Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 82604 December 10, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARCOS P. JIMENEZ and ROBERT JIMENEZ, accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Sisenando Y. Famoso for accused-appellants.

NARVASA, J.:p

The failure of the police authorities to observe the constitutional safeguards governing custodial
interrogation impels rejection of the extrajudicial confession ascribed to one of the appellants
and consequent reversal of the Trial Court's verdict of conviction chiefly based thereon.

On August 13, 1985 the pohce officers at the Ginatilan, Cebu station received a report that one
Pelagio Jimenez had been found dead at barangay Guiwanon, "below the cliff near the balite
tree." Without much loss of time, Pat. Reynaldo Cinco and other policemen went to the scene to
conduct an investigation. The Municipal Circuit Judge of Ginatilan, Hon. Palmacio Calderon,
accompanied them, as did Dr. Trifina M. Ferraren. They came upon the lifeless body of Pelagio
Jimenez at the place indicated, with stab and lacerated wounds on the head and leg; and
apparently the corpse was beginning to decompose since there were maggots crawling over the
face, arms, hands and feet.

The police investigators learned that the deceased Pelagio Jimenez had been living separately
from his family; that in the early morning of August 12, 1985, Marcos Jimenez, who was wont to
spend the night at his father's house, told his mother that Pelagio Jimenez had not come home the
previous night; that inquiries were immediately made about Pelagio and a search for him
undertaken by his relatives and friends; that although the search lasted the whole day and
proceeded well into the night of the 12th, it proved unsuccessful, and it was not until the morning
of the following day, August 13, 1985, that Pelagio Jimenez was finally found, murdered, the
searchers having been led to the place where he lay by the foul already being exuded by his
corpse.

The investigators also learned from the persons that interviewed of other circumstances that drew
their suspicion to the sons of Pelagio Jimenez, Marcos and Robert, viz.: that was a trail of drops
of dried blood leading from the porch (pantawan) of the dead person's residence to the cliff by
balite tree where he was ultimately found; that at some the point the trail of blood was
interrupted by a patch of freshly plowed soil, and Robert Jimenez said that it was he who had
plowed that part of the field and before doing so, had indeed noticed some blood on the ground
but had attached no significance to it; that midway between Pelagio's house and the cliff, there
we signs as of a body having been dragged through some bushes; that the brothers, Marcos and
Robert Jimenez, were seen by neighbors bathing at the artesian well in that place at midnight, "as
if washing away stains of blood;" and that Pelagio Jimenez often had violent quarrels with his
children, and had been known to complain that there were even occasions when he had been
boxed and hit by his children, particularly Marcos and Robert, who had been accused of
surreptitiously selling copra belonging to their father's brother, a Dr. Mario Jimenez.

On the 16th of September, 1985, the police invited Pelagio's widow, Albina Jimenez, and her
sons, Marcos and Robert Jimenez, for questioning about their father's killing. The circumstances
attendant upon and subsequent to the questioning Marcos Jimenez are succinctly narrated in the
People's brief as follows:

... At first, ... (Marcos) denied any participation on the of his father. However,
after Lt. Bancog confronted Marcos Jimenez of his observations during the ocular
inspection (id. [TSN, May 26, 1986], p. 23) the latter admitted that it was his
brother Roberto who hacked their father on the right leg. Thereafter, they (Marcos
and Roberto) carried their father near the balite tree by the cliff and left him there
(id., p. 30). Initially, Lt. Bancog took down appellant's confession in a piece of
paper (Exh."C") (id., p. 24; Tsn, December 19, 1985, p. 7). Thereafter, Lt. Bancog
gave the draft (Exh. "C") to Pat. Cavalida to enable the latter to type the same
(id., p. 47).

Pat. Cavalida continued the investigation conducted by Lt. Bancog (Tsn, March 6,
1986, p. 8) in the presence of Ex-Judge Jabagat who acted as counsel for appellant
Marcos Jimenez (id., pp. 10-11; Tsn, May 26, 1986, p. 22). He typed appellant's
confession (Exh. "B") which was contained in the draft (Exh. "C") prepared by Lt.
Bancog while at the same time, injecting some questions of his own (ibid., pp. 4-
5). Appellant was unable to sign his confession (Exh. "B") since Judge Calderon,
before whom the confession was supposed to be sworn to and signed, had earlier
left (id., p. 6). Hence, appellant agreed to come back the next day to sign his
statement (Exh. "B") (id., p. 7).

The next day, appellant Marcos Jimenez failed to come back as promised, and the
authorities were unsuccessful in fetching him since they were informed that
appellant had left for Cebu City (id., p. 7). Marcos Jimenez returned thereafter,
but refused to sign his statement (Exh. "B") (id., p. 8).

At about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of August 16, 1985 (Tsn, March 7, 1987, p.
4) Manolita Castañares, a relative of appellants, overheard a conversation between
appellant Marcos Jimenez and his mother Albina, while they were on their way
toward the house of Dr. Jimenez (ibid). She heard Albina tell Marcos that the way
he answered the questions during the examination before the authorities were
 wrong. Marcos replied. "It is just the same because if I don't admit, you will be
the one pressured" (id., pp. 4-5). Albina remarked, "You should have denied
about the circumstances why it happened like that"(id., p. 5). Marcos answered,
"(I)t is just the same. Had somebody seen the one mentioned in the affidavit when
I admitted?" (id.).

Lt. Bancog asked a policeman to invite ex-Judge Jabagat so that, to use her own words, she could
"assist the accused whose confession has been taken before the Office of the Chief of Police."
According to Judge Jabagat, when she arrived at the station. what happened was, again in her
own language, Marcos Jimenez —

... was asked about the written confession, and it was read to him. He was (also)
apprise (sic.) of his Constitutional right, and I ask him about the contains (sic) of
his written confession, I said to him "are these true?" and he said, Yes, alright I
said, you sign. I am here to assist you, but if you think you are hesitant to sign it,
you think it over and ask me (for) time, (saying) I would like to confer with my
uncle Engineer Marcos Jimenez and that we summon (sic) his uncle who was just
around, and after that, he told me he was not going to sign the confession and I
ask (sic) him, if you will not sign, you have the privilege not to sign, if you don't
like to sign its' (sic) just OK.

Subsequently, an information dated October 22, 1985 was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Cebu
with the Regional Trial Court accusing Pelagio's widow, Albina Jimenez, and her son by Pelagio,
Marcos, Robert, and Wilkins, of the felony of parricide in that

. . . on or about August 11, 1985 at around 8'clock P.M. a barangay Guiwanon,

Ginatilan, Cebu, ... said accused, confederating together and helping one another,
with intent to kill and during night time, and without just cause, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hack Pelagio Jimenez ...
with bolo, inflicting upon the said Pelagio Jimenez mortal injuries on varoius
parts of his body, that soon caused his death thereafter.

All the accused entered a plea of innocent when arraigned. At the trial, the prosecution presented
eight (8) witnesses whose evidence established substantially the facts above summarized. The
four defendants took the witness stand and gave evidence in their behalf. They all maintained
their innocence of the crime.

Marcos Jimenez' testimony, substantially corroborated by his brother, Robert, is outlined by the
Trial Court as follows:

... that on August 11, 1985, he was at the house of his uncle, Dr Marcos Jimenez.
His mother (Albina) and his two brothers, (Robert & Wilkins) were also there. He
claims that they were overseeing the house of their uncle. At about 6. P.M. of that
day, his father came an asked for dry coconut leaves to light his way in going
home. At past P.M., he went home while the rest stayed behind. When he arrived
home, he did not see his father. He slept until the following morning. When he
 still did not see his father the following morning, he went back to his uncle's
house to inform his mother and brothers that their father did not arrive home that
night. So, they agreed to look for him. They looked for him in the bushes and
towards the sea the whole day and the following day until the body was found
near the cliff. It was then that he went to the poblacion to notify the authorities
about the death of his father.

Continuing, ... (Marcos) admitted having been investigated by Lt. Bancog on

August 16. They were only two in the room. He likewise admitted that Judge
Jabagat arrived but only after his statement has been typed by Pat. Cavalida. He
admitted that Lt. Bancog wrote down what he stated, and this handwritten
statement was handed to Pat. Cavalida. ... (He also) admitted the existence of
blood near the house and plenty of it in the bushes ... ; the existence of blood in
the plowed area ... (and) it was he and Robert who plowed the same. In the matter
of his confession (Exh. "B"), he claims that what is stated there is in accordance
with what his uncle, Marcos Jimenez, wanted him to tell; that he was pressured to
admit the crime under threat of punishment.

The defense rested its case on July 21, 1986, at which time the Trial Court gave the parties thirty
(30) days "from receipt of the stenographic notes within which to submit simultaneous
memoranda." The Court, declaring that it was "cognizant of the fact that the accused had been
incarcerated and detained for almost one year"' also issued the following Order absolving, for
lack of proof, Albina Jimenez and her son, Wilkins, from liability under the indictment, viz.:

The court after appreciating all the facts and the law in this case, finds no
evidence whether direct or circumstantial that may tend to establish the guilt of
two of the accused in this case, namely: Albina Jimenez and Wilkins Jimenez.
Considering the rule that judgment of conviction should be imposed only after the
guilt of the accused has been proven beyond reasonable doubt, the said two
accused should be acquitted.

Wherefore, without prejudice to an extended decision, the Court finds the said
two (2) accused: Albina Jimenez and Wilkins Jimenez NOT GUILTY of the
charge against them. Accordingly, they are hereby ordered released from custody
unless there are other causes which would warrant their further detention.

This Order serves as a partial decision in this case. The Court, aware of the long
detention suffered by the said accused, hereby orders the promulgation of this
judgment upon the two accused immediately in open Court.

Then on December 19, 1986, the Trial Court promulgated its Decision (dated November 21,
1986) finding "the defendants Marcos Jimenez and Robert Jimenez guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of parricide as defined and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal
Code," and condemning "the said defendants to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua." The
Trial Court stressed that "the revelations ... in the confession all tally with the evidences adduced
during the trial, viz.: the hacking by Robert of his father with a bolo is confirmed by the doctor
who examined the cadaver; the carrying of the body from the house to the cliff is confirmed by
the evidences of the bloodstains found along the way from the house to the cliff and of the signs
of a body being dragged along the bushes." The Court then made the following legal
pronouncements:

The Court agrees with the ... prosecution that a confession, although unsigned
and/or involuntarily given, is admissible an evidence if in consequence of such
confession facts are discovered which confirm it. As correctly pointed out,
jurisprudence sustains the admission of such an involuntary confession (People v.
Fontanilla [CA] O.G. 1313), and where details as described in such confession is
corroborated by evidence aliunde which dovetails with the essential fact
contained in the confession (People v. Elizaga, 23 SCRA 449).

The evidence, likewise, show conspiracy on the part of both accused, Marcos and
Robert. While an extra-judicial confession is under certain conditions, admissible
only as against the person made it and not as against his co-defendants, it
becomes admissible as corroborative evidence of other facts that stand to establish
the guilt his co-defendants (People v. Simbajon, et al., L-18073-75, Sept. 20,
1965).

From this judgment the defendants have taken an appeal this Court and here ascribe the
following errors to the Trial Court, to wit:

1) not giving credit to the claim of accused Marcos Jimenez that what he stated in the alleged
confession is in accordance with what his uncle, Marcos Jimenez, wanted him to tell and that he
was pressured to admit the crime under threat of punishment;

2) not giving credence to the testimony of accused Robert Jimenez to the effect that he had
nothing to do with the death of his father ...;

3) holding that Pelagio Jimenez was found in the house near the cliff on August 13, 1985;

4) giving credence to the testimony of ex-Judge Pacita Jabagat to the effect that she was in the
office of the Station Commander of Ginatilan, Cebu, in the afternoon of August 16, 1985 and she
was then the counsel of accused Marcos Jimenez for the purpose of the confession and that she
read the confession to him and when asked whether he admitted to be true all the allegations as
stated in the confession, confirmed that everything is true;

5) holding that the evidence shows conspiracy on the part of both accused ... ; and

6) finding and holding both accused ... guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide
by mere circumstantial evidence, there being no eyewitness available.

The Constitution explicitly declares that a person being investigated by the police as a suspect in
an offense has the right, among others, "to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice" and if he "cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one;" and that said right "cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. 1
The lawyer who assists the suspect under custodial investigation should be of the latter's own
choice, not one foisted on him by the police investigators or other parties. In this case, former
Judge Jabagat was evidently not of Marcos Jimenez' own choice; she was the police officers'
choice; she did not ask Marcos if he was willing to have her represent him; she just told him: "I
am here because I was summon(ed) to assist you and I am going to assist you." This is not the
mode of solicitation of legal assistance contemplated by the Constitution.

In one case, the confession of an accused was rejected there being no showing that the lawyer of
the Citizens' Legal Assistance Office (CLAO) called by the National Bureau of Investigation to
assist the accused was his counsel of choice. 2 In another case, the confession given during
custodial investigation was invalidated where it appeared that the lawyers called to be present at
the interrogation were members of the police organization investigating the suspects and did not
actively assist and advise them, being there merely to give a semblance of legality to the
proceedings. 3 In still another case, the confession of the defendant was disregarded upon a
showing that he had been assisted by an assistant fiscal (public prosecutor), who "cannot exercise
the function of defense counsel even during custodial investigation," and to allow such a practice
"would render illusory the protection given to the accused." 4

Furthermore, the evidence discloses that Judge Jabagat was not present at the critical time that
interrogation of Marcos Jimenez by the police was actually taking place. She came only after the
questioning had been completed, and the handwritten record of Marcos Jimenez' answers already
typewritten; and all she did was to show the typewritten document to Marcos and ask him if he
had voluntarily given the statements therein contained. This is far from being even substantial
compliance with the constitutional duty of police investigators during custodial interrogation,
supra. It follows that neither the handwritten summary of Marcos Jimenez' answers made by two
investigating officers nor the typewritten statement based thereon is admissible.

The typewritten confession is, in any event, unsigned, as are the handwritten notes from which
the former was derived. The confession was in fact expressly rejected by Marcos Jimenez as riot
reflective of his own perceptions and recollection, but as containing only what his uncle, Marcos
Jimenez, had instructed him to tell the police "under threat of punishment." Hence. the supposed
waiver made therein of his constitutional right to counsel of his own choice is void.

The interrogation of Marcos Jimenez having been conducted without the assistance of counsel,
and no valid waiver of said right to Counsel having been made, not only the confession but also
any admission obtained in the course thereof are inadmissible against Marcos Jimenez. This, too,
is the explicit mandate of the Constitution: any confession or admission obtained in violation
among others of the rights guaranteed in custodial investigations shall be inadmissible in
evidence against the person making the confession or admission. This is so even if it be shown
that the statements attributed to the accused were voluntarily made, or are afterwards confirmed
to be true by external circumstances.

Equally obvious is that any confession or admission ascribed to Marcos Jimenez in the premises
is inadmissible against his brother, his co-accused, Robert Jimenez, not only because obtained in
violation of the Constitution and therefore void, but also because of the familiar principle of res
inter alios acta. 5 "The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission
of another; " 6 the confession of an accused is admissible only against him, but not against his
co-defendants. 7

Now, without the confession or the admissions imputed to Marcos Jimenez, the rest of the
evidence of the prosecution is inadequate to overcome the presumption of innocence raised by
the fundamental law in favor of both the accused.

For instance, proof of the presence of the appellants at or near the place of the commission of the
crime is innocuous. They were after all children of the deceased, one of whom usually slept in
the same house as the latter. And the fact that there might have been some animosity and quarrels
between the deceased, on the one hand, and his wife and children, on the other, would indicate at
the most that the latter might have reason to wish him ill, but would not be proof that they
actually attacked and killed him. Furthermore, the witnesses who gave evidence of said quarrels
were close relatives of the deceased, i.e., his brothers, a sister-in-law, his cousins, who were not
themselves on good terms with at least one of the appellants. Eng. Marcos Jimenez, brother of
the victim, was the one who requested Lt. Bancog, the Police Chief of another town, to
investigate close members of the victim's family — on the basis, according to him — of
"rumors" and "gossips" 8 circulating in the barrio. Another brother of the victim, Dr. Mario
Jimenez, who together with Eng. Jimenez, testified as to previous quarrels between the deceased
and appellant, had a previous misunderstanding with appellants concerning the latter's
unauthorized sale of the former's copra. Jacinta Jimenez who testified to a recent quarrel between
the victim and his wife and sons Marcos and Robert, is the wife of Eng. Marcos Jimenez.
Another relative of the deceased, Manolita Castañares, testified to having heard a conversation
between the victim's wife Albina and the latter's son Marcos wherein the mother chided her son
for giving wrong answers during the investigation.

The information gathered by the police to the effect that Marcos and Robert Jimenez had been
seen by neighbors bathing at the artesian well at midnight of the day of the crime, ostensibly
washing away blood from their bodies and clothing, is patently speculative and arrant hearsay.
Not one of the persons who had supposedly seen the appellants washing themselves ever took
the witness stand to affirm this.

It is not correct to say, as the Trial Court does in its judgment under review, that the appellants
had tried to cover up the commission of the crime by not reporting it immediately to the
authorities and by attempting, during the search for the deceased, to prevent others from going to
the precise spot where the slain man was eventually found. That the appellants did not
immediately notify the authorities that Pelagio Jimenez was missing cannot be taken as an
inculpatory circumstance against them. The truth is that the victim's family and neighbors first
looked everywhere for him, and when he was finally found after a day's search, Marcos Jimenez
forthwith reported his father's death to the police. The truth is, too, that as disclosed by the
evidence, Robert Jimenez had indeed conducted a search for his father in the vicinity of the cliff
near the balite tree where his father's body was found the following day. Marcos Jimenez knew
this, and this is why he afterwards told other persons involved in the search not to proceed to that
place any more. It bears stressing that the area covered by the search has been described as a
"vast" area, and there were many large boulders and thick bushes about the balite tree. This
might explain why the corpse could not be immediately located. In fact, were it not for the foul
odor emanating from the direction of the balite tree, the searchers would not have proceeded
thereto as the place was so secluded.

In fine, all the evidence considered, it appears that the prosecution has failed to demonstrate the
guilt of the appellants the crime with which they are charged beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Trial Court dated November 21, 1986 is REVERSED, and
the appellants, Marcos P. Jimenez and Robert Jimenez, are ACQUITTED, with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 89418-19. November 21, 1990.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RODOLFO ASPILI, ERNESTO

MAGBANUA, EDUARDO MENDOZA, RODOLFO SALES, ROBERT AGUIRRE and
PACIFICO REBUTIDO, Accused-Appellants.

The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Enrique A. Javier, Sr. counsel de oficio for Accused-Appellants.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; COMPLEX CRIMES; SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY

WITH HOMICIDE AGGRAVATED WITH RAPE, COMMITTED IN THE CASE AT BAR;
PENALTY THEREOF; SAID CRIME NOW DESIGNATED AS PIRACY IN PHILIPPINE
WATERS. — The Court finds, at the outset, that the trial judge erred in designating the offense
committed by the appellants as rape with homicide aggravated by robbery in band. For one,
neither in law nor in jurisprudence is there an aggravating circumstance as robbery in band. More
importantly, the evidence shows that what was committed is the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide aggravated by rape. The overwhelming evidence reveals that the original
design of the malefactors was to commit robbery in order to facilitate their escape from the penal
colony. Their original intent did not comprehend the commission of rape. Hence, the crime of
rape cannot be regarded as the principal offense. In this case, since it attended the commission of
robbery with homicide, the rape is deemed to aggravate the crime but damages or
indemnification for the victim may be awarded. (See People v. Bacsa, 104 Phil. 136 [1958];
People v. Tapales, 93 SCRA 134 [1979]). Instead of ignominy, it is the rape itself that aggravates
the crime (People v. Mongado, 28 SCRA 642 [1969]). With respect to the deaths of Daisy
Gonzales and Yolanda Arque, the appellants are clearly liable therefor since, as held by this
Court in People v. Mangulabnan, (99 Phil. 992 [1956]) it is immaterial that the death of a person
supervened by mere accident, provided that the homicide is produced by reason or on occasion
of the robbery. Since rape and homicide co-exist in the commission of robbery, the offense
committed by the appellants is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, aggravated
by rape, punishable under Paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). It does
not matter if the technical name assigned to the offense is rape with homicide and with robbery
in band, for the real nature of the crime charged is determined not by the title of the complaint,
nor by the specification of the provision of the law alleged to have been violated, but by the facts
recited in the complaint or information. (See People v. Oliviera, 67 Phil. 427 [1939]) As the acts
constituting robbery with homicide were clearly set forth in the complaint and proven during
trial, then the appellants may be held liable for such crime, regardless of the erroneous
designation of the offense. In passing, it may be mentioned that the crimes committed by
appellants are now denominated as piracy in Philippine waters, punishable under Presidential
Decree No. 532. We find it unnecessary to retroactively apply the provisions thereof in favor of
the appellants because the acts committed by them are likewise punishable therein by reclusion
perpetua.

2. ID.; AGGRAVATIG CIRCUMSTANCES; RECIDIVISM, IN BAND AND ABUSE OF

SUPERIOR STRENGTH, ALSO ESTABLISHED IN THE CASE AT BAR; NOCTURNITY
AND CRAFT, NOT CONSIDERED. — We find no merit in the appellants’ contention that the
lower court erred in considering recidivism as an aggravating circumstance. All the appellants
are recidivists. They were serving sentence at the Sta. Lucia Penal Colony by virtue of a final
judgment of conviction when they committed the above-mentioned offenses. Rodolfo Aspili,
Ernesto Magbanua, Eduardo Mendoza and Pacifico Rebutido have previously been convicted of
the crimes of frustrated homicide, serious physical injuries, theft, and murder and trespass to
dwelling, respectively. Both Rodolfo Sales and Roberto Aguirre have previously been convicted
of robbery in band. We likewise uphold the trial court’s finding that the crime was aggravated
because it was committed by a band. All the six appellants were armed when they boarded the
vessel and perpetrated their dastardly acts. There is also abuse of superior strength, since most of
the victims were women and children ranging from 2 to 9 years old. However, the aggravating
circumstances of nocturnity and craft should not have been considered by the lower court. There
was no showing that the appellants purposely sought the cover of night when they committed the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide. Neither did the appellants employ craft, since
they had already boarded the vessel when they pretended to buy Tanduay Rum in exchange for
the dried fish and chicken they were carrying. Even without such pretense, they could
nonetheless have carried out their unlawful scheme.

3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS; REQUIREMETS

AND RESTRICTIONS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF RIGHT TO
COUNSEL HAVE NO RETROACTIVE EFFECT AND DO NOT APPLY TO CONFESSIONS
TAKEN BEFORE JANUARY 17, 1973. — The interlocking extrajudicial confessions executed
by the appellants are admissible even if they were not informed of their right to counsel. These
confessions were all taken in January 1970, long before the 1973 Constitution took effect. Article
III Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution, for the first time, concretized the present right of persons
under custodial investigation to counsel, how to be informed of such right and the effect of non-
compliance. The requirements and restrictions surrounding this constitutional guarantee,
however, have no retroactive effect and do not apply to confessions taken before January 17,
1973, the date of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. (See Magtoto v. Manguera, 63 SCRA 4
[1975])

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The appellants seek a reversal of the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palawan, 4th
Judicial Region, Branch 48, finding them guilty of the crime of rape with homicide, with the
aggravating circumstances of robbery in band, taking advantage of nighttime, recidivism, abuse
of superior strength and craft.

The facts for the prosecution are summarized by the Solicitor General, as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"On December 28, 1969, the M/L Elsa left Puerto Princesa City for Dumaran, Palawan. On
board were Catalino Nadayao, the patron of the vessel; Pepito Severino and two other crew
members; and thirteen (13) passengers among whom were Narcisa Batayola, Daisy Gonzales,
Josie Gonzales, Yolanda Arque, Wenifredo Magallanes, a certain Bunag and several children
ranging from two (2) to nine (9) years of age. All in all, 17 persons were on board M/L Elsa with
some cargoes consisting of liquor like tanduay, beer, coke, etc. The vessel left Puerto Princesa at
3:00 o’clock in the morning, navigating towards the lighthouse but due to big waves and strong
winds, the launch was forced to seek shelter at Balon, Sta. Lucia, Puerto Princesa City, arriving
thereat about 6 to 7:00 o’clock in the morning where they were stranded because of the bad
weather and the damaged rudder of the launch (TSN, 2-18-70, pp. 169-176).

While at the aforementioned place, near the site of the Sta. Lucia Penal Colony, in the afternoon
between one and three o’clock, two persons went aboard the M/L Elsa. They were identified by
Josie Gonzales as Pacifico Rebutido and Rodolfo Aspili, and after Pepito Severino handed to
them the liquor they left the launch (TSN, 8-26-70, pp. 437-442).

It was later established that said two accused together with the other four, namely: Ernesto
Magbanua, Rodolfo Sales, Roberto Aguirre and Eduardo Mendoza, all convicts — colonists of
Sta. Lucia Penal Colony, had been drinking liquor (tanduay) since the morning of December 28,
1969 even as they hatched the plan to escape from the Penal Colony with the use of M/L Elsa.
The buying of the tanduay served also the purpose of acquainting the herein accused that the
crew and passengers of M/L Elsa were innocent, peaceful and unarmed (TSN, 11-26-40, pp. 307-
312).

Between 7 and 8 o’clock in the evening of the same day, the six accused carried out their agreed
plan to escape and, fully armed with pistols and boloes, they boarded the launch bringing with
them chicken and dried fish. Upon boarding the launch, they placed themselves in strategic
positions. Magbanua talked to the patron of the launch who ordered the engine operator, Pepito
Severino, to fetch four bottles of tanduay. While in the act of handing the tanduay to Magbanua,
the latter suddenly thrust his bolo at Severino’s abdomen, at the same time pointing a pistol at
him shouting ‘walang kikilos’ (nobody moves). This prompted Severino to jump into the sea,
after seeing also the rest of the accused draw their bolos. Witnessing all these hostile acts and
having evaded a stab by Rodolfo Sales who nevertheless chased him, Catalino Nadayao was
constrained to jump overboard. Some passengers and the rest of the crew who were frightened by
the shouting of Magbanua and the ensuing commotion likewise jumped into the sea (TSN 2-20-
70, pp. 183-193; 3-17-70, pp. 196-197). Among the passengers who jumped overboard were
Daisy Gonzales and Yolanda Arque.

Only five persons were left in the launch who did not jump overboard. Josie Gonzales tried to
jump overboard but Ernesto Magbanua, one of the accused, prevented her by holding both arms.
Magbanua pulled and dragged her. Josie struggled to free herself but to no avail. Magbanua
succeeded in dragging her over the cargoes where he pinned her down. While in that lying
position he forcibly raped her for about five to ten minutes. At that time, Magbanua was pointing
a gun at Josie’s head. After Magbanua was through, Rodolfo Sales approached her, took off his
pants and laid on top of her for about 3 to 5 minutes. At the time Sales was raping Josie,
Magbanua was still holding her and pointing a gun at her. After Sales, Pacifico Rebutido
approached her and likewise raped her. Josie tried to evade but she was already weak and only
felt pain (TSN, 8-26-70, pp. 458-463; 8-27-90, pp. 1-23).

On the other hand, Narcisa Batayola likewise attempted to jump but Magbanua also held her at
the back portion of her dress and told her to return to the place where she and the other children
were originally hiding. She saw the accused ransacking the cargoes and taking the contents
thereof. Moments later, Roberto Aguirre then with a pistol held Narcisa on the shoulders while
Eduardo Mendoza held her legs and wrestled her down. Aguirre had sexual intercourse with her
followed by Mendoza. Thereafter, Rodolfo Aspili brought her out toward a sawali and right there
and then made her lay down in a slanting position. When Aspili was having sexual intercourse
with her, nobody was holding her but she could no longer resist as she was already exhausted
and weak (TSN, 11-16-70, pp. 147-167).

Subsequently, the six accused left the launch and boarded their banca. Thereafter, Josie and
Narcisa together with the children jumped into the water and swam to the bakawan to hide. They
were rescued by the ‘Baracuda Launch.’ In the process, the dead bodies of Daisy Gonzales and
Yolanda Arque were found.

Necropsy examination on the cadavers of Daisy and Yolanda showed that both died of
suffocation by drowning as blood was coming out from their nose, mouth and opening of both
ears due to rapture of tempanic membrane (TSN, 2-17-70, pp. 109-124).

Dr. Dueñas, the examining physician, likewise found that Josie Gonzales and Narcisa Batayola
both had undergone sexual penetration recently.

Subsequently, both Josie Gonzales and Narcisa Batayola filed separate complaints charging the
herein, six accused with the crimes of Rape with Homicide and Robbery in Band." (Brief for the
plaintiff-appellee, pp, 2-8, Rollo, p. 334)
On the basis of the above-mentioned alleged acts committed by the accused, the following
criminal cases were filed: cralawnad

1. Criminal Case No. 3

for

Rape with Homicide and with Robbery in Band

COMPLAINT

"The undersigned complainants, after having been duly sworn to oath in accordance with law,
accuse RODOLFO ASPILI, ERNESTO MAGBANUA, EDUARDO MENDOZA, RODOLFO
SALES, ROBERTO AGUIRRE and PACIFICO REBUTIDO, of the crime of RAPE WITH
HOMICIDE AND WITH ROBBERY IN BAND, committed as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"‘That on or about the 28th day of December, 1969, in Sitio Balon, Sta. Lucia Sub-Colony,
Municipality of Puerto Princesa, Province of Palawan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused who are all serving sentence by virtue of a final
judgment in the Iwahig Penal Colony, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, conspiring and confederating
together and helping one another, forcibly boarded the motor launch named ‘M/L ELSA’ which
was then at anchor seeking shelter in the vicinity due to bad weather and while on board the said
vessel the accused Ernesto Magbanua, Rodolfo Sales, and Pacifico Rebutido, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with deliberate intent and lewd designs and by means of
force, violence and intimidations using guns and boloes for the purpose, had sexual intercourse
one after the other with the herein complainant JOSIE GONZALES, a minor 13 years of age,
against her will, she being one of the 17 passengers aboard the said vessel while the rest of the
accused were either having carnal knowledge with another victim NARCISA BATAYOLA,
likewise a minor 15 years of age, by means of force and intimidation and against her will; while
the others were ransacking the baggages of the passengers and on the occasion of such acts of the
accused, panic took place aboard the said vessel thus forcing the other passengers to jump
overboard for fear of bodily harm, and as a consequence thereof, DAISY GONZALES age 15,
and YOLANDA ARQUE, age 9, both passengers of the said vessel were drowned; and further
on the occasion thereof, all the accused took and carried away, unlawfully and feloniously and
against the will of the owners thereof, cash amount of money, personal belongings and cargoes
aboard the vessel amounting to no less than TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency.’"

CONTRARY TO LAW and with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, by an armed band,
in an uninhabited place, recidivism and or reiteration, with evident premeditation, superior
strength and with the use of craft, fraud or disguise, and penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4111 in relation to Article 160 of the
same Code." chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

SGD. PABLO GONZALES SGD. JOSIE GONZALES

Father-Complainant Complainant

(Rollo, pp. 15-16)

2. Criminal Case No. 4

for

Rape with Homicide and with Robbery in Band

COMPLAINT

"That on or about the 28th day of December, 1969, in Sitio Balon, Sta. Lucia Sub-Colony,
Municipality of Puerto Princesa, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused who are all serving sentence by virtue of a final
judgment in the Iwahig Penal Colony, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, conspiring, confederating
together and helping one another, forcibly boarded the motor launch named ‘M/L ELSA’ which
was then at anchor seeking shelter in the vicinity due to bad weather and while on board the said
vessel, the accused Roberto Aguirre, Eduardo Mendoza and Rodolfo Aspili, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with deliberate intent and lewd designs and by means of
force, violence and intimidation, using guns and boloes for the purpose had sexual intercourse,
one after the other, with herein complainant, Narcisa Batayola, a minor 15 years of age, against
her will, she being one of the 17 passengers aboard the same vessel while the rest of the accused
were either having carnal knowledge with another victim, Josie Gonzales, likewise a minor 13
years of age, by means of force and intimidation and against her will; while the others were
ransacking the baggages of the passengers and on the occasion of such acts of the accused, panic
took place aboard the said vessel, thus forcing the other passengers to jump over board for fear of
bodily harm, and as a consequence thereof, Daisy Gonzales age 15 and Yolanda Arque, age 9,
both passengers of the said vessel were drowned; and further on the occasion thereof, all the
accused took and carried away unlawfully and feloniously and against the will of the owners
thereof, cash amount of money, personal belongings and cargoes of the vessel amounting to no
less than P2,000.00, Philippine Currency.

"Contrary to law and with the aggravating circumstances of night time, by an armed band in an
uninhabited place, recidivism and/or reiteration, with evident premeditation, superior strength
and with the use of craft, fraud or disguise, and penalized under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. No. 4111 in relation to Art. 160 of the same Code.

Puerto Princesa, Palawan, Philippines, January 7, 1970

(SGD.) CRISTITO ARQUE (SGD.) NARCISA BATAYOLA Y ARQUE Guardian-Uncle-

Complainant Complainant"

(Rollo, pp. 179-180)

The facts for the defense are summarized by their counsel as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The true facts of the cases are those testified to by Ernesto Magbanua, Eduardo Mendoza,
Roberto Aguirre, Rodolfo Sales and Manolo Espino stated briefly hereunder as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

At about 9:00 o’clock in the morning of December 28, 1969, Ernesto Magbanua and Roberto
Aguirre left their nipa hut at Santa Lucia Penal Colony and went to the Prison Brigade of the said
colony to get their dirty clothes. At the brigade they met three (3) private persons, passengers or
crews of Motor Launch ‘Elsa’. They were eating ‘Camote Cassava’ with the Capataz of the
colony on duty, a certain person called Rudy.

From the brigade, Magbanua and Aguirre proceeded to the hut of Pacifico Rebutido. There they
saw Pacifico Rebutido, Rodolfo Aspili, Rodolfo Sales and Eduardo Mendoza drinking tanduay
which were brought to Rebutido’s hut by the three (3) private persons from the Motor Launch
‘Elsa’.

At about 6:00 o’clock in the afternoon of the same date, Ernesto Magbanua and his companions
returned to the colony brigade for the usual daily checking and counting of prisoners. After the
checking-up, the group returned to the nipa hut of Pacifico Rebutido and there planned to escape
from the Sta. Lucia Penal Colony situated in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. They agreed to hire the
Motor Launch ‘Elsa’ anchored about ten (10) arms length from the wharf of Sta. Lucia Penal
Colony in Balon, Puerto Princesa, Palawan with money, chickens and dried fish.

At about 7:00 o’clock in the evening of that date the group, defendants-appellants herein, went to
the Motor Launch ‘Elsa’ using the banca of the colony and bringing with them money, chickens
and dried fish. Ernesto Magbanua boarded the launch ahead of the rest, talked to the patron of
the launch to bring them to liberty and offered money, chickens and dried fish for their fares. His
companions likewise boarded the motor launch, Rebutido being the last to board the same at the
time when the patron of the launch was still thinking and considering the offer of Magbanua. But
when Rebutido reached the deck of the launch, he stepped on a loose board and fell inside the
engine room. The impact of his fall was so loud that the patron jumped overboard into the sea
shouting to his crews and passengers to likewise jump into the sea. Only two women, a man and
small children remained in the launch. Magbanua told the remaining persons on board the launch
not to jump overboard because they did not have bad intentions.

Magbanua and his companions then searched for those who jumped into the sea for anyone who
may not know how to swim in order to save him. And they found a small boy about nine (9)
years of age struggling to swim. They saved him by using a pole and pulling him towards the
launch. When asked why he jumped overboard, the boy said that he jumped because he heard the
Captain of the launch shouting to them to jump into the sea.

When the herein appellants found no more persons on the sea around the launch, Rodolfo Aspili
and Eduardo Mendoza went down to the engine room with one male passenger of the launch and
tried to start the engine. It was at that moment when Magbanua who remained on the deck saw
Josie Gonzales at the prow of the launch. He asked her to accomodate him for a sexual
intercourse, but Josie pointed him instead to Narcisa Batayola saying that Batayola is the one
having experience on the matter. When told that he (Magbanua) did not like Batayola, Josie
agreed to a sexual intercourse if Magbanua will not harm her. She undressed herself when told to
undress. Then Magbanua opened the zipper of his pants and let Josie hold his penis. While Josie
was holding his penis, Magbanua made her lie down. He inserted his penis inside the vagina of
Josie who complained of pains. It took Magbanua about five (5) minutes to insert only two
inches of his penis inside the vagina of Josie Gonzales. At that same moment, Rodolfo Sales and
Pacifico Rebutido pulled Magbanua up from Josie Gonzales reminding Magbanua that their
agreement was only to escape and what he was doing to Josie Gonzales was not part of their
agreement.

At about the same time that Magbanua was having sexual intercourse with Josie Gonzales,
Roberto Aguirre was also having sexual intercourse with Narcisa Batayola. Before the
intercourse, Aguirre saw Batayola about to jump into the sea. He prevented her from jumping
overboard by holding her. Then he went around the deck of the launch to see if there were still
persons swimming on the water, leaving Batayola at the prow of the launch. Seeing none, he
returned to Batayola and asked her to have sexual intercourse with him. At first Batayola
refused. But later she undressed herself when told to undress. Aguirre made her lie down and he
inserted his penis inside the vagina of Narcisa Batayola without any difficulty. He made two
successive sexual intercourse with Narcisa Batayola, after which they both dressed up. They
were in that situation when Rodolfo Sales and Pacifico Rebotido arrived, pulled Aguirre away
and they boarded their banca because they saw someone flashlighting the premises at the shore.
Magbanua also called Aspili and Eduardo Mendoza at the engine room and they likewise
boarded their banca and proceeded to the mangrove swamp to escape. On the way, they noticed
that Aspili was left behind." (Appellant’s Brief, pp. 3-6)

The two cases were consolidated and, after hearing, the lower court rendered judgment finding
the accused guilty of the crime of rape with homicide. The dispositive portion of the decision is
set forth below: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, haloed by the illuminating light of all aforegoing facts, laws, jurisprudence and
arguments, this Court finds all the herein accused, namely: Rodolfo Aspili, Ernesto Magbanua,
Eduardo Mendoza, Jr., Rodolfo Sales, Roberto Aguirre and Pacifico Rebutido guilty of the
crimes of Rape with Homicide, with the aggravating circumstances of Robbery in Band, taking
advantage of nighttime, recidivism, abuse of superior strength and craft, in the above-entitled
Criminal Case No. 3, beyond reasonable doubt, and sentences all of them to Reclusion Perpetua,
and all, likewise, guilty of the same but separate crime with all the same aforementioned
aggravating circumstances, in the above-entitled Criminal Case No. 4, beyond reasonable doubt
and imposes upon all of them, another separate penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, both penalties to
be served successively, with all its accessory penalties too in both cases, further, all same six (6)
herein accused are sentenced and ordered to pay actual damages jointly and solidarily as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. P265.00 — to Josie Gonzales;

2. 24.00 — to Narcisa Batayola;

3. 36.00 — to Pepito Severino and

4. P1,675.00 — to Catalino Nadayao, for and the other passengers, named by him to have
suffered losses, in an amount corresponding to each, respectively,

and furthermore, the same six (6) aforenamed accused are sentenced and ordered to pay, jointly
and solidarily, moral damages, in the amount of P25,000.00 to each of Josie Gonzales and
Narcisa Batayola, their heirs and assigns respectively, as moral damages, and ultimately to
indemnify in the same manner, the parents, their heirs and assigns of deceased Daisy Gonzales
and Yolanda Arque, the amount of P30,000.00 for each and every death of the said two (2)
deceased, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in all the aforecited civil
liabilities. It is further directed that an alias warrant of arrest be issued against Rodolfo Sales and
Pacifico Rebutido and not to be returned until they were in the custody of the law." (Rollo, pp.
290-291)

We agree with the trial court that the prosecution correctly presented the facts of the case.

The appellants raise the following assignments of errors: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS HEREIN ARE RAPE WITH HOMICIDE WITH THE
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF ROBBERY IN BAND, NIGHTTIME, SUPERIOR
STRENGTH, RECIDIVISM, AND CRAFT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

HEREIN CONSPIRED TO COMMIT THE OFFENSES OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE AND
CONVICTING ALL OF THEM OF THE SAID CRIMES." (Rollo, pp. 326-327)

The Court finds, at the outset, that the trial judge erred in designating the offense committed by
the appellants as rape with homicide aggravated by robbery in band. For one, neither in law nor
in jurisprudence is there an aggravating circumstance as robbery in band. More importantly, the
evidence shows that what was committed is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
aggravated by rape.

The records disclose that the appellants took control of the vessel M/L Elsa by threatening the
crew and passengers with their boloes and pistols. (TSN, pp. 452-459, August 26, 1970; pp. 137-
148, November 16, 1970) Narcisa Batayola, a prosecution witness, testified that after the
commotion that ensued when appellants wielded their weapons, some of the appellants
immediately started ransacking the cargoes and taking the contents thereof (TSN, p. 148,
November 16, 1970) These acts of the appellants therefore manifest an unlawful intent to gain,
through violence and intimidation of persons, by taking the vessel and personal property of the
crew and passengers, which comprises the crime of robbery.

The overwhelming evidence reveals that the original design of the malefactors was to commit
robbery in order to facilitate their escape from the penal colony. Their original intent did not
comprehend the commission of rape. Hence, the crime of rape cannot be regarded as the
principal offense. In this case, since it attended the commission of robbery with homicide, the
rape is deemed to aggravate the crime but damages or indemnification for the victim may be
awarded. (See People v. Bacsa, 104 Phil. 136 [1958]; People v. Tapales, 93 SCRA 134 [1979]).
Instead of ignominy, it is the rape itself that aggravates the crime (People v. Mongado, 28 SCRA
642 [1969]).

With respect to the deaths of Daisy Gonzales and Yolanda Arque, the appellants are clearly
liable therefor since, as held by this Court in People v. Mangulabnan, (99 Phil. 992 [1956]) it is
immaterial that the death of a person supervened by mere accident, provided that the homicide is
produced by reason or on occasion of the robbery. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Since rape and homicide co-exist in the commission of robbery, the offense committed by the
appellants is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, aggravated by rape,
punishable under Paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). It does not matter
if the technical name assigned to the offense is rape with homicide and with robbery in band, for
the real nature of the crime charged is determined not by the title of the complaint, nor by the
specification of the provision of the law alleged to have been violated, but by the facts recited in
the complaint or information. (See People v. Oliviera, 67 Phil. 427 [1939]) As the acts
constituting robbery with homicide were clearly set forth in the complaint and proven during
trial, then the appellants may be held liable for such crime, regardless of the erroneous
designation of the offense.

With the foregoing pronouncements, the Court no longer deems it necessary to deal with the
appellants’ argument in their first assignment of error that assuming arguendo that they are guilty
of committing rape, the crimes of rape and homicide should be viewed as separate and distinct
offenses. We have already ruled that the crime committed is the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, the rape being considered merely as an aggravating circumstance.

We find no merit in the appellants’ contention that the lower court erred in considering
recidivism as an aggravating circumstance. All the appellants are recidivists. They were serving
sentence at the Sta. Lucia Penal Colony by virtue of a final judgment of conviction when they
committed the above-mentioned offenses. Rodolfo Aspili, Ernesto Magbanua, Eduardo Mendoza
and Pacifico Rebutido have previously been convicted of the crimes of frustrated homicide,
serious physical injuries, theft, and murder and trespass to dwelling, respectively. Both Rodolfo
Sales and Roberto Aguirre have previously been convicted of robbery in band.

We likewise uphold the trial court’s finding that the crime was aggravated because it was
committed by a band. All the six appellants were armed when they boarded the vessel and
perpetrated their dastardly acts. There is also abuse of superior strength, since most of the
victims were women and children ranging from 2 to 9 years old. chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
However, the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and craft should not have been considered
by the lower court. There was no showing that the appellants purposely sought the cover of night
when they committed the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. Neither did the
appellants employ craft, since they had already boarded the vessel when they pretended to buy
Tanduay Rum in exchange for the dried fish and chicken they were carrying. Even without such
pretense, they could nonetheless have carried out their unlawful scheme.

With respect to the second assignment of error, the appellants’ contention that there was no
conspiracy in the commission of rape becomes immaterial in view of the fact that all of them
directly participated in its commission. Appellants Magbanua, Sales and Rebutido took turns in
raping Josie Gonzales, while appellants Aguirre, Mendoza and Aspili ravished Narcisa Batayola.
The Court accords more weight and credence to the testimonies of complainants Gonzales and
Batayola. These two girls, 13 and 15 years old respectively, would not subject themselves to the
rigors of a public trial if they were not motivated by an honest desire to punish their assailants.
Moreover, their narrations were corroborated by the testimony of Dr. Juanito Duenas who
physically examined Gonzales and Batayola and found that both indeed had just undergone
sexual penetration.

The interlocking extrajudicial confessions executed by the appellants are admissible even if they
were not informed of their right to counsel. These confessions were all taken in January 1970,
long before the 1973 Constitution took effect. Article III Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution, for
the first time, concretized the present right of persons under custodial investigation to counsel,
how to be informed of such right and the effect of non-compliance. The requirements and
restrictions surrounding this constitutional guarantee, however, have no retroactive effect and do
not apply to confessions taken before January 17, 1973, the date of effectivity of the 1973
Constitution. (See Magtoto v. Manguera, 63 SCRA 4 [1975])

At any rate, even without considering these extrajudicial confessions, the Court is convinced that
the guilt of appellants has been incontrovertibly established beyond reasonable doubt by the
prosecution.

The Court, however, finds that the trial judge erred in imposing upon the appellants two separate
penalties of reclusion perpetua, both penalties to be served successively. The basis for this
imposition by the lower court is its finding that the appellants are guilty of two crimes of rape
with homicide, one for the rape of Josie Gonzales and the other for the rape of Narcisa Batayola.
We have already pronounced, though, that the rape committed is merely an aggravating
circumstance. Since the appellants are found guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide aggravated by rape, recidivism, in band and abuse of superior strength, then, applying
Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, only one penalty of reclusion perpetua
should have been imposed. cralawnad

In passing, it may be mentioned that the crimes committed by appellants are now denominated as
piracy in Philippine waters, punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532. We find it
unnecessary to retroactively apply the provisions thereof in favor of the appellants because the
acts committed by them are likewise punishable therein by reclusion perpetua.
Considering the perversity accompanying the crime, the heinous nature not only of the offense
but its manner of commission, and the refusal of the accused to learn from their earlier
convictions, the Court strongly feels that the sentences herein imposed must be fully served. Any
official who goes over any applications for pardon or parole is urged to read the records of the
case before acting on the applications.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 3 and 4 is AFFIRMED but
MODIFIED. The appellants are found guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide with the aggravating circumstances of rape, recidivism, in band and abuse of superior
strength and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The award of
actual damages is hereby affirmed. The awards representing indemnity for the deaths are
increased to P50,000.00 for each victim while the moral damages for the rapes are increased to
P30,000.00 for each victim.

SO ORDERED.

People v Judge Ayson 175 SCRA 216 (1989)

02/14/2011

0 Comments

 
Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines and was allegedly
involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets.  The PAL management notified him of an
investigation to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code
of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the
Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was
sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit
team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he
was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not
ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not
guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos’ written admission and statement, to which
defendants argued that the confession was taken without the accused being represented by a
lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by
the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the
admission and statement of accused.
Held: No. The judge should admit the evidence in court as the accused was not under custodial
investigation when his statements were taken. One cannot invoke violation of the right to counsel
in administrative proceeding. The right to self incrimination and custodial investigation are
accorded only when the accused is subjected to custodial inquest which involves the questioning
initiated by police authorities after a person is taken in custody or deprived of his freedom in any
way. Because the statements were obtained beyond the purview of custodial investigation the
evidence should be admitted in court.
---------------
Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the
accused include:
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. 
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall
be used against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.

He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything
he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him
throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded
him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or
make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the
prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against
him.The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-
dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of
constitutional rights."

People v Pinlac 165 SCRA 675 (1988)

Facts: The accused was convicted for two separate criminal cases for robbery and robbery with
homicide. He assailed his conviction on the contention that the court erred in admitting his extrajudicial
confession as evidence which was taken by force, violence, torture, and intimidation without having
appraised of his constitutional rights and without the assistance of counsel.

Issue: Whether or not due process was observed during the custodial investigation of the accused.

Held: The court find it meritorious to declare that the constitutional rights of the accused was violated in
the failure of the authorities in making the accused understand the nature of the charges against him
without appraising him of his constitutional right to have a counsel during custodial investigation.
Moreover the prosecution merely presented the extrajudicial confession of the accused which is
inadmissible as evidence and the other evidences provided therein are merely circumstantial and
subject for rebuttal. The court acquitted the accused. 

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 79138 July 2, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DAVID LOVERIA y SANTOS, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for defendant-appellant.

CORTES, J.:
The accused-appellant David S. Loveria was charged before the Regional Trial Court, Branch CLIX (159) with the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and Frustrated Homicide under the following information:

That on or about the 21st day of February, 1985, in the Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with
three (3) John Does whose true name, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping and
aiding one another, armed with a knife, with intent of gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, hold-up a passenger jeepney with Plate No. NXG-150-Pil. '84, one of the
passengers, Richard Bales y Andres of his Seiko Wrist Watch worth P300.00 and a colored brown wallet containing
 P50.00, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforementioned amount of P350.00; that on the occasion of
said robbery, said accused, with intent to kill, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab with the said knife one Ricardo Yamson y Malanon, thereby inflicting upon him stab wounds which directly caused
his death, and one Cerilo Manzanero y Nacion the driver of the said passenger jeepney, on the vital parts of his body,
thereby inflicting upon him stab wounds which ordinarily would have caused his death, thus performing all the acts of
execution which should have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by
reason of cause independent of the will of the accused, that is, due to the timely and able medical attendance rendered
to the said Cerilo Manzanero y Nacion which prevented his death.

Contrary to law. (Rollo, p. 3).

Upon being arraigned on July 3, 1985, the appellant entered a plea of not guilty (Record, p. 18.)

The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:

On February 25, 1985, at around 7:00 in the evening, Cerilo Manzanero was driving a jeepney fully loaded with
passengers en-route from Cubao, Quezon City to Cogeo, Marikina, Metro-Manila. While crossing the bridge of
Barangay Baranca, Marcos Highway, Marikina, Metro Manila, accused shouted "hold-up" and Manzanero stopped his
jeep. Accused who was seated right behind Manzanero, poked a knife on the latter's right side of his nape and then
pulled him off his seat with the assistance of another companion into the inner rear portion of the jeep; at the same
time, stabbing Manzanero with knives at the front and back of his body. Accused had three (3) other companions. One
was seated on the right side of the jeep, opposite accused; the two others were seated opposite each other at the rear
side of the jeep. Accused and his three other companions divested the passengers of their jewelries, watches, rings
and necklaces.

Manzanero had a companion-conductor by the name of Richard Bales who was seated in front of the jeep at the right
side. He was likewise stabbed by the other companion of accused who he identified as Martin Castaneda but he
sustained only slight injury on his finger. His Seiko watch was taken from him.

Passenger Ricardo Yamson was likewise seated on the front part of the jeepney in between driver Manzanero and
conductor Bales. He was stabbed by one of the holduppers and died that same night. Testimonies of victim driver
Cerilo Manzanero; passenger Betty S. Apolinario; conductor and victim Richard Bales; Patrolmen Jaime Agueda and
Bill Ayun (TSN, Hearings of August 14 and 21, 1985; October 9, 1985; November 13, 1985; May 5, 1986; June 23,
1986; July 15, 1986; December 8 and 23, 1986; January 6, 1987; Exhibits B and I, C and O)

Cerilo Manzanero was brought to Sto. Niño Hospital at Marcos Highway and then transferred to Quezon City Medical
Center where he was treated by Dr. Antonio P. Ligot who issued a Medico-Legal Certificate with the following
diagnosis:

Multiple stab wound antero-posterior chest wall, Bilateral, Penetrating, Bilateral Hemothoax
Bilateral Thoracostomy

(Exhs. A and A-1). Dr. Ligot testified that these injuries would have caused the death of Manzanero were he not treated
medically. (TSN, hearing of October 21, 1986).

Mrs. Amada Yaco, mother-in-law of Manzanero presented receipts for medicine expenses in the amount of P2,051.80
(Exhs. J, J-1 to J-19; M-4 to M-6) doctor's fee of P3,000.00 (Exh. K); payments for the blood in the amount of P470.00
(Exhs. L and M); and P2,700.00 for the hospital bills (Exhs. M-1 to M-3) or a grand total of P8,221.80.

Victim Ricardo Yamson was brought to the Quirino Memorial Hospital at 8:30 in the evening of February 21, 1985
where he died of profuse hemmorrhage, secondary to stab wound at 9:20 in the same evening (Exhs. F, G and H;
Testimony of Mrs. Carmelita Yamson, Hearing of February 3, 1986).i•t•c-aüsl Carmelita Yamson, victim's mother,
testified that for the funeral parlor services, they spent P5,300.00; for cemetery expenses, P1,700.00; for transportation
expenses, P750.00; for interment, P12,000.00; for 40 days prayer period, P4,500.00; for expenses incurred during the
preliminary investigation on the Fiscal's office in Marikina, Metro Manila, P1,500.00; or a total expenses of P28,750.00
which witness rounded off to P29,000.00 (TSN, Hearing of February 3, 1986).

(Trial Court Decision, pp. 2-3.)

The defense offered by the appellant is summarized by his counsel as follows:

The accused David Loveria, 25 years old, formerly residing at Sitio Maagay, Antipolo, Rizal and a volunteer worker of
the Share and Care for Poor Settlers Pastoral (SCAP for short) declared that on February 18, 1985, he was attending a
live-in seminar at the Communication for Asia in Old Sta. Mesa, Manila. The duration of the seminar was from February
18 to February 22, 1989. Between 8:00 and 8:30 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1985, upon permission from
their training officer, he went to the Farmers Market in Cubao to ask money from his mother for transportation fare for
 the following day. When he failed to meet his mother, he decided to go back to the Communication Foundation for
Asia. Fortunately, at the loading zone for passenger vehicles bound for Sta. Mesa, he met his father who gave him
money. After that, he went back to the Communication Foundation for Asia and stayed there the whole evening. (TSN,
pp. 6-13, January 5, 1987)

(Appellants Brief, p. 6.)

After trial, the trial court found the appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the decision dated May 26, 1987 reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the prosecution having established the guilt of (the) accused beyond reasonable
doubt, the Court hereby finds accused David Loveria GUILTY of the complex crime of Robbery with Homicide and
Frustrated Homicide under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code with the aggravating circumstance of having been
committed in band, without any mitigating circumstance; and, in relation to Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, hereby imposes upon him to suffer life imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua; and orders said accused:

(1) to pay the compulsory heirs of deceased victim Ricardo Yamson, represented by his mother Conchita Yamson, the
amount of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) as an indemnity for Ricardo Yamson's death; TEN THOUSAND
PESOS (P10,000.00) as and for actual damages; TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as and for moral damages;
TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as and for exemplary damages:

(2) to pay victim Cerilo Manzanero the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY ONE PESOS &
80/100 (P8,221.80) as indemnity for actual damages; P5,000.00 as and for moral damages; and P5,000.00 as and for
exemplary damages; and

(3) to indemnify Richard Bales the amount of THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P300.00) for the unrecovered watch.

[Trial Court Decision, p. 7]

From this judgment of conviction, the appellant filed the present appeal.

The first issue raised by the appellant pertains to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

To prove the culpability of the appellant, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Cirilo Manzanero, the driver of the jeepney:
Richard Bales, the companion/conductor of Manzanero; Betty Apolinario, a passenger of the jeepney; Dr. Antonio Ligot, the physician who
examined Manzanero; Pat. Bill Ayun and Pat. Jaime Ganueda, of the Marikina Police Station who conducted an investigation of the incident.
The following witnesses were also presented to prove the civil liability arising from the crime: (1) Carmelita Yamson, the mother of the victim
Ricardo Yamson; and (2) Amada Yaco, the mother-in-law of Manzanero.

The appellant specifically assails the credibility of Cerilo Manzanero, Betty Apolinario and Richard Bales, all of whom positively identified the
appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime.

According to Manzanero, while he was driving his fully loaded passenger jeepney on the evening of February 21, 1985 from Cubao to
Cogeo, Marikina, he heard a person from the back announce a hold-up, which made him pull the jeepney to a sudden stop. Whereupon, the
passenger immediately behind him, or on the extreme left side of the jeepney, poked a bladed weapon on the right side of his neck (TSN,
August 14, 1985, p. 5). Manzanero was able to identify the person who poked the knife at him as the appellant David Loveria because the
former managed to turn his face towards the latter (TSN, August 21, 1985, p. 13).

Manzanero was then taken by the appellant and three other men inside the jeepney, at the back portion thereof, and was stabbed several
times (TSN, August 14, 1985, p. 6). After the stabbing, Manzanero's wristwatch and earnings were taken from him (TSN, August 21, 1985, p.
17). Injured, Manzanero rolled down from the jeepney but was able to flee (TSN, August 14, 1985, p. 11).

Richard Bales, the companion/conductor of Manzanero, who was seated on the front seat corroborated the testimony of Manzanero on
almost all its material points. He testified that he saw the appellant stab Manzanero (TSN, June 23, 1986, pp. 3-4 & 16). However, Bales
added that after the four men were finished with Manzanero, they turned to him and Ricardo Yamson, a passenger who was also seated on
the front seat beside Bales (Id, pp. 6-7).i•t•c-aüsl One of the robbers, whom Bales identified as a certain Martin Castañeda, stabbed him,
injuring his finger, and took his watch (Id.). The other robbers chased Yamson, who attempted to flee, and stabbed him on the neck (Id., pp.
16-17). Yamson was taken to the Quirino Memorial General Hospital but died that same night. [Exh. "F" (Medico-Legal Certificate) and Exh.
"G" (Autopsy Report)].

Betty S. Apolinario, a passenger who was seated on the left side of the jeepney testified that the four hold-up men boarded the jeepney in
Cubao (TSN, October 9, 1985, p. 5) and seated themselves on the four corners of the jeepney (Id, p. 6). Apolinario stated that she saw the
appellant David Loveria poke a knife at the driver, pull the latter from the driver's seat, and stab him after taking him to the inner back portion
of the jeepney (Id., pp. 4-5). She was able to remember the appellant because she was the third passenger from the driver's back. In other
words, there was only one person between her and the appellant (Id., p. 4). Apolinario also testified that the hold-up men forcibly took
valuable from the passengers (Id., p. 8).

The appellant contends that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Cerilo Manzanero, the driver because of its
improbability. The appellant argues that "(i)f indeed the purpose was to stab the jeepney driver, then there was no need to bring him to the
rear portion of the jeepney to accomplish the purpose. He could be stabbed while seated at the driver's seat." (Appellant's Brief, p. 7).

The contention is without merit. It is true that Manzanero could have been stabbed by the appellant while the former was at the driver's seat.
But neither was it improbable for appellant to have stabbed Manzanero in the manner described by the latter and corroborated by witnesses
Apolinario and Bales. The motive which impelled the appellant and his companions in pulling Manzanero out of the driver's seat and stabbing
him at the inner rear portion of the jeepney is known only to them. The Court will not speculate as to why the appellant and his companions
executed the crime in the manner that they did. Crimes are known to have been executed in odd and unusual ways. But in the instant case,
the Court is of the considered view that there was nothing strange nor improbable in tile testimony of Manzanero. Apolinario and Bales that
after the jeepney stopped, the appellant poked a knife at Manzanero, pulled the latter out of the driver's seat, and together with his
companions took him to the rear portion of the jeepney where Manzanero was eventually stabbed and robbed of his wristwatch and
earnings.

The appellant next turns to witness Betty S. Apolinario, contending that she failed to positively identify the appellant because when asked to
identify any of the holdup men who may be present in court, she stated the following in reference to the appellant:, "I think he is the one
wearing a white T-shirt" [TSN, October 9, 1985, p. 7 ]. However, Apolinario's use of the expression "I think" does not necessarily indicate her
uncertainty as to the identity of the appellant. In fact, when the defense tried to exploit, during the cross-examination of Apolinario, the
seemingly tentative statement just quoted, it became apparent that she was sure and positive about the identity of the appellant. The
pertinent portion of the cross-examination is quoted as follows:

Q — Mrs. Witness you also testified last time in answer to the question of the private prosecutor, I
quote, "This person who stabbed the driver if you will see him, will you be able to identify him?"
and you said "Yes, sir". The next question, "Will you please tell us whether this person is present
in this courtroom?" and you said "I think he is the one wearing a white T-shirt." What do you
mean by "I think he is the one wearing a white T-shirt"?

A — What I have in mind he is the one there that is why I am pointing to him. (Witness pointing to
the accused David Loveria.)

Q — Are you positive about the identification of the accused David Loveria or could it be also
another person?

A — No, I am not wrong.

(TSN, November 13, 1985, pp. 18-19.)

To impugn further the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, the appellant cites alleged inconsistencies between the sworn statements
given separately by Manzanero and Bales to the police on the one hand, and their testimonies in open court, on the other hand. The
appellant claims that Manzanero did not mention in his affidavit (Exh. "I") that the hold-up men took his money and valuables but on cross-
examination, he declared that the holdup men took his wristwatch and the boundary for the day. The appellant further claims that Richard
Bales did not implicate him in his affidavit but pointed to him on the witness stand. Affidavits, taken ex parte, are generally considered to be
inferior to the testimony y given in open court [People v. Pacola, G.R. No.
L-26647, August 14, 1974, 58 SCRA 370]. The Court has consistently held that an affidavit, taken ex parte, is almost always incomplete and
inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions, sometimes from want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may
be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestions of his memory and for his
accurate recollection of all that belongs to the subject. (People v. Tan, 89 Phil. 337 (1951); People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. L-40727,
September 11, 1980, 99 SCRA 697; People v. Avanzado, Jr., G.R. No. 73116, February 29, 1988, 158 SCRA 427).

It has likewise been held that inconsistencies between the testimonies given during the investigation stage and during the court proceedings
may be disregarded without impairing the credibility of the witnesses, considering such factors as illiteracy [People v. Sato, G.R. No. L-
47911, July 27, 1988, 163 SCRA 602] or inability of the witness to read the language in which the ex parte affidavit was written [People v.
Capinpin, Jr., G.R. No. 67785, October 4, 1988, 166 SCRA 233]. In the instant case, Manzanero explained his failure to state in the affidavit
that certain things were taken from him, by the fact that at the time of the execution of the affidavit, he had just checked out from the hospital
and was still under medication (TSN, August 21, 1985. p. 17).

As a final assault on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, the appellant notes the delay by the former in reporting the incident.

The crime was committed on February 21, 1985. Manzanero reported the matter to the police on March 14, 1985 (Exh. "B"). However,
Manzanero was confined at the Quezon City Medical Center from February 21 up to March 2, 1985 [Exh. "A"]. Hence, it is evident that the
lapse of time between the commission of the crime and the filing by Manzanero of a complaint with the police, was due to the fact that he
was still recuperating from the wounds inflicted on him.
Although Richard Bales executed his affidavit only on May 7, 1985 [Exh. "O"], while Betty Apolinario remained silent until she was presented
in court to testify, these circumstances alone should not destroy their credibility. The rule is well-established that the failure to reveal or
disclose at once the identity of the accused does not necessarily affect much less impair, the credibility of the witness [People v. Valdez,
G.R. No. 75390, March 25, 1988, 159 SCRA 152]. The initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information about a criminal case and their
unwillingness to be involved in criminal investigations due to fear of reprisal is common and has been judicially declared not to affect
credibility (People v. Rosario, G.R. No. L-46161, February 25, 1985,134 SCRA 497).

In fine, the Court, after a thorough examination of the entire record of the case, especially the transcript of stenographic notes, finds the trial
court's reliance on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses to convict the appellant, to be well-founded. The claims made by the appellant
have not impaired the credibility of the prosecution witnesses who positively identified him as one of the perpetrators of the crime.

Finally, the appellant assails the manner in which he was identified by Manzanero at the headquarters of the 225th Philippine Constabulary
(PC) in Cogeo, Antipolo, Rizal, claiming violation of his constitutional right to counsel.

Sec. 20, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution, which was in force at the time the events under review occurred reads:

Sec. 20. No person shall be compelled to be witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in the evidence.

Sec. 12(1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution provides similar guarantees by stating:

Sec. 12(1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.

The court must emphasize that the so-called Miranda rights contained in the abovequoted constitutional provisions may be invoked by a
person only while he is under custodial investigation [People v. Duero, G.R. No. 52016, May 13, 1981, 104 SCRA 379]. which has been
defined as the "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way" [People v. Caguioa, G.R. No. L-38975, January 17, 1980, 95 SCRA 2, 9 citing Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436]. Hence, for instance, these constitutional rights may no longer be claimed by a defendant in a criminal case already pending in
court [People v. Ayson, G.R. No. 85215, July 7, 1989] because he is no longer under custodial investigation.

The ruling enunciated in Gamboa v. Cruz, [G.R. No. 56291, June 27, 1988, 162 SCRA 642], concerning the right to counsel of a person
under custodial investigation finds application in the instant case. In that case, the accused was arrested for vagrancy and taken to the police
station. The following day he was placed on a line-up and a female complainant pointed to him as one of the persons who robbed her. While
on trial, the accused filed a motion to acquit or demurrer to evidence on the ground, among others, that he was deprived of his constitutional
right to counsel at the time the complainant was in the process of accusing or identifying him for allegedly committing a crime. The motion
having been denied by the trial court, the accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court, which ruled that the
right to counsel of a person under custodial investigation cannot be invoked until such time that the police investigators start questioning,
interrogating or exacting a confession from the person under investigation. The Court held that in the police line-up conducted in that
particular case, it was the complainant who was being investigated and who gave a statement to the police while the accused was not
questioned at all. Thus, the Court concluded that the latter could not, during the line-up, invoke his right to counsel because he was not
under custodial interrogation. In the case at bar, Manzanero, upon learning that certain hold-up men were being detained at the 225th PC
Company, Cogeo, Antipolo, Rizal in connection with another robbery, went there to check. Having identified the appellant among the
detainees, he reported the matter to the Marikina police [See Exh. "B"]. Thereafter, Pat. Bill Ayun accompanied Manzanero back to the PC
headquarters in Antipolo where Manzanero identified to Pat. Ayun the appellant as one of the persons involved in the incident. Pat. Ayun
then took the sworn statement of Manzanero which was presented in court as Exh. "B" [TSN, December 8, 1986, p. 3.] Since, as in the
Gamboa case, the appellant was not investigated when Manzanero was in the process of identifying him, he cannot claim that his right to
counsel was violated because at that stage, he was not entitled to the constitutional guarantee invoked.

But even assuming that the process of identification of the appellant by Manzanero at the PC headquarters was attended by constitutional
infirmities, only Manzanero's sworn statement (Exh. "B") where he identified appellant and which was taken by Pat. Ayun, would be excluded
for being inadmissible in evidence. The testimony of Manzanero made in open court positively identifying the appellant, as well as those of
Richard Bales and Betty Apolinario, would not be affected. These testimonies, taken together with the other evidence on record, would be
sufficient to sustain the trial court's judgment of conviction.

The defense of alibi put up by the appellant has not helped him any for it has not destroyed the damaging effects of the evidence for the
prosecution. Courts look upon the defense of alibi with suspicion and always receive it with caution, not only because it is inherently weak but
also because of its easy fabrication [People v. Badilla, 48 Phil. 718 (1926); People v. Lumantas, G.R. No. 16383, May 30, 1962, 5 SCRA
157; People v. Genoguin, G.R. No. 23019, March 28, 1974, 56 SCRA 181; People v. Gaddi, G.R. No. 74065, February 27, 1989, 129 SCRA
649: People v. Salcedo, G.R. No. 78774, April 12, 1989; People v. Somera, G.R. No. 65589, May 31, 1989]. For alibi to succeed, it must be
shown not only that the accused was at some other place but that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the site of the crime at
the time of its commission. (U.S. v. Oxiles, 29 Phil. 587 (1915): People v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 26807, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 812; People
v. Pigon, G.R. No. 76048, May 29, 1989).i•t•c-aüsl In People v. Lumantas (G.R. No. L-28355, July 17, 1969, 28 SCRA 764), where the
accused claimed that at the time of the killing he was in another barangay two kilometers away from the scene of the crime, the Court held
that it was not impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its commission. In the case at bar,
the appellant admitted his presence in Cubao on the night the crime was committed (TSN, January 6, 1987, p. 14).i•t•c-aüsl The Court notes
the fact that the four men who committed the crime boarded the jeepney in Cubao (TSN, October 9, 1985, p. 5). And although according to
the appellant, he was in Cubao at 8:30 p.m. while the crime was committed between 7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. in Marikina, the Court rules that
the required physical impossibility of being at the scene of the crime has not been proved for alibi as a sufficient defense to become available
to the appellant.

Moreover, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witnesses that the accused
committed the crime (People v. Chavez, G.R. No. L-38603, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 221; People v. Torres, G.R. No. 76711,
September 26, 1988, 165 SCRA 702; People v. Sabado, G.R. No. 76952, December 22, 1988, 168 SCRA 681.)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Gamboa v Cruz 162 SCRA 642 (1988)

Facts: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant. During a line-up of 5 detainees including
petitioner, he was identified by a complainant to be a companion in a robbery, thereafter he was
charged. Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without
notice and in the absence of his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due
process. The court denied said motion. Hearing was set, hence the petition.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner’s right to counsel and due process violated.

Held: No. The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled,
at such stage, to counsel. He had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The moment there
is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even
plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should
then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in
writing and in the presence of counsel. 

On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive and
constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a counsel. He was accorded all the opportunities to
be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead
opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. What due process abhors is
the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.

People v Agustin 240 SCRA 541 (1995)

Facts: Quiaño, the gunman who killed the victims, confessed during the investigation conducted by
Baguio City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia in his office that he was the triggerman. He implicated Abenoja, Jr.,
who engaged him to kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee, Cartel, who provided the armalite, and a certain "Jimmy."
During the investigation, Wilfredo Quiaño was assisted by Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom. Stenographic notes
of the proceedings during the investigation as transcribed with the sworn statement of Quiaño was
signed, with the assistance of Atty. Cajucom, and swore to before City Fiscal Balajadia. The following
day, Agustin was apprehended, and was investigated and was afforded the privileges like that of Quiaño.
Agustin’s defense interpose that he was forced to admit involvement at gunpoint at Kennon Road. He
further declared that although he was given a lawyer, Cajucom (a law partner of the private prosecutor),
he nevertheless, asked for his uncle Atty. Oliver Tabin, and that Atty. Cajucom interviewed him from
only two minutes in English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect he understands. The promise that
he would be discharged as a witness did not push through since Quiaño escaped. However the RTC
convicted him, since conspiracy was established, hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant’s extrajudicial statements are admissible as evidence to

warrant conviction.

Held: No. The statement of the accused is inadmissible as evidence in court. Despite asking for his uncle
to represent him he was provided with an impartial counsel who is an associate of the private
prosecutor. It also appears that some of the transcripts of the notes of the proceeding that show the
extrajudicial statement made by the accused were not signed by him. By making his statements the
accused voluntarily waived his right to remain silent but that was not put in writing either.

It would be in violation of the mandate of custodial investigation to admit the statement of the accused
when the process undertaken is one bereft of meeting the standard requirements of the due process
that should be accorded to the accused in custodial investigation, hence he should be acquitted.
PEOPLE VS. GALIT
135 SCRA 465

FACTS:
1. Francisco Galit was arrested for killing Natividad Fernando on the occasion of a robbery.
2. He was detained and interrogated almost continuously for 5 days.
3. He consistently maintained his innocence.
4. There was no evidence to link him to the crime.
5. The interrogating officers began to maul him and to torture him physically.
6. They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl of human waste.
7. The prisoner then admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit.
8. He then signed the confession they prepared.
9. The trial court convicted him of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced him to the
supreme penalty of Death.
10. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
Is the confession is admissible in evidence.

HELD:
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason
for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be
used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or
anyone he chooses by the most expedient means – by telephone if possible – or by letter or messenger.
It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engage by the person arrested,
by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by
anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made
with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law
that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be
several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language
known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he
understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate
with his lawyer, a relative or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had
been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about 2 weeks after he had executed the
Salaysay that his relatives were allowed to see him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of
right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed re-
enactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute grave violations of
his rights.

The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evidence
because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law.

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATIONPEOPLE VS GALIT MARCH 20, 1985

FACTS:

The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a robbery. He had beendetained and
interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He consistentlymaintained his innocence.
There was no evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously,something drastic had to be done. A
confession was absolutely necessary. So the investigatingofficers began to maul him and to torture him
physically. Still the prisoner insisted on hisinnocence. His will had to be broken. A confession must be
obtained. So they continued tomaltreat and beat him. 'They covered his face with a rag and pushed his
face into a toilet bowlfull of human waste. The prisoner could not take any more. His body could no
longer endurethe pain inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer. His will had been broken.
Headmitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed the confessionthey
prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators,purporting it to be
a reenactment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused was informed of his constitutional rights to remain silentand to counsel,
and that any statement he might make could be used against him.

RULING:

Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law
that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Insteadthere should be
several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in adialect or language
known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and thereis no showing that he
understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused wasnot permitted to communicate
with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters andother relatives did not know that he had
been brought to the NBI for investigation and it wasonly about two weeks after he had executed the

salaysay 

that his relatives were allowed to visithim. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to
counsel and yet during theinvestigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again
accused was notassisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION
 

G.R. No. 89112 August 3, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE, plaintiff-appelle,

vs.
ANDRES LIWAG y MORALES and MARIO L. BOLAÑOS, accused, MARIO L. BOLAÑOS, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Pedro N. Belmi for accused-appellant.

BIDIN, J.:p

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXVI, Iriga City, which (a) found the accused Andres Liwag and
Mario Bolaños guilty of murder; (b) sentenced them to reclusion perpetua; (c) ordered them to indemnify the heirs of the victim, jointly and
solidarily, in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS as actual and compensatory damages; (d) to pay THREE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS as moral damages; and (e) to pay the costs.

In the morning of September 9, 1979, prosecution witnesses Emilio Cerillo and Domingo Hallare were inside the Margate Building repairing
the ricemill owned by accused-appellant Bolaños (TSN, April 11, 1983, p. 12). About five (5) meters away, witness Cerillo saw appellant
Bolaños hand a gun to accused Liwag while talking to each other (TSN, April 11, 1983, pp. 16-19, 23). Moments later, they heard gunshots.
Cerillo stood up from the dug-out of the machine where he had been and saw accused Liwag with a gun, shooting at someone, whom he
later on identified as the deceased Ely A. Lee. Accused Liwag then went to the staircase and pointed his gun at Cerillo as he went up the
stairs of the Margate Building. Informed of the incident, Purita Margate Lee, wife of the deceased, rushed to the ricemill and there she saw
the victim lying on the ground in fetal position, in a pool of his own blood. Purita cradled her husband and asked: "Daddy, who shot you?" In
his dying words, the victim uttered: "Si Mario" (TSN August 5, 1985, pp. 5 & 11.) The victim was taken to the hospital, but was pronounced
dead an arrival.

Responding policemen rushed to the Margate Building and cordoned off the area after having received reports that the gunman had gone
inside the building after the shooting. Appellant met with the police officers and denied that the gunman was still inside the building.
However, after negotiations, appellant agreed to look for the said gunman. One hour later, appellant informed the authorities that accused
Liwag to surrender. After one hour, the accused surrendered to the policemen. Accused Liwag was brought to the
Iriga City Police Headquarters accompanied by appellant Bolaños (TSN, September 8, 1981, pp. 17-24).

Accused Liwag refused to give any statements to the police. Sworn statements obtained from several witnesses, however, including Emilio
Cerillo, Domingo Hallare, Roger Castañeda, and Dionisio Orbon, implicated accused Liwag. Based on said statements, accused Liwag was
detained.

Thereafter, the police ventured to conduct a search of the Margate Building where the appellant and his family lived and where the gunman
had sought refuge after the shooting but accused-appellant refused to allow the search, this time invoking the absence of a warrant
therefore. One day after the shooting incident, or on September 9, 1979, the police searched the Bolaños residence after having obtained
the proper search warrant. In the course thereof, the lethal weapon was found inside the wall of the bathroom, discreetly. hidden behind a tile
(TSN, June 4, 1985, pp. 2-16) It was a fully loaded .22 caliber Arminius with Serial No. 34683, licensed in the name of, and admittedly owned
by appellant Bolaños.

A ballistic examination was then conducted by the PC Crime Laboratory on the said firearm. Five (5) slugs which were recovered from
different parts of the victim's body during the autopsy served as specimen slugs. These were compared with test slugs (bullets which were
actually test-fired from the gun recovered from the Bolaños residence). It was confirmed that the specimen slugs as well as the test slugs
were fired from the gun recovered from the Bolaños residence. In other words, the specimen and test slugs were all fired from the same .22
caliber Arminius owned by appellant Bolaños.

On September 10, 1979, an Information for murder was filed against accused Liwag.

On September 23, 1979, however, accused Liwag made a confession before the Station Commander of Iriga City, claiming that it was
appellant Bolaños who had ordered the killing of Lee (TSN, August 13, 1981, pp. 5-8). On the same date, a sworn statement to that effect
was executed (Exhibit "R" Original Records, p. 15-16) by accused Liwag as follows:

Liwag's confession (Exhibit "R"):

Q Ano ang dahilan at binaril mo si Mr. Ely Lee?

A Dahil nga po sa utos ni Kuya Mario Bolaños, at hindi po ako nakatanggi sa dahilang ang aking
familia ay nakatira sa lupa ng Nanay ni Kuya Mario sa Batangas at ako naman ay dito sa kanya
sa Iriga nagtatrabaho at kung hindi ko iyon susunduin ako at ang aking familia ay kanyang
palalayasin at ako po ay wala nang mapupuntahan at ako po ay kanyang pinangakuan na siya
and bahala sa akin.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Matapos kang sabihan ni Kuya Mario mo na tirahin mo si Ely Lee ano pa ang ibang ginawa
niya?

A Iniabot sa akin ni Kuya Mario ang baril at siya ay umalis na at umakyat na ang bahay at ng
lalabas na si Mr. Ely Lee sa loob ng bodega ito ay akin ng binaril.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Anong klaseng baril ang ibinigay sayo ni Kuya Mario mo para gamitin mo sa pagbabaril kay
Mr. Ely Lee?
 A Magnum 22 kulay itim walo ang lagayan ng bala (8 shooter) de bola.

Q Ano ang pagkakaiba sa baril na ginamit mo at sa baril na ipinakita sa iyo ng pulis noong gabi
ng Septiembre 9, 1979 na nakuha ng pulis sa bahay ni Atty. Mario Bolaños?

A Iyon po ang baril na ginamit ko sa pagbaril kay Mr. Ely Lee.

xxx xxx xxx

On September 24, 1979, a re-enactment of the commission of the crime was conducted under the supervision of Fiscal Malate. The re-
enactment showed how accused-appellant handed the murder weapon to accused Liwag (Exhibit "S", Original Records, p. 17) and how the
latter shot the victim (Exhibit "T", Original Records, p. 18).

On February 19, 1980, an amended Information for murder was filed charging accused Liwag as principal by direct participation and
appellant Bolaños as principal by inducement for the fatal shooting of Lee. It reads:

That on or about the 9th day of September, 1979 at or about 9:45 o'clock in the morning, at San Roque, Iriga City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction at this Honorable Court, the said accused MARIO L. BOLAÑOS, motivated by
hate which had harbored against one Ely A. Lee, conspiring and confederating with co-accused ANDRES LIWAG y
MORALES, with intent to kill and without any justifiable cause, the having induced and ordered the said co-accused
Andres Liwag y Morales to shoot Ely A. Lee, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot said ELY A.
LEE with a 22 caliber Magnum revolver, trademark Arminius, bearing Serial No. 346938, belonging to the said MARIO
L. BOLAÑOS, for several times, hitting said ELY A. LEE at the different parts of his body, thus inflicting upon him
injuries which directly caused his instantaneous death.

That the commission of the crime was attended by the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery and the
generic aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and cruelty.

That as a consequence of the illegal acts of the said accused, the family of the victim suffered actual, moral and other
form of damages in such amount as may proven in court.

ALL ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo, p. 101).

The records show that on the basis of the Amended Information, accused-appellant Bolaños was arrested and detained, but was
subsequently released on bail. Upon arraignment, accused Andres Liwag and appellant entered a plea of Not Guilty. In the course of the
presentation of evidence by the prosecution before the trial court, accused Liwag escaped from jail.

The prosecution theorized that appellant's grudge against the victim Lee was the motive behind the killing. In this regard, the wife of the
victim testified that appellant borrowed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) from the deceased to be used as an investment for a business
enterprise. Bad blood between appellant and the deceased ensued for failure of the former to pay the sum owed and to render an accounting
therefor. As a consequence, the victim often berated appellant in public.

Seeking exoneration of the appellant in the commission of the crime charged, the defense presented a different version. According to its
witness Simeon Margate, father-in-law of both the victim as well as appellant, the victim was fuming mad and was threatening the workers of
appellant Bolaños who were suspected by the deceased as responsible for the loss of his two (2) empty softdrink bottles. Witness Margate
allegedly cautioned by the deceased against any such act, and even offered to pay for twice the value of the lost empty bottles (TSN,
November 20, 1981, pp. 2-11). Accordingly, the defense contends, the shooting incident was the result of the confrontation between the
victim Lee and accused Liwag regarding the lost empty softdrink bottles.

In addition, appellant Bolaños also presented the testimony of accused Liwag made during the preliminary investigation conducted by the
City Fiscal of Iriga. During the said preliminary investigation, accused Liwag made a statement to the effect that he (accused Liwag) was
recanting his testimony dated September 23, 1979, implicating appellant in the crime charged. A sworn statement of accused Liwag dated
July 27, 1983, was also presented reiterating what had been alleged during the preliminary investigation.

On March 29, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision convicting the accused Andres Liwag and appellant Mario Bolaños of the crime of
murder attended by the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery and the generic aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
and cruelty. Hence, this appeal.

In his brief, appellant assigns the following errors:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION OF ACCUSED ANDRES LIWAG IMPLICATING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT MARIO BOLAÑOS, OVER
 THE VEHEMENT OBJECTION OF THE LATTER, IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME NOTWITHSTANDING THE
FACT THAT SAID EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION, EXHIBIT "R" HAD BEEN REPEATEDLY REPUDIATED BY THE
DECLARANT AND THE LATTER HAD NEVER BEEN PLACED ON THE WITNESS STAND DURING THE TRIAL OF
THE INSTANT CASE.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE TESTIMONY OF EMILIO CERILLO, ONE OF THE WITNESSES
FOR THE PROSECUTION, THAT THE LATTER ALLEGEDLY SAW DEFENDANT-APPELLANT MARIO BOLAÑOS
HANDED TO ACCUSED ANDRES LIWAG THE FATAL WEAPON, A .22 CALIBER, ARMINIUS, WITH SERIAL NO.
346838, AS AN AFTERTHOUGHT AND FABRICATED.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT MARIO BOLAÑOS THE LATTER'S ALLEGED REFUSAL TO ALLOW THE POLICE AUTHORITIES OF
IRIGA CITY TO SEARCH HIS HOUSE WITHOUT SEARCH WARRANT TO ALLOW THE POLICE AUTHORITIES TO
IMMEDIATELY GET INSIDE HIS HOUSE AND IN REMAINING SILENT DURING THE PERIOD THE POLICE
AUTHORITIES WERE CONDUCTING THE SEARCH FOR THE FATAL WEAPON INSIDE THE HOUSE OF
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT MARIO BOLAÑOS.

VI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT AS ILLEGAL; AND,
THEREFORE, THE ALLEGED FATAL WEAPON, EXHIBIT "C" WAS ILLEGALLY OBTAINED AND INADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE AGAINST DEFENDANT-APPELLANT MARIO BOLAÑOS.

V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED MOTIVE FOR THE FATAL KILLING OF ELY LEE,
THE VICTIM, WAS THE SUPPOSED STANDING GRUDGE BETWEEN DEFENDANT-APPELLANT MARIO
BOLAÑOS, TESTIFIED BY THE WIDOW OF ELY LEE, PURITA MARGATE-LEE, WHEN IN TRUTH AND IN FACT,
THE HARD EVIDENCE ON RECORD, WAS THAT THE SHOOTING INCIDENT WAS PRECIPITATED BY ELY LEE'S
BEING INCENSED AND ANGERED ON SEPTEMBER 9, 1979, OVER THE LOST (sic) OF TWO (2) EMPTY
BOTTLES OF SOFT DRINKS FROM THE BODEGA LOCATED ADJACENT TO THE RICEMILL OF DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT MARIO BOLAÑOS WHICH LEAD (sic) TO THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN ELY LEE AND
ACCUSED ANDRES LIWAG.

VI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER THERE
BEING NO PROOF OF CONSPIRACY IN THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE BETWEEN THE LATTER AND
ACCUSED ANDRES LIWAG.

VII.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT MARIO BOLAÑOS ON THE BASIS OF
FLIMSY, SURMISES, UNWARRANTED PRESUMPTIONS AND CONJECTURES. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 82-83, Rollo).

Well-settled is the rule that the extrajudicial confession of an accused is binding only upon himself and is not admissible against his co-
accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as other accused are concerned (People vs. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109 [1979]). However, this rule
is not without exceptions, one of which provides that the extrajudicial confession of an accused is admissible against his co-accused where
the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation of the co-accused in the killing of the victim (People
vs. Alvarez, 201 SCRA 364 [1991]; People vs. Vasquez, 113 SCRA 772 [1982]).

Appellant vehemently argues, however, that in a succeeding affidavit executed by accused Liwag, the latter denied the involvement of
appellant in the commission of the crime.

The Court sees no merit in the argument. In the first place, accused Liwag managed to escape from jail during the trial of the case and
therefore cannot be cross-examined as to the veracity of his affidavit of retraction. Just because one has executed an affidavit of retraction
does by no means imply that what has been previously said is false or that latter is true. On the contrary, affidavits of retraction can be easily
secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for financial considerations and such being the case, said retractions are exceedingly
unreliable for there is always the probability of their being repudiated subsequently (People v. Mangulaban, 200 SCRA 611 [1991]; De
Guzman v. Intermediate Appellate court, 184 SCRA 128 [1990]; People v. Clamor, 198 SCRA 642 [1991]).
More importantly, the extra-judicial confession of accused Liwag was made with the assistance of counsel, Atty. Rudito Espiritu, whom the
police asked to assist the said accused. Under the circumstances, Liwag's earlier affidavit with the assistance of counsel implicating
appellant Bolaños cannot easily be set aside. More, Liwag's confession contained details which were corroborated on material points by the
witnesses for the prosecution in establishing the link of circumstantial evidence which, among others, warrant the conviction of herein
appellant.

Circumstantial evidence is the evidence of collateral facts or circumstances from which an inference may be drawn as to the probability or
improbability of the facts in dispute (5 Moran, p. 17, 1980 ed.). Not only the prior and coetaneous actuations of the accused in relation to the
crime but also his acts or conduct subsequent thereto can be considered as circumstantial evidence of guilt (U. S. vs. De Los Santos, 24
Phil. 329 [1913]. To warrant conviction in criminal cases upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must be more than one, derived from
facts duly proven, and the combination of all of them must be such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt (People vs. Tiozon,
198 SCRA [1991].

Regarding the matter of the validity of the issuance of the search warrant, we note that accused-appellant has not presented evidence to
show that the same was improperly issued. In the absence thereof, the presumption is that official acts were regularly performed. Accused-
appellant has not presented evidence to overcome this presumption, hence the presumption stands. Consequently, the murder weapon
recovered from accused-appellant's bathroom during the search conducted at the residence of said accused- appellant, is admissible in
evidence. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that accused-appellant was able to prove that the search warrant was invalid, and in view
thereof, the murder weapon is inadmissible in evidence, the fact of the recovery of the said weapon in accused-appellant's bathroom at his
residence would still be admissible as part of the circumstantial evidence against herein accused-appellant.

As correctly stated by the trial court, the confession of accused Liwag with respect to the fact that accused-appellant was the one handed
who handed him the murder weapon was corroborated by the testimony of witness Cerillo that he saw accuse-appellant give accused Liwag
a gun immediately before the shooting. Aside from this testimony of witness Cerillo, there is no direct evidence that would link accused-
appellant to the crime. However, as earlier stated, circumstantial evidence that would point to accused-appellant as having taken part in the
crime abound.

Thus, We see reversible error committed by the trial court when it considered the following as circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of
accused-appellant Bolaños as principal by inducement:

1. The giving of the gun to Andres Liwag. Why should he give his gun to his co-accused if he were not in conspiracy
with him? . . . In his own words, the gun was inside the clutch bag inside a travelling bag inside a locker. The place
where the gun was kept was quite secret and the locker was locked. So, if he did not give his gun to his co-accused
Andres Liwag, how then, . . . did the gun come into the possession of Andres Liwag?

2. Why Bolaños refusal to allow the police officers to capture Andres Liwag inside his residence and asking for one
hour for him to find out if the culprit was inside his house and another hour to talk to him to surrender? . . . . Did he not
also use the two hours to conceal the instrument of the crime and give his instruction to Liwag?

3. Why is his refusal to allow the police to search his house for the gun without a search warrant?

4. Why is nonchalance while the police were searching for the gun inside his residence? Is it not more natural to help in
search if he had no feeling of guilt?

5. . . . why was the gun fully loaded when it was found inside the walling of the bathroom despite its having been
discharged of its bullets after Liwag had fired them against the victim? . . . . Was Liwag also in possession of the bullets
so that he was able to reload the gun before he did it in the hole between the wall, or was it not Bolaños himself who
reloaded the gun in order to conceal the fact that it had been used?

6. The motive . . . The testimony of Mrs. Purita Margate-Lee positively shows that there was bad blood between the
victim Ely Lee and the accused Mario Bolaños which was the result of the jueteng venture, in which the victim always
lambasted the said accused even in public. The humiliation and embarrassment caused the said accused by the victim
must have been enough reason for him to desire to kill the victim. Andres Liwag having stayed for a very short time
(about two weeks) in Iriga and known (sic) Ely Lee for such short duration could not have easily nurtured such a desire.
Bolaños assertion that Andres Liwag killed Ely Lee on his own . . . is unbelievable. It implies that Andres Liwag already
had the gun in his possession when he was subjected to Karate by Ely Lee. Which again poses the question: Did
Liwag arm himself for the confrontation with Ely Lee just because of the lost soft drinks of which he was suspected to
have stolen? And to repeat, Fiscal Bolaños himself testified that his gun was placed inside a clutch bag . . . and that it
was not easy matter for anybody to get the gun. Besides, there is no evidence to show that Andres Liwag was hurt . . .
in the hands of Ely Lee. If there was a confrontation . . . how come the persons in the ricemill were not able to hear or
witness the same, considering that Cerillo and Hallare were just a few meters away, repairing the screen?

7. The accused Andres Liwag being a "boy" of Mario Bolaños, a provincemate, and more especially because his family
was living in a place owned by Bolaños mother, shows that Bolaños had a great ascendancy over Andres Liwag that
he could exert sufficient influence upon the said accused to impel the latter to commit the crime according to his
instruction.
The Court therefore agrees with the conclusion of the trial court that accused Andres Liwag and accused-appellant Bolaños are guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, for fatal shooting the victim Ely A. Lee. Accused Liwag is guilty as principal by direct
participation, while accused-appellant Bolaños is guilty as principal by inducement.

That the crime was attended by treachery is borne out by the records. There is treachery when the offender commits any of t he crimes
against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make (Art. 14, No. 16, Revised Penal Code). Treachery may
exist even if the attack is frontal if the same is sudden and unexpected (People v. Liston, 179 SCRA 415 [1989]). Accused Liwag, after being
instructed by accused-appellant, killed the victim with treachery, the details of which he narrated in the affidavit he executed (Exhibit "R"),
thus:

Pagharap ko po ki Mr. Ely Lee kinalabit ko lang ng kinalabit ang baril at hindi ko po matandaan kung ilang beses ko
pong kinalabit ang baril at kung saan ko tinamaan si Mr. Ely Lee. . . . . (Sinumpaang Salaysay of Andres Liwag, 23
Sept. 1979, first par., p. 2.).

Likewise, evident premedidation was present in the commission of the crime. To appreciate the circumstance of evident premeditation, it is
necessary to establish the following: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) the act manifestly indicating that the
culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of the time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will he had desired to harken to its warnings
(People vs. Gravino, 122 SCRA 123 [1983]). In the case at bar, all requisites were present. Appellant had sent for accused Liwag from
Batangas ostensibly to gain an honest living. But far from it. Moments before the tragic incident, appellant was seen talking to accused Liwag
and in the course thereof, handed a gun to the latter. After the victim was killed, accused Liwag was likewise seen running upstairs leading to
the residence of appellant Bolaños. This notwithstanding, responding policemen were refused entry by appellant on the lame excuse that the
assailant did not seek refuge there. As it turned out, however, accused Liwag did indeed hide inside the residence of appellant.

All told and guided by the corroborative testimonies of the prosecution witnesses vis-a-vis Liwag's counselled confession, as well as the
other circumstantial evidence convincingly linking appellant as principal by inducement to the commission of the crime, the Court finds
appellant guilty of the offense charged.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED

People Vs. Borromeo 133 SCRA 106 (Persons and Family Relations)

Facts: At high noon on July 3, 1981, the four year old niece of Susana & Elias Borromeo told Matilde
Taborada (mother of Susana) that Susana was screaming because Elias was killing her. Taborada told her
to inform her son, Geronimo Taborada. Geronimo, in turn, told his father and together, they went to
Susana’s hut. There they found Susana’s lifeless body next to her crying infant and Elias mumbling
incoherently still with the weapon in his hands. The accused-appellant, Elias, said that because they
were legally and validly married, he should only be liable for “homicide” and not “parricide”. He thinks
such because there was no marriage contract issued on their wedding day and after that. However, in
his testimony, he admitted that the victim was his wife and that they were married in a chapel by a
priest.

Issue: Does the non-execution of a marriage contract render a marriage void?

 
Held: In the view of the law, a couple living together with the image of being married, are presumed
married unless proven otherwise. This is attributed to the common order of society. Furthermore, the
validity of a marriage resides on the fulfillment or presence of the requisites of the marriage which are :
legal capacity and consent. The absence of the record of such marriage does not invalidate the same as
long as the celebration and all requisites are present.

Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption
or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in
constant violation of decency and law. (Son Cui vs. Guepangco, 22 Phil. 216). And, the mere fact that no
record of the marriage exists in the registry of marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long as in
the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. The forwarding of a copy of the
marriage certificate to the registry is not one of said requisites. (Pugeda vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849).  The
appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the indemnity increased from 12,000 to 30,000

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 77116 January 31, 1989

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FERDINAND CAMALOG and NOVELITO SOTTO, defendants-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Coronel Law Office for defendant-appellants.

 
GANCAYCO, J.:

When is a confession legally sufficient in accordance with the system of criminal justice
in this country? The present case brought before this Court on appeal from a decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Cavite in Criminal Case No. TM-140 entitled People vs.
Armando de los Reyes, et al., projects this issue.

In an Information that was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite, Armando de los
Reyes, Ferdinand Camalog and Novelito Sotto were charged with the crime of Robbery
with Homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite. It reads as follows:

That on or about June 12, 1985, In the municipality of Tanza, Cavite,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused, conspiring together, acting jointly and assisting one
another, with violence against persons and with intent of gain and without
the consent of the owner did, then and there wilfully and feloniously rob,
take and carry away cash money amounting to P600.00 and assorted
jewelry valued at P30,600.00 Philippine Currency and owned by Jose M.
Malabanan, and by reason and on the occasion of the robbery, the said
accused with intent to kill, did, then and there wilfully and feloniously strike
and stab Jose M. Malabanan, with a pickax and a three-bladed and
pointed weapon commonly known as tres cantos on the different parts of
his body causing the death of Jose M. Malabanan, to the damage and
prejudice of his heirs.

The aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nighttime, treachery and

abuse of superior strength, were present at the time of the commission of
the aforesaid offense.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 1

The accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned. The three accused were earlier arrested and detained
without bail.

The facts of the case as presented by the prosecution are as follows:

In the morning of June 12, 1985, the Integrated National Police (INP) stationed at Tanza, Cavite received
a report that a killing was perpetrated inside a house at Barrio Amaya, Tanza, Cavite. Two INP police
officers, Patrolmen Ruben Bolante and Augusta de la Cruz responded to the report and conducted an
investigation at the scene of the crime. They came upon the lifeless body of Jose M. Malabanan. The
deceased was found lying on the floor of the room. They noted that the furniture was in disarray and that
the cabinet in the room was forcibly opened with its contents scattered around the victim. The
investigators took note of the presence of several bloodstains in many parts of the room. They then found
a pick hammer lying near the victim's body. They also came upon a triple bladed knife, popularly called as
tres cantos. Upon going outside the house, they discovered human blood spilled near an artesian well. A
third police officer, Sgt. Esmeraldo Romero, interrogated some of the residents of the Barrio. He
eventually came upon a barrio resident, Bayani Bocalan, who told them that he saw Armando de los
Reyes, a resident of Tanza, strolling near the house of the victim in the early morning of June 12, 1985
and was in the company of two other men, all of them acting suspiciously in the vicinity of the house of
the victim.

Acting on the information given by Bayani Bocalan, the police authorities invited Armando de los Reyes to
their office for questioning. Sgt. Romero informed de los Reyes about his constitutional rights and then
began interrogating him. De los Reyes admitted his participation in the commission of the crime and
identified his two companions as a certain Mario from Ilocos and one Ben from Manila, both of whom,
according to him, could be found in the Luneta Park of Manila. The extra-judicial confession was reduced
in writing and was signed by him before Judge Aurelio Icasiano, Municipal Trial Court Judge of Tanza,
Cavite.

A team of Tanza policemen accompanied De los Reyes to the Luneta on the evening of June 13, 1985 to
look for the said Mario and Ben. At the Luneta, De los Reyes pointed out to the policemen the accused
Ferdinand Camalog and Novelito Sotto whom he identified as his fellow conspirators.

Ferdinand Camalog and Novelito Sotto were interrogated and made to sign extra-judicial confessions
wherein they admitted their alleged participation in the commission of the crime charged. These
statements were subscribed and sworn to also before Judge Icasiano.

On the basis of these extra-judicial confessions, the three were charged with the crime of Robbery with
Homicide.

The appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge.

Both oral and documentary evidence were presented in court by the prosecution. They established the
death of Jose Malabanan, the damage caused to his heirs, and the loss of P30,600.00 worth of cash and
jewelries. The extra-judicial statements of the accused were presented, identified and admitted in court as
part of the testimony of the police investigators.

The defense presented witnesses who testified on the good moral character of Camalog and Sotto and
their whereabouts in the early morning of June 12, 1985.

On the witness stand, De los Reyes admitted his participation in the commission of the crime charged but
retracted his statement made in the extra-judicial confession regarding the participation of his co-accused
Camalog and Sotto. He testified that he had been mauled by the police investigators during the
interrogation. He also testified that he was threatened with bodily harm if he refused to admit having
committed the crime charged. He likewise testified that be was forced to pinpoint the two other accused
as his co-conspirators on account of a threat against his life made by the police authorities. He asserted
that Camalog and Sotto were not involved in the commission of the robberry and homicide, that two men
named Ben and Mario were his companions then, and that both Ben and Mario are still at large.

The other two accused, Camalog and Sotto, testified that they were never near the scene of the crime on
the date and time it was committed, and that they were in their residences in Manila and Quezon City,
respectively. Two witnesses, Concepcion Villasis and Robert Cabanban, employer and brother-in-law,
respectively, of Sotto and Camalog, were presented to corroborate the alibi they gave.

The accused further stressed the fact that they were forced to sign the extra-judicial confessions
presented in court. They also testified that the police investigators heat, maltreated and threatened them
with death if they refused to sign the confessions. They likewise stated that they were never informed
about their constitutional rights and that the police investigators never conducted an investigation as
regards their alleged participation in the crime. The two accused further testified that during the period
covering their custodial interrogation, they never had the chance to confer with a lawyer.
On September 30, 1986, the trial court rendered a decision finding all the three accused guilty of the
crime charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused ARMANDO DE LOS REYES, FERDINAND

CAMALOG, and NOVELITO SOTTO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide punishable under Article 294 par. (1) of the Revised Penal Code
and there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances present in the commission of
the crime hereby sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs of the victim jointly and severally (1) in the amount of P30,000.00 for
the death of Jose Malabanan; (2) P30,600.00 for the items taken from the victim's house;
and (3) actual damages of P70,000.00; (4) moral damages of P5,000.00 and to pay the
proportionate costs.

SO ORDERED. 2

Taking exception to the finding that their guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the accused
Ferdinand Camalog and Novelito Sotto appealed their case to this Court on the ground that the trial court
erred as follows:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS

OF THE APPELLATE BECAUSE THEY WERE OBTAINED THROUGH FORCE,
THREAT AND INTIMIDATION AND THAT THEY WERE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF
SECTION 20, ARTICLE IV OF THE (1973) PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF JOHN
LEO ALABADO.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI.

IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED

ARMANDO DE LOS REYES.

V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLATE APPELLANT'S GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

In considering these interrelated errors assigned by appellants, We find merit in their contention that there
is no moral certainty to find them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

The records show that their confessions were not regularly obtained. There were enough indications that
the statements were not given voluntarily.

The trial court gave credence to the claim of the prosecution that the subject confessions were signed
voluntarily on the basis of the failure of appellants to complain to the Municipal Trial Judge that they were
forced to sign the same. The trial court failed to take note of the fact that when said confessions were
presented to Judge Icasiano, their tormentors were present to hear and know what the appellants would
say and do. They remained in the custody of their tormentors and not with Judge Icasiano. Appellants
must have been reasonably apprehensive of further maltreatment if they manifested to Judge Icasiano
that they were forced to sign the said confessions. 3

An observation was also made by the court a quo that it was not shown that the police investigators had ill
motive in order to implicate the accused to such a heinous crime. The police investigators were from
Tanza, Cavite, just like the victim and his heirs. Appellant Ferdinand Camalog is from Ilocos Sur while
appellant Novelito Sotto hails from Oriental Mindoro and both resided in Metro Manila. De los Reyes
pointed them out to the police investigators to be the "Ben" and "Mario" who were his confederates. None
of said nicknames jibed with the true names of appellants. The police investigators did not care. They
brought the two to their headquarters in Tanza. They investigated them under circumstances that place
into serious doubt their impartiality and motive.

The presence of details in the confessions of appellants were considered by the trial court as evidence
that the confessions were voluntarily made. An examination of the confession earlier executed by De los
Reyes shows that the details in the questioned confessions of appellants were culled from the said
confession of De los Reyes.

The high point in deciding this case is the respect which must be accorded the constitutional rights of
custodial prisoners at the time they are subjected to interrogation and their subsequent execution of an
extra-judicial confession, was there really a confession or admission during the custodial investigation?
Were they informed of their rights? We find no affirmative answers to these questions. It appears that the
appellants were not informed of their constitutional rights and, even assuming that they were so informed,
there is no indication that they understood those rights.

We gave emphasis to these points in recent cases, to wit:

When the Constitution requires a person under investigation to be informed of his rights
to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of
meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an
abstract constitutional principle. As a rule, therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police
officer just to repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article
IV of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the
latter is entitled: he must also explain their effects in practical terms, e.g., what the person
under interrogation may or may not do, and in a language the subject fairly understands.
4

In Reyes vs. Quizo 5 We took time to elucidate on this viz.

In other words, the right of a person under interrogation "to be informed' implies a
correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates
an effective communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of this,
there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has been 'informed'
of his rights. Now, since the right to be informed' implies comprehension, the degree of
explanation required will necessarily vary, depending upon the education, intelligence
and other relevant personal circumstances of the person under investigation. Suffice it to
say that a simpler and more lucid explanation is needed where the subject is unlettered.

The trial court relied on the testimony of the police investigators that the appellants have been informed of
their fundamental rights but failed to take note of the conspicuous absence of any lawyer to assist the
accused during the custodial investigation. Even assuming that the accused waived their constitutional
right to counsel, there is no indication that they did so with the assistance of counsel. The testimony of the
accused during the trial of this case supports Our observation, to wit:

Atty. Abaya:

Q. Do you know who conducted the investigation?

A. The police.

Q. When you were investigated by the police were you assisted by counsel of your choice?
 A. No, sir.

Q. Did they inform you that you have the right to counsel?

A. No, sir.

Q. And did they manifest to you that they will give you a lawyer to assist you in your
investigation?

A. No, sir.

Q. Despite the absence of a lawyer, did you give a statement to the police investigator?

6
A. No, sir. I did not give (a) statement.

Atty. Abaya:

Q. You did not give a statement to the police investigator?

A. I was just asked to sign the document.

Q. Why did you sign the document?

A. I signed it because I was being threatened by the police.

Q. What kind of threat did the police exert on your person?

7
A. They told me that if I will not sign the document, they are going to salvage me.

The prosecution witness, Sgt. Esmeraldo G. Romero, testified:

Atty. Bince:

Q. In short, when you told him of his right to counsel, there was no lawyer present, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When you told him that the statement that he will give might be used against him, you told that without the presence of the lawyer, is that
correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When he refused allegedly the assistance of counsel there was no counsel around, is that also correct?

8
A. Yes, sir.

Atty. Bince:

Q. You said you investigated also Novelito Sotto. During your investigation of him there was no lawyer
present. Is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When you told him he can avail (of) the services of a lawyer, there was no lawyer present. Is that
correct?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. In short in both the custodial investigation of Armando de los Reyes and Novelito Sotto there was no
lawyer present to assist them?

A. Yes, sir. 9

Very relevant to this case is the pronouncement of this Court in Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 10 reiterated in
People vs. Galit 11 and People vs. Lumayok, 12 where this Court categorically stated that the waiver by the
accused of his right to counsel must be made in the presence and with the assistance of counsel.

We stressed the inadmissibility of extra-judicial confessions obtained in violation of this principle:

At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him
of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any, He shall
be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the
right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most
expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibilityof the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself of by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. (Emphasis supplied.) 13

In People vs. Lumayok, 14 this Court made the following observation —

No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel

engaged by the person arrested by any person on his behalf or appointed by the court
upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to
counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance
ofcounsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down whether
exculpatory or inculpatory in whole or in part shall be inadmissible in evidence.
(Emphasis supplied).

The second error submitted by the appellants is that the extra-judicial confessions offered in evidence
were obtained in violation of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the fundamental law in force
and effect at the time of their arrest. Even assuming that the accused were informed of their right to
remain silent, there is no showing that the appellants fully understood the same.

The assertion made by the police investigators to the effect that the appellants were informed of their
fundamental rights will not overthrow the fact that appellants were not assisted by counsel during the
custodial investigation even if they had waived the right. The fact that the appellants were never assisted
by counsel during the custodial investigation is confirmed in the testimony of prosecution witness Sgt.
Esmeraldo Romero.

From the foregoing, it clearly appears that the Tanza, Cavite police investigators informed the accused-
appellants Ferdinand Camalog and Novelito Sotto about their constitutional rights in a rather sloopy
manner. The type of questions and answers recited in their extra-judicial confessions is Identical to that of
their co-accused Armando de los Reyes. There was not even a semblance of conformity with the
fundamental law.
Of course, the trial court put emphasis on the testimony of prosecution rebuttal witness John Leo Alabado
that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of June 17, 1985 on his way to the residence of Bayani Bocalan,
he saw the three (3) persons coming out of the victim's house. He identified the appellants to be among
the three. 15

This witness was presented by the prosecution when its witness Bayani Bocalan failed to appear and
accused De los Reyes denied the participation of the appellants in the commission of the offense. It took
this witness over a year to report what he saw. And instead of reporting the same to the police authorities
he conveniently allegedly reported what he supposedly saw to the victim's father who was then looking for
witnesses. He appeared in court without a subpoena. The sudden emergence of this witness at the
closing stages of the case is, to say the least, suspicious. A reading of the transcript of his testimony,
shows how incredible it can be. He remembers the exact day he saw appellants. He did not notice any
startling occurrence to remember said date and the identities of appellants so vividly. He met Francisco
Malabanan, the father of the victim, for the first time in April 1986 when he revealed what he knew
allegedly because his conscience bothered him. It was Malabanan who brought him to court to testify.

Bayani Bocalan, who was the witness who identified De lo Reyes and saw his two companions, was
never presented by the prosecution. Such wilful suppression of evidence gives rise to the presumption
that if presented the same would prove to be adverse to the prosecution. 16

Moreover as argued by appellants, the testimony of Alabado was improper for rebuttal. It should have
been presented at the time the prosecution was presenting its evidence on direct examination.

The Solicitor General does not share the enthusiasm of the trial court in accepting the testimony of this
witness. He argues, however that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants are sufficient to establish
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court finds otherwise. With the inadmissibility of the extra-
judicial confessions of appellants, their conviction becomes baseless. They are entitled to an acquittal.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite in Criminal Case No. TM-140 dated
September 30, 1986 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE as to the defendants-appellants and another
judgment is hereby rendered ACQUITTING defendants-appellants FERDINAND CAMALOG and
NOVELITO SOTTO with costs de oficio. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 121982. September 10, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEONILO CUI y BALADJAY,

BEVERLY CUI y CANTUBA, EDUARDO BASINGAN y SABELLO, WILFREDO GARCIA,
alias “TOTO”, JOSELITO GARCIA, alias “TATA GARCIA”, EMMANUEL GARCIA, alias
“MAWI”, a certain SADAM, BIENVENIDO NACARIO y PARDILLO, alias “REY
NACARIO”, a certain EDGAR, a certain BENJIE, LUIS OBESO, alias “LEOS”, HILARIA
SARTE, alias “LARING”, and YUL ALVAREZ, accused.

LEONILO CUI y BALADJAY, BEVERLY CUI y CANTUBA, LUIS OBESO,

alias “LEOS”, and HILARIA SARTE, alias “LARING”, accused-appellants.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:
In the evening of December 5, 1990, some ten (10) armed robbers raided the compound of
Johnny and Rose Lim on Edison Street, Lahug, Cebu City. The Lims, their three (3) children,
and the employees of the family-owned business, William’s Educational Supply, were able to
see the faces of the leader Wilfredo alias “Toto” Garcia and two of his men, Mawe Garcia and a
certain Edgar. The other robbers could not be identified as they had flour sacks over their heads.

The robbers carted away cash and jewelries worth twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). They
also blindfolded and forcibly abducted seventeen (17) year old Stephanie, the youngest daughter
of the Lims. They demanded a ransom of one million pesos (P1,000,000.00) for her release.

Johnny Lim turned over to Toto Garcia the ransom amount in the afternoon of the next day at an
arranged meeting place. Stephanie, in turn, was released to her father.

Initially, the Lims kept the crime a secret. But on the third day, they reported the kidnapping to
the Philippine National Police Cebu Metropolitan District Command (Cebu Metrodiscom) at
Camp Sotero, Cabahug, Cebu City. The Metrodiscom Intelligence Security Team (MIST)i[1]
conducted an investigation and Johnny Lim was shown photographs of criminal elements to
identify the suspects. From around ninety (90) photographs, Lim picked that of Toto Garcia.

The identification of Toto Garcia gave the MIST a valuable lead. Toto Garcia was known as the
leader of a group of armed robbers called the Baong Gang. The gang’s base of operation was
pinpointed at Quiot, Pardo, Cebu. When the police learned from Lim that his house guard,
Eduardo Basingan, hailed from Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City, they decided to interrogate him.

Basingan’s interrogation broke the case wide open. He identified Toto Garcia, Mawe Garcia and
Edgar as the three (3) who did not wear masks, Sadam and Rey as the two (2) who held him and
the Lims at gunpoint, and Tata Garcia, Yul Alvarez, a certain Benjie, a certain Leos and a certain
Laring as the look-outs who stayed outside the Lim compound. He named Toto Garcia as the
chief plotter of the crime at bar, and revealed that his neighbors and close family friends, the
spouses Leonilo and Beverly Cui, participated in the plan. Basingan said he was asked to join
the plot and was assured that he would not be under suspicion because he would be placed at gun
point together with the other members of the Lim household when the crime is committed.
However, he refused to join the plot during the December 2, 1990 meeting of the group at the
residence of the Cuis in Quiot,. Pardo, Cebu City. Leonilo Cui even invoked their close ties as
godfathers of each other’s children but he was unmoved. At the meeting were Toto Garcia,
Mawi Garcia, Edgar, Rey, Sadam and the Cuis.

On December 18, 1990, Basingan executed a sworn statementii[2] reiterating these revelations in
writing. Johnny and Rose Lim then formalized their complaint by executing a Joint Affidavit.iii
[3] The members of the Metrodiscom Intelligence Security Team also executed a Joint
Affidavitiv[4] relating their investigation. With these as bases, Assistant Prosecutor Bienvenido
N. Mabanto, Jr. filed an Informationv[5] for Kidnapping with Ransom against Basingan, the Cuis,
and the members of the group of Toto Garcia as identified by Basingan in his sworn statement.
On the same day, December 18, 1990, Basingan and Leonilo Cui were arrested.vi[6] Beverly Cui
was also taken into custody on January 17, 1991.vii[7] The Cuis, however, were later granted bail
and their plea for preliminary investigation was given due course.viii[8]

On March 14, 1991, Joselito “Tata” Garcia, Hilaria Sarte and her live-in partner, Luis Obeso,
referred to by Basingan as “Laring” and “Leos”, respectively, were arrested in the neighboring
Negros Island. The next day, however, Tata Garcia died due to “hemorrhage, severe, secondary
to gunshot wounds”.ix[9] Upon presentation of his death certificate, the trial court ordered his
name deleted from the information.

On March 22, 1991, Obeso and Sarte filed their own motions for preliminary investigation.x[10]
Their motions were granted in an Order dated April 2, 1991.xi[11]

On April 1, 1991, Basingan executed a second sworn statementxii[12] reiterating his first. In
addition, he detailed the role of the Cuis in the planning of the crime at bar.

After preliminary investigation, Prosecutor Manuel J. Adlawan found that the participation of the
Cuis was only that of accomplices. Thus, on May 13, 1991, an Amended Information was filed
downgrading the charge against the Cuis as mere accomplices in the kidnapping with ransom of
Stephanie Lim. It reads:

“That on or about the 5th day of December, 1990, at about 9:00 P.M. more or less and for
sometime subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, all private individuals, conniving and confederating together,
and mutually helping with one another, armed with unlicensed firearms, with deliberate intent,
with intent of gain, enter the dwelling house of spouses Johnny and Rose Lim and while inside
therein with violence and intimidation, take and carry away cash and jewelries in the amount of
P20,000.00 from the possession of and belonging to spouses Johnny and Rose Lim and that on
the occasion thereof, and in connection therewith and for the purpose of extorting ransom from
said spouses Johnny and Rose Lim, herein accused, in pursuance of their superior strength did
then and there kidnap and detain Stephanie Lim 17 years old [sic] daughter of spouses Johnny
and Rose Lim and while Stephanie Lim was under detention in the place other than the latter’s
dwelling place, the said accused demanded the amount of P1,000,000.00 for the release of
Stephanie Lim to which demands and for fear of the latter’s life spouses Johnny and Rose Lim
delivered and caused to be delivered the amount of P1,000,000.00 to said accused; and accused-

“(1) Leonilo Cui y Baladjay and

“(2) Beverly Cui y Cantuba

who are hereby charged for the same offense as accomplices cooperate in its execution by
previous acts and subsequently profiting in the effects of the crime by receiving the amount of
P10,000.00 from the principal accused as their share of the loot, to the damage and prejudice of
Johnny, Rose and Stephanie Lim in the total amount of P1,020,000.00.

“CONTRARY TO LAW.”xiii[13]
On May 15, 1991, Basingan, the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte were arraigned and they all pleaded not
guilty.xiv[14] On June 27, 1991, Basingan escaped from prison.xv[15]

Trial on the merit ensued against the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte. Basingan was tried in absentia.

On February 13, 1992, Bienvenido Nacario, alias “Rey Nacario”, was arrested. On arraignment
on April 13, 1992, he pleaded not guilty. However, on May 5, 1992, he, too, escaped from
detention and remains at large to this date.

On August 18, 1992, the prosecuting fiscal manifested before the trial court that, per newspaper
report, Toto Garcia had been killed in Davao.

On December 6, 1993, the trial court convicted the Cuis, Obeso, Sarte, Basingan and Nacario.xvi
[16] It held:

“In the light of the totality of the evidence adduced in the case at bar and the law and
aforementioned jurisprudence, the Court is convinced that a conspiracy was hatched by all the
accused in perpetrating the crime charged. For instance, as borne out by the testimony of Sgt.
Narciso Ouano, Jr., police investigator of the Cebu Metrodiscim [sic], accused Eduardo Basingan
declared during his investigation that the plan was indeed carried out and he knew all the persons
who participated in that robbery, naming Toto Garcia, Tata Garcia, Mawi Garcia, Rey, Edgar,
Sadam, Yul Alvarez, Benjie, Leo and Laring. When the named robbers entered the residence of
his master Johnny Lim, the robbers were wearing masks except Toto Garcia, Mawi Garcia and
Edgar. The others, Rey, Sadam, Laring, Leo, Benjie and Yul Alvarez were wearing masks but
Basingan was still able to identify them in spite of the fact that they were wearing masks because
these persons were familiar to him already as they used to frequent the house of Leonilo and
Beverly Cui. At the time of the robbery, only Toto Garcia, Mawi Garcia, Edgar, Rey and Sadam
went inside the house of his master while Yul Alvarez, Benjie, Leos and Laring were guarding
outside the building. On December 7, 1990, two days after the robbery, he was called by his
Comadre Beverly Cui and the latter handed to him the amount of P40,000.00 in her house,
saying that Toto Garcia left the said amount to be given to him. During their talk, Basingan
verbally told them about the incident relative to the kidnapping and his having received
P40,000.00 from Toto Garcia as his share of the ransom. A formal investigation was conducted
by Sgt. Armando Ballon in the presence of Atty. Elias Espinosa who assisted Eduardo Basingan.

“x x x The denial of accused Luis Obeso and Hilaria Sarte as to their participation in the
commission of the crime does not hold water for they were duly identified even during the initial
phase of the commission of the crime. They were the renters of the house where Stephanie, the
kidnapped victim, was placed. Stephanie had identified the house. The flight of these two
accused to Bacong, Dumaguete City is indicative of their guilt. x x x

“The prosecution has indeed established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt as
against accused Eduardo Basingan, Bienvenido Nacario y Pardillo, @ “Rey Nacario,” Luis
Obeso, @ “Leos”, Hilaria Sarte, @ “Laring”, Leonilo Cui y Baladjay and Beverly Cui y
Cantuba, the latter two are only as accomplices, to the crime of kidnapping with ransom. x x
x”.xvii[17]
They were sentenced to suffer the following penalties:

“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered

convicting the accused Eduardo Basingan, Bienvenido Nacario y Pardillo @ “Rey Nacario,”
Luis Obeso, @ “Leos”, Hilaria Sarte, @ “Laring”, as principals for the crime of KIDNAPPING
WITH RANSOM and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accused Leonilo Cui
and Beverly Cui being accomplices, to suffer an imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. They are further ordered to jointly restitute to the victim the
ransom money less the amount recovered. Accused Hilaria Sarte and Luis Obeso, being
detention prisoners are credited in full during the whole period of their detention provided that
they signify in writing that they will abide with the rules and regulations of the penitentiary.

“x x x

“SO ORDERED.”xviii[18]

Obeso and Sarte filed their Notice of Appealxix[19] on May 19, 1994. The Cuis filed theirsxx[20]
on May 31, 1994.

In their Brief dated April 21, 1997, Obeso and Sarte prayed for their acquittal on the following
grounds:

“I

“THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANTS ON THE BASIS OF THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL STATEMENT MADE BY
EDUARDO BASINGAN AND THE TESTIMONY OF SGT. NARCISO OUANO JR.
THEREON, WHICH ARE HEARSAY EVIDENCE.

“II

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE TWO ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AS

PRINCIPALS BY CONSPIRACY DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY COMPETENT AND
CONVINCING PROOF OF THEIR CULPABILITY.”xxi[21]

On June 25, 1997, the Cuis also filed their Brief. They contended:

“I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF APPELLANTS-SPOUSES LEONILO CUI AND BEVERLY CUI TO REMAIN
SILENT, TO COUNSEL AND AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION HAD BEEN GROSSLY
VIOLATED DURING THEIR CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.

“II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING HEARSAY EVIDENCE OFFERED
TO PROVE ALLEGED CONSPIRACY AND PARTICIPATION OF APPELLANTS-
SPOUSES LEONILO CUI AND BEVERLY CUI, AS ACCOMPLICES IN THE CRIME
CHARGED.”xxii[22]

On August 13, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General filed, in lieu of an Appellee’s Brief, a
Manifestationxxiii[23] recommending the acquittal of the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte on the
ground that the prosecution failed to present adequate proof of their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. It was postulated:

“It is clear that the only piece of evidence that would link appellants directly to the kidnapping of
Stephanie Lim is the Sworn Statement executed by Eduardo Basingan (Exhibit “C”) implicating
appellants and describing their participation in detail. Basingan’s extra-judicial confession,
however, is inadmissible for being hearsay as he was not presented by the prosecution as its
witness, he having escaped after arraignment. Hence, appellants were not afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine him. Cross-examination is an indispensable instrument of criminal
justice to give substance and meaning to the constitutional right of the accused to confront the
witnesses against him and to show that the presumption of innocence has remained steadfast and
firm x x x. It was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions or ex-
parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection
of the witness in the exercise of his right of cross-examination x x x.

“Perhaps realizing the futility of relying solely on Basingan’s extra-juridical (sic) confession in
order to secure appellants’ conviction, the prosecution presented Sgt. [O]uano who testified on
the informal investigation he conducted on Basingan. Part of his testimony was the same extra-
judicial confession made by Basingan which was strongly objected to by appellants. It cannot be
overemphasized that Sgt. [O]uano’s testimony is not based on his own personal knowledge but
on other evidence. He has no personal knowledge of the participation of the appellants in the
kidnapping of the victim. Hence, his testimony is purely hearsay evidence and has no probative
value, whether objected to or not x x x.”xxiv[24]

There is no question that Basingan escaped and never testified in court to affirm his accusation
against the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte. Thus, the trial court committed reversible error in admitting
and giving weight to the sworn statements of Basingan. In the same vein, the testimony of Sgt.
Ouano confirming the content of Basingan’s sworn statements is not proof of its truth and by
itself cannot justify the conviction of appellants. Both the extrajudicial sworn statements of
Basingan and the testimony of Sgt. Ouano are clear hearsay. Indeed, the records show that the
trial court itself admitted Basingan’s statements merely as part of the investigation of Sgt.
Ouano, thus:

“Q What else did Mr. Basingan tell you?

“A That it was the group of Toto Garcia who barged into the residence of Mr. Lim and that it
was that group of Toto Garcia who kidnapped the daughter of Mr. Lim and also it was that group
that gave him P40,000.00 out of the ransom money.

“COURT:
“x x x

“Q Were you able to determine who composed that group?

“A According to Basingan the group was composed of Wilfredo Garcia as the leader, Joselito
Tata Garcia, Mawi Garcia, Edgar, a certain Rey, a certain Leon and a certain Laring.

“ATTY. GONZALEZ:

“We move to strike out the answer of this witness. It is hearsey [sic]. The answer[‘s]
premise [is] according to.

“FISCAL ADLAWAN:

“That independence are relevant question which took action [sic].

“COURT:

“Overruled.

“x x x

“FISCAL ADLAWAN:

“Q Was there any inquiries [sic] made by you on Eduardo Basingan how did he happen to know
this group of Toto Garcia?

“ATTY. GONZALEZ:

“We object. I understand there are two investigations. He conducted his own investigation.

“ATTY. GONZALEZ: (Con’t)

“Which investigation is he referring to.

“COURT:

“As preliminary investigation.

“ATTY. GONZALEZ:

“Before the formal investigation he conducted his own investigation?

“COURT:

“Answer.
“A Yes, I did inquire from him and that he told me Toto Garcia is frequently in the house of
Leonilo and Beverly Cui and that he was introduced by the couple to Toto Garcia in one of those
visits of Toto Garcia in the house and that subsequently thereafter he knew of the persons of [sic]
Toto Garcia is associationg [sic] with because Toto Garcia went to the house of Leonilo Cui.

“ATTY. GONZALEZ:

“May we move to strike out from the records for being that he has no personal knowledge
as to that information.

“COURT:

“Objection overruled.

“ATTY. GONZALEZ:

“In that case, your Honor may we make it of record that I am interposing a continuing
objection as to the series of questioning considering that we strongly belive [sic] that what
was given by this witness is hearsay.

“COURT:

“The objection is noted. The witness is only testifying regarding his investigation.”xxv[25]

Despite its ruling, the trial court used the statements of Basingan, as testified to by Sgt. Ouano,
as proofs of the guilt of the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte. Undeniably, they are hearsay for any oral or
documentary evidence is hearsay by nature if its probative value is not based on the personal
knowledge of the witnesses but on the knowledge of some other person who was never presented
on the witness stand.xxvi[26]

Conviction cannot be based on hearsay evidence. In the 1996 case of People v. Raquel,xxvii[27] we
squarely addressed the issue of whether or not the extra-judicial statements of an escaped
accused implicating his co-accused may be utilized against the latter. There we ordered an
acquittal and held:

“A thorough review of the records of this case readily revealed that the identification of herein
appellants as the culprits was based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of accused
Amado Ponce pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of the crime. As earlier stated, the said
accused escaped from jail before he could testify in court and he has been at large since then.

“The extra-judicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against
the latter, unless these are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to
cross-examine his co-accused on the latter’s extra-judicial statements, it is elementary that the
same are hearsay as against said accused. That is exactly the situation, and the disadvantaged
plight of appellants, in the case at bar.
“Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing with the confession of an accused
which implicates his co-accused. A distinction, obviously, should be made between extra-
judicial and judicial confessions. The former deprives the other accused of the opportunity to
cross-examine the confessant, while in the latter his confession is thrown wide open for cross-
examination and rebuttal.

“The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. An extra-judicial confession is binding only upon the
confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a
principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon himself, and
are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly
inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere
unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither
ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.”xxviii[28]

The res inter alios has exceptions. Thus, Section 30 of Rule 130 provides:

“The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may
be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration.”

For this provision to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied:

“a. That the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself;

"b. that the admission relates to the common objects; and

"c. that it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.”xxix[29]

The general rule is that extra-judicial declarations of a co-conspirator made before the formation
of the conspiracy or after the accomplishment of its object are inadmissible in evidence as
against the other co-conspirators, on the ground that the accused in a criminal case has the
constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him and to cross- examine
them.xxx[30]

In the case at bar, the alleged conspiracy among the accused was not priorly established by
independent evidence. Nor was it shown that the extra-judicial statements of Basingan were
made while they were engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. In truth, the statements were
made after the conspiracy has ended and after the consummation of the crime. They were not
acts or declarations made during the conspiracy’s existence. Since the extra-judicial admissions
were made after the supposed conspiracy, they are binding only upon the confessant and are not
admissible against his co-accused; as against the latter, the confession is hearsay.xxxi[31] In fine,
the extra-judicial statements of Basingan cannot be used against the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte
without doing violence against their constitutional right to confront Basingan and to cross-
examine him.xxxii[32]
Be that as it may, we hold that on the basis of other evidence on record, the Cuis are guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of being accessories, not accomplices as held by the trial court, in the
kidnapping of Stephanie Lim.

Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes as accomplices those persons who
cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts not indispensable to
the consummation of the offense. Accomplices cooperate in the execution of the crime by
previous or simultaneous acts, by means of which they aid, facilitate or protect the execution of
the crime, without, however, taking any direct part in such execution, or forcing or inducing
others to execute it, or contributing to its accomplishment by any indispensable act.xxxiii[33] Had
Basingan been able to testify on his affidavit detailing the role of the Cuis in the planning of the
robbery of the Lim household, the trial court would have had sufficient basis to convict them as
accomplices therein. As discussed above, however, Basingan escaped before taking the witness
stand.

This Court, however, holds that the Cuis profited from the kidnapping of Stephanie Lim and are
liable as accessories.

Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes as accessories to the crime those
who, subsequent to its commission, take part therein by profiting themselves or assisting the
offenders to profit by the effects of the crime, without having participated therein, either as
principals or accomplices. Conviction of an accused as an accessory requires the following
elements: (1) that he has knowledge of the commission of the crime; and (2) that he took part in
it subsequent to its commission by any of the three modes enumerated in Article 19 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.xxxiv[34] These twin elements are present in the case of the Cuis,
and indubitable proof thereof is extant in the records of the case.

The members of the Metrodiscom Intelligence Security Team (MIST), namely, Lt. John P.
Campos, Lt. Michael Ray B. Aquino, Sgt. Narciso L. Ouano, Jr., Sgt. Felipe Honoridez, Sgt.
Armando Ballon, Sgt. Oscar Dadula, Cpl. Jeremias Canares, and Sgt. Catalino Ybanez, executed
a Joint Affidavit dated December 18, 1990 stating, among other things, that “the couple Leonilo
and Beverly Cui, although denying knowledge of the kidnapping revealed that Toto Garcia is
their Compadre” and that “they also turned over to us the amount of P10,000.00 representing that
given to them by Toto Garcia out of the ransom money".xxxv[35]

This statement charging the Cuis with having partaken of the ransom money was not denied
either in the Counter-Affidavit of Leonilo Cui dated February 15, 1991 or in the Counter-
Affidavit of Beverly Cui of the same date. In his Counter-Affidavit, Leonilo Cui even admitted
that he knew that Toto Garcia and Basingan had held secret meetings in his house and that he
had already become suspicious of their acts, but he did not confront them because they treated
each other as special friends, they being godfather of each other’s children.

In their defense, the Cuis submitted an Affidavit dated February 15, 1991 executed by Myrna M.
Limbagan, a niece of Beverly Cui who lived with them in their house in Pardo, Cebu City. But
instead of exonerating the Cuis, this Affidavit inculpates them as it states in paragraph 10 that
“on December 7, 1990, Toto Garcia, Eduardo Basingan and other persons visited the residence
of the Spouse[s] Cui[s] and handed some amounts of money to the couple”.xxxvi[36] Significantly,
it is Limbagan, a witness for the defense, who corroborates the incriminating statements made by
the members of the Metrodiscom Intelligence Security Team in their Joint Affidavit.

Realizing the aggravation caused them by the affidavits of Limbagan and the members of the
Metrodiscom Intelligence Security Team, the Cuis jointly executed a Supplement Counter-
Affidavitxxxvii[37] dated April 24, 1991 this time denying that they profited in any way from the
kidnapping of Stephanie Lim. They explained that they turned over the sum of P10,000.00 to Lt.
Michael Ray Aquino not as their share in the ransom money but as a “bribe” to prevent the
members of the Metrodiscom Intelligence Security Team from further inflicting physical harm
on the person of Leonilo Cui. In her testimony in open court, Beverly Cui claimed that she and
her husband were arrested on December 14, 1990 at their residence in Pardo, Cebu City but that
she was later released by the members of the Metrodiscom Intelligence Security Team so that
she could withdraw money from the bank to pay to them in exchange for her husband’s freedom.

Two of the members of the Metrodiscom Intelligence Security Team, Sgt. Narciso Ouano and
Sgt. Catalino Ybanez, testified rebutting the claim of Beverly Cui. Sgt. Ouano testified as
follows:

“FISCAL ADLAWAN:

“x x x

“Q How about this P10,000.00 which according to you was recovered from the accused Cui
couple?

“x x x

“Q How did you come into possession which according to you came from the Cui couple?

“A The P10,000.00 was turned over to us by Beverly Cui.

“Q Did Beverly Cui say anything when this P10,000.00 was handed to you?

“A She told us that the P10,000.00 represents the money given to her and her husband by
Toto Garcia.

“Q And did you inquire from Beverly Cui why did Toto Garcia gave [sic] them P10,000.00?

“A They told us that Toto Garcia gave it to them sometime on December 7 and that was the
share from the loot in the kidnapping.

“COURT:

“Q Was it given to them?

“A The couple told us it was given by Toto Garcia as their share of the ransom money as a
result of the kidnapping of Stephanie Lim.

“x x x

“FISCAL ADLAWAN:

“Q Was Beverly Cui already under arrest when she gave you this information?

“A No, Sir. It was her husband who was held then. She was free.”xxxviii[38]

For his part, Sgt. Catalino B. Ybanez testified in the following manner:

“COURT: Are you familiar with the P10,000.00?

“A - Yes, sir.

“COURT: You mean the money given?

“A - The money was turned over by Beverly Cui to Lt. Aquino, sir.

“COURT: In your presence?

“A - Yes, sir.

“COURT: What did she tell Lt. Aquino?

“A - She told Lt. Aquino that the money was for the ransom money which was given to him by
Toto Garcia.

“COURT: Now, what was the remark of Lt. Aquino?

“A - He accepted the money, sir. He accepted the money and he told the couple if he could
execute an affidavit regarding their participation in the involvement of the kidnapping.

“COURT: What was the answer?

“A - Actually, the couple denied the involvement, sir, but he was given the money.

“COURT: What was the answer of Beverly Cui to Lt. Aquino when it was mentioned that the
P10,000.00 was a part of the stolen money? The answer of Beverly Cui to Lt. Aquino, what else
did Beverly Cui say, did he tell Lt. Aquino?

“A - The money was given to her.

“Q - Was he made to execute an affidavit?

“A - Actually he denied the involvement.

“COURT: But as you said, now, why did Lt. Aquino ask Beverly Cui to execute an affidavit that
the P10,000.00 was a part of the ransom money?

“A - Lt. Aquino told the couple go execute an affidavit.

“COURT: What was the answer of Beverly Cui?

“A - They denied the[ir] involvement.

“x x x

“COURT: What is the remark of Beverly Cui?

“A - According to Beverly Cui and Leonilo B. Cui, that they were not involved in the
kidnapping, sir.

“x x x

“FISCAL ADLAWAN:

“x x x

“Q - Now, Beverly Cui and Leonilo Cui testified in court that Beverly Cui was released on the
same evening that she was arrested by your team, what do you say to this?

“COURT: Was she released?

“A - She was released, your Honor.

“COURT: Beverly Cui?

“A - On assurance that she will help in looking [for] the group of Toto Garcia, your Honor.

“Q - What was the result, or was she able to locate the group?

“A - She pointed to us to the house of the wife of Toto Garcia, but during the raid,
unfortunately, Toto Garcia was not in their house.

“Q - Who guided you to the house of Toto Garcia?

“A - Beverly Cui, sir.

“Q - Where is this house located?

“A - Basak, sir.

“Q - Was this the same house where those articles were raided and confiscated or recovered
including the firearm owned by the complaining witness Johnny Lim already marked as Exhbit
“A”, a .22 caliber for the prosecution, is this the house?

“A - Yes, sir.

“Q - Had it not been for Beverly Cui, you would not be able to locate the house of Toto Garcia?

“A - No, sir.

“Q - Now, did Beverly Cui show to you any bank book?

“A - Yes, sir.

“Q - How many bank books were shown?

“A - At first about 5 bank books, sir.

“x x x

“COURT: You stated that this P10,000.00 received by Cui was a part of the ransom money
lifted only from the admission of the Cuis or the Cuis plus other parties?

“A - By the Cuis, sir.

“COURT: No proof that the Cuis are beneficiaries of Lt. Aquino?

“A - Only the couple, your Honor.

“COURT: In other words, you learned the P10,000.00 only when the money was returned by
Beverly Cui?

“A - During the confrontation the couple admitted that they have that other passbook, the
P10,000.00, sir.

“COURT: I’m referring of (sic) the admission that the P10,000.00 was a part of the ransom
money?

“A - Yes, sir.

“COURT: When did you learn that it was a ransom-money? At the time the money was
returned or before the return?

“A - At the time when there was a confrontation, sir.

“COURT: What do you mean by confrontation?

“A - When we confronted the accused, sir.

“COURT: The Cuis?

“A - Yes, and she admitted she has with her in the bank, the P10,000.00.

“x x x

“COURT: You mean an interrogation not a confrontation by you?

“A - Not by me, but by the investigator, sir.

“COURT: Who was doing the interrogation?

“A - Ouano, sir.

“COURT: You mean Ouano interrogating the Cuis? Then you were listening?

“A - Yes, sir.

“COURT: You heard the Cuis that they were given money by Toto Garcia and the money is in
the bank.

“A - Yes, sir.”xxxix[39]

Significantly, it is again the Cuis themselves, in their Motion for Reconsideration dated
December 2, 1993, who corroborated Sgt. Ybanez’s claim that Beverly Cui was temporarily
released for the particular purpose of accompanying the police to the hideout of Toto Garcia and
his men. Thus, in par. 5 of their Motion for Reconsideration, they allege that “x x x Beverly Cui
was temporarily released from custody in order for her to lead the police to the hideouts of the
other suspects of the crime”.xl[40]

As accessories to the consummated crime of kidnapping for ransom, the penalty imposable upon
Leonilo and Beverly Cui is two degrees lower than that prescribed by law.xli[41] Under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty shall be death where the kidnapping was
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom. However, when the crime was perpetrated in
December 1990, the death penalty has been suspended by the 1987 Constitution and commuted
to reclusion perpetua. Since no modifying circumstance is appreciated for or against the Cuis,
the imposable penalty should be in the medium period of the indeterminate sentence applicable
under Republic Act no. 4103, as amended.xlii[42]

Finally, while we affirm the conviction of the Cui spouses, we acquit Obeso and Sarte.
The only evidence linking Obeso and Sarte to the kidnapping of Stephanie Lim is Basingan’s
sworn statements that a certain Leos and a certain Laring were among the lookouts who stood as
guards outside the house of the Lims while Toto Garcia and his group were inside. Basingan’s
sworn statements are hearsay, hence, inadmissible in evidence against his co-accused because he
escaped before he could take the witness stand.

Except for Basingan who could not even give the real names of Obeso and Sarte and just referred
to them as Leos and Laring, respectively, no one really knew them. And significantly, no
prosecution witness identified them, not even Stephanie Lim. She never saw any of them during
the robbery or in the house where she was detained. Her testimony runs, viz.:

“DIRECT EX. BY FISCAL ADLAWAN

“xxx

“Q - What else took place?

“A - They blindfolded me and handcuffed me and brought me out, sir.

“Q - What do you mean when you said you were brought out, out of your residence?

“A - That is correct, sir. They brought me to another place.

“Q - By what means?

“A - Our Fiera, sir.

“Q - You owned the vehicle?

“A - Yes, sir.

“Q - While you were brought to (sic) outside, were you able to recognize one of them?

“A - No, sir, because I was blindfolded.

“Q - Was there an instance when your blindfold was taken off?

“A - When I was placed in a room.

“x x x

“Q - And how long did you stay in that house where you were brought by those persons known
as Toto Garcia and others?

“A - From dawn until afternoon.

“x x x

“COURT: What happened when you were brought back to your house?

“A - Few days after I was asked to identify the house and the room where I stayed.

“Q - You were brought to that place [a] few days after?

“A - Yes, sir.

“Q - Who were with you when you were brought to that place?

“A - Members of the Metro Discom, sir.

“Q - When you were brought to the place again [a] few days after you were released, did you
come to know who occupied that room?

“ATTY. GONZALES: Hearsay, your Honor, she has no personal knowledge, whatever
information given to her that’s not of her own, your Honor.

“COURT: Let us find out, if she knows.

“A - Laring, sir.

“x x x

“COURT: Cross?

“CROSS BY ATTY. GONZALES

“x x x

“Q - And you mentioned of a certain Laring, you agree with me that this Laring was identified
to you by people of the Metro Discom?

“A - Yes, sir.

“Q - And the people at the Metro Discom meaning the police officers, told you that it was
Laring who occupied the place where you were allegedly brought, right?

“A - Yes, sir.

“COURT: I can not hear.

“WITNESS: Yes, sir, occupied by Laring.

“Q - You have not seen Laring?

“A - Yes, sir.

“Q - You have not seen Laring, you mean no?

“A - Yes, sir.

“x x x

“Q - Now, you mention, no. Now, in your house where this incident allegedly took place,
you only saw Toto Garcia?

“A - Yes, sir.

“Q - You could not identify anybody there?

“A - No, sir.
x x x”.xliii[43]

Obeso and Sarte interposed the defense of alibi. They asseverated that in late November, 1990,
they left the house they were renting in Linao, Minglanilla, Cebu and went to Banilad, Bacong,
Dumaguete City where the parents of Sarte reside. It was there, in March 1991, that they were
arrested.

The prosecution never rebutted the claim of live-in partners Obeso and Sarte that they were in
Bacong, Dumaguete City as early as November, 1990. No direct evidence has been proffered by
the prosecution to place Obeso and Sarte at the scene of the crime. Their alibi has to be given
credence.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, dated
December 6, 1993, in Criminal Case No. CBU-20464, is MODIFIED. Appellants Leonilo and
Beverly Cui are CONVICTED as ACCESSORIES and are ORDERED to serve the
indeterminate sentence of two (2) years, four (4) months and one day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Appellants LUIS
OBESO, alias “LEOS”, and HILARIA SARTE, alias “LARING” are ACQUITTED and if
presently detained, they are ordered immediately released from detention unless other legal
reasons exists to detain them. The Director of Prisons is ordered to inform this Court within ten
(10) days from receipt of this Decision his compliance. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
i

ii

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 185012               March 5, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
VICTOR VILLARINO y MABUTE, Appellant.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

In this special complex crime of rape with homicide, the unsolicited and spontaneous confession of
guilt by the appellant to the police officer is admissible in evidence. The circumstantial evidence is also
sufficient to sustain the conviction of the appellant even if no spermatozoa was found in the victim’s
body during an autopsy.

Factual Antecedents

On August 3, 1995, an Information1 was filed charging appellant Victor Villarino y Mabute with the
special complex crime of rape with homicide. The Information contained the following accusatory
allegations:

That on or about the 29th day of April, 1995, at about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, at Barangay "D1",
Municipality of Almagro, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named accused, with lewd design, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge against a minor ten (10)
years [sic], "AAA",2 without the latter’s consent and against her will, and thereafter, with deliberate
intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inflict upon the said "AAA"
mortal wounds on x x x different parts of her body, which caused her untimely death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. After the termination of the pre-trial conference,
trial ensued.

The Version of the Prosecution

The case against the appellant, as culled from the evidence presented by the prosecution, is as follows:

On April 28, 1995, "BBB", together with her 10-year old daughter "AAA" and her younger son "CCC"
went to the house of their relative in Barangay "D" to attend the fiesta to be held the next day.3

On even date, from 7:00 o’clock to 9:00 o’clock in the evening, SPO4 Jesus Genoguin (SPO4
Genoguin) was in his house in Barangay "D" entertaining his guests, one of whom was appellant.
While personally serving food and drinks to appellant, SP04 Genoguin noticed that the latter was
wearing a bracelet and a necklace with pendant. Appellant even allowed SPO4 Genoguin to put on the
bracelet.4

On April 29, 1995, at around 9:00 o’clock in the morning, the appellant who was on his way to
Barangay "D", passed by the house of Rodrigo Olaje (Rodrigo). At that time, Rodrigo noticed
appellant wearing a bracelet and a necklace with pendant. He was also wearing a white sleeveless t-
shirt (sando).5

At 11:00 o’clock in the morning, appellant was at the house of "BBB’s" aunt. "BBB" offered him food.
"BBB" also noticed that he was dressed in a white sando and that he wore jewelry consisting of a
bracelet and a necklace with pendant.6 At 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, he was seen wearing the same
sando and jewelry while drinking at the basketball court in Barangay "D".7
At around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, "BBB" told "AAA" to go home to Barangay "D1" to get a t-
shirt for her brother. "AAA" obeyed. However, she no longer returned. While "BBB" was anxiously
waiting for "AAA" in the house of her aunt in Barangay "D",8 she received information that a dead
child had been found in Barangay "D1". She proceeded to the area where she identified the child’s
body as that of her daughter, "AAA".9

At around 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Rodrigo, who was the barangay captain of Barangay "D1"
received information that a dead child was found in their barangay. He instructed a barangay tanod to
inform the police about the incident. Thereafter, Rodrigo proceeded to the specified area together with
other barangay tanods.10

SPO4 Genoguin also went to the crime scene after being informed by his commander.11 Upon arrival,
he saw the corpse of a little girl behind a big boulder that was about 10 meters away from the trail
junction of the barangays.12 People had gathered seven to 10 meters away from the dead body, but no
one dared to approach.13

"AAA’s" lifeless body lay face up with her buttocks on top of a small rock. Her body was slanted
downward with her legs spread apart and dangling on the sides of the small boulder. She was no longer
wearing short pants and panty, and blood oozed from her vagina. Wrapped around her right hand,
which was positioned near her right ear, was a white sando.14

"AAA’s" panty was found a meter away from her body, while her short pants was about two meters
farther. A bracelet and a pendant were also recovered from the crime scene. Rodrigo and "BBB"
identified these pieces of jewelry as those seen on the appellant. They also identified the sando on
"AAA’s" arm as the appellant’s.15 Thus, the hunt for appellant began.16

On the same day, the appellant was found in the house of Aurelia Susmena near the seashore of
Barangay "D1". He was drunk and violent. He resisted arrest and had to be bodily carried to the
motorboat that would take him to the municipal building in Almagro, Samar. The arresting team made
the appellant take off his clothes since they were wet. When he complied, his briefs revealed
bloodstains.17

"AAA’s" corpse was taken to Calbayog District Hospital for autopsy. The Medico Legal Necropsy
Report indicated the following injuries sustained by "AAA":

- Lacerated wounds:

# 1 – 2 cm. in length forehead

# 2 – 2 cm. in length globella

# 3 – 2.5 cm. in length, left lateral supraorbital region

# 4 – 3 cm. in length, left infraorbital region with fracture of underlying bone

# 5 – 4 cm. in left occiput with linear fracture of underlying bone

 - Hematoma, confluent abrasion, 3 cm. in diameter, sacrum

- Genitalia grossly female, pre-pubertal

- Vaginal orifice admits two fingers with ease

- Laceration, posterior vagina wall 3 cm.

- Laceration, anterior vaginal wall (12 o’clock) 1.5 cm.

CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardiorespiratory Arrest secondary to:

Cerebral hemorrhage and concussion secondary to multiple lacerated wounds to skull fissure

Hypovolomic shock secondary to Massive Hemorrhage, secondary to third degree vaginal laceration.18

Dr. Arleen P. Lim, Medical Officer III, testified that four of the five lacerated wounds could have been
caused by a hard irregular or blunt object, like a rock or stone.19 While the fifth lacerated wound could
have been the result of a strong force, as when the head is forcibly banged.20 "AAA’s" hematoma was
just above her buttocks.21 She further testified that the ease with which two fingers entered "AAA’s"
vaginal orifice could have been caused by sexual intercourse. The lacerations in her vaginal wall could
also have been the result of sexual intercourse or by the forcible entry of an object into the vaginal
canal, such as a penis.22 Dr. Lim confirmed that the cause of death of "AAA" was cardio-respiratory
arrest secondary to multiple lacerated wounds and skull fracture.23

Due to the death of "AAA", "BBB" incurred (1) P2,200.00 for the embalming and for the coffin (2)
P700.00 for transportation and (3) P4,000.00 for the wake and construction of the tomb.

On May 2, 1995, the police brought appellant to Calbayog City for medical examination since he had
scratches and abrasions on his body. While waiting for a boat ride at 4:00 o’clock in the morning, the
police team took a coffee break. SPO4 Genoguin was momentarily left alone to guard the appellant.
During this short period, the appellant voluntarily admitted to SPO4 Genoguin that he committed the
crime charged. He also told SPO4 Genoguin that he could keep the pendant and bracelet if he would
retrieve the t-shirt and throw it into the sea. SPO4 Genoguin rejected the appellant’s offer and reminded
him of his right to a counsel and that everything the appellant said could be used against him in court.
Unperturbed, the appellant reiterated his offer.24

When they boarded the motorboat, the appellant repeatedly offered to give SPO4 Genoguin P20,000.00
if he would throw the sando into the sea. However, the police officer ignored the offer and instead
reported the matter to the Chief of Police of Almagro, SPO4 Basilio M. Yabao.25 Later, the appellant’s
mother, Felicidad Mabute y Legaspi, asked him not to testify against her son.26

At the Calbayog District Hospital, Senior Resident Physician Dr. Jose V. Ong, found that appellant’s
body had 10 healed abrasions and two linear abrasions or scratches, particularly, on his breast, knees,
as well as right and left ears, that could have been caused by fingernails.27

The Version of the Appellant

In the afternoon of April 29, 1995, the appellant and his mother were at the residence of Aurelia
Susmena. The appellant was sleeping in a hammock when he was abruptly awakened by Rodrigo,
SPO4 Genoguin, and several policemen and barangay tanods. They tied his hands and feet with a
nylon rope, and dragged him towards the seashore. Rodrigo hit the nape of the appellant with a gun
then poked it at the appellant’s mother, who wanted to help him. The appellant was then forcibly
loaded in a motorboat.28

The appellant denied owning the bracelet, the pendant, and the sando found at the scene of the crime.
He claimed it was impossible for him to buy these pieces of jewelry since he was only a cook in the
fishing venture managed by Rodrigo. He maintained that he was not even paid for his services, for
which reason he abandoned his work. This resulted in the failure of the fishing venture to operate for a
day, which allegedly angered Rodrigo making him testify against him.29

The Decision of the Regional Trial Court

On May 19, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Calbayog City, Branch 32 rendered a Decision30 finding
the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of rape with homicide. It disposed
as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused, VICTOR VILLARINO y Mabute,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with Homicide of a ten-year old minor, for which
he is hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH, as provided for under R.A. No. 7659,
to pay the complainant, BBB, the sum of P50,000.00 and P6,900.00 for actual expenses, plus all the
accessory penalties provided by law, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay
the costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

The Verdict of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals (CA) found the appellant guilty only of homicide. The dispositive portion of its
Decision31 reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 19, 1999, of the RTC of Calbayog City, in Criminal Case No.
2069 is MODIFIED. As modified, accused-appellant VICTOR VILLARINO y MABUTE is found
GUILTY of HOMICIDE and he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from
twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. The appealed Decision is
AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.32

Still unsatisfied, the appellant comes to us raising the following assignment of errors:

Issues

I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF RAPE WITH
HOMICIDE SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A VERDICT OF CONVICTION DESPITE THE

FACT THAT THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.33

Our Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the following elements

must concur: (1) the appellant had carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman
was achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on occasion of such carnal
knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, the appellant killed a woman.34 When the victim is
a minor, however, it is sufficient that the evidence proves that the appellant had sexual intercourse or
sexual bodily connections with the victim.35

In the instant case, appellant voluntarily confessed to raping and killing "AAA" to SPO4 Genoguin. He
even offered to give the pieces of jewelry to the latter if his sando is thrown into the sea. The appellant
did not deny this accusation nor assail its truthfulness.

When appellant confessed to the crime, he was alone with SPO4 Genoguin, and no force or
intimidation was employed against him. The confession was spontaneously made and not elicited
through questioning. The trial court did not, therefore, err in holding that compliance with the
constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation is not applicable in the instant case.36

In People v. Dy,37 we held that:

Contrary to the defense contention, the oral confession made by the Accused to Pat. Padilla that "he
had shot a tourist" and that the gun he had used in shooting the victim was in his bar which he wanted
surrendered to the Chief of Police (t.s.n., October 17, 1984, pp. 6-9), is competent evidence against
him. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged may be given in
evidence against him (Sec. 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court). It may in a sense be also regarded as part of
the res gestae. The rule is that, any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the
confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of
it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in substance
(23 C.J.S. 196, cited in People v. Tawat, G.R. No. 62871, May 25, 1985, 129 SCRA 431).

What was told by the Accused to Pat. Padilla was a spontaneous statement not elicited through
questioning, but given in an ordinary manner. No written confession was sought to be presented in
evidence as a result of formal custodial investigation. (People v. Taylaran, G.R. No. L-19149, October
31, 1981, 108 SCRA 373). The Trial Court, therefore, cannot be held to have erred in holding that
compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation is not applicable in the instant
case, as the defense alleges in its Error VII.38
At any rate, even without his confession, appellant could still be convicted of the complex crime of
rape with homicide. The prosecution established his complicity in the crime through circumstantial
evidence which were credible and sufficient, and led to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant
committed the complex crime of rape with homicide. When considered together, the circumstances
point to the appellant as the culprit.

First. Prior to the incident, three witnesses saw the appellant wearing the white sleeveless t-
shirt, a necklace with pendant and a bracelet. Rodrigo saw the appellant wearing the same sando
and pieces of jewelry when the latter was working in his fishing venture. He again saw the
appellant wearing the same apparel and jewelry on the day the victim was raped and murdered.
SPO4 Genoguin recalled that he saw appellant wearing the necklace with pendant and the
bracelet on the eve of the commission of the crime. On that fateful day, he noticed that the
appellant was wearing the white sleeveless t-shirt and the same pieces of jewelry in a drinking
spree a kilometer away from the crime scene. "BBB" also testified that on the day of her
daughter’s death, she saw the appellant wearing a white sleeveless t-shirt, a necklace with
pendant, and a bracelet.

Second. The pendant and bracelet were later recovered a few meters away from the lifeless
body of "AAA". The white sando was also found clasped in the right hand of the victim.

Third. The appellant could no longer produce the sando and pieces of jewelry after his arrest.

Fourth. The physical examination on the appellant revealed 10 healed abrasions and two linear
abrasions or scratches on his breast, knees and ears which could have been caused by the
fingernails of the victim. Appellant offered no plausible explanation on how he sustained said
injuries.

Fifth. The victim had blood oozing from her vaginal orifice, while the appellant had human
blood-stains on his briefs.

Sixth. The appellant attempted to bribe SPO4 Genoguin and the policemen who were escorting
him to Calbayog City, by offering them P20,000.00 in exchange for the disposal of his white
sleeveless t-shirt found in the crime scene.

Seventh. The appellant’s mother requested SPO4 Genoguin not to testify against her son.

The appellant argues that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses which were replete with contradictions and improbabilities. According to him, Rodrigo’s
declaration that it was around 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of April 29, 1995 when he was told of the
discovery of a dead body contradicts "BBB’s" testimony that she instructed the victim to go home to
Barangay "D1" at around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of the same day. Moreover, Rodrigo’s claim
that the appellant, a fisherman, always wore the pieces of jewelry in question while at work, is contrary
to human experience. Lastly, SPO4 Genoguin’s contention that he saw appellant wearing the pieces of
jewelry on separate occasions prior to the commission of the crime is inconsistent with his subsequent
testimony that he was not even sure of the ownership of the said jewelry.

Appellant’s contentions are not worthy of credence. A perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes
reveals that it was Prosecutor Feliciano Aguilar who supplied the time of 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon
when Rodrigo was informed that a dead body of a child was found, thus:

Q On April 29, 1995 at around 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon where were you?

A I was in the house.

Q Your house in what barangay or what place?

A In Barangay "D1", Almagro, Samar.

Q While you were in your house in Barangay "D1", Almagro, Samar was there any unusual
incident that happened that you came to know [of] on April 29, 1995 in the afternoon at around
2:00 o’clock?

A Yes, there was.39

Moreover, the time when Rodrigo was informed of the incident and the time stated by "BBB" when she
sent "AAA" on an errand to Barangay "D1", were mere approximations, which cannot impair their
credibility. An error in the estimation of time does not discredit the testimony of a witness when time is
not an essential element.40

The inconsistencies indicated by the appellant are likewise inconsequential since they do not detract
from the fact that "BBB" sent "AAA" on an errand in Barangay "D1" where her dead body was later
discovered. Far from being badges of fraud and fabrication, the discrepancies in the testimonies of
witnesses may be justifiably considered as indicative of the truthfulness on material points of the facts
testified to. These minor deviations also confirm that the witnesses had not been rehearsed.41

The credibility of SPO4 Genoguin is not adversely affected by his inability to immediately identify the
ownership of the jewelry found near the dead body of the victim despite his testimony that he saw the
appellant wearing the same jewelry on previous occasions. The workings of a human mind placed
under emotional stress are unpredictable leading people to act differently.42 There is simply no standard
form of behavioral response that can be expected from anyone when confronted with a startling or
frightful occurrence.43 SPO4 Genoguin, despite being a policeman since 1977,44 was affected by the
gruesome crime. His years in the police service did not prepare him to witness the lifeless body of a 10-
year old girl who had been brutally raped and murdered.

In sum, the inconsistencies raised by the appellant are too inconsequential to warrant a reversal of the
trial court’s ruling. The decisive factor in the prosecution for rape with homicide is whether the
commission of the crime has been sufficiently proven. For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the
testimony of a witness to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt the innocence of
the appellant for the crime charged.45 As the contradictions alleged by the appellant had nothing to do
with the elements of the crime of rape with homicide, they cannot be used as ground for his acquittal.46

The appellant imputes improper motive to witness Rodrigo who, allegedly, had an axe to grind against
him because Rodrigo’s fishing venture incurred huge losses after appellant abandoned his job as a
cook. Such imputation, however, deserves scant consideration. Other than appellant’s self-serving
allegation, there is no proof that his sudden departure from work adversely affected the operations of
the fishing venture.1avvphi1
Against the prosecution’s evidence, the appellant could only offer a mere denial and alibi. However,
denial and alibi are intrinsically weak defenses and must be supported by strong evidence of non-
culpability in order to be credible. Courts likewise view the defense of alibi with suspicion and caution,
not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it can be fabricated easily.47
Also, the testimonies of appellant’s mother and Aurelia Susmena, a close family friend, deserve no
probative weight. In People v. Sumalinog, Jr.,48 we held that when a defense witness is a family
member, relative or close friend, courts should view such testimony with skepticism.

Besides, in order for alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the appellant was somewhere else
during the commission of the crime; it must also be shown that it would have been impossible for him
to be anywhere within the vicinity of the crime scene.49 In the case at bench, the appellant was in the
house of Aurelia Susmena which is located in the same barangay where the body of the victim was
discovered. Thus, it was not at all impossible for the appellant to be at the scene of the crime during its
commission.

Hence, the appellant’s twin defenses of denial and alibi pale in the light of the array of circumstantial
evidence presented by the prosecution.50 The positive assertions of the prosecution witnesses deserve
more credence and evidentiary weight than the negative averments of the appellant and his witnesses.

The CA ruled that the evidence adduced by the prosecution are sufficient to produce a conviction for
homicide but not for the crime of rape. In so ruling, the CA ratiocinated that while there were
lacerations in the vaginal orifice of the victim, the absence of spermatozoa, however, belied that she
was raped.

We disagree. The absence of spermatozoa does not necessarily result in the conclusion that rape was
not committed.51 Convictions for rape with homicide have been sustained on purely circumstantial
evidence.52 In those cases, the prosecution presented other tell-tale signs of rape such as the laceration
and description of the victim’s pieces of clothing, especially her undergarments, the position of the
body when found and the like.53

Here, we reiterate that there is an unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence from which we can infer
that the appellant raped "AAA". In a secluded area, her undisturbed corpse was discovered lying face-
up and slanting downward with her buttocks on top of a small boulder. Her 10-year old lifeless body
was naked from waist down with legs spread apart and dangling from the rock. Blood oozed from the
vaginal orifice. Wrapped around her right hand was the appellant’s sando. Her shorts were found a few
meters away, just like the appellant’s pendant and bracelet. Moreover, the appellant confessed to
having raped "AAA". These circumstances lead to one fair and reasonable conclusion that appellant
raped and murdered "AAA".

The Penalty

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to RA 765954 provides that when by reason or on the
occasion of the rape a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. However, in view of the
passage on June 24, 2006 of RA 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty
in the Philippines" we are mandated to impose on the appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole.55

The Damages
In line with current jurisprudence,56 the heirs of the victim are entitled to an award of P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity, which is commensurate with the gravity of the complex crime committed. As actual
damages, the heirs of "AAA" are entitled to an award of P6,900.00 only since this was the amount of
expenses incurred for "AAA’s" burial. Moral damages in the amount of P75,000.00 must also be
awarded.57 Lastly, the heirs are entitled to an award of exemplary damages in the sum of P50,000.00.58
Article 229 of the Civil Code allows the award of exemplary damages in order to deter the commission
of similar acts and to allow the courts to forestall behavior that would pose grave and deleterious
consequences to society.59

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 00065 is MODIFIED. Appellant Victor Villarino y Mabute is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of rape with homicide and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay the heirs of "AAA" the amounts
of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P6,900.00 as actual damages, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-59604 November 14, 1986

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,

vs.
VICTORIO PIA y BAYHON, GAUDENCIO LAMANGAN y SARIA, VENANCIO PIA y BAYHON, DIOSDADO ANCIADO y AMORA, MARIO GARCIA
y UMALI, and EDUARDO VINA y MONTEMAYOR, accused.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff.

Franco L. Loyola for accused Lamangan.

Leonardo Peji Esteleydiz for accused Anciado.

 
PARAS, J.:

This case is before Us on automatic review from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cavite finding Gaudencio Lamangan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention and accordingly sentencing him to death, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the guilt of the accused GAUDENCIO LAMANGAN, as principal, and DIOSDADO ANCIADO
and MARIO GARCIA, as accessories, in the Commission of the offense charged in the information, has been established with
proof beyond reasonable doubt, and hereby imposes upon the accused GAUDENCIO LAMANGAN the mandatory penalty of
death, and sentences the accused Diosdado Anciado and Mario Garcia to suffer imprisonment from eight (8) years of prision
mayor, as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and each to
pay one-fifth of the costs. Said accused are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the spouses Juanito Chua and Elma
Diato Chua the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages.

The accused Diosdado Anciado and Mario Garcia shall be credited with four-fifths (4/5) of the period during which they have
been under preventive imprisonment, unless at the time of their initial confinement they had executed an agreement binding
themselves to the same rules and regulations applicable to regular prisoners, in which event they shall be credited with the
entire period of their preventive imprisonment.

In the event the accused Diosdado Anciado and Mario Garcia should opt to appeal from the judgment, the Court hereby fixes
their appeal bond in the amount of P25,000.00.

In view of the imposition of the death penalty upon the accused Gaudencio Lamangan, let the original folio of this case, together
with all the evidence, oral and documentary, be forthwith elevated to the Honorable Supreme Court for automatic review.

SO ORDERED.

It appears undisputed that the antecedent facts upon which this case is based hinged primarily on the kidnapping and serious illegal detention of
Juanito Chua and his wife in the evening of December 28, 1977 at Dimasalang, Imus, Cavite committed in the following manner: Immediately after
complainant Juanito Chua parked his car near their residence and while he was opening its door, two (2) persons accosted him, one of them poked a
gun at his head and the other poked a knife at his neck, warning Juanito Chua to keep quiet. They tied Juanito Chua's hands and those of his wife
Elma Diato Chua and brought them in a car to a hut. The kidnappers demanded a ransom of P100,000.00, warning that a refusal would compel them
to kill Juanito Chua and his wife. Juanito Chua told them that he did not have that amount. He bargained to reduce it. The kidnappers finally agreed to
accept the amount of P18,000.00. Juanito Chua's wife was then released so that she could secure the money which was to be delivered to the
kidnappers at Zapote, Las Piñas, Metro Manila in the afternoon of December 29, 1977. In the meantime, Juanito Chua continued to be detained in the
hut by his kidnappers. He was rescued by the Philippine Constabulary on January 3, 1978. (pp. 3-4, Appellant's Brief)

Under an information filed by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite on March 28, 1978, herein appellant Gaudencio Lamangan, together with his
co-accused Victorio Pia, Venancio Pia, Diosdado Anciado, Mario Garcia and Eduardo Vinas, were charged with the crime of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention.

Two other alleged participants in the commission of the offense, Emiliano del Rosario and Federico Camia alias Iding were, at the time of the filing of
the information, at large. Of the six (6) accused in the custody of the authorities, five (5) namely, Diosdado Anciado, Venancio Pia, Mario Garcia,
Victorio Pia and Eduardo Vina, bolted the Provincial Jail of Cavite during the trial. (pp. 3-9, Appendix of Appellant's Brief)

Accused Diosdado Anciado surrendered on March 21, 1979 to the Provincial Governor and was re-confined in the Provincial Jail of Cavite.

On June 11, 1979, accused Mario Garcia also surrendered and was likewise detained anew at the Provincial Jail of Cavite.

The court suspended the trial of the case against the remaining fugitives, Venancio Pia, Victorio Pia and Eduardo Vina, and the two other participants,
Emiliano del Rosario and Federico Camia, who were at large, until they shall have been apprehended. The trial of the case proceeded with respect to
accused Gaudencio Lamangan, Diosdado Anciado and Mario Garcia. As herein earlier stated, they were found guilty and sentenced accordingly for
their participation in the commission of the crime. Only Gaudencio Lamangan's case was elevated to Us on automatic review in view of the imposition
by the trial court of the death penalty on him.

In his Brief, appellant made the following assignments of error:

1. The lower court erred in considering the extrajudicial admission of accused-appellant Gaudencio Lamangan as evidence of guilt.

2. The lower court erred in concluding that accused-appellant Lamangan directly participated in the kidnapping of Juanito Chua.

3. The lower court erred in convicting the accused-appellant Lamangan as principal in the crime of kidnapping and in imposing upon him the
mandatory penalty of death.

4. The lower court erred in not acquitting accused-appellant Lamangan of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.
all of which boil down to the more important issue of whether or not the guilt of accused-appellant has been established beyond reasonable doubt.

The contention of appellant that his extrajudicial confession is not admissible, is untenable. Records show that accused Venancio Pia, Mario Garcia,
Victorio Pia and appellant executed their confessions (Exhs. "A", "B", "C" and "H", respectively) before investigators in the presence of counsel de
oficio (Order dated February 7, 1978 of Municipal Judge of Silang, Cavite). Appellant's repudiation of his sworn statement (Exh. "C") during the trial
because the Philippine Constabulary (PC) allegedly extracted his admissions through the use of force, threats and intimidation consisting of physical
violence is baseless. For if they had indeed been maltreated, particularly appellant, they should have complained to the counsel de oficio or to
Municipal Judge to whom the case was referred by the PC for preliminary investigation. In fact, since appellant's arrest on January 3, 1978, he only
complained for the first time, that is, at the hearing held on May 23, 1980, that he was subjected to maltreatment by the PC, claiming that dried
banana leaves were placed on his chest and set on fire. It has been held that where the defendants did not present evidence of compulsion or duress
or violence on their persons; where they failed to complain to the officers who administered the oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies and where
they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim, all these should be considered as factors indicating
voluntariness of confessions. (People vs. Villanueva, 128 SCRA 488; People vs. Urgel, 134 SCRA 483; People vs. Toledo, 140 SCRA 259).

At any rate, appellant's confession (Exh. "C") narrates that:

5. T. Maaari bang sabihin mo sa tagasiyasat kung paano ninyo binalak o plinano ang pagkidnap sa inyong
ginawa?

S. Opo, ganito po iyon noong pong ika-24 ng Desyembre 1977 pinag-usapan po namin ang pagkidnap na
iyan sa mag-asawa nina Juanito Chua at Ginang Elma Chua sa pamumuno ni Nani del Rosario ... at
noong ika-28 ng Desyembre 1977 ang oras po ay humigit ika 9:00 ng gabi ay inutusan ako ni Boy Helen
na magpunta sa bayan at magtagpotagpo kami sa gasolinahan sa tapat ng bahay ni Juanita Chua at noon
nga pong ang oras ay humigit kumulang sa ika-10:00 ng gabi ay sapilitang isinakay namin sa kotse ang
mag-asawa at dinala namin sa isang bahay kubo doon sa Bo. Balite 1st, Silang, Cavite ...

6. T. At noong makarating kayo sa kubo ano naman ang inyong ginawa sa mag-asawa?

S. ...Inutusan namin ang kanyang asawa na si Mrs. Elma Chua na kumuha ng pera na nagkakahalaga ng
Labinwalong Libong Piso (18,000.00) bilang kapalit ng kanyang asawa.

xxx xxx xxx

9. T. Saan naman ninyo napag-usapan ang lugar at oras na dadalhin ang pera?

S. Doon po namin iniutos na dalhin ang salapi sa MVS Theater, Zapote, Metro Manila. (Emphasis
supplied)

The rule is that an extrajudicial confession replete with details could not have been extracted by force. (People vs. Nillos, 127 SCRA 207) In the case
at bar, the confession of appellant contains details which the investigators could not have known beforehand.

Be this as it may, independent of the aforesaid confession, the inculpatory facts were established by prosecution witness Juanito Chua who testified
as follows:

ATTY. BINAY:

All right. Now, what portion of your head, will you please tell this Honorable Court the exact portion of your
head when you stated a gun was poked at you?

WITNESS:

Here, sir. (Witness pointing to the left temple, 2 inches left eyebrow).

ATTY. BINAY:

Now, please tell us what happened after that?

A When a gun was poked on me, I was not able to alight from my car, sir.

Q Then, what happened?

A I was told to move to the other side of my car, sir.

 Q Who instructed you to move on the other side of your car?

A That person who pointed that gun on me, sir.

Q Will you kindly look around this courtroom, Mr. Witness, and tell this Honorable Court if that person who
poked a gun on your head and who instructed you to move on the other side of your car is present in this
court room?

A Yes, sir. There he is.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

Make of record that the witness approached a certain person and tapped his shoulder who identified
himself as Victorio Pia.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. BINAY:

Now, after you had unlocked and opened the door, please ten us what happened.

A After unlocking and opening the door on the other side of my car, there was a person that I do not know
who suddenly entered the said door and poked a knife.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Will you kindly step down and tap the right shoulder of the person if he is inside the courtroom, as you
said?

A Yes, sir. (Witness stepped down from the witness stand and approached a person who Identified himself
as Gaudencio Lamangan).

ATTY. BINAY:

After Gaudencio Lamangan entered your car and he poked a knife on your neck, what happened after
that?

A They tied my hands, sir.

Q Who in particular tied your hands?

A That person who pointed that knife on me (the witness pointed to the accused Gaudencio Lamangan).

Q Now, tell us what happened after your hands were tied by Gaudencio Lamangan?

A My wife went down our apartment, sir.

Q And what did she do, if she did anything?

A She approached the driver and said, 'ano bang nangyayari sa inyo? What is happening.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. BINAY.

With that particular statement, what did this Gaudencio Lamangan and Victorio Pia do?

A What he did, he dragged my wife at the rear of our car, sir.

 Q All right, Now, after your wife was placed at the back of your car, what happened next?

A We left, sir, and upon reaching the corner of Dimasalang Subdivision, they blindfolded me, sir.

ATTY. BINAY.

xxx xxx xxx

Q All right. Now, you said you stopped cruising after thirty minutes. Will you please tell us what happened?

A He removed my blindfold after we have stopped, sir.

(pp. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, t.s.n., September l5, 1978)

Q Now, you said a while ago that when you rested for ten (10) minutes, you were blindfolded. Now, when
you were walking for about one (1) hour, were you still blindfolded, Mr. Chua?

A Yes, sir.

Q After you were told to stoop down, what happened?

A I was asked to enter a place, as if, it was a hut, and which I could not see because I was then
blindfolded.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. BINAY.

Alright, what transpired after that?

A I told them, how much are you demanding from me?

xxx xxx xxx

Q What was the reply?

A P100,000.00, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q When you said the amount was too big for you to raise what was their answer, if any?

A They told me that in case they could not get that amount demanded from me, they ought to follow their
Commander, I will be killed otherwise they are going to kill us.

(pp.7, 8, 19, 11 and 12, t.s.n., September 27, 1978, emphasis supplied).

Q And then, what happened?

A Suddenly, I heard shouts that there were PC soldiers.

Q When you heard shouts that there were PC soldiers, what did you do, if you did
anything.

WITNESS:

I immediately jumped outside that hut, sir.

ATTY. BINAY:
Will you kindly tell us why you have to jump outside the hut after you heard those shouts that they were PC
 soldiers.

A Because I was worried that there might be a shooting or they might fire on the hut.

Q What transpired after you jumped out of the hut, Mr. Chua?

A I was taken by Sgt. Cortez.

Q Now, would you be able to tell us what happened to that person whom you said
you were talking earlier before you heard shouts that they were PC soldiers?

A Lamangan was also taken by Sgt. Cortez, including the gun

Q Were you able to know finally, who was this person?

A Yes, sir.

ATTY. BINAY:

Who is this?

A Gaudencio Lamangan. (and witness pointing to Gaudencio Lamangan.

(pp. 34, 35 and 36, t. s. n., Id.,emphasis supplied)

The foregoing declarations were corroborated in their essential details by prosecution witnesses Elma Chua and PC Sergeant Rodolfo Habana.
Clearly then, even if the confession were to be disregarded, the testimony of the witnesses proved the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond
reasonable doubt. (People vs. Crisanto, Jr., 134 SCRA 413).

The crime committed by appellant and his group is kidnapping and serious illegal detention punishable under Article 267 of the Penal Code, as
amended. Since the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim and since complainant Juanita Chua was kept
under detention the imposable penalty for the offense committed is death. Appellant's direct participation (the evidence shows that he was the person
who stuck a knife at the victim's neck at the time Juanito Chua and his wife were kidnapped) makes him guilty as principal.

Considering that as aforestated, Juanito Chua was rescued and the culprits failed to receive the ransom money which they had purposely sought, and
that no bodily harm or injury was inflicted upon the victim, the penalty that We have decided to .impose is that of reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the decision under review, being in accordance with law and the evidence, is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification of the penalty
from one of death to reclusion perpetua

SO ORDERED.
Aballe vs. People, 183 SCRA 196, G.R. No. 64086, March 15, 1990

Argument that Aballe’s extrajudicial admission should have been disregarded by thelower court for having
been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights welltaken.-The argument that Aballe’s extrajudicial
admission should have been disregarded bythe lower court for having been obtained in violation of Aballe’s
constitutional rights iswell taken. Throughout the custodial interrogation, the accused’s parents and
relativeswere almost always around but at no stage of the entire proceedings was it shown thatthe youthful
offender was ever represented by counsel. Since the execution of theextrajudicial statement was admittedly
made in the absence of counsel, whether deoficio or de parte, and the waiver of counsel was not made with
the assistance of counsel as mandated by the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973Constitution, said
confession should have been discarded by the lower court.An officer making an arrest may take from the
person arrested any money or propertyfound upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime
or was the fruitof the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violenceor
escaping or which may be used in evidence in the trial of the case.-Indeed, equally inadmissible is the kitchen
knife recovered from Aballe after hiscapture and after the police had started to question him. Together with
the extrajudicialconfession, the fatal weapon is but a fruit of a constitutionally infirmed interrogationand must
consequently be disallowed. The bloodstained T-shirt, however, is admissible, being in the nature of an
evidence in plain view which an arresting officer may take andintroduce in evidence. The prevailing rule in this
jurisdiction is that “an officer makingan arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found
upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might
furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or escaping, or which may be used in evidence in
the trial of the cause. . .”Testimony of Sgt. Marante on Aballe’s oral confession is competent to positively
link the accused to the killing.-But even with the exclusion of the extrajudicial confession and the fatal weapon
weagree with the trial court that the guilt of the accused has been established beyondreasonable doubt. It is
well to note that even before the taking of the extrajudicialconfession, the accused, upon being picked up in
the morning of November 8, 1980 ashe was coming out of the communal bathroom and wearing a T-shirt
covered with bloodstains which he tried to cover with his hands, suddenly broke down and knelt before Sgt.
Marante and confessed that he killed Jennie Banguis. The testimony of Sgt.Marante on Aballe’s oral confession
is competent evidence to positively link theaccused to the aforesaid killing.Declaration of an accused expressly
acknowledging his guilt of the offense chargedmay be given in evidence against him.-
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 117690. September 1, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALBERTO DANO y JUGILON, accused-

appellant.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

On appeal is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 29, in
Criminal Case No. 1579, promulgated on July 25, 1994, finding appellant Alberto Dano y Jugilon
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, for the death of his brother Emeterio Dano, and imposing
upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The facts of this case are gleaned from the records.

On April 11, 1994, the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga del Sur charged appellant with the crime of
murder, as follows:

“That on or about March 16, 1994 at around 6:30 o’clock in the evening, more or less, at Tiguian,
Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack, hack and stab his brother Emeterio Dano inflicting several
mortal wounds causing his instantaneous death.

“Contrary to law with qualifying aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery.”[1]

On May 3, 1994, appellant was arraigned and with the assistance of counsel de parte, pleaded not
guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.

The prosecution presented four witnesses: Wilfredo Tapian, a carpenter; Demosthenes Peralta, the
barangay captain of Tiguian, Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur; SPO3 Jesus Reales of the Philippine
National Police (PNP); and Teresita Dano, widow of the victim.

The prosecution’s evidence established the following:

On March 16, 1994, at around half past six o’clock in the evening, prosecution witness Wilfredo
Tapian was resting in the house of a Neneng Miras in Tiguian, Margosatubig, when Teresita Dano
arrived and asked for his help. Teresita told Wilfredo that her husband, Emeterio, attacked his brother
Alberto, herein appellant, in the latter’s house.[2] Wilfredo immediately rushed to appellant’s house,
which was some one hundred meters away.
On arriving at appellant’s house, Wilfredo saw the victim pacing back and forth in appellant’s front
yard. The victim, armed with a scythe was shouting at appellant, who was looking out of the window,
to come down so they could fight to the death. (“Kanaog diri kay magkamatay ta.”)[3] Wilfredo tried
to pacify the victim who kept repeating his challenge while striking his scythe on the ground, but to no
avail.[4] Appellant also advised his younger brother to go home, but the latter refused to listen.
Suddenly, Emeterio leaped at appellant who was standing with his head out of the window and slashed
appellant with his scythe but missed.[5] Seeing that his efforts to stop the fraternal quarrel were of no
use and fearful of being hit in the affray, Wilfredo left for home.

Between the hours of six and seven o’clock that same evening, Demosthenes Peralta, the barangay
captain of Tiguian, was informed by Wilfredo and a certain Fernando Teves that the Dano brothers
were quarreling.[6] Demosthenes went to appellant’s home to investigate. On his way, he met
appellant. The latter told Peralta he had killed Emeterio and voluntarily surrendered to him.[7]
Demosthenes left appellant in Wilfredo’s house and proceeded to appellant’s residence where he saw
the bloody corpse of the victim sprawled in the yard, near the stairs.[8] He noticed that the body bore
several hacking and slashing wounds.[9] Demosthenes fetched appellant from Wilfredo’s house and
took him to the police station.

Early in the morning of the next day, Demosthenes fetched a doctor from the town proper of
Margosatubig. The latter examined the victim’s body, still lying in appellant’s yard. At the request of
the police station commander, Demosthenes took photos of the corpse, which he later turned over to the
police.[10] He conducted a further examination of the crime scene and found a bloodstained scythe
beneath appellant’s house.[11] The scythe’s wooden handle had the name “Alberto Dano” carved on it.
He turned over the scythe to the police.

The necropsy report established that the cause of death was acute blood loss, secondary to multiple
hacking wounds.[12]

When interrogated by the police, appellant, without assistance of counsel, admitted he killed his
brother. The pertinent portion of his statement, contained in the police blotter, and read into the records
without objection by the defense, reads:

“[S]ubject admitted of (sic) killing his younger brother as the latter was drunk and provoked him for
(sic) a scythe duel right downstair(s) of his house that prompted him to get his scythe and come down
from his house and allegedly boxed first his brother and subsequently hacked several times as he was
already commanded by his evil thought(s).”[13]

The victim’s widow admitted that the scythe, which her late husband carried on that fateful day, was
returned to her by some people in their barangay.[14] She did not turn over the scythe to the police.[15]

The defense presented appellant and his spouse as its witness.

Appellant claimed that he acted in self-defense and in defense of his family. He narrated that he and his
family were preparing to go to bed at around 6:30 p.m. March 16, 1994, when he heard somebody
shout “Boy, come down and we will fight to death.” (“Boy kanang diha kay magpatay ta”)[16] At first,
he tried to ignore the challenge, but when it was repeated several times, he looked out the window and
saw his brother Emeterio outside, armed with a scythe. He told his brother to go home but the latter,
who appeared disturbed, did not heed his words. Instead, he kept on hitting the ground with the scythe.
[17] Without any provocation on his part, Emeterio suddenly leaped at him and attacked him with the
scythe, which he evaded.[18] Emeterio then ascended the stairs to push open the bamboo door on the
porch leading to their living room.[19] The door partially opened after Emeterio slammed it several
times. Appellant’s wife and children screamed and cried in fear.[20] Appellant held and twisted his
brother’s wrist to disarm him of the scythe.[21] They grappled for the scythe while in the porch, then
tumbled down the stairs.[22] When they hit the ground, the victim was dead. Appellant did not know
how many times he hit his brother or how many wounds he inflicted.[23] He said he was not in a
normal state of mind. Seeing that he had killed his brother, appellant threw the scythe under his house
and went to the barangay captain to surrender. His spouse largely corroborated appellant’s version of
the first round of the fratricidal affray.[24] She claimed, however, that she did not see how the victim
was killed as they were inside the house and she, as well as her children, had their eyes closed in shock
and fear.[25]

Appellant denied owning the scythe found by the barangay captain beneath his house.[26] He did not
know why his name was engraved on the wooden handle of said scythe.[27] He was sure, however, that
it was the same scythe that his brother was carrying during the incident.[28]

Appellant explained that he had a previous misunderstanding with the victim over the purchase of a
horse from his cousin Doroteo Oliver on installment basis. Emeterio wanted to buy the horse, but
appellant bought it ahead of him, which caused the former to resent him.[29]

The court below disbelieved appellant’s version of the incident and decided as follows:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Alberto Dano y Jugilon guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no proof of any modifying circumstances either
to aggravate or mitigate the liability, hereby sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua; to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity for the death of
said victim; P3,000.00 as actual damages, compensatory damages of P2,000.00 by way of unrealized
earnings and to pay the costs.

“SO ORDERED.”[30]

On August 2, 1994, appellant seasonably filed his notice of appeal. He assigns the following errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING A SWEEPING CONCLUSION THAT

TREACHERY EXISTS IN THE CASE AT BAR.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING, IF NOT TOTALLY IGNORING, THE

ACCUSED’S CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE AND/OR DEFENSE OF RELATIVES, OR AT
LEAST INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE AND/OR DEFENSE OF RELATIVES.

III
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT SAID THAT EXHIBIT “E’ OF THE PROSECUTION
WAS NOT OBJECTED TO BY THE DEFENSE.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RELYING TOO MUCH CREDENCE (sic) TO THE
TESTIMONY OF TERESITA DANO WHO DECLARED THAT THE SCYTHE (EXHIBIT “D”
FOR THE DEFENSE ON ONE HAND, WHILE EXHIBIT “4” FOR THE PROSECUTION)
WAS OWNED BY THE ACCUSED AND NOT THAT OF THE VICTIM.

Simply stated, the pertinent issues for our consideration are:

(1) Did the trial court err in admitting the extrajudicial confession of the accused?

(2) Did the court a quo err in failing to appreciate appellant’s defense of self-defense and/or
defense of relatives, or at the least incomplete self-defense and/or defense of relatives?

(3) Did it err in convicting appellant of murder qualified by treachery and imposing the penalty
therefor?

On the first issue, appellant avers that it was error for the trial court to give weight to the admissions
made by appellant during custodial investigation (Exhibit “E”). Appellant contends that his
constitutional and statutory right to counsel during custodial investigation was violated when the police
took his statements without a lawyer to assist him. He further argues that the trial court should have
declared his statements before the police inadmissible when they were objected to during the trial.

A person under investigation for the commission of an offense is guaranteed the following rights by the
Constitution: (1) the right to remain silent; (2) the right to have competent and independent counsel of
his own choice, and to be provided one if he cannot afford the services of counsel; and (3) the right to
be informed of these rights.[31] These rights “cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.”[32] A confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requirements: (1) the
confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be in writing.[33]
In convicting the accused of the offense charged, the trial court held:

“Accused’s testimony on the witness stand however, contradicts his version appearing on the police
blotter of the police station of Margosatubig dated March 16, 1994, where he admitted the killing of his
younger brother Emeterio Dano as ‘the latter was drunk and provoked him for (sic) a scythe duel right
downstairs of his house that prompted him to get his scythe and come down from his house and
allegedly boxed first his brother and subsequently hacked several times as he was already commanded
by evil thoughts.’

“During the formal offer of evidence by the prosecution, defense counsel admitted the authenticity of
the extract of above entry in the police blotter (Exhibit “B”, prosecution) containing the foregoing
recital as testified to by SPO4 Jesus Reales. Such entry in the police blotter when not objected to, is
presumed to have been accomplished in the regular performance of official duties by the police officer
who made the entry, hence is entitled to full faith and credit. It having been entered at the time when
the accused had just surrendered to the authorities in a remorseful attitude and in a spontaneous manner
free of any extraneous influence and coaching of a lawyer, the same entry carries great weight and high
probative value, in the absence of any proof of tampering or alteration thereof. This Court therefore
considers the recital in said entry more credible and easy to believe, than the self-serving version of the
accused given on the witness stand which is more a product of an after-thought and concocted story
than an honest and truthful version of what actually happened.”[34]

We have carefully scrutinized the records including the List of Exhibits for the Prosecution[35] and the
prosecution’s offer of evidence[36] and nowhere find mention of Exhibit “E.” What we find offered by
the prosecution as evidence is the testimony of SPO3 Jesus Reales “on the authenticity of the entries on
the police blotter.[37] The blotter recorded the incident immediately after the crime and another entry
in the morning, recorded what was observed on the scene of the crime including a description of the
prostrate body of the accused.”[38] We also noted in the records that the defense objected to the
admission of the testimony of SPO3 Reales “because said witness is incompetent to testify as to the
entry…having admitted…that he was not one who entered that (sic) events in the police blotter and…
that he has no knowledge when the entries in the police blotter were made….”[39] Moreover, we noted
that SPO3 Reales admitted that as an assistant investigator, he was familiar with investigation
procedures.[40] Under cross-examination, he also admitted appellant was interrogated by the police
regarding the incident,[41] but there was no showing whatsoever appellant was assisted by counsel
during custodial investigation.[42]

Considering the foregoing circumstances, we find merit in appellant’s claim that his constitutional
rights were violated. First, the trial court erred when it relied on the supposed extrajudicial confession
of appellant in the police blotter. Extrajudicial confessions must conform to the requirements of the
Constitution.[43] A suspect’s confession, whether verbal or non-verbal, when taken without the
assistance of counsel without a valid waiver of such assistance regardless of the absence of coercion or
the fact that it had been voluntarily given,[44] is inadmissible in evidence,[45] even if appellant’s
confession were gospel truth.

We also find the court’s reliance on the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed[46] misplaced. This presumption cannot by itself prevail over positive averments
concerning violations of the constitutional rights of an accused.[47]

It was also error for the trial court to have considered and relied on the questioned entry in the police
blotter, given the failure of the prosecution to offer it in evidence. Evidence which has not been
formally offered cannot be considered by courts.[48] There is valid reason, therefore, to strike down the
lower court’s reliance on the assailed police blotter entry in convicting appellant.

All these, however, do not suffice to acquit appellant of the offense charged. Appellant admitted killing
the victim before the barangay captain, who is neither a police officer nor a law enforcement agent.
Such admission, even if done without the assistance of a lawyer, is not in violation of appellant’s
constitutional rights.[49] The constitutional requirements on custodial investigation do not apply to
spontaneous statements made in a voluntary manner whereby appellant orally admitted authorship of
the crime.[50] What the Constitution proscribes is the compulsory or coercive disclosure of
incriminating facts.

On the second issue, appellant pleads self-defense and/or defense of relatives. When an accused
invokes self-defense, the onus probandi to show that the killing was justified shifts to him.[51]
Even if the prosecution evidence were weak, it could not be readily dismissed after the accused had
openly admitted his responsibility for the killing. Self-defense, like alibi, is inherently a weak defense,
which can easily be concocted.[52]

For self-defense to prosper, appellant must prove by clear and convincing evidence the following
elements: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.[53]

In order that defense of a relative may be appreciated, the following requisites must concur: (1)
unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
it; and (3) in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the person making the defense
took no part therein.[54]

Appellant faults the trial court when it concluded that unlawful aggression was absent at the time of the
killing. He insists that the killing of and the attack by the victim were nearly simultaneous, without
appreciable interval of time. Assuming that the number of wounds sustained by the deceased negated
self-defense and/or defense of relative, according to appellant, the trial court erred in not appreciating
incomplete self-defense, given the fact that the other elements of the justifying circumstances involved
were present, namely, unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and lack of sufficient provocation
on appellant’s part.

The Solicitor General counters that appellant’s defenses cannot be appreciated since the victim was
already unarmed when killed. There was no more danger to the life and limb of appellant or to the
members of his family. Unlawful aggression was absent at the time of the killing. Furthermore, the
appellant was unscathed in the tumult, while he was able to inflict twelve (12) hacking wounds on the
victim. This fact belies appellant’s theory and reveal an intent to kill the victim. Inasmuch as appellant
failed to prove there was no unlawful aggression, there cannot be any self-defense, complete or
incomplete, according to the Solicitor General.

For self-defense or defense of a relative, whether complete or incomplete, to be appreciated, the

element of unlawful aggression is indispensable.[55] If there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing
to prevent or repel.[56] For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be a positively strong act
of real aggression, and not merely a threat or an intimidating stance. Thus, the accused who claims self-
defense or defense of relative must positively establish that there was an actual, sudden, and
unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, on the part of the victim.

In the instant case, the trial court found:

“…Despite the long scuffle over the possession of the scythe with his deceased brother which started
from the porch of their house up to the ground near the stairway, accused has (sic) never sustained a
single wound on his body, not even a scratch or a bruise. In contrast, the deceased sustained twelve
(12) multiple hacking wounds all over his body…He admitted that from the time he gained control and
possession of the scythe from his brother, the deceased was already armless (sic) and there was no
more danger to himself coming from his brother.”[57]

The question of whether appellant acted in self-defense is essentially a question of fact.[58] In the
instant case, the trial court found that appellant was able to disarm the victim before the killing. It was
also established that, despite appellant’s assertion that he engaged in a life or death struggle for the
possession of the weapon during which the combatants fell from the porch to ground, he incredibly
sustained nary a scratch or injury. By contrast, the victim suffered twelve (12) ghastly wounds, some of
which were at his back. In view of these findings, the evidence for the defense cannot be characterized
as clear and convincing. The deceased and appellant were allegedly wrestling all over the crime scene
for possession of the weapon, yet the victim sustained wounds in the back. The number, location, and
gravity of the wounds that the victim sustained do not support the claim of unlawful aggression on his
part at the time he was killed. If appellant were merely defending himself, he did not have to hack the
deceased a dozen times. Moreover, appellant’s inability to explain why he came out of the fierce
struggle unscathed seriously and hopelessly damages his credibility. Thus, in the absence of any
showing that the factual findings were reached arbitrarily or without sufficient basis, appellate courts
accord the highest respect and even finality to findings of fact by trial courts.[59]

We share the view that appellant was able to disarm his assailant before the latter was killed. Then
there was no longer any real peril to the life or safety of the appellant or his family when the victim lost
his weapon. When unlawful aggression which has begun earlier no longer exists, the one making the
defense has no right to kill or even wound the former aggressor.[60] To successfully invoke self-
defense and defense of relative, appellant must prove by evidence most satisfactory, the concurrence of
all the elements of self-defense and/or defense of a relative, the most important of which is unlawful
aggression on the victim’s part. Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense or defense of
a relative, complete or incomplete, and conviction of appellant must follow.[61]

On the third issue. Appellant submits the qualifying element of treachery is absent in the instant case.
He relies on People v. Butler, 120 SCRA 281(1983) where we held that treachery is not present where
accused and victim grappled with each other and People v. Maguddatu, 124 SCRA 594 (1983), where
we ruled that treachery cannot be appreciated where the killing was made on the spur of the moment.

To this the Solicitor General agrees. The Solicitor General points out that treachery cannot be
appreciated because the evidence on the record is bereft of any showing of the precise manner in which
the killing was done. He cites People v. Timple, 237 SCRA 52 (1994). Relying on People v. Cedenio,
233 SCRA 356 (1994), he argues that treachery cannot be presumed but must be proved by evidence as
convincing and conclusive as the killing itself. Thus, he concludes that appellant should only be
convicted of the crime of homicide.

Treachery occurs when the accused employs means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.[62] There is treachery
where the accused’s attack was so sudden and launched from behind that the victim was caught off
guard without an opportunity to defend himself.[63]

The trial court’s findings with respect to the presence of treachery cannot be sustained. For treachery to
be appreciated, the following must be proven: (1) the employment of means of execution which give
the person assaulted no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the deliberate or conscious
adoption of such means adopted by the assailant.[64] In this case, there was no showing whatsoever by
the prosecution that appellant deliberately adopted the means of attack used to kill the victim. Note that
it has been established that there was, initially, unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased.
Appellant in defending himself from the deadly assault was able to grab the weapon of the victim,
disarm him, and kill him. The circumstances of the assault show that appellant did not have the luxury
of time to deliberate and contemplate the manner or method of killing the victim. Moreover, the
deceased had deliberately provoked and attacked appellant. For treachery to be appreciated there must
not be even the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.[65]

Absent the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the offense committed is not murder but only
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.[66]

Lastly, we find that the trial court failed to appreciate two mitigating circumstances in appellant’s
favor, namely: (1) that sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately
preceded the killing, and (2) that appellant voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority or
his agents. The record is categorical that appellant surrendered to the barangay captain of Tiguian after
the incident. A barangay leader is a person in authority.[67]

The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. Where there are two mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstances present, the court shall “impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
law in the period that it may deem applicable.”[68] The penalty next lower is prision mayor. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty to be imposed shall be taken from the medium
period of the imposable penalty which is prision mayor, while the minimum shall be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree which is prision correcional in any of its periods. Prision mayor in its
medium period is eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Prision correcional in its maximum
period is four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day to six (6) years.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Alberto Dano y Jugilon
is found GUILTY of the crime of HOMICIDE and consequently, sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
prison term of four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day of prision correcional as minimum to
eight (8) years and twenty (20) days of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay the heirs of Emeterio
Dano P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death and P3,000.00 for burial expenses.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181084 Case Digest
G.R. No. 181084

People of the Philippines

v Bartolome Tampus and Ida Montesclaros

Ponente: Puno

Facts:

On appeal is the CA Visayas decision affirming with modification the

decision of the RTC of Lapu-Lapu city in finding Ida Montesclaros guilty as
an accomplice in the commission of rape.

This appeal stems from two criminal cases: (1) the information states that,
on april 1, 1995 about 4:30pm in Lapulapu city with the jurisdiction of the
RTC Lapu-Lapu, the accused Tampus was in deep slumber due to drunkenness
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with the then 13 yer old victim against her will in conspiracy
with Ida Montesclaros who gave permission to Tampus to rape the minor.(2)
on April 3, 1995 at about 1am, Tampus was armed with a wooden club and by
means of threat and intimidation did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge with then 13 year old against her will.

The offended party is the daughter of montesclaros. Montesclaros started o

rent a room in a house owned by Tampus, a barangay tanod. Minor testified
that she was in the house with her mother and Tampus on April 1, 1995, that
the two adults were drinking beer and forced her to drink too. After having
3 bottles then she got sleepy and was lying on the floor when she overheard
Tampus requesting her mother to be permitted to have sexual intercourse
with the minor. Montesclaros agreed and told Tampus to leave as soon as he
is finish with her daughter. Montesclaros then left for work and left the
minor along with Tampus. The minor fell asleep and have woken up with pain
and blood on her genitals. The minor cried  to her mother but was ignored
by Montesclaros.
Minor testified that the abuse was repeated on April 4, 1995. That then
made her to seek from her Aunt Nellie who reported the incident to the
police. On May 9, 1995 the head of the medico-legal branch of the PNCLS
conducted a physical examination of the minor and testified that the result
of the examination revealed a deep healed laceration.

On September 22, 1995 the minor filed 2 complaints against Tampus on rape
and against Montesclaros on conspiracy to the rape.

Tampus denied the rape with alibis that Ida always bring her daughter to
the beer house with her and his duties to the barangay tanod post would
prevent the incident of the minor having left at home alone with him.

then the head of Dept. Psychiatry issued a medical certification which

showed that Ida was treated as an outpatient diagnosed with Schizophrenia.

Trial court convicted Tampus of 2 rapes and Ida as accomplice.Ida's illness

was then appreciated and in effect mitigated her penalty.

CA then dismissed the instant appeal for lack merit but with modification
that Ida was guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice.

CA explained that Ida as accomplice is dependent on proving the principal

guilty.

iii

iv

viRepublic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-68969 January 22, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
USMAN HASSAN y AYUN, respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:
1
of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Ninth Judicial Region Branch
This is a pauper's appeal of the decision
XIII, dated January 25, 1984, which "finds the accused USMAN HASSAN y AYUN guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principal of the Crime of MURDER, and there being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance
attending the commission of the crime, and pursuant to Paragraph No. 1 of Article 64 of the Revised Penal
Code, hereby imposes upon the said accused the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and all its accessory
penalties; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro the amount of P12,000.00 and
to pay the costs." 2

Usman Hassan was accused of murder for stabbing to death Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro, 24, single, and a resident
of Zamboanga City. 3 At the time of his death on July 23,1981, the deceased was employed as manager of the
sand and gravel business of his father. On the other hand, Hassan was an illiterate, 15-year-old pushcart
cargador. 4

The quality of justice and the majesty of the law shine ever brightest when they are applied with more jealousy to
the poor, the marginalized, and the disadvantaged. Usman Hassan, the herein accused-appellant, belongs to
this class. At the time of the alleged commission of the crime, he was poor, marginalized, and disadvantaged. He
was a flotsam in a sea of violence, following the odyssey of his widowed mother from one poverty-stricken area
to another in order to escape the ravages of internicine war and rebellion in Zamboanga del Sur. In the 15 years
of Hassan's existence, he and his family had to evacuate to other places for fear of their lives, six times. His
existence in this world has not even been officially recorded; his birth has not been registered in the Registry of
Births because the Samal tribe, to which he belongs, does not see the importance of registering births and
deaths.

Usman was convicted on the bases of the testimony of a lone eyewitness for the prosecution and the sloppiness
of the investigation conducted by the police investigator, Police Corporal Rogelio Carpio of the Homicide and
Arson Section of the Zamboanga City Police Station, who also testified for the prosecution.

We rule that Usman Hassan's guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and that Usman Hassan must,
therefore, be set free.

The lone eyewitness for the prosecution is Jose Samson, 24 years old when he testified, married, and a resident
of Zamboanga City. On the day of the killing, he was employed at the sand and gravel business of the father of
the deceased but was jobless at the time of his examination-in-chief on February 3, 1982.

He testified that he was with Ramon Pichel, Jr. at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of July 23, 1981; that he was
a backrider in the motorcycle of Ramon when they went to buy mangoes at Fruit Paradise near the Barter Trade
Zone in Zamboanga City that while he was selecting mangoes, he saw a person stab Ramon who was seated at
his red Honda motorcycle which was parked about two or three meters from the fruit stand where he Samson)
was selecting mangoes; that he saw the assailant stab Ramon "only once" and that after the stabbing, the
assailant ran towards the PNB Building. When asked at the cross-examination if he knew the assailant, Samson
said, "I know him by face but I do not know his name." 5
This sole eyewitness recounted the stabbing thus: "While Ramoncito Pichel, Jr. was holding the motorcycle with
both of his hands, the assailant come from behind, held his left hand and stabbed him from behind on his chest
while the victim was sitting on the motorcycle." He claimed that he was able to see the assailant because it was
very bright there that Ramon was facing the light of a petromax lamp, and that all these happened in front of the
fruit stand a — distance of about 6 to 7 meters from the side of the road.

Samson described the assailant as wearing a white, short-sleeved t-shirt and maong pants, but "he did not see if
the aggressor was wearing shoes," that the assailant stabbed Ramon with a knife but "he did not exactly see
what kind of knife it was, and he did not see how long the knife was He said he brought the wounded Ramon to
the Zamboanga City General Hospital in a tricycle.

On cross-examination, Samson testified:

xxx xxx xxx

Q When you rushed Ramon Pichel, Jr. to the hospital you came to know that he was already dead, is that
correct?

A Yes, sir, I learned that he was already dead.

Q In the hospital, were you investigated by the police?

A They just asked the description of that person as to his attire and his appearance.

Q And it was while in the hospital that you told them the description of the one who stabbed Ramon Pichel,
Jr.?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And the body of Ramon Pichel, Jr., was brought to the Funeraria La Merced?

A Yes, sir,

Q Can you recall what time was that?

A I do not know what time was that.

Q And it was all La Merced Funeraria that the police brought to you the accused?

A...

Q For Identification?

A Yes, sir.

Q And he was alone when you Identified him?

A Yes he was alone.

Q Aside from working with the Pichel family in their sand and gravel business, do you have any blood relationship with them?

6
A Yes. sir.

(Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

 7
which was taken only on July 25, 1981, two days after the stabbing,
What comes as a surprise is that Samson's statement
and sworn to only on July 27, 1981, also two days after it was taken, or four days after the killing, was never
presented or mentioned by the prosecution at all. The information was practically forced out of Police Corporal
Rogelio P. Carpio, a witness for the People, during his cross-examination. 8 The sworn statement contained the
following questions and answers:

xxx xxx xxx

Q-14. What and please narrate it to me briefly in your own words, the incident you are referring?

A-14. While I was busy selecting some mangoes, I saw unidentified person whom I can recognize by face
if seen again embraced my companion Ramon Pitcher Jr. while the latter was aboard his motorcycle
parked within the area. That this person without much ado, and armed with a knife suddenly stabbed him
(Ramon). That by coincidence to this incident, our eye met each other and immediately thereafter, he fled
the area toward the Philippine National Bank (PNB). That this unidentified person was sporting a semi-long
hair, dressed in White Polo-Shirt (Short sleeve), maong pants height to more or less 5'5, Dark Complexion.
That as this unidentified person fled the area I immediately came to aid my companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr.,
and rushed him to Zamboanga General Hospital, on board a Tricycle. That may companion (Ramon) did
not whispered (sic) any words to me for he was in serious condition and few minutes later, he expired.

Q-15. Was tills unidentified person was with companion when he attack (sic) Ramon Pitcher Jr.?

A-15. He was alone Sir.

Q-16. Can you really Identified (sic) this person who attacked and stabbed your companion, Ramon
Pitcher, Jr., that evening in question?

A-16. Yes, Sir,

Q-17. Do you still remember that confrontation we made at the Office of La Merced Funeral Homes,
wherein you were confronted with one Usman Hassan, whom this Officer brought along?

A-17. Yes, Sir.

Q-18. Was he the very person, who attacked and stabbed your companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr.?

A-18. Yes, Sir, he was the very person who attacked and stabbed my companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr., that
evening in question.

Q-19. Why?

A-19. Because his face and other physical appearance were fully noted by me and this I cannot forget for
the rest of my life.

Q-20. Before this incident, was there any altercation that had ensued while in the process of buying some
mangoes in that area?

A-20. None Sir.

Q-21. Were you able to note what kind of knife used by said Usman Hassan in stabbing your companion,
Ramon Pitcher Jr.?

A-21: None Sir,

Q-22. Well, I have nothing more to ask of you, do you have anything more to say, add or alter in this
statement?

A-22. No more Sir.

Q-23. Are you willing to give a supplemental statement if needed in the future?
 9
A-23. Yes, Sir.

(Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

10
is substantially the same as that embodied in the "Case
The version of the sole eyewitness appearing in his statement
Report," Exhibit it "C", by Police Corporal Carpio, also admitted a s Exhibit "2." This exhibit for the prosecution
confirms the sworn statement of witness Samson that an unidentified person, whom he recognized only by face,
appeared and without any provocation, the latter embraced the victim and stabbed the same allegedly with a
knife." The rest of the Case Report: is also significant in that it confirms the confrontation between the accused
and Jose Samson in the funeral parlor arranged by the police Investigator and prosecution witness, Corporal
Carpio.

xxx xxx xxx

From this end, a follow-up was made within the premises of the Old Barter Trade, wherein the
person of USMAN HASSAN Y AYUN, of Paso Bolong, this City, was arrested in connection with
the above stated incident. That this Officer and companions arrested this person Usman due to
his physical appearance, which was fully described by victim's companion. Jose Samson.
During his arrest, a knife, measuring to more or less seven (7) inches in blade was confiscated
in his possession. The person of Usman Hassan was brought along at the La Merced Funeral
Homes for a confrontation with victims companion, Jose Samson and in this confrontation, Jose
Samson positively Identified said Usman Hassan as the very person who stabbed the victim.

Usman Hassan, on the other hand, denied the charges levelled against hub and admitted
ownership of said knife; claiming among other things that he used said knife for slicing
mangoes. 11

xxx xxx xxx

We hold that the evidence for the prosecution in its entirety does not satisfy the quantum of proof — beyond
reasonable doubt — required by the Constitution, the law, and applicable jurisprudence to convict an accused
person. The said evidence denies us the moral certainty which would allow us to pronounce, without uneasiness
of conscience. Usman Hassan y Ayun guilty of the killing of the deceased Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro, and condemn
him to life imprisonment and in effect turning him into a flotsam again in a sea of convicted felons in which he
would be a very young stranger.

In evaluating the worth of the testimony of the lone eyewitness for the prosecution against the denial and alibi of
the accused, value judgment must not be separated from the constitutionally guaranteed presumption of
innocence.

When the evidence for the prosecution and the evidence for the accused are weighed, the
scales must be tipped in favor of the latter. This is because of the constitutional presumtion of
innocence the accused enjoys as a counter-foil to the awesome authority of the State that is
prosecuting him.

The element of doubt, if reasonable in this case, must operate against the inference of guilt the
prosecution would draw from its evidence. That evidence, as it happens, consists only of the
uncorroborated statement of the two policemen which, as previously observed, is flawed and
therefore suspect. 12

The testimony of Jose Samson, the lone eyewitness, is weak and unconvincing. And so with the evidence
sought to be introduced by Police Corporal Carpio. We discover, for example, that the expert testimony of the
medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, Dr. Valentin Bernalez, presented by the prosecution,
contradicted, on material points, the testimony of the one eyewitness, Jose Samson. While Samson averred on
the witness stand that he saw the assailant stab the deceased "from behind on his chest" 13 only once, the NBI
medico-legal officer Identified two stab wounds, one at the front portion of the chest at the level and third rib,
(sic) and another stab wound located at the left arm posterior aspect." 14 The same medical expert also
concluded from the nature and location of the chest wound, which was the cause of death, that the same was
inflicted on the victim while the alleged accused was in front of him." 15

The investigation of this case by the Homicide/Arson Section of the Zamboanga Southern Police Sector, 16 at
Zamboanga City, particularly by Police Corporal Rogelio P. Carpio, leaves much to be desired. For one, we are
not satisfied with the procedure adopted by the police investigators in the Identification of the accused as the
assailant. We have no doubt that Usman Hassan was "presented" alone 17 to Jose Samson by the police
investigator and prosecution witness, Police Corporal Carpio, and his police companions, at the office of the La
Merced Funeral Homes in Zamboanga City. As correctly termed by the very evidence 18 of the prosecution, the
procedure adopted by the police investigators was a confrontation" between Jose Samson, Jr. and Usman.
Earlier, on direct examination, Corporal Carpio testified that Usman was alone when he was brought to Samson
for confrontation in the funeral parlor. However, on cross-examination, Carpio made a turnabout by saying that
the accused was Identified by Samson in a "police line-up;" this tergiversation we dare say, was an afterthought,
more the result of an over or careless cross-examination, augmented by the leading questions 19 of the trial
judge rather than a fastidiousness if not sincerity, on the part of the police investigator, to honestly correct
erroneous statements in his examination-in-chief. The fact remains that both Samson and the accused testified
clearly and unequivocably that Usman was alone when presented to Samson by Carpio. There was no such
police line-up as the police investigator, to honestly correct erreoneous statements in his examination-in-chief.
The fact remains that both Samson and the accused testified clearly and unequivocably that Usman was alone
when presented to Samson by Carpio. There was no such police investigator claimed on second thought.

The manner by which Jose Samson, Jr. was made to confront and Identify the accused alone at the funeral
parlor, without being placed in the police line-up, was "pointedly suggsestive, generated confidence where there
was none, activated visual imagination, and, all told, subserted his reliability as eyewitness. This unusual,
coarse, and highly singular method of Identification, which revolts against the accepted principles of scientific
crime detection, alienates the esteem of every just man, and commands neither our respect nor acceptance." 20

Moreover, the confrontation arranged by the police investigator between the self-proclaimed eyewitness and the
accused did violence to the right of the latter to counsel in all stages of the investigation into the commission of a
crime especially at its most crucial stage — the Identification of the accused.

As it turned out, the method of Identification became just a confrontation. At that critical and decisive moment,
the scales of justice tipped unevenly against the young, poor, and disadvantaged accused. The police procedure
adopted in this case in which only the accused was presented to witness Samson, in the funeral parlor, and in
the presence of the grieving relatives of the victim, is as tainted as an uncounselled confession and thus falls
within the same ambit of the constitutionally entrenched protection. For this infringement alone, the accused-
appellant should be acquitted.

Moreover, aside from this slipshod Identification procedure, the rest of the investigation of the crime and the
preparation of the evidence for prosecution were done haphazardly, perfunctorily, and superficially. Samson was
not investigated thoroughly and immediately after the incident. As previously mentioned, his statement was
taken by the investigator only two days after the murder of Ramon Pichel, Jr. and sworn only two days after it
had been taken. Similarly, there is nothing in the record to show that the fruit vendor—from whom Samson and
the deceased were buying mangoes that fateful evening and who certainly must have witnessed the fatal
stabbing—was investigated, or why he was not investigated. Nor is any explanation given as to why the
companion 21 of the accused at the time Corporal Carpio arrested him (accused) 'sitting on a pushcart " 22 at
about 8:00 P.M. (around 7:00 P.M., according to Usman) of that same evening near the scene of the crime, was
not also investigated when he could have been a material witness of the killing or of the innocence of the
accused. In addition, the knife and its scabbard, 23 Confiscated by Carpio from Usman (tucked on the right side
of his waist") at the time of his arrest, were not even subjected to any testing at all to determine the presence of
human blood which could be typed and compared with the blood type of the deceased. A crime laboratory test
— had Carpio or the prosecuting fiscal, or even the trial judge, insisted on it — would have revealed whether or
not the knife in question (confiscated from the accused by Carpio one hour after the alleged commission of the
crime) had indeed been the weapon used to kill Ramon. The police investigator instead nonchalantly dismissed
this sin of omission by saying that the knife could have been cleaned or the bloodstain could have been taken
away. 24 This presumption of the deadly weapon's having been "cleaned" of bloodstains is tantamount to
pronouncing the accused of being guilty.

Our doubt about the guilt of the accused is further deepened by a resolution, 25 in a separate case, 26 of Assistant
City Fiscal of Zamboanga City and deputized Tanod bayan Prosecutor Pablo Murillo, which clearly reveals that
on July 24, 1981, a day after the killing of Ramon Pichel, Jr., a similar stabbing took place at Plaza Pershing
near the place of the earlier incident, with the suspect in that frustrated homicide case being a certain Benhar
Isa, 'a notorious and a deadly police character" in Zamboanga City, with a long record of arrests. In that
resolution, Fiscal Murillo said the same Benhar Isa was tagged as 'also a suspect in the stabbing of Ramon
Pichel, Jr. to death and the stabbing of Pastor Henry Villagracia at the Fruit Paradise, this City." The said
resolution further states that "with regards to this incident or witnesses ever testified for fear of possible
reprisals." 27

The trial of Usman Hassan began on October 27, 1981. Benhar Isa himself was killed by a policeman on August
28, 1981, while he (Isa) "was apparently under the influence of liquor armed with a knife (was) molesting and
extorting money from innocent civilians' and "making trouble." 28 The records of the case at bar do not show any
attempt on the part of Corporal Carpio, or any other police officer, to investigate or question Benhar Isa in
connection with the killing of Pichel, Jr. Was it fear of the notorious police character that made the police officers
disregard the possible connection between the slaying of Ramon and that of the person (Harun Acan y Arang of
the Ministry of National Defense) 29 who was allegedly stabbed by Benhar Isa a day after the killing of Ramon
Jr.? And yet questioning Isa might have provided that vital link to the resolution of Usman's guilt or innocence.
But why should the police officers investigate Isa when Usman Hassan was already in custody and could be an
available fall guy? Usman Hassan, instead, became a victim of a grave injustice. Indeed, Usman Hassan is too
poor to wage a legal fight to prove his innocence. And he is so marginalized as to claim and deserve an honest-
to-goodness, thorough, and fair police investigation with all angles and leads pursued to their logical, if not
scientific, conclusions. Sadly circumstanced as he is, the authority of the State was too awesome for him to
counteract.

The appealed decision made much ado of the admission by Usman "that he was arrested at the former barter
trade, which is a place just across the place of the stabbing at the Fruit Paradise." 30 The trial judge found it
"therefore strange that on the very evening of the stabbing incident he was still at the barter trade area by 8:00
o'clock in the evening when he usually comes to the city proper at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning and goes
home at past 5:00 o'clock and sometimes 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon." 31 Usman's explanation — that, at
around 7:00 o'clock P.M., he was waiting for transportation to take him home — was found by the trial court as
'flimsy and weak since he did not explain why he had to go home late that evening." 32 But the whole trouble is
nobody asked him. The trial judge did not propound any single question to the accused, and only three to his
mother on innocuous matters, by way of clarification, if only to put on record what the mother and son could
articulate with clarity. Taking into account their poverty and illiteracy, the mother and son needed as much, if not
more, help, than the trial judge extended to the prosecution witnesses during their examination by asking them
clarificatory and mostly leading questions. In that sense and to that extent, the accused was disadvantaged.

A fact that looms large, though mutely to testify on the innocence of the accused but the importance of which
was brushed away by the trial judge was the presence of the accused near the scene (about 100 to 150 meters
away) soon after the stabbing (he testified at around 7:00 P.M. although Police Corporal Carpio stated it was
8:00 P.M.) where he was found sitting on his pushcart with a companion. If he were the assailant, he would have
fled. But the trial court instead indulged in conjecture, foisting the probability that the accused 'was lulled by a
false sense of security in returning to the place (of the stabbing), when no police officers immediately responded
and appeared at the scene of the crime," adding 'there are numerous cases in the past where criminals return to
the scene of their crimes, for reasons only psychologist can explain." 33 It must have escaped the trial court's
attention that Usman has no criminal record, and, therefore, he could not be generally classed with criminals. In
the second place, the trial court's rationalization ignores the biblical truism recognized by human nature and
endorsed with approval by this Court that "(T)he wicked flee when no man pursueth but the righteous are as bold
as a lion." 34
And now as a penultimate observation, we could not help but note the total absence of motive ascribed to
Usman for stabbing Ramon, a complete stranger to him. While, as a general rule, motive is not essential in order
to arrive at a conviction, because, after all, motive is a state of mind, 35 procedurally, however, for purposes of
complying with the requirement that a judgment of guilty must stem from proof beyond reasonable doubt, the
lack of motive on the part of the accused plays a pivotal role towards his acquittal. This is especially true where
there is doubt as to the Identity of the culprit 36 as when 'the Identification is extremely tenuous," 37 as in this
case.

We can not end this travail without adverting to the cavalier manner in which the trial court disregarded the
claimed young age of Usman Hassan.

The defense claims that the accused Usman Hassan is a minor, basing such claim on the
testimony of Lahunay Hassan, the mother of said accused, who declared that her son Usman
Hassan, who is one of her four (4) children, was born in the year 1967. She testified that she
was just told by a person coming from their place about the year of the birth of her son Usman.
However on cross-examination, Lahunay Hassan cannot even remember the date or year of
birth of her other children. The failure of Lahunay Hassan to remember the date or year of birth
of her children is of course understandable, considering that she is unschooled and she belongs
to a tribe that does not register births, deaths or marriages, however, it is strange that she only
took pains to find out the year of birth of her son Usman. For this reason, the Court granted a
motion of the defense on September 13, 1982, to have the herein accused examined by a
competent dentist to determine his age. However, the findings of the dentist of Zamboanga
General Hospital which is marked as Exhibit "5" shows the following: "age cannot be determined
accurately under present mouth conditions. Approximately, he can be from 14 to 21 years of
age." This simply means that the herein accused could either be 14 years of age or 21 years of
age, or any age in between those aforestated years. From the observation of this court, the
accused Usman Hassan was about 18 years of age at the time he committed this crime and this
observation is based on his personal appearance, his size and facial features and other
personal characteristics, hence he can not be classified as a youthful offender under Article. 189
of Presendential Decree No. 603, as ammended by Presedential Decree No. 1179. In the case
of U.S. vs. Mallari, 29 Phil. 13 and People vs. Reyes and Panganiban, CA 48 O.G. 1022, cited in
the Edition, Page 680, it was ruled by the Supreme Court that "In cases where the age of the
culprit is at issue as a basis for claiming an exempting mitigating circumstance, it is incumbent
upon the accused to establish that circumstance ad any other elements of defense. 38

Considering that the age of the accused could exempt him from punishment or cause the suspension of his
sentence under Articles 12 and 80, respectively of the Revised Penal Code, if found guilty, more meticulousness
and care should have been demanded of medical or scientific sources, and less reliance on the observation of
the judge as had happened in this case. The preliminary findings of the dentist that the accused could be
anywhere between fourteen to twenty one years, despite the difficulty of arriving at an accurate determination
due to Hassan's mouth condition, would have placed the trial judge on notice that there is the probability that the
accused might be exempted from criminal liability due to his young age. All the foregoing indicates that the
accused had not been granted the concern and compassion with which the poor, marginalized, and
disadvantaged so critically deserve. It is when judicial and police processes and procedures are thoughtlessly
and haphazardly observed that cries of the law and justice being denied the poor are heard. In any event, all this
would not be of any moment now, considering the acquittal of the accused herein ordered.

WHEREFORE, the decision is hereby REVERSED, and the accused Usman Hassan y Ayun is ACQUITTED of
the crime charged. His release from confinement is hereby Ordered, unless he is held for another legal cause.
With costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.

 
 

Separate Opinions
 
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
That the testimony of the lone eyewitness is weak and
unconvincing.
 
 
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
That the testimony of the lone eyewitness is weak and
unconvincing.

G.R. No. L-56291 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-56291 June 27, 1988

Cristopher Gamboa

vs Hon. Alfredo Cruz, Judge of CFI-Manila

Ponente: Padilla

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for TRO to
annul and set aside the CFI decision against Gamboa.

Gamboa: he was arrested for vagrancy without warrant of arrest. He was

brought to precinct 2, Manila, booked for vagrancy and then detained. The
next day, he was identified as a companion to a robbery. He was arraigned.
In the hearing, Gamboa filed a motion to acquit or demurrer to evidence
presenting that his constitutional right to counsel and due process was
violated. Court denied the motion. Hence this instant petition.

Ruling:

The instant petition is one for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of

discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the respondent
judge in issuing the questioned order dated 23 October 1980. It is basic,
however, that for certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary
and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of judicial
prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and common law
traditions.

The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when
the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information
and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point
or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to
avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or
confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the
commission of an offense.

Answer: As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police

line-up (at least, in this case) was not part of the custodial inquest,
hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. It was
held that when the process had not yet shifted from the investigatory to
the accusatory as when police investigation does not elicit a confession
the accused may not yet avail of the services of his lawyer.

On the right to due process, the Court finds that petitioner was not, in
any way, deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as he was
duly represented by a member of the Bar. He was accorded all the
opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his
defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to
Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case.

vii

viii

ix

x
xi

xii

xiiiSECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 102786. August 14, 1998]

ALEJANDRO B. DE LA TORRE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and THE PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This case is here on appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated June 18, 1991,
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City finding petitioner
Alejandro B. de la Torre guilty of qualified theft and sentencing him to an indeterminate prison
term of 6 years, 1 month, and 11 days, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day, as maximum, and
ordering him to indemnify the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO), the offended party, in
the amount of P41,786.00.

The facts are as follows:

In the afternoon of April 18, 1989, Alexander Manalo, an electrical engineer of MERALCO
assigned to inspect six electric meters installed in the premises of the Cathay Pacific Steel
and Smelting Corporation (CAPASSCO) on De la Cruz Street in San Bartolome, Novaliches,
Quezon City, discovered that the said electric meters were missing. He reported the loss to
the MERALCO office in Ortigas Avenue, Pasig City. On April 20, 1989, Manalo and Felino
Olegario, also of MERALCO, gave statements to the Northern Police District at Camp
Karingal, Sikatuna Village, Quezon City regarding the loss of the electric meters. They
suspected that CAPASSCO employees must have damaged the electric meters while
tampering with them and that to conceal the attempt, the employees must have removed the
electric meters. They expressed suspicion that MERALCO personnel were involved.

Patrolman Edgar Enopia, who was assigned to the case, proceeded to the scene of the crime
and inquired from people he saw there if they had seen the electric meters being taken down
from the post near the gate of CAPASSCO. According to Enopia, one of those he asked,
Danilo Garcia, said he had seen at about 10:00 p.m. on April 11, 1989 four crewmembers in a
MERALCO service truck, with the number 522 painted on its side, removing the electric
meters. Acting on this lead, Enopia asked MERALCO for the identities of the men, one of
whom turned out to be petitioner de la Torre. It appears that MERALCO service truck number
522 had specific crewmembers assigned to it.

On July 4, 1989, the crewmembers were taken to the NPD headquarters for investigation.
They were included in a line-up of eight (8) persons. Garcia pointed to petitioner de la Torre
as the leader of the group which took down the electric meters from the CAPASSCO
premises, but he did not recognize the three (3) other crewmembers.
Based on the statements of Alexander Manalo, Felino Olegario, Edgar Enopia, and Danilo
Garcia, Assistant City Prosecutor Demetrio Macapagal filed on July 13, 1989 an information
charging petitioner de la Torre with Qualified Theft as defined in Arts. 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code:

That on or about the 11th day of April, 1989, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, ALEJANDRO DELA TORRE Y BERNAL, being then
employed as leadman of a 5-men service crew of linemen of MERALCO, with grave abuse of
confidence, in conspiracy with his co-accused JOHN DOE, PETER DOE and CHARLES
DOE, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, with intent to
gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the following properties owned by the
Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) which were installed at the premises of the CATHAY
PACIFIC STEEL AND SMELTING CORPORATION (CAPASSCO), located at No. 292 P. dela
Cruz Street, San Bartolome, Novaliches, this City, customers of the aforesaid MERALCO, to
wit:

One (1) GE Type C-9,

120 volts, Co. No. 42GRM-219 ---P13,025.00

One (1) GE Type VW-63-A,

120 volts, Co. No. 41G208 --- 4,997.06

One (1) GE Type V-63-A,

120 volts, Co. No. 41GD-558 --- 2,870.94

One (1) GE Type G-9,

139 volts, 3 phase, No.42GRIM 1091 --- 13,025.00

One (1) WH Type

D4A-2, 3 phase, Co. No.41D4AW-92 --- 4,997.06

One (1) Reactive Meter,

No. 41CA-34 --- 2,870.94

with an aggregate value of P41,786.00, Philippine Currency, belonging to MANILA

ELECTRIC COMPANY, represented by FELINO R. OLEGARIO, to the damage and prejudice
of the latter in the aforementioned amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]

The case was raffled to Branch 92 of the RTC of Quezon City, presided over by Judge Pacita
Cañizares-Nye. Trial was held from December 28, 1989 to February 1, 1990. In a decision
rendered on March 16, 1990, Judge Cañizares-Nye, relying heavily on the testimony of
Garcia, found petitioner de la Torre guilty of Qualified Theft and thus sentenced him to an
indeterminate prison term of 6 years, 1 month, and 11 days of prision mayor, as minimum, to
8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum; and ordered him to pay MERALCO the
amount of P41,786.00.
Petitioner de la Torre appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending first, that his constitutional
rights were violated during the custodial investigation conducted in the case; second, that the
RTC erred when it admitted in evidence the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, when
the same were not formally offered; third, that the RTC took into account hearsay evidence in
arriving at its judgment; and fourth, that the uncorroborated testimony of Garcia was
insufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, the Court of Appeals[2]
affirmed the lower court’s decision.[3] The Court of Appeals subsequently denied
reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.

First. Petitioner de la Torre alleges violation of his constitutional rights under Art. III, §12(1) of
the Constitution which provides that “any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.” Petitioner de la Torre claims he was not informed of
his right to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel during the investigation
conducted on July 4, 1989 at the NPD headquarters, where the crewmembers of MERALCO
service truck number 522 were presented in a police line-up. He further invokes the
exclusionary rule in par. 3 of the same §12 that “any confession or admission obtained in
violation of [this rule] shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.”

In Gamboa v. Cruz,[4] this Court ruled that “no custodial investigation shall be conducted
unless it be in the presence of counsel, engaged by the person arrested, or by any person in
his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself, or by anyone
in his behalf, and that, while the right may be waived, the waiver shall not be valid unless
made in writing and in the presence of counsel.”[5] However, this applies only from the
moment the investigating officer begins to ask questions for the purpose of eliciting
admissions, confessions, or any information from the accused. A police line-up is not
considered part of any custodial inquest because it is conducted before that stage is reached.
[6]

In the instant case, petitioner de la Torre, together with the other crewmembers of MERALCO
truck number 522, was merely included in a line-up of eight (8) persons from which he was
picked out by Garcia as the leader of the group which had removed the electric meters from
the CAPASSCO premises. Until then, the police investigation did not focus on petitioner.
Indeed, no questions were put to him. Rather, the questions were directed to witnesses of the
complainant. There is, therefore, no basis for petitioner’s allegations that his rights as a
suspect in a custodial interrogation were violated.

Second. Petitioner contends that the trial court admitted in evidence the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses when the fact is that before they testified, their testimonies were not
formally offered as required by Rule 132, §35 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, as held in
People v. Java:[7]

. . . Rule 132, Section 34 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that for evidence to be
considered, it should be formally offered and the purpose specified. . . .
Under the new procedure as spelled out in Section 35 of the said rule which became effective
on July 1, 1989, the offer of the testimony of a witness must be made at the time the witness
is called to testify. The previous practice was to offer the testimonial evidence at the end of
the trial after all the witnesses had testified. With the innovation, the court is put on notice
whether the witness to be presented is a material witness and should be heard, or a witness
who would be testifying on irrelevant matters or on facts already testified to by other
witnesses and should, therefore, be stopped from testifying further.

. . . Section 36 of the aforementioned rule requires that an objection in the course of the oral
examination of a witness should be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become
reasonably apparent. Since no objection to the admissibility of evidence was made in the
court below, an objection raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered. [8]

Petitioner raised this point, however, only in the Court of Appeals. He thus waived his
objection by his failure to raise it at the close of the presentation of the prosecution evidence
in the trial court. As already noted, the trial in this case took place from December 28, 1989
to February 1, 1990. That was after the adoption of the new rule which required that the offer
be made at the beginning of the testimony of a witness. Petitioner should have invoked this
rule and objected to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, if not before each of their
testimonies, then at least at the time their testimonies were formally offered at the close of the
presentation of the prosecution evidence. Not having done so, he must be deemed to have
waived his objection based on this ground. Consequently, the trial court committed no error
in considering the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in its decision despite the fact that
such testimonies had not been offered before they were given.

Third. Petitioner claims that, in violation of the hearsay rule, written statements pertaining to
disputed facts were considered by the trial court in its decision without presenting the
declarants at the trial for examination.

Rule 132, §1 of the Rules of Court provides that “the examination of witnesses presented in a
trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness
is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of
the witness shall be given orally.” The reason for this rule is two-fold: to afford the judge the
opportunity of observing the demeanor of the witness and to allow the adverse party a chance
of cross-examining him.

Although hearsay evidence may be admitted because of lack of objection by the adverse
party’s counsel, it is nonetheless without probative value. The explanation for this is given in
People v. Valero, thus:[9]

The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence, like
hearsay evidence or evidence that violates the rule of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask
for the striking out of the same does not give such evidence any probative value. The lack of
objection may make any incompetent evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence
should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not
has no probative value.
In this case, documents material to the guilt of the accused were admitted without the
prosecution presenting in court those who executed them, to wit: Exhibit M, certification
signed by a certain G.B. Pilapil, Jr., which states that MERALCO did not send out any
personnel to inspect the electrical installations at CAPASSCO during the period April 11, 1989
to April 12, 1989; Exhibit N, certification issued by one Vitaliano A. Dizon, which states that
MERALCO did not receive any complaint from CAPASSCO concerning the electric meters in
question during the same period; and Exhibit P, certification given by a certain E.M. Lopez,
Jr., stating that MERALCO did not authorize any of its employees to remove the subject
electric meters.

These documents contain statements of facts and, therefore, those who made them should
have been presented in court so that they could be cross-examined by the defense.
Otherwise, whatever matter they contain is hearsay and, consequently, without probative
value.

Fourth. We likewise agree with the final point raised by petitioner, namely, that the evidence
for the prosecution at the trial is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
trial court convicted petitioner solely on the uncorroborated testimony of Danilo Garcia.

Garcia claimed that at about 10:00 p.m. on April 11, 1989, while he was waiting for his wife in
front of the CAPASSCO compound on P. de la Cruz Street, San Bartolome, Novaliches,
Quezon City, he saw petitioner supervising the other crewmembers of a MERALCO service
truck number 522 in bringing down the six electric meters from the MERALCO post at the
CAPASSCO compound. According to Garcia, he noticed the Meralco truck parked below the
Meralco post outside the CAPASSCO gate. The truck was equipped with a crane-like
structure to which was attached a basket in which two men rode. The basket was raised
toward the Meralco post while two or three men remained on the ground next to the Meralco
truck. One man was giving instructions to the men removing the meters. Garcia recognized
the truck to be that of Meralco because of its familiar orange color. Thus, he testified:

Q: While conversing with your friends at a sidewalk beside CAPASSCO, did you observe
any unusual incident?

A: There is, sir.

Q: Could you please tell us what is this unusual incident that you observed?

A: Yes, sir, a MERALCO truck was parked and the basket was being raised to the post.

Q: And could you please tell us what happened after the basket was raised to the post,
Mr. Witness?

A: While the basket was being raised to the post with two (2) men on board, another one
was giving instructions from below.

....

Q: After the adjustment of the basket, what happened, Mr. Witness?

A: Then, they opened the box that was attached to the wall of CAPASSCO while the other
one was tampering the meters and handing it to his companion who was with him in the
basket.

....

Q: Mr. Witness, could you recognize the two (2) men aboard the basket if you have the
opportunity of seeing them again?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How about the other man who was giving instructions on the ground? Can you
recognize that person if you have the opportunity of seeing him again?

A: Yes, sir.

....

Q: Will you look around inside the courtroom if he is here?

A: No, sir.

Q: I will show you photographs of several persons. Can you identify the person whom
you saw giving instructions on April 11, 1989?

A: Yes, sir.

....

(Witness pointed to a photograph of Alejandro de la Torre which appears on the bailbond filed
by the accused.)

....

Q: Can you remember the body number of the truck, Mr. Witness?

A: Body number 522, sir.

Q: You stated that it was Body No. 522. Why do you say that it is 522, Mr. Witness?

A: It so happened that I won in the jueteng, sir. [10]

To be sure, the uncorroborated testimony of a lone witness is sufficient basis for the
conviction of the accused if it is credible, positive, and constitutes proof beyond reasonable
doubt that the latter is guilty. However, in the case at bar, the answers given by Garcia to
questions asked during his direct examination fall short of this standard. First, Garcia must
have an extremely acute sense of perception to recall a feature of the MERALCO service
truck, such as its number, which at the time had absolutely no significance for him. His claim
that he remembered the number because it was the number of a winning bet in “jueteng” is
too facile to be convincing. Second, Garcia must have a phenomenal memory to be able to
recall almost three months after the incident the appearance of a complete stranger whom he
had seen only once. The removal of electric meters by crewmembers of MERALCO was
hardly a remarkable event that would have deserved the attention to detail that Garcia, a
mere chance passerby, apparently lavished upon it. As this Court said in People v. Ibal:[11]

. . . the presence of minor inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness could be an indication

of truth. A witness whose testimony is perfect in all aspects, without a flaw and remembering
even the minutest details which jibe beautifully with one another, lays himself open to
suspicion of having been coached or having memorized statements earlier rehearsed.

On the other hand, if, as Garcia said, he noticed that the MERALCO men were “tampering
with the meters,” it is a source of wonder why he did not report the matter to the barangay
authorities.

Not only is the testimony of Danilo Garcia improbable. His credibility as a witness is likewise
doubtful in view of the testimony of Pio Bautista, a council member of Barangay San
Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City. He testified that Danilo Garcia was not known to
residents of P. de la Cruz Street in San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City. According to
Bautista, he made inquiries upon the request of petitioner de la Torre concerning the
residence address of Garcia. Bautista testified:

Q: . . . Were you able to make some exhaustive inquiries of Mr. Danilo Garcia which he
said in his sworn statement “nakatira sa looban of P. de la Cruz Street, San Bartolome,
Quezon City?”

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And then what happened when you went in looban, P. de la Cruz Street, San
Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City?

A: Nobody was able to tell me that a certain Danilo Garcia resides in that place. [12]

Evidence to be believed must come from a credible witness and must itself be credible.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and petitioner Alejandro B. de la

Torre is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.
 xivRepublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION
 

G.R. No. 85043 June 16, 1992

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GLENN HATTON, defendant-appellant.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

Accused-appellant, Glenn Hatton, was charged with the crime of murder, for the death of one Faustino Algarme, in a complaint signed by P/Cpl. Jose
C. Custorio of the Catarman Police Station. The complaint read as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of August, 1986 at about 7:30 in the evening, more or less, in the municipality of Catarman,
province of Northern Samar, Philippines and within the preliminary jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused armed with a knife commonly known as "Dipang," with intent to kill thru treachery and evident premeditation. without
any provocation and justifiable motive, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one
FAUSTINO ALGARME with the knife he provided himself for the purpose hitting him at the back and inflicting upon him mortal
wound which wound caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 1. Records)

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant, duly assisted by his counsel pleaded not guilty to the charge (p. 65, Records).

According to the principal witnesses for the prosecution, Edgardo Ongue and Romeo Basierto, the incidents surrounding the death of Algarme were
as follows:

The town of Catarman, Northern Samar was celebrating its fiesta on that day of August 29, 1986. The victim, Faustino Algarme and three (3) of his
friends. namely: Jesus Aboda, Romeo Basierto and witness Edgardo Ongue were on their way to the house of Engr. Corbillo after drinking two (2)
bottles of beer each at Aileen's Restaurant. The group walked abreast Algarme, who was on the extreme left at the edge of Bonifacio street, with
Ongue, Basierto and Aboda, in that order, to his right. It was about seven (7) o'clock in the evening. When they neared the CLAO office, they noticed
two (2) men coming towards their direction. One was short and stocky and the other was tall. While the tall man was one step behind them, he tapped
the shoulder of Faustino Algarme with his left hand and stabbed him with his right hand. Algarme shouted for help and called "Romy (Basierto), please
help me I was struck." At that moment. Ongue gazed at the tall man who tried to pull back the knife from the victim's back. Ongue did not know the
man who stabbed Algarme, but he took notice of his mestizo features. The tall man failed to get the knife. Then he ran towards the corner of a house
owned by Nonong Hatton. (TSN. April 28, 1987. pp. 2-8).
Another witness for the prosecution, Romeo Basierto testified that as soon as the tall man stabbed Algarme, he ran and Basierto chased him (p. 11,
TSN, May 26, 1987). Basierto recognized the tall man who stabbed Algarme when the latter turned his face towards him (p. 21, TSN, May 26, 1987).
He recognized the accused because both of them were residents of Catarman.

Edgardo Ongue brought the victim to the hospital where he died of "massive hemorrhage secondary to stab wound (Exh. "H"). Meanwhile, Basierto
reported the incident to the police headquarters. Three policemen, one of whom was identified as Titing Varela, accompanied him to the scene of the
crime where they beamed their flashlights towards the house of Nonong Hatton where he believed the tall man and his companion entered (p. 12,
TSN, May 26, 1987).

According to Ongue, the day after the incident when he went to the Police station to shed light on the incident, he narrated to the police officers what
really transpired. He told them that the features of the assailant was still in his memory and that if they can show or present a person who will fit his
description, he can identify him. He waited at the police station from 8:00 to 11:00 o'clock but the police failed to present any person to him. On the
second day after the incident, he was picked-up from his office and made to identify their suspect who turned out to be the accused-appellant. The
latter was sitting on a bench in the police station and a policeman pointed to him as their suspect. (pp. 24-26, TSN, April 28, 1987).

The accused-appellant interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that on that same night, from 6:00 p.m. to 10:30 p.m., he was in the house of his
friend Eddie Laguitan. They were joined by their friends Eric Parnam, Edgar Maningcay, Marlon Acibar, Jaime Mijares and a girl named Imelda. Since
it was the town fiesta and the baptism of the niece of Eddie Laguitan, they were invited by Eddie for some snacks and drinks. During the entire period,
he got up only twice to go to the comfort room. His testimony was corroborated by Mrs. Laguitan, Eddie's mother who served them, and another
person who was with the group, Jaime Mijares.

The accused-appellant denied having stabbed the victim. He categorically stated also that he was left-handed.

After trial, judgment was rendered finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of which
the decision states:

WHEREFORE, the court hereby finds the accused Glenn Hatton GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder,
defined and penalized under Article 248, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. There being neither in attendance mitigating
nor aggravating circumstance, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify
the heirs of Faustino Algarme in the amount of P30,000.00 including the amount of P10,000.00. hospitalization and burial
expenses, and to pay the costs.

The knife, Exh. "C," is hereby ordered confiscated, to be disposed of in accordance with regulations.

SO ORDERED. (p. 111. Records)

From the judgment of conviction, accused-appellant filed this appeal.

In his brief, the following issues were raised by him in the assignment of errors:

I. The accused-appellant was condemned before he was heard by a court that allied itself with the prosecution, in violation of the
constitutional right to due process of law.

II. The trial court erred in holding that the accused-appellant's being left-handed is a detail "comparatively trivial and does not
destroy the credibility of the witness or his testimony."

III. The trial court erred in holding the identification of the accused-appellant to the victim's attacker is positive and convincing
considering that no courtroom identification was made, and the said identification was based solely on a pre-trial line-up of sorts,
conducted in violation of the accused-appellant's right to counsel, and in a manner filled with innumerable "suggestive
influences."

IV. The lower court erred in not giving credence to the evidence presented by the accused-appellant.

V. The lower court erred in holding that the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. (pp. 6-7, Appellant's Brief)

The accused-appellant objected to the conduct of the judge during trial. He alleged that the judge manifested bias and partiality in hearing the case.
The judge allegedly asked leading questions and various points not asked by the fiscal when the prosecution presented its first witness. He practically
took over the task of conducting the direct examination, asking fifty one (51) questions while the fiscal asked only a total of twenty-five (25) questions.
The judge also asked another forty (40) questions during cross-examination and practically took over the task of re-direct examination. The same
attitude was displayed by the judge during the entire trial of the case.

Likewise, the accused-appellant pointed out that after the direct examination of the first witness for the defense, Jaime Mijares, the judge took the task
of conducting the cross-examination by asking fifty-nine (59) questions while the Fiscal only asked nine (9) questions.
We read the transcript of stenographic notes and indeed, it is true that the judge was overzealous in controlling the conduct of the hearing. He asked
more questions than did counsel of the accused or the fiscal. It is conceded though that the trial judge did not manifest any bias in favor of the
prosecution in asking the witnesses for the prosecution nor any hostility or malice against the defense witnesses. We note also that the questions
asked by the court were clarificatory questions aimed to paint a clearer picture of what was testified to by the witnesses. As we held in People v.
Ibasan, Sr. G.R. No. L-61652. June 22, 1984; 129 SCRA 695:

. . . It is not denied that the court had at certain points conducted its own questioning during the proceedings. The records,
however, show that the court's questions did not amount to interference as to make the case for the prosecution and deprive the
accused of their defense. The questions of the judge addressed to the witnesses and the accused were merely to clarify certain
points and confirm certain statements. The number of times that a judge intervenes is not necessarily an indication of bias. It
cannot be taken against a judge if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths which tend to destroy
the theory of one party.

As held in the case of Ventura v. Yatco (105 Phil. 287) "Judges are not mere referees like those of a boxing bout, only to watch
and decide the results of a game; they should have as much interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious presentation of
evidence, calling attention of counsel to points at issue that are overlooked, directing them to ask questions that would elicit the
facts on the issues involved, clarifying ambiguous remarks by witnesses, etc."

A judge may properly intervene in the trial of a case to promote expedition and avoid unnecessary waste of time or to clear up
some obscurity (People v. Catindihan, 97 SCRA 196: Par. 14 Canons of Judicial Ethics: Administrative Order No. 162 dated
August 1, 1946, 42 O.G. 1803). In this respect, the record shows no irregularity in the conduct of the trial judge.

The counsel for the accused pointed out also that the decision was rendered by the judge on June 19, 1987 when it was only on June 29, 1987 when
the accused-appellant and another witness for the defense. Jaime Mijares, was presented as a witness in court. This fact allegedly showed the bias of
judge who already adjudged the accused guilty before hearing his defenses.

It appears from the record of this case that the decision was dated June 29, 1987. The transcript of stenographic notes showed, however, that the last
hearing was conducted the next day, June 30, 1987. It appears to the court that the date appearing in the decision was only a typographical error.
There was no irregularity in the promulgation of the decision. The record reveals that the promulgation of the decision was set on July 7, 1987 (p. 104,
Record) after both parties submitted their respective testimonial and documentary evidence. Moreover, the decision reflected that the trial judge took
into consideration the defense of the accused and the testimony of the witnesses in arriving at his decision.

After a careful study of the case, We hold that the judgment of conviction must be reversed.

First, the witness for the prosecution positively stated that the victim was stabbed with a knife using the right hand of the assailant. The accused-
appellant on the other hand testified that he is left-handed. The accused-appellant takes exception to the finding of the trial court that:

. . . Even if such claim is true, it was not quite demonstrated that from the location of the wound, the relative positions of
assailant and victim and the trajectory of the blow considering the internal organ pierced thereby, the injury could not have been
inflicted by a right-handed person. It appears, however, that the location of the injury is compatible with the relative positions of
the assailant and victim as established by the prosecution. At any rate, such detail is considered comparatively trivial and does
not destroy the credibility of the witness or his testimony (People v. Pielago, 140 SCRA 418). (p 109, Records)

We are of the considered opinion that the matter of the accused-appellant being left-handed and the testimony of the prosecution witness that the
assailant delivered the fatal blow with his right hard is not a trivial matter. A left-handed person cannot be expected to deliver a thrust with the same
intensity using his right hand. The intensity of the blow can be deduced from the fact that the assailant failed to remove the knife after the thrust
despite his attempt, as testified to by witness. Ongue (p. 7. TSN, April 28, 1987). In fact, the knife was deeply embedded with such force that it had to
be removed in the hospital (p. 5, TSN, April 28, 1987). It is erroneous for the trial judge to conclude that there was no direct proof that from "the
location of the wound, the relative positions of assailant and victim and the trajectory of the blow considering the internal organ pierced thereby, the
injury could not have been inflicted by a right-handed person." What could be a more positive proof of this fact than the categorical statement of the
prosecution witnesses who saw the incident and who categorically stated that the assailant delivered the fatal blow with his right hand. It is unnatural
for a left handed person to use his right hand in accomplishing a tough act as stabbing another. It is also hard to believe that the left handed assailant
can deliver a stab blow with the same force as that of his right, as in this case.

Second, in People v. Llaneras, et al., G.R. No. 89117, June 19, 1991, We held that "(T)here is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a
proper identification (People v. Espiritu, G-R. No. 80406, November 20, 1990). Thus, even if there was no police line-up, there could still be proper
identification as long as such identification was not suggested to the witnesses by the police."

The prosecution through witness Ongue, made it appear that the latter identified the accused-appellant in a police line-up. The details however,
showed otherwise. On direct examination by the court, he said:

COURT:

Q: What time did you see him in the police station for that identification?

A: In the morning, one day after the incident.

 Q: How many hours after the incident?

A: I could not exactly remember the hours, Your Honor.

Q: Was it the day after the incident?

A: A day after the incident. Yes. Your Honor.

Q: You mean to say it was the following morning that you saw him at the police station?

A: Not exactly because the police was not able to bring him the following morning, it was the other day.

Q: After the incident?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

On cross-examination, the trial court propounded the following questions.

COURT:

Q: You said that you were able to recognize Glenn Hatton at the police station two mornings after the
incident, did you not say so?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Why, what transpired at the police station when you went there? You relate to the court what procedure
was followed by the police in your investigation and in your identification of Glenn Hatton, that is the point
of the question?

A: When I went to the police station to shed light of (sic) the incident I was made to tell on how the incident
happened by the police who was assigned on us to ask questions and I narrated to them all what really
had transpired and because of the feature that was in my memory about the person who struck the victim
that night I was able to tell them that if they can show me or present to me person who will fit the same
person in my memory I can identify and describe the assailant.

Q: You mean to say you describe(d) the feature of the assailant to the police?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Thereafter, what did the police do after you described the feature of the assailant?

A: They said they have already some suspect in mind.

Q: Did you know at the time that you were being investigated by the police that you knew already the
suspect they had?

A: At that time, not yet, your Honor.

Q: Right after you described the feature of the assailant what did the police do?

A: They begun hunting for their suspect.

Q: How long did you stay inside the police station?

A: I went there 8:00 o'clock in the morning and probably I was able to go back to the office around 11:00
o'clock already because it was already ready for dinner. (sic)

Q: So that from 8:00 to 11:00 o'clock in the morning that you were at the police station you were never
confronted with the presence of the accused at the police station?

A: Not yet, your Honor.

Q: By the way, when was that investigation that you were made to relate to the police of what happened?

A: Just after the incident the following morning, I could not exactly remember the date but it was the
following morning after.

Q: Alright, what transpired next in connection with this case after that investigation the following morning
after the incident? What resulted in the investigation?

A: When they were able to produce their suspect I was again picked up from the office and made to
identify the person.

Q: When was that when you were picked up from the office?

A: It was two days after already.

Q: Who picked you up?

A: A policeman.

Q: Where were you brought?

A: To the police station.

Q: The same police station where you narrated the incident?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What transpired there at the police station this time?

A: I told them that he is the same fellow.

Q: You describe to the court what procedure was followed after you arrived at the police station?

A: The accused Glenn Hatton was just sitting along the bench there and a policeman told me that he is
their suspect and I immediately looked at him. Although he was wearing long sleves polo (sic) at the time
of the incident but I immediately identified him and told the police that he is really the one who stabbed the
victim.

Q: You mean to tell the court that you only identified the accused after the police indicated him to you to be
one of their suspect?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: So you had no idea that he was the assailant before the police indicated him to you as one of their
suspects?

A: I had the idea of his feature only but not his name, but when he was presented to me for identification
and looked at him it came into my memory that he really is the person who stabbed the victim that night. In
other words. Your Honor. when I looked at him he fits the same feature to the person I saw that night.

Q: Just before the police indicated him to you to be among the suspects you already saw him?

A: During the incident I saw him.

Q: During that morning just before the police pointed to you that he is one of the suspects you already saw
him? In other words, that very morning before the police pointed him to you to be one of the suspects you
already saw him?

A: Not yet because there were many people sitting along the benches.
 Q: So before the police pointed him to you you had no idea that the assailant was one among those
seated on the bench?

A: Not yet, Your Honor, but when the police asked me to identify who among those persons seated on the
bench and when I looked at them I immediately identify the accused Glenn Hatton to be the person who
stabbed Faustino Algarme that night.

Q: How many persons were seated on the bench?

A: I cannot exactly remember, Your Honor, but the bench is full of persons seated along the bench.

Q: More or less. how many?

A: About ten persons.

Q: From among the ten persons seated on the bench the Policeman indicated to you the accused?

A: The police told me that among those persons seated at his right is one of their suspects, and I was
made to identify the accused.

Q: On that bench approximately were seated ten persons according to you?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: How many persons bearing mestizo's feature seated on that bench where the accused also sat?

A: Only one.

Q: So it is now clear to the court that from these persons approximately 10 in number seated on that
bench you were made to point out and identify the assailant of Faustino Algarme?

A: Yes, Your Honor. (pp. 6-27. TSN. April 28, 1987). (emphasis supplied).

There is every reason to doubt the regularity of the identification by Ongue of the accused-appellant. From his testimony, it is clear that he did not
positively identify the accused-appellant. At the time of the incident he made a very fleeting glance on the person who stabbed the victim. At that
moment, he had the impression that the assailant was a mestizo. During the proceedings in the police station where he was supposed to identify the
assailant, he identified the accused-appellant as allegedly the person who stabbed the deceased, not because he was certain that the accused-
appellant was really the assailant but because he was the only mestizo in the station and because he was pointed to the policemen as their suspect.
The fact is that the accused-appellant was not identified in a police line-up. He was pointed to by the police as their suspect. He being the only
mestizo in the station, Ongue pointed to him as "the man." From all indications, the identification of accused-appellant by Ongue was suggested by
the police and this is objectionable. We quote hereunder a portion of the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court expressing its misgivings on the
identification of a suspect in a police line-up where the influence of improper suggestion is strong.

. . . A major factor contributing to the high incidence of miscarriage of justice from mistaken identification has been the degree of
suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses for pre-trial identification. A
commentator has observed that [t]he influence of improper suggestion upon identifying witnesses probably accounts for more
miscarriages of justice than any other single factor-perhaps it is responsible for more such errors than all other factors
combined. . . . Suggestion can be created intentionally or unintentionally in many subtle ways. And the dangers for the suspect
are particularly grave when the witness' opportunity for observation was insubstantial, and thus his susceptibility to suggestion
the greatest.

Moreover, "[i]t is a matter of common experience that, once a witness has picked out the accused at the line-up, he is not likely
to back on hip word later on, so that in practice the issue of identity may (in the absence of other relevant evidence) for all
practical purposes be determined there and then, before the trial.

xxx xxx xxx

What facts have been disclosed in specific cases about the conduct of pretrial confrontations for identification illustrate both the
potential for substantial prejudice to the accused at that stage and the need for its revelation at trial. A commentator provides
some striking examples:

In a Canadian case . . . the defendant had been picked out of a line-up of six men, of which he was the only Oriental. In other
cases, a black-hailed suspect was placed among a group of light-haired persons, tall suspects have been made to stand with
short non-suspect, and, in a case where the perpetrator of the crime was known to be a youth, a suspect under twenty was
placed in a line-up with five other persons, all of whom were forty or over.
 Similarly state reports, in the course of describing prior identifications admitted as evidence of guilt, reveal numerous instances
of suggestive procedures, for example, that all in the line-up but the suspect were known to be identifying witness, that the other
participants in a line-up were grossly dissimilar in appearance to the suspect, that only the suspect was required to wear
distinctive clothing which the culprit allegedly wore, that the witness is told by the police that they have caught the culprit after
which the defendant is brought before the witness alone or is viewed in jail, that the suspect is pointed out before or during a
line-up. and that the participants in the line-up are asked to try on an article of clothing which fits only the suspect. (U.S. v.
Wade. 388 U.S. 218: 18 L ed. 2d 1149, 87 S Ct, 1926).

Seeking shelter under the just quoted U.S. v. Wade case, the accused-appellant also argued that when he was presented in a line-up of sorts he was
not represented by a counsel. This allegedly violates his constitutional right to counsel during custodial investigation.

This argument raised by appellant has no merit. The doctrine enunciated in the case of U.S. v Wade is that the presence of counsel is indispensable
in a post-indictment line-up. In this case, the accused had already been arrested and a lawyer already appointed to represent him. It was fifteen days
after his arrest and the appointment of a lawyer to represent him when he was presented in a police line-up to be identified by the prosecution witness.
There was no doubt that Wade in that case was already under custodial investigation where his right to counsel already attached.

Since it appears that there is grave potential for prejudice. intentional or not, in the pre-trial lineup. which may not be capable of
reconstruction at trial. and since presence of counsel itself can often avert prejudice and assure a meaningful confrontation at
trial, there can be little doubt that for Wade the post-indictment lineup was a critical stage of the prosecution at which he was "as
much entitled to such aid [of counsel] . . . as at the trial itself." (United States Supreme Court Reports. Lawyer Edition, vol. 18. P.
1163).

In the instant case, Hatton was brought to the police station only to be identified. by a witness to the killing of Algarme. Technically, he was not yet
under custodial investigation.

The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation. i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit
information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or stage. the person being
interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admission or confessions
from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense.

xxx xxx xxx

As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General. the police line-up (at least, in this case) was not part of the custodial
inquest. hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel, The Solicitor General states:

When Petitioner was identified by the complainant at the police line-up, he had not been hell vet to answer
for a criminal offense. The police line-up not a part of the custodial inquest, hence, he was not vet entitled
to counsel. Thus, it war held that when the process had not yet shifted from the investigatory to the
accusatory as when police investigation does not elicit a confession the accused may not yet avail of the
services of his lawyer (Escobedo v. Illinois of the United States Federal Supreme Court. 378 U.S. 478,
1964). Since petitioner in the course of his identification in the police line-up had not yet been held to
answer for a criminal offense, he was, therefore, not deprived of his right to be assisted by counsel
because the accusatory process had not yet set in. The police could not have violated petitioner's right to
counsel and due process as the confrontation between the State and him had not begun. In fact, when he
was identified in the police line-up by complainant, he did not give any statement to the police. He was,
therefore, not interrogated at all as he was not facing a criminal charge. Far from what professes, the
police did not, at that stage, exact a confession to be used against him. For it was not he but the
complainant who was being investigated at that time. He "was ordered to sit down in front of the
complainant while the latter was being investigated" (par. 3 03. Petition). Petitioner's right to counsel had
not accrued. (Gamboa v. Cruz. G.R. No. L-56291. June 27, 1988, 162 SCRA 642).

Third, the other prosecution witness who identified the accused-appellant as the knife wielder was Romeo Basierto. He claimed in his testimony that at
the time the victim was stabbed. he did not at once recognize him (p. 5, TSN. June 30. 1987). However, when he chased him. he recognized the man
as the herein accused-appellant when the latter turned his face towards Basierto before he allegedly entered the house of Nonong Hatton (p. 7, Ibid).
He knew the accused appellant because they were both residents of Catarman. However, as the defense counsel pointed out in the cross-
examination, Basierto never mentioned the name of the accused-appellant in the sworn statement he executed on the 2nd of September 1986. In fact,
he categorically stated that he did not recognize the man, who stabbed Algarme. We quote hereunder the pertinent portion of his affidavit:

xxx xxx xxx

Q — Will you narrate to this investigator what transpired on that date and time

A — While the four of us were on our way to the house of Engr. Corbilla on that particular date and time,
passing near the CLAO office. we met two persons of which one was tall and the other was short. When
the tall one got abreast with Faustino Algarme who was walking at the edge of the street, he tapped
Faustino by the shoulder and immediately delivered a blow at Faustino and at this instance he shouted for
help saying that he was stabbed. I backed out a little to see what happened because I was hidden from
view by Edgardo Ongue and I saw this tall man ran towards the corner near the house of Nonong Hatton
and upon nearing the entrance of the fence of the house of Nonong Hatton, this tall man together with the
 short man who was following him got lost and I believe they entered the entrance of the fence to the house
of Nonong Hatton. After this, I went to the police station.

Q — Did you recognize the man who stabbed Faustino?

A — No sir, but this morning, Edgardo Ongue who was the one who saw the face of this tall man who
stabbed Faustino identified this man at the station who later turned out to be Glenn Hatton the son of
Nonong Hatton. (emphasis ours)

While an affidavit being taken ex parte is almost incomplete and often inaccurate (People v. Avanzado, 158 SCRA 427) the affiant Basierto could not
have omitted the identity of accused-appellant as the knife-wielder if it were true that he was able to identify him at that time he gave chase The matter
of the identity of the knife-wielder could not have been omitted by him considering its importance in the resolution of the death of his friend.

While Basierto's other companions brought the victim to the hospital, he allegedly went to the police station to report the incident (TSN, p. 11, Ibid).
The police on duty, Alfredo Nocha. however, testified that there was no entry in the police blotter regarding the death of Algarme in the evening of
August 29, 1986. There was an entry in the police blotter on August 30, 1986 that at 8:10 in the morning, a certain Vicente Rojas reported the
stabbing of Algarme by an unidentified man.

More importantly, the accused-appellant was not positively identified in court. True, his name was referred to by both Basierto and Ongue in their
respective direct testimonies. However. he was not identified in Court. The failure of the prosecution witness to positively identify the assailant in court
is fatal to the prosecution's cause. Pre-trial identification is not sufficient.

While it is true that the defense of alibi is weak. it holds true only if the prosecution's evidence is strong. The better rule is, the prosecution must rely on
the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense (People v. Solis. et al., 182 SCRA 182 (1990); People v. Buenaflor. 181
SCRA 225 (1990), People v. Rodriguez. G.R. No. 95902, Feb. 4, 1992). With the exclusion of the pre-indictment identification of the accused-
appellant and the failure of the prosecution witnesses to positively identify him in court, the case against him must fail.

ACCORDINGLY, The appealed decision is reversed. Accused-appellant is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

xv

xvi

xvii

xviii

xix

xxPeople vs. MacamG.R. Nos. 91011-12. November 24, 1994Ponente: Justice Quiason

FACTS:Appellants Ernesto and Danilo Roque, together with Macam, Cedro and Cawilan, Jr.,were accused of
Robbery with Homicide. They conspired to rob Benito Macam and kill LeticiaMacam. The appellants were
arrested without a warrant. When they refused to admit the robberykilling, they were brought to the QC
General Hospital before the surviving victims in handcuffsand made to line up in handcuffs together with some
policemen in civilian clothes foridentification.ISSUEWhether or not their warrantless arrest and uncounseled
identification by the prosecutionwitnesses during the police line-up at the hospital are violative of their
constitutional rights.HELDNo. The decision of the RTC is affirmed.RATIO DECIDENDIThe right to counsel is
extended to critical stages of prosecution which include policeline-up. After the start of the custodial
investigation, any identification of an uncounseledaccused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. However,
the prosecution did not present
evidence regarding appellants’ identification at the police line

-up. Hence, the exclusionarysanctions against the admission in evidence of custodial identification of an
uncounseled accusedcannot be applied. On the other hand, appellants did not object to the in-court
identification madeby the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution witnesses, who made the identification
of appellants at the police line-up at the hospital, again identified appellants in open court. In theabsence of
such objection, the prosecution need not show that said identifications were of independent origin.The arrest
of appellants was made without the benefit of a warrant of arrest. However,appellants are estopped from
questioning the legality of their arrest. This issue is being raised forthe first time by appellants before this
Court. They have not moved for the quashing of theinformation before the trial court on this ground. Thus, any
irregularity attendant to their arrestwas cured when they voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction
of the trial court byentering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial.

xxi

xxii

xxiii

xxiv

xxv

xxvi

xxvii

xxviii

xxixRepublic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-46956 May 7, 1987

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PEDRO DECIERDO, defendant-appellant.

SARMIENTO, J.:

On September 29, 1971, Pantaleon C. Tauto-An, a sanitary inspector assigned to Tambulig,

Zamboanga del Sur, was summoned to Barrio Ebarle to examine the mortal remains of Emilio
Montillano, a former Ebarle barrio captain. 1 From his findings, the deceased suffered three gunshot wounds located at the
2
through which two pellets of "shotgun shells" 3 entered, exiting "at the right portion of the back."
"left side nipple level"
4
He established the date of death on September 28, 1971 and the time thereof at or about 3:00 a.m. 5 Further
according to him, he found Montillano lying "at the stairs of his residence" 6 at the time he examined his body. 7

8
Except for the killer himself, the shooting was observed by no eyewitness.

On the same date, September 29, 1971, Ernesto Cortes, desk sergeant of the Tambulig police, commenced
Criminal Case No. 629 in the Municipal Court of Tambulig against one Felipe Cedilla for preliminary
investigation. 9 On the same date, Judge Gualberto Bacarro, Sr. of the Tambulig Municipal Court issued a
warrant of arrest against Cedilla.

Finding a prima facie case against Cedilla, Judge Bacarro, on March 18, 1972, issued an order forwarding the
case to the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur for trial. 10 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 905 of
the Zamboanga del Sur Court of First Instance. The charge: murder of Emilio Montillano. 11

Cedilla was duly arraigned, after which the government presented its evidence.

Meanwhile, on January 11, 1973, Rufino Fernandez, Chief of Police of Tambulig, on the strength of a statement given by Adelita Decierdo 12 pointing
to Pedro Decierdo, Adelita's husband, and Regino Duhay lungsod as Montillano's killers, filed a complaint against Decierdo and Duhay lungsod. 13
Judge Bacarro, who conducted the preliminary examination, issued a warrant for the arrest of both Decierdo and Duhay lungsod on January 15, 1973.

Decierdo was apprehended in his residence at Matingon, about 30 kilometers from Tambulig, 14 on May 23 or 24, 1973, 15 by Patrolman Alfredo
Bopadora of the Tambulig police. was brought to the Tambulig municipal building on May 25, 1973, where he supposedly executed a written
confession 16 admitting responsibility for the shooting of Montillano on September 27, 1971. He likewise allegedly fingered Duhay lungood as the
mastermind. It was a confession Decierdo was, , supposed to have reiterated before Baldomero Fernandez, Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga
del Sur, 17 who investigated Criminal Case No. 905.

On June 27, 1973, Angel Babiera, Zamboanga del Sur Provincial FiscaL filed an Information against Decierdo and Duhay lungsod for murder. Based,
however, on Decierdo's alleged revelations, he, on October 12, 1973, filed an Amended Information, that reads in part.

xxx xxx xxx

That on September 27, 1971, in barrio Ebarle, municipality of Tambulig, Province of Zamboanga del Sur, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed with a homemade shotgun and
a hunting knife with evident premeditation and in consideration of a price or reward in the amount of P1,000.00 and intent to kill
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did, then and there wilfully, feloniously and treacherously shoot one EMILIO
MONTILLANO hitting and wounding the vital part of his body which caused his death shortly thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

xxx xxx xxx

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1308 of the Zamboanga del Sur Court of First Instance.

On June 15, 1973, Fiscal Fernandez, in view of the alleged confession in question, moved to dismiss Criminal Case No. 905. 18 Acting on such
motion to dismiss, the Honorable Asaali Isnani, presiding Judge of the Zamboanga del Sur Court of First Instance, issued, on the same date, an order
dismissing death shortly thereafter. the murder case against Felipe Cedilla. 19

Both Decierdo and Duhay lungsod entered pleas of "not guilty. " Thereafter, the case was set for trial.

20
On June 20, 1974, Judge Isnani issued an order acquitting Duhay lungsod for lack of evidence.

21
On October 9, 1974, Judge Isnani rendered the Decision; the dispositive portion reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, appreciating the aggravating circumstances of treachery and that the crime was
committed in consideration of a price or reward, without having been off- set by any mitigating
 circumstance, the Court hereby sentences the accused, PEDRO DECIERDO alias Edoy to the
supreme penalty of DEATH, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the
heirs of the victim Emilio Montillano in the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay one-half (1/2) costs.

xxx xxx xxx

The case is now before us on automatic review.

We reverse.

There is no doubt that the accused's alleged extrajudicial confession is in the nature of an uncounselled
confession and hence, inadmissible in evidence. Section 20 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution applies. It
provides:

Section 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation
of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.

That the aforequoted provision applies has been affirmed in a long line of decisions, 22 the confession in question
having been obtained during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, although the incumbent Chief Justice of this
Court insists that coerced confessions obtained either prior to or after the effectivity of the 1973 Charter are
equally inadmissible in evidence. 23

While the right to counsel is a right that may be waived, such waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent .
24
The waiver must furthermore be in the presence of the accused's lawyer. 25

In the case at bar, Pedro Decierdo was not assisted by a lawyer when he signed Exhibits "A"-"A-25", his
supposed confession. Judge Bacarro himself so admitted. On cross-examination, he testified:

xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Cimafranca, P.:

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Now, but in your investigation, did I heard it right that you advise him that he is entitled to a lawyer?

A. I asked him orally.

Atty. Cimafranca, P.:

(Continuing)

Q. But nevertheless he was not assisted by any lawyer?

A. Because there was no lawyer in Tambulig.

Q. You did not even assign a lawyer to assist him this is for the purpose of investigation?

26
A. As I said there is no lawyer on record in Tambulig.

xxx xxx xxx

That fact alone (absence of counsel) nullifies the confession.

Indeed, the questioning should have ceased at that precise point, since the government itself was not prepared to provide Decierdo with the services
of a lawyer, had Decierdo requested for one. In that event, Decierdo's right to counsel would have been an illusion even if he had been in fact advised
of such right.

Furthermore, there is no showing that the accused in fact waived his constitutional rights when he executed, or more precisely, was made to execute,
Exhibits "A"-"A-25". The exhibits in question simply declare:

xxx xxx xxx

The affiant and accused in Criminal Case No. 699, for MURDER was appraised of his Constitutional Rights under the Republic
of the Philippines and the nature of this investigation regarding self-incrimination, taken in QUESTION and ANSWER IN THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE translated into the CEBUANO DIALECT of which he understands and testified as follows:

1. QUESTION: Did you now understand your Constitutional Rights and the nature of the investigation,
which has been explained to you?

ANSWER: Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

27
as well as People v. Broqueza, 28 we held that the waiver must rest on clear evidence,
In People v. Pascual,
otherwise, the alleged waiver is void. The records are indeed unclear whether or not Decierdo in fact declined or
spurned Judge Bacarro's offer of a lawyer. The judge thus testified:

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

TO WITNESS:

Q When you told the accused under the constitution he is entitled to a lawyer, what was his answer?

A I cannot remember what was his answer, Your Honor.

Q Did you not put in writing his answer?

A It was not placed but I asked him orally.

Q So you do not know whether the accused before you investigated him give a statement that he want the
assistance of counsel?

29
A He not also say that he news the assistance of counsel.

xxx xxx xxx

From this testimony, we are not convinced that the accused made a waiver of his rights.

It is claimed, however, that Decierdo reiterated his confession before Fiscal Baldomero Fernandez upon the
reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 905, before whom he allegedly. declined anew the assistance of a lawyer.
We quote from Exhibit "C":

xxx xxx xxx

INVESTIGATOR: I am appraising you of your rights under the constitution that you are entitled to the aid of
a lawyer even during this investigation, my question is, do you want the assistamce of a lawyer during this
investigation?
 30
ACCUSED DECIERDO: No sir.

xxx xxx xxx

But assuming that this amounts to a waiver, still, it is an invalid waiver, Decierdo not having been assisted by a lawyer at the time he executed Exhibit
31
"C". Apropos this rule, we held in a recent decision, People vs. Jar:

xxx xxx xxx

Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection, the
presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently, the prosecution must prove with strongly convincing
evidence to the satisfaction of this Court that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily submitted his
confession and knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist him
during the taking of that confession. That proof is missing in this case. 32

xxx xxx xxx

We are not satisfied furthermore that the accused was here apprised of his constitutional rights within the
contemplation of the fundamental law. Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution sets forth, indeed, quite a
stringent procedure. So we held in People v. Caguioa: 33

xxx xxx xxx

... Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that
any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to
the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant, may waive
effectuation of those rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to
consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual
is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may
not question him, The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered
some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any
further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consent to be
questioned."

xxx xxx xxx

In People vs. Duero, 34 we added

xxx xxx xxx

At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed

in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent.

For those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed simply to make them aware of it-the
threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise.

More important, such a warning is an absolute pre-requisite in overcoming the inherent

pressures of the interrogation atmosphere

Further, the warning will show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his
privilege should he choose to exercise it . . .
 The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything
said can and will be used against the individual in court. This warning is needed in order to
make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing it . . .

An individual need not make a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer. While such request
affirmatively secures his right to have one, his failure to ask for a lawyer does not constitute a
waiver. No effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless
specifically made after the warnings we here delineate have been given. The accused who does
not know his rights and therefore does not make a request may be the person who most needs
counsel . . .

If an individual indicates that he wishes the assistance of counsel before any interrogation
occurs, the authorities cannot rationally ignore or deny his request on the basis that the
individual .does not have or cannot afford a retained attorney ...

In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights under this system then, it
is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with an attorney, but also that if
he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him . . .

Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in
any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the
interrogation must cease . . . If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he
wants one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent . . .

If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a
heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived his privilege against self- incrimination and his right to retained or appointed
counsel . . .

An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an
attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a waiver . . .

The warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion today are, in
the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement
made by a defendant.

xxx xxx xxx

And in Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, 35 a decision we affirmed in People v. Galit, 36 we ruled:

xxx xxx xxx

7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shag be informed of
his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make
could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible
or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this
is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of
counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court
upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may
be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. 37
 xxx xxx xxx

It is not enough that the accused be informed of his constitutional rights. That is but the first step. It is necessary,
in addition, that he be convinced that notwithstanding the fact that he is in "enemy" territory, he is not a doomed
man. That is the essence of Section 20 of the 1973 Bill of Rights.

Indeed, the hostile environment of police headquarters (the police-dominated atmosphere" referred to in Duero,
et al. supra) or similar venues are enough to overwhelm one, who, out of resignation, may execute a
"confession" not truly his own. In People v. Navoa 38 we said that "coercion can be mental as well as physical,
and that the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional confession." 39

The accused herein is furthermore unlettered, who is unable to spell his surname correctly. 40 This should have
compelled Judge Bacarro to take greater pains in explaining to the accused his constitutional rights. 41 In People
v. Nicandro, " we admonished:

xxx xxx xxx

When the Constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of Ms right to
remain silent and to counsel it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of meaningful
information petition rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle. As a rule, therefor, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to
repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the
Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled:
he must also explain their effects in practical terms, e.g., what the person under interrogation
may or may not do, and in a language the subject fairly understands (See People vs. Ramos,
122 SCRA 312; People vs. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2.) In other words, the right of a person under
interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police
investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in
understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be
said that the person has been "informed" of his rights. Now, since the right "to be informed"
implies comprehension, the degree of explanation required will necessary vary, depending upon
the education, intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of the person under
investigation. Suffice it to say that a simpler and more lucid explanation is renewed where the
subject is unlettered. 43

xxx xxx xxx

The right against self-incrimination expressed in the Constitution is not, indeed, an Idle right. It strikes at the very
foundations of modem civilization. Time and again this Court has so emphasized. We said in People v. Alegre y
Cerdoncillo. 44

xxx xxx xxx

The right or privilege of a person accused of a crane against self-incrimination is a fundamental

right. It is a personal right of great importance and is given absolutely and unequivocably. The
privilege against self-incrimination is an important development in man's struggle for liberty. It
reflects man's fundamental values and his most noble of aspirations, the unwillingness of
civilized men to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilema of self- accusation, perjury
or contempt; the fear that self- incriminating statements may be obtained by inhumane treatment
and abuses, and the respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each
individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life. 45

xxx xxx xxx

But in People v. Jimenez, 46 we spoke in even clearer language:

 xxx xxx xxx

The history of this constitutional right against compulsory self petition stems from the revulsion
of mankind against the abuses committed by the ecclesiastical inquisitions and by the Star
Chamber several centuries ago. The privilege against self-incrimination "was aimed at a more
far-reaching evil-a recurrence of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, even if not in their stark
brutality. Involuntary confessions had been rejected by all courts not only on the ground of its
unreliability but also more important, on humanitarian principles which abhor all forms of torture
or unfairness towards the accused in criminal proceedings. Although the constitutional language
in which the privilege is cast might be construed to APPLY only to situations in which the
prosecution seeks to call a defendant to testify against himself at the criminal trial its application
has been held to apply to civil proceedings, to congressional investigations, to juvenile
proceedings, and other statutory inquiries. In the application of this right, the natural concern is
the obvious realization that an inability to protect the right at one stage of a proceeding may
make its invocation useless at a later stage. Thus, testimony "obtained in civil suits, or before
administrative or legislative committees, could also prove so incriminatory that a person
compelled to give such testimony might readily be convicted on the basis of those disclosures in
a subsequent criminal proceeding.

In 1966, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the precedent-setting case of Miranda v.
Arizona, established rules to protect a criminal defendant's privilege against self- incrimination
from the pressures arising during custodial investigation by the police. Thus, to provide practical
safeguards for the practical reinforcement for the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the
Court held that "the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. ... 47

xxx xxx xxx

Incorporating Miranda v. Arizona, 48 in the Constitution was by no means an effort to copycat American
precedents. It was intended to fill a constitutional hiatus under the 1935 Charter. According to the 1935 Bill of
Rights:

49
(18) No person shall be compelled to be a witness against him.

But if Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Charter carried quite an exacting standard compared to its 1935
predecessor, the 1987 Constitution provides for an even more demanding procedure. Thus:

SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violation petitions of this section as well
as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
50
We have not, after all, built a perfect democracy. "Invitations" for questioning by police agencies, forced "re-
enactments" of crimes, and coerced confessions are practices that have not perished with the passing of the
ancien regime. It is in such proceedings that the guiding hand of counsel becomes truly essential. The fact that
the respondent may, in the minds of the Peace officers holding him under custody, be truly guilty is of no
moment, for if he is, such peace officers are charged to present Proof of such guilt. But let that guilt rest on
competent evidence, and not from an involuntary admission.

For the time-honored rule is that it is the lesser evil to set a hundred guilty men free than to have one innocent
person languish in prison. As humanity enters the threshold of the 21st century, it is indeed unimaginable that
the dreaded days of the inquisition should Still haunt us. The rights of a human being, no matter how
unfortunately circumstanced, deserve full recognition and protection. Only then can we be truly called a civilized
society.

The people contend however that Exhibits "A"-"A- 25,' were executed voluntarily, for which they should be
admitted in evidence. 51

While we have consistently ruled that the Constitution does not envision confessions otherwise voluntarily given,
52
here, we have serious doubts whether Exhibits "A"-"A-25" were the accused's voluntary statements. As we
said, the accused was not assisted by counsel. That makes that statement, in contemplation of law,
"involuntary," even if it were otherwise voluntary, technically. The accused moreover was arrested, he did not
surrender. But what disturbs us is the fact that he was brought to the Tambulig municipal judge for questioning,
53
albeit there is nothing in the records that will show that he wished to see His Honor, least of all to confess to a
crime before him. The investigation was moreover witness by three policemen, his captor, Pat. Bopadora, being
one of them. 54

Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that the accused volunteered his alleged confession before Judge
Bacarro. He was, as it were, brought to His Honor's waiting arms.

We doubt likewise whether or not the one-sentence "advices" embodied in Exhibits "A"-"A-25" and "C-6" satisfy
the requirements of the Constitution. We have had occasion to strike down a similar advice. In People v. Galit,
supra, we decreed:

xxx xxx xxx

12. Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements
of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws.
Instead there should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple
words in a dialect or language known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar
and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest,
accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his
sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation
and it was only about two weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were
allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet
during the investigation he was not assisted by one. 55

Other than the confession in question, the government has no other evidence to support Decierdo's conviction.
The witness, Pantaleon Tauto-An, testified but on the injuries suffered by the victim, 56 while the only other
witnesses for the people, Judge Gualberto Bacarro, Patrolman Alfredo Bopadora, and Fiscal Baldomero
Fernandez all testified on the alleged confession executed by the accused. 57 As earlier noted, the prosecution
presented no eyewitnesses. Complete reliance is thus placed on the accused's supposed confession. That
confession being inadmissible in evidence, it follows that Decierdo is entitled to an acquittal.

WHEREFORE, the decision is hereby reversed, and the accused Pedro Decierdo is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged. His release from confinement is hereby ordered, unless he is held for another legal cause. With costs
de oficio, et al.
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin
and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

xxx

xxxi

xxxii

xxxiii

xxxiv

xxxv

xxxvi

xxxvii

xxxviii

xxxix

xl

xli

xlii

xliii

[G.R. No. 128287. February 2, 1999.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

,

plaintiff-appellee

vs

. RIZAL ESPIRITU

 KINAO

accused-appellant 

Facts:

Appellant Rizal Espiritu was convicted as charged for the crime of murder and wassentenced to suffer the
penalty of 

reclusion perpetua

 by the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. The conviction was based mainly on his confession and the
corroboratingevidence of 

corpus delicti

. His extra-judicial confession stated that he and Fred Malicdankilled Sato Sanad after being hired by Gerald
Alicoy to do so for the sum of P20,000.00.Aside from describing the details of how he had his cohort killed
Sanad, during the ocular inspection, he even pointed out the place where the killing had been committed.
Andwhen he executed his extra-judicial confession before the police and during the preliminary investigation of
the case before the city prosecutor wherein he admitted his participation in the said incident, he was assisted
by Atty. Daniel Mangallay. However,during the trial of the case, the accused denied any participation in the
killing of Sanad.He also assailed the admissibility of his extra-judicial confession. And, he claimed thatAtty.
Mangallay was retained by Alfredo Kinao and not by himself and that the saidlawyer was unable to advise or to
explain to him the contents of his extra-judicialconfession before he signed it.

ECDHIc

Hence, this appeal.Issue:Whether or not the extra-judicial confession of Espiritu is admissible as evidence.Held:

 
The Court ruled that appellant's contention that Atty. Mangallay was retained not by theappellant personally
but by his uncle, Alfredo Kinao, is not proof of counsel deprivation.The fact remains that Kinao, in hiring the
counsel, acted on behalf of appellant. Besides,appellant did not object when Atty. Mangallay represented him
during the investigations before the police and the city prosecutor. In fact, he expressly acknowledged
Atty.Mangallay as his counsel.We must clarify that the right to counsel does not mean that the accused must
personallyhire his own counsel. The constitutional requirement is satisfied when a counsel is (1)engaged by
anyone acting on behalf of the person under investigation or (2) appointed bythe court upon petition of the
said person or by someone on his behalf.

People v Agustin 240 SCRA 541 (1995)

Facts: Quiaño, the gunman who killed the victims, confessed during the investigation conducted by Baguio City
Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia in his office that he was the triggerman. He implicated Abenoja, Jr., who engaged him to
kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee, Cartel, who provided the armalite, and a certain "Jimmy." During the investigation,
Wilfredo Quiaño was assisted by Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom. Stenographic notes of the proceedings during the
investigation as transcribed with the sworn statement of Quiaño was signed, with the assistance of Atty.
Cajucom, and swore to before City Fiscal Balajadia. The following day, Agustin was apprehended, and was
investigated and was afforded the privileges like that of Quiaño. Agustin’s defense interpose that he was forced
to admit involvement at gunpoint at Kennon Road. He further declared that although he was given a lawyer,
Cajucom (a law partner of the private prosecutor), he nevertheless, asked for his uncle Atty. Oliver Tabin, and
that Atty. Cajucom interviewed him from only two minutes in English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect
he understands. The promise that he would be discharged as a witness did not push through since Quiaño
escaped. However the RTC convicted him, since conspiracy was established, hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant’s extrajudicial statements are admissible as evidence to warrant
conviction.

Held: No. The statement of the accused is inadmissible as evidence in court. Despite asking for his uncle to
represent him he was provided with an impartial counsel who is an associate of the private prosecutor. It also
appears that some of the transcripts of the notes of the proceeding that show the extrajudicial statement
made by the accused were not signed by him. By making his statements the accused voluntarily waived his
right to remain silent but that was not put in writing either.

It would be in violation of the mandate of custodial investigation to admit the statement of the accused when
the process undertaken is one bereft of meeting the standard requirements of the due process that should be
accorded to the accused in custodial investigation, hence he should be acquitted.

Email ThisBlogThis!Share to TwitterShare to FacebookShare to Pinterest

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANACLETO Q. OLVIS, Acquitted, ROMULO VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS
and DOMINADOR SORELA,

G.R. No. 71092 September 30, 1987

Forced re-enactments, like uncounselled and coerced confessions come within the ban against self-
incrimination. Evidence based on such re-enactment is a violation of the Constitution and hence, incompetent
evidence.

Here, accused is not merely required to exhibit some physical characteristics; by and large, he is likewise made
to admit criminal responsibility against his will. It is a police  procedure just as condemnable as an uncounselled
confession. The lack of counsel makes statement in contemplation of law, 'involuntary' even if it were
otherwise voluntary.
 

FACTS:

On September 9, 1975, authorities from the Integrated National Police station of Barrio Polanco, in Zamboanga
del Norte, received a report that a certain Deosdedit Bagon is missing. Bagon had been in fact missing since
two days before. He was last seen by his wife in the afternoon of September 7, 1975, on his way home to Sitio
Sebaca where they resided. A search party was conducted by the authorities to mount an inquiry. As a matter
of police procedure, the team headed off to Sitio Sebaca to question possible witnesses. There, they chanced
upon an unnamed volunteer, who informed them that Deosdedit Bagon was last seen together with
Dominador Sorela, one of the accused herein. The authorities then thereafter picked up Sorela for
interrogation. Sorela bore several scratches on his face, neck and arms when the police found him. According
to him, he sustained those wounds while clearing his ricefield. Apparently unconvinced, the police had Sorela
take them to the ricefield where

he sustained his injuries. But half way there, Sorela illegally broke down, and, in what would apparently crack
the case for the police, admitted having participated in the killing of the missing Bagon. Sorela allegedly
confessed having been with Deosdedit Bagon, a friend of his, in the evening of September 7, 1976 in Sitio
Sebaca. They were met by Romulo Villarojo and Leonardo Cademas, Sorela's co-accused herein and likewise
friends of the deceased, who led them to a secluded place in the ricefields. According to their confessions
Villarojo attacked Bagon with a bolo, hacking him at several parts of the body until he, Bagon, was dead.
Moments later, Sorela fled, running into thick cogon grasses where he suffered facial and bodily scratches. The
police soon picked up Villarojo and Cademas. Together with Sorela, they were turned over to the custody of
Captain Encabo the Polanco Station Commander. The police thereafter made the three re-enact the crime.
Sorela was directed to lead them to the grounds where Discredit Bagon was supposed to have been buried. But
it was Villarojo who escorted them to a watery spot somewhere in the ricefields, where the sack-covered,
decomposing cadaver of Bagon lay in a shallow grave. The necropsy report prepared by the provincial health
officer disclosed that the deceased suffered twelve stab and hack wounds, six of which were determined to be
fatal. In the re-enactment, the suspects, the three accused herein, demonstrated how the victim was boloed to
death. A photograph, shows the appellant Villarojo in the posture of raising a bolo as if to strike another, while
Solero and Cademas look on. Another photograph, portrays Villarojo in the act of concealing the murder
weapon behind a banana tree, apparently after having done the victim in. Initial findings of investigators
disclosed that the threesome of Solero, Villarojo, and Cademas executed Discredit Bagon on orders of Anacleto
Olvis, then Polanco municipal mayor, for a reward of P3,000.00 each. While in custody, the three executed five
separate written confessions each. The first confessions were taken on September 9, 1975 in the local
Philippine Constabulary headquarters. The second were made before the Polanco police. On September 18,
1975, the three accused reiterated the same confessions before

the National Bureau of Investigation Dipolog City sub-office. On September 21, 1975 and September 25, 1975,
they executed two confessions more, again before the Philippine Constabulary and the police of Polanco. In
their confessions of September 9, 1975, September 14, 1975, September 21, 1975, and September 25, 1975,
the said accused again pointed to the then accused Anacleto Olvis as principal by inducement, who allegedly
promised them a reward of P3,000.00 each. In their confessions of September 18, 1975, sworn before agents
of the National Bureau of Investigation, however, they categorically denied Olvis' involvement in the knowing.
We note that the three were transported to the Dipolog City NBI sub-office following a request on September
10, 1975 by Mrs. Diolinda O. Adaro daughter of Olvis, and upon complaint by her of harassment against her
father by his supposed political enemies. The court a quo rendered separate verdicts on the three accused on
the one hand, and Anacleto Olvis on the other. However Olvis was acquitted, while the three were all
sentenced to die for the crime of murder. In acquitting Olvis, the trial court rejected the three accused's earlier
confessions pointing to him as the mastermind, and denied the admissibility thereof insofar as far as he was
concerned. It rejected claims of witnesses that the three accused-appellants would carry out Olvis' alleged
order to kill Bagon upon an offer of a reward when in fact no money changed hands. With the acquittal of Olvis,
however the remaining accused-appellants subsequently repudiated their alleged confessions in open court
despite prior confessions, and now were alleging that there were threats by the Polanco investigators of
physical harm if they refused to "cooperate" in the solution of the case. They likewise alleged that they were
instructed by the Polanco police investigators to implicate Anacieto Olvis in the case. They insisted on their
innocence. The accused Romulo Villarojo averred, specifically, that it was the deceased who had sought to kill
him, for which he acted in self-defense. For the defense, the accused Romulo Villarojo admitted hacking the
victim to death with a bolo. He

stressed, however, that he did so in self- defense. He completely absolved his co-accused Dominador Sorela
and Leonardo Cademas from any liability. The murder of Deosdedit Bagon was witnessed by no other person.
The police of Polanco had but the three accused-appellants' statements to support its claiming.

Issues:

 (1.)

Whether these statements, as any of the extrajudicial confession can stand up in court. (2.)

Whether Villarojo’s claim of self 

-defense tenable?

Ruling:

 (1.)

No. The three accused-appellants' extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible in evidence. Prior to any
questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make
may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in
clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent. For those unaware of the privilege, the
warning is needed simply to make them aware of the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its
exercise. More important, such a warning is an absolute pre-requisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of
the interrogation atmosphere. The confessions in the case at bar suffer from a Constitutional infirmity In their
supposed statements dated September 9, 14, and 21, 1975, the accused-appellants were not assisted by
counsel when they "waived" their rights to counsel. The lack of counsel makes statement in contemplation of
law, 'involuntary' even if it were otherwise voluntary,

technically.”

Forced re-enactments, like uncounselled and coerced confessions come within the ban against self-
incrimination. The 1973 Constitution, the Charter prevailing at the time of the proceedings below, says: No
person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. This should be distinguished, parenthetically, from
mechanical acts the accused is made to execute not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain
physical attributes determinable by simple observation. This includes requiring the accused to submit to a test
to extract virus from his body, or compelling him to expectorate morphine from his mouth, or making her
submit to a pregnancy test, or a foot printing test or requiring him to take part in a police lineup in certain
cases." In each case, the accused does not speak his guilt. It is not a prerequisite therefore that he be provided
with the guiding hand of counsel. But a forced re-enactment is quite another thing. Here, the accused is not
merely required to exhibit some physical characteristics; by and large, he is made to admit criminal
responsibility against his will. It is a police procedure just as condemnable as an uncounselled confession. It
should be furthermore observed that the three accused-appellants were in police custody when they took part
in the re-enactment in question. It is under such circumstances that the Constitution holds a strict application.
Any statement he might have made thereafter is therefore subject to the Constitutional guaranty.

n such a case, he should have been provided with counsel. (2.)

The records will disclose that the deceased suffered twelve assorted wounds caused by a sharp instrument. The
assault severed his right hand and left his head almost separated from his body. This indicates a serious intent
to kill, rather than self-defense. In finding that Villarojo did take the life of the victim, superior strength or
nocturnity is unfound. In the absence of any other proof, the severity and number of wounds sustained by the
deceased are not, by themselves, sufficient proof to warrant the appreciation of the generic aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Hence, Villarojo

should be liable for plain homicide, and accused-appellants Leonardo Cademas and Dominador Sorela are
acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.
People v Obrero

G.R. No.-122142 May 17, 2000

Appellant was convicted of robberry with homicide.He executed a written confession as a result of a
custodial ivestigation.The issue is whether such is valid.

Held:

The extrajudicial confession was invalid.  The perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights is inadequate
to transmit information to the suspect. Also, Art IIISec12(1) requires an independent and competent
counsel  of the suspect’s choice. Atty de los Reyes was not an independent counsel being the PC
Captain and Station Commander. As held in P v Bandula, the independent counsel cannot be a special
prosecutor, private or public prosecutor, municipal attorney or counsel of the police whose interest is
adverse to the accused.

While there is evidence to the homicide consisting of the corpus delicti, there is no evidence of the
robbery except the confession. The lack of objection of appellant to the introduction of the
constitutionally proscribed evidence did not satisfy the burden of proof which rested on the
prosecution. Acquitted of robbery with homicide.

 
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 114385. January 29, 1998]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EFREN JEREZ, accused-appellant.

DECISION

ROMERO, J.:

Appellant Efren Jerez, along with Joselito Quijan, Zaldy Victa and Efren Bola (at large), were
charged with the crime of robbery with double homicide in Criminal Case No. 6755 before the
Regional Trial Court[1] of Daet, Camarines Norte, Branch 38, under an information [2] dated
October 15, which reads as follows:

“That on or about 1:00 o‘clock in the afternoon of May 23, 1990 within the Basit Compound at
barangay Sta. Rosa, municipality of Jose Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named (accused)
armed with revolvers and bladed weapons conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping with one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of
gain and by means of violence take from REYNALDO OCHOA and JOSELITO BALBASTRO
the following personal properties, to wit: cash money amounting to P45,000.00, two (2) gold
plated Seiko 5 wristwatch(es), one (1) golden Horseshoe type ring and one (1) gold plated
Ray-ban with the total value of P52,000.00, Philippine Currency, belonging to said Reynaldo
Ochoa and Joselito Balbastro; that on the occasion of said robbery and for the purpose of
enabling the said accused to take, steal and carry away the aforesaid articles, the herein
accused in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation and taking
advantage of their superior number and strength, assault, attack and stab said Reynaldo
Ochoa and Joselito Balbastro, thereby inflicting upon them multiple mortal wounds on the
different parts of their bodies, and as a result thereof, the said Reynaldo Ochoa and Joselito
Balbastro died instantly, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victims.

CONTRARY TO LAW.”

Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty.

A concise narration of the factual circumstances that led to appellant’s conviction follows:
On May 23, 1990, while waiting for passengers near Josie’s Restaurant in the Municipality of
Labo, Camarines Norte, tricycle driver Gil Villafranca was approached by a person, later
identified as appellant, informing him that he was looking for a carabao buyer.[3]
Subsequently, Villafranca accompanied the latter to the house of one Reynaldo Ochoa.
When apprised of the purpose of the visit, Julian, the son of Reynaldo, sought his father near
Kathleen Pawnshop and advised him about the four carabaos allegedly for sale at Barangay
Teddy, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.[4]

Appellant, together with Reynaldo and another carabao buyer, Joselito Balbastro, boarded a
motorcycle and proceeded to Barangay Teddy to check the condition of the carabaos. It was
the last time, however, that the two were seen alive. When the latter failed to return the
following day, a search, led by Julian, was conducted. In the course of their inquiry, it was
learned that the motorcycle owned by Reynaldo was in the custody of the barangay captain of
Teddy, Jose Panganiban who told them that it was recovered from the Basit Compound.
Forthwith, they proceeded to the said compound and found Reynaldo and Joselito lifeless,
having sustained several mortally-inflicted stab wounds in different parts of their bodies. The
victims were divested of their watches, rayban glasses, and a sum of money amounting to
P37,000.00.

Police Major Roberto Rosales of the Camarines Norte Integrated National Police testified that
upon appellant’s arrest, the latter was apprised of his constitutional rights. On June 25, 1990,
in the presence of Atty. Augusto Schneider, an investigation conducted by the police ensued
and statements therein were reduced to writing, signed and sworn to before Jose Panganiban
Municipal Mayor Arnie Arenal, who likewise inquired whether or not appellant understood the
consequences of his confession.[5]

Appellant, on the other hand, proffered alibi as his defense and that the extra-judicial
confession was allegedly obtained through the use of physical violence, coercion and
intimidation.

He contended that on the day the incident in question occurred, he was with his common law
wife, Mercedes Sarical, at the house of a certain Felix Rellolosa from 9:00 o’clock a.m. to 4:00
o’clock p.m. drinking liquor with some friends.[6] He further tried to buttress his alibi by
declaring that no one saw him as a participant in the slaying nor was any property of the
victims recovered from him.

In a decision dated April 19, 1993, the trial court convicted appellant, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding accused EFREN JEREZ guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with double homicide, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify and/or reimburse the heirs of the
following:

To the Heirs of Reynaldo Ochoa

1. P 50,000.00 damage for death

2. 100,000.00 loss of earning capacity
 (estimated income x life span)
3. 25,000.00 articles/money lost
(P20,000.00, watch, others)
4. 50,000.00 burial and other expenses
----------------

P225,000.00

To the Heirs of Joselito Balbastro

1. P 50,000.00 damage for death

2. 100,000.00 loss of earning capacity
(estimated income x life span)
3. 27,000.00 articles/money lost
(P17,000.00, watch, Ray-Ban)
4. 50,000.00 burial and other expenses
----------------

P227,000.00

But for insufficiency of evidence, Joselito Quijan and Zaldy Victa are hereby acquitted.

SO ORDERED.”[7]

Appellant assails the lower court for giving weight and credence to the extra-judicial
statement, stating that at the time of the taking thereof, he was assisted by an ineffectual
counsel who could not safeguard his constitutional rights and interests.

We affirm appellant’s conviction.

It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that for a confession to be admissible, it “must satisfy all
four fundamental requirements: (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession must
be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the confession must
be express; and (4) the confession must be in writing.” [8] Appellant argued that the first and
second requirements were not complied with. The records of the case, however, reveal
otherwise.

It must be borne in mind that when appellant executed the extrajudicial confession, it was
done in the presence of his counsel, Atty. Schneider, and sworn to before Mayor Arenal. If
indeed his confession were obtained as a result of coercion and intimidation by policemen at
the police station, he could have informed the Mayor of the maltreatment he suffered. Having
failed to convince the authorities, the extra-judicial confession voluntarily made by Jerez is
admissible in evidence. “The presumption, therefore, of spontaneity and voluntariness stands
unless the defense proves otherwise. [9]

Appellant argued that the trial court erred when it denied his right to have an independent
counsel of his own choice. The records show that at the time the extrajudicial confession was
executed, appellant disclosed to the police officers that his counsel of choice was Atty.
Freddie Venida but that the latter would not be available as he is due to depart for Manila on
the same day. Subsequently, Major Rosales suggested that Atty. Schneider, supposedly the
only lawyer available in Jose Panganiban, appear as the counsel of appellant during
investigation and the latter answered in the affirmative, as shown from the excerpts of his
extrajudicial confession, thus:

“PASUBALI:- Ginoong Jerez, ikaw ay kukunan namin ng malayang salaysay tungkol sa isang
usapin na aming sinisiyasat. Subalit, bago ang lahat, nais naming malaman mo na ikaw ay
may mga karapatan susog sa ating Saligang Batas. Ito ay ang mga sumusunod:

Una: Ikaw ay may karapatang tumangging magbigay ng salaysay o kaya ay magbigay ng

salaysay, sapagkat ang anumang sasabihin mo sa pagtatanong na ito ay maaaring gamitin
laban sa iyo sa harap ng hukuman. Nauunawaan mo ito?

Sagot: Opo.

Ikalawa: Ikaw ay may karapatang ding kumuha ng isang manananggol na sarili mong pili
upang siyang maging gabay mo sa pagtatanong na ito. Nauunawaan mo ito?

Sagot: Opo.

Nais mo bang maging gabay mong manananggol ang ating kaharap na manananggol na si
Atty. Augusto B. Schneider?

Sagot: Opo.

Pangatlo: Nais din naming malaman mo at ng lahat na ikaw ay hindi namin pinangangakuan,
sinasaktan o tinatakot upang magbigay ng iyong sariling salaysay, kundi, ito ay pawang
katotohanang kusang loob mong sasabihin at isasalaysay. Nauunawaan mo ito?

Sagot: Opo.

Tanong: Kung nauunawaan mong lahat itong mga pasubaling ito, ikaw ba ay nakahanda ng
magbigay ng iyong sariling malayang salaysay?

Sagot: Opo.”[10]

While the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under custodial investigation
cannot afford the services of a lawyer or (where the preferred lawyer is unavailable as in the
case at bar) is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused has the final choice as
he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against
the former’s appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter
subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer. [11] Thus, “once the
prosecution has shown that there was compliance with the constitutional requirement on pre-
interrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary and the declarant bears the
burden of proving that his confession is involuntary and untrue. The burden is on the accused
to destroy this presumption. A confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves
that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency.
[12]

Although appellant thereafter claimed that the confession he gave was made under duress,
there is, however, no evidence on record to support the same. In People v. Villanueva, this
Court declared that “voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such that
if upon its face the confession exhibits no sign of suspicious circumstances tending to cast
doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details, which could possibly be supplied only by
the accused, reflecting spontaniety and coherence which psychologically cannot be
associated with a mind to which violence and torture have been applied, it may be considered
voluntary.”[13] A scrutiny of the sworn statement discloses in detail relevant facts surrounding
the commission of the offense charged which the accused himself could only have known.

The Court, therefore, finds that appellant’s constitutional right to counsel was not breached
when he agreed to be represented by Atty. Schneider.

Appellant likewise argued that the trial court should have admitted his defense of alibi
“considering that he was not properly identified and physical evidence like properties, money,
fingerprints were not discovered by the arresting officers.” [14]

This contention is simply unavailing in the case at bar. It is settled in this jurisdiction that “for
alibi to prosper, it is not enough that the accused prove that he was somewhere else when
the crime was committed. He must demonstrate that he could not have been physically
present at the place of the crime or in its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.” [15]
Appellant testified that on the day in question, he was engaged in a drinking spree with his
friends at the house of Felix Rellolosa at Talobatib, Labo, Camarines Norte and he went
home at 4:00 o’clock p.m. staying thereat for the rest of the night. Unfortunately, this
version of the appellant was contradicted by prosecution witnesses, Julian Ochoa and Gil
Villafranca, who positively identified him in court as the person scouting for carabao buyers
in the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte at around 9:00 o’clock a.m. on May 23, 1990.
Needless to say, where an accused’s alibi is established only by himself, his relatives and
friends, his denial of culpability should be accorded the strictest scrutiny. They are
necessarily suspect and cannot prevail over the testimonies of the more credible witnesses
for the prosecution.[16]

The Court is, therefore, convinced that appellant’s culpability of the offense charged was
proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The computation, however, of the damages awarded by the trial court for loss of earning
capacity fixing the same at P100,000.00 for each victim is erroneous. “The formula
consistently used by the Supreme Court in determining life expectancy is (2/3 x [80 - age of
the victim at the time of death]).” [17] Thus, the award for loss of earning capacity for each
victim shall be as follows:

Joselito Balbastro

P36,000.00 - gross annual income (P3,000.00 x 12 mos.)

Multiply: 30 - life expectancy (2/3 x 45 [80 - 35 age at time of death])
P1,080,000.00 - total loss of earning capacity

Reynaldo Ochoa

P36,000.00 - gross annual income (P3,000.00 x 12 mos.)

Multiply: 21 - life expectancy (2/3 x 31 [80 - 49 age at time of death])
P756,000.00 - total loss of earning capacity

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DISMISSED and the decision of
the trial court finding accused-appellant EFREN JEREZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant shall
indemnify Joselito Balbastro and Reynaldo Ochoa in the amount of P1,080,000.00 and
P756,000.00, respectively, for losses of their respective earning capacity. Costs against
appellant.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

 
PEOPLE OF THE   G.R. No. 178300
PHILIPPINES,
 
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
 
 
 
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
 
Chairperson,
- versus -
CARPIO,*
 

  CORONA,**

  CHICO-NAZARIO, and

DOMINGO REYES y PAJE, PERALTA, JJ.

ALVIN ARNALDO y AVENA
 
 x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

For review is the Decision,[1] dated 14 August 2006, and Resolution,[2] dated 18
October 2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02301 affirming with
modifications the Decision,[3] dated 26 February 2002, of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 12, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 1611-M-99 finding herein
accused-appellants Domingo Reyes y Paje (Reyes), Alvin Arnaldo y Avena (Arnaldo) and
Joselito Flores y Victorio (Flores) guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping for
ransom with homicide and imposing upon each of them the capital punishment of
death.

The facts culled from the records are as follows:

On 11 August 1999, an Information[4] was filed before the RTC charging

appellants with the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide.
The accusatory portion of the information reads:

The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice hereby accuses

Domingo Reyes y Paje, Alvin Arnaldo y Avena and Joselito Flores y Victorio of the crime of
kidnapping for ransom with homicide defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, committed as follows:

That on or about 11:00 p.m. on July 16, 1999, at Sitio Lambakin, barangay Sto. Cristo,
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and
grouping themselves together with Juanito Pataray y Cayaban, Federico Pataray y Cabayan and
Rommel Libarnes y Acejo, who are still at large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, by means of force and intimidation and with use of firearms, carry away and
deprive Robert Yao, Yao San, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Raymond Yao, Ronald Matthew Yao, Lennie
Yao, Charlene Yao, Jona Abagatnan ang Josephine Ortea against their will and consent on
board their Mazda MVP van for the purpose of extorting money in the amount of Five Million
Pesos (P5,000,000.00), that during the detention of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymong Yao, said
accused with intent to kill, willfully and unlawfully strangled Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond
Yao to death to the damage and prejudice of their heirs in such amount as may be awarded to
them by this Honorable Court.

During their arraignment,[5] appellants, assisted by a counsel de oficio, pleaded

“Not guilty” to the charge. Trial on the merits thereafter followed.

The prosecution presented as witnesses Jona Abagatnan (Abagatnan), Robert

Yao (Robert), Yao San, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Alex Alberto, PO3 Roberto Jabien, Atty.
Florimond Rous (Atty. Rous) and Atty. Carlo Uminga (Atty. Uminga). Their testimonies,
taken together, attest to the following:
  

The Yao family is composed of Yao San (father), Chua Ong Ping Sim (mother),
Robert and Raymond (children), Lenny (daughter-in-law, wife of Robert), Matthew and
Charlene (grandchildren), and Jona Abagatnan and Josephine Ortea (housemaids). The
Yao family owns and operates a poultry farm in Barangay Santo Cristo, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan.

On 16 July 1999, at about 11:00 p.m., the Yao family, on board a Mazda MVP
van, arrived at the their poultry farm in Barangay Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan. Yao San alighted from the van to open the gate of the farm. At this juncture,
appellant Reyes and a certain Juanito Pataray (Pataray) approached, poked their guns
at Yao San, and dragged him inside the van. Appellant Reyes and Pataray also boarded
the van. Thereupon, appellants Arnaldo and Flores, with two male companions, all
armed with guns, arrived and immediately boarded the van. Appellant Flores took the
driver’s seat and drove the van. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their cohorts then
blindfolded each member of the Yao family inside the van with packaging tape.[6]

After about 30 minutes of traveling on the road, the van stopped. Per order of
appellants and their cohorts, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Jona Abagatnan
(Abagatnan) stepped out of the van with appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and
one of their male companions.[7] Appellant Flores, with the other male companion,
drove the van with the remaining members of the Yao family inside the vehicle.[8]
  

Later, the van stopped again. Appellant Flores and his male companion told Yao
San to produce the amount of five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) as ransom in exchange
for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan. Thereafter,
appellant Flores and his male companion left the van and fled; while Yao San, Lenny,
Matthew, Charlene and Josephine remained inside the van. Upon sensing that the
kidnappers had already left, Yao San drove the van towards the poultry farm and
sought the help of relatives.[9]

Meanwhile, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan were taken on
foot by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and one male companion to a safe-
house situated in the mountainous part of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan where they
spent the whole night.[10]

On the morning of the following day, at around 4:00 a.m., appellants and their
cohorts tried to contact Yao San regarding the ransom demanded, but the latter could
not be reached. Thus, appellants instructed Abagatnan to look for Yao San in the
poultry farm. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and one male companion escorted
Abagatnan in proceeding to the poultry farm. Upon arriving therein, Abagatnan
searched for Yao San, but the latter could not be found. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo
told Abagatnan to remind Yao San about the ransom demanded. Thereafter,
appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their male companion left Abagatnan in the poultry
farm and went back to the safe-house.[11]
  

In the safe-house, appellants told Robert that they would release him so he
could help Abagatnan in locating Yao San. Robert and appellants left the safe-house,
and after 30 minutes of trekking, appellants abandoned Robert. Robert then ran
towards the poultry farm. Upon arriving at the poultry farm, Robert found Yao San and
informed him about the ransom demanded by the appellants. Robert also told Yao San
that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were still held by appellants and their cohorts.
[12]

On 18 July 1999, appellants called Yao San through a cellular phone and
demanded the ransom of P5 million for Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond. Yao San
acceded to appellants’ demand. Appellants allowed Yao San to talk with Chua Ong Ping
Sim.[13]

On the morning of 19 July 1999, appellants again called Yao San via a cellular
phone and threatened to kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond because of newspaper
and radio reports regarding the incident. Yao San clarified to appellants that he did not
report the incident to the police and also pleaded with them to spare the life of Chua
Ong Ping Sim and Raymond. Appellants then instructed Yao San to appear and bring
with him the ransom of P5 million at 3:00 p.m. in the Usan dumpsite, Litex Road,
Fairview, Quezon City. Yao San arrived at the designated place of the pay-off at 4:00
p.m., but none of the appellants or their cohorts showed up. Yao San waited for
appellant’s call, but none came. Thus, Yao San left.[14]
  

On 23 July 1999, the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were found at
the La Mesa Dam, Novaliches, Quezon City.[15] Both died of asphyxia by strangulation.
[16]

On 26 July 1999, appellant Arnaldo surrendered to the Presidential Anti-

Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) at Camp Crame, Quezon City. Thereupon,
appellant Arnaldo, with the assistance of Atty. Uminga, executed a written extra-
judicial confession narrating his participation in the incident. Appellant Arnaldo
identified appellants Reyes and Flores, Pataray and a certain Tata and Akey as his co-
participants in the incident. Appellant Arnaldo also described the physical features of
his cohorts and revealed their whereabouts.[17]

Subsequently, appellant Reyes was arrested in Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan. Thereafter, appellants Arnaldo and Reyes were identified in a police line-up
by Yao San, Robert and Abagatnan as their kidnappers.[18]

On 10 August 1999, agents of the PAOCTF arrested appellant Flores in Balayan,

Batangas. Afterwards, appellant Flores, with the assistance of Atty. Rous, executed a
written extra-judicial confession detailing his participation in the incident. Appellant
Flores identified appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and a certain Tata and Akey as
his co-participants in the incident. Appellant Flores was subsequently identified in a
police line-up by Yao San, Robert and Abagatnan as one of their kidnappers.[19]

The prosecution adduced documentary evidence to bolster the aforesaid

allegations, to wit: (1) Sinumpaang Salaysay of Abagatnan (Exhibit A);[20] (2)
Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay of Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San (Exhibit B);[21]
(3) sketch made by Abagatnan (Exhibit C);[22] (4) death certificates of Chua Ong Ping
Sim and Raymond (Exhibits D & E);[23] (5) Sinumpaang Salaysay of Robert (Exhibit F);
[24] (6) Sinumpaang Salaysay of Yao San (Exhibit H);[25] (7) joint affidavit of Police
Senior Inspector Loreto P. Delelis and PO3 Roberto Jabien (Exhibit I);[26] (8) joint
affidavit of PO3 Alex Alberto and PO3 Leonito Fermin (Exhibit J);[27] (9) written extra-
judicial confession of appellant Flores (Exhibit K);[28] (10) written extra-judicial
confession of appellant Arnaldo (Exhibit L);[29] and (11) sketch made by appellant
Arnaldo (Exhibit M).[30]

For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of appellants, Marina Reyes,
Irene Flores Celestino, Wilfredo Celestino, Jr., Rachel C. Ramos, and Isidro Arnaldo.
Appellants denied any liability and interposed alibis and the defense of frame-up. Their
testimonies, as corroborated by their witnesses, are as follows:

Appellant Arnaldo testified that he was an “asset” of the PAOCTF. He narrated

that on 25 July 1999, while he was at the tricycle terminal of Brgy. Sto. Cristo, San Jose
del Monte, Bulacan, a police officer named Liwanag of the PAOCTF approached and
invited him to go to Camp Crame to shed light on a kidnapping case allegedly
committed by a certain Brgy. Captain Ramos and by members of the Aguirre and
Bautista families. He accepted the invitation. Subsequently, he proceeded to Camp
Crame and met therein Colonel Cesar Mancao III (Colonel Mancao) of the PAOCTF.
Colonel Mancao told him that the PAOCTF would arrest Brgy. Capt. Ramos and certain
persons named Gerry Bautista and Dadie Bautista. Colonel Mancao instructed him to
identify said persons as responsible for the kidnapping of the Yao family. He refused to
do so because he feared Brgy. Capt. Ramos. The day after, Colonel Mancao called
appellant Arnaldo to his office. Upon arriving thereat, the latter saw Yao San. Yao San
promised him that if their kidnappers would be apprehended through his cooperation,
he would give him P500,000.00. He accepted Yao San’s offer under the condition that
he would identify a different set of suspects. Later, Colonel Mancao gave him
P30,000.00.[31]

Subsequently, he pointed to appellants Reyes and Flores as his cohorts in

kidnapping the Yao family. He implicated appellants Reyes and Flores to get even with
them, since the two had previously mauled him after he sold their fighting cocks and
failed to give them the proceeds of the sale.[32]

He denied having met with Atty. Uminga. He was not assisted by the latter when
he was forced by the PAOCTF to make a written extra-judicial confession on the
kidnapping of the Yao family. Further, he claimed that while he was under the custody
of PAOCTF, a certain Major Paulino utilized him as a drug pusher. Upon failing to remit
the proceeds of the drug sale, he was beaten up by PAOCTF agents and thereafter
included as accused with appellants Reyes and Flores for the kidnapping of the Yao
family.[33]

On the other hand, appellant Reyes testified that he slept in his house with his
family from 6:00 p.m. of 16 July 1999 until the morning of the next day; that on the
early morning of 26 July 1999, five policemen barged into his house and arrested him;
that the policemen told him that he was a suspect in the kidnapping of the Yao family;
that he was mauled by the policemen outside his house; that the policemen forcibly
brought him to Camp Crame, where he was subsequently tortured; that he knew the
Yao family because he worked as a carpenter in the family’s poultry farm at Brgy. Sto.
Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan; that he had no involvement in the kidnapping of
the family; and that appellant Arnaldo implicated him in the kidnapping of the family
because appellant Arnaldo held a grudge against him.[34]

For his part, appellant Flores testified that he stayed in his sister’s house at
Antipolo City from 12 July 1999 up to 30 July 1999; that he went to her house on 12
July 1999 because it was the birthday of her child; that he worked as a construction
worker during his stay in his sister’s house; that he was arrested in Batangas and
thereafter brought to Camp Crame, where he was beaten up by policemen for refusing
to admit involvement in the kidnapping of the Yao family; that after three days of
beating, he was forced to sign a document which he later found out to be a written
extra-judicial confession; that he never met nor did he know Atty. Rous; that he knew
the Yao family because he lived near the family’s poultry farm, and he used to work
therein as a welder; that he had no participation in the kidnapping of the family; and
that appellant Arnaldo implicated him in the kidnapping of the family because he and
appellant Reyes had mauled appellant Arnaldo several years ago.[35]

The defense proffered documentary and object evidence to buttress their

foregoing claims, to wit: (1) prayer booklet of appellant Arnaldo (Exhibit 1 for appellant
Arnaldo);[36] (2) calling card of Colonel Mancao (Exhibit 2 for appellant Arnaldo);[37]
and (3) pictures allegedly showing appellant Flores working as a carpenter in Antipolo
City (Exhibits 1 & 2 for appellant Flores).[38]

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dated 26 February 2002 convicting
appellants of the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide and
sentencing each of them to suffer the supreme penalty of death. Appellants were also
ordered to pay jointly and severally the Yao family P150,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P500,000.00 as moral damages and the costs of the proceedings. The dispositive
portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding herein three (3) accused DOMINGO REYES y PAJE, ALVIN
ARNALDO y AVENA, and JOSELITO FLORES y VICTORIO guilty as principals beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH (DOUBLE) HOMICIDE as charged, they
are hereby sentenced each to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH as mandated by law, to
jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of deceased Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond Yao in
the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00), and all the private offended
parties or victims, including the heirs of the deceased, in the amount of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as moral damages, subject to the corresponding filing fee as a
first lien, and to pay the costs of the proceedings.[39]

 
  

By reason of the death penalty imposed on each of the appellants, the instant
case was elevated to us for automatic review. However, pursuant to our ruling in
People v. Mateo,[40] we remanded the instant case to the Court of Appeals for proper
disposition.

On 14 August 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming with
modifications the RTC Decision. The appellate court reduced the penalty imposed by
the RTC on each of the appellants from death penalty to reclusion perpetua without the
possibility of parole. It also decreased the amount of civil indemnity from P150,000.00
to P100,000.00. Further, it directed appellants to pay jointly and severally the Yao
family P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. The fallo of the Court of Appeals’ decision
states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 12, dated February 26, 2002, in Criminal Case No. 1611-M-99 convicting
accused-appellants of the crime of Kidnapping For Ransom with (Double) Homicide, is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that:

1) accused-appellants are instead sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion

perpetua;

2) the award of civil indemnity ex delicto is hereby reduced to P100,000; and

3) accused-appellants are further ordered to pay private complainants the

amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.[41]
  

Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ Decision

but this was denied. Hence, appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on 25 August 2006.

In their separate briefs,[42] appellants assigned the following errors:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES;

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING A CONSPIRACY BETWEEN APPELLANTS;

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL
CONFESSIONS OF APPELLANT ARNALDO AND APPELLANT FLORES;

IV.

 
 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TOTALLY IGNORING THE CORROBORATED EVIDENCE OF THE
DEFENSE;

V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD PROVEN APPELLANTS’
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[43]

Anent the first assigned error, appellants assail the credibility of prosecution
witnesses Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San.

In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses, this Court is

guided by the following well-settled principles: (1) the reviewing court will not disturb
the findings of the lower court, unless there is a showing that the latter overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that
may affect the result of the case; (2) the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality, as it had the opportunity to
examine their demeanor when they testified on the witness stand; and (3) a witness
who testifies in a clear, positive and convincing manner is a credible witness.[44]

After carefully reviewing the evidence on record and applying the foregoing
guidelines to this case, we found no cogent reason to overturn the RTC’s ruling finding
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible. Prosecution witnesses
Abagatnan, Robert, and Yao San positively identified appellants and their cohorts as
their kidnappers during a police line-up and also during trial. Abagatnan specifically
testified during the trial that after appellants and their cohorts forcibly entered the van
where she and the Yao family were, appellant Flores drove the van away from the
poultry farm; that appellants Reyes and Arnaldo were among the kidnappers who
guarded her, Robert, Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond in the safe-house; and that
appellants Reyes and Arnaldo accompanied her in going to the poultry farm to search
for Yao San and remind him about the ransom demanded.[45] Robert confirmed that
appellants and their cohorts blindfolded them inside the van during the incident. He
also recounted that appellants and their cohorts detained him and Chua Ong Ping Sim,
Raymond and Abagatnan in a safe-house. He was later instructed by appellants to find
Yao San and remind him about the ransom.[46] Yao San declared that during the
incident, appellant Reyes and Pataray approached him, poked their guns at him, and
dragged him into the van. Appellant Flores took the driver’s seat and drove the van.
Appellant Flores and his male companion told him to produce P5 million as ransom
money in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and
Abagatnan.[47]

Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San testified in a clear and candid manner during the
trial. Their respective testimonies were consistent with one another. They were
steadfast in recounting their ordeal despite the grueling cross examination of the
defense. Moreover, their testimonies were in harmony with the documentary
evidence adduced by the prosecution. The RTC and the Court of Appeals found their
testimonies credible and trustworthy. Both courts also found no ill motive for
Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San to testify against appellants.
  

Appellants, nonetheless, maintain that Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San could not
have identified their kidnappers, because (1) the incident occurred in the darkness of
the night; (2) they were blindfolded then; and (3) the heads of the kidnappers were
covered by T-shirts.

It appears that the crime scene was well-lighted during the incident. At that time,
there was a light from a fluorescent bulb hanging above the gate of the poultry farm
wherein Yao San was held at gunpoint by appellant Reyes and Pataray.[48] The
headlights of the van were also turned on, making it possible for Abagatnan and Robert
to see the faces of appellant Reyes and Pataray as the two approached and poked their
guns at Yao San.[49] Further, there was a bulb inside the van, which turned on when
the door’s van was opened. This bulb lighted up when appellants and their cohorts
forcibly boarded the van, thus, allowing Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San to glance at
the faces of appellants and their cohorts.[50]

Although the Yao family was blindfolded during the incident, it was,
nevertheless, shown that it took appellants and their cohorts about 10 minutes before
all members of the Yao family were blindfolded.[51] During this considerable length of
time, Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San were able to take a good look at the faces of
appellants and their cohorts. In addition, Abagatnan and Robert narrated that their
respective blindfolds loosened several times, giving them the opportunity to have a
glimpse at the faces of appellants and their cohorts.[52]
  

Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San testified that even though the heads of
appellants and their cohorts were covered by T-shirts, their faces were, nonetheless,
exposed and uncovered, allowing them to see their faces.[53] Robert and Yao San also
declared that they recognized the faces of appellants during the incident because the
latter resided near the poultry farm of the Yao family, which used to hire them several
times in the farm as carpenters/welders.[54]

Appellants, however, insist that the testimonies of Abagatnan, Robert and Yao
San that they were able to recognize the kidnappers -- because although the
kidnappers’ heads were covered with T-shirts, their faces were nevertheless exposed
or uncovered -- are incredible. Appellants argue that it is against human nature and
experience that kidnappers would cover only their heads and not their faces in
concealing their identities.

It is not illogical or against human nature for appellants and their cohorts to
cover their heads with T-shirts, while leaving their faces exposed and uncovered when
they kidnapped the Yao family. Perhaps, appellants and their cohorts thought that
putting T-shirts on their heads without covering their faces was sufficient to conceal
their identities. Regardless of their reason, the fact remains that Abagatnan, Robert
and Yao San positively identified appellants as their kidnappers, and their said
identification and testimonies were found by the RTC, the Court of Appeals and by this
Court to be credible. In People v. Barredo,[55] the victim testified that he was able to
identify the accused as his assailants because the latter took off their masks during the
assault. The accused argued that the victim’s testimony was incredible because
persons who wore masks would not take them off so casually in the presence of their
victims, as doing so would reveal their identities. The trial court, nonetheless, ruled
that the victim’s testimony was credible and truthful. We sustained such ruling of the
trial court and ratiocinated:

Appellants dispute the plausibility of Enrico Cebuhano’s claim that he was able to
identify the assailants because they took off their masks. Persons who wear masks would not
take them off so casually in the presence of their victims, as doing so would thereby reveal
their identities. x x x.

The above arguments are untenable. In his testimony, Enrico Cebuhano clearly stated
that the men who entered his home removed their masks when he was brought downstairs.
Why they did so was known only to them. It is possible that they thought that there was no
one in the vicinity who could identify them, or that they wanted Enrico to see who they were
so as to intimidate him. It is also possible that they felt secure because there were 14 of them
who were all armed. In any event, what is important is that the trial court found Enrico
Cebuhano’s testimony to be both credible and believable, and that he was able to positively
identify appellants herein, because the men who entered his home removed their masks, x x x.

It is significant to note that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were brutally killed
as a result of the kidnapping. It is difficult to believe that Robert and Yao San would
point to appellants and their cohorts as their kidnappers if such were not true. A
witness’ relationship to the victim of a crime makes his testimony more credible as it
would be unnatural for a relative interested in vindicating a crime done to their family
to accuse somebody other than the real culprit.[56] Relationship with a victim of a
crime would deter a witness from indiscriminately implicating anybody in the crime.
His natural and usual interest would be to identify the real malefactor and secure his
conviction to obtain true justice for the death of a relative.[57]

Appellants put in issue the failure of Robert and Yao San to immediately report
the incident and identify appellants to authorities despite their common claim that
they recognized appellants, as the latter used to work in the poultry farm.

Robert and Yao San cannot be blamed for not immediately reporting the incident
to the authorities. Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were still held by appellants and
their cohorts when the ransom was demanded for their release. Appellants and their
cohorts were armed and dangerous. Appellants and their cohorts also threatened to
kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond if Yao San and Robert would report the incident to
the authorities.[58] Understandably, Yao San and Robert were extremely fearful for
the safety of their loved ones, and this caused them to refrain from reporting the
incident. Robert and Yao San cannot also be blamed for not reporting the incident to
the police even after the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond had already been
found, and appellants and their cohorts had cut their communication with them.
Certainly, the killings of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond had a chilling/paralyzing
effect on Robert and Yao San. Also, appellants and their cohorts were still at large
then, and the possibility that they would harm the remaining members of the Yao
family was not remote, considering that appellants and their cohorts were familiar with
the whereabouts of the Yao family. At any rate, we have held that failure to
immediately report the kidnapping incident does not diminish the credibility of the
witnesses.[59] The lapse of a considerable length of time before a witness comes
forward to reveal the identities of the perpetrators of the crime does not taint the
credibility of the witness and his testimony where such delay is satisfactorily explained.
[60]

Apropos the second assigned error, appellants contend that the prosecution
failed to prove that they conspired in kidnapping the Yao family.

Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more
persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy presupposes
unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective among the
accused.[61] When the accused by their acts aimed at the same object, one
performing one part and the other performing another part as to complete the crime,
with a view to the attainment of the same object, conspiracy exists.[62]

As can be gleaned from the credible testimonies and sworn statements of

Abagatnan, Robert and Yao, appellant Reyes and Pataray[63] approached and poked
their guns at Yao San, and thereafter dragged the latter into the van. Appellant Flores
then took the driver’s seat and drove the van, while each member of the Yao family
was blindfolded by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their cohorts inside the van.
Thereafter, appellant Flores instructed Yao San to produce the amount of P5 million as
ransom money in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and
Abagatnan. Appellant Reyes and appellant Arnaldo were among the kidnappers who
guarded Abagatnan, Robert, Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond in the safe-house. They
also accompanied Abagatnan and Robert in going to the poultry farm to search for and
remind Yao San about the ransom demanded. Further, appellants Arnaldo and Flores
narrated in their respective extra-judicial confessions[64] how they planned and
executed the kidnapping of the Yao family. Their extra-judicial confessions also
detailed the particular role/participation played by each of appellants and their cohorts
in the kidnapping of the family. Clearly, the foregoing individual acts of appellants and
their cohorts demonstrated their unity of purpose and design in kidnapping the Yao
family for the purpose of extorting ransom.

Appellants, however, challenge the legality and admissibility of the written extra-
judicial confessions.

Appellant Reyes claims that his alleged participation in the kidnapping of the Yao
family was based solely on the written extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo
and Flores. He maintains, however, that said extra-judicial confessions are inadmissible
in evidence, because they were obtained in violation of his co-appellants’ constitutional
right to have an independent counsel of their own choice during custodial
investigation. Appellant Reyes alleges that the agents of the PAOCTF did not ask his co-
appellants during the custodial investigation whether they had a lawyer of their own
choice, and whether they could afford to hire a lawyer; that the agents of the PAOCTF
suggested the availability of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous to his co-appellants; and that
Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous were associates of the PAOCTF. Appellant Reyes also
asseverates that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores cannot
be utilized against him.
  

Appellant Flores argues that his written extra-judicial confession is inadmissible

in evidence, because it was obtained in violation of his constitutional right to have an
independent counsel of his own choice during custodial investigation. He insists that
his written extra-judicial confession was elicited through force, torture and without the
assistance of a lawyer. He avers that he was not assisted by any lawyer from the time
he was arrested until he was coerced to sign the purported confession; that he was
forced to sign it because he could not anymore endure the beatings he suffered at the
hands of the PAOCTF agents; and that he never met or knew Atty. Rous who, according
to the PAOCTF, had assisted him during the custodial investigation.

Appellant Arnaldo contends that his written extra-judicial confession should be

excluded as evidence, as it was procured in violation of his constitutional right to have
an independent counsel of his own choice during custodial investigation. He claims
that he was not given freedom to choose his counsel; that the agents of the PAOCTF
did not ask him during the custodial investigation whether he had a lawyer of his own
choice, and whether he could afford to hire a lawyer; and that the agents of the
PAOCTF suggested the availability of Atty. Uminga to him.

An extra-judicial confession is a declaration made voluntarily and without

compulsion or inducement by a person under custodial investigation, stating or
acknowledging that he had committed or participated in the commission of a crime.
[65] In order that an extra-judicial confession may be admitted in evidence, Article III,
Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the following safeguards be
observed[66]:

Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate
the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or
other forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 shall be

inadmissible in evidence against him.

Thus, we have held that an extra-judicial confession is admissible in evidence if

the following requisites have been satisfied: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be
made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be
express; and (4) it must be in writing.[67]

The mantle of protection afforded by the above-quoted constitutional provision

covers the period from the time a person is taken into custody for the investigation of
his possible participation in the commission of a crime or from the time he is singled
out as a suspect in the commission of the offense although not yet in custody.[68]
  

The right of an accused to be informed of the right to remain silent and to

counsel contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.[69] Such
right contemplates effective communication which results in the subject understanding
what is conveyed.[70]

The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the

slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false.[71] The right to
counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer
starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the
accused.[72] The lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be, as
far as reasonably possible, the choice of the accused. If the lawyer is one furnished in
behalf of accused, he should be competent and independent; that is, he must be willing
to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused.[73] A competent and
independent counsel is logically required to be present and able to advice and assist his
client from the time the latter answers the first question asked by the investigator until
the signing of the confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the
confession was made voluntarily, and that the person under investigation fully
understood the nature and the consequence of his extra-judicial confession vis-a-vis his
constitutional rights. [74]

 
 However, the foregoing rule is not intended to deter to the accused from
confessing guilt if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires, but to protect him from
admitting what he is being coerced to admit although untrue. To be an effective
counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client.
The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything
which might incriminate him; but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to
preclude the slightest coercion on the accused to admit something false. The counsel
should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.[75]

We have gone over the records and found that the PAOCTF investigators have
duly apprised appellants Arnaldo and Flores of their constitutional rights to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel of their own choice during their
respective custodial investigations.

The Pasubali[76] of appellants Arnaldo and Flores’s written extra-judicial

confessions clearly shows that before they made their respective confessions, the
PAOCTF investigators had informed them that the interrogation about to be conducted
on them referred to the kidnapping of the Yao family. Thereafter, the PAOCTF agents
explained to them that they had a constitutional right to remain silent, and that
anything they would say may be used against them in a court of law. They were also
told that they were entitled to a counsel of their own choice, and that they would be
provided with one if they had none. When asked if they had a lawyer of their own,
appellant Arnaldo replied that he would be assisted by Atty. Uminga, while appellant
Flores agreed to be represented by Atty. Rous. Thereafter, when asked if they
understood their said rights, they replied in the affirmative. The appraisal of their
constitutional rights was done in the presence of their respective lawyers and in the
Tagalog dialect, the language spoken and understood by them. Appellants Arnaldo
and Flores and their respective counsels, Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous, also signed and
thumbmarked the extra-judicial confessions. Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous attested to
the veracity of the afore-cited facts in their respective court testimonies.[77] Indeed,
the appraisal of appellants’ constitutional rights was not merely perfunctory, because it
appeared certain that appellants had understood and, in fact, exercised their
fundamental rights after being informed thereof.

Records reflect that appellants Arnaldo and Reyes were likewise accorded their
right to competent and independent counsel during their respective custodial
investigations.

As regards appellant Arnaldo, Atty. Uminga testified that prior to the questioning
of appellant Arnaldo about the incident, Atty. Uminga told the PAOCTF investigators
and agents to give him and appellant Arnaldo space and privacy, so that they could
freely converse. After the PAOCTF investigators and agents left them, he and appellant
Arnaldo went to a cubicle where only the two of them were present. He interviewed
appellant Arnaldo in the Tagalog language regarding the latter’s personal
circumstances and asked him why he was in the PAOCTF office and why he wanted a
lawyer. Appellant Arnaldo replied that he wanted to make a confession about his
participation in the kidnapping of the Yao family. Thereupon, he asked appellant
Arnaldo if the latter would accept his assistance as his lawyer for purposes of his
confession. Appellant Arnaldo agreed. He warned appellant Arnaldo that he might be
sentenced to death if he confessed involvement in the incident. Appellant Arnaldo
answered that he would face the consequences because he was bothered by his
conscience. He inquired from appellant Arnaldo if he was harmed or intimidated into
giving self-incriminating statements to the PAOCTF investigators. Appellant Arnaldo
answered in the negative. He requested appellant Arnaldo to remove his shirt for him
to check if there were torture marks on his body, but he found none. He also observed
that appellant Arnaldo’s appearance and movements were normal. His conference
with appellant Arnaldo lasted for 15 minutes or more. Thereafter, he allowed the
PAOCTF investigators to question appellant Arnaldo.[78]

Further, Atty. Uminga sat beside appellant Arnaldo during the inquiry and
listened to the latter’s entire confession. After the taking of appellant Arnaldo’s
confession, Atty. Uminga requested the PAOCTF investigators to give him a copy of
appellant Arnaldo’s confession. Upon obtaining such copy, he read it entirely and
thereafter gave it to appellant Arnaldo. He instructed appellant Arnaldo to read and
comprehend the same carefully. He told appellant Arnaldo to ask him for clarification
and comment if he did not agree or understand any part of his written confession.
Appellant Arnaldo read his entire written confession and handed it to him. Atty.
Uminga asked him if he had objections to it. Appellant Arnaldo replied in the negative.
He then reminded appellant Arnaldo that the latter could still change his mind, and
that he was not being forced to sign. Appellant Arnaldo manifested that he would sign
his written confession. Later, he and appellant Arnaldo affixed their signatures to the
written confession.[79]
  

With respect to appellant Flores, Atty. Rous declared that before the PAOCTF
investigators began questioning appellant, Atty. Rous interviewed him in Tagalog inside
a room, where only the two of them were present. He asked appellant Flores about his
personal circumstances. Appellant Flores replied that he was a suspect in the
kidnapping of the Yao family, and he wanted to give a confession regarding his
involvement in the said incident. He asked appellant Flores whether he would accept
his assistance as his lawyer. Appellant Flores affirmed that he would. He asked
appellant Flores why he wanted to give such confession. Appellant Flores answered
that he was bothered by his conscience. Atty. Rous warned appellant Flores that his
confession would be used against him in a court of law, and that the death penalty
might be imposed on him. Appellant Flores told him that he wanted to tell the truth
and unload the burden on his mind. He requested appellant Flores to lift his shirt for
the former to verify if there were torture marks or bruises on his body, but found none.
Again, he cautioned appellant Flores about the serious consequences of his confession,
but the latter maintained that he wanted to tell the truth. Thereafter, he permitted the
PAOCTF investigators to question appellant Flores.[80]

Additionally, Atty. Rous stayed with appellant Flores while the latter was giving
statements to the PAOCTF investigators. After the taking of appellant Flores’
statements, he instructed appellant Flores to read and check his written confession.
Appellant Flores read the same and made some minor corrections. He also read
appellant Flores’ written confession. Afterwards, he and appellant Flores signed the
latter’s written confession.[81]
  

It is true that it was the PAOCTF which contacted and suggested the availability
of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous to appellants Arnaldo and Flores, respectively.
Nonetheless, this does not automatically imply that their right to counsel was violated.
What the Constitution requires is the presence of competent and independent counsel,
one who will effectively undertake his client’s defense without any intervening conflict
of interest.[82] There was no conflict of interest with regard to the legal assistance
rendered by Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous. Both counsels had no interest adverse to
appellants Arnaldo and Flores. Although Atty. Uminga testified that he was a former
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent, he, nevertheless, clarified that he had
been separated therefrom since 1994[83] when he went into private practice. Atty.
Uminga declared under oath that he was a private practitioner when he assisted
appellant Arnaldo during the custodial investigation.[84] It appears that Atty. Uminga
was called by the PAOCTF to assist appellant Arnaldo, because Atty. Uminga’s
telephone number was listed on the directory of his former NBI officemates detailed at
the PAOCTF. Atty. Rous, on the other hand, was a member of the Free Legal Aid
Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City at the time he
rendered legal assistance to appellant Flores.[85] Part of Atty. Rous’ duty as member
of the said group was to render legal assistance to the indigents including suspects
under custodial investigation. There was no evidence showing that Atty. Rous had
organizational or personal links to the PAOCTF. In fact, he proceeded to the PAOCTF
office to assist appellant Flores, because he happened to be the lawyer manning the
office when the PAOCTF called.[86] In People v. Fabro,[87] we stated:

 
 The Constitution further requires that the counsel be independent; thus, he cannot be
a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney
whose interest is admittedly adverse to that of the accused. Atty. Jungco does not fall under
any of said enumeration. Nor is there any evidence that he had any interest adverse to that of
the accused. The indelible fact is that he was president of the Zambales Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and not a lackey of the lawmen.

Further, as earlier stated, under Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
an accused is entitled to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. The phrase “preferably of his own choice” does not convey the message
that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude
other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense.
Otherwise, the tempo of custodial investigation would be solely in the hands of the
accused who can impede, nay, obstruct, the progress of the interrogation by simply
selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his
interest.[88] While the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial
interrogation cannot afford the services of counsel – or where the preferred lawyer is
not available – is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the final
choice, as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer
provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not
raise any objection to the counsel’s appointment during the course of the investigation,
and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the
swearing officer.[89] Appellants Arnaldo and Flores did not object to the appointment
of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous as their lawyers, respectively, during their custodial
investigation. Prior to their questioning, appellants Arnaldo and Flores conferred with
Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous. Appellant Arnaldo manifested that he would be assisted
by Atty. Uminga, while appellant Flores agreed to be counseled by Atty. Rous. Atty.
Uminga and Atty. Rous countersigned the written extra-judicial confessions of
appellants Arnaldo and Flores, respectively. Hence, appellants Arnaldo and Flores are
deemed to have engaged the services of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous, respectively.

Since the prosecution has sufficiently established that the respective extra-
judicial confessions of appellant Arnaldo and appellant Flores were obtained in
accordance with the constitutional guarantees, these confessions are admissible. They
are evidence of a high order because of the strong presumption that no person of
normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime, unless prompted by
truth and conscience.[90] Consequently, the burden of proving that undue pressure or
duress was used to procure the confessions rests on appellants Arnaldo and Flores.[91]

In the case at bar, appellants Arnaldo and Flores failed to discharge their burden
of proving that they were forced or coerced to make their respective confessions.
Other than their self-serving statements that they were maltreated by the PAOCTF
officers/agents, they did not present any plausible proof to substantiate their claims.
They did not submit any medical report showing that their bodies were subjected to
violence or torture. Neither did they file complaints against the persons who had
allegedly beaten or forced them to execute their respective confessions despite several
opportunities to do so. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores averred that they informed their
family members/relatives of the alleged maltreatment, but the latter did not report
such allegations to proper authorities. On the contrary, appellants Arnaldo and Flores
declared in their respective confessions that they were not forced or harmed in giving
their sworn statements, and that they were not promised or given any award in
consideration of the same. Records also bear out that they were physically examined
by doctors before they made their confessions.[92] Their physical examination reports
certify that no external signs of physical injury or any form of trauma were noted
during their examination.[93] In People v. Pia,[94] we held that the following factors
indicate voluntariness of an extra-judicial confession: (1) where the accused failed to
present credible evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on their persons; (2)
where they failed to complain to the officers who administered the oaths; (3) where
they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged
intimidators for maltreatment; (4) where there appeared to be no marks of violence on
their bodies; and (5) where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable
physician to buttress their claim.

It should also be noted that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo

and Flores are replete with details on the manner in which the kidnapping was
committed, thereby ruling out the possibility that these were involuntarily made. Their
extra-judicial confessions clearly state how appellants and their cohorts planned the
kidnapping as well as the sequence of events before, during and after its occurrence.
The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language if, upon its face,
the confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its
integrity, it being replete with details which could only be supplied by the accused.[95]

With respect to appellant Reyes’s claim that the extra-judicial confessions of

appellants Arnaldo and Flores cannot be used in evidence against him, we have ruled
that although an extra-judicial confession is admissible only against the confessant,
jurisprudence makes it admissible as corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to
establish the guilt of his co-accused.[96] In People v. Alvarez,[97] we ruled that where
the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of
participation by the co-conspirator, that confession is receivable as evidence against a
co-accused. In People v. Encipido[98] we elucidated as follows:

It is also to be noted that APPELLANTS’ extrajudicial confessions were independently

made without collusion, are identical with each other in their material respects and
confirmatory of the other. They are, therefore, also admissible as circumstantial evidence
against their co-accused implicated therein to show the probability of the latter’s actual
participation in the commission of the crime. They are also admissible as corroborative
evidence against the others, it being clear from other facts and circumstances presented that
persons other than the declarants themselves participated in the commission of the crime
charged and proved. They are what is commonly known as interlocking confession and
constitute an exception to the general rule that extrajudicial confessions/admissions are
admissible in evidence only against the declarants thereof.

Appellants Arnaldo and Flores stated in their respective confessions that

appellant Reyes participated in their kidnapping of the Yao family. These statements
are, therefore, admissible as corroborative and circumstantial evidence to prove
appellant Reyes’ guilt.

Nevertheless, even without the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo

and Flores, evidence on record is sufficient to sustain a finding of culpability of
appellant Reyes. As earlier found, Abagatnan, Robert and Yao positively identified
appellant Reyes as one of their kidnappers. They specifically testified that during the
incident, appellant Reyes (1) approached and pointed a gun at Yao San and dragged the
latter inside the van; and (2) accompanied Abagatnan and Robert in going to the
poultry farm to search for and remind Yao San about the ransom demanded. The RTC,
Court of Appeals and this Court found such testimonies credible.

Appellants argue that their alibis cast reasonable doubt on their alleged guilt.
Appellant Reyes avers that he could not have been one of those who kidnapped the
Yao family on the night of 16 July 1999 at around 11:00 p.m., because he was sleeping
with his family in their residence during such time and date. Likewise, appellant Flores
asseverates that he could not have been present at the crime scene on such date and
time, as he was already sleeping in his sister’s house at Antipolo City. For his part,
appellant Arnaldo asserts that he is a victim of a police frame-up. He alleges that he
was an asset of the PAOCTF, but was later utilized as a drug pusher by the said agency.
Upon failing to remit the proceeds of a shabu sale to the PAOCTF officers, he was
beaten up and included as accused in the kidnapping of the Yao family.

Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to prove.
Alibi must be proved by the accused with clear and convincing evidence; otherwise it
cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that
he was somewhere else when the crime was committed. He must likewise prove that
it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate
vicinity at the time of its commission.[99]
  

The defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by this Court with
disfavor, for it can easily be concocted but is difficult to prove. In order to prosper, the
defense of frame-up must be proved by the accused with clear and convincing
evidence.[100]

It should be observed that the family residence/house of appellant Reyes where

he claimed to have slept when the incident occurred is located within Brgy. Sto. Cristo,
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.[101] This is the same barangay where the Yao family’s
poultry farm is situated. Appellant Reyes, in fact, admitted that the poultry farm is
near his residence.[102] There is a huge possibility that appellant Reyes slept for a
while, woke up before 11:00 p.m., and thereafter proceeded to the Yao family’s poultry
farm to participate in the kidnapping of the family. The same is true with appellant
Flores. Wilfredo, appellant Flores’ nephew, testified that he and appellant went to bed
and slept together in the house of appellant’s sister in Antipolo City at about 8:00 p.m.
of 16 July 1999.[103] It is greatly possible that Wifredo did not notice when appellant
Flores woke up later at 9:00 p.m. and immediately proceeded to the Yao family’s
poultry farm to participate in the kidnapping of the family, arriving therein at about
11:00 p.m. It is a fact that a person coming from Antipolo City may reach San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan in two hours via a motor vehicle, considering that there was no more
heavy traffic at that late evening. Obviously, appellants Reyes and Flores failed to
prove convincingly that it was physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene
during the incident.

 
 Appellant Flores submitted two pictures which, according to him, show that he
worked as a construction worker from 12 July 1999 up to 30 July 1999 while staying in
his sister’s house at Antipolo City. These pictures, however, do not clearly and
convincingly support such claim, because (1) the pictures were undated; (2) the shots
were taken from a far distance; and (3) the face of the man in the pictures which
appellant Flores claims as his is blurred, unrecognizable and almost hidden, as such
person is wearing a cap and is in a position where only the right and back portions of
his head and body are visible.

Appellant Arnaldo also failed to prove with convincing evidence his defense of
frame-up. Aside from his self-serving testimony that he was a former PAOCTF agent
and that he was beaten and included as accused in the kidnapping of the Yao family by
the PAOCTF agents because he failed to remit to the PAOCTF officers the proceeds of
his sale of shabu, he did not present convincing proof to support said allegations. He
submitted the calling card of Colonel Mancao, which appears to have been signed by
the latter at the back portion, but there is nothing on it which indicates or verifies that
appellant Arnaldo was indeed a former PAOCTF agent. He also submitted a prayer
book containing his handwritten narration of torture he allegedly experienced at the
hands of the PAOCTF agents, but this does not conclusively show that he was beaten by
the PAOCTF agents. As we earlier found, appellant Arnaldo did not produce any
medical records/certificates or file any complaint against the PAOCTF agents to bolster
his claim of maltreatment.

 
 It is true that the alibis of appellants Reyes and Flores and the defense of frame-
up of appellant Arnaldo were corroborated on some points by the testimonies of some
of their relatives/friends. We have, however, held that alibi and the defense of frame-
up become less plausible when they are corroborated only by relatives and friends
because of perceived partiality.[104]

Indeed, the positive and credible testimonies of Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San
prevail over the alibis and defense of frame-up of appellants.[105]

We shall now determine the propriety of appellants’ conviction for the special
complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide and the corresponding
penalties imposed.

Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of kidnapping is
committed with the concurrence of the following elements: (1) the offender is a private
individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his
liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the
offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention
lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c)
serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats
to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a
public officer.[106] All of the foregoing elements were duly establish by the testimonial
and documentary evidences for the prosecution in the case at bar. First, appellants
and their cohorts are private individuals. Second, appellants and their cohorts
kidnapped the Yao family by taking control of their van and detaining them in a
secluded place. Third, the Yao family was taken against their will. And fourth, threats
to kill were made and the kidnap victims include females.

Republic Act No. 7659 provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if any of
the two qualifying circumstances is present in the commission of the kidnapping: (1)
the motive of the kidnappers is to extort ransom for the release of the kidnap victims,
although none of the circumstances mentioned under paragraph four of the elements
of kidnapping were present. Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or
demanded for the redemption of a captured person that would release him from
captivity.[107] Whether or not the ransom is actually paid to or received by the
perpetrators is of no moment.[108] It is sufficient that the kidnapping was committed
for the purpose of exacting ransom;[109] and (2) the kidnap victims were killed or died
as a consequence of the kidnapping or was raped, or subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts. Both of these qualifying circumstances are alleged in the
information and proven during trial.

As testified to by Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San, appellants and their cohorts
demanded the amount of P5 million for the release of Chua Ong Pong Sim and
Raymond. In fact, Yao San went to the Usan dumpsite, Litex Road, Fairview, Quezon
City, to hand over the ransom money to appellants and their cohorts, but the latter did
not show up. It was also apparent that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were killed or
died during their captivity. Yao San declared that appellants and their cohorts called up
and told him that they would kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond who were still under
their custody, because they heard the radio report that the incident was already known
to the police. True to their threats, the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond
were later found dumped in La Mesa Dam. Their respective death certificates show
that they died of asphyxia by strangulation.

Withal, the death penalty cannot be imposed on the appellants in view of the
passage of Republic Act No. 9346 on 24 June 2006 prohibiting the imposition of death
penalty in the Philippines. In accordance with Sections 2 and 3 thereof, the penalty
that should be meted out to the appellants is reclusion perpetua without the possibility
of parole. The Court of Appeals, therefore, acted accordingly in imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without the possibility of parole on each of the appellants.

The Court of Appeals was also correct in ordering appellants to jointly and
severally pay civil indemnity and exemplary damages to the Yao family. Nonetheless,
their corresponding amounts should be modified. In People v. Quiachon,[110] we
explained that even if the death penalty was not to be imposed on accused because of
the prohibition in Republic Act No. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 was still
proper, as the said award was not dependent on the actual imposition of the death
penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the
death penalty attended the commission of the offense. As earlier stated, both the
qualifying circumstances of demand for ransom and the double killing or death of two
of the kidnap victims were alleged in the information and proven during trial. Thus, for
the twin deaths of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond, their heirs (Yao San, Robert,
Lenny, Matthew and Charlene) are entitled to a total amount of P150,000.00 as civil
indemnity. Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good.[111] In criminal offenses, exemplary damages may be recovered when
the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, whether
ordinary or qualifying.[112] Since both the qualifying circumstances of demand for
ransom and the killing or death of two of the kidnap victims (Chua Ong Ping Sim and
Raymond) while in captivity were alleged in the information and proven during trial,
and in order to deter others from committing the same despicable acts, the award of
exemplary damages is proper. The total amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages
should be modified. In several cases,[113] we awarded an amount of P100,000.00 to
each of the kidnap victims. As in this case, the amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages should be awarded each to Yao San, Robert, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene,
Abagatnan and Ortea. This makes the total amount of exemplary damages add up to
P700,000.00.

The appellate court aptly held that the award of moral damages is warranted.
Under Article 2217 of the New Civil Code, moral damages include physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock and similar
injury. Article 2219 of the same Code provides that moral damages may be recovered
in cases of illegal detention. There is no doubt that each member of the Yao family
suffered physical and/or psychological trauma because of the ordeal, especially
because two of the family members were ruthlessly killed during their captivity.
Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,[114] Yao San, Robert, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene,
Abagatnan and Ortea should each receive the amount of P100,000.00 as moral
damages. Per computation, the total amount of moral damages is P700,000.00 and not
P500,000.00 as fixed by the RTC and the Court of Appeals.

Finally, we observed that the RTC and the Court of Appeals denominated the
crime committed by appellants in the present case as the special complex crime of
kidnapping for ransom with double homicide since two of the kidnap victims were
killed or died during the kidnapping. The word “double” should be deleted therein.
Regardless of the number of killings or deaths that occurred as a consequence of the
kidnapping, the appropriate denomination of the crime should be the special complex
crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide.

WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated 14 August 2006, and Resolution, dated 18

October 2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02301 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the total amount of civil indemnity
is P150,000.00; (2) the total amount of exemplary damages is P700,000.00; (3) the total
amount of moral damages is P700,000.00; and (4) the appropriate denomination of the
crime committed by appellants is the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom
with homicide.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
  

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 175330

Appellee,

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - PERALTA ,

BERSAMIN,*

ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

RODOLFO CAPITLE and

ARTURO NAGARES, Promulgated:

Appellants. January 12, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case
  

This is an appeal from the 27 January 2006 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 01479. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 28 April 2000 Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Pasig, Branch 267, in Criminal
Case No. 105733, convicting appellants Rodolfo Capitle and Arturo Nagares for the crime
of murder.

The Facts

The Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the case as follows:

The historical backdrop shows that at around 7:40 a.m. of August 6, 1993, at Orambo Drive,
Orambo, Pasig City, Barangay Chairman Avelino Pagalunan was gunned down by four (4) men
who thereafter ran towards Shaw Blvd. The incident was witnessed by Ruiz Constantino and
Solomon Molino who were seated six (6) arms length away and conversing on the flower pots
planted with bougainvilla lined along Orambo Drive corner St. Jude Street, Orambo, Pasig City.
Barangay Chairman Avelino Pagalunan was thereafter brought to Medical City Hospital where
he expired due to multiple gunshot wounds in the body, in the neck and in the head. The most
fatal wound was the one sustained in the head.

On that same day, at around 10:30 a.m., Solomon Molino, a Barangay Kagawad, gave his
statement to the District Central Investigation Branch, Eastern Police District Command
relating the incident he saw but failed to identify the assailants.

On September 29, 1993, Arturo Nagares was apprehended by the Pasig Police on account of his
conviction in another case for Frustrated Homicide. He was later to be taken custody by the
National Bureau of Investigation at its detention center along Taft Avenue where the next day,
on September 30, 1993, Ruiz Constantino gave his statement identifying Arturo Nagares y De
Leon from the four (4) pictures presented to him as one of the three (3) armed assailants of
Barangay Captain Pagalunan on August 6, 1993.

Arturo Nagares was likewise identified from the four (4) pictures shown to another witness,
Rodolfo Paat, who claims to be at Orambo Drive corner Shaw Blvd., Pasig City, when he heard
several gun shots with people shouting “nagbabarilan, nagbabarilan.” Moments later, from the
corner of St. Jude St. and Orambo Drive, he saw four (4) men each carrying guns running from
Orambo Drive towards Shaw Blvd. and boarded a jeep going to Mandaluyong, Metro Manila.

The third witness to give a statement to the NBI on same day was Solomon Molino who
likewise identified Arturo Nagares from the four (4) pictures laid before him.

On October 19, 1993, while under detention at the NBI, Arturo Nagares executed an
extrajudicial confession to the killing of Barangay Chairman Avelino Pagalunan before Atty.
Orlando V. Dizon, Chief, SOG, NBI. Assisting him in the confession was practicing lawyer,
Atty. Esmeralda E. Galang, who was at the NBI following up the implementation of a warrant
of arrest in one of the cases she was handling. In Nagares’ extrajudicial confession, he
implicated Vice Mayor Anching De Guzman as the mastermind, and Rodolfo Capitle a.k.a.
Putol, Elymar Santos and a John Doe as his cohorts in the killing of the Barangay Chairman.

On January 21, 1994, witness Solomon Molino executed his third affidavit before the NBI and
identified Ramil Marquina in a police line-up as one of those who fired at Pagalunan.

Then again, on March 21, 1994, the same Solomon Molino gave a written statement before the
Pasig Police identifying Rodolfo Capitle, who was earlier arrested by the police by virtue of a
warrant of arrest issued by Judge Milagros V. Caguioa of the Pasig Court for Frustrated
Homicide.

On March 26, 1994, witness Rodolfo Paat executed another statement before the NBI
identifying Rodolfo Capitle from the 20 pictures shown him as one of those armed men he saw
on August 6, 1993 running from Orambo Drive to Shaw Blvd.

On April 4, 1994, a criminal charge sheet for Murder was filed against Rodolfo Capitle and
Arturo Nagares.
 

On September 29, 1994, the Information was amended to include Ramil Marquina as one of the
accused, together with Rodolfo Capitle and Arturo Nagares. The Amended Information reads:

The undersigned 2nd Asst. Provincial Prosecutor accuses RODOLFO CAPITLE, ARTURO
NAGARES and RAMIL MARQUINA of the crime of MURDER, committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of August 1993 in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together, with intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery, and
with abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shot Brgy. Chairman Avelino Pagalunan on the vital parts of his body, thereby
inflicting upon the latter mortal and fatal gunshot wounds which caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On April 17, 1997, all three (3) accused were properly arraigned. Assisted by their respective
counsels, they entered a “not guilty” plea. After the case was set for pre-trial conference, trial
on the merits followed.

During the trial, prosecution witness Ruiz Constantino testified and identified accused Arturo
Nagares as one of those he saw shooting the victim, Barangay Chairman Avelino Pagalunan,
but could not identify the rest of the assailants. Another witness for the People, Solomon
Molino, with whom Constantino was conversing at the time, claimed to have witnessed the
shooting incident and even prepared a sketch as to the respective positions of the victim, the
assailants and where they were seated. Nevertheless, he found it hard to identify the gun
wielders.

The third eyewitness, Rodofo Paat, who claims that during the incident he was at the end of the
tricycle line along Orambo Drive between Shaw Blvd. and St. Peter St. when he heard gunshots
coming from Orambo Drive corner St. Jude St. about 80 meters away from where he was. Upon
hearing the gunshots, people in the vicinity scampered for cover but he stayed put and saw four
 (4) persons with guns emerged from the smoke running towards Shaw Blvd. He later on
identified two (2) of them in open court as accused Arturo Nagares and Rodolfo Capitle.

Accused Arturo Nagares offered alibi as a defense. He was sleeping at the house of his sister
Gaudelia Mercado at 92 F. Asedillo St., Bagong Katipunan, Pasig City, as he was suffering
from fever due to boil (“pigsa”) at the right leg, he said. This testimony found corroboration
from his sister, Gaudelia, and even narrated she accompanied Arturo to the Rizal Medical
Center where he was treated and given medication by a certain Dr. Ong. As to the extrajudicial
confession, Nagares claimed that he was violated, forced, coerced and tortured into admitting
the crime, and to sign the already prepared extrajudicial confession.

For his part, accused Rodolfo Capitle as well put forth the defense of alibi insisting that on the
day of the shooting, he was at their house at Bambang, Pasig, with his wife and children
cleaning and feeding the hogs. Afterwards, he continued, he took a bath and rested for the rest
of the day. His wife substantiated his testimony. Rodolfo went on saying that on March 18,
1994, he was arrested and detained at the Pasig Police Headquarters for another crime. On
March 23, 1994, the NBI took custody of him at the NBI Headquarters along Taft Avenue.
While at the NBI Headquarters, he complained of having been tortured by placing a plastic bag
on his face, boxed on the chest and abdomen, electrocuted and was forced to admit to the killing
of the Barangay Captain but was able to refuse, nonetheless.

x x x x3

The Ruling of the Trial Court

After trial, the trial court rendered a Decision dated 28 April 2000 finding appellants guilty
as charged, while acquitting Ramil Marquina. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused ARTURO NAGARES and
RODOLFO CAPITLE GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of MURDER defined
and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and each accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Upon the other hand, considering
that the Court failed to prove the guilt of the accused RAMIL MARQUINA beyond reasonable
doubt, the aforesaid accused is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

Accordingly, the Court orders accused Nagares and Capitle to pay jointly in solidum the widow
of the victim, Merlie Pagalunan, the following amounts, to wit:

1.      PhP50,000.00 as indemnity;

2.      PhP 100,000.00 as moral damages;

3.      PhP 50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

4.      PhP 50,000.00 representing actual and compensatory damages;

5.      PhP 30,000.00 as attorney’s fees;

6.      And costs.

The Jail Warden of the Pasig City Jail where accused Rodolfo Capitle is presently detained
during the pendency of this case, is accordingly ordered to immediately transfer the person of
the aforesaid accused to the National Bilibid Prisons (NBP) of the Bureau of Corrections in
Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila, as he is now considered an insular prisoner. Let therefore the
corresponding Order/s of Commitment (Mittimus) be issued pursuant to Circular No. 4-92-A,
dated April 20, 1992 and Circular No. 66-97 dated October 14, 1997 of the Office of the Court
Administrator of the Supreme Court.

In the meantime, the Director of the National Bilibid Prisons (NBP) where accused Arturo
Nagares is already serving sentence for another crime, is hereby informed of the latter’s
conviction in the present case for his appropriate action and guidance.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.4

 
  

In convicting appellants, the trial court found that two out of three eyewitnesses, in the
persons of Ruiz Constantino and Rodolfo Paat, positively identified appellants as among the
perpetrators of the crime. The trial court discarded appellants’ alibis and denial as such
cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses. The trial
court likewise rejected appellants’ claims of “frame-up” and torture as unsubstantiated.

The trial court found no violation of appellant Nagares’ constitutional rights insofar as his
confession is concerned. Nagares’ Sinumpaang Salaysay is presumed to be voluntary and
Nagares failed to overthrow such presumption. Further, there was sufficient evidence that
Nagares was assisted by an independent and effective counsel during the custodial
investigation, belying Nagares’ allegations.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, disposing of the case as
follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, finding no reversible error in the appealed judgment,
the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.5

In affirming the conviction of appellants, the Court of Appeals found the extrajudicial
confession executed by Nagares admissible since it was (1) voluntary; (2) made with the
assistance of a competent and independent counsel; (3) express; and (4) in writing. The
Court of Appeals pointed out that the specific information stated in the impugned
confession “not only categorically detailed [Nagares’] participation in the crime, it likewise
show[ed] badges and traits of voluntariness of the confession.”

The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court that Nagares was duly assisted by an
independent counsel during the custodial investigation. According to the Court of Appeals,
“the photographs during the custodial investigation, and execution of the 6-page 70
questions and answers extrajudicial confession are at war against the presence of
uncivilized practice of extracting confession by coercion.”

As regards Capitle, the Court of Appeals held that “an extrajudicial confession is binding
only on the person making it (Nagares) and is not admissible against his co-accused
(Capitle).” Hence, there was no direct evidence linking Capitle to the crime. Nevertheless,
the Court of Appeals found sufficient circumstantial evidence warranting Capitle’s
conviction for the crime charged.

The Issues

Appellants raise the following issues:

1. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF APPELLANTS WERE

VIOLATED THEREBY RENDERING THE EVIDENCE PURPORTEDLY
OBTAINED THROUGH SAID VIOLATION AS NULL AND VOID.

2.      WHETHER THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH

THE GUILT OF APPELLANTS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 6

 
 The Ruling of this Court

We sustain the appellants’ conviction.

Nagares’ extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence

Nagares challenges the admissibility of his extrajudicial confession, claiming that it was
made under duress and that he was not assisted by an independent counsel during the
custodial investigation. Nagares maintains such flaws in the investigation violated his right
guaranteed under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. This provision reads:

Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

 
 

Based on the records, Nagares’ extrajudicial confession was voluntarily given, and thus
admissible. As found by the Court of Appeals, (1) there is no evidence of compulsion or
duress or violence on the person of Nagares; (2) Nagares did not complain to the officers
administering the oath during the taking of his sworn statement; (3) he did not file any
criminal or administrative complaint against his alleged malefactors for maltreatment; (4)
no marks of violence were observed on his body; and (5) he did not have himself examined
by a physician to support his claim. Moreover, appellant’s confession is replete with details,
which makes it highly improbable that it was not voluntarily given.

Likewise negating Nagares’ claim of a coerced confession are the photographs taken during
the signing, thumbmarking, and swearing of the extrajudicial confession. All the pictures
depicted a “cordial and pleasant atmosphere” devoid of any sign of torture, threat, duress or
tension on Nagares’ person. In fact, the photographs showed Nagares smiling.

Further, the records show that Nagares was duly assisted by an effective and independent
counsel during the custodial investigation in the NBI. As found by the Court of Appeals,
after Nagares was informed of his constitutional rights, he was asked by Atty. Esmeralda E.
Galang whether he accepts her as counsel. 7 During the trial, Atty. Galang testified on the
extent of her assistance. According to her, she thoroughly explained to Nagares his
constitutional rights, advised him not to answer matters he did not know, and if he did not
want to answer any question, he may inform Atty. Galang who would be the one to relay
his refusal to the NBI agents. She was also present during the entire investigation.

Moreover, Nagares’ extrajudicial confession was corroborated by evidence of corpus

delicti.8 Corpus delicti has been defined as the body, foundation, or substance of a crime. 9
Here, the fact of death and the criminal
agency had been sufficiently established by the death certificate (Exhibit “F”) and the
medico-legal report (Exhibit “C”) the veracity of which had been affirmed on the witness
stand by the examining physician.10

Based on the foregoing, there is clearly no basis for Nagares’ plea that his extrajudicial
confession should have been excluded from the evidence because it was obtained in
violation of his rights under Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution.
 

Nagares was positively identified as one of the victim’s assailants

Apart from Nagares’ valid extrajudicial confession, the positive identification made by Ruiz
Constantino strengthened the prosecution’s case. During the trial, Constantino identified
Nagares as one of the victims’ assailants, to wit:

ATTY. BLANES:

Q You said you will be able to remember the face of those who shot Avelino Pagalunan, now, if
you see them again, will you be able to identify them?

A Yes, sir.

Q If they are inside the courtroom, will you be able to identify them?

A Yes, sir.

Q Will you please point those who shot Avelino Pagalunan.

INTERPRETER

(witness pointing to a man in the first row wearing orange polo shirt and when asked he
answered by the name of Arturo Nagares)11

xxxx

COURT:

You said that you saw the three (3) person who were shooting the victim and you have
identified one of the assailants a certain Arturo Nagares are the two (2) others inside the
Courtroom?
 A I cannot exactly say because my attention at that time was only with Arturo Nagares.12

Appellants’ attempt to discredit Constantino must fail since there was no showing of any
improper motive on Constantino’s part that would induce him to testify falsely against
Nagares.13 Further, settled is the rule that the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses is generally accorded great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal since the
trial court was in a better position to decide thereon, having personally heard the witnesses
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 14

Nagares’ alibi and denial deserve scant consideration. Well-entrenched is the rule that alibi,
which is inherently weak, cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the
eyewitnesses at the crime scene.15 Here, Constantino positively identified Nagares as one of
the perpetrators of the crime overthrowing the latter’s alibi and denial. More importantly,
Nagares miserably failed to establish the physical impossibility for him to be at the crime
scene at the time of the commission of the felony. Nagares testified that on that fateful day,
he was sleeping in his sister’s house on F. Asedillo Street, Katipunan, Pasig City. He also
claimed that on that day he was treated at Rizal Medical Center. It was not shown that it
was impossible for Nagares to reach and be at the crime scene whether he was coming from
his sister’s residence or from the hospital. Further, the defense failed to present any hospital
record substantiating Nagares’ claim.

Capitle is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder

based on circumstantial evidence

To further establish appellants’ guilt, prosecution witness Paat testified, thus:

Q: What was that incident that took place?

A: I heard successive gun shots.

Q: Now in relation to where you were from what direction did you hear this successive gun
shots?
A: At the corner of St. Jude and Oranbo Drive, sir.

Q: What did you notice, if any at the corner of Oranbo Drive and St. Jude?

A: I saw 4 men coming from the smoke.

Q: More or less, Mr. Witness, could you estimate the distance from where you were to the
corner of Oranbo Drive & St. Jude?

A: More or less 80 meters.

Q: Now, you said, you saw men coming from the corner of Oranbo Drive and St. Jude where
there was smoke, how many men more or less?

A: 4 men, sir.

Q: Where, where they headed to and when you had seen these 4 men coming from that
direction?

A: On their way going to Shaw Blvd.

Q: Did you notice if they were holding something?

xxxx

A: I saw each one of them holding a gun.16

 

xxxx

Q: Now of these 4 men running and holding caliber 45 did you recognize any of them?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: If those whom you recognized is or are inside this court room, will you be able to point to
them?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Will you please point to them, Mr. Witness?

INTERPRETER: Witness pointing to two (2) male persons, one (1) the right wearing an orange
polo who when asked his name answered Arturo Nagares and a man beside him wearing yellow
t-shirt who when asked his name answered Rodolfo Capitle.17

xxxx

Q: How at that time, you take a look at the alleged persons, four (4) persons whom you
allegedly saw holding a gun?

A: More or less one (1) minute.

Q: Could you make an estimate if it is less than one (1) minute.

ATTY. BLANES:

He said more or less your Honor, from the corner of Oranbo Drive and he said more or less.
  

Q: Is it less than one (1) minute?

A: More or less one (1) minute.

Q: And that they were running?

A: Yes sir. Almost on the jogging phase.18

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, there was no direct evidence linking Capitle
to the crime charged, only circumstantial evidence.

Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for

conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

Hence, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of

circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the
guilt of the accused.19

 
Based on Paat’s testimony, there is sufficient circumstantial evidence justifying Capitle’s
conviction. There is more than one circumstance: (1) the victim was gunned down at the
corner of Orambo Drive and St. Jude St., Mandaluyong City; (2) Paat heard several
gunshots coming from that area; (3) Paat saw four men, including Nagares and Capitle,
coming from the corner of Orambo Drive and St. Jude St. and running away towards Shaw
Blvd.; (4) the four men, including Nagares and Capitle, were all carrying guns; and (5)
prosecution witness Constantino saw Nagares, together with several other men, shot the
victim. To the unprejudiced mind, the foregoing circumstances, when analyzed and taken
together, leads to no other conclusion except that of appellants’ culpability for the victim’s
death.20

Modification in the award of damages

When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil
indemnity ex delicto for the victim’s death; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral
damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages. 21

We sustain the award of P50,000 civil indemnity, which is mandatory and granted to the
victim’s heirs without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. 22

For lack of factual basis, we delete the award of actual or compensatory damages. The party
seeking actual damages must produce competent proof or the best evidence obtainable, such
as receipts, to justify an award therefor. 23 No such documents were offered as evidence in
this case. Nevertheless, we award P25,000 as temperate damages when no evidence of
burial or funeral expenses is presented in the trial court. Under Article 2224 of the Civil
Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the victim’s heirs
suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved. 24

While we sustain the award of moral damages, which does not require allegation and proof
other than the victim’s death, we reduce the amount from P100,000 to P50,000 pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence.25

 
Since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was proved in this case, the award of
exemplary damages is proper. However, we reduce the amount of exemplary damages from
P50,000 to P30,000 consistent with prevailing jurisprudence. 26

The award of P30,000 attorney’s fees lacks factual and legal basis and thus must be deleted.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal and AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the 27

January 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01479. We award
temperate damages in the amount of P25,000. The amounts of moral damages and
exemplary damages are reduced to P50,000 and P30,000, respectively. The award of actual
damages and attorney’s fees is deleted.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

 
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 187536

Plaintiff-Appellee,

  Present:

   
CARPIO, J.,
 
Chairperson
BRION,
-versus- BERSAMIN,*
PEREZ, and
  SERENO, JJ.

 
 
Promulgated:
 

   

MICHAEL BOKINGO alias August 10, 2011

“MICHAEL BOKINGCO” and
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

 
 For review is the Amended Decision[1] dated 14 November 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00658, finding appellants Michael Bokingco[2]
(Bokingco) and Reynante Col (Col) guilty as conspirators beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

On 31 July 2000, an Information[3] was filed against appellants charging them of

the crime of murder committed as follows:

 
That on or about the 29th day of February, 2000 in the City of Angeles,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, armed
with a claw hammer and with intent to kill by means of treachery, evident
premeditation, abuse of confidence, and nighttime, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and maul NOLI PASION, by hitting and
beating his head and other parts of his body with said hammer, thereby inflicting upon
said NOLI PASION fatal wounds on his head and body which caused his death.[4]

On arraignment, Bokingco entered a guilty plea while Col pleaded not guilty.
During the pre-trial, Bokingco confessed to the crime charged.[5]

The victim, Noli Pasion (Pasion) and his wife, Elsa, were residing in a house
along Mac Arthur Highway in Balibago, Angeles City. Pasion owned a pawnshop,
which formed part of his house. He also maintained two (2) rows of apartment units at
the back of his house. The first row had six (6) units, one of which is Apartment No. 5
and was being leased to Dante Vitalicio (Vitalicio), Pasion’s brother-in-law, while the
other row was still under construction at the time of his death. Appellants, who were
staying in Apartment No. 3, were among the 13 construction workers employed by
Pasion.[6]
  

The prosecution’s evidence show that at around 1:00 a.m. on 29 February 2000,
Vitalicio was spin-drying his clothes inside his apartment when Pasion came from the
front door, passed by him and went out of the back door.[7] A few minutes later, he
heard a commotion from Apartment No. 3. He headed to said unit to check. He peeped
through a screen door and saw Bokingco hitting something on the floor. Upon seeing
Vitalicio, Bokingco allegedly pushed open the screen door and attacked him with a
hammer in his hand. A struggle ensued and Vitalicio was hit several times. Vitalicio bit
Bokingco’s neck and managed to push him away. Bokingco tried to chase Vitalicio but
was eventually subdued by a co-worker. Vitalicio proceeded to his house and was told
by his wife that Pasion was found dead in the kitchen of Apartment No. 3. Vitalicio
went back to Apartment No. 3 and saw Pasion’s body lying flat on the kitchen floor.
Pasion and Vitalicio were brought to the hospital. Pasion expired a few hours later
while Vitalicio was treated for his injuries.[8]

Elsa testified that she was in the master’s bedroom on the second floor of the
house when she heard banging sounds and her husband’s moans. She immediately got
off the bed and went down. Before reaching the kitchen, Col blocked her way. Elsa
asked him why he was inside their house but Col suddenly ran towards her, sprayed tear
gas on her eyes and poked a sharp object under her chin. Elsa was wounded when she
bowed her head to avoid the tear gas.[9] Col then instructed her to open the vault of the
pawnshop but Elsa informed him that she does not know the combination lock. Elsa
tried offering him money but Col dragged her towards the back door by holding her
neck and pulling her backward. Before they reached the door, Elsa saw Bokingco open
the screen door and heard him tell Col: “tara, patay na siya.”[10] Col immediately let
her go and ran away with Bokingco. Elsa proceeded to Apartment No. 3. Thereat, she
saw her husband lying on the floor, bathed in his own blood.[11]

PO3 Quirino Dayrit (PO3 Dayrit) was stationed at Police Station No. 4 in
Barangay Salakot, Balibago, Angeles City. At 1:20 a.m. of 29 February 2000, he
received a phone call regarding the incident. He, together with a certain P/Insp.
Maniago, proceeded to Apartment No. 3 and conducted an investigation. He noticed a
pool of blood on the cemented floor of the kitchen. He also saw a claw hammer with a
green lead pipe handle approximately 13 inches long near the kitchen sink. A lead pipe
measuring 40 inches and a chisel were also found in the nearby construction site. The
police went to Angeles University Medical Center afterwards. PO3 Dayrit saw Pasion
lying in one of the beds while Vitalicio was still loitering around the emergency room.
He approached Vitalicio and Elsa who both informed him of the incident.[12] He
prepared a police report on the same day narrating the result of his investigation.[13]

Evelyn Gan, the stenographic reporter of Prosecutor Lucina Dayaon, jotted down
notes during the preliminary investigation. She attests that Bokingco admitted that he
conspired with Col to kill Pasion and that they planned the killing several days before
because they got “fed up” with Pasion.[14]

The necropsy report prepared by Dr. Joven G. Esguerra (Dr. Esguerra), contained
the following findings:

 
1.                  Marked pallor of lips and nailbeds
2.                  Body in rigor mortis
 3.                  Contusion with hematoma, right medial infraorbital region extending to the
right of the root of the nose.
4.                  Contusion with hematoma, left post-auricular region.
5.                  Contusion with hematoma, right angle of mandible.
6.                  Contusion with hematoma, right mandibular region.
7.                  Contusion with hematoma, left occipital region.
8.                  Contusion with hematoma, right fronto-parietal region.
9.                  Contusion with hematoma, right supraorbital region.
10.              Abrasions, linear, confluent, proximal third, right leg anterior 2 ½ x 6 ½ cm.
11.              Contusion with hematoma, left shoulder, level of head of left humerus.
12.              Stab wound, anterior chest along the anterior median line, 7 cm above the nipple
line, 0.8cm length, 0.5 cm wide and 1 cm deep, hitting and puncturing the
manubrium sterni, not entering the thoracic cavity. Both extremities round.
13.              2 stab wounds, non-penetrating, anterior chest, 13 cm to the left of the anterior
median line, 3 cm below injury (12) 14 cm the right of the anterior median line 4
½ on below injury (12). Wound 0.8 cm in length, both extremities round.
14.              Lacerated wound, semi-lunar shape, 3 cm length, left shoulder.
15.              Lacerated wound, right eyebrow area, C-shaped 2 ½ cm length.
16.              Lacerated wound, lateral angle, right eye, 0.8 cm length.
17.              Lacerated wound, right supraorbital region, medial aspect, 2 cm length.
18.              Lacerated wound, semi-lunar, 5 cm length, occipital region 5 cm length
involving all layers of the scalp with brain tissue seen on the gaping wound.
19.              Lacerated wound, 4 cm length, C-shaped 2 ½ cm to the right of injury (18) 1 ½
cm below, wound involving the whole scalp.
20.              Lacerated wound, left post-auricular region, C-shaped 4 cm length, 3 cm length.
21.              Lacerated wound left post-auricular region, region of the squamous part of the
left temporal bone, C-shaped (2) 3.5 cm and 4 cm lengths.
22.              Lacerated wound, right mandibular region 4 cm length, 1 cm wide.
23.              Lacerated wound, stellate, 5.5 x 5 x 5 cm, right fronto-parietal region with brain
tissue out of the gaping wound.
24.              Lacerated wound, right submandibular region 0.3 x 3.5 cm.
25.              Lacerated wound, right cheek 0.8 cm length.
26.              Depressed, complete fracture, occipital bone right with stellate linear
extensions, with gaping, with brain tissue maseration.
27.              Skull fracture, right fronto-parietal region, depressed, complete, C-shaped with
linear extensions, with gaping of bone with brain tissue maceration and
expulsion.
28.              Hemorrhage, massive, subdural and epidural.
29.              Brain tissue damage.[15]
 

Dr. Esguerra concluded that the injuries sustained by Pasion on his skull proved
fatal.[16]

 
 Appellants testified on their own behalf. Bokingco recalled that he was sleeping
in Apartment No. 3 at around 1:20 a.m. on 29 February 2000 when he was awakened by
Pasion who appeared to be intoxicated. The latter wanted to know why he did not see
Bokingco at the construction site on 28 February 2000. When Bokingco replied that he
just stayed at the apartment the whole day, Pasion suddenly hit him in the head. This
prompted Bokingco to take a hammer and hit Pasion. They both struggled and
Bokingco repeatedly hit Pasion. Bokingco escaped to Manila right after the incident.
He was subsequently arrested in Mindanao on 11 June 2000.[17] During the cross-
examination, Bokingco admitted that he harbored ill feelings towards Pasion.[18]

Col confirmed that he was one of the construction workers employed by Pasion.
He however resigned on 26 February 2000 because of the deductions from his salary.
He went home to Cainta, Rizal, where he was apprehended and brought to Camp Olivas.
Upon reaching the camp, he saw Bokingco who pointed to him as the person who killed
Pasion. He insisted that he doesn’t know Bokingco very well.[19]

On 16 December 2004, the trial court rendered judgment[20] finding appellants

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, viz:

 
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused MICHAEL BOKINGO alias
MICHAEL BOKINGCO and REYNANTE COL guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and
there being the two aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence to
be considered against both accused and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of
guilty in favor of accused Bokingo only, hereby sentences each of them to suffer the
penalty of DEATH. Each accused is ordered to indemnify the heirs of victim Noli
Pasion in the amount of Seventy five thousand pesos (P75,000.00) to pay the heirs of the
victim Seventeen thousand six hundred pesos (P17,600.00) as actual damages, Fifteen
 thousand pesos (P15,000.00) as attorney’s fees, Twenty five thousand pesos
(P25,000.00) as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.[21]

In its Decision dated 24 July 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of
the trial court but reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua in view of Republic Act No.
7659, thus:

 
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Accused-appellant REYNANTE COL is found GUILTY as conspirator beyond
reasonable doubt of MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation
and with the attendant aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence,
with no mitigating circumstances. The proper imposable penalty would have been
death. However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, appellant is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Accused-appellant is further ordered to indemnify the
heirs of victim Noli Pasion in the amount of Seventy five thousand pesos (P75,000.00);
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages; Twenty five thousand pesos
(P25,000.00) as exemplary damages; Twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as
temperate damages; Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) as attorney’s fees; and to pay
the costs.[22]

Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration[23] and called the appellate court’s
attention on the omission to rule on Bokingco’s fate when it rendered the challenged
decision. Appellants also noted the absence of other evidence, aside from Bokingco’s
admission, to prove that conspiracy existed in the instant case. Appellants maintained
that the admission made by Bokingco cannot be used as evidence against his alleged co-
conspirator. Appellants also took exception to the findings of the lower courts that the
aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, nighttime and abuse of
confidence attended the commission of the crime.[24]

 
 The Court of Appeals merely modified its Decision by including the criminal
liability of Bokingco in its dispositive portion of its Amended Decision, which reads:

 
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Accused-appellants MICHAEL BOKINGCO and REYNANTE COL are found
GUILTY as conspirators beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER as defined in Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by
treachery and evident premeditation and with the attendant aggravating circumstances of
nighttime and abuse of confidence, with no mitigating circumstances. The proper
imposable penalty would have been death. However, pursuant to Republic Act No.
9346, the accused-appellant are sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
without the possibility of parole (in accordance with Section 3 of the said law). Each of
the accused-appellants is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of victim Noli Pasion in
the amount of Seventy five thousand pesos (P75,000.00); Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages; Twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary
damages; Twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate damages; Fifteen
thousand pesos (P15,000.00) as attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs.[25]
 
 
Appellants filed a notice of appeal. In its Resolution dated 26 October 2009, this
Court required the parties to submit their Supplemental Briefs within 30 days from
notice thereof if they so desire.[26] Appellants manifested that they are no longer filing a
Supplemental Brief and are adopting their arguments in the Appellant’s Brief submitted
before the Court of Appeals.[27] The appellee likewise manifested that it is dispensing
with the filing of a Supplemental Brief. [28] The instant case was thus submitted for
deliberation.

In seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals’ Amended Decision, two issues
were raised: 1) whether the qualifying circumstances were properly appreciated to
convict appellant Bokingco of murder and 2) whether appellant Col is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator.
 
 There is no question that Bokingco attacked and killed Pasion. Bokingco made
two (2) separate and dissimilar admissions: first, in his extrajudicial confession taken
during the preliminary investigation where he admitted that he and Col planned the
killing of Pasion; and second, when he testified in open court that he was only provoked
in hitting Pasion back when the latter hit him in the head. On the basis of his
extrajudicial confession, Bokingco was charged for murder qualified by evident
premeditation and treachery.
 
Appellants maintain that they could not be convicted of murder. They question
the presence of treachery in the commission of the crime considering that no one from
the prosecution witnesses testified on how Pasion was attacked by Bokingco. They also
submit that evident premeditation was not proven in the case. They belittle Bokingco’s
extrajudicial admission that he and Col planned the killing. The attendance of the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence was likewise assailed
by appellants. They aver that nighttime was not purposely sought but it was merely co-
incidental that the crime took place at that time. Neither has trust and confidence been
reposed on appellants by the victim to aggravate the crime by abuse of confidence.
Appellants claim that they were living in an apartment owned by Pasion, not because the
latter trusted them but because they worked in the construction of the victim’s
apartment.
 
On the other hand, the OSG emphasizes that the prosecution has established that
Pasion was defenseless when fatally attacked by Bokingco and there was no opportunity
for him to defend himself from the unexpected assaults of Bokingco. The OSG agrees as
well with the trial court’s findings that evident premeditation, nighttime, and abuse of
confidence attended the commission of the crime.
 
 We agree with appellants that treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify the crime
to murder in the absence of any proof of the manner in which the aggression was
commenced. For treachery to be appreciated, the prosecution must prove that at the time
of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and that the offender
consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him.
[29] Nobody witnessed the commencement and the manner of the attack. While the
witness Vitalicio managed to see Bokingco hitting something on the floor, he failed to
see the victim at that time.[30]
 
Bokingco admitted in open court that he killed Pasion.[31] But the admitted
manner of killing is inconsistent with evident premeditation. To warrant a finding of
evident premeditation, the prosecution must establish the confluence of the following
requisites: (a) the time when the offender was determined to commit the crime; (b) an
act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient
interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him
to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[32] It is indispensable to show how and
when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried
out. [33] In the instant case, no proof was shown as to how and when the plan to kill
was devised. Bokingco admitted in court that he only retaliated when Pasion allegedly
hit him in the head.[34] Despite the fact that Bokingco admitted that he was treated
poorly by Pasion, the prosecution failed to establish that Bokingco planned the attack.
 
It was during the preliminary investigation that Bokingco mentioned his and Col’s
plan to kill Pasion.[35] Bokingco’s confession was admittedly taken without the
assistance of counsel in violation of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides:
 
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
 and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.
 
xxxx
 
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
 
In People v. Sunga,[36] we held that “the right to counsel applies in certain
pretrial proceedings that can be deemed ‘critical stages’ in the criminal process. The
preliminary investigation can be no different from the in-custody interrogations by the
police, for a suspect who takes part in a preliminary investigation will be subjected to no
less than the State's processes, oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of pursuing those
who might be liable for criminal prosecution.”[37] In said case, Sunga made an
uncounselled admission before the police. He later acknowledged the same admission
before the judge in a preliminary investigation. Sunga was thrust into the preliminary
investigation and while he did have a counsel, for the latter’s lack of vigilance and
commitment to Sunga’s rights, he was virtually denied his right to counsel. Thus, the
uncounselled admission was held inadmissible.[38] In the instant case, the extrajudicial
confession is inadmissible against Bokingco because he was not assisted at all by
counsel during the time his confession was taken before a judge.
 
The finding that nighttime attended the commission of the crime is anchored on
the presumption that there was evident premeditation. Having ruled however that
evident premeditation has not been proved, the aggravating circumstance of nighttime
cannot be properly appreciated. There was no evidence to show that Bokingco
purposely sought nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.
 
Abuse of confidence could not also be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance
in this case. Taking into account that fact that Bokingco works for Pasion, it may be
conceded that he enjoyed the trust and confidence of Pasion. However, there was no
showing that he took advantage of said trust to facilitate the commission of the crime.
 
A downgrade of conviction from murder to homicide is proper for Bokingco for
failure of the prosecution to prove the presence of the qualifying circumstances.
 
Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the applicable penalty for homicide
is reclusion temporal. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance alleged
and proven in the instant case, the penalty should be applied in its medium period
pursuant to Article 64(1) of the Revised Penal Code, which ranges from a minimum of
14 years, 8 months and 1 day to a maximum of 17 years and 4 months. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty shall be within the range of prision
mayor in any of its periods as minimum to reclusion temporal in its medium period as
the maximum. The range of prision mayor is from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years, while
reclusion temporal in its medium period, ranges from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17
years and 4 months. Therefore, the indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of
prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal,
as maximum is appropriate under the circumstances.[39] The award of exemplary
damages should be deleted as no aggravating circumstance was proven.
 
Col, on the other hand, was charged as a co-conspirator. He contends that to hold
him guilty as co-conspirator, it must be established that he performed an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy. Applying Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, Col
asserts that Bokingco’s uncounselled testimony that appellants planned to kill Pasion
bears no relevance considering the fact that there was no other evidence which will
prove the conspiracy. Col also claims that Elsa’s statements during trial, such as the
presence of Col inside her house and his forcing her to open the vault of the pawnshop,
as well as the alleged statement she heard from Bokingco “Tara, patay na siya,” are not
adequate to support the finding of conspiracy.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) justifies Col’s conviction of murder by
conspiracy by mentioning that starting from the declaration of Bokingco, the victim’s
wife, Elsa, also positively declared that Col blocked and attacked her with a knife when
she tried to check on her husband. She was left alone by Col when he was told by
Bokingco that the victim was already dead. For the OSG, appellants’ acts are indicative
of conspiracy. The OSG contends that the prosecution witnesses had no ill-motive to lie
and falsely accuse appellants of the crime of murder.
 
The lower courts concluded that there was conspiracy between appellants.
 
We disagree.
 
This Court is well aware of the policy to accord proper deference to the factual
findings of the trial court, owing to their unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination.[40]
However, this rule admits of exceptions, namely: 1) when the trial court’s findings of
facts and conclusions are not supported by the evidence on record, or 2) when certain
facts of substance and value likely to change the outcome of the case have been
overlooked by the lower court, or 3) when the assailed decision is based on a
misapprehension of facts.[41] The second exception obtains in this case.
 
Indeed, in order to convict Col as a principal by direct participation in the case
before us, it is necessary that conspiracy between him and Bokingco be proved.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit an
unlawful act. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and
after the commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused
evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
interest.[42] Unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are
essential to establish the existence of conspiracy.[43]
 
As a rule, conspiracy must be established with the same quantum of proof as the
crime itself and must be shown as clearly as the commission of the crime.[44]
 
The finding of conspiracy was premised on Elsa’s testimony that appellants fled
together after killing her husband and the extrajudicial confession of Bokingco.
 
Nobody witnessed the commencement of the attack. Col was not seen at the
apartment where Pasion was being attacked by Bokingco. In fact, he was at Elsa’s
house and allegedly ordering her to open the pawnshop vault, thus:
 
Q: Do you remember any unusual incident that happened on that time and date
when you were in your master’s bedroom?
 
A: I heard a bumping sound (kalabog) at the back portion of our building where we
reside.
 
xxxx
 
Q: What did you do when you heard those sounds in the wee hours of the morning
on that day when you were in your master’s bedroom?
 
A: I wondered why and I immediately went down to the kitchen since the door of
the kitchen was directly leading to the back door or back portion of the building
where the apartments were situated.
 
Q: Why, on what floor is this master’s bedroom located?
 
A: Second floor.
 
Q: Were you actually able to go down and see what was happening?
 
A: Yes, sir, but I was only able to reach the stairs leading to the kitchen. I was not
able to go out of the kitchen because I was blocked.
 
Q: You were blocked by whom?
 
A: By Reynante Col.
 
Q: Are you referring to the same Reynante Col, the accused in this case?
 
A: Yes, sir.
 
xxxx
 
Q: You said you were blocked by Reynante Col. How did he block you?
 
A: As soon as I reached the stairs, I was blocked by Reynante Col and he was
situated near the back door of the pawnshop. There is a pawnshop in the front
portion of our residence.
 
Q: When you saw him near the door of your pawnshop, did you confront him?
 
A: Yes, sir.
 
Q: How did you confront him?
 
A: I asked him, Reynante, what are you doing here?
 
Q: What was the reaction of Reynante Col?
 
A: He ran towards me and sprayed something into my eyes and he put a sharp
object under my chin. (Witness demonstrating by putting her hand under her
chin)
 
Q: How far was he before he attacked you?
 
A: Probably, from the witness stand up to the chair of Fiscal Hilario. Maybe two
steps away from him. (Around 3 meters)
 
Q: Were you able to identify what this spray is and what part of your body was hit?
 
A: My eyes were sprayed with tear gas.
 
Q: What did you feel when your eyes was (sic) sprayed with tear gas?
 
A: It was “mahapdi” (painful).
 
Q: When you felt pain in your eyes, how were you able to see something or a sharp
weapon under your chin?
 
 A: Before he sprayed the tear gas to my eyes, I was able to see him poke the sharp
object under my chin and I bowed my head a little to avoid the tear gas. I was
wounded under my chin and I felt the sharpness of the object.[45]
 
xxxx
 
Q: What else happened while he was doing that to you?
 
A: He sprayed tear gas in my eyes and told me to be silent.
 
Q: What else, if any, did he tell you?
 
A: To open the combination of the vault.
 
Q: Did you comply to his order that you open the combination of the vault?
 
A: No, sir. I do not know the combination.
 
Q: What vault are you referring to?
 
A: Vault of the pawnshop.
 
Q: Where is that pawnshop located with reference to your residence?
 
A: At the first floor is the pawnshop and at the back is our kitchen.
 
Q: When you refused to open the vault of the pawnshop, what did Reynante Col do
about it?
 
A: He did not say anything.
 
Q: How about you, was there anything else you did?
 
A: I offered him money so he will not kill me.
 
Q: When you offered him money so he will not kill you, did he agree?
 
A: No, sir.
 
Q: What else happened next when he did not agree to your offer of money?
 
A: He dragged me going towards the back door.[46]
 
 
Based on these acts alone, it cannot be logically inferred that Col conspired with
Bokingco in killing Pasion. At the most, Col’s actuations can be equated to attempted
robbery, which was actually the initial information filed against appellants before it was
amended, on motion of the prosecution, for murder.[47]
 
Elsa testified that she heard Bokingco call out to Col that Pasion had been killed
and that they had to leave the place. This does not prove that they acted in concert
towards the consummation of the crime. It only proves, at best, that there were two
crimes committed simultaneously and they were united in their efforts to escape from
the crimes they separately committed.
 
Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco had
already killed Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves were not coordinated
because while Bokingco was killing Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was
attempting to rob the pawnshop.
 
In as much as Bokingco’s extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against him, it
is likewise inadmissible against Col, specifically where he implicated the latter as a
cohort. Under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another. Res inter alios acta alteri
nocere non debet. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the
confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused, and is considered as hearsay
against them.[48] An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by
a conspirator. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act or
declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator provided that the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than by such act or declaration.[49] In order that the admission of a
conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that first,
the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; second, the
admission relates to the common object; and third, it has been made while the declarant
was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.[50] As we have previously discussed, we
did not find any sufficient evidence to establish the existence of conspiracy. Therefore,
the extrajudicial confession has no probative value and is inadmissible in evidence
against Col.
 
Bokingco’s judicial admission exculpated Col because Bokingco admitted that he
only attacked Pasion after the latter hit him in the head.
 
All told, an acquittal for Col is in order because no sufficient evidence was
adduced to implicate him.
 
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00658 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant
Reynante Col is ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt. The Bureau of
Corrections is ordered to cause the immediate release of accused-appellant, unless he is
being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court of action taken within ten
(10) days from notice.
Appellant Michael Bokingco is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Homicide. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six years (6) and one
(1) day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum Appellant is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of
Noli Pasion in the amount of Seventy five thousand pesos (P75,000.00); Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages; Twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as
temperate damages; Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) as attorney’s fees; and to pay
the costs.
 
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Januario, 267 SCRA 608 , G.R. No. 98252 February 07, 1997

G.R. No. 98252 February 7, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RENE JANUARIO y ROLDAN, EFREN CANAPE y BAYOT, ELISEO SARITA @ TOTO, EDUARDO SARINOS
and SANTIAGO CID, accused.
RENE JANUARIO Y ROLDAN and EFREN CANAPE y BAYOT, accused-appellants.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The 1987 Constitution was crafted and ordained at a historic time when our nation was reeling from
ghastly memories of atrocities, excesses and outright violations of our people's rights to life, liberty
and property. Hence, our bill of rights was worded to emphasize the sanctity of human liberty and
specifically to protect persons undergoing custodial investigations from ignorant, overzealous and/or
incompetent peace officers. The Constitution so dearly values freedom and voluntariness that, inter
alia, it unequivocally guarantees a person undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense
not only the services of counsel, but a lawyer who is not merely (a) "competent" but also (b)
"independent" and (c) "preferably of his own choice" as well.
In the case before us, the main evidence relied upon for the conviction of appellants was their own
extrajudicial confessions which admittedly were extracted and signed in the presence and with the
assistance of a lawyer who was applying for work in the NBI. Such counsel cannot in any wise be
considered "independent" because he cannot be expected to work against the interest of a police
agency he was hoping to join, as a few months later he in fact was admitted into its work force. For
this violation of their constitutional right to independent counsel, appellants deserve acquittal. After
the exclusion of their tainted confessions, no sufficient and credible evidence remains in the Court's
records to overturn another constitutional right: the right to be presumed innocent of any crime until
the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
This is an appeal from the Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch XVIII in Tagaytay City,
disposing of Criminal Case No. TG-l392-89, viz.:
WHEREFORE, and premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused:
(1) RENE JANUARIO Y ROLDAN
- and -
(2) EFREN CANAPE Y BAYOT
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Sec. 14 last sentence of R.A. No. 6539,
otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Law and as charged against them in the Information and
pursuant to the said law, this Court hereby imposes upon the said accused, the supreme penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua or life imprisonment.
Further, they are ordered to pay jointly and severally, but separately, the heirs of their victims,
namely, Geronimo Malibago and Andrew Patriarca, Jr., the sums of:
(a) P50,000.00 for moral damages
(b) P50,000.00 for exemplary damages;
(c) P25,000.00 for actual damages
and to pay the costs of this proceeding.
There being no evidence to warrant a finding of conviction beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is
hereby rendered ACQUITTING Accused SANTIAGO CID of the crime charged. Being a detention
prisoner, the City Warden of Tagaytay City is hereby ordered to immediately release said person from
his prison cell, unless he is therein detained for any other cause.
SO ORDERED.
The Antecedents
On November 7, 1988, an Information signed by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose M. Velasco, Jr., was
filed against accused-appellants Rene Januario and Efren Canape, and their co-accused Santiago Cid,
Eliseo Sarita @ Toto and Eduardo Sarinos @ Digo charging them with violation of Republic Act No.
6539 (Anti-Carnapping Law) 2 allegedly commited as follows:
That on or about September 4, 1987, at Barangay Bulihan, Municipality of Silang, Province of Cavite,
the above-named accused, together with Eliseo Sarita @ Toto and Eduardo Sarinos who (sic) still at-
large, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain,
by means of force, violence and intimidation; did, then and there, willfully (sic), unlawfully and
feloniously, after stabbing to death the driver Gernonimo (sic) Malibago and conductor Andrew
Patriarca, take, steal and carry away and carnap, one Isuzu passenger type jeepney, with plate No.
DFB- 550, owned by Doris and Victor Wolf, to their damage and prejudice in the total amount of
P124,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
Arraigned on February 7, 1989, appellants Januario and Canape, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded
not guilty. 4 On May 30, 1989, Cid, assisted by counsel de parte, likewise entered a plea of not guilty. 5
Sarita and Sarinos remained at large. At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses:
Myrna Temporas, NBI Agent Arlis S. Vela, Vicente Dilanco Pons, Andrew Patriarca, Sr., Juliana
Malibago, Atty. Magno Toribio, and Atty. Carlos Saunar, documentary and other evidence tending to
prove the following:
Sometime in March 1988, Santiago Cid went to the house of prosecution witness Vicente Dilanco
Pens, a farmer engaged in the buy and sell business, in Camarines Sur. Cid, Pens' cousin, asked Pens if
he wanted to buy a jeepney. Pons replied that he had no money but that he could help him find a
buyer for the jeepney for the price of P50,000.00. With Amador Alayan, one of the drivers of his son
who was around, Pons offered to look for a buyer of the jeepney provided that Cid would entrust the
vehicle to them. Cid agreed to the proposal. At that time, Pens did not know who owned the jeepney,
but he eventually offered it for sale to Myrna Temporas who agreed to the purchase price of
P65,000.00. However, Temporas paid Pens only the amount of P48,500.00. 6
Myrna Temporas had a slightly different story. According to her, Pons said that the jeepney was
owned by his niece, Doris Wolf. Pons, purportedly acting upon the instructions of Doris Wolf,
borrowed from Myrna Temporas the amount of P48,500.00 and used the jeepney as a collateral. The
amount was given to Pens in P10,000.00 cash and the balance in a check payable to Doris Wolf. The
check was encashed as it was cleared from Myrna Temporas' account. It bore a signature supposedly
of Doris Wolf at its back portion and a second endorsement by Pons who subsequently deposited it in
his account.
On September 11, Temporas asked Pons to secure a special power of attorney from Doris Wolf. Pens
promised to comply in one or two weeks. But Pens failed to pay the indebtedness. So, Myrna
Temporas repeatedly went to his house in Digmaan, Camarines Sur to collect the amount borrowed
but Pons always promised that he himself would go to her house to pay. 7
Inasmuch as Pons also failed to produce a deed of sale covering the jeepney, Temporas lodged a
complaint against him for estafa before the NBI. 8 Acting on the complaint, the NBI contacted the
relatives of the owner of the jeepney who went to Camarines Sur, identified the jeepney and
informed the NBI that its driver (deceased Geronimo Malibago) and conductor (deceased Andrew
Patriarca, Jr.) had been killed by carnappers. 9
Patriarca's widow also filed a complaint with the NBI. Upon investigation, an NBI team led by
Supervising Agent Magno Toribio found out that the carnapping of the jeepney and the killing of
Patriarca and Malibago were the "handiwork" of a group of four (4) persons named Rene Januario,
Efren Canape, Eliseo Sarita alias Tote, and Eduardo Sarinos alias Digo. The team also discovered that
the jeepney was disposed of through Cid. 10
Appellants Januario and Canape, as well as Cid, were arrested in Camarines Sur. The NBI then invited
Pons and Temporas to shed light on the carnapping incident. The jeepney was recovered in an auto
shop with its engine partly dismantled. Upon being informed by the NBI that the jeepney had been
found, an insurance company brought it back to Manila.
From the "oral investigation" they conducted at the Naga City NBI office on March 27, 1988, the team
learned that Sarita and Sarinos took Patriarca and Malibago inside a sugar plantation where
presumably they were killed. Because appellants volunteered that their companions were their
neighbors in Paliparan, Dasmarinas, Cavite who could be in Manila already, the NBI team decided to
take down their statements at the NBI head office in Manila. The team traveled with appellants to
Manila, arriving there at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of March 28, 1988.
At the Taft Avenue head office of the NBI, the team took the statements of appellants one at a time.
They asked Atty. Carlos Saunar, who was "just around somewhere," to assist appellants during the
investigation Agent Arlis Vela took the: statement of appellant Januario while Supervising Agent
Toribio took that of Canape. The first portion of the statement, Exhibit C, taken from appellant
Januario reads:
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NA IBINIGAY NI RENE JANUARIO Y ROLDAN SA HARAP NI NBI AGENT ARLIS E.
VELA NGAYONG IKA-28 NG MARSO 1988 SA NBI, NCR, MANILA.
TANONG Mr. RENE JANUARIO ipina-aalam namin sa iyo na ikaw ay aming inuusig sa salang pagnakaw
ng isang jeepney at pagkapatay sa driver at conductor nito. Gusto naming malaman mo na ikaw ay
hindi maaring pilitin na magbigay ng salaysay at kong (sic) sakaling magbibigay ka ng salaysay, ano
mang sasabihin mo rito ay pueding (sic) gamitin laban sa iyo sa ano mang caso. Nauunawaan mo ba
ito?
SAGOT Naiintiendihan (sic) ko.
T Kailangan mo ba ang tulong ng abogado sa ipagtatanong na ito?
S Magsalaysay (sic) lang ako nag-may abogado ako.
T May abogado ka ba sa ngayon?
S Mayroon no si Atty. CARLOS SAUNAR ay nandito para tulongan (sic) ako.
T Nanunumpa ka na magsasabi ng katotohanan, buong katotohanan at wala ng iba kungdi
katotohanan lamang sa nagtatanong na ito?
S Opo.
T Sabihin mo ang iyong pangalan at iba-ibang bagay tungkol sa iyong pagkatao?
S RENE JANUARIO y ROLDAN, 26 taong gulang, binata, isang (sic) buy and sell hanapbuhay at
naninirahan sa Puro Batya, Libmanan, Camarines Sur.
xxx xxx xxx 11
According to appellant Januario, two weeks before September 1987, he was already in the house of
appellant Canape in Bgy. Palapala, Dasmarinas, Cavite to procure chicken and "kalawit" for his
business. He also went there because his new friends named Toto Sarita and Digo Samera (sic), as well
as appellant Canape, wanted him to look for a buyer of a jeep. Appellant Januario asked for a
photograph of the jeep to assist him in making a canvass of buyers in Bicol but he was told that he
would have it later at night because they were then having drinks in the house of Toto.
After that drinking spree, the group agreed to fetch appellants Januario and Canape at 4:00 o'clock
the following morning. It was Digo Samera who fetched appellants before they went to the house of
Tote Sarita. Together, they went to GMA town in Cavite. It was around 5:00 o'clock in the morning
when they hailed a jeep from the "looban." There after, the following allegedly transpired:
T Ano na ang nangyari noong kayo ay sumakay sa jeep?
S Ako ang naunang sumakay pagtigil noong jeep. Bago maka-alis ang jeep nagsalita si TOTO SARITA na
nasa baba pa kasama sina EFREN CANAPE at DIGO na 'HINTAY ka muna may naiwanan pa ako.
Sumakay si Digo sa tapat ng conductor na nasa loob ng jeep samantalang si TOTO ay pumuesto sa
bandang kanan sa unahan ng jeep at si EFREN ay sa bandang kaliwa rin ng jeep tapat ng driver at
sabay si EFREN at TOTO na sumakay sa unahan ng jeep at mabilis na tinulak ni EFREN ang driver
patungo kay TOTO na siyang tumutok, (sic) sa driver ng isang sandata balisong 29. Habang nangyayari
iyon ay tinutukan naman ni DIGO na nasa loob ng jeep ang conductor na pinasubsub ang ulo habang
tinutukan ng 29. Ang sabi sa akin ni DIGO ay "REN igapos mo ito" at inabutan niya ako ng isang
panyong panali. Sa aking kabiglaanan ako ay napasunod at tinali ko iyong conductor.
T Ano na ang sumunod na nangyari matapos matalian mo ang conductor?
S Napansin ko na lang na maneho na ni TOTO Sarita ang jeep na kanyang pinasibad habang ang driver
ay nakatali na rin at ako naman ay sinabihan ni DIGO na hawakan iyong conductor sa balikat habang
tinutukan no patalim ni DIGO. Ang conductor ay nagsasalita na siya ay nasasaktan dahil nakatusok na
ang patalim sa kanyang leeg o batok.
T Ano ang nangyari matapos na matutukan ang conductor at driver at habang nagmamaneho Si
TOTO?
S Mula sa lugar na iyon pagkaraan ng ilang minuto ay biglang iniliko sa isang-maliit na lupang kalsada
na napapaligiran ng tubo at talahib at doon ay hininto ang sasakyan:
T Ano na ang sumonod (sic) na nangyari sa lugar na iyon matapos na maihinto ang jeep?
S Unang bumaba po ay si TOTO na hawak ang driver pababa at itinulak ang driver sa may tobohan
(sic). Si EFREN ay sumonod (sic) hanggang sa may gilid ng karsada' habang si TOTO ay tuloy sa tobohan
(sic) na dala ang driver. Si DIGO naman ay tinulak ang conductor hawak-hawak sa buhok at ang sabi
naman sa akin ay hawakan ko ang balikat. Kinuha sa akin ang conductor ni DIGO at dinala sa may
tubuhan (sic) at akin na lang narinig na ang pag-ungol no conductor dahil malapit lang iyon sa
sasakyan.
T Nakikita mo ba sila DIGO at ang conductor habang siya ay umuungol?
S Hindi ko na po nakita kasi nasa tubohan na.
T Sila TOTO at ang driver nasaan sila habang naririnig mong umuungol ang conductor?
S Pumasok po sa tubohan hindi ko na sila makita.
T Ano na ang nangyari matapos na dalhin ni TOTO ang driver at ni DIGO naman ang conductor sa
tobohan (sic)?
S Mga ilang minuto lang po ay bumalik na sila sa sasakyan at kami sumakay na at si TOTO ang
nagmaneho ng sasakyan at tuloy-tuloy na kami sa Bikol, sa Libmanan, Camarines Sur.
T Noong kayo ay umalis sa tubohan na iyon, nasaan na noon ang driver at ang conductor?
S Wala na no.
T May napansin ka ba kina DIGO at TOTO noong sila ay sumakay sa jeep galing sa tubuhan (sic)?
S Humihingal sila po na parang pagod at napansin ko na may dugo ang kamay ni DIGO at ang damit at
pantalon naman ni TOTO ay may tilamsik (sic) ng dugo.
xxx xxx xxx 12
Appellant Januario described the driver as more than fifty years old, Of medium build, and with gray
hair and a fine nose. Upon reaching Libmanan, they went directly to Santiago Cid with whom
appellant Januario had earlier conferred regarding the sale of the jeep. Appellant Januario did nor
know to whom the jeep was sold but he knew that Cid approached Vicente Pens. The latter gave
appellant Januario P1,000 cash and rice and eggs worth around P600. A second jeep was brought by
Tote and Digo to
Roger Abajero. Cid brought both appellants to the house of Roger. Later, the jeep was impounded at
the NBI Naga City office.
Appellant Januario signed and thumbmarked his statement which was sworn before NBI Executive
Director Salvador R. Ranin. It was also Signed by Atty. Carlos Saunar "as counsel."
Appellant Canape's sworn statement, Exhibit I, was taken by Atty. Magno V. Toribio, a supervising NBI
Agent. Quoted in full, the statement reads:
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NI (BINIGAY NI EFREN CANAPE y BAYOT KAY AGENTS MAGNO V. TORIBIO
AND TOMAS C. ENRILE MGA AHENTE NG NBI DITO SA NCR, NBI, MANILA, NGAYONG IKA 27 NG
MARSO 1988.
1. TANONG Ginoong EFREN CANAPE y BAYOT, ikaw ay aming iniimbistigahan ngayon tungkol sa
pagnanakaw ing isang Izuzu (sic) type jitney sa Silang, Cavite sa pagkamatay ng conductor nito noong
buwan ng Septembyre (sic) 1988. Bago ka namin tanungin aming ipinaalam sa iyo ang iyong mga
karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang Batas. Una, ikaw ay may karapatan na huwag magbigay ng salaysay sa
imbistigasyon na ito, at manahimik. Ano mang sabihin mo dito ay puweding gamitin laban sa iyo sa
asunto Kriminal o civil. Ikalawa ikaw ay may karapatan na kumuha ng iyong abogado upang tulungan
ka saimbistigasyon na ito. At kung gusto mo pero wala kang pambayad sa sirbesyon (sic) nito, ikaw ay
bibigyan ng NBI ng libre. Matapos mong malaman ang iyong mga karapatan, ikaw ba ay nakahandang
magbigay ng kusang loob na salaysay?
ANSWER Opo, sir.
T Kung ganoon sabihin mo ang iyong buong pangalan, tirahan at iba pang mga bagay-bagay na
pweding pagkakakilalanan sa sa iyong pagkatao?
S Ako is EFREN CANAPE y BAYOT, 31 anyos and idad (sic), kasal kay AIDA ROLDAN, isang mag-sasaka
(sic) nakatapos ng ika-limang baitang sa elementarya, at at sa kasalukuyan ay naninirahan sa Bgy.
Sibuho, Libmanan, Camarines Sur.
T Ikaw ba ay may nalalaman sa pagkanakaw ng isang Malaguena type type Jeepney sa Bulihan, Silang,
Cavite noong buwan ng Septyembre 1988?
S Opo, sir.
T Kung ganoon sabihin mo sa mga imbistigador na ito kung paano ang buong pangyayari?
S Kasi nung (sic) minsan ako ay mapasyal sa Bgy. Crossing, sakop ng Dasmarinas, Cavite noong mga
buwan ng Agosto 1987 kami ay nagkita ng aking aking Kaibigan na si 'TOTO' SARETA at ang kanyang
kasama na si DIGO (complete name unknown) at ako ay kanyang sinabihan na humanap ng buyer ng
isang jeep. Kaya, ng (sic) ako ay umuwi na ng Libaman, Camarines Sur ako ay humanap (sic) ng taong
interesado na bumili ng nasabing Jeep, katulung si RENE JANUARIO na taga bayan ng Libmanan. Ang
aming nakitang interesado sa jeep ay si SANTIAGO CID. Kaya ang aming ginawa ni RENE ay bumalik sa
Bgy. Crossing, Dasmarinas, Cavite para ipaalam kina TOTO SARETA na kami ay nakakuha na ng buyer.
Ng gabing yaon na kami ay dumating kami ay niyaya nina TOTO na mag inuman at habang kami ay
nag-iinuman sinabi ni TOTO na may makukuha na kami na jeep. Mga bandang alas kuwatro ng
madaling araw, kami ay niyaya na nlna TOTO na kunin na ang jeep. Kami ay lumakad na papuntang
Bulihan Silang, Cavite, Pagdatlng namin doon, kami ay naghintay ng mga ilang minuto. Ng (sic)
dumaan ang isang Jeep na wala pang (sic) pasahero, ito ay pinara ni DIGO at kami ay sumakay. Mga
ilang minuto naman lumipas habang ang diyep (sic) ay tumatakbo papuntang Alabang ay naglabas ng
patalim sin TOTO at DIGO at tinutukan ang driver at ang kundoktor. Tapos kami ni RENE ay sinabihan
(sic) din nila na maglabas ng patalim at tutukan din ang driver at ang kundoktor (sic). Pagdating namin
sa Bgy. Maguyam, sakop din ng Silang sapilitang (sic) ibinaba nina TOTO, DIGO at RENE ang driver at
ang kundoktor (sic) at dinala sa loob ng tubuhan. Ako ay naiwan sa loob ng jeep. Hindi naman
natagalan ay lumabas na ang tatlo galing sa loob ng tubuhan, hindi na kasama ang driver at and
kundoktor (sic). Tapos, narining ko kay TOTO na ayos na daw'. Ang sunod naming ginawa ay pinatakbo
na namin ang jeep papuntang Libmanan. Pagdating namin sa Libmanan dumerretso (sic). kay
SANTIAGO CID at ibinigay na namin sa kanya jeep. Ang sabi naman ni SANTIAGO ay dadalhin niya ang
jeep kay VICENTE PONS na taga Libmanan din.
T Alam mo ba ang nangyari sa driver at konduktor (sic) ng Jeep na inagaw niyo?
S Ang pag-kaalam ko ho sa sabi ni TOTO na 'ayos na' ang ibig sabihin ay patay na sila.
T Sino naman ang VICENTE PONS na ito?
S sabi sa amin ni SANTIAGO si VICENTE PONS ay ang kanyang nakuhang buyer ng jeep.
T Sa pagkaalam mo ba ay talagang binili ni VICENTE PONS and Jeep?
S Opo, sir.
T Magkano naman ang pagkabili ni VICENTE PONS?
S Hindi ko po alam kung magkano ang iksaktong halaga, pero ang presyo sa amin ni SANTIAGO ay
P25,000.00.
T Nang dalhin ha ninyo ang jeep kay SANTIAGO ay agad ninyong dinala at pinagbili rin kay VICENTE
PONS?
S Opo, ng araw din na iyon.
T Magkano ha ang paunang bayad kung mayroon man, na ibinigay ni VICENTE PONS sa inyo?
A Ang alam ko ho ay P4,000.00 ang ibinigay ni VICENTE PONS kay SANTIAGO dahil siya ang kausap
nito.
T Magkano naman ang halagang naparte mo?
S Ako ho ay binigyan ni SANTIAGO ng P1,000.00?
T Ito bang pag-pabili ninyo ng jeep kay VICENTE PONS ay may kasulatan?
S Wala po.
T Kailan pa ang mga sumunod na bayad na ibinigay sa inyo ni VICENTE PONS?
S Hindi ko na ho masyadong matandaan ang iksaktong oras na kanyang pagbayad at kung magkano
basta ang pag-kaalam ko ay mga tatlong beses lang siyang naghulog at iyon ay kanyang ibinibigay kay
SANTIAGO. Si SANTIAGO naman ang siyang nag-bibigay (sic) sa amin.
T Ito bang si SANTIAGO CID at si VICENTE PONS ay alam kung saan at paano ninyo nakuha ang jeep?
S Opo, sir
T Nasaan na ngayon sina TOTO SARETA at DIGO?
S Sa Dasmarinas, Cavite ho.
T Hindi na ba sila napupuntang Libmanan?
S Bihira na ho sir. Pumupunta lang ho sila kung kukuha ng pera
T Sa pagkaalam mo, mayroon pa ba silang ibang Jeep na dinala sa Libmanan?
S Mayroon pa ho akong nalaman kay SANTIAGO CID, na may isa pang jeep na dinala daw sina TOTO at
DIGO sa kanya at kanya namang ibenenta kay Mr. ROGELIO ABAJERO, na taga Libmanan din.
T Ano pa ang ibang alam mo tungkul (sic) dito sa pangalawa jeep, na ibenenta (sic) nila kay Mr.
ABAJERO?
S Wala na ho sir.
T Iyung tungkol sa unang jeep na ibenenta kay Mr. VICENTE PONS, alam mo ba kung nasaan na iyon
ngayon?
S Hindi ko rin po alam kung saan dinala ni Mr. PONS.
T Ito bang sina TOTO SARETA at DIGO ay matagal mo ang kakilala?
S Matagal no ho sir, dahil sa ako ay ipinanganak din sa Dasmarinas, Cavite at doon din lumaki. Sila ho
ay aking mga kababayan at matalik kung mga kaibigan.
T Nung ikaw ba ay sabihan nina TOTO na humanap ng buyer ng jeep alam mo ba na ang jeep na iyon
ay nanakawin lamang?
S Opo, sir.
T Pansamantala ay wala na muna akong itatanong sa iyo, ikaw ba ay mayroon pa ibig sabihin?
S Wala na po, KATAPUSAN NG SALAYSAY.
SINGED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
(Illegible signature) (Illegible signature)
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 27th day of March 1988 at NBI National Capital Region,
Manila. I likewise certify that I have carefully examined the herein affiant and that I am satisfied that
he voluntarily executed his statement and understood the same.
(Signed)
Atty. ARLIS E. VELA
(By Authority of Rep. Act 157) 13
After the investigation, appellants went with the NBI agents in searching for their companions." 14
Meanwhile, Andrew Patriarca, Sr. reported the disappearance of his son, Andrew, Jr., the jeepney and
its driver to the police detachment in Bulihan, Silang, Cavite and the police stations in Silang and Imus,
Cavite. Two weeks after September 4, 1987, the body of 23 year-old Andrew Patriarca, Jr. was found
in a sugarcane plantation in Maguyam. His head was severed from his body. 15 The body of the driver,
Geronimo Malibago, stepfather of Doris Wolf, the owner of the jeepney, 16 was recovered after the
harvest of sugarcane in the plantation 17 in Maguyam. 18 Malibago's widow identified the body from its
clothing. 19
On September 12, 1989, the prosecution formally offered its evidence, 20 which the court duly
admitted 21 For its part, the defense, through counsel, manifested its intention to file a demurrer to
evidence. However, because the defense had not yet presented accused Cid, the court on November
21, 1989, ordered the cancellation of his bail bond and gave his surety thirty days within which to
show cause why judgment against the bond should not be rendered. The defense counsel, Atty. Jose
Claro, was likewise required to explain why he should not be held in contempt of court for his failure
to file a demurrer to evidence. 22
For failure of the defense counsel to appear at the scheduled hearing dates and to file the promised
demurrer to evidence, the court on December 22, 1989, issued an order stating that the "accused
may no longer at this time be allowed to present their Demurrer to Evidence." It scheduled dates for
the presentation of defense evidence and appointed Atty. Oscar Zaldivar as counsel de oficio for the
defendants. 23
Nevertheless, on December 26, 1989, counsel for the defense Claro mailed a "demurrer to evidence
or motion to dismiss on (sic) insufficiency of
evidence." 24 On January 10, 1990, the trial court denied the motion finding that the demurrer did not
"contain any reason compelling enough to recall the previous order," disallowing the filing of said
pleading. 25
On February 8, 1990, upon the manifestation of Atty. Claro that appellants would no longer present
evidence, the trial court issued an order considering the case terminated as far as appellants were
concerned. However, it granted a "reservation" to present evidence as regards Cid. The trial court
further directed Atty. Claro to present Cid before the court on March 9, 1990. It ordered the filing of
memoranda "as the case of accused Januario and Canope (sic) is now considered closed." It set the
"partial promulgation of judgment" on March 9, 1990 "insofar as the two (2) accused are concerned."
26

On March 1, 1990, appellants' counsel filed their memorandum. 27

On March 9, 1990, the trial court did not make a "partial promulgation of judgment." Instead, it
ordered the "continuation of proceedings for purposes of rebuttal evidence." 28
On the same day, the defense presented Santiago Cid as a witness. He testified that a certain Raul
Repe, Tote Sarita and Digo Sarreal approached him about the sale of the jeepney. He referred them to
Vicente Pens who he thought would buy the vehicle. He knew appellants were "i" from Libmanan but
did not see them during the transaction for the sale of the jeepney. 29
On March 27, 1990, the Court denied defense counsel Claro's motion to cancel the hearing scheduled
for that day. Noting the presence of Atty. Carlos Saunar, a prosecution witness whose attendance
during Scheduled trial dates had been delayed, and citing the "imperatives of justice," the trial court
issued an order directing that the testimony of said witness should be heard that day. 30 In the
absence of the counsel of record for the defense; the trial court reiterated the appointment of Atty.
Oscar Zaldivar as counsel de oficio.
Atty. Saunar testified that he joined the NBI sometime in May or June 1988. In March 1988, while still
in private practice, he was at the NBI head office handling a client case when Arty. Vela, an NBI agent,
approached him. The latter and Arty. Toribio introduced him to appellants and Cid. Vela and Toribio
told him that the three had verbally confessed to participation in a crime and that they needed his
assistance as they were about to execute their sworn statements. 31 Saunar agreed to assist the three
suspects and allegedly explained to them the consequences of their confession. He also supposedly
told them individually, and in Tagalog, their constitutional rights, like their rights to be silent and to
counsel and that whatever they would say could be used against them. 32
Saunar identified his signature in the sworn statement of appellant Januario. However, he could no
longer recall which of the three accused ,appellant Canape although he admitted that the latter's face
was "familiar." 33 He was certain, however, that he participated in the taking of appellant Canape's
sworn statement on March 28, 1988. He admitted that his signature does not appear on appellant
Canape's sworn statement but he could "only surmise" that he did not sign the same sworn statement
because either it was not presented to him immediately after the statement was taken or that it had
been misplaced. 34
After receiving Saunar's testimony, the trial court asked the prosecution whether it was presented as
rebuttal testimony. Answering in the positive, the prosecutor reminded the court that when Saunar
could not be presented as a witness, he had made a reservation to call him as "additional evidence for
the prosecution and/or rebuttal" testimony. Clarifying this, the court said that as against Cid, the
testimony was a principal one but a rebuttal as far as the appellants were concerned. 35
On May 11, 1990, the defense manifested that it was closing its case. The prosecution having waived
its right to present "any rebuttal evidence," the trial court issued an order requiring the filing of the
parties' respective memoranda. 36 On June 27, 1990, the trial court rendered the herein questioned
Decision. 37
The Issues
In their separate briefs filed by their respective counsel (Atty. Jose C. Claro for Januario and Any.
Florendo C. Medina for Canape), appellants ascribe basically two errors against the trial court:
(1) The trial procedure, particularly the presentation and admission Of the testimony of Arty. Carlos
Saunar, was irregular and prejudicial to the appellants; and
(2) The extra-judicial confessions of the appellants are inadmissible in evidence for having been
extracted in violation of their constitutional right to counsel.
Insisting that his guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, appellant Januario contends
that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence his sworn statement before the NBI and the
testimony of Arty. Saunar as rebuttal or additional witness after the prosecution had rested its case,
he (appellant Januario) had filed his memorandum, and the decision had been scheduled for
promulgation. 38
For his part, appellant Canape also claims that his guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. He questions the trial court's having given "weight and sufficiency" to his extra-judicial
confession. 39
Appellant Januario contends that the trial court erred in allowing the presentation of Saunar as a
witness after the prosecution had closed its case and offered its documentary evidence. Saunar could
not in any guise be considered as a rebuttal witness simply because there was no defense evidence to
rebut.
The Court's Ruling
The First Issue: Order of Trial
The pertinent provisions of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court state:
Sec. 3. Order of trial. — The trial shall proceed in the following order:
(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge, and in the proper case, the civil
liability.
(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and damages, if any, arising from the
issuance of any provisional remedy in the case.
(c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting evidence only, unless the court, in the
furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional evidence bearing upon the main issue.
(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the cases shall be deemed submitted unless the court directs the
parties to argue orally or to submit memoranda.
(e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information
but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied.)
The trial procedure as outlined in this rule is ordinarily followed to insure the orderly conduct of
litigations to attain the magisterial objective of the Rules of Court to protect the parties' substantive
rights. 40 However, strict observance of the Rules depend upon the circumstances obtaining in each
case at the discretion of the trial judge. Thus, as early as 1917, this Court explained:
. . . . The orderly course of proceedings requires, however, that the prosecution shall go forward and
should present all of its proof in the first instance; but it is competent for the judge, according to the
nature of the case, to allow a party who has closed his case to introduce further evidence in rebuttal.
This rule, however, depends upon the particular circumstances of each particular case, and falls
within the sound discretion of the judge, to be exercised or not as he may think proper. 41
Hence, the court may allow the prosecutor, even after he has rested his case or even after the
defense has moved for dismissal, to present in-voluntarily omitted evidence. 42 The primary
consideration is whether the trial court still has jurisdiction over the case. Thus
The claim that the lower court erred in allowing the prosecuting attorney to introduce new evidence
is devoid of any merit, for while the prosecution had rested, the trial was not yet terminated and the
cause was still under the control and jurisdiction Of the court and the latter, in the exercise of its
discretion, may receive additional evidence. Sec. 3(9), Rule 119 of the Rules of Court clearly provides
that, in the furtherance of justice, the court may grant either of the parties the right and opportunity
to adduce new additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in question. 43
Saunar's testimony was admitted in evidence before the trial court rendered its Decision.
Undoubtedly then, the court a quo retained its jurisdiction even though the prosecution had rested its
case. As to appellants, Saunar was an additional prosecution witness, not a rebuttal witness, because
the defense waived presentation of evidence after the prosecution had rested its case. 44 Saunar was,
therefore, a rebuttal witness with respect to accused Cid. 45
The Second Issue: Appellants' Right to Counsel
Proof of Saunar's presence during the custodial investigation of appellants is, however, not a
guarantee that appellants' respective confessions had been taken in accordance with Article 111,
Section 12(1) of the Constitution. This constitutional provision requires that a person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have no less than "competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice." Elucidating on this particular constitutional requirement, this
Court has taught:
It is noteworthy that the modifiers competent and independent were terms absent in all organic laws
previous to the 1987 Constitution. Their addition in the fundamental law of 1987 was meant to stress
the primacy accorded to the voluntariness of the choice, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a
custodial investigation, by according the accused, deprived of normal conditions guaranteeing
individual autonomy, an informed judgment based on the choices given to him by a competent and
independent lawyer.
Thus, the lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be as far as reasonably
possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer were one furnished in the
accused's behalf, it is important that he should be competent and independent, i.e., that he Is willing
to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would
merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual's constitutional
rights. In People v. Basay, this Court stressed that an accused's right to be informed of the right to
remain silent and to counsel 'contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than
just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.
Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the latter could
not afford one) should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latter's relative or person
authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or
person authorized by the accused to file such petition. Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever
testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are generally suspect, as
in many areas, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic. 46
We find that Saunar was not the choice of appellant Januario as his custodial investigation counsel.
Thus, NBI Agent Arlis Vela testified:
Q Now, considering that they were then under your custody, and under investigation, were they
represented by counsel during the time that you took their statements?
A Yes, sir. They were.
Q Do you recall who was that counsel who represented them?
A Atty. Carlos Saunar, sir.
Q Was he the counsel of their own choice, or was the counsel furnished by your office?
A Because they were not represented by counsel of their own choice, we got the service of Atty.
Carlos Saunar who helped them. 47
xxx xxx xxx
Q And Atty. Saunar is connected with the NBI?
A At that time, he was at the NBI Office. He was just somewhere around.
Q And it was the NBI who requested Saunar to assist Mr. Rene Januario in the investigation?
A We requested him, because he was just around, sir. 48 (Emphasis supplied.)
As regards Saunar's assistance as counsel for appellant Canape, investigating NBI Agent Magno
Toribio testified as follows:
Q Now, with regards to your advice that he has a right to counsel, and to seek assistance of a counsel
of his own choice if he does not have one, and to remain silent, and if he does not have a lawyer, you
will furnish One, for him, now what was his answer?
WITNESS:
According to him, he does not need a lawyer, but despite that refusal to have a lawyer. . .
COURT:
That is not refusal. That is manifestation that he does not need a lawyer. He did not refuse. He raid,
he does not need a lawyer.
WITNESS:
Although, he does not need a lawyer, we provided him a lawyer by the name of Atty. Carlos Saunar,
who was present during the investigation, and who advised him of the consequences of the
statements that he will give, and he did not refuse.
FISCAL VELAZCO:
Now, how did you know that Atty. Saunar gave him advice gave accused Canape advice?
A Because we were present.
Q Now, when did Atty. Saunar give that advice to accused Canape, was it before, during, or after the
taking of this statement?
A Before, during, and after the taking of the statement.
Q Now, may we know from you why Atty. Saunar was present there?
A He was present the because be was then applying for the position of NBI agent.
FISCAL VELAZCO:
Was he the only lawyer who was present there?
A I remember, Atty. Claro, sometimes is there, representing another client. 49
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, Atty. Saunar is employed with the NBI office, am I right?
A Yes, sir.
Q When was he employed at the NBI office? Tell us the exact date?
COURT:
If you can.
WITNESS:
Maybe in September.
ATTY CLARO:
19?
A 1988.
Q But he was always frequent in the NBI office because he was to be employed, is that what you
mean?
A He was applying.
Q And from where is he?
A I think he is from Bicol.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, how many times have you requested Atty. Saunar to assist a person under your investigation
in the NBI office, other than this? A I cannot remember anymore.
Q You always ask him to assist if there is no lawyer available, or the person to be investigated has no
lawyer?
A If he is around. 50 (Emphasis supplied.)
Let us for the moment grant arguendo that Saunar's competence as a lawyer is beyond question.
Under the circumstances described by the prosecution however, he could not have been the
independent counsel solemnly spoken of by our Constitution. He was an applicant for a position in the
NBI and therefore it can never be said that his loyalty was to the confessants. In fact, he was actually
employed by the NBI a few months after. As regards appellant Januario, Saunar might have really
been around to properly apprise appellant of his constitutional right as reflected in the written sworn
statement itself.
However, the same cannot be said about appellant Canape. Clearly, he was not properly informed of
his constitutional rights. Perfunctorily informing a confessant of his constitutional rights, asking him if
he wants to avail of the services of counsel and telling him that he could ask for counsel if he so
desires or that one could be provided him at his request, are simply not in compliance with the
constitutional mandate. 51 In this case, appellant Canape was merely told of his constitutional rights
and posthaste, asked whether he was willing to confess. His affirmative answer may not, by any
means, be interpreted as a waiver of his right to counsel of his own choice.
Furthermore, the right of a person under custodial investigation to be informed of his rights to remain
silent and to counsel implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain
and to con- template an effective communication that results in an understanding of what is
conveyed. 52 Appellant Canape's sworn statement, which reads and sounds so lifeless on paper, fails
to reflect compliance with this requirement. Neither does the aforequoted testimony of NBI Agent
Toribio. Bearing in mind that appellant Canape reached only the fifth grade, the NBI agents should
have exerted more effort in explaining to him his constitutional rights.
Moreover, there is enough reason to doubt whether appellant Canape was in fact and in truth
assisted by counsel. Atty. Saunar affirmed on the witness stand that he assisted appellants on March
28, 1988. 53 However, the sworn statement itself reveals that it was taken on March 27, 1988. No
satisfactory explanation was made by the prosecution on this discrepancy. All that Agent Vela stated
was that they conducted an oral investigation in Naga City on March 27, 1988 and that investigation
at the NBI Manila head office was made in the afternoon of March 28, 1988. 54
The law enforcement agents' cavalier disregard of appellants' constitutional rights is shown not only
by their failure to observe Section 12 (1) of Article m of the Constitution. They have likewise forgotten
the third paragraph of Section 12 of the same article which mandates that an admission of facts
related to a crime must be obtained with the assistance of counsel; otherwise it would be
inadmissible in evidence against the person so admitting. 55
An admission which, under Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, is an "act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact" is different from a confession which, in turn, is defined in
Section 33 of the same Rule as the "declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the Offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein." Both may be given in evidence against the
person admitting or confessing. In People vs. Lorenzo, 56 the Court explained that in a confession there
is an acknowledgment of guilt while in an admission the statements of fact by the accused do not
directly involve an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with
which the accused is charged.
Appellants verbally intimated facts relevant to the commission of the crime to the NBI agents in Naga
City. This is shown by the testimony of NBI Agent Vela that, based on the facts gathered from
interviews of people in that city, they "invited" and questioned appellants, thus:
Q Now, tell us, what was your purpose in inviting these two (2) people?
A That was in connection with the vehicle I mentioned earlier, in connection with the carnapping
incident mentioned earlier.
Q You invited them in connection with the carnapping because you want to, know from them actually
what they know about the carnapping, am I correct?
A Precisely, that is right. 57
Apparently attempting to avoid the questions on whether appellants admitted complicity in the crime,
Agent Toribio testified:
ATTY. CLARO:
When you were conducting an investigation, and you saw me at the NBI building, Naga City, you were'
referring to the investigation of Mr. Canape, am I right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that investigation you were conducting was reduced to writing, and that is now Exhibit "G", am
I right?
A That is not.
Q But you investigated Mr. Canape in Naga City at the NBI building, am I right, tell the Court?
A At that time, we were taking the statement of the woman, the complainant, in the estafa case, and
the; other witnesses.
COURT:
You mean, at the time you investigated that estafa complaint, that was the time when you also
investigated Canape, is that what you mean?
FISCAL VELAZCO:
No, your Honor.
COURT:
But there is a question of counsel. You better clarify that.
WITNESS:
He was asking me if I had already taken the statement of Canape.
COURT:
That is it, sir, Naga City. That is the question.
WITNESS:
Not yet. We were only asking him.
ATTY. CLARO:
By him, whom are you referring to:
A The complainants and the witnesses, sir.
Q All right. You were with Atty. Vela when you conducted an investigation to (sic) Mr. Canape, am I
right? In Naga City?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
Q And Mr. Vela at that time, was also conducting an investigation to (sic) a certain Rene Januario in
Naga City, is that right?
A. No. We took the statement in Manila.
COURT:
You took the statement in Manila. How about in Naga, that is the question of counsel?
A Naga, no statement yet.
ATTY. CLARO:
Mr. Toribio, because you were with Mr. Vela, Mr. Vela did not conduct any investigation to (sic) Mr.
Januario, one of the accused in this case, in Naga City? Tell the Court?
A Not yet at that time, because it was useless. The crime was committed in Silang, Cavite. They will
have to be brought to Manila for the appropriate Judge or Fiscal.
COURT:
So, you are claiming that you did not conduct any investigation of Canape?
A We conducted an investigation. When we took the statement of the other witnesses, complainant
and witnesses.
COURT:
Does that satisfy you?
ATTY. CLARO:
No.
COURT;
Please clarify the question.
WITNESS:
It is true that we were sometimes talking with those people, but not investigating them yet. 58
(Emphasis supplied.)
Note should also be taken of the fact that according to Atty. Saunar, when he acceded to be the
custodial investigation counsel of appellants, the latter had already confessed. Thus:
COURT:
There is one thing that he would like to add, 'that I talked to the accused one by one,' you want to add
something?
A And I confirmed with them whether they are confessing to their crime, and they said yes. In fact,
from what I: observed, they have already confessed to the NBI agents.
COURT:
All of them confessed?
A Yes, your Honor, because they also told me what happened .
FISCAL VELAZCO:
Now, when they informed you that they intend to confess, now, did you explain to them, to the
accused or to the persons under investigation the consequences of confessing?
A Yes, that is basic. I informed them of their rights to remain silent and to counsel, and whatever they
will confess there will be used against them during the trial of this case.
Q How about that ultimate consequence of admission?
A Yes. I told them that if they confess, they will have to go to prison.
Q And what were their answers?
A Actually, they have already confessed to their crime before I talked to them.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. ZALDIVAR:
Your Honor, the witness has just answered during the preliminary question of the Fiscal that at the
time his assistance was sought by the NBI, the accused had in fact already confessed.
COURT:
I am now asking him, have you said that?
A They have already confessed.
ATTY. ZALDIVAR:
We can review the transcript of stenographic notes.
COURT:
What do you mean by that?
A They were still confessing at that time, your Honor.
ATTY. ZALDIVAR:
I just want to manifest into the record that they have already confessed; that the witness has just
repeated the word .
COURT:
But there is an explanation by him. Put that on record, all of them.
FISCAL VELAZCO:
Now, did you verify whether that confession was only verbal or in writing?
A That was only verbal that is why there is a need for the sworn statement to be taken. That was the
time that I was telling them that they can be put to jail. 59 (Emphasis supplied)
It is therefore clear that prior to the execution of the sworn statements at the NBI head office,
appellants had already made verbal admissions of complicity in the crime. Verbal admissions,
however, should also be made with the assistance of counsel. Thus:
The verbal admissions allegedly made by both appellants of their participation in the crime, at the
time of their arrest and even before their formal investigation, are inadmissible, both as violative of
their constitutional rights and as hearsay evidence. These oral admissions, assuming they were in fact
made, constitute uncounselled extrajudicial confessions within the meaning of Article III, Section 12 of
the Constitution. 60
That appellants indeed admitted participation in the commission of the crime in Naga City is shown by
the fact that the NBI agents brought them to Manila to facilitate apprehension of the other culprits
who could be either in Cavite or Manila. Because their uncounselled oral admissions in Naga City
resulted in the execution of their written confessions in Manila, the latter had become as
constitutionally infirm as the former. In People vs. Alicando, 61 this Court explained the ramifications of
an irregularly counselled confession or admission:
We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction. We have also adopted
the libertarian exclusionary rules known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr.
Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone v. United States. According to this rule,
once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or
derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized
evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the
indirect result of the same illegal act. The fruit of the poisonous tree is at least once removed from the
illegally seized evidence, but is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence
illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally
illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence sub- sequently obtained.
Appellants might have indeed committed the crime in concert with Eliseo Sarita and Eduardo Sarinos.
However, what could have been their valuable admissions and confessions as far as the prosecution
was concerned were sullied and rendered inadmissible by the irregular manner by which the law
enforcement agents extracted such admissions and confessions from appellants Without such
statements, the remaining prosecution evidence — consisting mostly of hearsay testimony and
investigation reports — is sorely inadequate to prove appellants' participation in the crime.
Notably, these law enforcers did not only defy the mandate of Section 12 of the Bill of Rights but,
after making "inquiries" from appellants about the crime, they likewise illegally detained appellants as
shown by the admission of one of the NBI agents that appellants were deprived of their liberty while
in their custody. 62 Appellants were even made to travel for ten (10) hours 63 from Naga City to Manila
just so their formal confessions could be executed in the latter city. According to NBI Agent Vela, they
"actually arrested" the appellants when the court issued the warrant for their arrest. 64 The records
show however that the NBI turned appellants over to the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Silang-
Amadeo in Cavite only on March 30, 1989. On the same day, the same court turned them back to the
NBI for "detention during pendency of the case. 65
Epilogue
The Court understands the difficulties faced by law enforcement agencies in apprehending violators of
the law especially those involving syndicates. It sympathizes with the public clamor for the bringing of
criminals before the altar of justice. However, quick solution of crimes and the consequent
apprehension of malefactors are not the end-all and be- all of law enforcement. Enforcers of the law
must follow the procedure mandated by the Constitution and the law. Otherwise, their efforts would
be meaningless. And their expenses in trying to solve crimes would constitute needless expenditures
of taxpayers' money.
This Court values liberty and will always insist on the observance of basic constitutional rights as a
condition sine qua non against the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of government.
The admonition given by this Court to government officers, particularly those involved in law
enforcement and the administration of justice, in the case of People vs. Cuizon, 66 where NBI agents
mishandled a drug bust operation and in so doing violated the constitutional guarantees against
unlawful arrests and illegal searches and seizures, is again called for and thus reiterated in the case at
bench, to wit:
. . . In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect Ordinary
people to be law abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights. Some lawmen,
Prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long as the law
enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by which they were
Obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law enforcement. Ironically, it
only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the eventual denigration of
society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law
and to Preserve the peace and security of Society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with
deliberate care anti within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never
justifies the means. 67
WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 in Tagaytay
City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellants Rene Januario and Efren Canape are
ACQUITTED. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director General, Philippine National Police
and the Director, National Bureau of investigation " order that Eliseo Sarita and Eduardo Sarinos,
who are still at large, may be apprehended and this time properly investigated and prosecuted
The accused-appellants are hereby ORDERED RELEASED immediately unless they are being detained
for some other legal cause.
SO ORDERED,

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 75366 July 4, 1990

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CARLOS AMPO-AN, DANIEL ALBAÑA, DANIEL CHAVEZ, and PORFERIO CALAROM,
accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellants.

SARMIENTO, J.:
In an Amended Information dated August 23, 1982, the appellants Carlos Ampo-an, Daniel Albaña, Daniel Chavez, and Porferio Calarom, together
with Manuel Doinog, were accused of Robbery in Band with Multiple Homicide allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of May, 1982, early in the morning, at Sitio Taganoran, Barangay Tagnao, Municipality of
Gandara, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Carlos
Ampo-an, Daniel Albaña, Daniel Chavez and Porferio Calarom y Herrera alias Porfing together with Manuel Doinog who is still
at large, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, by means of treachery and evident premeditation
and with the use of superior strength and cruelty to the herein below mentioned victims, armed with homemade shotguns
(bardog) and sharp-pointed bolos, with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, stab, hack and wounded the bodies of the following victims: PABLO CAAMOD (husband), ROSITA CAAMOD (wife) and
their three children; DANILO CAAMOD ROMEO CAAMOD and two years old GEMMA CAAMOD thus causing the death of said
mentioned victims; then by means of force and intimidation of persons; take, steal and carry away with them the amount of TWO
HUNDRED (P200.00) PESOS CASH, taken from Rosita Caamod before she was killed, to the damage and prejudice of said
1
above-mentioned victims.

Manuel Doinog remains at-large and can not be located.

Upon arraignment, the remaining four accused pleaded "not guilty" and trial commenced.

In due course, a decision was rendered convicting the appellants of the crime charged. The dispositive portion
reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares accused Carlos Ampo-an Daniel Albaña, Daniel
Chavez and Porferio Calarom, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principal of the crime of
robbery with multiple homicide as charged, and considering the presence of four (4) aggravating
circumstances, namely: nighttime, superior strength, by band and morada, and without any
mitigating circumstance to offset, sentences each of them to suffer the extreme penalty of
DEATH, in the manner prescribed by law, with the accessories of the law, and they should
jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the (five [5]) deceased victims the sum of ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) pesos and pay to Rita Caamod the sum of
P2,030.00 actual damages and pay the corresponding costs.

SO ORDERED. 2

Pursuant to the mandate of the Constitution 3 vis-a-vis the death penalty imposed, the records were elevated to
this Court on automatic review. However, pending the resolution of this case, appellant Porferio Calarom died in
the Bureau of Prisons Hospital on June 30, 1988. Thus, his criminal liability was totally extinguished, and it is
only his (estate's) possible civil liability that is to be determined in this appeal.

We adopt the statement of facts submitted by the Solicitor General as we find it to be accurate and supported by
the records of the case.

Spouses Pablo and Rosita Caamod and their four children resided in a one-room house in Sitio
Taganoran, Barangay Tagnao, Gandara, Samar. Woven coconut leaves served as wall of their
house.

It was the habit of the Caamods to keep a gas lamp lighted while sleeping. At the time of the
incident, the moon likewise provided illumination.
At about 1:00 o'clock in the morning of May 23, 1982, Leticia Caamod, one of the children was
awakened by a gun shot (p. 21, tsn, November 9, 1983). When she looked outside, she saw
Porferio Calarom carrying a gun, a bolo and torch. Porferio Calarom called her father asking for
petroleum for the torch he will use in fishing (p. 24, Ibid). Leticia Caamod also saw Carlos Ampo-
an, Daniel Albaña and Daniel Chavez. They were likewise armed with bolos (p. 23, tsn,
November 9, 1983).

Pablo Caamod woke up and gave petroleum to Porferio Calarom. Without warning, Porferio
Calarom stabbed Pablo Caamod. Pablo Caamod explained, "Compadre do not kill me." Porferio
Calarom answered, "Come on, I will kill you because you will reveal" (p. 27, tsn, November 9,
1983).i•t•c-aüsl

Pablo Caamod ran to the bushes about three meters away from the house. Porferio Calarom,
Carlos Ampo-an and Daniel Chavez chased him (p. 29, ibid), while Daniel Albaña entered the
house of the Caamod's (p. 30, ibid). Upon overtaking Pablo Caamod, Porferio Calarom again
hacked him on the thigh. Carlos Caamod (sic) and Daniel Chavez likewise took turns in hacking
Pablo Caamod. As a result, Pablo Caamod suffered nine wounds (Exhibit "L", Autopsy Report
for Pablo Caamod).

Meantime, Leticia Caamod surreptitiously went out of the house and hid behind the bushes,
about two meters at the back of the house and three meters from where her father was being
attacked. At her vantage point, she became the terrified spectator of the killing of her father by
Porferio Calarom, Daniel Albaña, Carlos Ampo-an and Daniel Chavez.

Inside the house, Daniel Albaña demanded money from Rosita Caamod (p. 1, tsn, November 20
[November 10], 1983). Leticia Caamod saw her mother hand money to Daniel Albaña. Then
Daniel Albaña stabbed Rosita Caamod on the abdomen. Rosita Caamod pleaded for her life
saying, "Son, do not kill me." Daniel Albaña retorted, "I will kill you because you will reveal" (p. 2,
tsn, ibid).i•t•c-aüsl Rosita Caamod sustained eight wounds (Exh. "N", Autopsy Report for Rosita
Caamod).

Thereafter, Porferio Calarom, Daniel Albaña, Carlos Ampo-an and Daniel Chavez mercilessly
stabbed and killed Danilo, Romeo and Gemma Caamod who were roused from their sleep (p. 3,
tsn, November 20 [November 10], 1983). Then they looked for Leticia Caamod, but when they
failed to find her, they went away (p. 4, tsn, ibid).

Leticia Caamod remained behind the bushes. At daybreak, she proceeded to her older sister,
Rita Caamod Marcial, residing in another house at Barangay Tagnao, Gandara, Samar, to
report the gruesome incident (p. 4, tsn, November 10, 1983). Still in tears and horrified, Leticia
Caamod named appellants as the perpetrators of the crime (p. 4, ibid; p. 49, tsn, November 15,
1983; p. 73, ibid). Rita accompanied Leticia to Barangay Captain Conrado Martinez who in turn
accompanied them to the police authorities in Gandara, Samar (p. 51, ibid). Police authorities
under Police Sgt. Genelito Penellere, Sub-station Commander of Gandara, Samar, went with
Leticia, Rita and Barangay Captain Martinez to the scene of the crime (p. 83, tsn, December 7,
1983). They saw the lifeless bodies of Pablo Caamod near the bushes, Rosita Caamod at the
back of the house (p. 83, tsn, December 7, 1983), and Danilo, Romeo and Gemma inside the
house (p. 84, ibid).

At the scene of the crime, the police investigators saw a footprint which resembled that of
Porferio Calarom, who had webbed toes (p. 85, tsn, December 7,1983).i•t•c-aüsl

The police investigators proceeded to the house of Porferio Calarom and found him there. They
noted that beside him was a bolo with blood-stained handle and scabbard (p. 88, tsn, December
7, 1983). His polo shirt also appeared to be blood-stained (p. 88, ibid).
When interrogated at the house and in the presence of Barangay Captain Martinez, Porferio
Calarom admitted that he participated in the commission of the offense, and disclosed that his
cohorts were appellants Daniel Chavez (p. 33 [sic], ibid) Carlos Ampo-an and Daniel Albaña (p.
34 [sic], ibid).

Upon his arrest, Daniel Chavez was taken to the house of Barangay Captain Martinez. In the
presence of Martinez, Porferio Calarom rebuked Daniel Chavez, "Do not deny because you are
one, you are the planner of this incident" (p. 95, ibid). This resulted to verbal altercation between
the two. Thereafter the two were subjected to investigation by the police authorities at the office
of Sgt. Penellere (p. 95, ibid).

Daniel Albaña and Carlos Ampo-an could not be located as they left for unknown places,
obviously to avoid arrest (p. 113, tsn, December 7, 1983). On June 3, 1982 or ten days after the
gory event, however, they surrendered to Tomas Oliva, then Acting Barangay Captain of
Tagnao, Gandara, Samar, as a result of the negotiation for their surrender undertaken by their
parents (p. 114, tsn, ibid). 4

It is evident from the above recital of facts that only the testimony of Leticia Caamod, the twelve
year old daughter of the Caamod spouses and the lone survivor of the heinous crime, identified
and established the criminal participation of each of the appellants as she alone witnessed the
brutal slaying of her parents, her two brothers, and her younger sister. And she did so positively,
clearly, and promptly. She was even tested in the crucible of a voir dire 5 which she passed with
flying colors.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

FISCAL AGUILAR:

With the Permission of this Honorable Court.

Q. Do you understand why you are made to swear?

Y. Yes.

Q. Why?

Y. To tell the truth.

Q. And do you know what would happen to you (if you) tell a lie?

Y. You are being punished by God.

FISCAL AGUILAR:

Q. And do you know what will the Court do if you are caught telling a lie?

Y. I will be put in prison.

Q. So you will tell the truth in this Court?

Y. Yes, sir. 6
Before us, the appellants assail their conviction by alleging that the trial court gravely erred in giving full weight
and credence to the evidence of the prosecution and in disregarding the evidence for the defense.
Consequently, they contend that the trial court gravely erred in finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged. 7

All the appellants interposed alibi as their common defense.

1. Daniel Chavez, 27, married, and used to be a welder in Manila for about 7 years, 8 denied the charge against
him. He testified that it was only when his wife, Jovita, wrote him she would be giving birth that he returned home
to Barangay Tagnao, Gandara, Samar, on April 29, 1982. On the eve of May 22, 1982, his wife gave birth to
their first born assisted by Tarcela Machate, a comadrona. The following day, after buying their viand, he was
arrested at Tagnao. He was brought inside a room adjacent to the jail across the office of the station commander
where he was allegedly tortured. He was then forced to affix his signature on an affidavit the contents of which
were never read to him. For fear of his life, he never divulged the claimed maltreatment.

2. Daniel Albaña, 20, single, farmer, and residing in Sitio Cabayangan, Barangay Tagnao, Gandara, Samar, 9
testified that on the same night, his older sister, Jovita, the wife of Chavez, was already experiencing labor pains,
thus he and Daniel stayed at home.

In the early morning of May 23, 1982, Patrolman Ayong and another policeman arrived; they took him to
Gandara where he was put in jail. The policemen struck him with a piece of wood hitting him at the back; he was
also boxed on the chest. While he was being maltreated, he learned through Patrolman Ayong about the
massacre of the Caamod family for which he was being inculpated.

Daniel Albaña presented Rosita Victoriano Albaña, his mother and mother-in-law of Daniel Chavez, the latter
being the husband of his (Daniel Albaña's) sister. At the time of the killings, both Daniels slept at their
farmhouse. They did not leave the place because Chavez's wife had just given birth. The following day, they
were arrested by three (3) policemen who brought them to the municipal jail.

Andres Albaña, the father of Daniel Albaña, was also called to the witness stand. He stated that on the eve of
the massacre of the Caamod family, Daniel Chavez was at the bedside of his wife, while Daniel Albaña was
pounding rice. He added that the two did not leave the house and he knew this as a fact because he did not
sleep till the early morning of May 23, keeping himself awake by reading the Holy Bible. When he inquired from
the policemen why the two were being arrested, the policemen meanly fired their guns at the mud, thus
splashing mud at his face.

3. Carlos Ampo-an, 22, single, farmer, and a resident of Barangay Tagnao, Gandara, Samar, 10 testified that on
the night of May 22, 1982, he was with his parents, Tiburcio and Marianita Ampo-an, at their farm house at Sitio
Taganoran. On the next day, Moning Vitoriano (Mamerto Vitoriano) hired him to work at the former's farm in the
hills of Sitio Taganoran. He finished his work around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon.

On June 2, 1982, Carlos Ampo-an was investigated at the office of Patrolman Ayong. He vehemently denied the
alleged surrender. Instead, he was smitten with the muzzle of an armalite on his right leg and right chest as
evidenced by a scar on his leg. He was even compelled to place his thumbprint on a document the contents of
which he was not told nor was he allowed to read.

Mamerto Vitoriano, affirmed that Carlos tilled his camote and cassava plantation on May 23, 1982, from 7:00
o'clock in the morning till noontime. He was paid P5.00 for the work done.

Marianita Ampo-an, the mother of Carlos Ampo-an, corroborated the alibi of her son. She testified that her son,
Carlos, slept in their house when the gruesome episode took place. In fact, she and Carlos woke up at around
4:00 o'clock in the morning of May 23, 1982 because Carlos would still have to sharpen his bolo to be used in
clearing the farm of Mamerto Vitoriano.
Decisive in this appeal is the determination as to which prevails between the positive identification of the four
appellants by one eyewitness as against their individual alibi. As stated earlier, the trial court found the herein
accused, Carlos Ampo-an, Daniel Chavez, Daniel Albaña, and Porferio Calarom guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as co-principals of the crime of robbery with multiple homicide and sentenced each of them to suffer the extreme
penalty of death. After a thorough scrutiny of all the evidences on record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court
with modification as to the penalty imposed.

While indeed, "(T)he prosecution has the onus probandi of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt and the weakness of the defense does not relieve it of its duty . . . ," 11 in the instant case, we
are fully convinced that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the four accused-
appellants. As underscored at the outset, Leticia Caamod, the only survivor, in her testimony. positively and
clearly identified the four accused, Carlos Ampo-an, Daniel Albaña, Daniel Chavez, and Porferio Calarom, as the
killers of her father, Pablo Caamod, 48, mother, Rosita Caamod, 45, two younger brothers, Romeo, 7, Danilo, 2,
and her younger sister, Gemma, 5 years old. In her account, on the early morning of May 23, 1982, a gunshot
woke her up. 12 With the illumination from the lighted gas lamp measuring around nine centimeters in
circumference and the moonlight that filtered through the porous coconut leaves which served as walls of their
small hut, 13 she vividly witnessed the grotesque scene as she hid first at one side of the stairs, and later in the
bushes, just two meters from their home; how Porferio Calarom, armed with a shotgun and a bolo, on the pretext
of asking for petroleum to fuel their torches, stabbed the right side of the body of her father; how her father ran to
the "grasses" (bushes); how Daniel Chavez, Daniel Ampo-an, and Porferio Calarom also armed with bolos
chased him; and how they took turns in hacking her father to death. 14 Leticia well recognized the appellants
because of the lighted torches which Porferio Calarom and Carlos Ampo-an were carrying, and as already
stated, the lighted gas lamp inside their house plus the moonlight that filtered into their humble abode. Except
the fifth accused who was in the dark, she was certain of the identity of the four men especially Porferio
Calarom, the "compadre" of her father, because they were not wearing masks, hats, or anything to hide their
identities. 15 More so because she and the appellants live in the same Barangay of Tagnao, Gandara, Samar,
although in different sitios.

Leticia was not only an eyewitness but also an "earwitness." She audibly heard Daniel Albaña demand money
from her mother saying, "Mang Rosing give us money." 16 Then her mother pleaded for her life in desperation.
She begged, "Son, do not kill me." 17 But Daniel Albaña responded, "I will kill you because you will report." 18
Soon her pleas were silenced when Daniel Albaña mercilessly stabbed the abdomen of her mother after
grabbing from her hand the money he demanded. Through the spaces between the sheets of cogon leaves, she
saw the whole macabre scene depicting her loved ones as helpless victims of men of ill will.

By six o'clock in the same morning, when "the coast was clear," so to speak, she ran to her elder sister, Rita
Marcial y Caamod 25, married, a farmer, and who resided in another house in the same barangay. 19 Still visibly
disturbed and frightened, she narrated to her sister Rita the atrocious killing of their kinfolk and the names of the
killers, to wit: Carlos Ampo-an, Daniel Chavez, Daniel Albaña, and Porferio Calarom. Being in such an emotional
state, Leticia certainly was in no position to contrive to falsely implicate the appellants with an atrocious offense.
For in the words of the Court, "the identification of an accused by an eyewitness while in a state of shock is
worthy of full faith and credit." 20

Promptly, Rita and Leticia went to the Barangay Captain of Tagnao, Conrado Martinez, and reported the crime;
forthwith, he accompanied them to Police Sergeant Genelito Penellere, Sub-station Commander of Gandara,
Samar. Together with some members of the Civilian Home Defense Force and army soldiers, they went to the
scene of the crime. This prompt action of the Caamod sisters which led to the immediate arrest of two of the
killers bespeaks spontaneity of reaction not dictated by an ulterior motivation but of their earnest desire for the
vindication of the deaths of their father and mother and brothers and sister. 21

22
Besides, the gruesome pictures that were taken hours after the killing, eloquently speak for themselves.

Time and time again, the Court has invariably decreed that alibi can not prevail over the positive identification of
the accused as the perpetrators of the crime. To sustain the defense of alibi, the accused must not only prove
satisfactorily that he was at another place at the time the crime happened, but more important, that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed. 23
Appellants brothers-in-law Daniel Chavez and Daniel Albaña's mutual defense of alibi that they were attending to
the needs of Jovita who was giving birth at their house at the same time of the alleged killing, is unavailing.

The two Daniels live together in Sitio Cabayangan. In going to Barangay Tagnao proper, they would pass the
victim's Sitio Taganoran which is just two (2) kilometers away from their (Daniels') home, and could be reached
in less than two (2) hours hiking. With this distance, it was not physically impossible for the brothers-in-law to be
at the scene of the crime at one o'clock in the early morning of May 23, 1982.

We can not give credence to the narrations of Andres Albaña, Rosita Victoriano Albaña, and Marianita Ampo-an
on the alibi of their respective relatives. Their testimonies are undeniably tainted with biases borne out of
compassion and the natural desire of parents to bail out their sons from criminal liability. Furthermore, "(a)libi is
at best a weak defense and easy of fabrication especially between parents and children, relatives, and even
those not
related." 24

On the same vein, we reject Porferio Calarom's alibi. His house is only two kilometers away from the Caamod's
place. This fact of accessibility would suffice to obviate the favorable consideration of his defense of alibi notably
in the light of abundant real evidence presented against him, like the footprints with the tell-tale webbed toes
matching his discovered at the scene of the crime, the bolo with the hilt and scabbard thereof still wet with blood
found in his house when the police arrested him on the same morning of the killings and robbery, and his
bloodstained polo shirt also found by the police in the same place and on the same occasion as the bolo. All
these physical evidences affirm incontrovertibly his positive and clear identification by the young girl Leticia and
set our minds at rest on the moral certainty of his guilt precluding any iota of doubt.

With the overwhelming evidence of guilt, there seems to be no need to dwell lengthily on the admissibility or
inadmissibility of the extra-judicial confessions of Calarom and Chavez despite the objections belabored by the
defense. After all, these "confessions" could be ignored altogether without prejudicing the requirements of proof
beyond reasonable doubt which, as we already ruled, the prosecution has amply established. Be this as it may,
the issue raised by the defense on this score digs deep into constitutional imperatives on the rights of the
accused which we can not and must not just dismiss perfunctorily.

We say, the extra-judicial confessions of Porferio Calarom and Daniel Chavez suffer constitutional infirmities.
Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution is explicit. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in
violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.

Daniel Chavez testified that after his arrest on May 23, 1982, some police authorities inserted in one of his
nostrils a piece of bamboo split and boxed him on the chest, upper part of his umbilicus, and on his neck. Then
he was investigated by Patrolman Arturo Ayong in the presence of Police Sergeant Genelito Penellere at the
Integrated National Police Investigation Section of Gandara, Samar. After that, he was allegedly forced to affix
his thumbprint on his sworn statement.

Porferio Calarom was also investigated by Patrolman Arturo Ayong on May 24, 1982. He also testified that
policemen held his right hand and forced him to place his thumbmark on his written declaration.

The trial court did not believe these imputations of torture or high-handedness against the officers of the law in
the investigation of this case and in the obtention of these "confessions" and admitted them nevertheless as part
of the evidence proving the guilt of the appellants. We do not find anything in the records of the case which
would compel us to overrule the trial court on this score. But there is an undeniable fact which constrains us to
declare the inadmissibility of these confessions. The statements of Chavez and Calarom on May 23 and 24,
1982 were taken without assistance of counsel. While it is true that there were waivers of the right to counsel,
the declarants were not also assisted by counsel when they executed the said waivers.
While the right to counsel may be waived, such waiver must be effected voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
The waiver must be furthermore, with the assistance of the accused's lawyer.

Since Porferio Calarom and Daniel Chavez were neither assisted by counsel while they were under
investigation, nor at least, given a counsel de oficio when they waived their rights to counsel, their confessions
are inadmissible in evidence. The lack of counsel "makes [those] statement[s], in contemplation of law,
'involuntary,' even if it were otherwise voluntary, technically." 25

We are convinced that the teachings of Galit, 26 Burgos, 27 Olvis, 28 and similar cases that no custodial
investigation should be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by
any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or anyone on his
behalf.

Be all these as they may, regardless of the inadmissibility in evidence of the extrajudicial confessions, we find
there are other proofs in the record sufficient to affirm the appealed decision of the trial court holding all the four
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of robo con homicidio as defined and
penalized under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code. The juridical concept of this special complex crime of
robbery with homicide does not limit the taking of human life to one single victim. 29 The number of persons killed
is immaterial. All homicides or murders are merged in the composite, integrated whole, that is robbery with
homicide, as long as all the killings were perpetrated by reason of or on occasion of robbery. 30 Further, the term
"homicide" in robbery with homicide should be understood as a generic term and includes murder. 31

The appellants, all armed with bolos and a shotgun, busted in the dwelling of the deceased Caamod family and
robbed them. By reason or occasion of the robbery, they killed Pablo Caamod with the sole end in view of
removing opposition to the robbery. They further ruthlessly slew Rosita, Danilo, Romy, and Gemma to prevent
their identification and to conceal the robbery.

We now deal with the aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the crime. The trial court is
correct in ruling that the generic aggravating circumstances of nighttime and morada aggravated the offense.
The darkness of the early dawn was purposely sought by the robbers for their easy escape. Morada is likewise
present in this case, inasmuch as the crime took place and was committed by the appellants in the home of the
victims. The appellants showed greater perversity in their deliberate invasion of the tranquility of the Caamod's
domicile. 32

On the other hand, we can not stamp our imprimatur on the trial court's appreciation of the aggravating
circumstances of superior strength and by band as these are absorbed in treachery which unquestionably
attended the commission of the complex offense charged. 33

The penal liability of Porferio Calarom had been extinguished by his death on June 30, 1988; however, his civil
liability survives him which can be recovered from his estate.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED except that the penalty imposed shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to the provisions of Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines. With costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 82178 July 31, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROMEO SALUDAR y MONDIGO alias "Bay", JULIO MABANSAG y MABAIT alias
"Chito", and WILFREDO BABON y PORE alias "Totong Babon", RAFAEL ROSALA and
MANUEL ROSALA, defendants; ROMEO SALUDAR y MONDIGO alias "Bay", defendant-
appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Public Attorney's Office for defendant-appellant.

PADILLA, J.:
For consideration is the appeal of the accused Romeo Saludar y Mondigo alias "Bay" from the decision * rendered in Criminal Case No. 68252 of the
Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro Manila, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused ROMEO SALUDAR y MONDIGO alias Bay guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide and hereby sentences said accused ROMEO
SALUDAR y MONDIGO alias Bay to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the victim FRANCISCO CATU y SIOJO in the
amount of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) for the death of said victim and the further sum of TWO HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00) in compliance with the mandate in articles 100, 104 (1) (3) and 107 of the Revised Penal
Code and to pay the costs.

In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited in full with the period of his preventive imprisonment.

On the other hand, for failure of the prosecution to rebut the constitutional presum ption of innocence, accused JULIO
MABANSAG y MABAIT alias Chito and WILFREDO BABON y Pore alias Totong Babon are hereby acquitted of the offense
charged, with costs de oficio.

The Municipal Jail Warden of Pasig is hereby ordered to release the persons of the accused JULIO MABANSAG y MABAIT
alias Chito and WILFREDO BABON y PORE alias Totong Babon from custody unless there exists any other order or orders to
the effect that they should remain confined under custody.

In case of appeal by accused ROMEO SALUDAR y MONDIGO alias Bay, the Branch Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to
reproduce the Information in this case and have it certified as a true copy by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal and have
it archived the same to be revived upon the apprehension of accused RAFAEL ROSALA alias Nonoy and MANUEL ROSALA.
 Let alias warrant of arrest be issued for the arrest of said accused RAFAEL ROSALA alias Nonoy and MANUEL ROSALA the
same to be served thru the Taguig Police Force, NBI, PC/CIS and CAPCOM.

The established facts of the case are as follows: At about 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 12 September 1986, Francisco Catu, also known as "Mang
Paquito", was stabbed, resulting in his death, inside his store located at Tomasa Avenue, Tomasa Estate Subdivision, Barangay Ususan, Taguig,
Metro Manila. The proceeds from sales in his store, amounting to P4,000.00, were missing and probably taken by the person or persons responsible
for his death.

Eufrocina Porlaje, who was living just across the street from the store of Mang Paquito, declared that shortly before or about 8:30 o'clock in the
evening of 12 September 1986, while she was talking to Cely Mallari in front of her house, she saw a group of men, not less than five (5), but not more
than eight (8), in number, going towards the store of Mang Paquito. The store was closed, but Mang Paquito was standing outside the door. The men
talked to Mang Paquito and moments later, Mang Paquito went inside his store. Not long thereafter, Mang Paquito shouted: "ano ba, ano ba" and the
men standing outside the store ran away.

Later, Eufrocina heard a dog yelling in pain. She also heard Richie, the son of Mang Paquito, shout: "Tama na, 'Dy'", after which she saw a man dash
out of the store and run to where the group of men had gone. Eufrocina, however, was unable to recognize the man, nor the group of men.
Afterwards, she saw Richie going to the house of his aunt. When he returned, he had his aunt, Aling Nora, with him. Not long thereafter, Eufrocina
heard Aling Nora cry out that Mang Paquito had been stabbed. Upon hearing this, she went to the house of Mang Paquito and helped in bringing him
1
to the hospital, leaving Cely Mallari behind as she did not want to go with her.

Richard Catu, or Richie the son of Mang Paquito, declared that he was awakened by a commotion and the
sound of breaking glass coming from the store. Upon going outside the room to investigate, he saw a man
stabbing his father, and another man stabbing their dog, after which both ran away. He could not recognize the
men. However, he later saw the man who stabbed their dog lying in the morgue of a funeral parlor in Taguig.
After the men had gone, he roused his elder brother, Harold, to attend to their father, while he ran to seek help
from their relatives living nearby. 2

Mang Paquito was brought to a medical clinic in Tuktukan, Taguig, Metro-Manila, but when his wife Doris Lim de
Catu arrived at the hospital, Mang Paquito was already dead. Doris Lim declared that she spent P18,000.00 for
the funeral, including the wake; and that the daily revenue from the store is P4,000.00, which could no longer be
found, except for some small coins and bills. 3

On 5 November 1986, the police authorities received information that one Romeo Saludar alias "Bay" of
Barangay Ususan, Taguig, Metro-Manila, was involved in the killing of Mang Paquito. Romeo Saludar was,
consequently, picked up and brought to police headquarters for questioning. During the custodial interrogation
that ensued, Romeo Saludar executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he admitted his participation in the
commission of the crime and pointed to one Jose (whose cadaver was found lying in the morgue of a funeral
parlor in Taguig, Metro Manila), Nonoy Rosala, Manuel Rosala, Totong Babon, Julio Mabansag, and one Junior
as his companions.

In view of these revelations, Wilfredo Babon alias "Totong Babon" and Julio Mabansag alias "Chito" were picked
up for questioning. Both, however, denied participation in the commission of the crime. 4 Nevertheless, they were
charged, together with Romeo Saludar, with the crime of Robbery with Homicide in an Information filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro-Manila, which was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 68252.

When arraigned, the three (3) accused entered pleas of "not guilty".

On 12 December 1986, the Information was amended to include Rafael Rosala alias "Nonoy" and Manuel
Rosala as party defendants. Said defendants, however, have remained "at large" up to the present and their
whereabouts are unknown.

At the trial of the case, Romeo Saludar claimed that he was maltreated by police investigators and forced to sign
his extrajudicial confession (Exh. H). He further claimed that the contents of the documents were not read nor
explained to him before he signed the same. He declared that he was at home the whole day of 12 September
1986, fixing the wall of their house, and did not leave the house of any time. 5 He further declared that he first
met his co- accused, Wilfredo Babon and Julio Mabansag, only on 5 November 1986, at the elementary school
building where they evacuated because of the flood. 6
Josefina Saludar corroborated the testimony of her husband, Romeo Saludar. She testified that her husband
was in their house the whole day of 12 September 1986, and went to sleep after taking their supper. 7

After Romeo Saludar rested his defense, his co-accused Julio Mabansag and Wilfredo Babon, instead of
presenting evidence in their defense, filed a demurrer to the evidence.

In support of his appeal, the defendant-appellant Romeo Saludar claims that the trial court erred in finding him
guilty of the crime charged on the sole basis of his Salaysay (Exh. H) which is inadmissible in evidence, for
having been extracted from him during custodial interrogation by means of force and violence and without the
assistance of counsel.

The Solicitor General agrees with him and recommends his exoneration.

After a review of the records of the case, we agree with the defendant-appellant and the Solicitor General that
the extrajudicial confession executed by the defendant during custodial investigation is inadmissible in evidence
for failure of the investigating officer to observe the structures laid down in People vs. Gali, 8 to wit:

7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of
his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and that any statement he might make
could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means-by telephone if possible-
or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this
is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of
counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf or appointed by the court
upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf The right to counsel may
be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. (emphasis supplied)

It would appear in the instant case that the defendant-appellant Romeo Saludar was not assisted by counsel
engaged by him, or by any person in his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition of the detainee or
anyone in his behalf, when he executed the Salaysay (Exh. H) during his custodial interrogation, as required in
the aforecited rule. Cpl. Ricardo Sto. Domingo, Jr. of the Marikina Police Station, who conducted the
interrogation, testifying for the prosecution, declared as follows:

Q When you arrested the accused Romeo Saludar, you immediately proceeded to the police
headquarters?

A No, before we proceeded to the police headquarters, we interrogated him until he tell this accomplices.
He implicated Julio Mabansag so we arrested him.

Q Where?

A Taguig Elementary School.

Q In the presence of what, the police officers?

A The police officers including the barangay tanod.

Q Who was the police officer present?

A Maj. Nestor Cruz, our chief at CID.

Q How many were you when you interrogated the suspects?

A 6 to 7 follow-up members.
Q Was the accused Romeo Saludar with a companion at that time exclusive of the arresting officers?

A None, sir.

Q Did you take their statements?

A After the arrest of Romeo Saludar and Julio Mabansag, we took them to the police headquarters.

Q At the police headquarters, what did you do?

A The statement of Romeo Saludar was reduced into writing.

Q How about Julio Mabansag?

A Together with Julio Mabansag.

Q Were they assisted by counsel?

A No, sir. I don't know with Pat. Fortaleza.

Q You want to impress the Hon. Court that you were not present at that time?

A I was present there but it was the discretion of Pat. Fortaleza.

Q You were also a witness to the taking down of the statements of the accused?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you inform him of his constitutional rights?

A It was Pat. Fortaleza who apprised him of his constitutional rights.

Q You were present then?

A Yes, sir.

Q Were you able to take down the exact words of Pat. Fortaleza in apprising the accused of their
constitutional rights? What were the exact words?

A You have the right to remain silent. What ever you say will be used as evidence for and against you. You
also have the right to secure the services of a counsel of your own choice.

Q And Romeo Saludar answered, 'Yes, sir'?

A Yes, sir.

Q After taking the statement of Romeo Saludar, what did you do?

A We proceeded to the Pepsi Cola Company to look for the residence of suspect Wilfredo Babon. Then,
we returned to the Taguig Police Station to take Wilfredo Babon.

Q Were you able to effect the arrest?

A Yes, sir.

Q He was immediately brought to the Eastern Police HQ for interrogation?

A Yes, sir.
 Q When you investigated the suspect, was he assisted by any counsel?

A No, sir.

Q Did you not avail the assistance of the CLAO member?

A No, sir.

Q During the interrogation, how long did it end or how long was it conducted?

A I cannot remember. It was continuous paper works and extensive follow-ups.

Q Who was the investigator?

A Pat. Fortaleza, Romeo de la Cruz and Ziga.

Q Do you have witnesses during the arrest when you arrested the suspects?

9
A None, sir.

The absence of counsel during the custodial investigation is affirmed by the Salaysay (Exh. H) of Romeo Saludar wherein the following is stated:

Tanong: Ngayong nalaman mo na ang ilan sa iyong mga karapatan na naaayon sa ating Binagong
Saligang Batas, ikaw ba naman ay nakahanda pa ring magbigay ng iyong salaysay kahit na walang
abogado at ang lahat ng iyong sasabihin sa pagtatanong na ito ay kusang loob at pawang katotohanan
lamang?

Sagot: (Sgd.) Romeo Saludar. (emphasis supplied)

If accused Romeo Saludar had been assisted by counsel, there would have been no need for the police investigator to ask if the accused was willing
to answer his questions even without the assistance of counsel.

The Court observes that there is written at the bottom of page 2 of said Salaysay a note that the appellant was assisted by one Atty. Editha Pio of the
Citizens Legal Assistance Office (CLAO). But said statement is not sufficient compliance with the rule. The CLAO attorney should have been
presented in court to confirm her presence during the custodial interrogation of the appellant, in view of the conflicting testimony of the police
investigators that Romeo Saludar was not assisted by counsel during custodial investigation, as well as to show her authority to appear for and in
behalf of the accused. Let it be noted that under the rule, it is necessary that the person under custodial investigation be assisted by an attorney
engaged by the accused or by any person on his behalf or appointed by the court, upon petition of the detainee or person acting on his behalf.
Appearing as public attorney is not enough. He should be engaged by the accused, or by the latter's relative or person authorized by him to engage
an attorney, or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to file such petition.

It appearing that there is no evidence that would link defendant-appellant Romeo Saludar to the commission of the crime other than the Salaysay
(Exhibits H and I) taken during custodial investigation, which are inadmissible in evidence, the guilt of said Romeo Saludar cannot be said to have
been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one entered, acquitting the defendant-appellant
Romeo Saludar y Mondigo alias "Bay" of the charge against him. With costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. L-88753-54 August 20, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTHONY KIDAGAN y PAQUITO, and ROBERTO TULDIKAN, accused. ANTHONY
KIDAGAN y PAQUITO, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

PARAS, J.:
In an information dated November 3, 1983 filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bontoc, Mountain Province, Branch 35, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 536, Anthony Kidagan y Paquito alias "Agnawa" was charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide defined and
penalized under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and committed as follows:

That at nighttime on or before December 4, 1982, Mountain Province, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with lewd designs and armed with a bolo, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and have carnal knowledge of one Paula Sagamla, by means of force, violence and
intimidation with the use of his said bolo, and immediately after having sexual intercourse with the victim, the said
accused, with treachery and with the evident purpose of silencing the victim and concealing the crime, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously strike and hack said Paula Sagamla with his bolo inflicting upon her, mortal
wound at the left neck and infra- aural area, which injury and other injuries inflicted by the accused upon said victim on
other parts of her body while raping her, were the direct and proximate cause of her death.

1
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. After trial or on March 28, 1989, the lower
court rendered a judgment of conviction in this wise:

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, accused Anthony Kidagan alias "Agnawa "is
hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Rape with
Homicide and considering the presence of two aggravating circumstances and the
indeterminate sentence law not applicable in this case, accused is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.

Accused is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P30,000.00,
Philippine Currency.

Accused is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Paula Sagamla the sum of
2
P7,987.50 representing burial expenses, and the sum of P20,000.00 as moral damages.

Thus, the instant appeal.

The facts of the case, as found by the trial court, are undisputed.

In the afternoon of December 4, 1982, Victor Gabaen and his girlfriend Paula Sagamla (victim), both 18
years old, left the sitio of Cagubatan together for sitio Tue to inform Gabaen's parents of their intention
to get married as Paula was already two (2) months pregnant. On the way, however, Paula became
reluctant and ashamed to meet the parents of Gabaen so they decided to return to Cagubatan without
reaching their destination. 3

On their way back, at around 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon, they stopped at Tompacan and sat down
under a santol tree. At this juncture, a man armed with a bolo, surreptitiously and without any warning
approached Gabaen and Sagamla from behind and shouted "whoa!" As Gabaen looked behind to see
the person the latter hammered his head with the handle of his bolo causing Gabaen to fall to the ground
unconscious. While lying on his stomach, Gabaen was able to regain consciousness and as he looked
around, he saw the man having sexual intercourse with his girlfriend Paula Sagamla. He could not do
anything for he felt weak. After having sexual intercouse with Paula, the man approached Victor Gabaen
and struck the latter with his bolo hitting Gabaen's nape. After hitting Gabaen, the man left. Gabaen
managed to stand up and found Paula lying on her back with a hack wound on her neck and with her
skirt lifted up to her waist and her blouse raised up to her neck exposing her breast and her genital
organ. Paula was dead. Her panty was found approximately one-and-a-half meters from where she lay. 4
Victor Gabaen managed to reach Cagubatan and was brought by his uncles to the hospital.

At about midnight of the same day, December 4, 1982, Paula's father, Lauriano Sagamla, received a
report that his daughter was missing and that her companion came home wounded. Upon hearing the
report, Lauriano Sagamla went with some companions to the Mankayan Police Station and reported the
matter. Thereafter, together with his wife and barrio mates, Lauriano Sagamla proceeded to Cagubatan
and reached the place in the early morning. A number of people and Tadian policemen were already
there. Lauriano Sagamla found his dead daughter lying on her back with a hack wound on her neck and
traces of fingernail scratches on her body. (TSN July 16, 1984, pp. 46-49). After the police officers have
seen and taken pictures of the body of the victim and inspected the scene of the crime, Paula's body
was carried and brought home to Bedbed Mankayan, Benguet.

A post-mortem examination conducted on December 6, 1982 by Dr. Mario K Abuan showed the
following:

EXTERNAL PHYSICAL FINDINGS:

xxx xxx xxx

Deep gaping wound at the left neck and infra-aural area with blood clotted stains around
the said wound, generalized contussion with hematomas and pinch marks of the faceleft
cheek.

xxx xxx xxx

HEAD AND NECK

The forehead and (R) cheek were characterized with plenty of hematomas. There were
five (5) pinch marks each corresponding to a finger with contusion/hematomas on the (L)
cheek. Mouth was sightly opened with the teeth visible, eyes were closed. On the
posterior of the neck starting from the cervical region is a deep hacking wound about 6
inches long in its entire length extending about 4 cm. right beyond the cervical vertebral
column up to the infra-aural area (L) side. The wound was about 7 cm. in its depth
completely bisecting the involved vertebral column with portions of the spinal gray
matter and brain tissues clearly visible, the stenoclidomastoid portions of the trapezius
muscles exposing the carotid ,subclavian arteris, the parotid glands and some nerves.
Hacked portions were greenish in color exceeding odorous smell. There were no other
similar wounds on other parts of the neck. On the posterior portion, (L) side, infra-
occipital was depression/hematoma about 5 x 8 cm. in its greatest dimensions.

THORAX AND ABDOMEN:

There were occasional contusions/hematomas and bite marks at the breast area and
scratch marks at the epigastric area.

EXTREMITIES:
 UPPER EXTREMITIES: There were minor cuts about 2 cm. at the base of the thumb and
second finger (L) hand. There were multiple contussions/hematomas at the arm and
forearm region, anterior part. 5

On July 24, 1983, a certain Roberto Tuldikan was investigated at the Tadian (Mt. Province) Police station
in connection with the killing of a certain Fernando Pitlongay. Tuldikan gave an extrajudicial confession
wherein he claimed that herein accused Anthony Kidagan told him that he (Anthony Kidagan) killed a
girl in Cagubatan and wounded said girl's companion.

On the basis of this revelation, Anthony Kidagan was summoned and investigated on July 25, 1983,
wherein he allegedly gave an extrajudicial confession admitting the raping and killing of Paula Sagamla
and the wounding of her boyfriend. Based on this alleged extrajudicial confession, Anthony Kidagan
was charged with and eventually convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide.

The accused alleges that he does not know anything about the raping and killing of Paula Sagamla and
that he was forced to sign his alleged extrajudicial confession. While admitting having signed the waiver
in his extrajudicial confession, the accused claims that his constitutional rights and the waiver he
signed were not explained to him. He further contends that even when he was brought before the mayor
for the subscription of his alleged confession, the mayor did not explain to him the contents of said
confession. The accused also admitted that he never informed the mayor of his maltreatment by the
policemen because of his fear that he would receive more maltreatment from the hands of the police
officers.

Evidence for the defense also shows that when the lone eyewitness of the prosecution (Victor Gabaen)
was asked to Identify the accused Anthony Kidagan, Gabaen failed to point to the accused as the person
who raped and killed his girlfriend Paula. In the affidavit executed by Gabaen, he pointed to a certain
Sario Ladangan as the culprit in the instant case. A criminal complaint was allegedly filed charging said
Sario Ladangan with Murder with Frustrated Murder. Furthermore, a certain police officer Melencio
Bulaga stated in his affidavit that when he investigated Gabaen at the hospital, the latter pointed to Sario
Ladangan, his alleged love rival for the hand of Paula Sagamla, as the perpetrator of the crime at bar. 6

The sole issue in the instant case is whether or not the guilt of accused-appellant Anthony Kidagan has
been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Crucial to the resolution of this issue is the determination of the
validity of the extrajudicial confession upon which the trial court based its judgment of conviction.

The pertinent provisions of law are found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution, which are as
follows:

Section 17. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process
of law.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 19. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved ...

Section 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to renmain silent and to counsel and
to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence. (Emphasis supplied) 7

The extrajudicial confession of accused Anthony Kidagan having been made on July 25, 1983, it must
therefore be considered in the light of the aforequoted law.
Patrolman Dionisio Dennen who took the statements of the accused, testified on cross-examination:

Q My question is, did you personally explain to him in detail the meaning of the constitutional right
to remain silent and to counsel?

A No sir but it was explained by Mr. Depayso, Joaquin.

Q But Mr. Depayso was not an investigating officer is that correct?

A Yes sir.

Q Now, when this Roberto Tuldikan was being investigated, was there any counsel present at the
time of his investigation?

A None sir.

Q Now, marked as Exhibit "G-5" of the prosecution is the supposed waiver of the accused Roberto
Tuldikan; was there a counsel present when the accused was supposed to have waived his right to
remain silent and to counsel was there a counsel present?

A None sir, but there were two witnesses whom I invited to the police station in the persons of
Joaquin Depayso and Ponciano Ma-ing assist in the course of the investigation.

Q But these two persons Depayso and Maing are not lawyers, is that correct?

A What I know is Mr. Depayso is a law graduate and Mr. Maing is not a lawyer.

Q And this Depayso never passed the bar, is that correct?

A As far as I know he did not pass the bar sir.

Q Now, it would seem from the sworn statement that Mr. Roberto Tuldikan was being investigated
for a crime of murder with robbery at Ipos Dalit, Tadian, Mountain Province, did you inform the
accused Roberto Tuldikan that he was being charged of murder with robbery which is punishable
with reclusion perpetua to death?

A No sir.

Q Now, it appears that there is only a thumbmark of, above the typewritten name of Roberto
Tuldikan in Exhibit "G" for the prosecution which is supposed to be the sworn statement of this
Roberto Tuldikan, is this Roberto Tuldikan illiterate?

Q What I know sir is that he does not know how to write sir. He does not also know how to read?

A Yes sir.

Q Now, let us go to the other accused, Anthony Kidagan, when was he apprehended?

A I do not know sir.

Q But it was you who investigated Anthony Kidagan.

A Yes sir.

Q And you are supposed to know the date when he was apprehended?

A I was only called to the police station to investigate him sir.

Q Now, where was he investigated, this Anthony Kidagan?

A Anthony Kidagan was investigated inside the office of the Station Commander.
 Q Were you alone when you investigated him?

A No sir.

Q Who were present?

A Present during the investigation were Police Captain Rafael Delson, Mr. Depayso and Mr. Maing,
Ponciano.

Q When was Anthony Kidagan investigated?

A I investigated Anthony Kidagan in the afternoon of July 25, 1983 sir.

Q What time in the afternoon did you investigate Anthony Kidagan?

A I can recall sir that from 1:00 o'clock to 3:00 o'clock p.m. sir.

Q Now, you mentioned to this court that among the people present during the investigation was
the chief of the INP in Tadian Rafael Delson, did he also investigate the accused when you were
investigating, did he also investigate the accused?

A No sir.

Q Of course this investigation of Anthony Kidagan was written down also, is that correct?

A It was written sir.

Q Who typewrote the statement of Anthony Kidagan?

A I was the one sir.

Q He signed his sworn statement, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q When did Kidagan sign his sworn statement?

A On July 25, 1983 in the afternoon.

Q Immediately after it was taken out from the typewriter is that correct?

A Just after it was explained sir.

Q Was there any counsel present when Mr. Kidagan was being investigated by your office, by you
personally before the office?

A None sir, but there were two witnesses during the investigation in the persons of Joaquin
Depayso and Ponciano Ma-ing who assisted him in the course of the investigation.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, you will agree with me that there is nothing in this alleged confession of his that he was
even informed of the effects of his sworn statement?

A None sir.

Q Did you inform him that robbery with murder is punishable with life imprisonment?

A No, sir.
 xxx xxx xxx

COURT

Now, you said that they signed their sworn statements, before whom did they sign? A They signed
their statements before us with the witnesses.

COURT

Why? Did you have the authority to let the affiant sign before you?

8
A None your honor.

. In the same extrajudicial confession, it is clearly stated that the examination was in connection
with the murder of a certain Fernando Pitlongay (and not with the rape with murder of Paula
Sagamla):

APPRAISAL:

Mr. Kidagan, you are hereby informed that you are under investigation in connection with the
murder of Fernando Pitlongay at sitio Inuman ,Kayam, Tadian, Mountain Province in the afternoon
of July 19, 1983. You are also informed that under our constitution you have the right to remain
silent and to be assisted by a lawyer of your own choice ...

Q Are you therefore so willing to speak or talk about the circumstances surrounding the killing of
Fernando Pitlongay along the National Road at sitio Inuman Kayam Tadian near Aluling Cervantes,
Ilocos Sur last July 19, 1983 even without the assistance of a lawyer?

9
A Yes sir.

Patrolman Dennen testified on direct examination:

Q Will you tell also your procedure in taking down the written investigation of Anthony Kidagan ?

A I informed him that this is an investigation in connection with the killing of Fernando Pitlongay of
10
sitio Inuman Kayam ,Tadian, Mountain Province ...

In the course of the investigation, however, the investigator suddenly shifted to the subject matter
of the instant case. Thus:

Q But you knew before hand that it was Miguel Ya-aw who escorted Fernando together with his
carabao to Tue, Tadian?

A Yes, because Bulay-og told me sir.

Q Let us divert our topic to the Cagubatan murder case wherein Paula Sagamla was killed and that
her boyfriend Victor Gabaen was wounded. Are you aware of this incident?

11
A Yes sir.

It is obvious from the foregoing testimonies that accused Anthony Kidagan was not assisted by counsel before and during the
investigation. Neither was his waiver of his right to counsel made with the assistance of counsel. Of equal importance is the fact that the
investigation was for the murder of a certain Fernando Pitlongay, and not on the rape and murder of Paula Sagamla. It is evident that the
accused was manipulated into giving his extrajudicial statements is on the case at bar. The accused was definitely not apprised of his
constitutional rights as the previous apprisal was in connection with the murder of Fernando Pitlongay and not with the subject matter of
the present case. Thus, he was not sufficiently informed of his rights during custodial investigation. It is Our considered view, therefore,
that the accused's extrajudicial confession should not have been admitted for having been obtained in clear violation of the constitution.

The Court has enunciated in a number of decisions that:

No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested,
by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the Court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his
 behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of
counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory in
12
whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

That principle is now enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly mandates that the waiver of the
right to counsel must be in writing and made in the presence of counsel, otherwise the extrajudicial
confession is inadmissible. 13

It is manifest that the trial court's judgment of conviction is based solely on such extrajudicial
confession which We find to be inadmissible. It is basically on this ground that the Solicitor General has
recommended to Us the acquittal of the accused-appellant. We find no plausible reason to deny the said
recommendation as the guilt of the accused has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

It may be disputed that apart from the extrajudicial confession of the accused, there is also the
testimony of Victor Gabaen who allegedly witnessed the rape and killing of Paula Sagamla.

We likewise find this testimony of no value at all. First, it is clear that the trial court's judgment was not
based on said testimony but solely on the accused's alleged extrajudicial confession. Second, it is clear
from the records that before the extrajudicial confession was taken and before the instant case was
filed, Victor Gabaen made a sworn statement positively Identifying a certain Sario Ladangan as the
culprit (Exhibit "1-B"). A criminal complaint was in fact filed against said Sario Ladangan docketed as
Criminal Case No. 608. Pertinent portions of Victor Gabaen's sworn statement are quoted hereunder:

Q What prompted you to this office this day?

A I came to file complaint sir.

Q Against whom are you filing your complaint?

A I am filing my complaint against Sario Ladangan of Cagubatan, Tadian, Mt. Province.

Q Why are you filing complaint against Sario Ladangan?

A I am filing my complaint against him because he hacked me and killed my girlfriend Paula
Sagamla.

Q When and where did that incident happen?

14
A At about 6:00 o'clock on the evening of December 4, 1982 at Cagubatan, Tadian, Mt. Province .

The above-quoted sworn statement is corroborated by an affidavit executed by a certain Patrolman Melecio Bulaga attesting to the fact that
as early as December 5, 1983 (one day after the incident) Victor Gabaen already pointed to Sario Ladangan as the perpetrator of the crime
at bar.

As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, it was only after the extrajudicial confession of the accused that the earlier criminal complaint
(Criminal Case No. 608) was withdrawn, and Victor Gabaen started pointing a finger at accused Anthony Kidagan. Gabaen was never able
to explain his earlier statement that Sario Ladangan was the culprit and his (Gabaen's) sudden change of mind, this time pointing to
Anthony Kidagan as the one who hacked him and killed his girlfriend Paula. This issue was raised by the accused-appellant but the trial
court did not even bother to pass upon said issue.

Evidently, Victor Gabaen failed to Identify beyond doubt the perpetrator of the crime. The prosecution has failed to show that accused-
appellant Anthony Kidagan is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime with which he was charged and convicted of. Consequently, the
principle that the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved must prevail.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment convicting Anthony Kidagan is hereby REVERSED and he is ACQUITTED of the crime charged, with costs de
officio.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 75362 March 6, 1990

JESUS ESTACIO Y ESTRELLA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION, respondent.

Albano & Associates for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:
Petitioner Jesus Estacio y Estrella moves to reconsider Our Resolution dated January 27, 1987, dismissing for lack of merit his petition to review, set
aside and reverse the Decision of respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 6603 finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-principal
of the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public/Commercial Documents and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from Two (2)
years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum; to pay a
fine of P5,000.00; to indemnify Solid Bank, Lucena Branch and/or the Central Bank of the Philippines in the sum of P648,564.70 representing the
amount defrauded and to pay the proportionate costs. The facts upon which judgment of conviction rests are summarized by the respondent court as
follows:

The evidence for the prosecution is to the effect that on August 26, 1981, accused Romero Villasanta (still-at-large) opened a
Current Account with the Lucena City Branch of the Solid Bank. In his information sheet (Exhs. A and A-1), Villasanta
represented himself as engaged in the construction business. Villasanta deposited an initial amount of P1,500.00. His current
account number is 37-574. His check books carried the numbers 107301 to 107325.

As part of the sinister plot, Villasanta opened another current account with the Cubao Branch of the Solid Bank under date of
August 27, 1981. Villasanta represented himself anew as a businessman and owner of the Romero Villasanta Construction
located at 14 P. Tuazon Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City. Villasanta deposited initially a check for P10,000.00 and cash in the amount
of P10,020.00. His Current Account Number is 115-02543-3.

Evidence further shows that on August 25, 1981, accused Romero Villasanta opened a current account with the Traders Royal
Bank, Pasig Branch. He presented himself as engaged in the construction business. He made an initial deposit in the amount of
P2,000.00. His current account number is 72-700934-6. His checkbooks carried the numbers 176931 to 177000.

After having opened three current accounts with three different banks, Villasanta and the syndicate began their insidious
operations. On August 28, 1981, Villasanta deposited three checks with his Current Account No. 72-700934-6 at the Traders
Royal Bank, Pasig Branch totalling P653,485.70 (Exh. T). Two of these checks were drawn against his Current Account No. 37-
574 with the Solid Bank, Lucena City Branch, namely: AA-37-107302 for P269,200.00 and AA-37-107304 for P379,285.70 or a
total of P648,485.70. It bears emphasizing that at the time these checks were issued, Villasanta had a mere P1,500.00
deposited with his Current Account No. 37-574 with the Solid Bank, Lucena City.
 On the same day of August 28, 1981, the deposited checks AA-37-107302 and AA-37-107304 were forwarded to the Clearing
House of the Central Bank for the standard clearing thereof. At the Central Bank Clearing House were accused Manuel
Valentino (who later on became a state witness), a bookkeeper detailed at the Clearing Office, Central Bank of the Philippines
and accused Jesus Estacio, janitor-messenger of the Central Bank of the Philippines who were then waiting for the demand
envelope containing the checks deposited by accused Villasanta. As soon as the demand envelope arrived, Estacio got the
same, placed it inside his push cart and brought the envelope inside the comfort room at the fourth floor of the Central Bank
Building. Accused Estacio then waited for state witness Valentino and accused Villasanta. When state witness Valentino and
Villasanta arrived, the former took the demand envelope and pulled out the checks in question and thereafter gave the same to
accused Villasanta. State witness Valentino got hold of the attached bank clearing statement of Solid Bank, Lucena Branch. The
amount of "P628,564.00" under the column "Amount Received" opposite the words "Traders Royal Bank", was thereafter
crossed out to make it appear that the same was not received while the total amount of "P992,723.99" appearing in the clearing
statement was likewise crossed out and replaced by the figures "P344,238.29" (Exh. G).

After the accused had altered the bank clearing statement, accused Valentino, the CB bookkeeper, prepared a Central Bank
Manifest (Exh. H) and in the column "Amount" he placed the correct figures P992,723.99 in the line opposite the Consolidated
Bank and Trust Company. As soon as this Manifest was signed by prosecution witness Alfonso Magsalin, CB Chief of Division,
accused Valentino superimposed thereon the amount of "P344,238.29" thereby making it appear that such was the only amount
received for Solid Bank, Lucena Branch.

The demand envelope for Solid Bank, Lucena Branch, together with the altered Central Bank Manifest and the altered bank
clearing statement, were thereafter sent to the Regional Central Bank Clearing House at Lucena City. The Regional Central
Bank Clearing House official, Adriano Valenzena, testified that he noticed nothing irregular when he received the demand
envelope for Solid Bank, Lucena, including the banking clearing statement and the Central Bank Manifest. He explained that he
saw the alteration but did not consider the same unusual because the balances in the bank clearing statement and in the Central
Bank Manifest are the same.

CB rules and regulations provide that out of town checks are cleared within three working days from date of presentation.
Accordingly, the Traders Royal Bank, Pasig Branch, considered as regular the deposits made by accused Villasanta in his
Account No. 37-574 drawn against his current account with Solid Bank, Lucena Branch, because no objection or notice of
refusal was received by Traders Royal Bank from Solid Bank, Lucena Branch, within the prescribed time, and understandably
so, as there were no checks received by the Solid Bank, Lucena Branch. Account No. 37-574 in the name of Romero Villasanta
was accordingly credited with the amount of P653,485.70. This represents the amount of the two (2) checks in the total sum of
P648,564.70, while the P500,000.00 represented the third check deposited by accused Villasanta with Traders Royal Bank on
August 28, 1981.

Under date of September 4, 1981, accused Villasanta issued TRB Check No. 176954 in the amount of P500,000.00 and made
payable to cash. This check was deposited with his Current Account No. 11502543-3 with Solid Bank, Cubao Branch. This
amount of P500,000.00 was drawn against the current account of Villasanta with the Traders Royal Bank, Pasig. As of
September 4, 1981, the balance of Account No. 72-700934-6 of Romero Villasanta with Traders Royal Bank, after deducting the
said P500,000.00 was P184,485.70.

On September 7, 1981, Villasanta encashed with the Traders Royal Bank, Pasig Branch, TRB Check No. 176956 in the amount
of P69,000.00. The following day, he encashed with the Traders Royal Bank, Pasig Branch, TRB Check No. 176958 in the
Amount of P84,500.00.

After accused Villasanta deposited the earlier mentioned TRB Check No. 176954 for P500,000.00 with his Current Account No.
115-2543-2 with Solid Bank, Cubao, his balance as stated in his ledger was P500,512.02 (Exh. M-1). Subsequently, Villasanta
encashed the following Solid Bank Checks, to wit:

1. Solid Bank Check No. 81230 dated 9/8/81 for P4,500.00 (Exh. M-3)

2. Solid Bank Check No. 81231 dated 9/8/81 for P420,000.00 (Exh. N-4)

3. Solid Bank Check No. 81232 dated 9/8/81 for P79,500.00 (Exh. N-5)

After the foregoing withdrawals and/or encashments, the balance of Account No. 115-02543-3 of accused Villasanta with the
Solid Bank, Cubao Branch as of September 8, 1981 was P l,012.04 (Exh. M-1).

All told, the syndicate was able to defraud the Solid Bank, Lucena City Branch and/or the Central in the total amount of
P648,564.70. This syndicate was able to achieve by falsifying the Central Bank Manifest of August 28, 1981 (Exh. H) and the
clearing statement for Solid Bank, Lucena, dated August 28, 1981 (Exh. G). (pp. 25-30, Rollo).

In seeking a reconsideration of Our aforesaid Resolution, petitioner claims that:

a) his extra-judicial statements dated May 4 and 5, 1982 (Exhs. E and E-1) are inadmissible in evidence as he was not properly
informed of his constitutional rights, and there was no valid waiver on his part of such rights prior to the taking of those
statements; that the statements were extracted through force and intimidation;
 b) the evidence adduced by the prosecution did not link him to the conspiracy.

In the alternative, petitioner asserts that if he was indeed guilty, his criminal liability should only be as an accessory or an accomplice; and he should
be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

The foregoing grounds now relied upon by petitioner were the same grounds of his petition which We had already considered when We issued our
subject Resolution. Re-examination of the evidence has yielded nothing to impel the Court to reconsider its previous dismissal of the petition.

We first pass upon the question of whether or not petitioner's extra-judicial confession (Exh. E) is admissible in evidence.

The extra-judicial statement of petitioner starts with the following questions and answers:

Q1. Question

We are informing you that you are under investigation in connection with the complaint of the Consolidated
Bank & Trust Corporation and the Central Bank for alleged Estate Falsification committed at the Central
Bank of the Philippines. But before we ask you any question, you must understand your legal rights. You
have the right to remain silent. You have the right not to give any statement if you do not wish to. Anything
you say may be used as evidence against you in any proceeding. You are entitled to the assistance of
counsel of your own choice. If you cannot afford a lawyer and you want one, a lawyer will be appointed for
you before we ask you any question. Now, after having been informed of your rights, are you still willing to
give a free and voluntary statement and swear to tell the truth in this investigation?

Answer:

Yes, sir.

Q2. Question:

Are you willing to sign a waiver of your rights?

Answer:

Yes, sir. (p. 11, Rollo)

The foregoing clearly shows that the investigator had advised petitioner of his constitutional rights.

Relying very heavily on the case of People v. Galit, (135 SCRA 465) petitioner now contends that there was no valid waiver of his right to remain silent
and to counsel because the same was not made with the assistance of counsel.

We agree with the petitioner that the prevailing rule is still that laid down by this Court in the said Galit case as follows:

This Court, in the case of Morales v. Ponce Enrile, laid down the correct procedure for peace officers to follow when making an
arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation, and which we reiterate:

At the time the person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he
must show the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that
any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative or any one who chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation
shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested by any person in his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by any one on his behalf. The right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the
procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part shall be inadmissible in evidence.

But while it is true that petitioner's waiver of his right to remain silent and to assistance by counsel was not made in the presence of counsel, the
defect was cured and the requirement laid down in the Galit case was substantially complied with when Estacio's lawyer, one Atty. Madarietta, arrived
at the closing stage of the interrogation, read the statement and talked to Estacio before the latter signed it.

Q After signing the statement?

A I would like to emphasize the fact that the accused Jesus Estacio signed the statement in the presence
of his counsel here. Exactly, he arrived before the closing stage of the statement taken.
 Q You are referring to?

A This representation (Atty. Madarietta).

CHAIRMAN

Q And before Estacio signed, was the lawyer of Jesus Estacio whom you pointed to as Atty. Madarietta
given the opportunity to read the statement before Estacio signed?

A Because that is the condition of the affiant, he will not sign the statement before his lawyer reads the
statement.

ATTY. MADARIETTA:

May I manifest for the record that I was able to talk with Estacio before he signed this statement marked
as Exhibit E, Your Honor. (Emphasis supplied) (t.s.n., testimony of NBI Agent Salvador Ranin, page 15,
hearing of January 17, 1985).

As respondent court aptly ruled, if the accused had not voluntarily waived his constitutional rights prior to the investigation or had wanted to change
his mind by availing of his right to remain silent after his counsel arrived and read the statement before the accused signed it, he could easily have
refused to sign the same and demand possession of the unsigned statement.

The repudiation by petitioner of his confession on the ground that it was extracted through force and intimidation is negated by the fact that the
confession contained details which only petitioner could have known. Thus the petitioner narrates his actual participation, as follows:

A I remember that sometime during the middle part of August, 1981, Manuel Valentino contacted me and
told me that we were going to have a meeting with Felipe Salamanca at the Ramada Hotel that night. I
went with Manuel Valentino to Ramada Hotel that night, and upon reaching thereat, Felipe Salamanca was
already there, together with a person whom I know as Romeo Villasanta (real name Romeo Portugal). We
occupied a room at the said hotel. When we were already inside the room, Felipe Salamanca discussed
with us a plan to defraud the Solid Bank, Lucena.

xxx xxx xxx

Q How did you know that at the meeting at the Ramada Hotel, the plan discussed thereat was to defraud
the Solid Bank, Lucena?

A I came to know this, because as they were discussing the plan, Felipe Salamanca was writing the name
of the bank to be victimized and I read it as Solid Bank, Lucena Branch. But after the conference, this
paper was burned by Felipe Salamanca. Besides, Manuel Valentino told me that our operation was against
the Solid Bank, Lucena Branch.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Will you please continue with your narration?

A If I remember right, it was August 21, 1981 (Friday) when Manuel Valentino asked me to work overtime
at the Clearing House because the check which Pepe Salamanca deposited was due to arrive at the
Clearing Office that day and that if the check would arrive, Manuel Valentino would give me a signal. At
about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that day, Manuel Valentino gave the signal to me, indicating the
check was already there. Upon receipt of the signal from Manuel Valentino, I brought in my pushcart to the
Clearing House and immediately, Manuel Valentino loaded the brown envelope, which was actually the
demand envelope for Solid Bank, Lucena, and as soon as it was loaded I brought it to the comfort room at
the 4th floor. Later, Manuel Valentino was already inside the comfort room, he got the demand envelope
for Solid Bank, Lucena, and then I went out to act as lookout while Valentino was doing something inside.
After a lapse of about 15 minutes, he went out of the comfort room and returned the demand envelope for
Solid Bank, Lucena Branch, then he proceeded to his office at the Clearing House. Then I followed him
there and brought in my pushcart, where he got the demand envelope for Solid Bank, Lucena Branch
which he placed in the rack intended for Central Bank Clearing House Lucena. Thereafter, I went out and
performed my duties doing overtime work.

In People v. Tintero, 111 SCRA 714, We ruled:

. . . According to our jurisprudence, details disclosed in the confession which could have been known only by the declarant
indicate the voluntariness in executing the same (People v. Bautista, 92 SCRA 465). Voluntariness in the execution of and
details narrated in the extra-judicial confession render the claim by the appellant of duress in its execution incredible. (People v.
 Limoso, 91 SCRA 364). And in People v. Villa, 93 SCRA 716, We held that the confessions of the accused cannot be totally
ignored even if they repudiated all of them on the ground of alleged extraction by force and intimidation, because the narrations
contained in them coincide with the narration given by the eye witnesses. And where the narration of the defendant tends to
explain his conduct or shift the blame to others, this is a circumstance that may be demonstrative of voluntariness and freedom
than of compulsion (People v. Santalani, 93 SCRA 313; See also People v. Nillos, 127 SCRA 207 [1984]; Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the respondent Sandiganbayan aptly ruled:

With the foregoing as backdrop, We find it difficult to give credit to Estacio's assertion that his statement given to the NBI was
taken under duress, compulsion, force or intimidation. The statement of Estacio contained intimate details of the conspiracy and
the syndicate's operations which could only have been known to him alone and which could not have been known to his
interrogator. This is not to mention that the same contained exculpatory statements in certain portions thereof which are
indicative of voluntariness and freedom of expression (People v. Balana, 123 SCRA 614). (pp. 36-37, Rollo)

Be this as it may, the point sought to be made by petitioner is of no moment. Even without the extra-judicial confession, the evidence on record is
sufficient to sustain petitioner's culpability as a co-conspirator in the defraudation of the bank.

Manuel Valentino, petitioner's co-accused turned state witness, positively and categorically testified on the knowledge and participation of petitioner in
the felonious act, to wit:

Q Do you know also the other accused here, Mr. Romeo Villasanta?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Would you tell us how you came to know him?

A I came to know him sometime in May 1981.

Q Where did you meet each other?

A I was met by Mr. Salamanca in front of the Central Bank, sir. Harrizon Plaza.

Q Did you proceed anywhere else after that?

A After the meeting, we proceeded to the Ramada Hotel lobby.

Q Who were with you during the time that you were in Ramada Hotel?

A We were four.

Q Who were they?

A Salamanca, Villasanta, Estacio and myself.

Q What if any did you talk about?

A They told me that they have a plan to defraud a bank in Lucena City.

Q Do you recall the name of this particular bank in Lucena City?

A It was about the Solid Bank.

Q What were you supposed to do in defrauding the bank in Lucena City?

A They told me about the pilferage scheme.

Q Will you tell us what is the pilferage scheme?

A Pilferage scheme, we will get the check from the demand envelope, then change the corresponding
bank statement and subtract that certain amount to the total of the Manifest. That's all sir.
 Q During the meeting was any assignment given to Mr. Estacio, the accused?

A He is only charged in bringing out the demand envelope, sir. (TSN, April 18, 1985, pp. 8-9)

Q What happened during the target date of August 28, 1981?

A I was amazed that time because I saw that Villasanta was there at the clearing operations division.

Q What time?

A Between 3:00 to 4:00 o'clock p.m.

Q So as soon as you saw Villasanta, what did you do?

A He approached me and told me that they have already deposited the subject check.

Q What did you do when you were told about that?

A I have signalled Estacio to bring out the demand envelope.

Q What did Estacio do?

A He brought out the demand envelope and proceeded to the 4th floor of the 5-storey building of the
Central Bank.

Q Who was with Mr. Estacio when he brought the demand envelope to the 4th floor?

A Romeo Villasanta.

Q How about you?

A I was busy preparing my proof sheet, then after that, I followed them.

Q Did you catch up with Villasanta and Jesus Estacio at the 4th floor?

A Yes sir.

Q What happened?

A I saw the demand envelope was already opened and the subject check was already pilfered by
Villasanta and the corresponding bank statement was already changed by him. (TSN, April 18, 1985, pp.
11-12).

Q What happened as soon as Mr. Villasanta was able to get the checks and altered the figures which you
identified?

A Villasanta then left the bank with the check already.

Q How about you, what did you do?

A I proceeded to my work in the clearing operations division.

Q How about Mr. Estacio, what did he do?

A He brought that demand envelope back to the rack where he took it earlier. (TSN, pp. 14-15)

Anent petitioner's claim that respondent Sandiganbayan erred when it held that he (Estacio) was part of the conspiracy, suffice it to say that
petitioner's culpability as a co-conspirator in the defraudation of the bank was amply demonstrated and established by the evidence on record. His
presence at the Ramada Hotel where he and his co-conspirators discussed the mechanics of their sinister plot and each conspirator's role defined,
and his execution of his role thereafter, unquestionably demonstrates his conspiratorial designs.
We held in People v. Dalusag, 133 SCRA 15, that:

There is conspiracy where several accused by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and another
performing another part so as to complete it with view to the attainment of the same object, and their acts, though apparently
independent are in fact concerted action and concurrence of petitioners. (Cited in People v. Petenia, 143 SCRA 361)

Finally, petitioner's claim of voluntary surrender, was correctly disregarded by the court a quo. We held in People v. Hanasan, 29 SCRA 534 that the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may properly be appreciated in favor of the accused when the following requisites concur: (a) the
offender has not been actually arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to an agent of a person in authority; and (c)
the surrender was voluntary. (People v. Canamo, 138 SCRA 141).

The foregoing requisites are not present in the case at bar. The evidence on record discloses that petitioner went to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) on February 16, 1982 upon the instruction of his superior and not of his own accord. Neither did he go to the NBI to place himself
at the disposal of the authorities.

Indeed, on this point the respondent Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that:

Estacio cannot invoke the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. When he went to the NBI on February 16, 1982, it was
in obedience to the order of his superior, Atty. Agapito Fajardo, the then officer-in-charge of the Anti-Bank Fraud Unit of the
Central Bank. In other words, he went there not spontaneously with intent to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities
because he acknowledged his guilt or wished to save the authorities the time and trouble of searching for him.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 93752 July 15, 1992

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LAROY BUENAFLOR y TUAZON alias "Larry," defendant-appellant.

FELICIANO, J.:

Laroy Buenaflor, who was charged with and convicted of rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the offended
party in the sum of P30,000.00 and the costs of suit, is before the Court on appeal.

The complaint filed by the offended party, Isabella Federis, against appellant Buenaflor reads as follows:

That on or about August 19, 1989, in the City of Naga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with lewd design, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, threats and
intimidation, commit sexual intercourse against one Isabella Federis y Cedron, against her will and consent.

1
Contrary to law.
The appellant having entered a plea of not guilty on arraignment, the case proceeded to trial. On 10 May 1990,
judgment was rendered by the trial court with the following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Laroy Buenaflor y Tuazon, alias "Larry," guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape under Article 335, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
accused is further ordered to indemnify the offended party, Isabella Federis, the sum of
P30,000.00 and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. 2

The facts constituting the offense were summarized by the trial court in its decision in the following
manner:

As the evidence of the prosecution stands, we find from the clear and positive testimony of the
complainant that she is 21 years old, single, a student at the University of Nueva Caceres in
Naga City, with residence at Lourdes Young, Nabua, Camarines Sur; that at about 11:00 o'clock
in the evening of August 19, 1989, she was on her way home to her boarding house in
Peñafrancia Avenue, Naga City, together with her boardmate Imelda Barcebal, coming from the
Bichara Theater, and they had to walk in returning to their boarding house; that when they
reached the Naga City Post Office along Peñafrancia Avenue, the accused coming from behind
them and armed with a knife put his left arm on her shoulder and with his right hand poked a
knife on the right side of her body and told her not to move because she might be killed; that she
called for Imelda Barcebal but the latter kept on running away and left her alone. The accused
then transferred the position of the knife from the right side of her body to the right side of her
neck. She tried to shout but the accused pressed harder the knife on her neck and dragged her
to a darker portion of the Mabini Interior and she noticed that the accused had no more pants
and brief and then pushed her down and laid on top of her and tried to remove her t-shirt
(Exhibit D), and [told] her not to shout because he was going to kill her. The accused was also
able to remove her pants (Exhibit E) and panty (Exhibit F) and, thereafter, inserted his penis on
her vagina for which she felt pain and the accused started kissing her on her lips and other parts
of her body. That she kept on crying and the accused threatened to kill her.

From the testimony of the complainant it has been further sufficiently established that, when she
was able to regain her strength she told the accused that wherever he will go she will go with
him, but requested the accused that she first be allowed to go home to got her clothes and
money, to which the accused agreed. The accused then accompanied the complainant on the
way to her boarding house, but when they reached the Mary Anne Snackhouse which was just
in front of the boarding house, the complainant told the accused to wait for her in that place. She
then proceeded to her boarding house and upon reaching the same she was met by Aurora
Ozaeta, Imelda Barcebal and the rest of her co-boarders. She then related to them the incident
that happened to her and further told them that the man who raped her was waiting for her in
front of the Mary Anne Snackhouse and described to them the person of the accused and the
clothes he was wearing. Her boardmate, Aurora Ozaeta, called up the police station giving said
information given by the complainant identifying the person of the accused and where he could
be found. That after a while policemen arrived informing them that they were able to apprehend
the person reported to have raped the complainant. The policemen showed to her a knife
(Exhibit B) which the complainant identified as the one used by the accused in poking at her.
The policemen went back to their police headquarters. After a while her parents arrived and they
all went to the police headquarters. Aurora Ozaeta and Imelda Barcebal followed to the police
headquarters. That at the police headquarters the policemen showed to the complainant the
person apprehended and the complainant readily identified him as the person who raped her. 3

Before this Court, the sole error assigned by the appellant is that:
 [t]he trial court erred in not considering the mitigating circumstances of imbecility and
drunkenness in convicting the accused/appellant of the crime charged. 4

Appellant did not seriously try to deny that he had sexual intercourse with Isabella Federis on the night of 19
August 1989. He, however, denied having sexually assaulted Isabella; he claimed that Isabella did not physically
resist the act of penile penetration and had in effect given her consent to it.

Appellant Buenaflor testified in substance that he was in Naga City Subdivision on 19 August 1989, in the house
of one Badong for whom he worked. He later declared that he was staying in his sister's house in Canaman,
Camarines Sur. On the night of 19 August 1989, he saw a movie at the Robertson Cinema; he left the cinema at
12:00 midnight and proceeded to the public plaza where he allegedly had been staying for fifteen (15) days. On
cross-examination, he declared that while at the plaza, he saw two (2) women talking. He approached them,
poked a knife at one of them (Isabella Federis) and led her away to a dark alley. There they performed the
sexual act, appellant stated, without Isabella offering any resistance and even embracing appellant in the course
of copulation. Appellant also testified that he was a "little bit drunk" during that time. 5

The trial court found that appellant Buenaflor had indeed forced himself on Isabella, that he had explicitly
admitted "poking a knife" at Isabella and that the testimony of Isabella that she had been forced down upon or
near a garbage heap in the dark alley of Mabini Interior and there ravished against her will, was forthright and
candid and worthy of belief. Appellant having presented no basis for rejecting and overturning the above finding
of coercion and intimidation, that finding must stand.

The principal submission of appellant was in fact that his criminal liability, if any, should at least have been
mitigated in view of his impaired mental faculties. Appellant apparently does not seek completely to avoid
criminal liability on the ground of imbecility as an exempting circumstance. The pleadings filed by appellant
merely tended to show erratic behavior and lack of coherence on his part in the course of trial, said to be
symptomatic of a diseased mind, which behavior, although not indicating complete deprivation of intelligence
and freedom of will, we are urged to take as basis for mitigation of liability.

During the pretrial conference, counsel for appellant stated that his client was suffering from mental disease. The
pretrial conference was thereupon reset to a later date and the trial court ordered appellant examined by a
physician to ascertain appellant's mental condition. Appellant Buenaflor was examined by Dr. Imelda Escuadra,
a medical specialist at the Don Susano Rodriguez Regional Mental Hospital. The report prepared by Dr.
Escuadra set forth the following information:

Brief Background History:

The patient is the fifth among eight siblings. He was born on February 14, 1968 by normal
spontaneous delivery, assisted by hilot at home. At age three months, he started to have
convulsions, up to age three years old. As a consequence, he had poor scholastic standing,
repeating Grade I several times and stopped at Grade II. He was observed to be childish with
poor speech development and behaved as "uto-uto."

Patient was accused of raping a girl last August 20, 1989. He was ordered to submit himself for
neuropsychiatric evaluation.

Mental Status Examination:

An adult male, with handcuffs, wearing clean printed polo shirt and faded maong pants. He had
pockmarks on his face due to pimple scars. He looked serious, with faraway gaze and at times
downcast eyes.

He claimed he was Larry Buenaflor, a resident of San Jose, Camarines Sur. He recognized his
companions: his mother and police escort. He claimed he finished Grade III. Initially, he denied
knowing the number of children in their family, later, he said there are four boys and five girls.
 He also claimed he did not know his age.

He admitted he had a case in court — rape; mentioned a girl named Annabel Frias as the victim,
a resident of Peñafrancia Street, Naga City. He narrated that he brought her home from Naga
City. With him that time was Ruel Villegas. He said he loved the girl and has been courting her
giving several dates when his love [was] accepted. He also said he raped the girl once but it was
Ruel who did it first. He cannot give the details of the incident of the crime.

He spoke coherently and relevantly but not spontaneous in character. He denied not [sic]
knowing some facts as his age, the number of children of the family and he was not sure of the
dates he gave. As he spoke, he sighed deeply.

He complained of impaired sleep and impaired appetite. He had impaired memory as evidenced
by his inability to recall important facts like number of children in the family.

During the second interview he was more relaxed, responded spontaneously and claimed he
had good sleep and appetite. No hallucinations were elicited.

In his third interview, he looked depressed, complaining of insomnia.

During the last interview, he was also depressed and complained of poor sleep.

Physical Examinations:

Essentially normal findings.

Psychological Testing:

Subject weighted a score of 37 with an IQ equivalent to 63 indicating mild mental deficiency

level of intellectual functioning. His judgment and comprehension are poor. Projectivewise,
depressive reaction is prominently established. Poor reality testing function is elicited.
Diagnosis:

1. Mental retardation

2. Reactive depression

3. No psychosis.

Remarks and Recommendations:

In view of the foregoing examinations and observations, the patient is suffering from Mental
Retardation and Reactive Depression. However, he is not psychotic.

A person with mental retardation has below normal intelligence as evidenced by the intelligence
quotient tests. He has poor memory, poor judgment and poor grasp of general information. He is
trainable up to the primary grades only. According to the "Synopsis of Psychiatry" by Kaplan a
patient with mental retardation "has concurrent deficits or impairment in adaptive functioning,
i.e., a person's effectiveness in meeting the standards expected for his or her age by his or her
cultural group in area such as social skills and responsibility, communicates daily living skills,
personal indulgence and self-sufficiency." (sic) Therefore, he is capable of undergoing judicial
trial with much difficulty. 6

Article 12 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:

 Art. 12. Circumstances which Exempt from Criminal Liability. — The following are exempt from
criminal liability:

1. An imbecile or insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

xxx xxx xxx

Imbecility, like insanity, is a defense which pertains to the mental condition of a person. Our case law
projects the same standards in respect of both insanity and imbecility, that is, that the insanity or
imbecility must constitute complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal act, or total
deprivation of freedom of the will. 7 The above quoted medical evidence that was admitted into the
record in the case at bar does not show complete deprivation (nor even substantial deprivation) of
intelligence on the part of appellant Buenaflor and he, accordingly, cannot be deemed exempted from
criminal liability for the rape of Isabella Federis. His behavior on the night he raped Isabella showed that
he was quite conscious of his acts and aware of the moral quality thereof.

At the same time, we believe, however, that the medical evidence of record does show that appellant Buenaflor's
mental faculties were to some extent retarded or impaired in their development, which impairment or retardation
reflects a diminished level of responsibility for his criminal acts. Article 13 (9) of the Revised Penal Code
provides as follows:

Art. 13. Mitigating Circumstances. — The following are mitigating circumstances:

xxx xxx xxx

(9) Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will power of the offender
without, however, depriving him of the consciousness of his acts.

xxx xxx xxx

We think that the mitigating circumstance contemplated in Article 13 (9) of the Revised Penal Code was present
in the case at bar.

Appellant, in addition, claimed intoxication as a mitigating circumstance. As earlier noted, he had declared on
cross-examination that he was a "little bit drunk" at the time be committed the act complained of. On that basis
alone, appellant asserts he should be credited with a mitigating circumstance.

The ordinary rule is that intoxication may be considered either as aggravating or as mitigating, depending upon
the circumstances attending the commission of the crime. Intoxication has the effect of decreasing the penalty, if
the intoxication is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the contemplated crime; upon the other hand,
when intoxication is habitual or intentional, it is considered as an aggravating circumstance. 8 The person pleading
intoxication must present proof that he had taken a quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, sufficient to produce the effect
9 10
of blurring his reason; and at the same time, he must prove that not only was intoxication not habitual but also that
11
his imbibing the alcoholic drink was not intended to fortify his resolve to commit the crime.

The record here does not show that appellant had taken an alcoholic beverage prior to raping Isabella Federis.
The testimony of appellant himself on direct examination did not establish such drinking as a fact. The sole basis
of appellant's claim to the alternative circumstance of intoxication is his own remark during cross-examination
that he was a "little bit drunk" when he inflicted himself sexually upon Isabella Federis. We do not believe that
appellant's own remark sufficiently established his asserted state of intoxication.

At any rate, the appreciation of a mitigating circumstance in favor of appellant Buenaflor would not have the
effect of reducing the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed upon him by the trial court. Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code prescribes that "in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, [such penalty)
shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the deed." Reclusion perpetua is a single indivisible penalty. 12

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated 10 May 1990 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against
appellant.

S0 ORDERED.