EN BANC

CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY, G.R. No. 184869

Represented by Officer-In-Charge

Dr. Rodrigo L. Malunhao,

Petitioner, Present:

CORONA, C.J.,

CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES,

VELASCO, JR.,*

NACHURA,*

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*

- versus - BRION,*

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,

PEREZ,

MENDOZA,* and
*
 SERENO,** JJ.

THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY, THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, THE CHAIRPERSON AND
COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES,
and THE LEAD CONVENOR OF THE
NATIONAL ANTI-POVERTY
COMMISSION,

Respondents. Promulgated:

September 21, 2010

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

 
DECISION
 

ABAD, J.:
 

This case concerns the constitutionality of a presidential proclamation that

takes property from a state university, over its objections, for distribution to
indigenous peoples and cultural communities.

**
 The Facts and the Case

Petitioner Central Mindanao University (CMU) is a chartered educational

institution owned and run by the State.1[1] In 1958, the President issued
Presidential Proclamation 476, reserving 3,401 hectares of lands of the public
domain in Musuan, Bukidnon, as school site for CMU. Eventually, CMU obtained
title in its name over 3,080 hectares of those lands under Original Certificates of
Title (OCTs) 0-160, 0-161, and 0-162. Meanwhile, the government distributed
more than 300 hectares of the remaining untitled lands to several tribes belonging
to the area’s cultural communities.

Forty-five years later or on January 7, 2003 President Gloria Macapagal-

Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 310 that takes 670 hectares from CMU’s
registered lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities in
Barangay Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon.

On April 3, 2003, however, CMU filed a petition for prohibition against

respondents Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, Chairperson and Commissioner of the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), and Lead Convenor of the National Anti-Poverty
Commission (collectively, NCIP, et al) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malaybalay City (Branch 9), seeking to stop the implementation of Presidential

1
Proclamation 310 and have it declared unconstitutional.

The NCIP, et al moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of

jurisdiction of the Malaybalay RTC over the action, pointing out that since the act
sought to be enjoined relates to an official act of the Executive Department done in
Manila, jurisdiction lies with the Manila RTC. The Malaybalay RTC denied the
motion, however, and proceeded to hear CMU’s application for preliminary
injunction. Meanwhile, respondents NCIP, et al moved for partial reconsideration
of the RTC’s order denying their motion to dismiss.

On October 27, 2003, after hearing the preliminary injunction incident, the
RTC issued a resolution granting NCIP, et al’s motion for partial reconsideration
and dismissed CMU’s action for lack of jurisdiction. Still, the RTC ruled that
Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional, being a valid State act. The RTC
said that the ultimate owner of the lands is the State and that CMU merely held the
same in its behalf. CMU filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but
the RTC denied the same on April 19, 2004. This prompted CMU to appeal the
RTC’s dismissal order to the Court of Appeals (CA) Mindanao Station.2[2]

CMU raised two issues in its appeal: 1) whether or not the RTC deprived it
of its right to due process when it dismissed the action; and 2) whether or not

2
Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional.3[3]

In a March 14, 2008 decision,4[4] the CA dismissed CMU’s appeal for lack
of jurisdiction, ruling that CMU’s recourse should have been a petition for review
on certiorari filed directly with this Court, because it raised pure questions law—
bearing mainly on the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation 310. The CA
added that whether the trial court can decide the merits of the case based solely on
the hearings of the motion to dismiss and the application for injunction is also a
pure question of law.

CMU filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA’s order of dismissal but it
denied the same,5[5] prompting CMU to file the present petition for review.

The Issues Presented

The case presents the following issues:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in not finding that the RTC erred in
dismissing its action for prohibition against NCIP, et al for lack of jurisdiction and

5
at the same time ruling that Presidential Proclamation 310 is valid and
constitutional;

2. Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed CMU’s appeal on the

ground that it raised purely questions of law that are proper for a petition for
review filed directly with this Court; and

3. Whether or not Presidential Proclamation 310 is valid and

constitutional.

The Court’s Rulings

One. The RTC invoked two reasons for dismissing CMU’s action. The first
is that jurisdiction over the action to declare Presidential Proclamation 310 lies
with the RTC of Manila, not the RTC of Malaybalay City, given that such action
relates to official acts of the Executive done in Manila. The second reason,
presumably made on the assumption that the Malaybalay RTC had jurisdiction
over the action, Presidential Proclamation 310 was valid and constitutional since
the State, as ultimate owner of the subject lands, has the right to dispose of the
same for some purpose other than CMU’s use.

There is nothing essentially wrong about a court holding on the one hand
that it has no jurisdiction over a case, and on the other, based on an assumption that
it has jurisdiction, deciding the case on its merits, both with the same results, which
is the dismissal of the action. At any rate, the issue of the propriety of the RTC
using two incompatible reasons for dismissing the action is academic. The CA
from which the present petition was brought dismissed CMU’s appeal on some
technical ground.

Two. Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 19806[6] vests in

the CA appellate jurisdiction over the final judgments or orders of the RTCs and
quasi-judicial bodies. But where an appeal from the RTC raises purely questions
of law, recourse should be by a petition for review on certiorari filed directly with
this Court. The question in this case is whether or not CMU’s appeal from the
RTC’s order of dismissal raises purely questions of law.

As already stated, CMU raised two grounds for its appeal: 1) the RTC
deprived it of its right to due process when it dismissed the action; and 2)
Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional. Did these grounds raise factual
issues that are proper for the CA to hear and adjudicate?

Regarding the first reason, CMU’s action was one for injunction against the
implementation of Presidential Proclamation 310 that authorized the taking of
lands from the university. The fact that the President issued this proclamation in
Manila and that it was being enforced in Malaybalay City where the lands were
located were facts that were not in issue. These were alleged in the complaint and
presumed to be true by the motion to dismiss. Consequently, the CMU’s remedy

6
for assailing the correctness of the dismissal, involving as it did a pure question of
law, indeed lies with this Court.

As to the second reason, the CMU claimed that the Malaybalay RTC
deprived it of its right to due process when it dismissed the case based on the
ground that Presidential Proclamation 310, which it challenged, was constitutional.
CMU points out that the issue of the constitutionality of the proclamation had not
yet been properly raised and heard. NCIP, et al had not yet filed an answer to join
issue with CMU on that score. What NCIP, et al filed was merely a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Malaybalay RTC over the
injunction case. Whether the RTC in fact prematurely decided the constitutionality
of the proclamation, resulting in the denial of CMU’s right to be heard on the
same, is a factual issue that was proper for the CA Mindanao Station to hear and
ascertain from the parties. Consequently, the CA erred in dismissing the action on
the ground that it raised pure questions of law.

Three. Since the main issue of the constitutionality of Presidential

Proclamation 310 has been raised and amply argued before this Court, it would
serve no useful purpose to have the case remanded to the CA Mindanao Station or
to the Malaybalay RTC for further proceedings. Ultimately, the issue of
constitutionality of the Proclamation in question will come to this Court however
the courts below decide it. Consequently, the Court should, to avoid delay and
multiplicity of suits, now resolve the same.

 
 The key question lies in the character of the lands taken from CMU. In
CMU v. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),7[7] the
DARAB, a national government agency charged with taking both privately-owned
and government-owned agricultural lands for distribution to farmers-beneficiaries,
ordered the segregation for this purpose of 400 hectares of CMU lands. The Court
nullified the DARAB action considering the inalienable character of such lands,
being part of the long term functions of an autonomous agricultural educational
institution. Said the Court:

The construction given by the DARAB to Section 10 restricts the land

area of the CMU to its present needs or to a land area presently, actively
exploited and utilized by the university in carrying out its present
educational program with its present student population and academic
facility — overlooking the very significant factor of growth of the university
in the years to come. By the nature of the CMU, which is a school established
to promote agriculture and industry, the need for a vast tract of agricultural
land for future programs of expansion is obvious. At the outset, the CMU
was conceived in the same manner as land grant colleges in America, a type
of educational institution which blazed the trail for the development of vast
tracts of unexplored and undeveloped agricultural lands in the Mid-West.
What we now know as Michigan State University, Penn State University and
Illinois State University, started as small land grant colleges, with meager
funding to support their ever increasing educational programs. They were
given extensive tracts of agricultural and forest lands to be developed to
support their numerous expanding activities in the fields of agricultural
technology and scientific research. Funds for the support of the educational
programs of land grant colleges came from government appropriation,
tuition and other student fees, private endowments and gifts, and earnings
from miscellaneous sources. It was in this same spirit that President Garcia
issued Proclamation No. 476, withdrawing from sale or settlement and
reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College (forerunner of the CMU) a
land reservation of 3,080 hectares as its future campus. It was set up in
Bukidnon, in the hinterlands of Mindanao, in order that it can have enough
resources and wide open spaces to grow as an agricultural educational
institution, to develop and train future farmers of Mindanao and help attract
settlers to that part of the country.

7
  
xxxx
 
The education of the youth and agrarian reform are admittedly
among the highest priorities in the government socio-economic programs. In
this case, neither need give way to the other. Certainly, there must still be
vast tracts of agricultural land in Mindanao outside the CMU land
reservation which can be made available to landless peasants, assuming the
claimants here, or some of them, can qualify as CARP beneficiaries. To our
mind, the taking of the CMU land which had been segregated for educational
purposes for distribution to yet uncertain beneficiaries is a gross
misinterpretation of the authority and jurisdiction granted by law to the
DARAB.
 
The decision in this case is of far-reaching significance as far as it
concerns state colleges and universities whose resources and research
facilities may be gradually eroded by misconstruing the exemptions from the
CARP. These state colleges and universities are the main vehicles for our
scientific and technological advancement in the field of agriculture, so vital to
the existence, growth and development of this country.8[8]

It did not matter that it was President Arroyo who, in this case, attempted by
proclamation to appropriate the lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and
cultural communities. As already stated, the lands by their character have become
inalienable from the moment President Garcia dedicated them for CMU’s use in
scientific and technological research in the field of agriculture. They have ceased
to be alienable public lands.

Besides, when Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA)
or Republic Act 83719[9] in 1997, it provided in Section 56 that “property rights
within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested” upon its effectivity

9
“shall be recognized and respected.” In this case, ownership over the subject lands
had been vested in CMU as early as 1958. Consequently, transferring the lands in
2003 to the indigenous peoples around the area is not in accord with the IPRA.

Furthermore, the land registration court considered the claims of several

tribes belonging to the area’s cultural communities in the course of the proceedings
for the titling of the lands in CMU’s name. Indeed, eventually, only 3,080 hectares
were titled in CMU’s name under OCTs 0-160, 0-161 and 0-162. More than
300 hectares were acknowledged to be in the possession of and subject to the
claims of those tribes.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the March
14, 2008 decision and September 22, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP 85456, and DECLARES Presidential Proclamation 310 as null and
void for being contrary to law and public policy.

EN BANC

ATTY. ROMEO L. ERECE, G.R. No. 166809

Petitioner,
 Present:

PUNO, C.J.,

- versus - QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

CARPIO,*

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

LYN B. MACALINGAY, JOCELYN CORONA,

BASTIAN, LYMAN B. SALVADOR, CARPIO MORALES,

BIENVENIDO L. REANO, BRIGIDA AZCUNA,

CECILIA R. ABRATIQUE, JEAN TINGA,

CORTEZ-MARZAN, FRANCISCO CHICO-NAZARIO,

M. BILOG, ROSA P. ESPIRITU, VELASCO, JR.,

ROLANDO EBREO, YANIE A. NACHURA,

PITLONGAY, and VIRGILIO REYES,

MAGPOC, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and

Respondents. BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

April 22, 2008

*
X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari10[1] of the Decision of the Court of

Appeals (CA) promulgated on January 7, 2005 affirming the Decision of the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) which found petitioner Atty. Romeo L. Erece guilty of
dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner is the Regional Director of the Commission on Human Rights

(CHR) Region I, whose office is located in San Fernando City, La Union.
Respondent employees of the CHR Region I filed an Affidavit-Complaint dated
October 2, 1998 against petitioner alleging that he denied them the use of the office
vehicle assigned to petitioner, that petitioner still claimed transportation allowance
even if he was using the said vehicle, and that he certified that he did not use any

10
government vehicle, when in fact he did, in order to collect transportation
allowance.

 
 

The Affidavit-Complaint reads:

xxx
 
4. That on September 10, 1998, we, Atty. Lynn Macalingay and Mr.
Lyman Salvador were denied the use of the office vehicle as evidenced by the
hereto attached copy of our denied Itinerary of Travel marked as Annex ‘B’;
 
5.                  That on August 5, 1998, I, Brigida Abratique requested for the use
of the government vehicle but the same was denied by Atty. Erece for the reason
that we would be using the same to Teachers Camp as evidenced by a copy of the
denied trip ticket with the marginal notes of Atty. Erece hereto attached as Annex
‘C’;
 
6.                  That on May 29, 1998, the request of Brigida Cecilia Abratique
and Francisco Bilog to use the vehicle within the City for field work purposes was
again denied by Atty. Erece as he will accordingly use the same;
 
7.                  That on April 20, 1998, a proposed trip was likewise postponed
by Atty. Erece on the ground that he will be using the vehicle as evidenced by a
copy of the proposed Itinerary of Travel with marginal note of Atty. Erece xxx;
 
8.                  That on April, 1997, I, Atty. Jocelyn Bastian requested for the use
of the vehicle as I need[ed] to go to the Benguet Provincial Jail but I was
instructed to commute because he will use the vehicle. To my dismay, I found
him still in the office when I returned from the Provincial Jail;
 
9.                  That such denials of the use of the vehicle are not isolated cases
but were just a few of the numerous instances of conflicts of schedules regarding
the use of the government vehicle and where we found ourselves always at the
losing end because we are the subordinate employees;
 
xxx
 
13. That Atty. Erece regularly receives and liquidates his
Representation and Transportation Allowances (RATA) which at present is in the
amount of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00), the payroll of such and its
 liquidation could be made available upon request by an authority to the Resident
Auditor but his liquidations for the month of April 1998 and September 1998
[are] hereto attached xxx;
 
14. That despite regular receipt of his RATA, Atty. Erece still
prioritizes himself in the use of the office vehicle to the detriment of the public
service;
 
15. That to compound things, he certifies in his monthly liquidation of
his RATA that ‘HE DID NOT USE ANY GOVERNMENT VEHICLE FOR THE
SAID MONTH’ xxx which is a big lie because as already stated, he is the regular
user of the government vehicle issued to CHR, Region I;
 
16. That I, Rolando C. Ebreo, the disbursing officer of the Regional
Field Office hereby attest to the fact that no deductions in the RATA of Atty.
Romeo L. Erece was ever done in connection with his regular use of the
government vehicle x x x.”11[2]

The CSC-Cordillera Administrative Region issued an Order dated October

9, 1998, directing petitioner to comment on the complaint.

In compliance, petitioner countered, thus:

xxx
 
4. In relation to paragraphs 2-D, 2-E and 2-G above cited, it is among
the duties as per management supervisory function of the Regional HR Director to
approve use or non-use of the official vehicle of the Region as it was
memorandum receipted to him and the non-approval of the use of the same if it is
not arbitrary and for justifiable reasons; said function of approval and disapproval
rests on the Regional Human Rights Director and that function is not merely
ministerial;
 

11
 5. That I have issued a guideline that the official vehicle will not be
used for the Mountain Provinces and Halsema Highway/Mountain Trail because
of the poor road condition and to prevent breakdown and early deterioration of
same xxx;
 
6. That Atty. Lynn B. Macalingay, one of the complainants had gone
to Mt. Province to attend the Provincial Peace and Order Council meetings,
conduct jail visitations and follow-up cases on many occasions using the regular
bus trips in the spirit of the policy as mentioned in paragraph 4 xxx;
 
7. That all employees had used the vehicle on official business
without exception, all complainants included xxx;
 
8. On September 10, 1998, Atty. Lynn Macalingay and Lyman
Salvador had the use of the vehicle disapproved for the reasons conforming to
paragraph 4 xxx;
 
9. On August 5, 1998, Atty. Erece disapproved the use of vehicle for
use of Brigida Abratique because:

‘a) The vehicle was available since July 30, 1998 for
use in Happy Hallow but not utilized earlier xxx;

b) On August 6, 1998, a DECS-CHR Seminar on Use

Human Rights Exemplar was held at the Teacher’s Camp Baguio City
and the vehicle was used to transport HR materials, overhead projector
and for the overall use of the seminar upon the request of the Public
Information and Education Office, Central Office, Commission on
Human Rights through Susan Nuguid of CHR, Manila;
 
xxx
 
d)                  That Mrs. Abratique and Co. were asked to explain the
unreasonable delay to attend to the case of Cherry Esteban which was
subject of the disapproved travel;’

10. On April 20, 1998, the itinerary of travel of Lyman Salvador was
RESCHEDULED from April 22 & 23, 1998 to April 23 & 24, 1998 as the
vehicle was used by Atty. Erece on an important travel to Manila upon order of no
less than the Honorable Chairperson, Aurora Navarette-Reciña of Commission on
Human Rights xxx;
 
 xxx
 
12.              As to the use of the vehicle by the Regional HR Director, same
shall be subject to the allowance/disallowance of the COA Resident Auditor,
likewise the Regional HR Director in all his travels outside Baguio City, he does
not claim bus and taxi fares per certification of Danilo Balino, the Administrative
Officer Designate and Mr. Rolando Ebreo, the Cash Disbursing Officer, Annex
‘Z’;
 
13.              In many cases, Atty. Romeo L. Erece has to maintain the vehicle
including car washing thereof, garage parking at his residence to maintain and
upkeep the vehicle and same is still in premium condition to the satisfaction of the
office at no extra cost to the Commission;
 
xxx

15.              In support thereof, we move to dismiss this case as pure

question on supervisory and management prerogative, which is reserved for the
Office Head and a harassment move by disgruntled employees who are counter-
charged hereof;
 
16.              Annexes ‘E’ and ‘F’ of the complaint [are] misplaced and
misleading because a clear and cognate reading of same does not reflect that I
checked/marked the use of government vehicle in the certification and as such no
dishonesty is involved; the documents speak for themselves. x x x Annex ‘E’ is
for the month of April, 1998 where the check marks are clear. On Annex ‘F’ of
the complaint, no reference is made as to the fact that I did not use the
government vehicle, if so, no allegation as to when I did use same for my personal
use.”12[3]
 
 

After a fact-finding investigation, the CSC Proper in CSC Resolution No.

99-1360 dated July 1, 1999 charged petitioner with Dishonesty and Grave
Misconduct for using a government vehicle in spite of his receipt of the monthly
transportation allowance and for certifying that he did not use any government
vehicle, when in fact, he did, in order to receive the transportation allowance.

 
12
 Pertinent portions of the formal charge read:

1. That despite the regular receipt of Erece of his monthly

Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA) in the amount of
P4,000.00, he still prioritizes himself in the use of the office vehicle (Tamaraw
FX) in spite of the directive from the Central Office that he cannot use the service
vehicle for official purposes and at the same time receive his transportation
allowance;
 
2. That Erece did not comply with the directive of the Central Office
addressed to all Regional Human Rights Directors, as follows: ‘to regularize your
receipt of the transportation allowance component of the RATA to which you are
entitled monthly, you are hereby directed to immediately transfer to any of your
staff, preferably one of your lawyers, the memorandum receipt of the vehicle(s)
now still in your name;’
 
3. That he certified in his monthly liquidation of his RATA that he
did not use any government vehicle for the corresponding month, which is not
true because he is the regular user of the government vehicle issued to CHR-
Region I.
 
The foregoing facts and circumstances indicate that government service
has been prejudiced by the acts of Erece.
 
WHEREFORE, Romeo L. Erece is hereby formally charged with
Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct. Accordingly, he is given five (5) days from
receipt hereof to submit his Answer under oath and affidavits of his witnesses, if
any, to the Civil Service Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region (CSC-
CAR). On his Answer, he should indicate whether he elects a formal
investigation or waives his right thereto. Any Motion to Dismiss, request for
clarification or Bills of Particulars shall not be entertained by the Commission.
Any of these pleadings interposed by the respondent shall be considered as an
Answer and shall be evaluated as such. Likewise, he is advised of his right to the
assistance of counsel of his choice.13[4]
 
 

After a formal investigation of the case, the CSC issued Resolution No.
020124, dated January 24. 2002, finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty and

13
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and penalizing him with
dismissal from the service.

Petitioner filed a petition for review of the CSC Resolution with the CA.

In the Decision promulgated on January 7, 2005, the CA upheld the CSC

Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and

the assailed Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are hereby
AFFIRMED.14[5]
 
 

Hence, this petition.

 
 
Petitioner raises these issues:
 
 

1.                 Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner
was not denied due process despite the admitted facts that respondents
failed to identify and testify on their Affidavit-Complaint and that
petitioner was denied of his right to cross-examine respondents on
their Affidavit-Complaint.

14
  

2.                 Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in adopting in toto
the conclusions of the CSC although they were based on mere
assumptions.

 
 

Petitioner contends that he was denied due process as he was not afforded
the right to cross-examine his accusers and their witnesses. He stated that at his
instance, in order to prevent delay in the disposition of the case, he was allowed to
present evidence first to support the allegations in his Counter-Affidavit. After he
rested his case, respondents did not present their evidence, but moved to submit
their position paper and formal offer of evidence, which motion was granted by the
CSC over his (petitioner’s) objection. Respondents then submitted their Position
Paper and Formal Offer of Exhibits.

Petitioner submits that although he was allowed to present evidence first, it

should not be construed as a waiver of his right to cross-examine the complainants.
Although the order of presentation of evidence was not in conformity with the
procedure, still petitioner should not be deemed to have lost his right to cross-
examine his accusers and their witnesses. This may be allowed only if he
expressly waived said right.

 
 The Court agrees with the CA that petitioner was not denied due process
when he failed to cross-examine the complainants and their witnesses since he was
given the opportunity to be heard and present his evidence. In administrative
proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s
side.15[6]

Velez v. De Vera16[7] held:

Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with “judicial

process” for a trial in court is not always essential to due process. While a day in
court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative
proceedings since they rest upon different principles. The due process clause
guarantees no particular form of procedure and its requirements are not technical.
Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character, the right to a notice or
hearing are not essential to due process of law. The constitutional requirement of
due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly established administrative
agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before the making of a
determination if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal before which all
objections and defenses to the making of such determination may be raised and
considered. One adequate hearing is all that due process requires. . . .
 
The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due
process. Nor is an actual hearing always essential. . . . 17[8]

Next, petitioner contends that the CA erred in adopting in toto the

conclusions of the CSC.

15

16

17
  

Petitioner contends that the conclusion of the CSC proceeded from the
premise that the petitioner was using the subject vehicle as his service vehicle,
which he disputes, because he did not use the vehicle regularly. The evidence
showed that the service vehicle was being used by the employees of the regional
office for official purposes. He argues that although the service vehicle is still in
his name, it should not be concluded that it is assigned to him as his service
vehicle, thus disqualifying him from receiving transportation allowance.

The Court is not persuaded. The pertinent conclusion of the CSC referred to
by petitioner reads:

At the outset, it must be stated that the entitlement to transportation

allowance by certain officials and employees pursuant to RA 6688 presupposes
that they are not assigned government vehicles. This was clarified by the
Supreme Court in the case of Aida Domingo vs. COA, G.R. No. 112371, October
7, 1998, where it ruled, as follows:

‘The provision of law in point is found in Section 28 of

Republic Act 6688, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act of 1989, to wit:
 
Sec. 28. Representation and Transportation Allowances. ...
The transportation allowance herein authorized shall not be granted
to officials who are assigned a government vehicle or use
government motor transportation, except as may be approved by
the President of the Philippines. Unless otherwise provided by
law, no amount appropriated in this Act shall be used to pay for
representation and/or transportation allowances, whether
commutable or reimbursable, which exceed the rates authorized
under this Section. Previous administrative authorization not
 consistent with the rates and conditions herein specified shall no
longer be valid and payment shall not be allowed.
 
xxx
 
In the case of Bustamante vs. Commission on Audit, 216
SCRA 134, decided by this Court on November 27, 1992, COA
also disallowed the claim for transportation allowance of the legal
counsel of National Power Corporation because he was already
issued a government vehicle. Involving the circular
aforementioned and almost the same facts as in this case, it was
therein held that COA Circular No. 75-6 is categorical in
prohibiting the use of government vehicles by officials receiving
transportation allowance and in stressing that the use of
government motor vehicle and claim for transportation allowance
are mutually exclusive and incompatible.
 
The issue need no longer be belabored for no less than this
Court ruled in the aforesaid case that a government official, to
whom a motor vehicle has been assigned, cannot, at the same time,
claim transportation allowance. (Underscoring supplied)

It is clear from the records that Director Edmundo S. Ancog, CHR-Central

office (Field Operations office), issued a Memorandum dated February 27, 1998,
addressed to all CHR Regional Directors in respect to Transportation Allowance.
The Memorandum states that transportation allowance shall not be granted to
Regional Directors whenever a government vehicle or use of government motor
transportation is already assigned to them. It further emphasized that should they
want to “avail regularization of their RATA,” the Regional Directors must
immediately transfer the vehicle to any of their staff/lawyer.

Records show that Erece was issued a government vehicle since August
10, 1997 and he did not transfer the vehicle to any of his staff. Notwithstanding
this fact and the said memorandum, he received transportation allowance
particularly for the months of April and September 1998, as reflected in the
Certification/s signed by him. This clearly resulted in undue prejudice to the best
interest of the service.
 
The foregoing facts logically lead to the conclusion that the act of Erece in
certifying that he has not used any government vehicle and consequently
 collecting Transportation Allowance despite the fact that a government vehicle
was assigned to him constitutes the offenses of Dishonesty and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.18[9]
 

The above conclusion,as well as the Memorandum dated February 27, 1998
issued by Director Ancog to the CHR Regional Directors, are both very clear.
Once a vehicle is assigned to a regional director, like petitioner, he is no longer
entitled to transportation allowance unless he assigns the vehicle to another
staff/lawyer. Since petitioner did not assign the subject vehicle assigned to him to
someone else, he is not entitled to transportation allowance.

Contrary to the argument of petitioner, there is no qualification that the

assigned vehicle should be for the exclusive use of the service vehicle of the
regional director alone to disqualify him from receiving transportation allowance.

Since the records show that petitioner collected transportation allowance

even if a government vehicle had been assigned to him, the CA did not err in
sustaining the decision of the CSC finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and penalizing him with
dismissal from the service.

18
 WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on January 7, 2005 is AFFIRMED.

No costs.

EN BANC

DATU PAX PAKUNG S. G.R. No. 179813

MANGUDADATU,
 
Petitioner,
 

 
Present:
 
 
 
PUNO, C.J.,
 
QUISUMBING,
 
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
 
CARPIO,
 
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus -
CORONA,*

*
   CARPIO MORALES,

  AZCUNA,

  TINGA,

  CHICO-NAZARIO,

  VELASCO, JR.,

  NACHURA,

  REYES,

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
and ANGELO O. MONTILLA, BRION, JJ.

Respondents.  
 
 

Promulgated:

December 18, 2008

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

 
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a

temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction19[1] assailing
Resolution Nos. 07-17920[2] dated August 16, 2007 and 07-30021[3] dated
September 19, 2007, of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in
HRET Case No. 07-021, entitled Angelo O. Montilla v. Datu Pax Pakung S.
Mangudadatu.

Datu Pax Pakung S. Mangudadatu (petitioner) and Angelo O. Montilla

(private respondent) were congressional candidates for the First District of Sultan
Kudarat during the May 14, 2007 national elections. Petitioner won by 17,451
votes and was proclaimed on May 22, 2007 by the Provincial Board of Canvassers
as the duly elected Representative of the said congressional district.

On May 31, 2007, respondent filed with the HRET a Petition of Protest (Ad
Cautelam)22[4] contesting the results of the elections and the proclamation of
petitioner.

19

20

21

22
 On June 14, 2007, the Secretary of the HRET caused the service of
summons23[5] upon petitioner through registered mail at Purok Losaria,24[6]
Tamnag (Poblacion), Lutayan, Sultan Kudarat, requiring petitioner to file an
Answer to the protest within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.

On July 11, 2007, the HRET received the Registry Return Receipt Card,25[7]
showing that a certain Aileen R. Baldenas26[8] (Baldenas) received the summons
on June 27, 2007.

On August 16, 2007, the HRET issued Resolution No. 07-17927[9] which
noted the aforementioned Registry Return Receipt Card and that despite the fact
that 43 days from June 27, 2007 had passed since Baldenas received the
summons, petitioner had not filed an answer in accordance with Rule 2728[10] of
the 2004 HRET Rules. In the same Resolution, the HRET considered petitioner to
have entered a general denial of the allegations of the protest.

23

24

25

26

27

28
 In an Order dated August 17, 2007, the HRET set the preliminary
conference on September 27, 2007 at 11:00 a.m.

Meanwhile, petitioner informally learned of respondent’s protest,

prompting petitioner to request his lawyers to verify the same from the records of
the HRET. Thereafter, his lawyers entered their appearance on September 4,
2007 and requested that they be furnished with copies of the petition of protest
as well as notices, orders and resolutions pertaining to the protest.

On September 10, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion to Reconsider29[11]

Resolution No. 07-179 and Motion to Admit Answer with Counter-Protest,
alleging that he never received the summons issued by the HRET. In his
affidavit30[12] attached to the motion, petitioner denied that Baldenas was a
member of his household or his employee. He further claimed that she was not
authorized to receive any important documents addressed to him. And assuming
that he had authorized her, the summons received by her was never brought to
his attention.

On September 19, 2007, the HRET issued Resolution No. 07-30031[13]

denying for lack of merit, petitioner’s Motion to Reconsider Resolution No. 07-
179, as well as his Motion to Admit Answer with Counter-Protest, the latter for
having been filed out of time. The HRET explained that:

29

30

31
 In the instant case, the recipient, Ailene R. Baldenas, could not have received
the summons had she not been found in said address or had she not been present
therein as to have been in a position to have acted in behalf of the resident of the
house, the protestee herein. The act of a person in receiving a mail matter cannot be
easily defied by simply denying that the receipt was unauthorized. We doubt
protestee’s self-serving allegation of lack of knowledge of Ailene R. Baldenas. This
denial of authority, or of knowledge of the recipient’s identity must be supported by
conclusive proof, the burden of which belongs to no other than the one making such
assertion, the protestee himself. The ruling cited by protestee in J.M. Tuason & Co. vs.
Fernandez does not apply herein as the summons was served at protestee’s residence
and not just at any house owned by him. In that case, service of summons was made in
a house, but not the defendant’s residence or dwelling place. Thus, such service was
ineffective and improper which is not the case herein as the service of the summons was
made to protestee’s residence in the province.

The records of the case bear that protestee’s residence is Purok Lo[sa]ria,
Tamnag (Poblacion), Lutayan, Sultan Kudarat. Aside from the protest, a Manifestation
filed by protestant to submit the Roll of Attorneys Numbers of his counsels indicates
that a copy thereof was sent to the same address on June 5, 2007, through registered
mail. The summons was sent and was received at the same address stated in the
protest. Accordingly, the registry return receipt card shows proper receipt by Ailene R.
Baldena[s] on June 27, 2007. In all instances of posting, either by protestant or by the
Tribunal, the presumption is that mailed matters were duly received by the addressee,
by himself or his representatives. The Tribunal should not be taken to task to ascertain
or cause the Postmaster’s personnel to first determine whether or not the person
receiving was or was not known to protestee. With the proof of service, such as the
registry return receipt card, at hand, the Tribunal is satisfied that jurisdiction was
acquired over protestee.

After the preliminary conference on September 27, 2007, the HRET issued a
Preliminary Conference Order, of even date, granting respondent’s motion for the
revision of ballots and directing the Secretary of the HRET to conduct the same in
all or 100% of the protested precincts in the instant case. The HRET also noted
petitioner’s manifestation in open court that his participation in the preliminary
conference was without prejudice to whatever legal remedies he may avail for
the reconsideration of Resolution No. 07-300 dated September 13, 2007, denying
his Motion to Reconsider Resolution No. 07-179 with Motion to Admit Answer
with Counter-Protest.

Petitioner filed the instant petition imputing grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the HRET for issuing Resolution
Nos. 07-179 and 07-300. He also prayed for a temporary restraining order and/or
a writ of preliminary injunction for this Court to enjoin the HRET from further
proceeding with HRET Case No.07-021.

Petitioner contended that the HRET never acquired jurisdiction over his
person because of the absence of a valid service of summons. He argued that a
substitute service of summons is made only “when the defendant cannot be
served personally at a reasonable time after efforts to locate him have
failed.”32[14] In his case, since the process server’s return failed to show on its
face the impossibility of personal service, then the substituted service was
improper and invalid.

In the Resolution of this Court dated October 16, 2007, we required

respondent to file his comment on the petition for certiorari within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days from notice.

In his comment, respondent countered that the HRET did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution Nos. 07-179 dated August 16, 2007 and
32
07-300 dated September 19, 2007. He argued that Rule 22 of the 2004 HRET
Rules merely states that “the Secretary of the Tribunal shall issue the
corresponding summons to the protestee or respondent, as the case may be.” He
posited then that the intent of the HRET in not expressly specifying personal
service of summons on the protestee or respondent was to give it a reasonable
discretion or leeway in serving the summons by other means such as registered
mail. Thus, service of summons on petitioner through registered mail did not
violate Rule 22 of the 2004 HRET Rules. Further, respondent claimed that Rule 14,
Sections 6 and 7 of the Rules of Court were inconsistent with Rule 22 of the 2004
HRET Rules and therefore should not be given suppletory application to HRET
proceedings.

Petitioner, in his reply, posited that Rule 22 of the 2004 HRET Rules was not
inconsistent with Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. According to
petitioner, the Secretary of the Tribunal is equivalent to the Clerk of Court, and
both the regular courts and the HRET have process servers and sheriffs who may
serve notices, orders, and summons. Petitioner further contends that there is
nothing in the 2004 HRET Rules that allows service of summons by registered mail
and strongly asserts that service of summons by registered mail is susceptible to
fraud and manipulation.

We grant the petition.

Rule 22 of the 2004 HRET Rules provides:

 RULE 22. Summons. – If the petition is not summarily dismissed in accordance with Rule
21 of these Rules, the Secretary of the Tribunal shall issue the corresponding summons
to the protestee or respondent, as the case may be, together with a copy of the
petition, requiring him within ten (10) days from receipt thereof to file his answer.

The 2004 HRET Rules on summons is silent on how the summons should be
served on the protestee. Significantly, Rule 8033[15] of the 2004 HRET Rules
provides that the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure applies by analogy or suppletorily
in so far as the latter may be applicable and not inconsistent therewith as well as
with the orders, resolutions and decisions of the HRET. In view of the failure of
the HRET Rules to specify the authorized modes of service of summons, resort
then is necessary to Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which state:

SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. – Whenever practicable, the summons shall be

served handling a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive
and sign for it, by tendering it to him.

SEC. 7. Substituted service. – If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person
of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving copies at

33
 defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof.

In the case at bar, the service of the summons was made through
registered mail, which is not among the allowed modes of service under Rule 14
of the Rules of Court.

In Federico S. Sandoval II v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

(HRET) and Aurora Rosario A. Oreta,34[16] this Court has held that in the matter of
service of summons, Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court apply
suppletorily to the rules of the HRET. To quote from that case:

The matter of serving summons is governed by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which applies
suppletorily to the Revised Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal through its Rule 80.23
Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide -

Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by
handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by
tendering it to him.

Sec. 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place
of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

It is well-established that summons upon a respondent or a defendant (i.e.,

petitioner herein) must be served by handing a copy thereof to him in person or, if he
refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. Personal service of summons most
effectively ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional requirement of
due process is accomplished. If however efforts to find him personally would make
prompt service impossible, service may be completed by substituted service, i.e., by
leaving copies of the summons at his dwelling house or residence with some person of

34
 suitable age and discretion then residing therein or by leaving the copies at his office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is an

extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the respondent or the defendant to the
consequences of a suit even though notice of such action is served not upon him but
upon another to whom the law could only presume would notify him of the pending
proceedings. As safeguard measures for this drastic manner of bringing in a person to
answer for a claim, it is required that statutory restrictions for substituted service must
be strictly, faithfully and fully observed. In our jurisdiction, for service of summons to
be valid, it is necessary first to establish the following circumstances, i.e., (a)
impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time, (b) efforts exerted to
locate the petitioners and, (c) service upon a person of sufficient age and discretion
residing therein or some competent person in charge of his office or regular place of
business. It is also essential that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be
stated in the proof of service or officer’s return itself and only under exceptional terms
may they be proved by evidence aliunde. Failure to comply with this rule renders
absolutely void the substituted service along with the proceedings taken thereafter for
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or the respondent.

We find no merit in respondent Oreta’s austere argument that personal service

need not be exhausted before substituted service may be used since time in election
protest cases is of the essence. Precisely, time in election protest cases is very critical so
all efforts must be realized to serve the summons and a copy of the election protest by
the means most likely to reach the protestee. No speedier method could achieve this
purpose than by personal service thereof. As already stated, the preferential rule
regarding service of summons found in the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to the
Revised Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Hence, as regards
the hierarchy in the service of summons, there ought to be no rational basis for
distinguishing between regular court cases and election protest cases pending before
the HRET. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Indeed the doctrine in Sandoval has been reiterated by this Court in

subsequent decisions to reiterate that in ordinary civil cases, personal service of
summons is preferred and resort to substituted service not only must be fully
justified but also comply strictly with requirements of the Rules of Court for
substituted service.35[17] In the early case of Olar v. Cuna,36[18] we held that:

In the case at bar, the summons were served by registered mail, which is not
among the modes of service under Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. Besides, under
Section 5 of aforesaid rule, the summons "may be served by the sheriff or other proper
officer of the province in which the service is to be made, or for special reasons by any
person especially authorized by the judge of the court issuing the summons." The
postmaster of Bato, Leyte, not being a sheriff or court officer, or a person authorized by
the court to serve the summons cannot validly serve the summons. The petitioners,
therefore, were not duly served with the summons in Civil Case No. B-674.

Indeed, if in ordinary civil cases (which involve only private and proprietary
interests) personal service of summons is preferred and service by registered mail
is not allowed on jurisdictional and due process grounds, with more reason
should election cases (which involve public interest and the will of the electorate)
strictly follow the hierarchy of modes of service of summons under the Rules of
Court.

We note that the HRET, in its Resolution No. 07-300, justified its resort to
registered mail in this wise:

In cases filed before the Tribunal involving distant legislative districts and
provinces, it has been its practice to serve the summons through registered mail, it
being impracticable to send the same by personal service to protestees or respondents
who reside in said far provinces. Since protestee resides in Sultan Kudarat, summons
was served to him through registered mail.

35

36
  

We do not agree. The Court sees no reason why the HRET cannot make use
of its own process servers to personally serve the summons, or alternatively,
delegate the matter to the process server of a court with territorial jurisdiction
over the place of residence of the respondent/protestee in the election case, at
the expense of the petitioner/protestant. Considering that the proper service of
summons on the respondent/protestee is a jurisdictional requirement and goes to
heart of due process, we cannot allow service of summons by a method not
sanctioned by the HRET Rules in relation to the Rules of Court.

In view of the foregoing, we find that the HRET committed grave abuse of
discretion in considering petitioner to have entered a general denial of the
allegations in respondent’s petition of protest and in denying his motion to
reconsider as well as his motion to admit answer with counter-protest.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Resolution

Nos. 07-179 and 07-300 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
in HRET Case No. 07-021 are SET ASIDE and the HRET is directed to admit the
Answer with Counter-Protest of petitioner Datu Pax Pakung S. Mangudadatu.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
 

EN BANC

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,  
G.R. No. 169013
represented by its Officer-in-Charge  
 
and Undersecretary, RAMON C.   Present:
BACANI,    
Petitioner,   PUNO, C.J.,
    QUISUMBING,
    YNARES-SANTIAGO,
    CARPIO,
    AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
    CORONA,
    CARPIO MORALES,
    AZCUNA,
- versus -   TINGA,
    CHICO-NAZARIO,
    VELASCO, Jr.,
    NACHURA,
    REYES,
    DE CASTRO, and
    BRION, JJ.
     
 GODOFREDO G. CUANAN,   Promulgated:
Respondent.   December 16, 2008

x----------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Decision37[1] dated May 16, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 87499 which set aside Resolution No. 041147 dated October 22, 2004 of the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) finding respondent Godofredo G. Cuanan (Cuanan) guilty
of sexual harassment and dismissing him from service, and the CA Resolution38[2] dated
July 18, 2005 which denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the Department of
Education (DepEd).

The factual background of the case is as follows:

37

38
 

On March 11, 1996, Luzviminda Borja and Juliana Castro, on behalf of their
respective minor daughters, Lily Borja and Charo Castro, filed before the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports - Regional Office No. III (DECS-RO No. III), Cabanatuan City,
two separate administrative complaints39[3] for Sexual Harassment and Conduct
Unbecoming a Public Officer against Cuanan, then Principal of Lawang Kupang
Elementary School in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija.

Acting on the complaints, DECS-RO No. III Regional Director Vilma L. Labrador
constituted an Investigating Committee, composed of three DepEd officials from the
province, to conduct a formal investigation. Following the investigation, the Investigating
Committee submitted its Investigation Report40[4] dated December 14, 1999, finding
Cuanan guilty of sexual harassment and recommending his forced resignation without
prejudice to benefits. In a Decision41[5] dated January 28, 2000, Regional Director
Labrador concurred in the findings of the Investigating Committee and meted out the
penalty of forced resignation to Cuanan without prejudice to benefits.

In an Order42[6] dated April 13, 2000, then DepEd Secretary Andrew Gonzales
affirmed the Decision of Regional Director Labrador. On May 30, 2000, Cuanan filed a
39

40

41

42
Petition for Reconsideration43[7] thereof, but the same was denied for lack of merit by
Secretary Gonzales in a Resolution44[8] dated June 19, 2000.

Cuanan elevated his case to the CSC. On January 20, 2003, the CSC issued
Resolution No. 030069,45[9] which set aside the June 19, 2000 Resolution of Secretary
Gonzales and exonerated Cuanan from the charge of sexual harassment. On January 23,
2003, copies of the resolution were duly sent to the parties, including the DepEd.46[10]
Cuanan received a copy of Resolution No. 030069 on January 31, 2003.47[11]

In a Letter dated February 3, 2003, Cuanan requested his reinstatement as

Elementary School Principal I.48[12] In a 1st Indorsement, the District Supervisor
recommended appropriate action.49[13] In a 2nd Indorsement dated February 4, 2003,
Schools Division Superintendent Dioscorides D. Lusung (Superintendent) recommended
that Cuanan be reinstated to duty as School Principal of San Antonio District upon finality
of the decision of the CSC.50[14] In a Letter51[15] dated February 10, 2003, Regional
Director Ricardo T. Sibug informed the Superintendent that Cuanan could not be
43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51
immediately reinstated to the service until an order of implementation was received from
the Department Secretary.

Sometime in March 2003, DepEd Undersecretary Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon sent
a letter to the CSC requesting a copy of CSC Resolution No. 030069 dated January 20,
2003. In a Letter52[16] dated March 25, 2003, the CSC informed the DepEd that a copy of
the requested resolution was duly sent to it on January 23, 2003. Nonetheless, the CSC
sent another copy of the resolution to the DepEd for its reference. The DepEd received
said reference copy on March 28, 2003.53[17]

On April 11, 2003, then DepEd Secretary Edilberto C. de Jesus filed a

Petition for Review/Reconsideration54[18] with the CSC. No copy of the pleading was
served upon Cuanan.

On July 29, 2003, Secretary De Jesus filed a Supplemental Petition for

Review/Reconsideration55[19] reiterating the prayer for reversal of the resolution. Again,
no copy of the pleading was served upon Cuanan.

52

53

54

55
 

Subsequently, pursuant to Division Special Order No. 001 series of 2003 dated
June 18, 2003, Cuanan was reinstated to his former position as school principal effective
April 30, 2003.56[20] In Division Special Order No. 285, series of 2003 dated July 8, 2003,
Cuanan was directed to return to duty.57[21] Based thereon, Cuanan requested payment
of salaries and his inclusion in the payroll, which the Division School Superintendent of
Nueva Ecija duly endorsed on November 7, 2003.58[22]

However, on October 22, 2004, the CSC issued Resolution No. 04114759[23] setting
aside CSC Resolution No. 030069 dated January 20, 2003. It found Cuanan guilty of
Sexual Harassment, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service and meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of his service eligibility, and perpetual
disqualification from holding public office. Cuanan received a copy of the Resolution on
November 9, 2004.60[24]

56

57

58

59

60
 Thirteen days later, or on November 22, 2004, Cuanan filed a petition for
certiorari61[25] with the CA seeking to annul Resolution No. 041147, alleging that the CSC
should not have entertained the petition for review/reconsideration since the DepEd was
not the complainant or the party adversely affected by the resolution; that the petition
for review/reconsideration was filed out of time; and that Cuanan was not furnished
copies of the pleadings filed by the DepEd in violation of procedural due process.

The DepEd sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper
remedy, the mode of review from a decision of the CSC being a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

On May 16, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision62[26] granting the petition for
certiorari and setting aside CSC Resolution No. 041147 dated October 12, 2004. The CA
held that while a motion for reconsideration and a petition for review under Rule 43 were
available remedies, Cuanan's recourse to a petition for certiorari was warranted, since
the act complained of was patently illegal; that the CSC gravely abused its discretion in
granting the petition for review/reconsideration filed by the DepEd without regard for
Cuanan's fundamental right to due process, since he was not duly notified of the petition
for review/reconsideration, nor was he required by the CSC to file a comment thereon,
much less, given a copy of the said petition; that the DepEd failed to establish that the

61

62
resolution was not yet final and executory when it filed its petition for
review/reconsideration.

DepEd filed a Motion for Reconsideration,63[27] but the CA denied the same in its
Resolution64[28] dated July 18, 2005.

Hence, the present petition on the following grounds:

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 87499, THE SAME NOT BEING THE
PROPER REMEDY IN ASSAILING CSC RESOLUTION NO. 041147 DATED OCTOBER 22, 2004.

II

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
ADJUDGING CSC AS HAVING COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING RESOLUTION
NO. 041147 DATED OCTOBER 22, 2004.65[29]

DepEd contends that the CA should have dismissed outright the petition for
certiorari because CSC decisions are appealable to the CA by petition for review under
Rule 43; that the filing of a motion for reconsideration was a precondition to the filing of a

63

64

65
petition for certiorari under Rule 65; that the DepEd, even if not the complainant, may
question the resolution of the CSC; that Cuanan failed to prove that the CSC's petition for
review/reconsideration was not seasonably filed; that even if Cuanan was not served a
copy of the pleadings filed by the DepEd, the CSC was not bound by procedural rules.

Cuanan, on the other hand, contends that the DepEd cannot file a motion for
reconsideration from the CSC Resolution exonerating him, since it is not the complainant
in the administrative case and therefore not a party adversely affected by the decision
therein; that even if DepEd may seek reconsideration of the CSC Resolution, the petition
for review/reconsideration was filed out of time; and that Cuanan’s right to due process
was violated when he was not given a copy of the pleadings filed by the DepEd or given
the opportunity to comment thereon.

The Court finds it necessary, before delving on the grounds relied upon by the
DepEd in support of the petition, to first resolve the question of whether the DepEd can
seek reconsideration of the CSC Resolution exonerating Cuanan.

In a long line of cases, beginning with Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy,66[30]

and reiterated in Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, Jr.,67[31] the Court has maintained
that the disciplining authority qualifies as a party adversely affected by the judgment, who

66

67
can file an appeal of a judgment of exoneration in an administrative case. CSC Resolution
No. 02160068[32] allows the disciplining authority to appeal from a decision exonerating
an erring employee, thus:

 
Section 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms. – x x x (l) PARTY ADVERSELY
AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in a disciplinary case has
been rendered or to the disciplining authority in an appeal from a decision exonerating
the said employee. (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, Cuanan's exoneration under CSC Resolution No. 030069 may be subject to a
motion for reconsideration by the DepEd which, as the appointing and disciplining
authority, is a real party in interest.

Now, as to the merits of DepEd's arguments, the Court finds none.

The remedy of an aggrieved party from a resolution issued by the CSC is to file a
petition for review thereof under Rule 4369[33] of the Rules of Court within fifteen days
from notice of the resolution. Recourse to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 renders
the petition dismissible for being the wrong remedy. Nonetheless, there are exceptions
to this rule, to wit: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates;
(b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null

68

69
and void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial
authority.70[34] As will be shown forthwith, exception (c) applies to the present case.

Furthermore, while a motion for reconsideration is a condition precedent to the

filing of a petition for certiorari, immediate recourse to the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari is warranted where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has
no jurisdiction; where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief; where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process; where the proceeding was ex parte or one in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object.71[35] These exceptions find application to Cuanan's petition for
certiorari in the CA.

At any rate, Cuanan's petition for certiorari before the CA could be treated as a
petition for review, the petition having been filed on November 22, 2004, or thirteen (13)
days from receipt on November 9, 2004 of CSC Resolution No. 041147, clearly within the
15-day reglementary period for the filing of a petition for review.72[36] Such move would
be in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of
substantial justice.73[37]

70

71

72

73
 Furthermore, CSC Resolution No. 030069 has long become final and executory. It
must be noted that the records show that copies of CSC Resolution No. 030069 were duly
sent to the parties, including DepEd, on January 23, 2003.74[38] Cuanan received a copy
thereof on January 31, 2003,75[39] while the DepEd requested a copy sometime in March
2003, or about two months later. Under the Rules of Evidence, it is presumed that official
duty has been regularly performed, unless contradicted.76[40] This presumption includes
that of regularity of service of judgments, final orders or resolutions.

Consequently, the burden of proving the irregularity in official conduct -- that is,
non-receipt of the duly sent copy of CSC Resolution No. 030069 -- is on the part of the
DepEd, which in the present case clearly failed to discharge the same.77[41] Thus, the
presumption stands that CSC Resolution No. 030069 dated January 20, 2003 had already
become final and executory when the DepEd filed its Petition for Review/Reconsideration
on April 11, 2003, more than two months later.

It is elementary that once judgment has become final and executory, it becomes
immutable and can no longer be amended or modified. In Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo,78
[42] this Court held:

74

75

76

77

78
 Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby
becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact
or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court
rendering it or by the highest court of the land. Just as the losing party has the right to file an
appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy
the finality of the resolution of his case. The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on
fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice, and that, at the risk of
occasional errors, the judgments or orders of courts must become final at some definite
time fixed by law; otherwise, there would be no end to litigations, thus setting to naught the
main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the
maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.79[43]

Moreover, while it is true that administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial

functions are free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, they are bound by
law and practice to observe the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in
justiciable cases presented before them.80[44] The relative freedom of the CSC from
the rigidities of procedure cannot be invoked to evade what was clearly emphasized
in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations:81[45] that all
administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process.

Furthermore, Section 43.A.82[46] of the Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in

the Civil Service provides:

79

80

81

82
 Section 43.A. Filing of Supplemental Pleadings. - All pleadings filed by the parties with the
Commission, shall be copy furnished the other party with proof of service filed with the
Commission.

Any supplemental pleading to supply deficiencies in aid of an original pleading but

which should not entirely substitute the latter can be filed only upon a favorable action by
the Commission on the motion of a party to the case. The said motion should be submitted
within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of the original pleading and it is discretionary
upon the Commission to allow the same or not or even to consider the averments therein.
(Emphasis supplied)

Cuanan undoubtedly was denied procedural due process. He had no opportunity to

participate in the proceedings for the petition for review/ reconsideration filed by the
DepEd, since no copy of the pleadings filed by the DepEd were served upon him or his
counsel; nor was he even required by the CSC to file his comments thereon. Considering
that pleadings filed by the DepEd were not served upon Cuanan, they may be treated as
mere scraps of paper which should not have merited the attention or consideration of the
CSC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87499 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Ang Tibay vs. CIR

 Due Process – Admin Bodies – CIR

TeodoroToribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company which supplies the Philippine
Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of members of National
Labor Union Inc. NLU averred that Toribio’s act is not valid as it is not within the CBA. That
there are two labor unions in Ang Tibay; NLU and National Worker’s Brotherhood. That NWB
is dominated by Toribio hence he favors it over NLU. That NLU wishes for a new trial as they
were able to come up with new evidence/documents that they were not able to obtain before as
they were inaccessible and they were not able to present it before in the CIR.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law.

HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. The SC ruled that all
administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of
due process. They are;

(1)     The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

(2)     Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.

(3)     While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision.
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.

(4)     Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence
must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

(5)     The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

(6)     The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

(7)     The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision
in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.

American Tobacco vs. Director

ATC et al filed before the Philippine Patent Office concerning the use of trade mark and trade
name. ATC et al challenged the validity of Rule 168 of the “Revised Rules of Practice before the
Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases” as amended, authorizing the Director of Patents to
designate any ranking official of said office to hear “inter partes” proceedings. Said Rule
likewise provides that “all judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and
directly prepared by the Director and signed by him.” These proceedings refer to the hearing of
opposition to the registration of a mark or trade name, interference proceeding instituted for the
purpose of determining the question of priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade name
or service-mark, and cancellation of registration of a trade-mark or trade name pending at the
Patent Office. Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of the hearing officers to hear
their cases, alleging that the amendment of the Rule is illegal and void because under the law the
Director must personally hear and decide inter partes case. Said objections were overruled by the
Director of Patents, hence, the present petition for mandamus, to compel the Director of Patents
to personally hear the cases of petitioners, in lieu of the hearing officers.

ISSUE: Whether or not the hearing done by hearing officers are within due process.

HELD: The SC ruled that the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested
by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which
the decision of the administrative agency will be made. The rule that requires an administrative
officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a
matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to
him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions.   It is sufficient that the
judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. Neither does
due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking of testimony
be before the same officer who will make the decision in the case. As long as a party is not
deprived of his right to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and the
decision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question that the requirements of
due process and fair trial are fully met.   In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the
part of the officer concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer.   It
is, however, required that to “give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making
determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the determinations must consider and
appraise the evidence which justifies them.”

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-68288 July 11, 1986

DIOSDADO GUZMAN, ULYSSES URBIZTONDO, and ARIEL RAMACULA,

petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY and DOMINGO L. JHOCSON in his capacity as President
of National University, respondents.
Efren H. Mercado and Haydee Yorac for petitioners.

Samson S. Alcantara for respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of

respondent National University, have come to this Court to seek relief from what they
describe as their school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." In
their petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction" dated August 7, 1984, they allege:

1) that respondent University's avowed reason for its refusal to re-enroll

them in their respective courses is "the latter's participation in peaceful
mass actions within the premises of the University.

2) that this "attitude of the (University) is simply a continuation of its

cavalier if not hostile attitude to the student's exercise of their basic
constitutional and human rights already recorded in Rockie C. San Juan
vs. National University, S.C. G.R. No. 65443 (1983) and its utter contempt
for the principle of due process of law to the prejudice of petitioners;" and

3) that "in effect petitioners are subjected to the extreme penalty of

expulsion without cause or if there be any, without being informed of such
cause and without being afforded the opportunity to defend themselves.
Berina v. Philippine Maritime Institute (117 SCRA 581 [1983]).

In the comment filed on September 24, 1986 for respondent University and its President
pursuant to this Court's requirement therefor 1 , respondents make the claim:

1) that "petitioners' failure to enroll for the first semester of the school year 1984-1985 is
due to their own fault and not because of their allegedexercise of their constitutional and
human rights;"

2) that petitioner Urbiztondo, sought to re-enroll only on July 5, 1986 "when the
enrollment period was already closed;"

3) that as regards petitioner Guzman, his "academic showing" was "poor", "due to his
activities in leading boycotts of classes"; that when his father was notified of this
development sometime in August, 1982, the latter had demanded that his son "reform
or else we will recall him to the province"; that Guzman was one of the petitioners in
G.R. No. 65443 entitled "Rockie San Juan, et al. vs. National University, et al.," at the
hearing of which on November 23, 1983 this Court had admonished "the students
involved (to) take advantage and make the most of the opportunity given to them to
study;" that Guzman "however continued to lead or actively participate in activities
within the university premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities,
that disturbed or disrupted classes therein;" that moreover, Guzman "is facing criminal
charges for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (Crim. Case
No. 066446) in connection with the destruction of properties of respondent University on
September 12, 1983 ", and "is also one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 8320483 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila entitled 'National University, Inc. vs. Rockie San Juan
et al.' for damages arising from destruction of university properties

4) that as regards petitioner Ramacula, like Guzman "he continued to lead or actively
participate, contrary to the spirit of the Resolution dated November 23, 1983 of this ...
Court (in G.R. No. 65443 in which he was also one of the petitioners) and to university
rules and regulations, within university premises but without permit from university
officials in activities that disturbed or disrupted classes;" and

5) that petitioners have "failures in their records, (and) are not of good scholastic
standing. "

Respondents close their comment with the following assertions, to wit:

1) By their actuations, petitioners must be deemed to have forfeited their privilege, if

any, to seek enrollment in respondent university. The rights of respondent university, as
an institution of higher learning, must also be respected. It is also beyond
comprehension why petitioners, who continually despise and villify respondent
university and its officials and faculty members, should persist in seeking enrollment in
an institution that they hate.

2) Under the circumstances, and without regard to legal technicalities, it is not to the
best interest of all concerned that petitioners be allowed to enroll in respondent
university.

3) In any event, petitioners' enrollment being on the semestral basis, respondents

cannot be compelled to enroll them after the end of the semester.

On October 2, 1984 this Court issued a resolution reading as follows:

... Acting on the Comment submitted by respondent, the Court Resolved

to NOTE the same and to require a REPLY to such Comment. The Court
further Resolved to ISSUE a MANDATORY INJUNCTION, enjoining
respondent to allow the enrolment of petitioners for the coming semester
without prejudice to any disciplinary proceeding to which any or all of them
may be subjected with their right to lawful defense recognized and
respected. As regards petitioner Diosdado Guzman, even if it be a fact
that there is a pending criminal charge against him for malicious mischief,
the Court nonetheless is of the opinion that, as above-noted, without
prejudice to the continuation of any disciplinary proceeding against him,
 that he be allowed to resume his studies in the meanwhile. As shown in
Annex 2 of the petition itself, Mr. Juan P. Guzman, father of said
petitioner, is extending full cooperation with petitioners to assure that
whatever protest or grievance petitioner Guzman may have would be
ventilated in a lawful and peaceful manner.

Petitioners' REPLY inter alia—

1) denied that Urbiztondo attempted to enroll only on July 5, 1984 (when enrollment was
already closed), it being alleged that "while he did try to enroll that day, he also
attempted to do so several times before that date, all to no avail, because
respondents ... persistently refused to allow him to do so" respondents' ostensible
reason being that Urbiztondo (had) participated in mass actions ... within the school
premises," although there were no existing disciplinary charge against petitioner
Urbiztondo" at the time;

2) asserted that "neither the text nor the context of the resolution 2 justifies the
conclusion that "petitioners' right to exercise their constitutional freedoms" had thereby
been restricted or limited; and

3) alleged that "the holding of activities (mass action) in the school premises without the
permission of the school ... can be explained by the fact that the respondents
persistently refused to issue such permit repeatedly sought by the students. "

On November 23, 1984, this Court promulgated another resolution, this time reading as
follows:

... The Court, after considering the pleadings filed and deliberating on the
issues raised in the petition for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies
with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction as well as the
respondents' comment on the petition and the reply of counsel for
petitioners to the respondents' comment, Resolved to (a) give DUE
COURSE to the petition; (b) consider the respondents' comment as
ANSWER to the petition; and (c) require the parties to file their respective
MEMORANDA within twenty (20) days from notice. ... .

Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum is the

fact that they had never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not
petitioners-students had indeed led or participated "in activities within the university
premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or
disrupted classes therein" 3 or perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion and intimidation,
slander, noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of University
authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case for damages and a criminal
case for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish
sufficient warrant for his expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is
the omission of respondents to cite this Court to any duly published rule of theirs by
which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic standing.

Under the Education Act of 1982, 5 the petitioners, as students, have the right among
others "to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue
their course therein up to graduation, except in case of academic deficiency, or violation
of disciplinary regulations." 6 Petitioners were being denied this right, or being
disciplined, without due process, in violation of the admonition in the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools 7 that "(n)o penalty shall be imposed upon any student
except for cause as defined in ... (the) Manual and/or in the school rules and regulations
as duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted." 8 This
Court is therefore constrained, as in Berina v. Philippine Maritime Institute, 9 to declare
illegal this act of respondents of imposing sanctions on students without due
investigation.

Educational institutions of course have the power to "adopt and enforce such rules as
may be deemed expedient for ... (its) government, ... (this being)" incident to the very
object of incorporation, and indispensable to the successful management of the
college." 10 The rules may include those governing student discipline. Indeed, the
maintenance of "good school discipline" is a duty specifically enjoined on "every private
school" by the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools; 11 and in this connection, the
Manual further provides that-

... The school rules governing discipline and the corresponding sanctions
therefor must be clearly specified and defined in writing and made known
to the students and/or their parents or guardians. Schools shall have the
authority and prerogative to promulgate such rules and regulations as they
may deem necessary from time to time effective as of the date of their
promulgation unless otherwise specified. 12

But, to repeat, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of

procedural due process. And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases
involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed
for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline
cases may be summary; and cross-examination is not, 'contrary to petitioners' view, an
essential part thereof. There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy
the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be
informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they
shag have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel,
if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have
the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly
considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the respondents are directed to allow the
petitioners to re-enroll or otherwise continue with their respective courses, without
prejudice to any disciplinary proceedings to which any or all of them may be subjected
in accordance with the standards herein set forth.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, CJ., Abad Santos, Feria, Yap, Fernan, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay,

Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz and Paras, JJ., concur.
 

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 127980             December 19, 2007

DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC., EMMANUEL SALES, RONALD HOLMES, JUDE

DELA TORRE, AMPARO RIO, CARMELITA QUEBENGCO, AGNES YUHICO and
JAMES YAP, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO D. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court of Manila, THE COMMISSION ON HIGHER
EDUCATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS,
ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD REVERENTE and
ROBERTO VALDES, JR., respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

NAGTATAGIS sa kasong ito ang karapatang mag-aral ng apat na estudyante na

nasangkot sa away ng dalawang fraternity at ang karapatang akademiko ng isang
pamantasan.

PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto
Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle
University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB)1 Joint Discipline Board because of their
involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other
student members of Domino Lux Fraternity. This is the backdrop of the controversy before Us
pitting private respondents' right to education vis-a-vis the University's right to academic
freedom.

ASSAILED in this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court are the following: (1) Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 30,
1996 dismissing DLSU's petition for certiorari against respondent Judge and private respondents
Aguilar, Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr.;2 (2) Resolution of the CA dated October 15,
1996 denying the motion for reconsideration;3 (3) Order dated January 7, 1997 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36 Manila granting private respondent Aguilar's motion to reiterate
writ of preliminary injunction;4 and (4) Resolution No. 181-96 dated May 14, 1996 of the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED) exonerating private respondent Aguilar and lowering
the penalties for the other private respondents from expulsion to exclusion.5

Factual Antecedents

Gleaned from the May 3, 1995 Decision of the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board, two violent
incidents on March 29, 1995 involving private respondents occurred:

x x x From the testimonies of the complaining witnesses, it appears that one week prior to
March 29, 1995, Mr. James Yap was eating his dinner alone in Manang's Restaurant near
La Salle, when he overheard two men bad-mouthing and apparently angry at Domino
Lux. He ignored the comments of the two. When he arrived at his boarding house, he
mentioned the remarks to his two other brods while watching television. These two brods
had earlier finished eating their dinner at Manang's. Then, the three, together with four
other persons went back to Manang's and confronted the two who were still in the
restaurant. By admission of respondent Bungubung in his testimony, one of the two was a
member of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. There was no rumble or physical violence
then.

After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of the fraternity
through the intercession of the Student Council. The Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity was
asking for an apology. "Kailangan ng apology" in the words of respondent Aguilar. But
no apology was made.

Then, 5 members of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity went to the tambayan of the Domino
Lux Fraternity in the campus. Among them were respondents Bungubung, Reverente and
Papio. They were looking for a person whose description matched James Yap. According
to them, this person supposedly "nambastos ng brod." As they could not find Mr. Yap,
one of them remarked "Paano ba iyan. Pasensiya na lang."

Came March 29, 1995 and the following events.

Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m., Mr. James Yap went out of the campus
using the Engineering Gate to buy candies across Taft Avenue. As he was about to re-
cross Taft Avenue, he heard heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to ten guys were running
towards him. He panicked. He did not know what to do. Then, respondent Bungubung
punched him in the head with something heavy in his hands – "parang knuckles."
Respondents Reverente and Lee were behind Yap, punching him. Respondents
Bungubung and Valdes who were in front of him, were also punching him. As he was
lying on the street, respondent Aguilar kicked him. People shouted; guards arrived; and
the group of attackers left.

Mr. Yap could not recognize the other members of the group who attacked him. With
respect to respondent Papio, Mr. Yap said "hindi ko nakita ang mukha niya, hindi ko
nakita sumuntok siya." What Mr. Yap saw was a long haired guy also running with the
group.
 Two guards escorted Mr. Yap inside the campus. At this point, Mr. Dennis Pascual was
at the Engineering Gate. Mr. Pascual accompanied Yap to the university clinic; reported
the incident to the Discipline Office; and informed his fraternity brods at their tambayan.
According to Mr. Pascual, their head of the Domino Lux Fraternity said: "Walang
gagalaw. Uwian na lang."

Mr. Ericson Cano, who was supposed to hitch a ride with Dennis Pascual, saw him under
the clock in Miguel Building. However, they did not proceed directly for home. With a
certain Michael Perez, they went towards the direction of Dagonoy Street because Mr.
Pascual was supposed to pick up a book for his friend from another friend who lives
somewhere in the area.

As they were along Dagonoy Street, and before they could pass the Kolehiyo ng Malate
Restaurant, Mr. Cano first saw several guys inside the restaurant. He said not to mind
them and just keep on walking. However, the group got out of the restaurant, among them
respondents Reverente, Lee and Valdes. Mr. Cano told Mr. Lee: "Ayaw namin ng gulo."
But, respondent Lee hit Mr. Cano without provocation. Respondent Reverente kicked Mr.
Pascual and respondent Lee also hit Mr. Pascual. Mr. Cano and Mr. Perez managed to
run from the mauling and they were chased by respondent Lee and two others.

Mr. Pascual was left behind. After respondent Reverente first kicked him, Mr. Pascual
was ganged-upon by the rest. He was able to run, but the group was able to catch up with
him. His shirt was torn and he was hit at the back of his head with a lead pipe.
Respondent Lee who was chasing Cano and Perez, then returned to Mr. Pascual.

Mr. Pascual identified respondents Reverente and Lee, as among those who hit him.
Although Mr. Pascual did not see respondent Valdes hit him, he identified respondent
Valdez (sic) as also one of the members of the group.

In fact, Mr. Cano saw respondent Valdes near Mr. Pascual. He was almost near the
corner of Leon Guinto and Estrada; while respondent Pascual who managed to run was
stopped at the end of Dagonoy along Leon Guinto. Respondent Valdes shouted: "Mga
putang-ina niyo." Respondent Reverente hit Mr. Pascual for the last time. Apparently
being satisfied with their handiwork, the group left. The victims, Cano, Perez and Pascual
proceeded to a friend's house and waited for almost two hours, or at around 8:00 in the
evening before they returned to the campus to have their wounds treated. Apparently,
there were three cars roaming the vicinity.6

The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner James
Yap and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the "Domino Lux
Fraternity," while the alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul
Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of "Tau Gamma Phi
Fraternity," a rival fraternity.

The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a complaint7 with the Discipline Board of
DLSU charging private respondents with "direct assault." Similar complaints8 were also filed by
Dennis Pascual and Ericson Cano against Alvin Lee and private respondents Valdes and
Reverente. Thus, cases entitled "De La Salle University and College of St. Benilde v. Alvin
Aguilar (AB-BSM/9152105), James Paul Bungubung (AB-PSM/9234403), Robert R. Valdes, Jr.
(BS-BS-APM/9235086), Alvin Lee (EDD/9462325), Richard Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and
Malvin A. Papio (AB-MGT/9251227)" were docketed as Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.

The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private respondents Aguilar,
Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and Reverente informing them of the complaints and requiring them
to answer. Private respondents filed their respective answers.9

As it appeared that students from DLSU and CSB10 were involved in the mauling incidents, a
joint DLSU-CSB Discipline Board11 was formed to investigate the incidents. Thus, petitioner
Board Chairman Emmanuel Sales sent notices of hearing12 to private respondents on April 12,
1995. Said notices uniformly stated as follows:

Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline Board had been constituted to
hear and deliberate the charge against you for violation of CHED Order No. 4 arising
from the written complaints of James Yap, Dennis C. Pascual, and Ericson Y. Cano.

You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board scheduled on April 19, 1995 at
9:00 a.m. at the Bro. Connon Hall for you and your witnesses to give testimony and
present evidence in your behalf. You may be assisted by a lawyer when you give your
testimony or those of your witnesses.

On or before April 18, 1995, you are further directed to provide the Board, through the
Discipline Office, with a list of your witnesses as well as the sworn statement of their
proposed testimony.

Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or your failure to submit the list of
witnesses and the sworn statement of their proposed testimony will be considered a
waiver on your part to present evidence and as an admission of the principal act
complained of.

For your strict compliance.13

During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, 1995, private respondents
interposed the common defense of alibi, summarized by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board
as follows:

First, in the case of respondent Bungubung, March 29, 1995 was one of the few instances
when he was picked-up by a driver, a certain Romeo S. Carillo. Most of the time,
respondent Bungubung goes home alone sans driver. But on this particular date,
respondent Bungubung said that his dad asked his permission to use the car and thus, his
dad instructed this driver Carillo to pick-up his son. Mr. Carillo is not a family driver, but
works from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for the Philippine Ports Authority where the elder
Bungubung is also employed.
 Thus, attempting to corroborate the alibi of respondent Bungubung, Mr. Carillo said that
he arrived at La Salle at 4:56 p.m.; picked-up respondent at 5:02 p.m.; took the Roxas
Blvd. route towards respondent's house in BF Parañaque (on a Wednesday in Baclaran);
and arrived at the house at 6:15 p.m. Respondent Bungubung was dropped-off in his
house, and taking the same route back, Mr. Carillo arrived at the South Harbor at 6:55
p.m. the Philippine Ports Authority is located at the South Harbor.14

xxxx

Secondly, respondent Valdes said that he was with his friends at McDonald's Taft just
before 6:00 p.m. of March 29, 1995. He said that he left McDonald at 5:50 p.m. together
to get some medicine at the university clinic for his throat irritation. He said that he was
at the clinic at 5:52 p.m. and went back to McDonald, all within a span of 3 or even 4
minutes.

Two witnesses, a certain Sharon Sia and the girlfriend of respondent Valdes, a certain
Jorgette Aquino, attempted to corroborate Valdez' alibi.15

xxxx

Third, respondent Reverente told that (sic) the Board that he was at his home at 5:00 p.m.
of March 29, 1995. He said that he was given the responsibility to be the paymaster of the
construction workers who were doing some works in the apartment of his parents.
Although he had classes in the evening, the workers according to him would wait for him
sometimes up to 9:00 p.m. when he arrives from his classes. The workers get paid
everyday.

Respondent Reverente submitted an affidavit, unsigned by the workers listed there,

supposedly attesting to the fact that he paid the workers at the date and time in question.16

xxxx

Fourth, respondent Aguilar "solemnly sw[ore] that [he] left DLSU at 5:00 p.m. for Camp
Crame for a meeting with some of the officers that we were preparing."17

On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution18 finding private
respondents guilty. They were meted the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion,19 pursuant to
CHED Order No. 4.20 The dispositive part of the resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Board finds respondents ALVIN
AGUILAR (AB-BSM/9152105), JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG (AB-PSM/9234403),
ALVIN LEE (EDD/94623250) and RICHARD V. REVERENTE (AB-MGT/9153837)
guilty of having violated CHED Order No. 4 and thereby orders their automatic
expulsion.
 In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO (AB-MGT/9251227), the Board acquits
him of the charge.

SO ORDERED.21

Private respondents separately moved for reconsideration22 before the Office of the Senior Vice-
President for Internal Operations of DLSU. The motions were all denied in a Letter-Resolution23
dated June 1, 1995.

On June 5, 1995, private respondent Aguilar filed with the RTC, Manila, against petitioners a
petition for certiorari and injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. It was docketed as Civil
Case No. 95-74122 and assigned to respondent Judge of Branch 36. The petition essentially
sought to annul the May 3, 1995 Resolution of the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board and the
June 1, 1995 Letter-Resolution of the Office of the Senior Vice-President for Internal Affairs.

The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent Judge issued a TRO24 directing DLSU, its
subordinates, agents, representatives and/or other persons acting for and in its behalf to refrain
and desist from implementing Resolution dated May 3, 1995 and Letter-Resolution dated June 1,
1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrollment of Aguilar for the second term of
school year (SY) 1995.

Subsequently, private respondent Aguilar filed an ex parte motion to amend his petition to
correct an allegation in paragraph 3.2125 of his original petition. Respondent Judge amended the
TRO26 to conform to the correction made in the amended petition.27

On June 7, 1995, the CHED directed DLSU to furnish it with copies of the case records of
Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121,28 in view of the authority granted to it under Section 77(c) of
the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (MRPS).

On the other hand, private respondents Bungubung and Reverente, and later, Valdes, filed
petitions-in-intervention29 in Civil Case No. 95-74122. Respondent Judge also issued
corresponding temporary restraining orders to compel petitioner DLSU to admit said private
respondents.

On June 19, 1995, petitioner Sales filed a motion to dismiss30 in behalf of all petitioners, except
James Yap. On June 20, 1995, petitioners filed a supplemental motion to dismiss31 the petitions-
in-intervention.

On September 20, 1995, respondent Judge issued an Order32 denying petitioners' (respondents
there) motion to dismiss and its supplement, and granted private respondents' (petitioners there)
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. The pertinent part of the Order reads:

For this purpose, respondent, its agents, representatives or any and all other persons
acting for and in its behalf is/are restrained and enjoined from –
 1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the
automatic expulsion of petitioner and the petitioners-in-intervention from the De
La Salle University and the letter-resolution dated June 1, 1995, affirming the
Resolution dated May 3, 1995; and

2. Barring the enrolment of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention in the

courses offered at respondent De La Salle University and to immediately allow
them to enroll and complete their respective courses/degrees until their graduation
thereat in accordance with the standards set by the latter.

WHEREFORE, the ancillary remedy prayed for is granted. Respondent, its agents,
representatives, or any and all persons acting for and its behalf are hereby restrained and
enjoyed from:

1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the
automatic expulsion of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention and the Letter-
Resolution dated June 1, 1995; and

2. Barring the enrollment of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention in the

courses offered at respondent (De La Salle University) and to forthwith allow all
said petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention to enroll and complete their
respective courses/degrees until their graduation thereat.

The Writ of Preliminary Injunction shall take effect upon petitioner and petitioners-in-
intervention posting an injunctive bond in the amount of P15,000.00 executed in favor of
respondent to the effect that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention will pay to
respondent all damages that the latter may suffer by reason of the injunction if the Court
will finally decide that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention are not entitled thereto.

The motion to dismiss and the supplement thereto is denied for lack of merit.
Respondents are directed to file their Answer to the Petition not later than fifteen (15)
days from receipt thereof.

SO ORDERED.33

Despite the said order, private respondent Aguilar was refused enrollment by petitioner DLSU
when he attempted to enroll on September 22, 1995 for the second term of SY 1995-1996. Thus,
on September 25, 1995, Aguilar filed with respondent Judge an urgent motion to cite petitioners
(respondents there) in contempt of court.34 Aguilar also prayed that petitioners be compelled to
enroll him at DLSU in accordance with respondent Judge's Order dated September 20, 1995. On
September 25, 1995, respondent Judge issued35 a writ of preliminary injunction, the relevant
portion of which reads:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF

MANILA that until further orders, you the said DE LA SALLE University as well as
your subordinates, agents, representatives, employees and any other person assisting or
 acting for or on your behalf, to immediately desist from implementing the Resolution
dated May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic expulsion of petitioner and the intervenors in
DLSU, and the letter-resolution dated June 1, 1995 affirming the said Resolution of May
3, 1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrolment of petitioner and
intervenors in the courses offered at DLSU and to allow them to enroll and complete their
degree courses until their graduation from said school.36

On October 16, 1995, petitioner DLSU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari37 (CA-G.R. SP
No. 38719) with prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
enforcement of respondent Judge's September 20, 1995 Order and writ of preliminary injunction
dated September 25, 1995.

On April 12, 1996, the CA granted petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction.

On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned Resolution No. 181-96, summarily
disapproving the penalty of expulsion for all private respondents. As for Aguilar, he was to
be reinstated, while other private respondents were to be excluded.38 The Resolution states:

RESOLUTION 181-96

RESOLVED THAT THE REQUEST OF THE DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY (DLSU),

TAFT AVENUE, MANILA FOR THE APPROVAL OF THE PENALTY OF
EXPULSION IMPOSED ON MR. ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG,
ROBERT R. VALDES, JR., ALVIN LEE AND RICHARD V. REVERENTE BE, AS IT
IS HEREBY IS, DISAPPROVED.

RESOLVED FURTHER, THAT THE COMMISSION DIRECT THE DLSU TO

IMMEDIATELY EFFECT THE REINSTATEMENT OF MR. AGUILAR AND THE
LOWERING OF THE PENALTY OF MR. JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, MR.
ROBER R. VALDEZ, JR., (sic) MR. ALVIN LEE AND MR. RICHARD V.
REVERENTE FROM EXPULSION TO EXCLUSION.39

Despite the directive of CHED, petitioner DLSU again prevented private respondent Aguilar
from enrolling and/or attending his classes, prompting his lawyer to write several demand
letters40 to petitioner DLSU. In view of the refusal of petitioner DLSU to enroll private
respondent Aguilar, CHED wrote a letter dated June 26, 1996 addressed to petitioner Quebengco
requesting that private respondent Aguilar be allowed to continue attending his classes pending
the resolution of its motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. 181-96. However, petitioner
Quebengco refused to do so, prompting CHED to promulgate an Order dated September 23,
1996 which states:

Acting on the above-mentioned request of Mr. Aguilar through counsel enjoining De La

Salle University (DLSU) to comply with CHED Resolution 181-96 (Re: Expulsion Case
of Alvin Aguilar, et al. v. DLSU) directing DLSU to reinstate Mr. Aguilar and finding the
urgent request as meritorious, there being no other plain and speedy remedy available,
considering the set deadline for enrollment this current TRIMESTER, and in order to
 prevent further prejudice to his rights as a student of the institution, DLSU, through the
proper school authorities, is hereby directed to allow Mr. Alvin Aguilar to provisionally
enroll, pending the Commission's Resolution of the instant Motion for Reconsideration
filed by DLSU.

SO ORDERED.41

Notwithstanding the said directive, petitioner DLSU, through petitioner Quebengco, still refused
to allow private respondent Aguilar to enroll. Thus, private respondent Aguilar's counsel wrote
another demand letter to petitioner DLSU.42

Meanwhile, on June 3, 1996, private respondent Aguilar, using CHED Resolution No. 181-96,
filed a motion to dismiss43 in the CA, arguing that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 rendered the
CA case moot and academic.

On July 30, 1996, the CA issued its questioned resolution granting the motion to dismiss of
private respondent Aguilar, disposing thus:

THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, dismissal of herein petition is hereby directed.

SO ORDERED.44

On October 15, 1996, the CA issued its resolution denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration, as follows:

It is obvious to Us that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 is immediately executory in

character, the pendency of a Motion for Reconsideration notwithstanding.

After considering the Opposition and for lack of merit, the Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.45

On October 28, 1996, petitioners requested transfer of case records to the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) from the CHED.46 Petitioners claimed that it is the DECS,
not CHED, which has jurisdiction over expulsion cases, thus, necessitating the transfer of the
case records of Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121 to the DECS.

On November 4, 1996, in view of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
38719 and the automatic lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction, private respondent Aguilar
filed an urgent motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995
before respondent RTC Judge of Manila.47

On January 7, 1997, respondent Judge issued its questioned order granting private
respondent Aguilar's urgent motion to reiterate preliminary injunction. The pertinent
portion of the order reads:
 In light of the foregoing, petitioner Aguilar's urgent motion to reiterate writ of
preliminary injunction is hereby granted, and respondents' motion to dismiss is denied.

The writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 is declared to be in force
and effect.

Let a copy of this Order and the writ be served personally by the Court's sheriff upon the
respondents at petitioners' expense.

SO ORDERED.48

Accordingly, private respondent Aguilar was allowed to conditionally enroll in petitioner DLSU,
subject to the continued effectivity of the writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25,
1995 and to the outcome of Civil Case No. 95-74122.

On February 17, 1997, petitioners filed the instant petition.

On June 15, 1998, We issued a TRO49 as prayed for by the urgent motion for the issuance of a
TRO50 dated June 4, 1998 of petitioners, and enjoined respondent Judge from implementing the
writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 issued in Civil Case No. 95-74122,
effective immediately and until further orders from this Court.

On March 27, 2006, private respondent Aguilar filed his manifestation51 stating that he has long
completed his course at petitioner DLSU. He finished and passed all his enrolled subjects for the
second trimester of 1997-1998, as indicated in his transcript of records52 issued by DLSU.
However, despite having completed all the academic requirements for his course, DLSU has not
issued a certificate of completion/graduation in his favor.

Issues

We are tasked to resolve the following issues:

1. Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which has legal authority to review decisions of
institutions of higher learning that impose disciplinary action on their students found
violating disciplinary rules.

2. Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its rights in expelling private respondents.

2.a Were private respondents accorded due process of law?

2.b Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic freedom?

2.c Was the guilt of private respondents proven by substantial evidence?

3. Whether or not the penalty imposed by DLSU on private respondents is proportionate

to their misdeed.
 Our Ruling

Prefatorily, there is merit in the observation of petitioners53 that while CHED Resolution No.
181-96 disapproved the expulsion of other private respondents, it nonetheless authorized their
exclusion from petitioner DLSU. However, because of the dismissal of the CA case, petitioner
DLSU is now faced with the spectacle of having two different directives from the CHED and the
respondent Judge – CHED ordering the exclusion of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente,
and Valdes, Jr., and the Judge ordering petitioner DLSU to allow them to enroll and complete
their degree courses until their graduation.

This is the reason We opt to decide the whole case on the merits, brushing aside technicalities, in
order to settle the substantial issues involved. This Court has the power to take cognizance of the
petition at bar due to compelling reasons, and the nature and importance of the issues raised
warrant the immediate exercise of Our jurisdiction.54 This is in consonance with our case law
now accorded near-religious reverence that rules of procedure are but tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice, such that when its rigid application tends to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, this Court has the duty to suspend their operation.55

I. It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the

power of supervision and review over
disciplinary cases decided by institutions
of higher learning.

Ang CHED, hindi ang DECS, ang may kapangyarihan ng pagsubaybay at pagrepaso sa
mga desisyong pandisiplina ng mga institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-aaral.

Petitioners posit that the jurisdiction and duty to review student expulsion cases, even those
involving students in secondary and tertiary levels, is vested in the DECS not in the CHED. In
support of their stance, petitioners cite Sections 4,56 15(2) & (3),57 54,58 57(3)59 and 7060 of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 232, otherwise known as the "Education Act of 1982."

According to them, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7722 did not transfer to the CHED the DECS'
power of supervision/review over expulsion cases involving institutions of higher learning. They
say that unlike B.P. Blg. 232, R.A. No. 7722 makes no reference to the right and duty of learning
institutions to develop moral character and instill discipline among its students. The clear
concern of R.A. No. 7722 in the creation of the CHED was academic, i.e., the formulation,
recommendation, setting, and development of academic plans, programs and standards for
institutions of higher learning. The enumeration of CHED's powers and functions under Section
8 does not include supervisory/review powers in student disciplinary cases. The reference in
Section 3 to CHED's "coverage" of institutions of higher education is limited to the powers and
functions specified in Section 8. The Bureau of Higher Education, which the CHED has replaced
and whose functions and responsibilities it has taken over, never had any authority over student
disciplinary cases.

We cannot agree.
On May 18, 1994, Congress approved R.A. No. 7722, otherwise known as "An Act Creating the
Commission on Higher Education, Appropriating Funds Thereof and for other purposes."

Section 3 of the said law, which paved the way for the creation of the CHED, provides:

Section 3. Creation of the Commission on Higher Education. – In pursuance of the

abovementioned policies, the Commission on Higher Education is hereby created,
hereinafter referred to as Commission.

The Commission shall be independent and separate from the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) and attached to the office of the President for administrative
purposes only. Its coverage shall be both public and private institutions of higher
education as well as degree-granting programs in all post secondary educational
institutions, public and private.

The powers and functions of the CHED are enumerated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7722. They
include the following:

Sec. 8. Powers and functions of the Commission. – The Commission shall have the
following powers and functions:

xxxx

n) promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise such other powers and functions as
may be necessary to carry out effectively the purpose and objectives of this Act; and

o) perform such other functions as may be necessary for its effective operations and for
the continued enhancement of growth or development of higher education.

Clearly, there is no merit in the contention of petitioners that R.A. No. 7722 did not transfer to
the CHED the DECS' power of supervision/review over expulsion cases involving institutions of
higher learning.

First, the foregoing provisions are all-embracing. They make no reservations of powers to the
DECS insofar as institutions of higher learning are concerned. They show that the authority and
supervision over all public and private institutions of higher education, as well as degree-
granting programs in all post-secondary educational institutions, public and private, belong to the
CHED, not the DECS.

Second, to rule that it is the DECS which has authority to decide disciplinary cases involving
students on the tertiary level would render nugatory the coverage of the CHED, which is "both
public and private institutions of higher education as well as degree granting programs in all post
secondary educational institutions, public and private." That would be absurd.

It is of public knowledge that petitioner DLSU is a private educational institution which offers
tertiary degree programs. Hence, it is under the CHED authority.
Third, the policy of R.A. No. 772261 is not only the protection, fostering and promotion of the
right of all citizens to affordable quality education at all levels and the taking of appropriate steps
to ensure that education shall be accessible to all. The law is likewise concerned with ensuring
and protecting academic freedom and with promoting its exercise and observance for the
continued intellectual growth of students, the advancement of learning and research, the
development of responsible and effective leadership, the education of high-level and middle-
level professionals, and the enrichment of our historical and cultural heritage.

It is thus safe to assume that when Congress passed R.A. No. 7722, its members were aware that
disciplinary cases involving students on the tertiary level would continue to arise in the future,
which would call for the invocation and exercise of institutions of higher learning of their right to
academic freedom.

Fourth, petitioner DLSU cited no authority in its bare claim that the Bureau of Higher
Education, which CHED replaced, never had authority over student disciplinary cases. In fact,
the responsibilities of other government entities having functions similar to those of the CHED
were transferred to the CHED.62

Section 77 of the MRPS63 on the process of review in student discipline cases should therefore be
read in conjunction with the provisions of R.A. No. 7722.

Fifth, Section 18 of R.A. No. 7722 is very clear in stating that "[j]urisdiction over DECS-
supervised or chartered state-supported post-secondary degree-granting vocational and
tertiary institutions shall be transferred to the Commission [On Higher Education]." This
provision does not limit or distinguish that what is being transferred to the CHED is merely the
formulation, recommendation, setting and development of academic plans, programs and
standards for institutions of higher learning, as what petitioners would have us believe as the
only concerns of R.A. No. 7722. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus: Where the
law does not distinguish, neither should we.

To Our mind, this provision, if not an explicit grant of jurisdiction to the CHED, necessarily
includes the transfer to the CHED of any jurisdiction which the DECS might have possessed by
virtue of B.P. Blg. 232 or any other law or rule for that matter.

IIa. Private respondents were accorded due process of law.

Ang mga private respondents ay nabigyan ng tamang proseso ng batas.

The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system of rights
based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to
be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entire history.64 The
constitutional behest that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law is solemn and inflexible.65

In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating school discipline,

"[t]here are withal minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy the demands of
procedural due process and these are: that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the
nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the
charges against them and with the assistance if counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of
the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;
and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case."66

Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so,
he cannot complain of deprivation of due process.67 Notice and hearing is the bulwark of
administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights that must be respected
even in administrative proceedings.68 The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.69 So long as the party
is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be
said that there was denial of due process.70

A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process – it is
enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective
sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be
based.71 "To be heard" does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court – one
may also be heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is
accorded, there is no denial of due process.72

Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by the DLSU-
CSB Joint Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. They were given the opportunity to answer
the charges against them as they, in fact, submitted their respective answers. They were also
informed of the evidence presented against them as they attended all the hearings before the
Board. Moreover, private respondents were given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf
and they did. Lastly, the Discipline Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by
all the parties before rendering its resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.

Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when they were not allowed
to cross-examine the witnesses against them. This argument was already rejected in Guzman v.
National University73 where this Court held that "x x x the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
requires observance of procedural due process. And it bears stressing that due process in
disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those
prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline
cases may be summary; and cross examination is not, x x x an essential part thereof."

IIb. Petitioner DLSU, as an institution of higher learning, possesses academic freedom which
includes determination of who to admit for study.

Ang petitioner DLSU, bilang institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-aaral, ay nagtataglay ng

kalayaang akademiko na sakop ang karapatang pumili ng mga mag-aaral dito.
Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning
academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or
college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public interest calls for some
restraint.74 According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the independence
of an academic institution to determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3)
how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.75

It cannot be gainsaid that "the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a
necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school
teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the
freedom "what to teach."76 Indeed, while it is categorically stated under the Education Act of
1982 that students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula
and to continue their course therein up to graduation,"77 such right is subject to the established
academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution. Petitioner DLSU,
therefore, can very well exercise its academic freedom, which includes its free choice of students
for admission to its school.

IIc. The guilt of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. was proven by
substantial evidence.

Ang pagkakasala ng private respondents na sina Bungubung, Reverente at Valdes, Jr. ay

napatunayan ng ebidensiyang substansyal.

As has been stated earlier, private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi. However,
in order that alibi may succeed as a defense, "the accused must establish by clear and convincing
evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b)
the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime."78

On the other hand, the defense of alibi may not be successfully invoked where the identity of the
assailant has been established by witnesses.79 Positive identification of accused where categorical
and consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying, should
prevail over the alibi and denial of appellants whose testimonies are not substantiated by clear
and convincing evidence.80 Well-settled is the rule that denial and alibi, being weak defenses,
cannot overcome the positive testimonies of the offended parties.81

Courts reject alibi when there are credible eyewitnesses to the crime who can positively identify
the accused.82 Alibi is an inherently weak defense and courts must receive it with caution
because one can easily fabricate an alibi.83 Jurisprudence holds that denial, like alibi, is
inherently weak and crumbles in light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses who testified
on affirmative matters that accused were at the scene of the crime and were the victim's
assailants. As between categorical testimonies that ring of truth on one hand and a bare denial on
the other, the former must prevail.84 Alibi is the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to fabricate
and difficult to disprove, and it is for this reason that it cannot prevail over the positive
identification of accused by the witnesses.85
The required proof in administrative cases, such as in student discipline cases, is neither proof
beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence but only substantial evidence.
According to Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,86 it means "such reasonable evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

Viewed from the foregoing, We reject the alibi of private respondents Bungubung, Valdes Jr.,
and Reverente.1awphi1 They were unable to show convincingly that they were not at the scene
of the crime on March 29, 1995 and that it was impossible for them to have been there.
Moreover, their alibi cannot prevail over their positive identification by the victims.

We hark back to this Court's pronouncement affirming the expulsion of several students found
guilty of hazing:

No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the immediate reinstatement of respondent

students who have been investigated and found guilty by the Disciplinary Board to have
violated petitioner university's disciplinary rules and standards will certainly undermine
the authority of the administration of the school. This we would be most loathe to do.

More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university's academic freedom which
has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present 1987 Constitution.87

Certainly, private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. do not deserve to claim a
venerable institution as their own, for they may foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on the
students currently enrolled, as well as those who come after them.88 It must be borne in mind that
universities are established, not merely to develop the intellect and skills of the studentry, but to
inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of the
total man.89

As for private respondent Aguilar, however, We are inclined to give credence to his alibi that he
was at Camp Crame in Quezon City at the time of the incident in question on March 29, 1995.
This claim was amply corroborated by the certification that he submitted before the DLSU-CSB
Joint Discipline Board, to wit:

CERTIFICATION

TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:

We, the undersigned, hereby declare and affirm by way of this Certification that
sometime on March 29, 1995, at about and between 4:30 P.M. and 5:30 P.M., we
were together with Alvin A. Aguilar, at Kiangan Hall, inside Camp Crame,
Quezon City, meeting in connection with an affair of our class known as Class 7,
Batch 89 of the Philippine Constabulary discussing on the proposed sponsorship
of TAU GAMMA PHI from said Batch '89 affair.
 That the meeting was terminated at about 6:30 P.M. that evening and Alvin Aguilar had
asked our permission to leave and we saw him leave Camp Crame, in his car with the
driver.

April 18, 1995, Camp Crame, Quezon City.90

The said certification was duly signed by PO3 Nicanor R. Faustino (Anti-Organized Crime CIC,
NCR), PO3 Alejandro D. Deluviar (ODITRM, Camp Crame, Quezon City), PO2 Severino C.
Filler (TNTSC, Camp Crame, Quezon City), and PO3 Ireneo M. Desesto (Supply Center,
PNPLSS). The rule is that alibi assumes significance or strength when it is amply corroborated
by credible and disinterested witnesses.91 It is true that alibi is a weak defense which an accused
can easily fabricate to escape criminal liability. But where the prosecution evidence is weak, and
betrays lack of credibility as to the identification of defendant, alibi assumes commensurate
strength. This is but consistent with the presumption of innocence in favor of accused.92

Alibi is not always undeserving of credit, for there are times when accused has no other possible
defense for what could really be the truth as to his whereabouts at the crucial time, and such
defense may, in fact, tilt the scales of justice in his favor.93

III. The penalty of expulsion imposed by DLSU on private respondents is disproportionate to

their misdeed.

Ang parusang expulsion na ipinataw ng DLSU sa private respondents ay hindi angkop sa

kanilang pagkakasala.

It is true that schools have the power to instill discipline in their students as subsumed in their
academic freedom and that "the establishment of rules governing university-student relations,
particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the
smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival."94 This power, however,
does not give them the untrammeled discretion to impose a penalty which is not commensurate
with the gravity of the misdeed. If the concept of proportionality between the offense committed
and the sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give
rise to a due process question.95

We agree with respondent CHED that under the circumstances, the penalty of expulsion is
grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the acts committed by private respondents Bungubung,
Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. Each of the two mauling incidents lasted only for few seconds and the
victims did not suffer any serious injury. Disciplinary measures especially where they involve
suspension, dismissal or expulsion, cut significantly into the future of a student. They attach to
him for life and become a mortgage of his future, hardly redeemable in certain cases. Officials of
colleges and universities must be anxious to protect it, conscious of the fact that, appropriately
construed, a disciplinary action should be treated as an educational tool rather than a punitive
measure.96

Accordingly, We affirm the penalty of exclusion97 only, not expulsion,98 imposed on them by the
CHED. As such, pursuant to Section 77(b) of the MRPS, petitioner DLSU may exclude or drop
the names of the said private respondents from its rolls for being undesirable, and transfer
credentials immediately issued.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions

dated July 30, 1996 and dated October 15, 1996, and Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36,
Order dated January 7, 1997 are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, while CHED Resolution 181-
96 dated May 14, 1996 is AFFIRMED.

Petitioner DLSU is ordered to issue a certificate of completion/graduation in favor of private

respondent Aguilar. On the other hand, it may exclude or drop the names of private respondents
Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. from its rolls, and their transfer credentials immediately
issued.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Quisumbing *, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr. ** , JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE            G.R. Nos. 164684-85

TELEPHONE COMPANY, INC.,

Petitioner,

                                                                   Present:

                                                                                             PUNO, J., Chairman,

 - versus -                                                                       AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

                                                                        CALLEJO, SR.,

                                                                        TINGA, and

                                                                        CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.

ANTONIO Q. TIAMSON,                       

Respondent.                             Promulgated:

                                                                        November 11, 2005

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

         

Being questioned in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision[1] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) dated April 16, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 51855 and 52247, and the Resolution
dated July 27, 2004 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
 

          On April 16, 1986, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. (PLDT)
employed Antonio Q. Tiamson as a Radio Technician II (JG4).  He was assigned at the
company’s North Luzon Toll Network Division, Clark Transmission Maintenance Center (Clark-
TMC) in Pampanga. After the expiration of the probationary period, he was extended regular
appointment for the same position.

         

In a Letter[2] dated July 29, 1994, Anthony Dy Dee, the President of the

Angeles City Telephone System and Datelcom Corporation, informed PLDT of his

complaint against its employees assigned in Clark-TMC, stating therein that he

suspected them to be in cohorts with the local subscribers in effecting illegal

overseas calls. Acting on the letter-complaint, PLDT immediately dispatched a

team of inspectors and investigators from its Quality Control and Inspection

Department (QCID) and Security Division to conduct surveillance operations in the

area.  On August 2, 1994, Vidal Busa, a radio technician, was caught in flagrante

delicto while monitoring an illegally connected overseas call using the radio

facilities of the company’s Clark-TMC Radio Room.[3]

 
 The QCID, likewise, requested the Switching Network Division at PLDT’s

Sampaloc National Toll Center to print the CAMA[4] tape recording of all long

distance calls originating from the PLDT Clark Exchange Traffic

 for the period of July 29 to August 2, 1994. The printout revealed that a

total of 469 fraudulent overseas and local calls were connected and completed at

the PLDT Clark-TMC Radio Room for the said period. Three overseas calls to Saudi

Arabia made on August 1, 1994 were imputed to Tiamson who appeared to be on

duty from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.[5]

The QCID conducted its initial investigation on August 2, 1994, where Busa

readily admitted his involvement in the illegal connection of overseas calls. In his

sworn statement, he specifically named Arnel Cayanan, his Shift Supervisor,

Antonio Tiamson and Paul Cruzada, both radio technicians, as the other

employees actively engaged in the illegal practice. He stated that he knew about

this because whenever he would relieve them from their tour of duty, he would

see that the circuit was engaged.[6]

On August 3, 1994, during a confrontation between Busa and Tiamson, the

former reiterated his earlier statement that the latter was involved in the illegal

act of connecting overseas calls.[7] For his part, Tiamson admitted that he knew

how to make an overseas call using the company’s radio equipment and that he
learned how to do so through hands-on experimentation and intensive reading of

operating manuals. He, however, denied having actually made an illegal

connection of overseas calls.  He declared that he knew of the wrongdoings of

Busa and even disconnected the latter’s overseas telephone calls whenever he

(Tiamson) was on duty. Tiamson claimed that he failed to report the actuations of

Busa because the latter was his supervisor and was afraid to antagonize him.[8] 

On August 5, 1994, there was another confrontation proceeding between

Busa, Tiamson, Cruzada and Cayanan. In their sworn statements, Busa and

Cruzada testified that, sometimes when they relieve Cayanan from his duty, they

would discover an illegal connection and an on-going conversation in the line.[9] 

Tiamson maintained that he disconnected the illegal calls of Busa, while Cayanan

implicated his subordinates.

The QCID recommended that administrative action for serious misconduct

be instituted against the said employees. Consequently, the company issued to

Tiamson an Inter-Office Memorandum dated August 12, 1994, charging him with
violation of the company’s disciplinary rules and regulations.  He was, likewise,

required to explain within 72 hours why he should not be dismissed, thus:

            Investigation of the complaint indicated hereunder disclosed that:

1.      Complainant – Mr. Anthony Dy, President DATELCOM Corp.

2.      The decrease of toll revenue for DATELCOM Angeles/Mabalacat Exchange due to
fraudulent overseas call scam was complained and notified by Mr. A. Dy to Mrs. B.
G. Gendrano – Clark Exchange Division Head on July 26, 1994.

3.      The complainant requested assistance to NBI and PLDT QCI to apprehend the
personnel responsible for the illegal connection.

4.      A clue was provided by Mr. Anthony Dy that the illegal overseas call was coming
from Clark-TMC through taped and equipment monitoring.
 5.  In the QCI investigation, you were implicated by your fellow Radio Technician Mr.
Vidal C. Busa as involved in the case. You admitted you know how to operate the
Lenkurt 26600 Signalling Test Set to initiate a call but denied doing it for personal
gain or interest but you failed to report the anomaly to your superior as one of your
supervisors was involved in the fraudulent case.

The acts described above are in violation of the Company’s rules and regulations
and is punishable with dismissal from the service.

In view of the above, please explain in writing within 72 hours from receipt hereof
why you should not be dismissed from the service for the acts described above. You may
elect to be heard if you so desire. …[10]

                                               

Meanwhile, Tiamson was placed under preventive suspension on August 16, 1994.[11]

On August 18, 1994, Tiamson submitted his written explanation denying

any participation in the illegal activities at PLDT’s Clark-TMC. He averred that

Busa’s statement against him was malicious and untrue and that he was the one

relieving Busa from his tour of duty and not the other way around.  He insisted

that on August 1, 1994, his tour of duty was from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.[12]

PLDT found his explanation unsatisfactory and inadequate in substance.

Thus, it issued an Inter-Office Memo[13] dated October 5, 1994, terminating

Tiamson’s employment effective October 7, 1994 on the ground of serious

misconduct and/or fraud.

Tiamson filed a complaint against PLDT for illegal suspension, illegal

dismissal, damages and other monetary claims, docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-

III-07-6414-95.

The Labor Arbiter resolved the case in favor of Tiamson:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring respondent PLDT

guilty of illegal dismissal and it is hereby ordered to reinstate complainant to his former position
without loss of seniority rights and with full backwages reckoned from the date of his dismissal
up to his actual or payroll reinstatement at the option of the respondent, which as of this date is in
the amount of Three Hundred Seventy-Two Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-Five and 32/100
(P372,825.32) Pesos.

Further, respondent is ordered to pay complainant attorney’s fee in the amount

of Thirty-Seven Thousand Two Hundred Eighty-Two and 53/100 (P37,282.53) Pesos.

The claims for moral and exemplary damages are dismissed for lack of evidence.

SO ORDERED.[14]
  

The Labor Arbiter declared that the complainant could not have made any illegal connection on
August 1, 1994 from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. because he was off-duty.
 
PLDT elevated the case to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On August 31, 1998, the
NLRC ruled that while there was just cause for Tiamson’s dismissal, the penalty of dismissal was too
harsh. Hence, the NLRC ordered that Tiamson be reinstated to his former position without loss of
seniority rights, but without backwages.[15]

Both parties moved to reconsider the decision, but the NLRC denied the

motions for lack of merit.[16]

 
 PLDT filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, assailing the NLRC’s order

of reinstatement despite a categorical finding that Tiamson was guilty of illegal

connection of overseas calls. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51855.

Tiamson filed a similar petition, assailing the deletion of the award of backwages

and attorney’s fees. This was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52247. The CA,

thereafter, ordered the consolidation of the two petitions.

          On April 16, 2004, the CA reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter, thus:

WHEREFORE, the petition by the PLDT under CA-G.R. SP No. 51855 is DENIED
DUE COURSE and DISMISSED while the petition by Antonio Tiamson under CA-G.R. SP
No. 52247 is GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED, and the Decision dated October 15,
1997 of the Labor Arbiter which was set aside by the NLRC, is hereby REINSTATED in its
fullness and without modifications.

SO ORDERED.[17]

         

The CA held that Busa’s sworn statement was not worthy of credence,  a mere afterthought, the

contents of which were seriously flawed. The appellate court found it difficult to believe Busa’s assertion

that, on several occasions when he came to relieve the respondent, a circuit was in use which the latter

would turn off before leaving. In this regard, the appellate court noted that Busa’s work shift preceded
that of the respondent, such that it would be impossible for him to see the respondent make an illegal

connection.[18]

The CA likewise opined that the respondent was denied due process when he was not apprised

of nor given the opportunity to confute the charge that during his duty on August 1, 1994, three

overseas calls to Saudi Arabia were recorded in the CAMA tape.[19]

The petitioner timely filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in its

Resolution[20] dated July 27, 2004.

The petitioner now comes before this Court, alleging that:

… THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN REINSTATING THE DECISION OF THE

ARBITER A QUO AS SAID DECISION WAS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND CONTRARY TO THE

EVIDENCE ON RECORD.[21]

The petitioner submits that it has presented more than substantial evidence to prove that the

respondent was involved in the illegal connection of overseas calls. The petitioner avers that the CA

erred in holding that Busa’s sworn statement was not credible. According to the CA, it would have been

impossible for Busa to see the respondent making an illegal connection since his tour of duty preceded

that of the respondent. The petitioner, however, asserts that there was a rotation of the employees’
tour of duty such that, at times, it was Busa who would take over from the respondent; hence, Busa had

the occasion to personally see the respondent connecting illegal calls. In support of this, the petitioner

proffers the copy of logbook entries from July 13 to August 3, 1994, which was attached to its

Memorandum of Appeal filed with the NLRC. The logbook shows that on several occasions, it was Busa

who took over from the respondent.[22]

The petitioner further asserts that the respondent failed to show that Busa was actuated and

impelled by improper motive and bad faith in executing his sworn statement.[23] The records show

that Busa, from the very start, had categorically and unequivocally named the respondent as one of

those engaged in the illegal connection of overseas calls.[24]  Moreover, Busa’s sworn statement had

been corroborated by the printout of the CAMA tapes (which disclosed that during the respondent’s

August 1, 1994 duty, three fraudulent calls to Saudi Arabia were illegally made),[25] as well as

Cayanan’s sworn statement implicating the respondent.[26]

The petitioner submits that the respondent’s offense was serious  in character and merits the

penalty of dismissal from employment. It contends that the respondent was accorded the full measure

of due process before he was dismissed: he was given a notice which apprised him of the charge against

him and required him to explain why he should not be dismissed, and later, a notice of termination. The

petitioner claims that the Labor Code simply requires that the employee be given a written notice

containing a statement of the causes of termination.  It insists that the printout of the recording of the
CAMA tapes showing that three illegal connections were made on August 1, 1994 is a mere evidentiary

matter that need not be mentioned in the notice.[27]

For his part, the respondent avers that Busa’s statement was uncorroborated and hearsay for

lack of cross-examination. He insists that Busa could not have seen him make illegal connections since

the latter’s shift came before his.[28]

The petitioner replies that an affidavit may be admissible even if the witness is not presented

during trial because technical rules are not strictly followed in proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and

the NLRC.[29]

The petition has no merit.

It is a settled rule that factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired

expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but

even finality.[30] Moreover, in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the Supreme Court

reviews only errors of law and not errors of facts.[31] However, where there is divergence in the

findings and conclusions of the NLRC, on the one hand, from those of the Labor Arbiter and the Court of

Appeals, on the other, the Court is constrained to examine the evidence.[32]

 
 In termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is

for just and valid cause; failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal.[33] The

employer’s case succeeds or fails on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the

employee’s defense. If doubt exists between the evidence presented by the employer and the

employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.[34] Moreover, the quantum of

proof required in determining the legality of an employee’s dismissal is only substantial evidence.

Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence or relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might

conceivably opine otherwise.[35]

In this case, the appellate court ruled for respondent Tiamson, ratiocinating as follows:

The issues posed by both parties involve the evaluation of the findings of facts by the

agencies a quo. While the general rule is that factual issues could not be properly raised and

considered in a petition for certiorari, it however admits of this exception that a disharmony

between the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and those of the NLRC opens the door to

review thereof by the Supreme Court (Asuncion vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 362

SCRA 56), including, of course, the Court of Appeals.

The crux of both petitions is whether the NLRC with its findings quoted below, was

correct in setting aside the disposition of the Labor Arbiter:

 
 We disagree that respondent failed to present evidence linking

complainant to the illegal connection scam. As pointed out by the respondent,

co-employee Busa and Cayanan in the course of their investigation implicated

complainant’s participation in illegal overseas connection.  Complainant also

failed to refute respondent’s evidence that on August 1, 1994, while he was on

duty, three (3) overseas calls to Saudi Arabia were recorded in cama tape

(Annex 4, p. 30, records).

However, we consider the penalty of dismissal too harsh considering

that respondent imposed a sixty (60)-day suspension on Paul Cruzada, a co-

employee of complainant who submitted (sic) culpability.  For where a lesser

punitive penalty would suffice, the supreme penalty of dismissal should be

visited (Almira vs. B.F. Goodrich, 58 SCRA 120).  Under the circumstances,

reinstatement but without backwages is appropriate (pp. 39-40, Rollo)

Our review of the records reveals that among the three employees who issued sworn

statements, namely, Busa, Cayanan and Cruzada,  it was only Busa who directly implicated

Tiamson and it was done inexplicably only in his second sworn statement. It does not inspire

credence as it comes as an afterthought and the contents are seriously flawed on material

points.  Looming large is the claim of Busa that on several occasions when he came to relieve

Tiamson, he observed that his circuit was logged on and in use, and Tiamson would then put it

off before leaving.  This is a canard because the shift of Busa was from 1:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.

and of course ahead of the 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. shift of Tiamson who came in as his reliever. 

Their tours of duty was in the converse order of what Busa claimed, and so he spoke with a
forked tongue when he stated that Tiamson at the preceding shift had his circuit logged on and

switched this off when he left.

A no less important point is the undisputed fact that Tiamson was not given the

opportunity to confute the charge that on August 1, 1994 while he was on duty, three (3)

overseas calls to Saudi Arabia were recorded in the cama tape.  This was not indicated in the

memorandum sent to him on August 12, 1994, the full text of which reads:

                                                                 August 12, 1994

TO                 : MR. ANTONIO Q. TIAMSON – Radio Tech II Clark TMC

FROM      : Division Head, North Luzon Toll Network

SUBJECT: ADMINISTRATIVE CASE

- - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -      

Investigation of the complaint indicated hereunder disclosed that:

1.  Complainant Mr. Anthony Dy, President DATELCOM Corp.

2. The decrease of toll revenue for DATELCOM Angeles/Mabalacat

Exchange due to fraudulent overseas call scam was complained and notified

by Mr. A. Dy to Mrs. H. G. Gendrano – Clark Exchange Division Head on July 26,

1994.

 
 3. The complainant requested assistance to NBI and PLDT QCI to

apprehend the personnel responsible for the illegal connection.

4.  A clue was provided by Mr. Anthony Dy that the illegal overseas call

was coming from Clark-TMC through taped and equipment monitoring.

           5. In the QCI investigation, you were implicated by your fellow Radio

Technician Mr. Vidal C. Busa as involved in the case. You admitted you know

how to operate the Lenkurt 26600 Signalling Test Set to initiate a call but

denied doing it for personal gain or interest but you failed to report the

anomaly to your superior as one of your supervisors was involved in the

fraudulent case.

         The acts described above are in violation of the Company’s rules and

regulations and is punishable with dismissal from the service. 

         In view of the above, please explain in writing within 72 hours from

receipt hereof why you should not be dismissed from the service for the acts

described above.  You may elect to be heard if you so desire.

         Please be informed also that you will be placed under preventive

suspension which will take effect on August 16, 1994 pending resolution of the

case.

 
          If no written explanation is received from you within the said period of 72

hours, this case will be decided on the basis of the evidence on hand. (p. 227,

Rollo)

                                                                      (SGD.)

                                                     ARMANDO A. ABESAMIS

            Procedural due process requires that an employee be apprised of the charge against him,

given reasonable time to answer the same, allowed ample opportunity to be heard and defend

himself, and assisted by a representative if the employee so desires (Concorde Hotel vs. Court of

Appeals, 362 SCRA 583; underlining supplied). Procedural due process requires that the

employer serve the employees to be dismissed two (2) written notices before the termination of

their employment is effected: (a) the first, to apprise them of the particular acts or omission for

which their dismissal is sought; and (b) second, to inform them of the decision of the employer

that they are being dismissed (Perpetual Help Credit Cooperative, Inc. vs. Faburada, 366 SCRA

693; underlining supplied). The Labor Arbiter, therefore, was correct in ruling that Tiamson was

indeed illegally dismissed from his employment.[36]

The petitioner maintains that contrary to the findings and conclusions of the appellate court, it

has established through substantial evidence that there was just cause for the respondent’s dismissal.

To bolster such contention, the petitioner adduces the following documentary evidences: (1) the sworn

statements of Vidal Busa specifically implicating the respondent;

 (2) the sworn statement of Arnel Cayanan; and (3) the printout of the CAMA tape, recording the
unauthorized overseas calls originating from Clark-TMC during the respondent’s tour of duty.

The respondent disputes the admissibility of Busa’s sworn statements for being hearsay since

the latter was not presented for cross-examination. This argument, however, is not persuasive because

the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC

where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only.[37]

The Court agrees with the contentions of the respondent and the findings and rulings of the CA.

The petitioner indeed failed to adduce substantial evidence to prove that the dismissal of the

respondent was for a just cause.  In his first sworn statement, Busa implicated the respondent in the

illegal connections of overseas calls in this manner:

T 25 - Bukod sa iyo, sinu-sino pa sa mga kasamahan mo ang tinuruan ni   Mr. Cayanan ng

sistemang ito?

S   - Sina Antonio Tiamson at Paul Cruzada na pawang mga Radio Technicians din.

T 26 - Ang ibig mo sabihin, ginagawa din nina Mr. Tiamson at Cruzada   

            ang magpa-patch ng mga tawag sa abroad o overseas?

S      - Opo.
  

T 27 - Paano mo naman nasisiguro ito?

S      - Nakikita ko po.

T 28 - Paano mo naman nakita samantalang magka-iba ang tour of duty  

            ninyo?

S      - Pag nag-relyebo kami ay naaabutan kong naka-engage ang circuit at pag tinanong ko ay

sinasabi nga nilang may tawag sila at kasalukuyang nag-uusap ang magkabilang parties.

[38]

During the confrontation between Busa and the respondent, the former likewise made the

following statements:

T 3  -  Ayon sa iyo, ginagawa rin ni Mr. Tiamson ang magku-kunekta ng mga illegal na tawag

overseas sa pamamagitan ng pag-gamit ng inyong Radio Equipment. Tama ba ito?

S      -  Tama po, Sir.

T 4   -  Paano mo nalaman na  ginagawa rin ni Mr. Tiamson ito?

 S   - Dahil nakikita ko siyang nagkukunekta at ilang beses ko ring nadatnan kapag nag-relyebo

kami na gumagana ang circuit na ang ibig sabihin ay may nag-uusap. At bago siya aalis ay

inilalagay niya sa normal position ang linyang ginamit niya.

T 5  -  Kailan pa ito gingawa ni Mr. Tiamson kung natatandaan mo pa?

S     -  Sa natatandaan ko ginagawa niya ito magmula noong 1992 pa.

T 6 -  Ayon pa rin sa iyo, alam din ni Mr. Tiamson na ginagawa rin ni Mr. Cayanan itong mga

illegal activities na ito. Paano mo nasabi na alam ni Mr. Tiamson itong ginagawa ni Mr.

Cayanan

 S   -  Kasi magkakasama kami at kaming apat lang nina Mr. Cayanan, Mr.Tiamson, Mr. Cruzada

at ako ang nakaka-alam niyang operation na iyan.[39]

On the other hand, during the confrontation among all four employees implicated in the matter,

Cayanan testified that he was aware that his “subordinates” were engaged in illegal activities. However,

he failed to specifically mention who these subordinates were.[40]

Although admissible in evidence, affidavits being self-serving must be received with caution. 

This is because the adverse party is not afforded any opportunity to test their veracity.[41] By

themselves, generalized and pro forma affidavits cannot constitute relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind may accept as adequate.[42] There must be some other relevant evidence to

corroborate such affidavits.

On this point, the petitioner submits that the printout of the CAMA tapes corroborated Busa’s

sworn statement. A perusal of the printout, however, shows that it is not authenticated by the proper

officer of the company. Moreover, the name of the respondent and the other annotations in the said

printout are handwritten and unsigned.

The ruling in Asuncion v. National Labor Relations Commission[43] is instructive on how such

document should be treated.  In that case, the employer submitted a handwritten listing and computer

printouts to establish the charges against the employee. The handwritten listing was not signed, and

while there was a computer-generated listing, the entries of time and other annotations therein were

also handwritten and unsigned. The Court ruled that the handwritten listing and unsigned computer

printouts were unauthenticated, hence, unreliable. Mere self-serving evidence (of which the listing and

printouts are of that nature) should be rejected as evidence without any rational probative value even in

administrative  proceedings.[44]

           

          Thus, in Uichico v. National Labor Relations Commission,[45] the Court elucidated the extent of

the liberality of procedure in administrative actions:

…  It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by

the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases. However, this procedural rule

should not be construed as a license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules. While
 the rules of evidence prevailing in the courts of law or equity are not controlling in proceedings

before the NLRC, the evidence presented before it must at least have a modicum of admissibility

for it to be given some probative value. …[46]

The decisions of this Court, while adhering to a liberal view in the conduct of proceedings before

administrative agencies, have nonetheless consistently required some proof of authenticity or reliability

as a condition for the admission of documents.[47] Absent any such proof of authenticity, the printout

of the CAMA tape should be considered inadmissible, hence, without any probative weight.

To conclude, the petitioner has not established by substantial evidence that there was just cause

for the respondent’s termination from his employment. The sworn statements of Busa and Cayanan

alone are not sufficient to establish that the respondent was guilty of serious misconduct. In light of such

finding, there is no need to delve into whether or not the respondent was afforded due process when he

was dismissed by the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals dated April 16, 2004, and its Resolution dated July 27, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 51855

and 52247 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 117565. November 18, 1997]

ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED (deceased), Regional Director, DAR – CAR, Represented by his

Heirs, Francisca A. Lumiqued, May A. Lumiqued, Arlene A. Lumiqued and Richard A.
Lumiqued, petitioners, vs. Honorable APOLINIO G. EXEVEA, ERDOLFO V. BALAJADIA
and FELIX T. CABADING, ALL Members of Investigating Committee, created by DOJ Order
No. 145 on May 30, 1992; HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, HON.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO, CHIEF Presidential Legal Adviser/Counsel; and HON. LEONARDO
A. QUISIMBING, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, and
JEANNETTE OBAR-ZAMUDIO, Private Respondent, respondents.

DECISION

ROMERO, J.:

Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an
administrative inquiry?

Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform –
Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) until President Fidel V. Ramos dismissed him from
that position pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12, 1993. In view of
Lumiqued’s death on May 19, 1994, his heirs instituted this petition for certiorari and
mandamus, questioning such order.

The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and
private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the Board of Discipline of the DAR. The first
affidavit-complaint dated November 16, 1989, [1] charged Lumiqued with malversation through
i

falsification of official documents. From May to September 1989, Lumiqued allegedly

committed at least 93 counts of falsification by padding gasoline receipts. He even submitted a
vulcanizing shop receipt worth P550.00 for gasoline bought from the shop, and another receipt
for P660.00 for a single vulcanizing job. With the use of falsified receipts, Lumiqued claimed
and was reimbursed the sum of P44,172.46. Private respondent added that Lumiqued seldom
made field trips and preferred to stay in the office, making it impossible for him to consume the
nearly 120 liters of gasoline he claimed everyday.

In her second affidavit-complaint dated November 22, 1989, [2] private respondent accused
ii

Lumiqued with violation of Commission on Audit (COA) rules and regulations, alleging that
during the months of April, May, July, August, September and October, 1989, he made
unliquidated cash advances in the total amount of P116,000.00. Lumiqued purportedly
defrauded the government “by deliberately concealing his unliquidated cash advances through
the falsification of accounting entries in order not to reflect on `Cash advances of other officials’
under code 8-70-600 of accounting rules.”

The third affidavit-complaint dated December 15, 1989, [3] charged Lumiqued with oppression
iii

and harassment. According to private respondent, her two previous complaints prompted
Lumiqued to retaliate by relieving her from her post as Regional Cashier without just cause.
The three affidavit-complaints were referred in due course to the Department of Justice (DOJ)
for appropriate action. On May 20, 1992, Acting Justice Secretary Eduardo G. Montenegro
issued Department Order No. 145 creating a committee to investigate the complaints against
Lumiqued. The order appointed Regional State Prosecutor Apolinario Exevea as committee
chairman with City Prosecutor Erdolfo Balajadia and Provincial Prosecutor Felix Cabading as
members. They were mandated to conduct an investigation within thirty days from receipt of the
order, and to submit their report and recommendation within fifteen days from its conclusion.

The investigating committee accordingly issued a subpoena directing Lumiqued to submit his
counter-affidavit on or before June 17, 1992. Lumiqued, however, filed instead an urgent motion
to defer submission of his counter-affidavit pending actual receipt of two of private respondent’s
complaints. The committee granted the motion and gave him a five-day extension.

In his counter-affidavit dated June 23, 1992, [4] Lumiqued alleged, inter alia, that the cases were
iv

filed against him to extort money from innocent public servants like him, and were initiated by
private respondent in connivance with a certain Benedict Ballug of Tarlac and a certain Benigno
Aquino III. He claimed that the apparent weakness of the charge was bolstered by private
respondent’s execution of an affidavit of desistance. [5]
v

Lumiqued admitted that his average daily gasoline consumption was 108.45 liters. He submitted,
however, that such consumption was warranted as it was the aggregate consumption of the five
service vehicles issued under his name and intended for the use of the Office of the Regional
Director of the DAR. He added that the receipts which were issued beyond his region were made
in the course of his travels to Ifugao Province, the DAR Central Office in Diliman, Quezon City,
and Laguna, where he attended a seminar. Because these receipts were merely turned over to him
by drivers for reimbursement, it was not his obligation but that of auditors and accountants to
determine whether they were falsified. He affixed his signature on the receipts only to signify
that the same were validly issued by the establishments concerned in order that official
transactions of the DAR-CAR could be carried out.

Explaining why a vulcanizing shop issued a gasoline receipt, Lumiqued said that he and his
companions were cruising along Santa Fe, Nueva Vizcaya on their way to Ifugao when their
service vehicle ran out of gas. Since it was almost midnight, they sought the help of the owner of
a vulcanizing shop who readily furnished them with the gasoline they needed. The vulcanizing
shop issued its own receipt so that they could reimburse the cost of the gasoline. Domingo
Lucero, the owner of said vulcanizing shop, corroborated this explanation in an affidavit dated
June 25, 1990. [6] With respect to the accusation that he sought reimbursement in the amount of
vi

P660.00 for one vulcanizing job, Lumiqued submitted that the amount was actually only P6.60.
Any error committed in posting the amount in the books of the Regional Office was not his
personal error or accountability.

To refute private respondent’s allegation that he violated COA rules and regulations in incurring
unliquidated cash advances in the amount of P116,000.00, Lumiqued presented a certification [7] vii

of DAR-CAR Administrative Officer Deogracias F. Almora that he had no outstanding cash

advances on record as of December 31, 1989.
In disputing the charges of oppression and harassment against him, Lumiqued contended that
private respondent was not terminated from the service but was merely relieved of her duties due
to her prolonged absences. While admitting that private respondent filed the required
applications for leave of absence, Lumiqued claimed that the exigency of the service necessitated
disapproval of her application for leave of absence. He allegedly rejected her second application
for leave of absence in view of her failure to file the same immediately with the head office or
upon her return to work. He also asserted that no medical certificate supported her application for
leave of absence.

In the same counter-affidavit, Lumiqued also claimed that private respondent was corrupt and
dishonest because a COA examination revealed that her cash accountabilities from June 22 to
November 23, 1989, were short by P30,406.87. Although private respondent immediately
returned the amount on January 18, 1990, the day following the completion of the cash
examination, Lumiqued claimed that she should be relieved from her duties and assigned to jobs
that would not require handling of cash and money matters.

Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued
was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17,
1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but
neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee
deemed the case submitted for resolution.

On August 12, 1992, Lumiqued filed an urgent motion for additional hearing, [8] alleging that he
viii

suffered a stroke on July 10, 1992. The motion was forwarded to the Office of the State
Prosecutor apparently because the investigation had already been terminated. In an order dated
September 7, 1992, [9] State Prosecutor Zoila C. Montero denied the motion, viz:
ix

“The medical certificate given show(s) that respondent was discharged from the Sacred Heart
Hospital on July 17, 1992, the date of the hearing, which date was upon the request of respondent
(Lumiqued). The records do not disclose that respondent advised the Investigating committee of
his confinement and inability to attend despite his discharge, either by himself or thru counsel.
The records likewise do not show that efforts were exerted to notify the Committee of
respondent’s condition on any reasonable date after July 17, 1992. It is herein noted that as early
as June 23, 1992, respondent was already being assisted by counsel.

Moreover an evaluation of the counter-affidavit submitted reveal(s) the sufficiency,

completeness and thoroughness of the counter-affidavit together with the documentary evidence
annexed thereto, such that a judicious determination of the case based on the pleadings submitted
is already possible.

Moreover, considering that the complaint-affidavit was filed as far back as November 16, 1989
yet, justice can not be delayed much longer.”

Following the conclusion of the hearings, the investigating committee rendered a report dated
July 31, 1992, [10] finding Lumiqued liable for all the charges against him. It made the following
x

findings:
“After a thorough evaluation of the evidences (sic) submitted by the parties, this committee finds
the evidence submitted by the complainant sufficient to establish the guilt of the respondent for
Gross Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct.

That most of the gasoline receipts used by the respondent in claiming for the reimbursement of
his gasoline expenses were falsified is clearly established by the 15 Certified Xerox Copies of
the duplicate receipts (Annexes G-1 to G-15) and the certifications issued by the different
gasoline stations where the respondent purchased gasoline. Annexes `G-1’ to `G-15’ show that
the actual average purchase made by the respondent is about 8.46 liters only at a purchase price
of P50.00, in contrast to the receipts used by the respondent which reflects an average of 108.45
liters at a purchase price of P550.00. Here, the greed of the respondent is made manifest by his
act of claiming reimbursements of more than 10 times the value of what he actually spends.
While only 15 of the gasoline receipts were ascertained to have been falsified, the motive, the
pattern and the scheme employed by the respondent in defrauding the government has,
nevertheless, been established.

That the gasoline receipts have been falsified was not rebutted by the respondent. In fact, he had
in effect admitted that he had been claiming for the payment of an average consumption of
108.45 liters/day by justifying that this was being used by the 4 vehicles issued to his office.
Besides he also admitted having signed the receipts.

Respondent’s act in defrauding the government of a considerable sum of money by falsifying

receipts constitutes not only Dishonesty of a high degree but also a criminal offense for
Malversation through Falsification of Official Documents.

This committee likewise finds that the respondent have (sic) unliquidated cash advances in the
year 1989 which is in violation of established office and auditing rules. His cash advances
totalling to about P116,000.00 were properly documented. The requests for obligation of
allotments and the vouchers covering the amounts were all signed by him. The mere certification
issued by the Administrative Officer of the DAR-CAR cannot therefore rebut these concrete
evidences (sic).

On the third complaint, this committee likewise believes that the respondent’s act in relieving the
complainant of her functions as a Regional Cashier on December 1, 1989 was an act of
harassment. It is noted that this was done barely two weeks after the complainant filed charges
against her (sic). The recommendation of Jose G. Medina of the Commission on Audit came
only on May 11, 1990 or almost six months after the respondent’s order relieving the
complainant was issued. His act in harassing a subordinate employee in retaliation to a complaint
she filed constitute(s) Gross Misconduct on the part of the respondent who is a head of office.

The affidavits of Joseph In-uyay and Josefina Guting are of no help to the respondent. In fact,
this only show(s) that he is capable of giving bribes if only to have the cases against him
dismissed. He could not have given a certain Benigno Aquino III the sum of P10,000.00 for any
other purpose.”
Accordingly, the investigating committee recommended Lumiqued’s dismissal or removal from
office, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal charges against him.

Acting on the report and recommendation, former Justice Secretary Franklin M. Drilon adopted
the same in his Memorandum to President Fidel V. Ramos dated October 22, 1992. He added
that the filing of the affidavit of desistance [11] would not prevent the issuance of a resolution on
xi

the matter considering that what was at stake was not only “the violation of complainant’s
(herein private respondent’s) personal rights” but also “the competence and fitness of the
respondent (Lumiqued) to remain in public office.” He opined that, in fact, the evidence on
record could call for “a punitive action against the respondent on the initiative of the DAR.”

On December 17, 1992, Lumiqued filed a motion for reconsideration of “the findings of the
Committee” with the DOJ. [12] Undersecretary Ramon S. Esguerra indorsed the motion to the
xii

investigating committee. [13] In a letter dated April 1, 1993, the three-member investigating
xiii

committee informed Undersecretary Esguerra that the committee “had no more authority to act
on the same (motion for reconsideration) considering that the matter has already been forwarded
to the Office of the President” and that their authority under Department Order No. 145 ceased
when they transmitted their report to the DOJ. [14] Concurring with this view, Undersecretary
xiv

Esguerra informed Lumiqued that the investigating committee could no longer act on his motion
for reconsideration. He added that the motion was also prematurely filed because the Office of
the President (OP) had yet to act on Secretary Drilon’s recommendation. [15]xv

On May 12, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos himself issued Administrative Order No. 52 (A.O.
No. 52), [16] finding Lumiqued administratively liable for dishonesty in the alteration of fifteen
xvi

gasoline receipts, and dismissing him from the service, with forfeiture of his retirement and other
benefits. Thus:

“That the receipts were merely turned over to him by his drivers and that the auditor and
accountant of the DAR-CAR should be the ones to be held liable is untenable. The receipts in
question were signed by respondent for the purpose of attesting that those receipts were validly
issued by the commercial establishments and were properly disbursed and used in the official
business for which it was intended.

This Office is not about to shift the blame for all these to the drivers employed by the DAR-CAR
as respondent would want us to do.”

The OP, however, found that the charges of oppression and harassment, as well as that of
incurring unliquidated cash advances, were not satisfactorily established.

In a “petition for appeal” [17] addressed to President Ramos, Lumiqued prayed that A.O. No. 52
xvii

be reconsidered and that he be reinstated to his former position “with all the benefits accorded to
him by law and existing rules and regulations.” This petition was basically premised on the
affidavit dated May 27, 1993, of a certain Dwight L. Lumiqued, a former driver of the DAR-
CAR, who confessed to having authored the falsification of gasoline receipts and attested to
petitioner Lumiqued’s being an “honest man” who had no “premonition” that the receipts he
(Dwight) turned over to him were “altered.” [18] xviii
Treating the “petition for appeal” as a motion for the reconsideration of A.O. No. 52, the OP,
through Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing, denied the same on
August 31, 1993.

Undaunted, Lumiqued filed a second motion for reconsideration, alleging, among other things,
that he was denied the constitutional right to counsel during the hearing. [19] On May 19, 1994,
xix xx

[20] however, before his motion could be resolved, Lumiqued died. On September 28, 1994, [21] xxi

Secretary Quisumbing denied the second motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus praying for the reversal of the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Committee, the October 22, 1992, Memorandum of
then Justice Secretary Drilon, A.O. No. 52 issued by President Ramos, and the orders of
Secretary Quisumbing. In a nutshell, it prays for the “payment of retirement benefits and other
benefits accorded to deceased Arsenio Lumiqued by law, payable to his heirs; and the backwages
from the period he was dismissed from service up to the time of his death on May 19, 1994.” [22] xxii

Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to
counsel during the hearing. They maintain that his right to counsel could not be waived unless
the waiver was in writing and in the presence of counsel. They assert that the committee should
have suspended the hearing and granted Lumiqued a reasonable time within which to secure a
counsel of his own. If suspension was not possible, the committee should have appointed a
counsel de oficio to assist him.

These arguments are untenable and misplaced. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived
unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an
accused during custodial investigation. [23] It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked
xxiii

or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the
case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent
and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime
in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department
Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable
under the law for the complaints filed against him. The order issued by Acting Secretary of
Justice Montenegro states thus:

“In the interest of the public service and pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, a Committee
to conduct the formal investigation of the administrative complaint for oppression, dishonesty,
disgraceful and immoral conduct, being notoriously undesirable and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service against Mr. ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED, Regional Director,
Department of Agrarian Reform, Cordillera Autonomous Region, is hereby created x x x.” [24] xxiv

As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating committee was not part of a criminal
prosecution. This was even made more pronounced when, after finding Lumiqued
administratively liable, it hinted at the filing of criminal case for malversation through
falsification of public documents in its report and recommendation.
Petitioners’ misconception on the nature of the investigation [25] conducted against Lumiqued
xxv

appears to have been engendered by the fact that the DOJ conducted it. While it is true that under
the Administrative Code of 1987, the DOJ shall “administer the criminal justice system in
accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes,
prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional system,” [26] conducting criminal
xxvi

investigations is not its sole function. By its power to “perform such other functions as may be
provided by law,” [27] prosecutors may be called upon to conduct administrative investigations.
xxvii

Accordingly, the investigating committee created by Department Order No. 145 was duty-bound
to conduct the administrative investigation in accordance with the rules therefor.

While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal

proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or
may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent’s
capacity to represent himself and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel. [28] In an administrative proceeding such as the one that transpired
xxviii

below, a respondent (such as Lumiqued) has the option of engaging the services of counsel or
not. This is clear from the provisions of Section 32, Article VII of Republic Act No. 2260 [29]
xxix

(otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on
discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 [30] xxx

(otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987). Excerpts from the transcript of
stenographic notes of the hearings attended by Lumiqued [31] clearly show that he was confident
xxxi

of his capacity and so opted to represent himself. Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in
administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether
there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with
the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.

Furthermore, petitioners’ reliance on Resolution No. 94-0521 of the Civil Service Commission
on the Uniform Procedure in the Conduct of Administrative Investigation stating that a
respondent in an administrative complaint must be “informed of his right to the assistance of a
counsel of his choice,” [32] is inappropriate. In the first place, this resolution is applicable only
xxxii

to cases brought before the Civil Service Commission. [33] Secondly, said resolution, which is
xxxiii

dated January 25, 1994, took effect fifteen days following its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation, [34] much later than the July 1992 hearings of the investigating committee
xxxiv

created by Department Order No. 145. Thirdly, the same committee was not remiss in the matter
of reminding Lumiqued of his right to counsel. Thus at the July 3, 1992, hearing, Lumiqued was
repeatedly appraised of his option to secure services of counsel:

“RSP EXEVEA:

This is an administrative case against Director Lumiqued. Director Lumiqued is present. The
complainant is present, Janet Obar-Zamudio. Complainant has just been furnished with a copy
of the counter-affidavit of the respondent. Do you have a counsel, Director?

DIR. LUMIQUED:
I did not bring anybody, Sir, because when I went to see him, he told me, Sir, that he has already
set a hearing, morning and afternoon today.

RSP EXEVEA:

So, we will proceed with the hearing even without your counsel? You are willing to proceed with
the hearing even without your counsel?

DIR. LUMIQUED:

Yes, I am confident . . .

CP BALAJADIA:

You are confident that you will be able to represent yourself?

DIR. LUMIQUED:

That is my concern.” xxxv

[35] (Underscoring supplied)

In the course of private respondent’s damaging testimony, the investigating committee once
again reminded Lumiqued of his need for a counsel. Thus:

“CP BALAJADIA:

Q. (To Director Lumiqued) You really wish to go through with this even without your counsel?

DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:

A. I think so, Sir.

CP BALAJADIA:

Let us make it of record that we have been warning you to proceed with the assistance of counsel
but you said that you can take care of yourself so we have no other alternative but to
proceed.” [36] (Underscoring supplied)
xxxvi

Thereafter, the following colloquies transpired:

“CP BALAJADIA:

We will suspend in the meantime that we are waiting for the supplemental affidavit you are
going to present to us. Do you have any request from the panel of investigators, Director
Lumiqued?

DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
I was not able to bring a lawyer since the lawyer I requested to assist me and was the one who
prepared my counter-affidavit is already engaged for a hearing and according to him he is
engaged for the whole month of July.

RSP EXEVEA:

We cannot wait . . .

CP BALAJADIA:

Why don’t you engage the services of another counsel. The charges against you are quite serious.
We are not saying you are guilty already. We are just apprehensive that you will go through this
investigation without a counsel. We would like you to be protected legally in the course of this
investigation. Why don’t you get the services of another counsel. There are plenty here in
Baguio...

DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:

I will try to see, Sir . . .

CP BALAJADIA:

Please select your date now, we are only given one month to finish the investigation, Director
Lumiqued.

RSP EXEVEA:

We will not entertain any postponement. With or without counsel, we will proceed.

CP BALAJADIA:

Madam Witness, will you please submit the document which we asked for and Director
Lumiqued, if you have other witnesses, please bring them but reduce their testimonies in
affidavit form so that we can expedite with the proceedings.” [37]
xxxvii

At the hearing scheduled for July 10, 1992, Lumiqued still did not avail of the services of
counsel. Pertinent excerpts from said hearing follow:

“FISCAL BALAJADIA:

I notice also Mr. Chairman that the respondent is not being represented by a counsel. The last
time he was asked to invite his lawyer in this investigation. May we know if he has a lawyer to
represent him in this investigation?

DIR. LUMIQUED:
There is none Sir because when I went to my lawyer, he told me that he had set a case also at
9:30 in the other court and he told me if there is a possibility of having this case postponed
anytime next week, probably Wednesday so we will have good time (sic) of presenting the
affidavit.

FISCAL BALAJADIA:

Are you moving for a postponement Director? May I throw this to the panel. The charges in this
case are quite serious and he should be given a chance to the assistance of a counsel/lawyer.

RSP EXEVEA:

And is (sic) appearing that the supplemental-affidavit has been furnished him only now and this
has several documents attached to it so I think we could grant him one last postponement
considering that he has already asked for an extension.

DIR. LUMIQUED:

Furthermore Sir, I am now being bothered by my heart ailment.” xxxviii

[38]

The hearing was reset to July 17, 1992, the date when Lumiqued was released from the hospital.
Prior to said date, however, Lumiqued did not inform the committee of his confinement.
Consequently, because the hearing could not push through on said date, and Lumiqued had
already submitted his counter-affidavit, the committee decided to wind up the proceedings. This
did not mean, however, that Lumiqued was short-changed in his right to due process.

Lumiqued, a Regional Director of a major department in the executive branch of the government,
graduated from the University of the Philippines (Los Baños) with the degree of Bachelor of
Science major in Agriculture, was a recipient of various scholarships and grants, and underwent
training seminars both here and abroad. [39] Hence, he could have defended himself if need be,
xxxix

without the help of counsel, if truth were on his side. This, apparently, was the thought he
entertained during the hearings he was able to attend. In his statement, “That is my concern,”
one could detect that it had been uttered testily, if not exasperatedly, because of the doubt or
skepticism implicit in the question, “You are confident that you will be able to represent
yourself?” despite his having positively asserted earlier, “Yes, I am confident.” He was
obviously convinced that he could ably represent himself. Beyond repeatedly reminding him
that he could avail himself of counsel and as often receiving the reply that he is confident of his
ability to defend himself, the investigating committee could not do more. One can lead a horse
to water but cannot make him drink.

The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the
law. In Nera v. Auditor General, [40] the Court said:
xl

“x x x. There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is
entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound
by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal
profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its
members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless
that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.”

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain
one’s side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even much
more creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings. [41] An actual
xli

hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due process. [42] As long as a party was given
xlii

the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due
process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. [43] Moreover,
xliii

this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek

reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. [44] Lumiqued’s appeal and his subsequent
xliv

filing of motions for reconsideration cured whatever irregularity attended the proceedings
conducted by the committee. [45]
xlv

The constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and property. [46] In the early
xlvi

case of Cornejo v. Gabriel and Provincial Board of Rizal [47] the Court held that a public office
xlvii

is not property within the sense of the constitutional guarantee of due process of law for it is a
public trust or agency. This jurisprudential pronoucement has been enshrined in the 1987
Constitution under Article XI, Section 1 on accountability of public officers, as follows:

“Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.”

When the dispute concerns one’s constitutional right to security of tenure, however, public office
is deemed analogous to property in a limited sense; hence, the right to due process could
rightfully be invoked. Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is not absolute. Of equal weight
is the countervailing mandate of the Constitution that all public officers and employees must
serve with responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. [48] In this case, it has been clearly
xlviii

shown that Lumiqued did not live up to this constitutional precept.

The committee’s findings pinning culpability for the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct
upon Lumiqued were not, as shown above, fraught with procedural mischief. Its conclusions
were founded on the evidence presented and evaluated as facts. Well-settled in our jurisdiction
is the doctrine that findings of fact of administrative agencies must be respected as long as they
are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or
preponderant. [49] The quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in administrative cases
xlix

is only substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. [50]
l

Consequently, the adoption by Secretary Drilon and the OP of the committee’s recommendation
of dismissal may not in any way be deemed tainted with arbitrariness amounting to grave abuse
of discretion. Government officials are presumed to perform their functions with regularity.
Strong evidence is not necessary to rebut that presumption, [51] which petitioners have not
li

successfully disputed in the instant case.

Dishonesty is a grave offense penalized by dismissal under Section 23 of Rule XIV of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. Under Section 9 of
the same Rule, the penalty of dismissal carries with it “cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
leave credits and retirement benefits, and the disqualification for reemployment in the
government service.” The instant petition, which is aimed primarily at the “payment of
retirement benefits and other benefits” plus backwages from the time of Lumiqued’s dismissal
until his demise, must, therefore, fail.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby DISMISSED and
Administrative Order No. 52 of the Office of the President is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
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xv EN BANC
 

JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., MATIAS G.R. No. 188920

V. DEFENSOR, JR., RODOLFO G.

VALENCIA, DANILO E. SUAREZ,

SOLOMON R. CHUNGALAO,

SALVACION ZALDIVAR-PEREZ,

HARLIN CAST-ABAYON, MELVIN G.

MACUSI and ELEAZAR P. QUINTO,

Petitioners, Present:
 Puno, C.J.,

Carpio,

Corona,

Carpio Morales,

Velasco, Jr.,

Nachura,

- versus - Leonardo-De Castro,

Brion,

Peralta,

Bersamin,

Del Castillo,

Abad,

Villarama, Jr.,

Perez, and

Mendoza, JJ.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

MANUEL A. ROXAS II,

FRANKLIN M. DRILON and Promulgated:

J.R. NEREUS O. ACOSTA,

Respondents. February 16, 2010

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 DECISION
 

ABAD, J.:
 

This petition is an offshoot of two earlier cases already resolved by the Court
involving a leadership dispute within a political party. In this case, the petitioners
question their expulsion from that party and assail the validity of the election of new
party leaders conducted by the respondents.

Statement of the Facts and the Case

For a better understanding of the controversy, a brief recall of the preceding

events is in order.

On July 5, 2005 respondent Franklin M. Drilon (Drilon), as erstwhile president of

the Liberal Party (LP), announced his party’s withdrawal of support for the
administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. But petitioner Jose L. Atienza,
Jr. (Atienza), LP Chairman, and a number of party members denounced Drilon’s move,
claiming that he made the announcement without consulting his party.

 
 On March 2, 2006 petitioner Atienza hosted a party conference to supposedly
discuss local autonomy and party matters but, when convened, the assembly proceeded
to declare all positions in the LP’s ruling body vacant and elected new officers, with
Atienza as LP president. Respondent Drilon immediately filed a petition[1] with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to nullify the elections. He claimed that it was
illegal considering that the party’s electing bodies, the National Executive Council
(NECO) and the National Political Council (NAPOLCO), were not properly convened.
Drilon also claimed that under the amended LP Constitution,[2] party officers were
elected to a fixed three-year term that was yet to end on November 30, 2007.

On the other hand, petitioner Atienza claimed that the majority of the LP’s NECO
and NAPOLCO attended the March 2, 2006 assembly. The election of new officers on
that occasion could be likened to “people power,” wherein the LP majority removed
respondent Drilon as president by direct action. Atienza also said that the
amendments[3] to the original LP Constitution, or the Salonga Constitution, giving LP
officers a fixed three-year term, had not been properly ratified. Consequently, the term
of Drilon and the other officers already ended on July 24, 2006.

On October 13, 2006, the COMELEC issued a resolution,[4] partially granting

respondent Drilon’s petition. It annulled the March 2, 2006 elections and ordered the
holding of a new election under COMELEC supervision. It held that the election of
petitioner Atienza and the others with him was invalid since the electing assembly did
not convene in accordance with the Salonga Constitution. But, since the amendments to
the Salonga Constitution had not been properly ratified, Drilon’s term may be deemed to
have ended. Thus, he held the position of LP president in a holdover capacity until new
officers were elected.

Both sides of the dispute came to this Court to challenge the COMELEC rulings.
On April 17, 2007 a divided Court issued a resolution,[5] granting respondent Drilon’s
petition and denying that of petitioner Atienza. The Court held, through the majority,
that the COMELEC had jurisdiction over the intra-party leadership dispute; that the
Salonga Constitution had been validly amended; and that, as a consequence, respondent
Drilon’s term as LP president was to end only on November 30, 2007.

Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before
respondent Drilon’s term expired. Fifty-nine NECO members out of the 87 who were
supposedly qualified to vote attended. Before the election, however, several persons
associated with petitioner Atienza sought to clarify their membership status and raised
issues regarding the composition of the NECO. Eventually, that meeting installed
respondent Manuel A. Roxas II (Roxas) as the new LP president.

On January 11, 2008 petitioners Atienza, Matias V. Defensor, Jr., Rodolfo G.

Valencia, Danilo E. Suarez, Solomon R. Chungalao, Salvacion Zaldivar-Perez, Harlin
Cast-Abayon, Melvin G. Macusi, and Eleazar P. Quinto, filed a petition for mandatory
and prohibitory injunction[6] before the COMELEC against respondents Roxas, Drilon
and J.R. Nereus O. Acosta, the party secretary general. Atienza, et al. sought to enjoin
Roxas from assuming the presidency of the LP, claiming that the NECO assembly which
elected him was invalidly convened. They questioned the existence of a quorum and
claimed that the NECO composition ought to have been based on a list appearing in the
party’s 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. Both Atienza and Drilon adopted that list
as common exhibit in the earlier cases and it showed that the NECO had 103 members.

Petitioners Atienza, et al. also complained that Atienza, the incumbent party
chairman, was not invited to the NECO meeting and that some members, like petitioner
Defensor, were given the status of “guests” during the meeting. Atienza’s allies
allegedly raised these issues but respondent Drilon arbitrarily thumbed them down and
“railroaded” the proceedings. He suspended the meeting and moved it to another room,
where Roxas was elected without notice to Atienza’s allies.

On the other hand, respondents Roxas, et al. claimed that Roxas’ election as LP
president faithfully complied with the provisions of the amended LP Constitution. The
party’s 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program could not be used for determining the NECO
members because supervening events changed the body’s number and composition.
Some NECO members had died, voluntarily resigned, or had gone on leave after
accepting positions in the government. Others had lost their re-election bid or did not
run in the May 2007 elections, making them ineligible to serve as NECO members. LP
members who got elected to public office also became part of the NECO. Certain
persons of national stature also became NECO members upon respondent Drilon’s
nomination, a privilege granted the LP president under the amended LP Constitution. In
other words, the NECO membership was not fixed or static; it changed due to
supervening circumstances.

 
 Respondents Roxas, et al. also claimed that the party deemed petitioners Atienza,
Zaldivar-Perez, and Cast-Abayon resigned for holding the illegal election of LP officers
on March 2, 2006. This was pursuant to a March 14, 2006 NAPOLCO resolution that
NECO subsequently ratified. Meanwhile, certain NECO members, like petitioners
Defensor, Valencia, and Suarez, forfeited their party membership when they ran under
other political parties during the May 2007 elections. They were dropped from the
roster of LP members.

On June 18, 2009 the COMELEC issued the assailed resolution denying
petitioners Atienza, et al.’s petition. It noted that the May 2007 elections necessarily
changed the composition of the NECO since the amended LP Constitution explicitly
made incumbent senators, members of the House of Representatives, governors and
mayors members of that body. That some lost or won these positions in the May 2007
elections affected the NECO membership. Petitioners failed to prove that the NECO
which elected Roxas as LP president was not properly convened.

As for the validity of petitioners Atienza, et al.’s expulsion as LP members, the

COMELEC observed that this was a membership issue that related to disciplinary action
within the political party. The COMELEC treated it as an internal party matter that was
beyond its jurisdiction to resolve.

Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution,

petitioners Atienza, et al. filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
 

The Issues Presented

Respondents Roxas, et al. raise the following threshold issues:

1. Whether or not the LP, which was not impleaded in the case, is an
indispensable party; and

2. Whether or not petitioners Atienza, et al., as ousted LP members, have the

requisite legal standing to question Roxas’ election.

Petitioners Atienza, et al., on the other hand, raise the following issues:

3. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it upheld
the NECO membership that elected respondent Roxas as LP president;

4. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it

resolved the issue concerning the validity of the NECO meeting without first resolving
the issue concerning the expulsion of Atienza, et al. from the party; and

5. Whether or not respondents Roxas, et al. violated petitioners Atienza, et

al.’s constitutional right to due process by the latter’s expulsion from the party.

 
 

The Court’s Ruling

One. Respondents Roxas, et al. assert that the Court should dismiss the petition
for failure of petitioners Atienza, et al. to implead the LP as an indispensable party.
Roxas, et al. point out that, since the petition seeks the issuance of a writ of mandatory
injunction against the NECO, the controversy could not be adjudicated with finality
without making the LP a party to the case.[7]

But petitioners Atienza, et al.’s causes of action in this case consist in respondents
Roxas, et al.’s disenfranchisement of Atienza, et al. from the election of party leaders
and in the illegal election of Roxas as party president. Atienza, et al. were supposedly
excluded from the elections by a series of “despotic acts” of Roxas, et al., who
controlled the proceedings. Among these acts are Atienza, et al.’s expulsion from the
party, their exclusion from the NECO, and respondent Drilon’s “railroading” of election
proceedings. Atienza, et al. attributed all these illegal and prejudicial acts to Roxas, et
al.

Since no wrong had been imputed to the LP nor had some affirmative relief been
sought from it, the LP is not an indispensable party. Petitioners Atienza, et al.’s prayer
for the undoing of respondents Roxas, et al.’s acts and the reconvening of the NECO are
directed against Roxas, et al.

 
 Two. Respondents Roxas, et al. also claim that petitioners Atienza, et al. have no
legal standing to question the election of Roxas as LP president because they are no
longer LP members, having been validly expelled from the party or having joined other
political parties.[8] As non-members, they have no stake in the outcome of the action.

But, as the Court held in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[9] legal standing in suits is

governed by the “real parties-in-interest” rule under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court. This states that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest.” And “real party-in-interest” is one who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. In other
words, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the relief sought. In raising
petitioners Atienza, et al.’s lack of standing as a threshold issue, respondents Roxas, et
al. would have the Court hypothetically assume the truth of the allegations in the
petition.

Here, it is precisely petitioners Atienza, et al.’s allegations that respondents

Roxas, et al. deprived them of their rights as LP members by summarily excluding them
from the LP roster and not allowing them to take part in the election of its officers and
that not all who sat in the NECO were in the correct list of NECO members. If Atienza,
et al.’s allegations were correct, they would have been irregularly expelled from the
party and the election of officers, void. Further, they would be entitled to recognition as
members of good standing and to the holding of a new election of officers using the
correct list of NECO members. To this extent, therefore, Atienza, et al. who want to
take part in another election would stand to be benefited or prejudiced by the Court’s
decision in this case. Consequently, they have legal standing to pursue this petition.
 

Three. In assailing respondent Roxas’ election as LP president, petitioners

Atienza, et al. claim that the NECO members allowed to take part in that election should
have been limited to those in the list of NECO members appearing in the party’s 60 th
Anniversary Souvenir Program. Atienza, et al. allege that respondent Drilon, as
holdover LP president, adopted that list in the earlier cases before the COMELEC and it
should thus bind respondents Roxas, et al. The Court’s decision in the earlier cases, said
Atienza, et al., anointed that list for the next party election. Thus, Roxas, et al. in effect
defied the Court’s ruling when they removed Atienza as party chairman and changed the
NECO’s composition.[10]

But the list of NECO members appearing in the party’s 60th Anniversary Souvenir
Program was drawn before the May 2007 elections. After the 2007 elections, changes in
the NECO membership had to be redrawn to comply with what the amended LP
Constitution required. Respondent Drilon adopted the souvenir program as common
exhibit in the earlier cases only to prove that the NECO, which supposedly elected
Atienza as new LP president on March 2, 2006, had been improperly convened. It
cannot be regarded as an immutable list, given the nature and character of the NECO
membership.

Nothing in the Court’s resolution in the earlier cases implies that the NECO
membership should be pegged to the party’s 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. There
would have been no basis for such a position. The amended LP Constitution did not
intend the NECO membership to be permanent. Its Section 27[11] provides that the
NECO shall include all incumbent senators, members of the House of Representatives,
governors, and mayors who were LP members in good standing for at least six months.
It follows from this that with the national and local elections taking place in May 2007,
the number and composition of the NECO would have to yield to changes brought about
by the elections.

Former NECO members who lost the offices that entitled them to membership
had to be dropped. Newly elected ones who gained the privilege because of their offices
had to come in. Furthermore, former NECO members who passed away, resigned from
the party, or went on leave could not be expected to remain part of the NECO that
convened and held elections on November 26, 2007. In addition, Section 27 of the
amended LP Constitution expressly authorized the party president to nominate “persons
of national stature” to the NECO. Thus, petitioners Atienza, et al. cannot validly object
to the admission of 12 NECO members nominated by respondent Drilon when he was
LP president. Even if this move could be regarded as respondents Roxas, et al.’s way of
ensuring their election as party officers, there was certainly nothing irregular about the
act under the amended LP Constitution.

The NECO was validly convened in accordance with the amended LP

Constitution. Respondents Roxas, et al. explained in details how they arrived at the
NECO composition for the purpose of electing the party leaders.[12] The explanation is
logical and consistent with party rules. Consequently, the COMELEC did not gravely
abuse its discretion when it upheld the composition of the NECO that elected Roxas as
LP president.
 

Petitioner Atienza claims that the Court’s resolution in the earlier cases
recognized his right as party chairman with a term, like respondent Drilon, that would
last up to November 30, 2007 and that, therefore, his ouster from that position violated
the Court’s resolution. But the Court’s resolution in the earlier cases did not preclude
the party from disciplining Atienza under Sections 29[13] and 46[14] of the amended LP
Constitution. The party could very well remove him or any officer for cause as it saw fit.

Four. Petitioners Atienza, et al. lament that the COMELEC selectively exercised
its jurisdiction when it ruled on the composition of the NECO but refused to delve into
the legality of their expulsion from the party. The two issues, they said, weigh heavily
on the leadership controversy involved in the case. The previous rulings of the Court,
they claim, categorically upheld the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over intra-party
leadership disputes.[15]

But, as respondents Roxas, et al. point out, the key issue in this case is not the
validity of the expulsion of petitioners Atienza, et al. from the party, but the legitimacy
of the NECO assembly that elected respondent Roxas as LP president. Given the
COMELEC’s finding as upheld by this Court that the membership of the NECO in
question complied with the LP Constitution, the resolution of the issue of whether or not
the party validly expelled petitioners cannot affect the election of officers that the NECO
held.

 
 While petitioners Atienza, et al. claim that the majority of LP members belong to
their faction, they did not specify who these members were and how their numbers could
possibly affect the composition of the NECO and the outcome of its election of party
leaders. Atienza, et al. has not bothered to assail the individual qualifications of the
NECO members who voted for Roxas. Nor did Atienza, et al. present proof that the
NECO had no quorum when it then assembled. In other words, the claims of Atienza, et
al. were totally unsupported by evidence.

Consequently, petitioners Atienza, et al. cannot claim that their expulsion from
the party impacts on the party leadership issue or on the election of respondent Roxas as
president so that it was indispensable for the COMELEC to adjudicate such claim.
Under the circumstances, the validity or invalidity of Atienza, et al.’s expulsion was
purely a membership issue that had to be settled within the party. It is an internal party
matter over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction.

What is more, some of petitioner Atienza’s allies raised objections before the
NECO assembly regarding the status of members from their faction. Still, the NECO
proceeded with the election, implying that its membership, whose composition has been
upheld, voted out those objections.

The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not

have blanket authority to resolve any and all controversies involving political parties.
Political parties are generally free to conduct their activities without interference from
the state. The COMELEC may intervene in disputes internal to a party only when
necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions.

The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already

been settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections[16]
that the COMELEC’s powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, “include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its
legitimate officers responsible for its acts.” The Court also declared in another case[17]
that the COMELEC’s power to register political parties necessarily involved the
determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may
resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an
incident of its power to register political parties.

The validity of respondent Roxas’ election as LP president is a leadership issue

that the COMELEC had to settle. Under the amended LP Constitution, the LP president
is the issuing authority for certificates of nomination of party candidates for all national
elective positions. It is also the LP president who can authorize other LP officers to issue
certificates of nomination for candidates to local elective posts.[18] In simple terms, it
is the LP president who certifies the official standard bearer of the party.

The law also grants a registered political party certain rights and privileges that
will redound to the benefit of its official candidates. It imposes, too, legal obligations
upon registered political parties that have to be carried out through their leaders. The
resolution of the leadership issue is thus particularly significant in ensuring the peaceful
and orderly conduct of the elections.[19]
 

Five. Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from the party is not a
simple issue of party membership or discipline; it involves a violation of their
constitutionally-protected right to due process of law. They claim that the NAPOLCO
and the NECO should have first summoned them to a hearing before summarily
expelling them from the party. According to Atienza, et al., proceedings on party
discipline are the equivalent of administrative proceedings[20] and are, therefore,
covered by the due process requirements laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations.[21]

But the requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal
affairs of political parties. The due process standards set in Ang Tibay cover only
administrative bodies created by the state and through which certain governmental acts
or functions are performed. An administrative agency or instrumentality “contemplates
an authority to which the state delegates governmental power for the performance of a
state function.”[22] The constitutional limitations that generally apply to the exercise of
the state’s powers thus, apply too, to administrative bodies.

The constitutional limitations on the exercise of the state’s powers are found in
Article III of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights, which guarantees
against the taking of life, property, or liberty without due process under Section 1 is
generally a limitation on the state’s powers in relation to the rights of its citizens. The
right to due process is meant to protect ordinary citizens against arbitrary government
action, but not from acts committed by private individuals or entities. In the latter case,
the specific statutes that provide reliefs from such private acts apply. The right to due
process guards against unwarranted encroachment by the state into the fundamental
rights of its citizens and cannot be invoked in private controversies involving private
parties.[23]

Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an

intermediary between the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a
state instrument. The discipline of members by a political party does not involve the
right to life, liberty or property within the meaning of the due process clause. An
individual has no vested right, as against the state, to be accepted or to prevent his
removal by a political party. The only rights, if any, that party members may have, in
relation to other party members, correspond to those that may have been freely agreed
upon among themselves through their charter, which is a contract among the party
members. Members whose rights under their charter may have been violated have
recourse to courts of law for the enforcement of those rights, but not as a due process
issue against the government or any of its agencies.

But even when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts will ordinarily not
interfere in membership and disciplinary matters within a political party. A political
party is free to conduct its internal affairs, pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right
to free association. In Sinaca v. Mula,[24] the Court said that judicial restraint in
internal party matters serves the public interest by allowing the political processes to
operate without undue interference. It is also consistent with the state policy of allowing
a free and open party system to evolve, according to the free choice of the people.[25]
 

To conclude, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld
Roxas’ election as LP president but refused to rule on the validity of Atienza, et al.’s
expulsion from the party. While the question of party leadership has implications on the
COMELEC’s performance of its functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, the same cannot be said of the issue pertaining to Atienza, et al.’s
expulsion from the LP. Such expulsion is for the moment an issue of party membership
and discipline, in which the COMELEC cannot intervene, given the limited scope of its
power over political parties.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition and UPHOLDS the

Resolution of the Commission on Elections dated June 18, 2009 in COMELEC Case
SPP 08-001.

SO ORDERED.

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