SECTION 12.

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an

offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.
If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means

which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17

hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this
section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or
similar practices, and their families.

Custodial investigation – any questioning initiated by law enforcement

officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way. It includes practice of issuing
invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he
is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the
inviting officer for any violation of law.

Rights available to the accused during custodial investigation(Miranda

rights)

1. Right to remain silent;

2. Right to competent and independent counsel;

3. Right to be informed of such rights;

4. Rights cannot be waived except in writing and signed by the

person in the presence of his counsel;
 5. No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiates the free will shall be used;

6. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar

forms of detention are prohibited;

7. Confessions/admissions obtained in violation of rights are

inadmissible in evidence.

Kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions

1. Coerced confessions, the product of the third degree, such as torture,

force, violence, threat and intimidations; and

2. Uncounseled statements given without the benefit of Miranda warning.

GUIDELINES FOR ARRESTING OR INVESTIGATING OFFICERS

1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation

must be informed in a language known to and understood by him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any.
Every other warning, information or communication must be in a language
known to and understood by said person;

2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any
statement he makes may be used as evidence against him;

3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and
have the presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of
his own choice;

4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the

services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may
also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the
Court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his behalf;

5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be

informed that no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted
except in the presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has been
made;

6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right
to communicate or confer by the most expedient means with his lawyer,
any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest, or
minister chosen by him or by anyone of his immediate family or by his
counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or
international non-government organization. It shall be the responsibility of
the officer to ensure that this is accomplished;

7. He must be informed that he has the right to waived any of said rights
provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently, and ensure that
he understood the same;

8. In addition, if the person arrested waived his right to a lawyer, he must

be informed that it must be done in writing and in the presence of counsel,
otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insists on
his waiver and chooses to speak;

9. The person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any

manner at any time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be
questioned with a warning that once he makes such indication the police
may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the
interrogation must cease if it has already begun;

10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right
to remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him
from invoking it at any time during the process, regardless of whether he
may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements;
11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case
may be, obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or
exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence

CONFESSION – a declaration made voluntarily and without compulsion or

inducement by a person acknowledging that he has committed or
participated in the commission of a crime.

RES GESTAE – declaration of the accused acknowledging guilt – may be

given in evidence against him by the police officer to whom the admission
was made, as part of res gestae.

A. Rights under Section 12: origins and rationale

Magtoto v. Manguera - 63 SCRA 4

DOCTRINE: Section 20, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution (Now Section 12,
Art. III of the 1987 Constitution) has and should be given a prospective
and not a retrospective effect. Thus, a confession obtained from a
person under investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not
been informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in
evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New
Constitution on January 17, 1973. Conversely, such confession is
admissible in evidence against the accused, if the same had been obtained
before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented after
January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to
counsel, since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before
that date.
NOTE: 1987 Constitution – Effectivity February 11, 1987.
The said provision of the Constitution was granted, for the first time, to a
person under investigation for the commission of an offense, the right to
counsel and to be informed of such right. And the last sentence thereof
which, in effect, means that any confession obtained in violation of this right
shall be inadmissible in evidence, can and should be given effect only
when the right already existed and had been violated.
To give a retroactive effect to this constitutional guarantee to counsel
would have a great unsettling effect on the administration of justice. It
may lead to the acquittal of guilty individuals and thus cause injustice
to the People and the offended parties in many criminal cases where
confessions were obtained before the effectivity of the New
Constitution and in accordance with the rules then in force although
without assistance of counsel.
Moreover, the Revised Penal Code provision which provides for the
retroactive effect of the Penal laws is not applicable in this case because:
First, constitutional provision in question has a prospective and not a
retrospective effect.
Second, the "penal laws" given retroactive effect by the Revised Penal
Code refer to SUBSTANTIVE penal laws, while the constitutional
provision in question is basically a procedural rule of evidence
involving the incompetency and inadmissibility of confessions and
therefore cannot be included in the term penal laws.
Third, Constitutional provisions as a rule should be given a prospective
effect
IN THIS CASE, since the confessions of the accused were taken before the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution in accordance with the rules then in
force, no right had been violated as to render them inadmissible in
evidence although they were not informed of "their right to remain silent
and to counsel," "and to be informed of such right," because no such right
existed at the time.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the said provision be given
a prospective application, and that confessions obtained before the
effectivity of the New Constitution are admissible in evidence against the
accused, his fundamental right to prove that his confession was
involuntary still stands. The present ruling does not in any way diminish
any of his rights before the effectivity of the New Constitution.
B. When the rights become available
In-custody investigation – any questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way.

Custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an

“invitation” to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense
he is suspected to have committed.
Rule begins to operate at once as soon as the investigation ceases to be a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime, and direction is ten aimed upon a
particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police
would then direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit incriminating
statements.
DOES NOT apply to:
1.A spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the
authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect
orally admitted having committed the offense;
2.Admissions or confessions made by a suspect before he was
placed under custodial investigation.
People v. Taylaran - 108 SCRA 373
DOCTRINE: The applicability of section 20, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution
(Now section 12, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution) does not contemplate
cases like the print where no written confession was sought to be
presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial investigation. What
was testified to is only what appellant told the police why he is
surrendering to them. It is just proper that the one who surrenders to the
police to give reason or explanation for his act of surrendering. It cannot be
said that under such circumstance, the surrendered is already "under
investigation within the meaning of the constitutional provision. If however,
he voluntarily admits the killing and it was precisely because he
surrendered to admit the killing, the constitutional safeguards to be
informed of his rights to silence and to counsel may not be invoked."
IN THIS CASE, the accused admitted and thereafter convicted with the
crime of Murder. On Appeal, it invoked the provision of Article IV, Section
20 of the 1973 Constitution in trying to block his admission of his
declaration to he killed Ofremia Atup because of her alleged vow to kill
him by witchcraft, contending that the safeguards therefor have not been
made available to him. The Court dismissed his argument and ruled that
since he voluntarily admits the killing and it was precisely because he
surrendered to admit the killing, the constitutional safeguards to be
informed of his rights to silence and to counsel may not be invoked.

Galman v. Pamaran - 138 SCRA 295

DOCTRINE: The section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provided
that a person detained for the commission of an offense undergoing
investigation has a right to be informed of his right to remain silent, to
counsel, and to an admonition that any and all statements to be given by
him may be used against him. However, there has been no pronouncement
in any of these cases nor in any other that a person similarly undergoing
investigation for the commission of an offense, if not detained, is not
entitled to the constitutional admonition mandated by said Section 20, Art.
IV of the Bill of Rights.
The fact that the framers of THE 1973 Constitution did not choose to use
the term "custodial" by having it inserted between the words "under" and
investigation", as in fact the sentence opens with the phrase "any person "
goes to prove that they did not adopt in entirety the Miranda doctrine.
IN THIS CASE, the records show that Generals Ver and Olivas were
among the last witnesses called by the Agrava Board. The subject matter
dealt with and the line of questioning as shown by the transcript of their
testimonies before the Agrava Board, indubitably evinced purposes other
than merely eliciting and determining the so-called surrounding facts and
circumstances of the assassination. In the light of the examination reflected
by the record, it is not far-fetched to conclude that they were called to the
stand to determine their probable involvement in the crime being
investigated. Yet they have not been informed or at the very least even
warned while so testifying, even at that particular stage of their testimonies,
of their right to remain silent and that any statement given by them may be
used against them.
This exclusionary rule applies not only to confessions but also to
admissions, whether made by a witness in any proceeding or by an
accused in a criminal proceeding or any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense.

People v. Judge Ayson - 175 SCRA 216

DOCTRINE: Rights of a person in custodial Interrogation exist only in
"custodial interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of accused persons."
And by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."
Thus, not every statement made to the police by a person involved in
some crime is within the scope of the constitutional protection. If not
made "under custodial interrogation," or "under investigation for the
commission of an offense," the statement is not protected.
Thus, a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not
under custodial interrogation. His interrogation by the police, if any there
had been would already have been ended at the time of the filing of the
criminal case in court (or the public prosecutors' office). Hence, with
respect to a defendant in a criminal case already pending in court (or
the public prosecutor's office), there is no occasion to speak of his right
while under "custodial interrogation" laid down by the second and
subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution,
for the obvious reason that he is no longer under "custodial
interrogation."
But unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing preliminary
investigation before the public prosecutor), in common with all other
persons, possesses the right against self- incrimination set out in the
first sentence of Section 20 Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, i.e., the
right to refuse to answer a specific incriminatory question at the time that it
is put to him.
Additionally, the accused in a criminal case in court has other rights in
the matter of giving testimony or refusing to do so. An accused
occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Under the
Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled
among others-
1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, and
2) to testify as witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a
witness he may be cross-examined as any other witness; however, his
neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be
used against him.
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently
charged with its commission in court, has the following rights in the matter
of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public
prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after having been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on
being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence,
threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and to
have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT —
a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the
prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which
tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is then
prosecuted.
IN THIS CASE, respondent Judge has misinterpreted Section 20, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution because Felipe Ramos was actually not in any
sense under custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly
understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the
discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have
had a hand.
The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation did
not therefore exist, were of no relevance to the inquiry. Moreover,
Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first
day of the administrative investigation and agreed that the
proceedings should be recorded, just as it is obvious that the note (later
marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the
day before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the
alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part.
They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda
rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.

C.Police line -ups: paraffin test: signature

A police line-up is NOT considered a part of any custodial inquest,
because it is conducted before that stage of investigation is reached.
*Out-court identification may be made:
1.“Show-up” – accused is brought face to face with the witnesses for
identification
2.“Police line-up” – suspect is identified by a witness from a group of
persons gathered for that purpose.
In a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to
accusatory stage.
The signing of the accused of the booking sheet and arrest report is not a
part of custodial investigation – it is no more than a record of arrest and a
statement on how the arrest was made.

Gamboa v. Judge Cruz - 162 SCRA 642

DOCTRINE: As a rule, no custodial investigation shall be conducted unless
it be in the presence of counsel, engaged by the person arrested, or by any
person in his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the
detainee himself, or by anyone in his behalf, and that, while the right may
be waived, the waiver shall not be valid unless made in writing and in the
presence of counsel. However, police line-up is not part of the custodial
inquest, which will entitle the accused to the right to counsel.
In accordance with the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, the Supreme Court
held that there is no real need to afford a suspect the services of counsel
during a police line-up. HOWEVER, the moment there is a move or even
an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or
even plain information which may appear innocent at the time, from
said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless
he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
IN THIS CASE, when petitioner was identified by the complainant at the
police line-up, he had not been held yet to answer for a criminal
offense. When the process had not yet shifted from the investigatory to the
accusatory as when police investigation does not elicit a confession the
accused may not yet avail of the services of his lawyer. Since petitioner in
the course of his identification in the police line-up had not yet been held to
answer for a criminal offense, he was, therefore, not deprived of his right to
be assisted by counsel because the accusatory process had not yet set in.
The police could not have violated petitioner's right to counsel and due
process as the confrontation between the State and him had not begun. In
fact, when he was identified in the police line-up by complainant, he did not
give any statement to the police. He was, therefore, not interrogated at all
as he was not facing a criminal charge. Far from what he professes, the
police did not, at that stage, exact a confession to be used against him. For
it was not he but the complainant who was being investigated at that time.
He "was ordered to sit down in front of the complainant while the latter was
being investigated". Petitioner's right to counsel had not accrued.
People v. Dimaano - 209 SCRA 819
DOCTRINE: . The Court in this case cited Gamboa v. Cruz and held that
police line-up is not part of the custodial inquest, hence, the a4ppellants
were not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. The Court further held that
the right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation – that is,
when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit
information and/or confessions or admissions from the accused. At
such point or state, the person being interrogated must be assisted by
counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced
admissions or confessions from the accused.
IN THIS CASE, the accused were convicted of the crime of robbery with
homicide and multiple frustrated homicide. On Appeal, they alleged, among
others, that their identification by the private complainants at the police
headquarters violated their constitutional right to counsel, in the absence of
their lawyer.
However, the Court held that when the appellants were identified by the
complainants at the police line-up, the former had not yet been held to
answer for the criminal offense for which they have been charged and
convicted. The police could not have, therefore, violated their right to
counsel as the confrontation between the State and them had not yet
begun.

People of the Philippines vs. Musa -G.R. No. 170472, July 3, 2009
DOCTRINE: Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police either
thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the
witness for identification or thru mug shots where photographs are shown
to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a
witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the
purpose of identifying the perpetrator.

The totality of circumstances test where courts consider the following

factors in resolving the admissibility of out-of-court identification of
suspects:
(1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the
crime;
(2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time;
(3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness;
(4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification;
(5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and,
(6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.

Moreover, the proper procedure on photographic identification:

FIRST, a series of photographs must be shown and not merely that of
the suspect; and
SECOND, when a witness is shown a group of pictures, their
arrangement and display should in no way suggest which one of the
pictures pertains to the suspect.
IN THIS CASE, the appellants assail the admissibility of their out-of-court
identification by the Witnesses Nancy and Ryan and argued that when
these witnesses went to the police station, their minds were ready to accept
that the persons they would identify were the suspects in the June 11, 2001
robbery.
Applying the above-mentioned test, the Court held that Nancy’s out-of-court
identification to be valid and, hence, admissible.
First, Nancy had a good view of the faces of the robbers.
Second, no competing event took place to draw her attention from
the hold-up. Hence, no distraction that could have prevented her from
having clear view of the faces and appearances of the robbers
Third, the identification took place within five days after the robbery;
Fourth, she described the suspects to a police inspector prior to
identifying them in the police station.
Lastly, nothing persuasive supports the appellants’ contention that
their identification at the police station was the result of an unduly
suggestive procedure.
Ultimately, aside from the application if the test, there was also no evidence
that the police either forced Nancy to point to the appellants as the robbers,
or suggested to her that the appellants were the suspects in the said
robbery.
Also, in accordance with the proper procedure on photographic
identification, Nancy significantly testified that "other" pictures, aside from
the pictures of the five appellants and of Barredo, were shown to her and to
Harold at the hospital. From these pictures, they were able to identify the
six perpetrators of the crime.
However, as to Witness Ryan’s identification of the appellants at the police
station, such is not as reliable since he admitted having been told by the
police that the persons detained were the suspects in the robbery before he
identified them.
Nevertheless, this irregular identification does not need to affect the
admissibility of Nancy and Ryan's independent in-court identification.
In convicting the appellants of the crime charged, the RTC and CA did not
rely on the identification made by Nancy and Ryan at the police station,
they relied on Nancy's positive identification of the appellants during trial as
well as the corroborative testimony of Ryan.

D. Right to counsel
It is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused
to admit something false – it attaches upon the start of the investigation.
The lawyer should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily
telling the truth.
The right to counsel is not required in a police line-up, neither may this
be invoked when the suspect is given a paraffin test – as he is not yet
under custodial investigation.
Before parents, brothers or sisters, spouse, mayor, municipal judge, district
school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel can appear, 2
conditions must be met:
1.Counsel of the accused is absent;
2.A valid waiver had been executed – in the absence of a valid
waiver, none of the above-named persons can stand in lieu of
counsel.
Competent and Independent – it is required for the lawyer to be “willing to
safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused,” as distinguished from
one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless
recital of the individual’s constitutional rights.
SC requires that the counsel be independent – thus, he cannot be a
special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a
municipal attorney – these are those whose interest is admittedly adverse
to the accused. HOWEVER, the mere fact that the lawyer was a retired
member of the Judge Advocate’s Office does not case any doubt on his
impartiality in assisting the accused.
The phrase “preferably of his own choice” does not convey the message
that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as
to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from
handling the defense. The constitutional requirement is satisfied when a
counsel is engaged by anyone acting in behalf of the person under
investigation, or appointed by the court upon petition by said person or by
someone on his behalf. – REASON: To hold otherwise, the tempo of
custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who can
impede, nay obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a
lawyer, who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his
interest.
A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused
when he does not raise any objection against the counsel’s appointment
during the course of the investigation, and the accused subscribes to the
veracity of the statement before the swearing officer.

People v. De Jesus - 213 SCRA 345

DOCTRINE: The Court held, citing Morales vs. Enrile, that at the time a
person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him
of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if
any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him.
The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a
relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by
telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished.
No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the
presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on
his behalf or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee
himself of by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but
the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel.
Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible
in evidence.
The right to counsel attaches when the investigating officer starts to ask
questions to elicit information or confession or admission from the accused.
IN THIS CASE, the investigating officer admitted that the two accused were
turned over to him for investigation, interviewed them and solicited from
them facts and information surrounding the robbery hold-up with homicide
without the assistance of a lawyer.
It was only then when the facts and information gathered reduced in writing
where the lawyer of the accused was present. Thus, the apparent violation
of the accused right to counsel.
Appellant in this case was already arrested as one of the principal suspects
in the killing of Garcia when he was turned over for investigation. The
"interview" conducted by the investigator cannot be considered merely as a
general inquiry but rather a custodial investigation. Custodial investigation
is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has began to focus on a particular suspect who
had been taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of
interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is when
questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.
As to the Miranda warning, the Court held that it was not validly made.
According to the Court, the stereotyped ‘advice’ appearing in practically all
extrajudicial confessions which are later repudiated has assumed the
nature of ‘legal form’. Police investigators either automatically type it
together with the word ‘Opo’ as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or
even copy it in their handwriting. Its fixed and artificially stately style does
not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the
part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free and
unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.
Thus, the accused are acquitted for failing to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

People v. Lucero - 249 SCRA 425

DOCTRINE: The 1987 Constitution requires that a person under
investigation for the commission of a crime should be provided with
counsel. An absolute, and not merely substantial, compliance with the
requirements of right to counsel is what the Constitution intend.
IN THIS CASE, it is showed that Atty. Peralta's, who was not the counsel of
choice of appellant, arrived at the second night of appellant's detention, at
around 9:00PM where he allegedly with appellant about his rights.
Thereafter, Atty. Peralta himself admitted he received no reaction from
appellant although his impression was that appellant understood him.
However, Atty. Peralta left appellant in the custody of the agents when his
real interrogation started. He said he had to attend the wake of a friend.
His attitude did not speak well of the importance he gave to his role
as counsel to a person under custodial interrogation for the
commission of a very serious offense. It was during his absence that
appellant gave an uncounselled confession.
The Court held that appellant's conviction cannot be based on his extra-
judicial confession, stating that when the Constitution requires the right to
counsel, it did not mean any kind of counsel but competent and
independent counsel.
IN THIS CASE, the circumstances in the case clearly demonstrate that
appellant received no effective counseling from Atty. Peralta.
Moreover, in custodial investigation, the right to counsel attaches from the
moment the investigation starts, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to
ask questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions from the
accused.
In this case, when the interrogation was just starting, Atty. Peralta left
appellant to attend the wake of a friend . At that critical stage, appellant
gave his uncounseled extra-judicial a confession. Surely, such a confession
where appellant was unprotected from mischief cannot convict.

Lumanog, et al. vs. People of the Philippines-, 7 September 2010

DOCTRINE: The right to counsel has been written into the Constitution to
prevent the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting
confessions from a suspect in a crime. The lawyer's role cannot be
reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a pre-
prepared confession, even if it indicated compliance with the
constitutional rights of the accused. The accused is entitled to effective,
vigilant, and independent counsel. Where the prosecution failed to
discharge the State's burden of proving with clear and convincing evidence
that the accused had enjoyed effective and vigilant counsel before he
extrajudicially admitted his guilt, the extrajudicial confession cannot be
given any probative value.
As a rule, the moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or
confessions or even plain information from a suspect, the latter should, at
that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
IN THIS CASE, Police officers claimed that upon arresting accused Joel,
they informed him of his constitutional rights to remain silent, that any
information he would give could be used against him, and that he had the
right to a competent and independent counsel, preferably, of his own
choice, and if he cannot afford the services of counsel he will be provided
with one.
The appellant argued, however, that since these rights can only be waived
in writing and with the assistance of counsel, there could not have been
such a valid waiver by Joel, who was presented to Atty. Sansano at the
IBP Office, Quezon City Hall only the following day and stayed overnight at
the police station before he was brought to said counsel.
The Court held that the right of the accused Joel to have a counsel was not
violated since Joel was provided with a lawyer secured by the investigators
from the IBP-Quezon City chapter, it cannot be said that his right to a
counsel "preferably of his own choice" was not complied with, particularly
as he never objected to Atty. Sansano when the latter was presented to
him to be his counsel for the taking down of his statement. The phrase
"preferably of his own choice" does not convey the message that the
choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to
preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from
handling the defense.
Thus, while the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under
custodial interrogation cannot afford the services of counsel - or
where the preferred lawyer is not available - is naturally lodged in the
police investigators, the suspect has the final choice, as he may reject
the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer
provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused
when he does not raise any objection against the counsel's
appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused
thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing
office
Lastly, the modifier “competent and independent” in the 1987
Constitution stresses the need to accord the accused, under the premise of
custodial investigation, of an informed judgment by a diligent and capable
lawyer. An effective and vigilant counsel requires that the lawyer be
present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the
confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating
officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the
lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and
that the person under investigation fully understands the nature and
the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to his
constitutional rights.
However, while the Court, in this case, invalidated the extrajudicial
confession made by the Appellant Joel, the Court still convicted Joel based
on other evidence presented.

MOREOVER, nothing irregular in the identification made by Alejo at the

police station during which he positively identified Joel de Jesus and
Lorenzo delos Santos as those lookouts who had pointed their guns at him
demanding that he buck down at his guardhouse. Even assuming
arguendo that Alejo's out-of-court identification was tainted with
irregularity, his subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that
may have attended it.
The inadmissibility of a police line-up identification should not
necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-court
identification.

Further, none of the danger signals which give warning that the
identification may be erroneous even though the method used is
proper.
The danger signals contained in the list, which is not exhaustive, are:
(1) the witness originally stated that he could not identify anyone;
(2) the identifying witness knew the accused before the crime, but
made no accusation against him when questioned by the police;
(3) a serious discrepancy exists between the identifying witness'
original description and the actual description of the accused;
(4) before identifying the accused at the trial, the witness erroneously
identified some other person;
 (5) other witnesses to the crime fail to identify the accused;
(6) before trial, the witness sees the accused but fails to identify him;
(7) before the commission of the crime, the witness had limited
opportunity to see the accused;
(8) the witness and the person identified are of different racial groups;
(9) during his original observation of the perpetrator of the crime, the
witness was unaware that a crime was involved;
(10) a considerable time elapsed between the witness' view of the
criminal and his identification of the accused;
(11) several persons committed the crime; and
(12) the witness fails to make a positive trial identification.
E. Right to be informed
This contemplates transmission of meaningful information rather than just
the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle.

People v. Pinlac - 165 SCRA 675

DOCTRINE: The Constitution requires a person under investigation "to be
informed" of his right to remain silent and to counsel which must be
presumed to contemplate the transmission of a meaningful information
rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle.
Thus, as a rule, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to
the person under investigation the provisions of the Constitution. He is not
only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled;
he must also explain their effects in practical terms, The right of a person
under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the
part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective
communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. When the
police falls short on this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be
said that the person has been "informed" of his rights.

IN THIS CASE, the Fiscal has the duty to provide evidence that there was
compliance with the duties of an interrogating officer. As it is the obligation
of the investigating officer to inform a person under investigation of his right
to remain silent and to counsel, so it is the duty of the prosecution to
affirmatively establish compliance by the investigating officer with his said
obligation. Absent such affirmative showing, the admission or confession
made by a person under investigation cannot be admitted in evidence.
Moreover, the Court citing People vs. Ramos, ruled that the verbal
admission of the accused during custodial investigation was inadmissible,
although he had been apprised of his constitutional rights to silence and to
counsel, for the reason that the prosecution failed to show that those rights
were explained to him, such that it could not be said that "the apprisal was
sufficiently manifested and intelligently understood" by the accused.
IN THIS CASE, the evidence for the prosecution failed to prove
compliance with these constitutional rights of the accused. Moreover,
the accused was not assisted by counsel and his alleged waiver was made
without the assistance of counsel. The record of the case is insufficient in
evidence, which was not satisfactorily rebutted by the prosecution, that the
accused was maltreated and tortured for seven (7) solid hours before he
signed the prepared extra-judicial confession.

SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses

punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Bail – the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law,
furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before
any court as may be required.
Bail as a matter of right – All persons in custody shall:
1.Before or after conviction by the MeTC, MTC, MTCC and MCTC;
2.Before conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by
death, RP or LI.
Bail, when discretionary:
1.Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, RP or
LI.

A. RIGHT TO BAIL
Emanates from the right to be presumed innocent.

Exemptions to the right of bail:

1.When charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
higher and evidence of guilt is strong.
2.Traditionally, the right to bail is not available to the military (does not
violate EPC because there is a substantial distinction between the military
and civilians.

People v. Nitcha - 240 SCRA 283

DOCTRINE: Bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused
nor of discretion on the part of the court if an accused who is charged
with a crime punishable by  reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial
court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty. In such a situation, the court
would not have only determined that the evidence of guilt is strong — which
would have been sufficient to deny bail even before conviction — it would
have likewise ruled that the accused's guilt has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be granted to the accused during the
pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Pertinently, an accused who is charged with a capital offense, shall also no
longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to
this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt
of the offense charged is strong.
IN THIS CASE, the accused questioned the proceeding in the trial court
and argued that an irregularity existed during the trial, considering that he
posted bail bond and thereafter pleaded not guilty which tantamount to him
earning the right to appeal to such decision of lower court.

The Court held, however, that the application of a bail bond is not a legal
obstacle to the appellant’s immediate incarceration after promulgation of a
decision involving a felony punishable by reclusion perpetua.
Thus, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a
matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction
clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is
strong.

Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, etc. Vs.

Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr. – 521 SCRA 470
DOCTRINE: While this Court in some cases limited the exercise of the right
to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various
international treaties, it can be gleaned that if bail can be granted in
deportation cases, there is no justification why it should not also be allowed
in extradition cases.
Considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to
deportation cases, it can be invoked in extradition cases – Both of which
are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person
detained is not in issue.
Lastly, in an extradition proceeding, being sui generis, the standard of
proof required in granting or denying bail can NEITHER be the proof
beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in
character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative
cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to
prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction.
THUS, the new standard is the "clear and convincing evidence" and
should be used in granting bail in extradition cases – THAT IS, clear
and convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk and will abide with
all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
IN THIS CASE, it was shown that private respondent was arrested and
remained incarcerated for over 2 years until the trial court ordered his
admission to bail. He had been detained for over two years without having
been convicted of any crime. Such an extended period of detention is a
serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty, which constitute his
right to bail.
The Court ultimately held that there was no evidence that shows private
respondent is not a flight risk. Consequently, the case was remanded to the
trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail
based on "clear and convincing evidence".

Revilla v. Sandiganbayan – G.R. No. 218232, July 24, 2018

DOCTRINE: The grant or denial of bail in an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua, such as plunder, hinges on the issue of whether the
evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This requires the conduct of bail
hearings where the prosecution has the burden of showing that the
evidence of guilt is strong, subject to the right of the defense to cross-
examine witnesses and introduce evidence in its own rebuttal. The court is
to conduct only a summary hearing, practicable and consistent with the
purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence
for purposes of bail.
IN THIS CASE, the Sandiganbayan found strong evidence of guilt against
Cambe and Napoles, considering the strings of evidence presented against
them from testimonial evidence from witnesses to documents which
permeate strong conviction against them.
Ultimately, the Sandiganbayan considered the entire record of evidence in
finding strong evidence of guilt.
For purposes of bail, the Court held that by judicial discretion, the law
mandates the determination of whether proof is evident or the presumption
of guilt is strong. 'Proof evident' or 'Evident proof' means clear, strong
evidence which leads a well-guarded dispassionate judgment to the
conclusion that the offense has been committed as charged, that accused
is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally if the law
is administered. 'Presumption great' exists when the circumstances
testified to are such that the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn
therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to an unbiased judgment and
excludes all reasonable probability of any other conclusion.”
The weight of evidence necessary for bail purposes is not proof
beyond reasonable doubt, but strong evidence of guilt, or "proof
evident," or "presumption great."
Accordingly, an examination of the entire record —totality of evidence —is
necessary to determine whether there is strong evidence of guilt, for
purposes of granting or denying bail to the accused.
Consequently, the Court ruled that Sandiganbayan rightfully denied bail to
Cambe and Napoles who are charged with the crime of plunder, after
finding strong evidence of their guilt.

B. Waiver of the right

The failure of the accused to call the attention of the Trial Court to the
unresolved petition for bail is deemed a waiver of the right to bail.

People vs. Judge Donato - 198 SCRA 130

DOCTRINE: The right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which
can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose
waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or
good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law.
Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or
privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the
voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known
by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such
person forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an
inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an
act inconsistent with claiming it.
Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute
or guaranteed by constitution may be waived, a waiver in derogation of a
statutory right is not favored, and a waiver will be inoperative and void if it
infringes on the rights of others, or would be against public policy or morals
and the public interest may be waived.
While it has been stated generally that all personal rights conferred by
statute and guaranteed by constitution may be waived, it has also been
said that constitutional provisions intended to protect property may be
waived, and even some of the constitutional rights created to secure
personal liberty are subjects of waiver.

IN THIS CASE, respondent Judge granted Private Respondent bail. It is

the stand of the petitioner that private respondent, "in agreeing to remain in
legal custody even during the pendency of the trial of his criminal case, has
expressly waived his right to bail." Upon the other hand, private respondent
asserts that such contention has no legal and factual basis, for in their
petition for habeas corpus they precisely questioned the legality of the
arrest and the continued detention of Private Respondent and others,
which was not resolved by Court or by the compromise agreement of the
parties but left open for further determination in another proceeding.
Ultimately, the Court ruled that, having agreed in another case to remain in
legal custody, private respondent had unequivocably and validly waived his
right to bail. Consequently, the respondent Judge clearly acted with grave
abuse of discretion in granting bail to the private respondent.

C. Excessive bail
De La Camara v. Enage - 41 SCRA 3
DOCTRINE: While the court is granted discretion to rule on question of bail,
the court shall, however, be supervised by the conditions imposed upon
seeking bail in determining whether it would amount to a refusal of the
constitutional right to bail.
Thus, the court, citing Villaseñor vs Abano, provided the guidelines in the
fixing of bail, as follows:
(1) ability of the accused to give bail;
(2) nature of the offense;
(3) penalty for the offense charged;
(4) character and reputation of the accused;
(5) health of the accused;
(6) character and strength of the evidence;
(7) probability of the accused appearing in trial;
(8) forfeiture of other bonds;
 (9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested;
and
(10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other
cases.

IN THIS CASE, the accused was charged with two criminal offenses where
he was required bail at the excessive amount of P840,000 for murder and
P355,000 for frustrated murder. At such offenses, bail could not possibly
exceed P50,000.00 for the information for murder and P25,000.00 for the
other information for frustrated murder.
The Court held that Respondent Judge ignored the above-mentioned
considerations and ruled, therefore, that the amount fixed by the Judge as
bail is excessive.

SECTION 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal

offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has
been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable

Due process of criminal proceedings

1. The accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction;
 2. The accused is proceeded against under the orderly processes of law;
3. The accused has been given notice and the opportunity to be heard;
and
4. The judgment rendered was within the authority of a constitutional law.

Standards in case the accused pleaded guilty to a capital offense

1. The trial court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of
the plea and the full comprehension of the consequences thereof;
2. The prosecution shall be required to present evidence to prove the guilt
of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and
3. The accused must be asked if he desires to present evidence on his
behalf and allow him to do so if he so desires.

EQUIPOISE Rule – applicable only where the evidence adduced by the

parties are equally balanced, in which case the constitutional presumption
of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused.
POLITICAL OFFENSE DOCTRINE Under this doctrine, common crimes,
perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their
character as common offenses and assume the political complexion of the
main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and consequently, cannot
be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the
same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.

A. Military tribunals
Olaguer v. Military - 150 SCRA 144
DOCTRINE: Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall be entitled to a trial. The trial contemplated by the due
process clause of the Constitution is a trial by judicial process, not by
executive or military process. Military commissions or tribunals, by
whatever name they are called, are not courts within the Philippine judicial
system.
Thus, a military commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction,
even during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly
committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and
that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and
void for lack of jurisdiction. A different ruling would result to the violation of
the right of due process.
IN THIS CASE, Olaguer and other petitioners who were all civilians were
tried before the military commission for the crime of subversion while the
civil courts were still operational. Petitioner Olaguer contends that being a
civilian, his trial by military commission deprives him of his right to due
process, since the due process guaranteed by the Constitution to persons
accused of "ordinary" crimes means judicial process. Respondents, on the
other hand, argued that such argument ignores the reality of the rebellion
and the existence of martial law. To the respondent, it is essential that in a
martial law situation, the military commission may operate.
Again, the Court held that military commissions or tribunals have no
jurisdiction to try civilians for alleged offenses when the civil courts are
open and functioning, even in the existence of martial law.
B. Due process
Scoty's Department Store v. Micaller - 99 Phil 762
DOCTRINE: The word “court” used in Sec. 25 of RA 875 (Industrial Peace
Act) cannot refer to the Court of Industrial Relations for to give that
meaning would be violative of the safeguards guaranteed to every accused
by the Constitution such as “no person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law” and that “in all criminal
prosecution the accused shall enjoyed the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses in his behalf”.
The procedure laid down by law to be observed by the Court of Industrial
Relations in dealing with Unfair Labor Practice cases negates those
constitutional guarantees to the accused because, among other things, the
law provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in court for the
courts of law or equity cannot be controlling and it is the spirit and
intention of this act that the Court of Industrial Relations and its
members and its Hearing Examiners shall use every and all reasonable
means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objective and
without regards to technicalities of law of procedure."
It is likewise enjoined that "the Court shall not be bound solely by the
evidence presented during the hearing but may avail itself of all other
means such as, but not limited to, ocular inspections and questioning
of well-informed persons which results must be made a part of the
record" [section 5 (b), Republic Act No. 875].
All this means that an accused may be tried without the right "to meet
the witnesses face to face" and may be convicted merely on
preponderance of evidence and not beyond reasonable doubt.
THIS IS AGAINST THE DUE PROCESS GUARANTEED BY THE
CONSTITUTION. This gap may be subserve strictly the rules applicable to
criminal cases to meet the requirements of the Constitution, but this would
be tantamount to amending the law which is not within the province of the
judicial branch of our Government.
Thus, IN THIS CASE, the power to impose the penalties provided for in
Sec. 25 of RA 875 is lodged in ordinary courts, and NOT in the Court of
Industrial Relations, notwithstanding the definition of the word "Court"
contained in Sec. 2(a) of said Act. Hence, the decision of the industrial
court in so far as it imposes a fine upon petitioners is illegal and should be
nullified.

C. Presumption of innocence
Presumption of innocence Can be invoked ONLY by an individual accused
of a criminal offense, not by a corporate entity.
United States v. Luling - 34 Phil 725
DOCTRINE: While presumption of innocence is the rule, it is established
also that certain facts only shall constitute prima facie evidence and that
then the burden is on the defendant to show that his acts are not criminal.
In case of statutory crimes, no constitutional provision is violated by a
statute providing that proof by the state of some material fact or facts shall
constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and that then the burden is shifted
to the defendant for the purpose of showing that such act or acts are
innocent and are committed without unlawful intention.
IN THIS CASE, appellant alleges that the provisions of Act No. 355, in so
far as it requires the accused to prove his innocence, is unconstitutional in
that the state is without right or authority to enact a law by virtue of the
terms of which certain facts only shall constitute prima facie proof of guilt.
The Court held that since the state have the right to declare what acts are
criminal, within certain well defined limitations, it has also the right to
specify what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what proof shall
constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and then to put upon the defendant
the burden of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are not
committed with any criminal intent or intention.
People v. Mingoa - 92 Phil 856
DOCTRINE: There is no constitutional objection to the enacting of law
providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by contrary
presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting
what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of
innocence.
The legislature may enact that when certain facts have been proven they
shall be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused
and shift the burden of proof provided there be rational connection
between that facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed so that the
inference of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and
arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common
experience.
IN THIS CASE, the accused assailed the constitutionality of article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code, providing for the prima facie evidence when there
is a failure on the part of the public officer to render his duty, and
contended that by convicting him based on mere presumptions, that is,
presumptions of criminal intent in losing the money under the
circumstances alleged and presumptions of guilt from the mere fact that he
failed, upon demand to produce the sum lacking – the trial court violates his
constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved
cannot be sustained.
However, the Court negated this contention and ultimately held that the
statute in the present case creates a presumption of guilt once certain facts
are proved. It makes the failure of public officer to have duly forthcoming,
upon proper demand, any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal use. The ultimate fact presumed is that officer has
malversed the funds or property entrusted to his custody, and the
presumption is made to arise from proof that he has received them and yet
he has failed to have them forthcoming upon proper demand. Clearly, the
fact presumed is but a natural inference from the fact proved, so that
it cannot be said that there is no rational connection between the two.
Furthermore, the statute establishes only a prima facie presumption,
thus giving the accused an opportunity to present evidence to rebut
it.
The presumption is reasonable and will stand the test of validity.

Fuertes v. Senate – G.R. No. 208162, January 7, 2020

DOCTRINE: The Constitutional presumption of innocence is not violated
when there is a logical connection between the fact proved and the ultimate
fact presumed. When such prima facie evidence is unexplained or
uncontradicted by the accused, the conviction founded on such evidence
will be valid. HOWEVER, the prosecution must still prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The existence of disputable
presumption does not preclude the presentation of contrary evidence.
IN THIS CASE, the constitutionality of section 14 of the Anti-Hazing law
was assailed by the petitioners in that, they contended, it provides a
presumption where the provision penalizes those who was merely present
on the initiation rites but had not witnessed, much less participated in any
wrong doing and, thus, unconstitutional.
The Court upheld the validity of the provision which provides that the
presence during a hazing is a prima facie evidence of participation
and related the same to conspiracy in the crime.
Citing Dungo vs. People, the Court held that, while conspiracy transcends
mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does
not in itself amount to conspiracy, the disputable presumption of actual
participation modifies the concept of conspiracy.
A disputable presumption arises from the mere presence of the offender
during the hazing, which can be rebutted by proving that the accused
took steps to prevent the commission of the hazing.

HENCE, as a rule, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in
itself amount to conspiracy, except under the anti-hazing law, where the
participation of the offenders in the criminal conspiracy can be proven by
the prima facie evidence due to their presence during the hazing, unless,
prevented the commission of the acts therein.
IN THIS CASE, Petitioner fails to show that a logic relation between the fact
proved (presence of a person during the hazing) and the ultimate fact
presumed (their participation in the hazing as a principal) is lacking.
NEITHER has it been shown that the provision does not meet the
requirement that the prosecution must prove the participation of the
accused in the hazing beyond reasonable doubt. Further, through their
express and implicit sanction, observers of hazing aggravate the abuses
perpetuated upon neophytes. Thus, further, those group members who
do not actually perform the hazing ritual, but who, by their presence,
incite or assure the violence being committed, may be principals
either by inducement or by indispensable cooperation.