocation
survey and map prepared by Engineer Icoy are
simply undeserving of any weight. DENR-7
Regional Executive Director Jeremias Dolino and
Director Estanislao Galano of the Regional
Management Services of DENR-7, themselves,
admitted that the task of determining whether a
parcel of land is within the alienable and disposable
area of the public domain falls within the Land
Evaluation Party of the Forest Management
Services of CENRO and PENRO of the DENR. In
this case, the CENRO/PENRO Land Evaluation
Party headed by Forester Anastacio Cabalejo,
together with the Chief of the Survey Unit of
CENRO, Engr. Celso Mayol, actually conducted a
segregation survey of Cadastral Lot 18590 on
November 4, 1995 to determine the alienable and
disposable portion of Cadastral Lot 18590 and on
the ground that they located three (3) Forest
Reserve (FR) monuments marked as FR 67, FR 69
and FR 70. Thus, after the said verification survey, a
survey plan was prepared by Engr. Celso Mayol and
at the back portion thereof, he certified to the
following, x x x.
xxxx
The [CENRO Certificate], having been issued by the
proper government officers tasked with the duty of
certifying as to land classifications in the region, the
same should be given weight and believed,
especially so that the results of the actual ground
survey of
November 4, 1996 were re-verified and re-checked
upon the order of PENRO Isabelo Montejo. 47
The CENRO Certificate relied on by the
respondents and given much weight by the RTC
reads as follows:
Republic of the Philippines
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES
OFFICE
Cebu City
CENRO, Cebu City/Lands Verification
CARMELINA CUIZON, et al. (Cebu City) March 20,
1996
CERTIFICATION
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that per projection and verification
conducted by Forester Anastacio C. Cabalejo, a
tract of land lot No. 18590, Cebu Cadastre 12
Extension, situated at Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City. As
shown and described in the Plan at the back hereof,
as surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Celso P. Mayol
for Carmelina Cuizon, et al. The same was found as
here-under indicated:
Lot A – containing an area of SEVEN HUNDRED
THIRTY-SEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
FIVE (737, 305) square meters, more or less, is
within the Alienable and Disposable, block-1, land
classification project 3-C, per Map 2124 of Cebu
City. Certified under Forestry Administrative Order
No. 4-642 dated July 31, 1957.
Lot B – containing an area of TWO HUNDRED SIX
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY[-]TWO
(206,552) square meters, more or less, is within the
Timberland block-C, land classification project 3-C,
per Map 2124 of Cebu City. Certified under Forestry
Administrative Order No. 4-642 dated July 31, 1957.
This certification is issued upon the request of the
interested party for the purpose of ascertaining the
land classification status only and does not entitle
him/her preferential priority rights of possession until
determined by competent authorities.
[signed] [signed]
ILUMINADO C. LUCAS ISABELO R
Community Environment and Provincial Env
Natural Resources Officer Natural Resources
SWORNSTATEMENT
I, Anastacio C. Cabalejo, forest officer, after having
been duly sworn to under oath according to the law
do hereby depose and say that I personally
projected and verified the area and the result is the
basis of the aforementioned certification.
[signed]
ANASTACIO C. CABALEJO
FORESTER III
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
12[th] day of
April 1996, at Cebu City, Philippines.
[signed]
ILUMINADO C. LUCAS
Community Environment and
Natural Resources Officer 48
Aggrieved, the petitioner and three of the private
oppositors appealed the decision of the RTC to the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78633, positing
the following assignment of errors:
1. Raised by private oppositors Gertrudes N.
Tabanas-Singson, Lourdes N. Tabanas, Francisco
N. Tabanas, and Vicente N. Tabanas (Heirs of
Agaton Tabanas):
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
APPLICANTS HAVE A REGISTERABLE TITLE TO
THE PARCEL OF LAND HEREIN APPLIED FOR
ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF TITLE AND
CONFIRMING THE SAME AND ORDERING ITS
REGISTRATION UNDER CA 141, AS AMENDED
BY P.D. 1529 OVER THE LAND DENOMINATED
AS SGS-07-000307, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
RESPECTIVE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS.
II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
THAT ONCE THE DECISION BECOMES FINAL,
THE DECREE AND ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE BE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF THE
APPLICANTS x x x. 49
2. Raised by petitioner Republic of the Philippines:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GRANTING
RESPONDENTS’APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
AREA COVERED BY THE APPLICATION IS
CLASSIFIED AS TIMBERLAND AND THEREFORE
UNALIENABLE. 50
3. Raised by private oppositors Heirs of Ponciano
Ybiernas:
Error No. 1 – That the trial court erred in disposing
all the area of Lot 18590 to the [respondents], but
none to the oppositors-applicants, contrary to the
Magsaysay Credo: THAT THOSE WHO HAVE
LESS IN LIFE SHOULD HAVE MORE IN LAW;
Error No. 2 – That under Art. 24 of the Civil Code,
judges are enjoined by law to protect the underdog,
which provides as follows:
"Art. 24. In all contractual, property or other
relations, when one of the parties is at a
disadvantage on account of his moral dependence,
ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age
or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his
protection."
Error No. 3 – That none of the respondents have
complied with the requirement as alluded to in Error
No. 1, which is the procurement of a permit from the
government agency in charge of issuance of such
permit, to occupy a public land, duly endorsed by
the DENR official, but PONCIANO YBIERNAS has
duly complied with all the requirements, plus
possession of more than 30 years of the land
applied for by him, and yet PONCIANO YBIERNAS,
the poorest among all the oppositors-applicants,
was not given a single square meter by the trial
court. Hence this shows that money talks. 51
4. Raised by private oppositors Aznar Enterprises,
Inc. and Aznar Brothers Realty Co.:
I.
THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS ERRED
IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE
REGISTRABLE TITLE OVER THE SUBJECT
PARCEL OF LAND DESCRIBED AS LOT SGS-07-
000307, PORTION OF LOT 18590 AND
ORDERING ITS REGISTRATION IN THE NAMES
OF THE APPLICANTS UNDER COMMONWEALTH
ACT NO. 141 AS AMENDED BY PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 1529.
II.
THE LOWER COURT HAS GRAVELY ERRED IN
INCLUDING THE PORTIONS OF 41.2092
HECTARES OF THE LOT WHICH BELONGS TO
THE APPELLANTS AZNAR ENTERPRISES, INC.
AND AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY CO., IN ITS
DECISION AND ORDERING ITS REGISTRATION
IN THE NAMES OF THE RESPONDENTS.
III.
THE LOWER COURT HAS GRAVELY ERRED IN
DENYING THE MOTION FILED BY [THE] AZNARS
DATED MARCH 31, 1998, TO ALLOW THEM TO
RELOCATE THE PORTION THEY CLAIMED OUT
OF THE AREA APPLIED FOR BY THE
RESPONDENTS. 52
Finding for the respondents, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC in its Decision dated June 28,
2006.
The Court of Appeals stated that the private
oppositors failed to prove that the parcels of land
they were claiming were identical to the respective
portions of the subject property the respondents
sought to register.
53
As for the petitioner’s appeal, the Court of Appeals
agreed with the RTC’s findings that the petitioner
failed to controvert the fact that the subject property
was within the alienable and disposable portion of
the public domain. It added that it was a great
blunder that petitioner’s own witness, for his failure
to conduct an actual relocation or verification
survey, could not even categorically identify the
relative position of the subject property to the
timberland area. 54
Undaunted, the Heirs of Agaton Tabanas, Aznar 55 
Enterprises, Inc. and Aznar Brothers Realty
Co., and the petitioner each moved to have the
56  57 
Court of Appeals reconsider its Decision.
The Court of Appeals, however, denied these
motions on October 27, 2006 for lack of merit. 58
The same oppositors filed their separate Petitions
for Review on Certiorari before this Court, to wit:
1. Private oppositors Aznar Enterprises, Inc. and
Aznar Brothers Realty Co.’s Petition for Review on
Certiorari was docketed as G.R. No. 175568 and
was denied by this Court in its February 26, 2007
Resolution for the following reasons:
59 
a. as the petition was filed beyond the extended
period pursuant to Section 5[a], Rule 56;
b. for failure to accompany the petition with a clearly
legible duplicate original, or a certified true copy of
the assailed resolution in violation of Sections 4[d]
and 5, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5[d], Rule 56;
and
c. for insufficient or defective verification, the same
being based "on knowledge and belief" in violation
of Section 4, Rule 7, as amended by Administrative
Matter No. 00-2-10-SC.
In any event, the petition failed to sufficiently show
that the appellate court committed any reversible
error in the challenged decision and resolution as to
warrant the exercise by this Court of its
discretionary appellate jurisdiction and the issues
raised therein are factual in nature.
This Court likewise denied with finality the Motion
for Reconsideration of Aznar Enterprises, Inc. and
60  thoroughly discussed and resolved by the lower
Aznar Brothers Realty Co. in a Resolution dated61  courts.
July 2, 2007.
2. Private oppositors Heirs of Agaton Tabanas’s
Petition for Review on Certiorari was docketed as
62  The crux of the controversy in the case at bar boils
G.R. No. 175397 and in a Resolution dated March
63  down to whether the grant of respondents’
14, 2007, was denied by this Court "for the Heirs’
failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals
committed any reversible error in the challenged
decision and resolution as to warrant the exercise of
this Court’s discretionary appellate jurisdiction," and
for raising issues, which were factual in nature.
This Court similarly denied with finality the Heirs of
Agaton Tabanas’s Motion for Reconsideration in a 64 
Resolution dated June 18, 2007. 65
On October 1, 2007, this Court denied for lack of
merit the Heirs of Agaton Tabanas’s motion to file a
second motion for reconsideration, and added that
no further pleadings would be entertained. 66
The Petition for Review on Certiorari now before us
67 
is the one filed by the petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, which presented the following ground:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A
QUESTION OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
SUBJECT LOTS ARE ALIENABLE LAND DESPITE
THE CLEAR EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY. 68
The petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals
ignored the long-standing rule that in land
registration proceedings, the applicants have the
burden of overcoming the presumption that the land
sought to be registered is inalienable land of the
public domain when it affirmed the RTC’s decision
to grant the respondents’ application for original
registration over the subject property despite their
failure to prove that it was alienable and
disposable. 69
The petitioner argues that the CENRO Certificate
the respondents relied on was erroneously issued;
thus, it did not afford them any vested right. The
petitioner adds: "at any rate, being the government
department charged with the duty to conduct survey
and classification of lands, the DENR’s recall of the
certification that the subject property is alienable
and disposable should have been accorded
respect."70
The respondents, in their Comment, contend that
71 
the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, that the subject property falls within the
alienable and disposable portion of the public
domain, is duly supported by substantial evidence.
Moreover, they asseverate, that the issue posed by
the petitioner is a factual issue, which had been
Issue
application for registration of title to the subject
property was proper under the law and
jurisprudence.
This Court’s Ruling
This Court finds the petition to be meritorious.
Procedural Issue: Nature of Issue
At the outset, this Court would like to address
respondents’ concern that the petition involves an
issue purely factual in nature; thus, it cannot be
subject of a petition for review under Rule 45.
This Court, in New Rural Bank of Guimba (N.E.),
Inc. v. Abad, reiterated the distinction between a
72  xxxx
question of law and a question of fact, viz:
We reiterate the distinction between a question of
law and a question of fact. A question of law exists
when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct
application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of
facts; or when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being
admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt
or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of
facts or when the query invites calibration of the
whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of
the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of
specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their
relation to each other and to the whole, and the
probability of the situation. (Citation omitted.)
The petitioner herein is not calling for an
examination of the probative value or truthfulness of
the evidence presented. What it wants to know is
73  land, whether personally or through their duly
whether the lower courts correctly applied the law
and jurisprudence when they granted the
respondents’ application for registration of title to the
subject property.
Main Issue: Nature and Character of Subject
Property
Going to the merits of the case, this Court agrees
with the petitioner that the respondents failed to
prove in accordance with law that the subject
property is within the alienable and disposable
portion of the public domain.
The Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141,
until this day, is the existing general law governing
the classification and disposition of lands of the
public domain, except for timber and mineral lands.
"Under the Regalian doctrine embodied in our
Constitution, land that has not been acquired from
the government, either by purchase, grant, or any
other mode recognized by law, belongs to the State
as part of the public domain." Thus, it is
74 
indispensable for a person claiming title to a public
land to show that his title was acquired through such
means. 75
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by Presidential Decree No.
1073, provides:
76 
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945,
except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or
the Property Registration Decree, likewise provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. - The following
persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Based on the foregoing parameters, applicants for
registration under Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 must sufficiently establish the
following:
1. that the subject land forms part of the disposable
and alienable lands of the public domain;
2. that the applicant and his predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the
same; and
3. that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
77
Land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. It must be proved. To prove that the
78 
subject property is alienable and disposable land of
the public domain, respondents presented the
CENRO Certificate dated March 20, 1996 signed by
CENR Officer Iluminado C. Lucas and PENR Officer
Isabelo R. Montejo, and verified by Forester
Anastacio C. Cabalejo.
However, this Court, in Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc., ruled that a CENRO or PENRO
79  PENRO. The respondents admit and even
Certification is not enough to certify that a land is
alienable and disposable:
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO
to certify that a land is alienable and disposable.
The applicant for land registration must prove that
the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, and that the
land subject of the application for registration falls
within the approved area per verification through
survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the
applicant for land registration must present a copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. These facts must
be established to prove that the land is alienable
and disposable. Respondent failed to do so
because the certifications presented by respondent
do not, by themselves, prove that the land is
alienable and disposable. (Emphasis ours.)
Although the survey and certification were done in
accordance with Forestry Administrative Order No.
4-642, issued by the then Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources declaring certain portions of
the public domain situated in Cebu City as alienable
and disposable, an actual copy of such
classification, certified as true by the legal custodian
of the official records, was not presented in
evidence. This was a crucial mistake. What was
presented was the certification of Nicomedes R.
80 
Armilla, the Land Evaluation Party Coordinator, that
the Cebu CENRO had on file a certified photocopy
of the administrative order. In fact, one of the private
oppositors objected to its submission in evidence for
violating the best evidence rule. 81
Moreover, DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No.
20 dated May 30, 1988, delineated the functions
82 
and authorities of the offices within the DENR.
Under Section G(1) of the above DAO, CENROs
issue certificates of land classification status for
areas below 50 hectares. For those falling above 50
hectares, the issuance of such certificates is within
the function of the PENROs, as per Section F(1) of
the same DAO. This delineation, with regard to the
offices authorized to issue certificates of land
classification status, was retained in DAO No.
38 dated April 19, 1990.
83  84
In the case at bar, the subject property has an area
of 731,380 square meters or 73.138
hectares.  Clearly, under DAO No. 38, series of
1âwphi1
1990, the subject property is beyond the authority of
the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable. 85
It is undisputed that while PENR Officer Montejo’s
signature appears on the CENRO Certificate, it was
under the CENRO that the survey of the subject
property was conducted. The certificate was
likewise issued under the CENRO, and not the
emphasize that it was the CENRO that was involved
in the conduct of the survey and issuance of the
certification with respect to the land classification
status of the subject property.
In Republic v. Medida, this Court said:
86 
This Court x x x holds that the alienability and
disposability of land are not among the matters that
can be established by mere admissions, or even the
agreement of parties. The law and jurisprudence
provide stringent requirements to prove such fact.
Our Constitution, no less, embodies the Regalian
doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, which is the source of any asserted right
to ownership of land. The courts are then
empowered, as we are duty-bound, to ensure that
such ownership of the State is duly protected by the
proper observance by parties of the rules and
requirements on land registration.
Unfortunately, respondents were not able to
discharge the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the land they sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
The June 28, 2006 Decision and October 27, 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 78633, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
respondents’ application for registration and
issuance of title to Lot SGS-07-000307, Cebu Cad.
12 Extension, Barangay Quiot, Cebu City, in Land
Registration Case No. 1421-N/LRA Rec. No. N-
67272 filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 20 is accordingly DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MARTIN S.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179987               September 3, 2013
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented
by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For our consideration and resolution are the motions
for reconsideration of the parties who both assail the
decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby
we upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA)
denying the application of the petitioners for the
registration of a parcel of land situated in Barangay
Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not
established by sufficient evidence their right to the
registration in accordance with either Section 14(1)
or Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for
registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay
Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as
Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-
square meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant
Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property
from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land
registration covering the property in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming
that the property formed part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that he
and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse
possession and occupation of the land for more
than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial
confirmation of his title.1
To prove that the property was an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan
presented during trial a certification dated June 11,
2001 issued by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated
as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as
surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at
Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of
249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the
Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the
Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification
Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A
and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March
15, 1982.2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered
judgment granting Malabanan’s application for land
registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this
application for registration and thus places under
the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the
lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot
9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One
Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324)
Square Meters, as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this
case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the
name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age,
Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting
Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory,
the corresponding decree of registration shall
forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed
the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan
had failed to prove that the property belonged to the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been
in possession of the property in the manner and for
the length of time required by law for confirmation of
imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its
decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the
application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the
ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA
declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, any period of possession prior
to the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable was inconsequential and should be
excluded from the computation of the period of
possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR
certification stated that the property had been
declared alienable and disposable only on March
15, 1982, Velazco’s possession prior to March 15,
1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing
Malabanan’s period of possession.
Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the
appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CA’s
decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through
a petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit)
remains the controlling doctrine especially if the
property involved is agricultural land. In this regard,
Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land
prior to its declaration as alienable and disposable
could be counted in the reckoning of the period of
possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property
Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in
Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the
land subject of the application for registration as
alienable and disposable should also date back to
June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum
considering that the land registration proceedings
therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio
for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v.
T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6 to support their argument
that the property had been ipso jure converted into
private property by reason of the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession by their
predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the
public domain for more than 30 years. According to
them, what was essential was that the property had
been "converted" into private property through
prescription at the time of the application without
regard to whether the property sought to be
registered was previously classified as agricultural
land of the public domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review
on certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish
by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of
the property on his part and on the part of his
predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners
submit that the mere classification of the land as
alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient
to convert it into patrimonial property of the State.
Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v.
Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification
of the land as alienable or disposable opened it to
acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that
Malabanan had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that
Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been
the real owners of the land with the right to validly
transmit title and ownership thereof; that
consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by
Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, applied in
their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the
application for registration on February 20, 1998, he
had already been in possession of the land for
almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when
the land was declared alienable and disposable by
the State.
The Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in
order to obtain a clarification with reference to the
application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends
that the decision has enlarged, by implication, the
interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It
reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to
registration only when the land subject of the
application had been declared alienable and
disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to
be imperative to discuss the different classifications
of land in relation to the existing applicable land
registration laws of the Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be
classified as either of public dominion or of private
ownership.11 Land is considered of public dominion if
it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs
to the State, without being for public use, and is
intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.12 Land
belonging to the State that is not of such character,
or although of such character but no longer intended
for public use or for public service forms part of the
patrimonial property of the State.13 Land that is other
than part of the patrimonial property of the State,
provinces, cities and municipalities is of private
ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a
legal concept first introduced into the country from
the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies
and the Royal Cedulas,14 all lands of the public
domain belong to the State.15 This means that the
State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land, and is charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land
of the public domain unless the State is shown to
have reclassified or alienated them to private
persons.17
Classifications of public lands
according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is
alienable and disposable primarily rests on the
classification of public lands made under the
Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, 18 lands of
the public domain were classified into three, namely,
agricultural, timber and mineral.19 Section 10, Article
XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the
public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement,
mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land, with the
reservation that the law might provide other
classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the
classification under the 1935 Constitution into
agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added
national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further
classified by law according to the uses to which they
may be devoted.21 The identification of lands
according to their legal classification is done
exclusively by and through a positive act of the
Executive Department.22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a
limit on the type of public land that may be
alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public
domain may be alienated; all other natural
resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into
two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the
State, or those classified as lands of private
ownership under Article 425 of the Civil
Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public
domain, or the public lands as provided by the
Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands
must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands
classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national
parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition
unless they are reclassified as agricultural.24 A
positive act of the Government is necessary to
enable such reclassification,25 and the exclusive
prerogative to classify public lands under existing
laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in
the courts.26 If, however, public land will be classified
as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or
national park, or when public land is no longer
intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the
land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration
of such conversion must be made in the form of a
law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the
Executive Department exercises its prerogative to
classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the
President declares that the State no longer intends
the land to be used for public service or for the
development of national wealth, the Regalian
Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141)
provides the manner by which alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, i.e.,
agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and
not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper
interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly
requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
applications for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used
the words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain" to
clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e.,
mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and
lands of patrimonial or private ownership, are
outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What
the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the
descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable"
further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only
the agricultural lands of the public domain as set
forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under
the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the
following requirements in order for his application to
come under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree,28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his
predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and
occupation of the property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken
place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be
an agricultural land of the public domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive
Department is vested with the authority to classify
lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the
land subject of the application for registration must
have been already classified as agricultural land of
the public domain in order for the provision to apply.
Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified
as agricultural land of the public domain, the
Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the
presumption that the land is alienable and
disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on
the requirement that the classification required by
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification
or reclassification of a public land as agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or
reclassification of the land as alienable and
disposable agricultural land should likewise have
been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because
any possession of the land prior to such
classification or reclassification produced no legal
effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12,
1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by
mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social
policy concerns, and insisted that the full legislative
intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945
as the reckoning point of the requisite possession
and occupation was the sole prerogative of
Congress, the determination of which should best
be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that
said date qualified the period of possession and
occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be
associated with the fixing of the date of June 12,
1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only
the plain and literal meaning of the law as written by
the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed
no requirement that the land subject of the
registration should have been classified as
agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such,
the applicant’s imperfect or incomplete title is
derived only from possession and occupation since
June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the
character of the property subject of the application
as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain determines its eligibility for land
registration, not the ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either
personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively during the
prescribed statutory period is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of the
period.29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine,
corporations may now acquire lands of the public
domain for as long as the lands were already
converted to private ownership, by operation of law,
as a result of satisfying the requisite period of
possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.30 It is
for this reason that the property subject of the
application of Malabanan need not be classified as
alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain for the entire duration of the requisite
period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land
should have been classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land at the time of the
application for registration is necessary only to
dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and
disposable also serves to determine the point at
which prescription may run against the State. The
imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is
acquired by reason of the applicant’s possession
and occupation of the alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the
necessary requirements for a grant by the
Government are complied with through actual
physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public
possession of an alienable and disposable land of
the public domain, the possessor is deemed to have
acquired by operation of law not only a right to a
grant, but a grant by the Government, because it is
not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in
order that such a grant be sanctioned by the
courts.31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the
Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to
unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino
citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation
thereof for the number of years prescribed by
law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should always
bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a
fairly recent legislative development bears out,
when Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act
No. 10023)33 in order to liberalize stringent
requirements and procedures in the adjudication of
alienable public land to qualified applicants,
particularly residential lands, subject to area
limitations.34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no
longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth by declaration of
Congress or the President, thereby converting such
land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the
applicable provision concerning disposition and
registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.35 As such, prescription can now run against
the State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules
relative to the disposition of public land or lands of
the public domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian
Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to
the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not
clearly under private ownership are also presumed
to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be
alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general
rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are
rendered alienable and disposable through any of
the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11
of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of
the application needs only to be classified as
alienable and disposable as of the time of the
application, provided the applicant’s possession and
occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945,
or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that
the applicant has performed all the conditions
essential to a government grant arises,36 and the
applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of
an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the
land has already ceased to be part of the public
domain and has become private property.37
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently
classified or declared as no longer intended for
public use or for the development of national wealth
are removed from the sphere of public dominion and
are considered converted into patrimonial lands or
lands of private ownership that may be alienated or
disposed through any of the modes of acquiring
ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of
acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or
extraordinary, proof that the land has been already
converted to private ownership prior to the requisite
acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine
qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil
Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present
sufficient evidence to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of
the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the
requisite character and period of possession -
possession and occupation that is open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or
earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure
converted to private property even upon the
subsequent declaration of it as alienable and
disposable. Prescription never began to run against
the State, such that the land has remained ineligible
for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to
be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree unless
Congress enacts a law or the President issues a
proclamation declaring the land as no longer
intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration and the respondent's
Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. PRESBITERO J.
CARPIO VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

I submitted my vote
joining the Separate
In the Result: See
Opinion of Justice
Separate Opinion
Brion
ARTURO D.
TERESITA J.
BRION
LEONARDO-DE
Associate Justice
CASTRO
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. MARIANO C. DEL

PERLATA CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. MARTIN S.
ABAD VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL JOSE CATRAL

PEREZ MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M.
BIENVENIDO L.
PERLAS-
REYES
BERNABE
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
See separate concurring and dissenting opinion Manila
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
FIRST DIVISION
CERTIFICATION
G.R. No. 192717               March 12, 2014
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
MINDA S. GAERLAN, Petitioner,
Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
vs.
above Resolution had been reached in consultation
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the court.
DECISION
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, seeking to annul and set aside the
Decision  dated March 11 , 2010 and the
1
Resolution  dated May 20, 2010 of the Court of
2
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00319-MIN. The
CA had reversed and set aside the Judgment  of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofMisamis Oriental,
Branch 20, in LRC No. 92-05 and dismissed the
application for registration of title filed by petitioner
Minda S. Gaerlan.
The records bear out the following
antecedents:
On April 10, 1992, petitioner filed an Application  for
original registration of title over a parcel of land
known as Lot 18793, Cad-237 of Cagayan
Cadastre, with an area of 1,061 square meters,
more or less, and particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land situated at Patag, Cagayan de Oro
City. Bounded on the North, by Lot 835, Cag. Cad;
on the East, by Lot No. 4342-A of Subd. Plan; on
the South, by Lot 4342-K of Subd. Plan; and on the
West, by lot 4342-C of Subd. Plan with an area of
ONE THOUSAND SIXTY ONE (1,061) SQUARE
METERS more or less (Lot 4342-B - Sketch Plan).
In her application, petitioner alleged that she
acquired the above-mentioned property from
Mamerta Tan in November 1989 by virtue of a Deed
of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land.  She had the
6 purposes under Tax Declaration No. 36942.
property declared for taxation purposes under her
name and was issued Tax Declaration Nos.
99893  and 05 83 51.  Attached to the application
7 8
are the following documents:
(a) Original Tracing Cloth Plan together with the
three (3) Blue print copies; 9 Cadastral Lot 4342, Case No. 4 situated at Patag,
(b) Technical Description of the parcel of land;
(c) Surveyor's Report of Survey or Surveyor' s
Certificate; 11
(d) Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered
Land;  and
12
(e) Tax Declaration No. 99893. 13
After finding petitioner's application sufficient in form
and substance, the trial court set the case for initial
hearing.
On August 25, 1992, the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed an Opposition  to petitioner's application for
14
registration on the ground that (1) neither petitioner
nor her predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land since June 12, 1945
or earlier; (2) the muniments of title and tax
declarations attached to the petition do not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a
bona fide acquisition of the subject land; (3) the
claim of ownership based on Spanish title is no
3
longer available for purposes of registration; and (4)
the subject land is a portion of the public domain,
hence, not registrable.
During the hearing, petitioner testified that (1) she is
the applicant for registration of a parcel of land
factual located at Buenavista Village, Carmen, Patag,
Cagayan de Oro City, known as Lot 18793, Cad-
237, Cagayan Cadastre, containing an area of
4 1,061 square meters; (2) that she acquired said land
through sale on November 28, 1989 from Mamerta
Tan; (3) that after the sale, she declared the
property for taxation purposes under her name; (4)
that she was issued Tax Declaration Nos. 99893
and 058351 ; (5) that she has been religiously
paying taxes thereon since 1989 up to 1991; and
( 6) that she took possession of the land and caused
its survey.
15
Petitioner also presented Mamerta Tan who testified
that she is the vendor of the land subject of the
5 present application and that she sold the land to
petitioner in 1989. Mamerta averred that she
became the owner of the said property in 1975 after
she bought the land from Teresita Tan. She
declared the property under her name for taxation
16
Another witness, Mr. Honesto Velez, the City
Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City, testified that he
issued certifications or certified copies of records on
file in his office and he identified the certified
photocopy of the Land History Card  pertaining to
17
Cagayan de Oro City under the name of cadastral
claimant Potenciano Abragan. The history card
10
started with Tax Declaration No. 1645 in the name
of Potenciano Abragan. Later, another tax
declaration, Tax Declaration No. 37129 in the name
of Presentacion Eviofa, was issued. This tax
declaration was subsequently replaced by Tax
Declaration No. 37130. He stated that based on the
records in their office, it appeared that petitioner is
the owner of Lot 4342. Another claimant is
Presentacion Eviota and the remaining portion was
in the name of Potenciano Abragan. Presentacion
Eviota was also issued a tax declaration, Tax
Declaration No. 124750 covering an area of 897
square meters, but not involving the same parcel of
land. Eviota's land was only a portion of Lot 4342.
The original area of the land claimed by Abragan is
12,293 square meters. 18
City Assessor Velez further testified that their
records showed that petitioner possessed a 1,061-
square meter portion of Lot 4342 covered by Tax
Declaration No. 058351. All the transfers made over
portions of this parcel of land were all recorded in
the land history card on file with their office, thus
paving the way for the issuance of corresponding
tax declaration to its new owners. 19
Petitioner also presented and offered the following
exhibits  to support her application for registration of
20
title, to wit:
1) Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land,
2) Tax Declaration Nos. 99893 and 058351 ,
3) Tax Receipts,
4) Certified True Copy of Land History Card,
5) Tax Declaration in the name of Potenciano
Abragan,
6) Tax Declaration in the name of Presentacion T.
Eviota,
7) Tax Declaration in the name of Potenciano
Abragan.
On November 20, 2001, the trial court rendered
Judgment  granting petitioner's application for
21
registration of title. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
There being no evidence presented by the
oppositor, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding
applicant Minda S. Gaerlan as owner in fee simple
of the land subject of this application and hereby
decreeing that Lot 18793, Cad-237, Cagayan
Cadastre, containing an area of One Thousand
Sixty One (1 ,061) square meters, more or less, be
registered in her name [in] accordance with the
technical description attached to the application.
SO ORDERED. 22
The Republic, through the OSG, appealed from the
aforementioned decision asserting that the trial
court erred in ruling that the subject parcel of land is
available for private appropriation. The appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 00319-MIN.
On March 11, 2010, the CA rendered a
Decision  reversing and setting aside the ruling of
23
the trial court and dismissing the application for
registration of title filed by petitioner.
The CA found that petitioner failed to present any
proof to establish that the subject land is alienable
and disposable. The CA stressed that the applicant
for land registration must prove that the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land of the public domain as alienable
and disposable and that the land subject of the
application falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Offices
(PENRO) or Community Environment and Natural
Resources Offices (CENRO). In addition, the CA
held that the applicant must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. Moreover, the CA
observed that there is no evidence on record to
establish that petitioner, by herself or through her
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land and that she
possessed the subject land since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. Thus, the appellate court ruled that petitioner
is not entitled to registration under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. 24
Hence, petitioner is now before us claiming that the
CA erred in denying her application for registration
of title.
Petitioner asserts that her predecessor-in-interest,
Potenciano Abragan, possessed the subject
property as early as 1929. She claims Potenciano
was the one who asked for the original survey of Lot
4342, Cad-23 7 with an original land area of 12,293
square meters, situated in Patag, Cagayan de Oro
City. She averred that the property subject of the
present application consisting of an area of 1,061
square meters and known as Lot 18793, Cad-237,
is a portion of Lot 4342, Cad-237. In support of her
claim, petitioner seeks to submit as additional
evidence Bureau of Lands (BL) Form No. 700-
2A  of the Land Management Services which
25
conducted a survey on Lot 4342, Cad-237 on
November 28, 1929 with Potenciano Abragan as the
Cadastral Survey Claimant.
Petitioner also maintains that the subject land is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain
and this land classification has long been approved
by the DENR Secretary. She points out that during
the entire period of possession of Potenciano
Abragan, the subject land had already been
classified as alienable and disposable land. To
support her claim, petitioner submits as additional
evidence the Certification  issued by the CENRO
26
stating that a parcel of land designated as Lot 4342,
Cad-237 located in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City
containing a total area of 12,293 square meters
more or less falls within an area classified as
Alienable and Disposable under Project 8, Block I
and Land Classification (LC) Map No. 5 85 certified
and approved on December 31, 1925. She prays
that she be allowed with leave of, court to submit
the aforementioned document in support of her
application for registration.
Furthermore, petitioner claims that she and her
witnesses had testified on the issue of actual, open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land, including the act of
declaring the subject lot for tax purposes in their
names and religiously paying the taxes of the land
to the government. Thus, petitioner argues that the
CA erred in not declaring that she is entitled to
registration of the subject land.
Respondent, through the OSG, filed a
Comment  asserting that only questions of law may
27
be raised in a petition filed under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Respondent posits that in the present case,
petitioner, for the first time and only in the present
appeal, seeks the admission to evidence of the
following: (1) the Certification dated July 16, 2010
issued by the CENRO in Cagayan de Oro City to
prove that Lot 4342, Cad-23 7 located in Patag,
Cagayan de Oro City falls within the alienable and
disposable area under Project No. 8, Block I and LC
Map No. 585 which was certified and approved on
December 31, 1925 and (2) BL Form No. 700-2A
which shows that Potenciano Abragan was the
original claimant of the entire land denominated as
Lot 4342 since 1929, to prove her supposed
acquisitive prescription of the contested lot.
Respondent argues that petitioner's attempt to
introduce additional evidence is impermissible as its
introduction would involve a review and assessment
of the evidence on record. Respondent adds that
the determination of the probative value of evidence
is a question of fact which is beyond the province of
a petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner should
have offered the aforementioned documents before
the land registration court and while the case was
pending appeal before the CA as it is an appellate
court with authority to receive evidence.
Moreover, respondent points out that BL Form No.
700-2A submitted by petitioner named Potenciano
Abragan as the original claimant of the entire area
known as Lot 4342 but the same document does
not show that petitioner is likewise a claimant of a
part of Lot 4342 or that she derived title to the lot in
question from Potenciano Abragan. Petitioner's
possession only started in 1989 when she acquired
the lot from Mamerta Tan who in turn acquired the
lot from Teresita Tan. But there is no clear evidence
showing how, when and from whom Teresita Tan
acquired the subject lot.
Respondent cites the rule that the applicant for
registration must be able to establish by evidence
that he and his predecessor-in-interest have
exercised acts of dominion over the lot under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. It is respondent's contention that even if said
BL Form No. 700-2A were considered in this
appeal, it would not help petitioner's cause because
the document is bereft of any information showing
that petitioner has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject
lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Hence, respondent maintains that the CA properly
reversed and set aside the trial court's ruling
granting petitioner's application for land registration
since petitioner failed to offer in evidence the
necessary certification that the parcel of land
applied for registration is alienable and disposable
in character during the proceedings below.
Petitioner also did not present any certification from
the DENR or a certified copy of any land
classification map in order to establish irrefutably
the fact that the subject parcel of land is, in fact,
alienable and disposable. Respondent claims that in
the absence of such classification the land remains
an unclassified land until it is released therefrom
and rendered open to disposition.
Also, respondent avers that petitioner failed to
present specific acts that would show the nature of
her possession and that of her predecessors-in-
interest. The trial court's decision merely relied on
the testimony of petitioner and her witnesses
regarding the transfer of possession of the subject
property from one possessor to another without,
however, adverting to the particulars of their
respective possession thereof. To prove adverse
possession, it is not enough to simply declare one's
possession and that of the petitioner's
predecessors-in-interest to have been adverse,
continuous, open, public, peaceful and in the
concept of owner for the required number of years.
The applicant should present specific acts that
would show such nature of possession. Thus,
according to respondent, petitioner has failed to
positively establish a registrable title to the subject
parcel of land.
Essentially, the main issue to be resolved is whether
the CA erred in dismissing petitioner's application
for registration of title.
Prefatorily, we address the issue raised by
respondent that only questions of law may be raised
in a petition for review on certiorari. Indeed, the
principle is well established that this Court is not a
trier of facts . Therefore, in an appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, only questions of law may be raised. 28
The distinction between a "question of law" and a
"question of fact" is settled. There is a question of
law when the doubt or difference arises as to what
the law is on a certain state of facts, and the
question does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a
"question of fact" when the doubt or controversy
arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
Simply put, when there is no dispute as to the facts,
the question of whether the conclusion drawn
therefrom is correct or not, is a question of law.  In29
Republic v. Vega,  the Court held that when
30
petitioner asks for a review of the decision made by
a lower court based on the evidence presented,
without delving into their probative value but simply
on their sufficiency to support the legal conclusions
made, then a question of law is raised.
In the present case, there seems to be no dispute
as to the facts, and the question presented before
us calls for a review of the CA's conclusion that the
documents and evidence presented by petitioner
are insufficient to support her application for
registration of title. Hence, the petition is properly
filed.
Now, on the merits. Petitioner asserts that the land
subject of her application has been declared
alienable and disposable in 1925 and that her
possession through her predecessors-in-interest
started in 1929. However, after a careful
examination of the evidence adduced by petitioner,
we find no error on the part of the CA in dismissing
petitioner's application for registration of title for the
failure of petitioner to prove satisfactorily the
requirements for registration provided under the law.
P.D. No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree
in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act
No. 141,  as amended by Section 4 of P.D. No.
31
1073  specifies those who are qualified to apply for
32
registration of land. Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 and
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended provide thus:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. -The following persons
may file in the proper Court of First Instance [now
Regional Trial Court] an application for registration
of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxxx
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
[now Regional Trial Court] of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their claims and
the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945,
except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Based on the above-quoted provisions, applicants
for registration of title must establish and prove: (1)
that the subject land forms part of the disposable
and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that
the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same; and (3)
that his possession has been under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.  Each element must necessarily be proven
33
by no less than clear, positive and convincing
evidence; otherwise the application for registration
should be denied. 34
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State. The burden of proof in
overcoming the presumption of State ownership of
the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration, who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable and
disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be presented to
establish that the land subject of the application is
alienable and disposable. 35
To prove that the land subject of the application for
registration is alienable, an applicant must establish
the existence of a positive act of the government
such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports
of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative
act or statute. The applicant may secure a
certification from the government that the lands
applied for are alienable and disposable, but the
certification must show that the DENR Secretary
had approved the land classification and released
the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved
area per verification through survey by the PENRO
or CENRO. The applicant must also present a copy
of the original classification of the land into alienable
and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary
or as proclaimed by the President. 36
To comply with the first requisite, petitioner
submitted a CENRO Certification stating that Lot
4342, Cad-237 located in Patag, Cagayan de Oro
City falls within the alienable and disposable area
under Project No. 8, Block I. Petitioner also
submitted LC Map No. 543 which was certified and
approved on December 31, 1925. We, however, find
that the attached certification is inadequate to prove
that the subject lot is alienable and disposable. We
held in Republic v. TA .N Properties, Inc.  that a
37
CENRO certification is insufficient to prove the
alienable and disposable character of the land
sought to be registered. The applicant must also
show sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary has
approved the land classification and released the
land in question as alienable and disposable. We
ruled in Republic v. TA .N Properties, Inc. that:
x x x it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to
certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for land registration must prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, and that the
land subject of the application for registration falls
within the approved area per verification through
survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the
applicant for land registration must present a copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. These facts must
be established to prove that the land is alienable
and disposable. Respondents failed to do so
because the certifications presented by respondent
do not, by themselves, prove that the land is
alienable and disposable. 38
Thus, as it now stands, aside from the CENRO
certification, an application for original registration of
title over a parcel of land must be accompanied by a
copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the
legal custodian of the official records in order to
establish that the land is indeed alienable and
disposable. 39
In Republic v. Medida,  the Court explained why a
40
CENRO or PENRO certification cannot be
considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein:
Public documents are defined under Section 19,
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as
follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official
acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public
except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private
documents required by law to be entered therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of
public documents referred to in Section 19(a), when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested
by the officer having legal custody of the record, or
by his deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the official
repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the
DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable
and disposable. The CENRO should have attached
an official publication of the DENR Secretary s
issuance declaring the land alienable and
disposable.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence provides:
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence.-Documents
consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other
public documents are evidence, even against a third
person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution
and of the date of the latter.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-
DENR, certifications [do] not fall within the class of
public documents contemplated in the first sentence
of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not
reflect "entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer," x x x. The
certifications are not the certified copies or
authenticated reproductions of original records in
the legal custody of a government office. The
certifications are not even records of public
documents. x x x 41
Moreover, the CENRO certification attached by
petitioner to her petition deserves scant
consideration since it was not presented during the
proceedings before the trial court or while the case
was pending before the appellate court. Petitioner
only presented the said certification for the first time
before this Court. The genuineness and due
execution of the said document had not been duly
proven in the manner required by law.  Also, 42
generally, additional evidence is allowed when it is
newly discovered, or where it has been omitted
through inadvertence or mistake, or where the
purpose of the evidence is to correct evidence
previously offered.  In the present case, petitioner
43
did not offer any explanation why the CENRO
certification was not presented and submitted during
the proceedings before the trial court to justify its
belated submission to this Court.
As to the second and third requisites, we agree with
the appellate court that petitioner failed to establish
that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land on or
before June 12, 1945. Based on the records, the
earliest evidence of possession that petitioner and
her predecessor-in-interest Mamerta Tan had over
the subject property was only in 1975 when
Mamerta Tan purchased the subject lot from
Teresita Tan. While Mamerta Tan testified that she
purchased the property from Teresita, the records
are bereft of any evidence to show Teresita's mode
of acquisition of ownership over the subject lot or
from whom she acquired the property and when her
possession of the subject lot had commenced.
1âwphi1
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier, her application for registration of title of the
subject property under P.D. No. 1529 should be
denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated March 11, 2010 and Resolution
dated May 20, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 00319-MIN are AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

In addition, Honesto Velez, City Assessor of

Cagayan de Oro City, merely testified on the tax WE CONCUR:
declarations issued to certain persons including
petitioner and Mamerta Tan as enumerated in the MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Land History Card of Cadastral Lot 4342 but his Chief Justice
testimony did not prove their possession and Chairperson
occupation over the subject property. What is
required is open, exclusive, continuous and TERESITA J.
notorious possession by the applicant and her
LEONARDO-DE LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.  Here, it
44
CASTRO Associate Justice
is not shown by clear and satisfactory evidence that
Associate Justice
petitioner by herself or through her predecessors-in-
interest had possessed and occupied the land in an
open, exclusive, continuous and notorious manner BIENVENIDO L. REYES
since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Associate Justice

Notably, petitioner attempted to convince this Court CERTIFICATION

that Potenciano Abragan is her predecessor-in-
interest and was in possession of the subject
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987
property even before 1929. However, there was
Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
absolutely no evidence proffered by petitioner that
above Decision had been reached in consultation
she derived her title to the property from Potenciano
before the case was assigned to the writer of the
Abragan. Moreover, BL Form No. 700-2A attached
opinion of the Court's Division.
by petitioner to her present petition and sought to be
submitted as additional evidence, does not in any
way prove that Potenciano Abragan was in MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
possession and occupation of the property before Chief Justice
1929. At best, it merely shows that it was
Potenciano who requested for an original survey of
the lot. More importantly, just like the CENRO
certification, BL Form No. 700-2A could not be given
any evidentiary weight and value since it was not
presented before the trial court and its genuineness
and due execution has not been duly proven. It
must be emphasized that any evidence which a
party desires to submit for the consideration of the
court must formally be offered by the party;
otherwise, it is excluded and rejected.45

In fine, since petitioner failed to prove that (1) the

subject property was classified as part of the
disposable and alienable land of the public domain;
and (2) she and her predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation thereof under a bona
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 204626               June 9, 2014
PAUL P. GABRIEL, JR., IRENEO C. CALWAG,
THOMAS L. TINGGA-AN, and the Heirs of
JULIET B. PULKERA, Petitioners,
vs.
CARMELING CRISOLOGO, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 is the June 14, 2012 Decision  of the Court
1
of Appeals (CA) and its November 14, 2012
Resolution  which reversed the April 18, 201 1
2
Decision  of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6,
3
Baguio City (RTC), and reinstated the September
15, 2009 Decision  of the Municipal Trial Court in
4
Cities, Branch 1, Baguio City (MTCC). in Civil Case
No. 13209, a complaint for recovery of possession.
The Facts
Records show that Carmeling Crisologo (Crisologo),
represented by her attorney-in-fact, Pedro Isican
(Isican), filed her complaint  for Recovery of
5
Possession and/or Ownership with Damages
against Juliet B. Pulkera, Paul P. Gabriel, Ireneo C.
Calwag, and Thomas L. Tingga-an (petitioners)
before the MTCC.
Crisologo alleged, among others, that she was the
registered owner of two parcels of land with a total
area of approximately 2,000 square meters,
described in, and covered by, two (2) certificates of
title – Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)Nos. T-
13935 and T-13936;that the properties were
covered by an Assessment of Real Property; that
the payments of realty taxes on the said properties
were updated; that sometime in 2006, she
discovered that petitioners unlawfully entered,
occupied her properties by stealth, by force and
without her prior consent and knowledge, and
constructed their houses thereon; that upon
discovery of their illegal occupation, her daughter,
Atty. Carmelita Crisologo, and Isican personally
went to the properties and verbally demanded that
petitioners vacate the premises and remove their
structures thereon; that the petitioners begged and
promised to buy the said properties for 3,500.00 per
square meter; that she gave petitioners time to
produce the said amount, but they reneged on their
promise to buy them; that petitioners refused to
vacate the subject properties despite several
demands; that the petitioners knew full well that the
subject premises they were occupying were titled
properties but they insisted on unlawfully holding the
same; and that she was unlawfully dispossessed
and displaced from the subject properties due to
petitioners’ illegal occupation.
On the other hand, petitioners countered that the
titles of Crisologo were products of Civil Registration
Case No. 1, Record 211, which were declared void
by the Supreme Court in Republic v. Marcos,  and 6
reiterated in Republic v. Marcos;  that the said case
7
was later enacted into law, Presidential Decree
(P.D.)No. 1271, entitled "An Act Nullifying Decrees
of Registration and Certificates of Title within the
Baguio Town site Reservation Case No.1, GLRO
Record No. 211, pursuant to Act No. 931, as
amended, but Considering as Valid Certain Titles of
Lands that are Alienable and Disposable Under
Certain Conditions and For Other Purposes" which
took effect on December 22, 1977; that Crisologo
failed to comply with the conditions provided in
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1271 for the validation of said
titles, hence, the titles were void; that petitioners
had been in open, actual, exclusive, notorious,
uninterrupted, and continuous possession of the
subject land, in good faith; and that Crisologo was
never in prior possession and had no valid title over
the subject land. 8
MTCC Ruling
On September 15, 2009, the MTCC rendered a
decision in favor of Crisologo, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders JUDGMENT in
favor of the plaintiff directing the defendants, their
heirs, assigns, representatives and/or any person
acting for and in their behalves to:
a) Immediately vacate the subject properties, and to
demolish/dismantle all their houses and other
structures on the properties; should defendants
refuse to comply, the plaintiff may
demolish/dismantle them at the expense of the
defendants;
b) Pay reasonable rentals of the use and occupation
of the subject properties at Php4,000.00 per month
from January 2006 for each of the defendants;
c) Pay Php20, 000.00 as attorney’s fees, and
d) Costs of litigation.
SO ORDERED.
The MTCC ruled that Crisologo was the registered
owner of the subject parcels of land, who, as such,
had declared these properties for taxation purposes
since 1969 and regularly paid the realty taxes
thereon. It stated that with Crisologo being the (1)
owner, petitioners were illegally occupying the land.
THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS
The MTCC added that petitioners could not question COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN LAW
Crisologo’s titles over the subject parcels of land in WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT HAS
an ordinary civil action for recovery of possession ACTUAL OR WAS IN PRIOR POSSESSION OF
because such defense was a collateral attack which THE LANDS INVOLVED CONTRARY TO THE
was prohibited under P.D. No. 1529, otherwise EVIDENCE, THE FACTS AND THE
known as the Property Registration Decree. Thus, it CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
could not inquire into the intrinsic validity of
Crisologo’s titles. (2)

Ruling of the RTC THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS

COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN FINDING
On April 18, 2011, the RTC reversed and set aside THAT THE PURPORTED EXECUTION AND
the decision of the MTCC. It was of the view that REGISTRATION OF THE PUBLIC INSTRUMENTS
petitioners’ assertion of the TCTs’ invalidity was not RELATIVE TO THE SALE IN 1967 OF THE
a collateral attack. It cited the rulings in Republic v. SUBJECT LANDS AND THE SUBSEQUENT
Marcos,  and
9
Republic v. Marcos,  which
10
ISSUANCE OF THE TITLES IN HER NAME
perpetually prohibited the reopening of Civil ESTABLISH POSSESSION.
Reservation Case No. 1, LRC Rec. No. 211, and,
therefore, the registration of parcels of lands. For (3)
said reason, the titles of Crisologo were products of
illegal proceedings nullified by this Court. She also THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS
failed to comply with the conditions set forth in P.D. COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN FINDING
No. 1271. Accordingly, the titles were void and the THAT THE TAX DECLARATIONS AND RECEIPTS
same could not be a legal basis for Crisologo to IN THE NAME OF THE RESPONDENT
justify the eviction of petitioners from the subject ESTABLISH HER POSSESSION OVER THE
premises. Having been nullified, these certificates of SUBJECT LOTS.
title ceased to be the best proof of ownership.
(4)
Ruling of the CA
THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS
On June 14, 2012, the CA rendered the assailed COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN FINDING
decision, setting aside the RTC decision and THAT THE SUPPOSED APPOINTMENT OF
reinstating that of the MTCC. PEDRO ISICAN AS ADMINISTRATOR
ESTABLISHES HER POSSESSION OVER THE
The CA held that Crisologo was entitled to the LANDS IN DISPUTE.
possession of the subject parcels of land. It
explained that her possession was established (5)
when she acquired the same by sale sometime in
1967 and when the certificates of title covering the
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
properties were subsequently issued. It added that
GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
her payment of realty taxes due on the said
RESPONDENT IS THE PRESENT POSSESSOR
properties since 1969 further strengthened her claim
OF THE SUBJECT LANDS REGARDLESS OF THE
of possession. Moreover, her appointment of Isican
ACTUAL CONDITION OF HER TITLES, IGNORING
as administrator of the subject properties and her
THE PRINCIPLE OF STARE DECISIS AND
offer to sell the lots to the petitioners showed that
ADHERENCE TO LAW.
she had control over the same. Accordingly, the CA
concluded that Crisologo’s right to remain in
possession of the subject lots should be preferred (6)
over the petitioners’ possession regardless of the
actual condition of her titles. Hence, the petitioners, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
who used force in occupying her properties, should GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
respect, restore and not disturb her lawful PETITIONERS DISTURBED THE POSSESSION
possession of the subject parcels of land. OF HEREIN RESPONDENT BY FORCE.

Unsatisfied with the CA decision, the petitioners (7)

instituted this petition anchored on the following
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
RESPONDENT’SSUPPOSED POSSESSION
OVER THE SUBJECT LOTS SHOULD BE
PREFERRED DESPITE THE NATURE OR
CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY AS PART OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. 11
Petitioners’ position
Petitioners aver that Crisologo failed to show
documentary or testimonial evidence that she
acquired the subject properties by sale or by any
other mode of acquisition from its previous owner.
Her only bases in claiming them were the titles
issued in her name, without a deed of sale.
Petitioners further argue that assuming that there
was really a sale that took place, its execution and
registration cannot establish her right of possession,
whether actual or constructive. First, the validity of
the subject titles was stricken down by Republic vs.
Marcos cases and P.D. No. 1271.
Hence, the TCTs could not be sources of legal
rights. Second, Crisologo never took actual
possession of the subject properties after the
alleged sale in 1967. She appointed an
administrator over the said property only in 2006.
Moreover, petitioners claim that her tax declarations
and receipts evidencing payment of taxes cannot
prove her possession or ownership over the subject
properties without proof of actual possession.
Finally, petitioners submit that there are facts and
circumstances that militate against her claim of
possession. They point out that the titles over the
subject properties have no encumbrances or
annotations whatsoever; that for more than forty
(40) years, the subject lots have not been subjected
to any deed, agreement, contract, mortgage or any
other property dealings; that the said titles are not
validated up to the present as certified by the
Register of Deeds of Baguio City; that she
presented no witnesses to prove her intention to
possess the subject lots; that the documents she
presented are not reliable because they were issued
only in 2008; that no improvements were introduced
by her; and that she is guilty of laches due to her
inaction to validate her titles.
Respondent’s position
Crisologo opposes the petition mainly on technical
grounds. First, she argues that the supposed
representatives of the petitioners who filed this
petition and signed the certification on non-forum
shopping have no authority to do so. Hence, they
have no standing to prosecute because they are not
the real parties in interest. Second, she claims that
the petitioners failed to furnish the CA a copy of
their motion for extension of time to file this petition
for review.
The Court’s Ruling
The only question that needs to be resolved in this
petition is – who between petitioners and
respondent Crisologo have a better right of
possession over the subject parcels of land. Both
contending parties claim that they have a superior
possessory right over the disputed lands.
After a careful review of the records, the Court holds
that Crisologo has a better right of possession over
the subject parcels of land.
Accion Publiciana: its nature and purpose
Also known as accion plenaria de posesion, accion
publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to
determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title. It refers to an ejectment suit
filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual
of the cause of action or from the unlawful
withholding of possession of the realty.
The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is
to recover possession only, not ownership. When
parties, however, raise the issue of ownership, the
court may pass upon the issue to determine who
between the parties has the right to possess the
property. This adjudication, nonetheless, is not a
final and binding determination of the issue of
ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the
issue of possession, where the issue of ownership
is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The
adjudication of the issue of ownership, being
provisional, is not a bar to an action between the
same parties involving title to the property. The
adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue
of ownership. 12
In her complaint, Crisologo prayed that she be
declared in prior actual possession of the properties
in dispute and that petitioners vacate the same and
demolish their houses therein. She alleged, among
others, that she was the registered owner of the
subject parcels of land and that petitioners
unlawfully entered her properties by stealth, force
and without her prior consent and knowledge.
Clearly, she primarily wanted to recover possession
of the subject parcels of land from petitioners.
Hence, the case is an accion publiciana.
Nonetheless, the petitioners have raised the issue
of ownership in their pleadings. They mainly argue
that Crisologo’s titles on the subject properties are
void and that they have been in open, actual,
exclusive, notorious, uninterrupted and continuous
possession over the subject properties in good faith.
The nullity of the decrees of registration and
certificates of titles in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1271 is
not absolute
Although Section 1 of P.D. No. 1271  invalidated13
decrees of registration and certificates of title within
the Baguio Town site Reservation Case No. 1,
GLRO Record No. 211, the nullity, however, is not
that sweeping. The said provision expressly states
that "all certificates of titles issued on or before July
31, 1973shall be considered valid and the lands
covered by them shall be deemed to have been
conveyed in fee simple to the registered owners"
upon 1) showing proof that the land covered by the
subject title is not within any government, public or
quasi-public reservation, forest, military or
otherwise, as certified by appropriating government
agencies; and 2) compliance by the titleholder with
the payment to the Republic of the Philippines of the
correct assessed value of the land within the
required period.
In the case at bench, the records show that the
subject parcels of land were registered on August
24, 1967. The titles are, thus, considered valid
although subject to the conditions set. But whether
or not Crisologo complied with the said conditions
would not matter because, this would be a collateral
attack on her registered titles, as would be
discussed later.
At any rate, petitioners, as private individuals, are
not the proper parties to question the status of the
respondent’s registered titles. Section 6 of P.D. No.
1271  expressly states that the "Solicitor General
14
shall institute such actions or suits as may be
necessary to recover possession of lands covered
by all void titles not validated under this Decree."
The respondent’s certificates of title give her the
better right to possess the subject parcels of land
It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of
indefeasible title to property in favor of the person in
whose name the title appears.  It is conclusive
1âwphi1
evidence with respect to the ownership of the land
described therein. It is also settled that the
titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of
ownership of the property, including possession.
Thus, in Arambulo v. Gungab,  this Court declared
15
that the "age-old rule is that the person who has a
Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession
thereof." 16
The records show that TCT No. T-13935  and TCT 17
No. T-13936  bear the name of Carmeling P.
18
Crisologo, as the registered owner. Petitioners do
not dispute the fact that she has a Torrens title over
the subject parcels of land.
The respondent’s Torrens certificates of title are
immune from a collateral attack.
As a holder of a Torrens certificate of title, the law
protects Crisologo from a collateral attack on the
same. Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree,
provides that a certificate of title cannot be the
subject of a collateral attack. Thus:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.
– A certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or
canceled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.
This rule has been applied in innumerable cases,
one of which was Francisco Madrid v. Spouses
Mapoy,  where it was written:
19
Registration of land under the Torrens system,
aside from perfecting the title and rendering it
indefeasible after the lapse of the period allowed by
law, also renders the title immune from collateral
attack. A collateral attack transpires when, in
another action to obtain a different relief and as an
incident of the present action, an attack is made
against the judgment granting the title.
This manner of attack is to be distinguished from a
direct attack against a judgment granting the title,
through an action whose main objective is to annul,
set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such
judgment if not yet implemented, or to seek
recovery if the property titled under the judgment
had been disposed of. To permit a collateral attack
on respondents-plaintiffs' title is to water down the
integrity and guaranteed legal indefeasibility of a
Torrens title.
The petitioners-defendants' attack on the validity of
respondents-plaintiffs' title, by claiming that fraud
attended its acquisition, is a collateral attack on the
title. It is an attack incidental to their quest to defend
their possession of the properties in an "accion
publiciana," not in a direct action whose main
objective is to impugn the validity of the judgment
granting the title. This is the attack that possession
of a Torrens Title specifically guards against; hence,
we cannot entertain, much less accord credit to, the
petitioners-defendants' claim of fraud to impugn the
validity of the respondents-plaintiffs' title to their
property.
As the lawful possessor. the respondent has the
right to eject the petitioners
The Court agrees with the CA that the only question
that needs to be resolved in this suit to recover
possession is who between the parties is entitled to
the physical or material possession of the subject
parcels of land. Therefore, the foremost relevant
issue that needs to be determined here is simply
possession, not ownership.
The testimonial and documentary evidence on
record prove that Crisologo has a preferred claim of
possession over that of petitioners. It cannot be
denied that she bought the subject properties from
the previous owner in 1967, which was why the
transfer certificates of title were subsequently issued
in her name. Records further show that she has
been paying the realty taxes on the said properties
since 1969. She likewise appointed Isican as
administrator of the disputed lands. More
importantly, there is no question that she offered to
sell to petitioners the portions of the subject
properties occupied by them. Hence, she deserves
to be respected and restored to her lawful
possession as provided in Article 539 of the New
Civil Code.20

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. MARTIN S.
PERALTA VILLARAMA, JR.*
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision

had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the

Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice