Indigenous Peoples Self-determination and the Nation State in Asia

Discussion Paper for the International Conference in Baguio City, Philippines,

April 18-21, 1999

THE CORDILLERA PEOPLES'

CONTINUING STRUGGLE FOR SELF-DETERMINATION

by the Cordillera Peoples Alliance

I. THE CORDILLERA PEOPLES AND THE PHILIPPINE NATION

A. An Overview of the Philippines and the Cordillera Region

The Philippines, its land and peoples

The Philippines is a tropical, mountainous country of 7,100 large and small islands, with a
land area of 300,000 square kilometers. It has three main island groups: Luzon with about
140,000 sq km, Visayas with about 60,000 sq km, and Mindanao-Sulu with about 100,000 sq
km. The country has 77 provinces as its main administrative divisions. These are grouped
into 15 regions and one "autonomous region" for Muslim Mindanao.

The entire country is rich in natural resources -- good agricultural soils of volcanic and
alluvial origin; extensive marine, forest and mineral resources; and various hydropower,
geothermal, and other sources of energy. The country remains mainly agrarian and feudal,
with some capitalist elements in the small industrial and service sectors.

As of 1995, the Philippines had a total population of 68 million, the overwhelming majority
being peasants. Its peoples are mainly of Austronesian or Malayo-Polynesian stock, with
minor traces of other racial stocks. Today, they are usually grouped according to
ethnolinguistic or ethnogeographic roots. (The number of ethnolinguistic groups varies from
30 to 150 or more, depending on the source.) The largest ethnolinguistic groups, in terms of
population and area occupied, include the Iloko, Pangasinense, Kapampangan, Tagalog,
Bikol, Waray, Sebuano (Sugbuhanon), Ilonggo (Hiligaynon), and Aklanon. Concentrated in
the lowlands and coastal areas, they compose the predominant population nationwide.

There are many more, smaller ethnolinguistic groups, too numerous to enumerate here.
Typically, they are indigenous or minority peoples who live in the interior uplands, far-flung
islands, and other less accessible parts of the country. The two largest contiguous territories
where these peoples may be found are: 1) all the uplands, some lowlands and far-flung islands
of Mindanao- Sulu, and 2) the Cordillera highlands and adjacent uplands of Northern Luzon.

The indigenous or minority peoples of Mindanao-Sulu are usually divided into two groups:
the Moro peoples who had embraced Islam under various sultanates, and the Lumad peoples
who were not assimilated into the Islamic-sultanate system. There are overlaps in such a
categorization, but this will not be dwelt on here.
The Cordillera region, its land and peoples
The next largest contiguous territory occupied by indigenous peoples is the Cordillera region
of Northern Luzon. As a physical region, the Cordillera or Gran Cordillera Central is a row of
great mountain ranges occupying half of Northern Luzon. Its rugged backbone contains many
peaks exceeding 2,000 meters, with rolling hills and stretches of river valleys along its flanks.
Irregular in shape, around 230 kilometers long and 120 km wide, its total area is estimated at
17,500 square km. Thus, the Cordillera is both the highest and the single largest mass of
mountains in the entire country.

The bulk of the Cordillera, as a physical region, is covered by the six provinces of Apayao,
Kalinga, Abra, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Benguet which includes the city of Baguio.
These have a total land area of almost 18,300 square km. The Cordillera's foothills extend
into other adjacent provinces.

Very rich in natural resources, the Cordillera region is especially famed for huge gold
deposits, pure stands of pine forest, and rich soils and water sources that have enabled its
peoples to sustain agriculture on mountainside rice terraces. As in the rest of the country, the
great majority of its peoples are peasants engaged in farming and other small-scale
production.

The Cordillera is heavily populated compared to the country's other mountainous areas. In
1995, it had a total population of more than 1.25 million people, the bulk of whom are
closely- related indigenous peoples. Collectively they are known popularly as Igorot. They
are grouped into a number of ethnolinguistic identities, such as the Apayao (or Isneg),
Tinggian, Kalinga, Bontok, Kankanaey, Ibaloy, and Ifugao.

These groupings, while convenient, do not fully reflect the real particularities and the extent
of diversity among the region's peoples. In fact, most of the indigenous peoples typically
identify themselves primarily with specific communities called ili (literally home village,
hometown, or home territory). Each ili is a self-identifying community with a specific
territory -- its ancestral land. While of diverse types, an ili usually consists of a closely-knit
cluster of villages, or a core village and its outlying hamlets, within a well-defined territory.

Bigger and more diverse populations are found in the Cordillera's melting-pot areas, such as
those in urban Baguio-Benguet and in the foothills and valleys adjoining the lowlands of
Luzon. There, the original indigenous communities have given way to hybrid communities
composed of migrants and indigenous peoples.

B. The Development of the Philippine Nation-State and its Indigenous Peoples

The creation of the Philippine nation-state cannot be viewed separately from the question of
how the country came to have non- indigenous people who now comprise its majority
population, and how its indigenous peoples acquired their present national- minority status.
But first, let us clarify our usage of some terms as they apply to the Philippine context.

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What are indigenous peoples? What are national minorities?
Indigenous peoples are those a) whose many generations of ancestors have lived in what they
consider their home territories; b) who continue to live in, or closely identify themselves with,
these territories; and c) who have retained much of their ancestral lifeways, which are quite
distinct from those of the rest of the population of the nation-state that now encompasses their
territories.

In general, indigenous peoples of a country predate the entry of other peoples bearing a
different social system, nationality, or ethnic origin. As the latter achieved dominance,
subjugating and assimilating other peoples into their social system, they dissolved many of
the earlier indigenous lifeways. The resultant mixed population became what we now
consider non-indigenous peoples. Generally, they form the majority or the single largest
group in the nation-state's population. The other peoples who resisted or escaped full
conquest and assimilation retained much of their earlier lifeways and at least a part of their
ancestral territory. Thus, they persisted as indigenous peoples.

An indigenous people -- except in cases where they have won independent statehood -- are
almost always a national minority within the nation-state that encompasses their homeland.
The term "national minority" implies that the group exists apart from but still within a broader
national community. It also emphasizes the group's small number in contrast to the larger
groups that comprise the nation's majority. The term "national minority" might be
objectionable to other indigenous peoples who assert their distinct nationhood. But it remains
applicable in the case of the Cordillera peoples, and the Cordillera Peoples Alliance treats the
two terms interchangeably depending on context.

We must be careful not to limit the concept of "indigenous" to its plain dictionary meaning,
which is "native or aboriginal to a place." Indeed, in this sense, some will say that the
Filipino people is an indigenous people. But this only obscures the real distinctions. If we
allow a very loose definition, all sorts of ethnic groups can claim indigenous-people status
based on some secondary attributes. But if we insist on a too-narrow definition, equally
indigenous peoples might be pushed into competing against each other on the fine issues of
"who arrived first, who retained more of ancestral lifeways, who is the worse victim, who is
more indigenous."

Self-ascription is a basic requisite in identifying indigenous peoples, but it is not enough. We

must also uphold historical truth by placing the ethnographic data within a concrete historical
framework. Specifically, the data must be placed within that complex process by which some
peoples were fully assimilated into nation-states while others were not. This process varies
from country to country, even from area to area in a particular country.

Effect of Spanish rule on Philippine peoples

Upon the arrival of Spanish colonialism in the Philippines in the 16th century, the then
estimated one million people lived in small independent communities that related to each
other through trade, intermarriage and war alliances. The pre-Spanish peoples were:

 The Aetas (Negritos) who lived in nomadic, hunting-gathering bands characterized by

egalitarian, primitive-communal social relations;

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  The peoples from whom are descended today's upland tribes, such as the Cordillera
and Lumad peoples. They lived in semi-settled villages based on a mix of hunting-
gathering, swidden farming, and some wet-rice farming, and practiced communalism
and incipient slavery;
 Those who lived in settled and highly-organized villages called barangays, mostly
along the seacoasts and the banks of large rivers and lakes. Comprising the largest
bulk, they engaged mostly in wet-rice farming, fishing, hunting and gathering, and
trading, and practiced patriarchal slavery.
 The larger communities organized under the Islamic sultanates in Mindanao. They
lived on extensive farming, fishing and trading, and bore the attributes of more
complex, slave-owning and feudal societies.

Spanish colonialism ultimately extended its full control to most coastal and other lowland
communities of Luzon, Visayas, and parts of Mindanao where it developed a colonial and
feudal society. It integrated the colonized native communities into one social system, while
dissolving the old indigenous ties within and among them. It is notable that the colonialists
did not settle wide parts of the country with white-creole communities or African slaves, as in
Latin America. Only in this particular sense could we say that most present-day Filipinos are
indigenous to the country, although the majority have lost much of their pre-conquest
identities and lifeways.

Filipino nation born and trapped under imperialism

Spanish rule itself sowed the seeds of Filipino nationhood. As the centuries passed,
centralized government encompassed and linked most of the islands. A feudal economy
matured, bearing initial elements of capitalism such as expanded commodity production, trade
and transport. The blend of Spanish-Catholic and local dominant cultures diffused through
the colonized peoples. Their collective experience of anti-colonial struggles, along with the
rise of the native intelligentsia, impelled the people to develop a common national awareness
especially from 1870 onwards.

While Spanish rule provided the prerequisites of nationhood, it was the Philippine revolution
of 1896-1898 that actually gave birth to the Filipino nation. The revolution gave solid life to
national consciousness, fought for national liberation against Spanish colonial rule, and
established the first modern nation- state covering the entire archipelago.

The short-lived Philippine Republic was eventually put down after a ruthless, decade-long
war of aggression and military occupation by the United States. The Philippines became an
American colony for around 40 years, then was occupied by Japanese forces during World
War II, and finally granted nominal independence by the US in 1946. During this long
colonial period, aspirations to Philippine independence were suppressed and reduced to a
superficial type of nationalism under American tutelage. When the US granted Philippine
independence in 1946, the Filipino nation-state was already trapped in the same postwar neo-
colonial system that afflicted other former colonies of the Western powers elsewhere.

Cordillera indigenous peoples as national minorities

While the rest of the Filipino peoples became deeply integrated into the colonial-feudal
system under 300 years of Spanish rule, many communities, such as those in Mindanao-Sulu

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and in most interior uplands, effectively resisted or escaped conquest and assimilation -- by
stubborn armed resistance or by moving further inland.

They remained unsubjugated and thus retained much of their indigenous identities and
lifeways. Their descendants comprise what are now the country's indigenous peoples, such as
the Moro, Lumad, Igorot, Mangyan, and Aeta peoples. Forcibly estranged from the colonized
peoples mostly in the lowlands, and subjected to the most brutal forms of genocide, ethnocide,
plunder and chauvinism, they were hence relegated to the status of national minorities.

The Cordillera peoples were peripherally involved in the 1896- 1898 revolution against Spain
and in the ensuing war of resistance against US conquest. This indicated the growing links
with the newborn Filipino nation. During the US colonial rule and the post-war Republic, the
Cordillera peoples were rapidly and forcibly integrated into the wider neo-colonial society.
Irreversibly, they have become part of the broader Filipino people. But the process has not
fully erased their distinct identities and lifeways, nor has it enabled them to escape national
oppression.

C. The Indigenous Peoples' Struggle for Self-determination

The Cordillera peoples face the same basic problems as the rest of the Filipino nation. These
have been summed up by the national democratic movement as imperialism, feudalism, and
bureaucrat capitalism. As indigenous peoples, however, they also suffer that distinct problem
called national oppression at the hands of the Philippine state. Their struggle for self-
determination is not merely to escape from the clutches of this state that oppresses them, but
to join the rest of the Filipino people in striking at the very roots of oppression and
exploitation in the wider Philippine society.

National oppression
National oppression is an institutionalized or deeply ingrained set of oppressive policies and
practices adopted by a nation's dominant social forces or state against specific peoples --
whether indigenous peoples and other national minorities within its boundaries, or other
weaker nations within its long reach.

The oppressor state forcibly tries to integrate or subsume these peoples into its own dominant
social system, and yet they are pushed down into a "second-class" status in relation with the
rest of society. The overall effect is that they suffer discrimination and inequalities within the
system, at the same time that they are prevented from pursuing freely their own mode of
existence and development outside the system.

In the case of the Cordillera peoples, they have been major victims of national oppression at
the hands of Spanish colonialism for 300 years, and at the hands of direct US colonial rule for
another 50 years. At present, they continue to suffer national oppression principally at the
hands of the current Philippine state. This state represents the interests, not truly of the
majority non-indigenous Filipino population, but of the local ruling classes and their foreign
masters. This national oppression against the Cordillera peoples may be manifested in the
following:

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  Denial of ancestral lands and resources;
 Destructive socio-economic impositions in the name of "national development;"
 Denial of democratic self-rule from the local to the national level;
 Active efforts to disable traditional or customary socio-political processes;
 Continuing militarization with ethnocidal effects;
 Destruction and commercialization of indigenous cultures;
 Continuing discrimination against indigenous peoples, even if in subtler forms.

Options in struggle for self-determination

On the basis of their very existence and continuing self- development, the Cordillera's
indigenous peoples assert their historical right to self-determination. They do this as
individual peoples (that is, as ili-type communities), and as a broad assemblage of closely-
related peoples who have come to regard the entire Cordillera as their home region.

In the most general terms, the right to self-determination means the right of every historically-
constituted people to determine their destiny and development based on their own wishes, free
from forcible interference by other peoples. It is the sovereign right of a people to freely
choose and develop their own socio- economic, political, and cultural systems.

In a specifically political sense, the right to self- determination is the right of a people to
constitute itself as an independent state or as a separate political entity if it so decides,
enjoying the same rights as all other nation-states, or otherwise, to freely determine its mode
of association with an existing state wherein it enjoys the same rights as the other constituent
peoples of that state. In this sense, the right to self-determination covers a wide range of
options that a people can choose from.

The first option is secession, or the breaking away of a people from a state to form an
independent state of their own, as a collective assertion of full nationhood.

We believe that in the case of the Cordillera, the option to secede from the Philippines would
be wrong and regressive. The Cordillera's indigenous peoples have never strived for
nationhood separately from the Filipino people. If we were to simply secede from a
Philippines that remained under the yoke of the same basic social problems, the region would
still be exposed to oppression by the state surrounding it. Worse, the secessionist struggle
would stir up more ethnic strife -- within and around the region, between indigenous and non-
indigenous peoples, and among indigenous peoples themselves.

The right to secede must be explicitly recognized as one of the options available to indigenous
peoples in fighting against national oppression. However, other options become clearly more
advantageous to the Cordillera peoples when they join in the Filipino people's continuing
struggle for full national liberation and social emancipation.
The second option is federation, or the act by which two or more previously independent
states form a common, federal government while continuing to exercise many of their
prerogatives as constituent states.
Federation might be the best option for other peoples fighting for self-determination, but this
setup would hardly apply in our case. In 1986-1987, some reformist groups became obsessed
with such an idea of a Cordillera state federating with other constituent Philippine states. But
that would have achieved nothing in the absence of radical social changes in the entire

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country. In addition, this option presumes a readiness to secede and stand as an independent
state should the federal setup fail -- which means it can be as problematic for the Cordillera as
the option to secede.

The third option is regional autonomy -- a political arrangement within a democratic republic,
under which specific territories of indigenous or minority peoples can exercise self-rule to a
higher degree than is exercised by other regular territories of the nation.

The national democratic movement believes that regional autonomy is the most appropriate
form by which the Cordillera's indigenous peoples can exercise their right to self-
determination while remaining part of the Filipino nation. From its inception, the CPA has
pushed for the creation of an autonomous region covering the entire Cordillera and uniting its
various peoples. We use the term "genuine regional autonomy" (GRA) to differentiate it from
the several variants of mere structural autonomy that has been offered so far by the Philippine
government.

GRA means self-rule for the Cordillera on the basis of broad grassroots democracy, through
which indigenous peoples can exercise the full range of their rights, pursue their collective
interests, and define their own path of development. GRA is compatible with Philippine
national sovereignty. In fact, GRA will strengthen the unity of the Filipino nation by ensuring
full equality and normalized social ties among the various indigenous and non-indigenous
peoples. It denies the imperialists and ambitious regional elites the opportunity to undermine
the nation's territorial integrity.

A final option, best combined with GRA, is to work for the adoption of special laws and
institutions by the nation-state to achieve enough guarantees on the recognition and protection
of the rights of its indigenous and minority peoples -- wherever they may be found within its
territory. The national democratic movement believes that this option will effectively work,
but only under conditions of full democracy for the broad masses of the people.

II. A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE CORDILLERA STRUGGLE FOR SELF-

DETERMINATION

A. Late 1960s to 1980: Early Years of Mass Struggle

Many so-called experts on the issue of Cordillera autonomy are usually vague or silent about
the roots of the Cordillera movement for indigenous peoples' rights. Some talk of self-
determination, regional autonomy, and ancestral lands in the Cordillera as if these concerns
were addressed only under the Aquino government in the mid-1980s. Others on the other
hand claim that traditional politicians of the region were already "fighting for the same
causes" even in the 1950s.

Kilusang Kabataan ng Kordilyera, Martial Law, and FITL-ILA

The truth is that the most extensive and coherent articulation of the Cordillera peoples'
aspirations for self-determination was initiated in the late 1960s by organizations of the
national democratic movement. Back in 1969, hundreds of Cordillera students formed a
militant organization called Highland Activists, followed in 1970 by another similar

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organization, the Kilusang Kabataan ng Kabundukan (Highland Youth Movement). In their
mass actions and organizing work, both groups articulated the plight of minority peoples in
the region while advocating the national democratic political program.

In 1971, the two merged to form the Kilusang Kabataan ng Kordilyera (Cordillera Youth
Movement), with members numbering in the thousands. The very use of the term
"Cordillera" signified that the young activists were no longer thinking like local tribal leaders
as in earlier periods of anti-colonial resistance, but as a mass movement that expressed the
voice of the Cordillera peoples as a whole.

Almost from the start, the highland activists were deeply influenced by the ideas of the
revolutionary movement led by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). Long before
"self- determination" and "regional autonomy" became popular catch phrases, the social
critiques, Philippine Society and Revolution and Preliminary Report for Northern Luzon
(published in 1970-1971 and written by CPP founding chair, Jose Ma. Sison) had already
expounded on the distinct problems and struggles of indigenous or minority peoples,
including their right to self-determination and the need for an autonomous government.
Cordillera activists avidly read these books and increasingly allied themselves with the CPP-
NPA (New People's Army), if not actually to join its ranks.

When then President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in 1972, most Cordillera
activists who were not detained either joined the CPP-NPA in armed struggle or worked
underground. They fanned out into the region's provinces, and soon rediscovered their
indigenous roots through field work and research. With many indigenous activists infusing its
ranks, the CPP-NPA made a short-lived attempt to form an ethnically-focused Federation of
Igorot Tribes for Liberation (FITL) with its own Igorot Liberation Army (ILA). The idea was
dropped in 1975 due to unwanted complications, and local CPP-NPA forces focused instead
on organizing the people first at the grassroots level.

Anti-Chico and anti-Cellophil struggles

In 1973, the Marcos regime launched the World Bank-funded Chico River Basin
Development project, which was to build several dams along the Chico river system. The
project threatened the people of two Cordillera provinces not only with physical dislocation
but with extinction as indigenous communities. The affected communities organized and
mobilized against the dam, and soon began using their indigenous institutions such as the
bodong to pursue their struggle.

The bodong is a set of customary processes related to forging peace pacts between two tribes,
as practiced in many areas of the region. Two major bodong-based assemblies were held
between 1973 and 1975 to firm up inter-tribal unity against the dam project.

In 1973-1974, mass resistance spread to another Cordillera province when the government
awarded 200,000 hectares of mostly pine forests to Cellophil and a sister company, both
owned by a Marcos crony. Again, the affected communities formed anti- Cellophil
organizations and forged their own inter-tribal pacts opposing the project.

At the same time, CPP-NPA-NDF (National Democratic Front) forces began to take root in
the affected areas, giving more teeth to the anti-Chico and anti-Cellophil mass opposition.

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The Marcos dictatorship intensified counterinsurgency operations, but the indigenous
communities escalated their opposition into a broad anti-fascist and anti-imperialist mass
movement. This movement went so far as to support the armed struggle against the
dictatorship.

The indigenous peoples' armed and unarmed struggles against the Chico dam and Cellophil
projects fueled the sparks that soon burst into a more defined and militant Cordillera
consciousness. Fighting a common enemy led to a wider sense of unity. Across the region,
more and more indigenous peoples found common cause in resisting the Marcos regime's
destructive projects, defending ancestral lands, and asserting their right to self-determination.

Failure of traditional political approaches

While all these mass struggles for indigenous peoples' rights were going on, other political
groups in the region contented themselves with much less.

In the 1972 government reorganization, the Cordillera provinces were separated into two
administrative regions, where they were grouped with non-Cordillera provinces. Belatedly in
1976, some traditional local leaders reacted with the superficial demand to regroup their
provinces into a separate region. Two Cordillera assemblymen filed a bill for this purpose
when the Batasang Bayan (Marcos' first of a series of rubber-stamp assemblies) was
convened. But the bill quietly died when Marcos came up with a second rubber-stamp
parliament in 1978. As one of the bill's authors now concedes, "the Assemblymen of the
Cordillera did not give a damn about the issue."

The truth was that most traditional politicians and leaders in the Cordillera had not demanded
any form of regional self-rule prior to 1976. At best, their notions of "self-rule" were their
own personal ambitions of becoming top officials in their home provinces; replacing older,
provincial, non-Cordillera kingpins; and perhaps acquiring more government powers not
enjoyed by earlier local officials.

B. 1980-1985: From Macliing's Martyrdom to Marcos' Fall

Macliing's martyrdom signals widening Cordillera struggle

On April 24, 1980, Macliing Dulag, a respected tribal elder and prominent leader of the anti-
Chico dam struggle, was murdered by government troops. Although intended to quell the
anti-dam opposition, his killing only served to rouse more indigenous people and advocacy
groups into action. Annual Macliing Memorial Days were held from 1980 to 1984 to renew
the indigenous peoples' unity in struggle. In 1985, Macliing's death was commemorated for
the first time as Cordillera Day. Cordillera Day has been regularly held every year since then.

Macliing's martyrdom had clearly become a rallying cry of the Cordillera peoples. Their
struggles resounded so powerfully and gained sympathy across the nation and overseas that
the Marcos regime had to suspend the Chico dam project in 1981 and stop Cellophil's
operations in 1983.

In March 1983, the First Cordillera Multisectoral Land Congress was held to discuss issues
and pass resolutions relating to ancestral land. In December 1983, the Kalinga-Bontoc Peace

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Pact Holders Association (KBPHA) was formed, which a year later became the Cordillera
Bodong Association (CBA) to reflect an expanded regional constituency. By its third
assembly in January 1986, the CBA had grown to hundreds of elders representing 35 peoples
(tribes) and bodong areas in the Cordillera region.

In June 1984, some 150 delegates representing 27 Cordillera peoples' organizations, including
the CBA, founded the Cordillera Peoples Alliance for the Defense of the Ancestral Domain
and for Self-Determination, or CPA. The CPA program called for the attainment of genuine
regional autonomy within a truly sovereign and democratic republic as the expression of the
right to self- determination of the Cordillera peoples. The CPA was to grow steadily over the
years, extending to 124 affiliate organizations and a mass membership of 30,000 by 1987.

Cordillera struggle flows into anti-dictatorship mass movement

The establishment of the CPA, CBA and other regional people's organizations signified a new
level of struggle, as the various localized struggles began to take a more unified and
regionwide shape. This was the cumulative effect of the previous efforts from the early
1970s, especially from 1975 to 1984.

Mass struggles on specific issues -- land, human rights, Chico/Cellophil, student rights,
cultural concerns -- converged into a broader mass movement directed against the US-backed
Marcos dictatorship and the rotten system it represented. Urban- based organizations linked
up with peasant-based rural organizations. They repeatedly came together in Cordillera-wide
protest campaigns, which were buoyed by successive waves of nationwide protests against the
Marcos dictatorship after the 1983 assassination of Benigno Aquino, Marcos' closest political
rival.

The CPA called on its forces to build "Kaigorotan Unity and Consciousness" to underscore
the common identity of all Cordillera peoples (Kaigorotan) as part of the broader Filipino
people. It was also an effort to transcend the narrow localism of tribal-based unity and
consciousness.

At the same time, the Cordillera mass movement flowed into the nationwide groundswell, as
all anti-fascist forces geared for the final showdown with the ailing Marcos dictatorship from
1984 onwards. Indigenous peoples' demands were carried in massive demonstrations in
Metro Manila and other regions, where giant protest murals showed Macliing Dulag's portrait
alongside those of other martyrs in the struggle. This symbolized the magnificent role played
by the indigenous peoples in the overall Filipino people's struggle for full national freedom
and people's democracy.

All these developments impelled other political groupings in the region to express more
clearly their platforms and positions on the various issues heating up the Cordillera.

CPA's "Regionalization and Beyond" campaign

Within the Batasang Pambansa (created in 1985 by Marcos as his third and last rubber-stamp
parliament), two delegates filed another bill for a separate Cordillera region within the
national system of administrative regions. This was to be composed of the five provinces
populated by indigenous peoples. In a parallel effort to attain this regional setup, some
middle-class groups in the region formed the Task Force Regionalization (TFR) coalition.

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Some may have empathized with the CPA's demand for regional autonomy, but the overriding
interest was to create a regional bureaucracy in whatever form, where one could get
employment, career advancement, or government contracts.

The CPA joined the TFR, but firmly set its own aims beyond mere regionalization of the
Cordillera. In early 1985, it launched the Regionalization and Beyond (RAB) campaign in the
continuing effort to push for genuine regional autonomy. Through the RAB campaign, the
CPA reached out to large numbers of people to explain its general and particular platforms. It
emphasized the point that GRA was attainable only upon the overthrow of the US- Marcos
dictatorship and with the establishment of a democratic coalition government.

However, some Cordillera middle-class circles seized on the link between regionalization and
GRA. They pushed the idea that regionalization was necessarily a big step forward and that
regional autonomy could be similarly attained through legislation (perhaps after Marcos was
overthrown) by "building on the gains" of regionalization.

Before the RAB campaign could move to a higher level, and before the bill could pass
Marcos' Batasan, the whole regionalization scheme was overtaken by rapidly unfolding
national events. The 1986 "snap election" led to the EDSA revolt and the rise to power of the
Aquino regime as the new US-sponsored administration. In a sense, this "regionalization"
episode prefigured the complex challenges that the Cordillera indigenous peoples' movement
would later face, as the new regime played out its own initiatives on regional autonomy.

C. 1986-1988: Aquino Government Tests "Autonomy" Approaches

CPLA's emergence
The Cordillera peoples joined the rest of the Filipino people in the overthrow of the Marcos
dictatorship that climaxed in the February 1986 uprising. They too were touched by the
euphoria that came with the new regime, as they looked forward to meaningful changes in
society and in their lives. But these hopes were soon eroded by the harsh reality of continuing
elitist rule and fascist outbursts. To complicate things, a new player emerged: a group called
the Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA), which broke away from the CPP-NPA
forces in the Cordillera.

The CPP-NPA forces had been refining their program and policies since 1984 to suit the
Cordillera's characteristics, especially as the homeland of indigenous peoples. They
conducted theoretical studies, social investigations, and consultations. These resulted in the
creation of the Cordillera Peoples Democratic Front (CPDF), where revolutionary indigenous
peoples' organizations in the region could further articulate and pursue their rights and
demands. The CPDF issued a draft program that combined the indigenous peoples' struggle
for self-determination with the broader Filipino people's struggle for national democracy.

Between 1984 and 1985, Conrado Balweg and his trusted people within the CPP-NPA began
to work out their own political ideas and form a secret faction. They were obsessed with the
idea of making the Cordillera an independent nation with supposedly a bodong-based form of
government. They harped on historical antagonisms between the Filipino majority and the
Cordillera's minority peoples.

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In February-March 1986, as the EDSA revolt swept the new Aquino regime into power,
Balweg's group began to move on its own. In April, they maneuvered a NPA company into
open mutiny, declared their breakaway from the CPP-NPA, and formed the CPLA with
Balweg as chair. They organized a small faction within the Cordillera Bodong Association
(CBA), and turned this into the Cordillera Bodong Administration (CBAd), again with
Balweg as head. The CBAd defined itself as "main channel of all socio-economic projects" in
the region, while the CPLA declared itself as "the army of the CBAd." Later, the CPLA-
CBAd were joined by another small group, Montanosa National Solidarity, led by Abrino
Aydinan, another ex-CPP-NPA cadre and now a regional government official.

The CPLA-CBAd rushed into the welcoming arms of the Aquino government, the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and moderate-leaning political groups. Supported by their
new-found friends, the CPLA-CBAd became the mascot in the campaign to delimit the
Cordillera peoples' struggle for self-determination by reducing it to a few narrow demands.
Top government officials, with CPLA-CBAd leaders at their side, made a big show of holding
consultations and initiating token welfare projects in a few indigenous communities. On its
own, CPLA-CBAd leaders launched an anti-communist witch hunt and slander campaign
against CPA-affiliated leaders and organizations.

Aquino Regime dangles "Cordillera peace talks"

In September 1986, President Corazon Aquino and her top officials met with Balweg and
other CPLA-CBAd leaders to initiate the so- called "Cordillera peace talks." Since the
CPLA-CBAd were just a handful of men with no broad mass base, the government had to
create the illusion that it was "talking peace" with a credible force. Aquino's officials actually
helped make the "Cordillera panel" more presentable by lumping together the CPLA-CBAd,
some Igorot professionals, and even local officials, into the so- called Cordillera Broad
Coalition (CBC). The CBC was supposed to speak for the Cordillera peoples in dealing with
the national government.

To conjure a popular mandate for negotiating with the government, the CPLA-CBAd and
their CBC allies hastily organized a four-day "Congress of the Cordillera Bodong," with slap
dash representation from the region's tribes and provinces, where they ratified the Pagta of the
Cordillera Bodong. This document, grandiosely worded like a constitution, declared the
establishment of a new state -- "Cordillera Bodong in the Cordillera Tribal Confederation, a
common national community of the various tribes and people of the Cordillera Culture and
Civilization."

This so-called Cordillera Bodong state never materialized. No one took it seriously, not even
the CPLA-CBAd. When the "peace talks" officially began in mid-December 1986, the
CPLA-CBAd-CBC panel in fact focused on just a few self-serving demands:

 recognition of the CPLA as regional security force;

 special powers for the CBAd; and
 creation of a regional council for socio-economic development.

At first, the CPA considered participating in the "peace talks," if only to correct mistaken
concepts about indigenous peoples' issues, while continuing to raise questions of principle

12
about the nature of the talks and the "Cordillera panel." However, both government and
Cordillera panels systematically excluded the CPA from any meaningful participation. In the
end, the CPA flatly refused to join the talks and declared the entire affair a farce.

Meanwhile, the CPP-NPA-NDF itself was engaging the Aquino regime in an uneasy first
round of peace talks. The NDF raised its own agenda, which included indigenous peoples'
rights. On January 17-18, 1987, the Cordillera Peoples Democratic Front, an NDF affiliate,
held a political congress attended by 5,000 people, where it affirmed its advocacy of
achieving regional autonomy through a revolutionary mass process which included armed
struggle.

Regional Autonomy in 1986 Con-Com and 1987 Constitution

Amid all the political confusion created by the CPLA-CBAd, the CPA seized the
opportunities created by the 1986 post-Marcos transition in order to pursue the demand for
genuine regional autonomy.

Two weeks after Mrs Aquino came to power, the CPA launched a renewed information and
signature campaign (ultimately gathering 14,000 signatures) for GRA. It raised the call:
"Power to Kaigorotan! Establish the Cordillera Autonomous Region!" and directly challenged
Mrs Aquino to use her extraordinary powers to immediately set up the autonomous region.
Mrs Aquino refused, merely promising to appoint an Igorot representative to the 48- person
Constitutional Commission (Con-Com) that she was forming to draft a new constitution. She
failed to keep that promise.

Nevertheless, the CPA stepped up its GRA campaign, which became all the more important
since the CPLA-CBAd kept confusing the people with its rantings about a "distinct Cordillera
Nation" with a bodong-based state. From June to December 1986, the CPA combined
regionwide mass actions with a high-profile lobby at the Con-Com -- considered by Con-Com
observers as "the best organized lobbying campaign" -- to demand that the draft constitution
include clear-cut provisions on indigenous peoples' rights, recognition of ancestral lands,
regional autonomy, and people's empowerment.

Partly as a result of the CPA lobby that gained support among some Con-Com delegates, and
partly because of armed movements among the country's indigenous peoples demanding self-
determination, the Con-Com accepted the principle of regional autonomy. It adopted major
sections providing for two autonomous regions: in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera.

However, the Con-Com made a fatal error in limiting the regional- autonomy provision to
broad generalities, and leaving its substantial details to Congress. According to the
Constitution's provisions, a regional consultative commission was to prepare a draft organic
act for the autonomous region and submit it to Congress, which would pass it within 18
months. Then the act was to be approved in a plebiscite to be held in the proposed areas of
the autonomous region.

The Constitution was ratified in February 1987. The CPA had wanted to reject it due to its
overall reactionary orientation, but decided to adopt a "critical Yes" stand in the hope of
sustaining the impetus and gains achieved in the struggle for GRA. However, much of the

13
Constitution's progressive content was quickly lost as the Aquino regime and an elite-
dominated Congress proceeded to restore the pre-martial law reactionary system.
Aquino creates CAR despite widespread opposition

It soon became clear that the new Constitution had created a political train which was to bring
some form of autonomy to the Cordillera region. The CPLA-CBAd and its CBC allies rushed
to position themselves in the lead car as early as possible. As suggested by top government
officials, Balweg and three of his colleagues wrote, for Aquino to sign, a draft Executive
Order (EO) creating an interim Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) even before regional
autonomy is established and even before Congress was convened.

At first, the government tended to support the CPLA-CBAd's leading position within the
proposed CAR, which alarmed the other political groups jockeying for position. Then
Cordillera congressmen and governors convinced Mrs Aquino to modify the EO in their
favor. The final version was a compromise between the CPLA-CBA and traditional
Cordillera politicians. Despite widespread opposition, EO 220 was signed into law by Mrs
Aquino in July 1987.

The CAR is not a regular administrative region like those existing in other parts of the
country. It has a 250-member policy-making body (the Cordillera Regional Assembly, CRA)
and a 29-member implementing body (the Cordillera Executive Board, CEB), all appointed
by the President. The CRA and CEB were set up in the first half of 1988.

The CBAd became a special commission in the CAR supposedly to oversee tribal concerns; it
has six slots in the CEB and enjoys an allocation of 46 percent of the entire CAR budget.
Also making up part of the CAR are the regional offices of the different national government
agencies. The CEB acts as the Cordillera's Regional Development Council (RDC), taking
charge of prioritizing and monitoring development programs submitted by the different
provincial councils.

The CAR is supposed to be an interim regional structure to help the national government
administer the Cordillera provinces until an autonomous region is set up. In truth, it merely
gave old and new Cordillera politicians a wider arena to compete in. In particular, the CAR
setup gave undeserved powers to the CPLA- CBAd, which attempted to use it as its regional
power base. This, plus the lack of popular consultation and mass participation, created a broad
opposition against EO 220 and the CAR.

The Cordillera Coalition for Genuine Regional Autonomy (CCGRA), a new coalition of 12
twelve cause-oriented organizations that included the CPA, launched regionwide protest
actions against EO 220 and CAR. Some traditional Cordillera politicians who were left in the
lurch (including the CPLA-CBAd's erstwhile allies in the CBC) also opposed the CAR. They
proposed to replace it with a regular administrative region as in the rest of the country.

CPLA becomes isolated

Meanwhile, the CPLA was running amok all over the Cordillera. It began to serve as an
unofficial paramilitary arm of the Armed Forces, and received arms, funds, and other logistics
support from the government. CPLA forces joined AFP counterinsurgency operations,

14
maintained detachments and checkpoints, and harassed local CPA activists whom it accused
of sympathizing with the NPA.

In October 1987, Daniel Ngayaan, tribal leader, CBA chair, and member of the CPA's
executive committee, was abducted by CPLA armed men. Balweg promptly confirmed that
the CPLA had indeed "executed" Ngayaan, and even threatened more harm against suspected
CPP-NPA "sympathizers". True to their word, in December 1987, the CPLA abducted,
tortured and killed Romy Gardo, a CPA provincial leader. The CPLA is also tagged as the
perpetrators of several other political murders of indigenous activists, and the forcible
evacuation of two tribal villages in March 1988.

While still being pampered by some national government officials, the CPLA was by now
thoroughly detached from the masses and wracked by internal dissension. Even its former
allies and traditional politicians were alienated by its violent methods and shamelessly corrupt
practices. The CPLA's crimes and misdeeds were so brazen that Abrino Aydinan (widely
regarded as the architect behind the "Cordillera Pagta" and EO 220) broke up with Balweg
and organized his own CPLA faction.

D. 1988-1992: First Government Attempt at "Regional Autonomy"

CRCC submits mediocre draft Organic Act

In June 1988, after several months of delaying tactics by the Cordillera congressmen who
wanted to protect their own turf, the government created the 29-member Cordillera Regional
Consultative Commission (CRCC). The CRCC was to formulate a draft organic act for the
Cordillera autonomous region and submit it to Congress -- all within 150 days.

The CRCC's final composition showed the power of traditional, elitist, patronage politics and
its rabid bias against progressive activist groups. Two screening groups, both beholden to the
President, came up with a CRCC list that filtered out representatives of CPA-connected
people's organizations. The Cordillera congressmen managed to insert 18 of their
recommendees.

Of the final CRCC members, some had opposed regional autonomy, some knew next to
nothing about it, some had promoted destructive projects such as the Chico dam, or
represented big-business interests. Some were not even Cordillera residents. Most were
traditional politicians, bureaucrats, or professional civic leaders. Only a pitiful few came
from the ranks of village elders and mass leaders who had consistently fought at the frontlines
of the indigenous peoples' struggles in the past decades. Not a single CRCC member
belonged to the original regional autonomy lobbyists at the Con-Com.

The CRCC convened in July 1988, with Aydinan (erstwhile CPLA-CBAd leader) as chair.
Immediately, the CRCC's strong conservative bloc and big-business lobbies flexed their
muscles whenever some delegate tried to reflect the grassroots aspirations of indigenous
peoples and the need to make autonomy really work for the masses. The few progressives
and their proposals were swamped by the conservative majority. Top government officials
later admitted that they balked at many CRCC proposals, because the Executive Department
was not really decided on regional autonomy, and was comfortable with the CAR it had

15
earlier created. Dominated by a conservative membership, given just five months to do its
job, and failing to hold sufficient in-depth grassroots consultations, the CRCC was soon
overwhelmed with external criticisms as well as internal dissensions.

The Cordillera Coalition for Genuine Regional Autonomy (CCGRA) adopted a position of
critical participation in the CRCC. It pledged to pursue the campaign for regional autonomy
anchored on people's empowerment, while affirming its rejection of CAR as an unjust
imposition on the Cordillera people.

Despite critical participation by progressives, and after a mad rush to beat the deadline, the
CRCC finally approved a final draft Organic Act (DOA) in December 1988. This DOA
contained fundamental flaws which both the revolutionary underground CPDF and the CPA
immediately criticized. Nonetheless, the draft contained enough progressive phrasing to
cause worry within the elite-dominated national government.

Various other groups had already started tearing the DOA to pieces even before it could be
reworked and passed by Congress. The social democrats, dissatisfied with the DOA, quickly
organized the Movement for Autonomy and Peace (MAP) which put up its own autonomy
proposals.

The CPLA-CBAd also batted for its own version of autonomy, describing the CRCC-DOA as
weak, impractical, and difficult to implement. But it repeatedly lobbied Congress for its two
self- serving proposals in the DOA: first, the creation of a Cordillera Defense Commission
and the inclusion of the CPLA as part of the regional security force; and second, the CBAd's
retention as a commission in the future regional government.

For their part, many CAR bureaucrats (CEB and CRA members) feverishly lobbied Congress
to retain the CEB and CRA beyond December 1989 or until the regional government shall
have been set up. Some even shamelessly proposed their inclusion in an "interim cabinet" of
the new autonomous region. At the same time, they actually wished to prevent the regional
autonomy scheme from pushing through, since they did not want to rock the CAR where they
were already enjoying the perks and privileges of power.

The CPA and other cause-oriented groups, which consistently worked for GRA from the start
but were skeptical of the CRCC draft, pursued their own approach under the CCGRA
umbrella. Realizing the great odds of attaining real autonomy under the Aquino regime, and
finding the CRCC-DOA basically flawed, but nonetheless wanting to popularize further the
issue of GRA, the CCGRA opted for critical participation in the congressional process of
hammering out an Organic Act.

In the face of the growing criticisms of the CRCC-DOA, several ex-CRCC members tried to
project a broad united front in support of the DOA by hastily organizing the Cordillera Unity
for Autonomy (CUA). For a brief period, the CUA included such diverse entities as the
CCGRA, the CBC, even some CAR bureaucrats -- and then quietly died.

Congress drafts watered-down autonomy bill

While senators appealed to the largely skeptical Cordillera organizations to "give Congress a
chance," the legislative butchery of the CRCC-DOA had in fact already begun. Radical-

16
sounding provisions were soon hacked away in quick succession, while others were reduced
to empty generalities and shallow technicalities.

In particular, the positively-worded provisions on ancestral lands, on restrictions to

destructive business operations, and on foreign military presence in the region (including the
special provision on the John Hay Air Station) were all unceremoniously deleted. Congress
even cropped off the CRCC-crafted preamble, which reiterated the Cordillera people's
"fundamental and constitutional right to self-determination." Other provisions, which could
be interpreted as allowing a broad range of powers for the autonomous regional government,
were shackled with the standard clause, "consistent with the Constitution and national laws
and policies."

The only substantial debates in Congress were on secondary and procedural issues, such as
the mode of electing the regional governor, specific form of government, extent of
administrative decentralization to be allowed at lower levels, and geographic scope of the
region. Even in such matters, the nation's legislators showed their biases against regional
autonomy. For example, concerned with its own control over national finances, Congress
drastically reduced the amount of funds to be made available to the regional government.

In March 1989, the Lower House passed its version of the Cordillera Organic Act -- a
thoroughly cut-up corpse of the original CRCC DOA. The Senate version was worse: it
retained only 1/10th of the CRCC draft. The final drafts merely confirmed what autonomy
advocates feared all along: the national government was lukewarm to the idea of a regional
autonomous setup. The mangling was so extensive that a respected academic -- a former
Con-Com member who had pushed for the constitutional provision on autonomy -- refused to
participate any further in the Congressional hearings and in the autonomy process. He had
realized that the entire affair had become a meaningless exercise.

In October 1989, Republic Act 6766, or the Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous
Region, was signed into law. Balweg's CPLA-CBAd, not seeing their major proposals in the
final text, snubbed the signing. While the Aydinan-CRCC lobby decried the butchery of their
draft, they nonetheless resigned themselves to the idea that "what was left was better than
none."

1989 Organic Act is rejected

Meanwhile, the CPA and other pro-GRA groups had already shifted their focus beyond the
halls of Congress, carrying the issue into mass mobilizations in urban communities and rural
villages. They launched an information campaign and staged mass actions to expose the fake
autonomy scheme and expound on the requirements for attaining GRA.

The CPA had led the successful pro-autonomy lobby in the 1986 Constitutional Commission
amidst the post-EDSA "revolutionary spirit" and democratic stirrings. By 1988-1989,
however, elitist pre-martial law political processes had been largely restored and traditional
politicians had returned with a vengeance. Regional autonomy -- like the concept of people's
empowerment that the Aquino government loved to invoke during its first months in power --
had been transformed by the ruling classes into an empty caricature, disembodied of its
original revolutionary, democratic, mass-based content. RA 6766 was a betrayal of the

17
Cordillera peoples' aspirations for GRA. The CPA and other progressive GRA advocates had
no other choice but to reject it.

The CPA actively campaigned against RA 6766, branding it as bogus autonomy. The CPA
and the Katipunan ng mga Katutubong Mamamayan ng Pilipinas (KKAMP, Federation of
Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines) called for a boycott of the plebiscites on both Organic
Acts for Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera. At the same time, they expressed unity with
other forces that campaigned for a "No" vote while remaining supportive of GRA.

Outside the CPA and its allies, other political groups also rejected RA 6766 but on different
grounds that were not exactly supportive of GRA. In ethnically-mixed Baguio-Benguet in
particular, large numbers of people opposed RA 6766 because of the fears (stirred up by
conservative politicians and big- business circles) that regional autonomy in any form would
generate ethnic divisions and reverse discrimination against non- indigenous people.

In a plebiscite held in January 1990, RA 6766 was rejected roundly, with the "No" vote at 73
percent winning in four out of five provinces. The government considered the establishment
of a "single-province autonomous region" in Ifugao (the lone province which voted "Yes"),
but the move was shot down by the Supreme Court. Hence, the Cordillera Administrative
Region remained in force. Its regional assembly and executive board were reconstituted. The
Cordillera people, having rejected a bogus- autonomy act, found themselves unjustly saddled
with a burdensome CAR setup as new aspiring bureaucrats scrambled for positions in the
CRA, CEB, and the various regional bureaus and agencies.

E. 1992-1998: Second Government Attempt at "Regional Autonomy"

From 1990 to 1998, the Cordillera indigenous peoples' movement continued to pursue GRA,
always in close connection with other issues: destructive projects, ethnocide, militarization,
democratic rights, and control of land and resources. As the CPA had insisted from its
inception, GRA must be patiently built from the grassroots through continuing programs of
people's empowerment: through mass education, mass organizing, mass struggles as well as
self-help projects of real benefit to the indigenous communities. It is a long and often painful
process, but always conducted at a pace acceptable and workable with the indigenous peoples
themselves.

Revival of bogus autonomy: RA 8438

After its 1990 debacle, the Cordillera bogus autonomy scheme hibernated for two years. In
1992, national elections brought in a new regime led by General Fidel Ramos and backed by a
"rainbow coalition" in Congress. Various political circles among the elite began considering a
second, supposedly more sober attempt at Cordillera autonomy.

This time, most traditional politicians in the Cordillera were determined to make autonomy
happen. But the project was to be strictly driven by the topmost concerns of traditional
politics: the notorious "3 P's" -- positions, projects, and pesos. There was to be no place for
"bleeding-heart" activism and "unrealistic" indigenous peoples' rights.

18
Some moderate-leaning, pro-autonomy groups in the Cordillera had been wishing that another
CRCC-type body be formed to write a new draft Organic Act. However, from 1992 to 1995,
all attempts to pass a law to create a new CRCC failed due to intense in-fighting among the
various lobby groups. Traditional politicians of all colors -- CAR officials, Cordillera
congressmen, provincial governors, CPLA-CBAd pack -- were not interested in another
CRCC. They were busy clawing at each other's throats over control of government funds and
projects, over personal positions, sometimes over the most inane and petty differences.

Up to 1995, then President Ramos simply played on these bickerings among Cordillera
politicians, to keep them in line as his administration consolidated its rule. He sometimes
threatened to abolish the CAR; at other times he dangled bits of extra power and funds for
local government units. At one time, he even threatened to replace the CAR with three new
administrative divisions -- Northern, Central, and Southern "sectors" -- which horrified most
of the region's politicians.

Ramos wanted to unite the entire Cordillera elite firmly behind his government's
comprehensive program, wherein the Cordillera would be maximized as a resource base for
mining, logging, energy, and tourism. The administration wanted a tame version of Cordillera
autonomy to facilitate its socio-economic projects in the region and to help preempt any mass
opposition. To ensure that Cordillera autonomy is set up during Ramos' term, his
administration adopted a "fast-track" approach in 1996. Ramos was in no mood to pamper
another CRCC, and simply urged his Congress allies to file and pass an autonomy bill without
much ceremony.

The Cordillera's traditional political circles, on the other hand, wanted to bargain for the
maximum possible advantages under an autonomous setup. Many of them aspired to gain,
maintain or expand their hold on regional power, especially those constitutionally banned
from running for reelection. Thus, their debates on the autonomy bills pending in Congress
focused mainly on the questions of how exactly to share regional powers and finances.

After six months of endless wrangling, Cordillera officials and executives finally arrived at a
"Covenant of Unity." Quickly, Congress passed in July 1997 RA 8438 or the second Organic
Act for Cordillera. RA 8438 was viewed by almost all pro-regional autonomy advocates as a
much lamer version of autonomy than its 1990 predecessor, RA 6766.

Cordillera peoples reject OA anew

The March 1998 plebiscite was a repeat of the 1990 plebiscite: in five out of six provinces,
Cordillera indigenous peoples rejected RA 8438 as a bogus autonomy scheme. At the
regional level, three out of four votes were "No" votes.

Almost the entire Cordillera crowd of traditional politicians -- congressmen, governors, CAR-
level officials, and their main beneficiaries among local bureaucrats and private contractors --
went all out and spearheaded a hard-sell "Yes" campaign.

Pro-Yes leaders shamelessly lusted for juicy positions and access to funds in the proposed
regional setup. They did not even deem to raise the issue of indigenous peoples' rights.
Instead, they simply bedazzled the people with promises of the "3 P's" (pesos, positions,
projects) under the proposed autonomous region. A favorite argument was that "since we're

19
all playing the money game here anyway, we'd rather ensure a hefty share for the region than
none at all." This political crowd mobilized massive government resources to whip up a
sizeable "Yes" vote.

Despite everything, the hardsell "Yes" campaign failed to stem the overwhelming "No" vote.
In fact, it produced its very opposite effect: throughout the region, people rejected RA 8438 in
protest against the power-hungry and corrupt politicians that peddled the "Yes" vote for the
most dubious reasons.

The rejection of RA 8438 by the Cordillera people was not a vote against genuine regional
autonomy. It was a vote against bogus autonomy, and against the corruption, opportunism
and abuses of the national political system that was producing this farcical show. Compared
with the 1990 plebiscite, the one held in 1998 presented a sharper alignment of the opposing
"Yes" and "No" camps. The result was a more solid, resounding, and definitive rejection of
bogus autonomy.

Of course, there remained a wide range of reasons why the majority voted a resounding "No".
But the underlying one is that the Cordillera's peoples are now more conscious and protective
than ever of their rights as indigenous peoples, especially against the danger of government
abuse. If at all, the results of the 1998 plebiscite indicate a marked rise in the political
consciousness of the Cordillera peoples after years of cumulative development. This trend is
the product of their own practical experience and of the long-term efforts of the progressive
mass movement. This development shows, in fact, that prospects are brighter for the advance
of genuine regional autonomy.

III. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR GENUINE REGIONAL AUTONOMY IN

THE CORDILLERA

A. Overall Critique of the Philippine Government's Responses to the Demand for Self-
determination

The experiences of the Cordillera peoples in dealing with the Philippine government's two
Cordillera autonomy laws, combined with the CAR setup under EO 220, have shown that the
present political system's "regional autonomy" schemes are nothing but a charade.

What the government passes off as "regional autonomy" is actually no more than the
administrative regionalization and decentralization of routine functions of local and regional
government structures. At best, the autonomy schemes are special measures to accommodate
a broader participation in local governance by politicians and professionals coming from
indigenous communities. In this sense, RA 6766, RA 8438, and EO 220 are just elaborations
or extensions of the principles of local government autonomy as defined in the 1991 Local
Government Code, as applied to a special administrative region such as the Cordillera.

We must remember that GRA does not simply redefine the administrative relationship
between local and central government. Nor does it merely mean more government jobs, more
funds, and more projects for our indigenous peoples. GRA means much more. It redefines the
basic political or state relationship between a territory of indigenous peoples and that of the

20
broader Filipino nation. At the very least, it must provide the framework for indigenous
peoples to resolve the very crucial issues of ancestral land, patrimonial resources, and
customary laws on their own, with minimum interference by the national government.

In contrast, the bogus autonomy schemes cooked up by the government have failed to address
such issues and satisfy the key demands on ancestral land and customary laws. In fact, RA
8438 did not even contain a single article or a substantially-detailed section on ancestral land
and customary law. Curiously, the government chose to address these two questions in
another national law -- the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (IPRA), itself a basically defective
law.

In IPRA, major issues related to ancestral lands and customary laws are left to the jurisdiction
of a National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), a seven-member body appointed by
the President and working under his office. Matters of life and death for indigenous peoples
are left to this small group of national bureaucrats who are not elected by indigenous peoples
and who may not rightfully represent them. This setup is itself a gross violation of the
indigenous peoples' right to self- determination and the constitutional principle of regional
autonomous powers. And yet the Philippine government and various apologists continue to
prattle about the illusory advantages of IPRA.

The whole political system is unwilling to let regional autonomy develop on its own, on the
basis of democratic self-rule at the community level. Instead, it imposes an elitist "from-the-
top- down" process of implementing autonomy. Its autonomy schemes provide for the formal
structures of regional government, but not the substantial guarantees of indigenous peoples'
rights. A regional legislative assembly and executive department are created, but their
officials are to be chosen and supervised through exactly the same elitist processes as before.
Had either RA 6766 or RA 8438 been ratified and the autonomous region established, the
resulting setup would have worsened instead of lightened the bureaucratic burdens imposed
on the people.

Finally, the government's bogus autonomy schemes are unable to rectify the basic defects in
the Philippines' social system. Neither could these provide the Cordillera's indigenous peoples
with even just a thin insulation from the ravages of the country's social ills.

B. Restatement of the Cordillera Peoples' Right to Self-determination

It is very clear to us by now that the Cordillera peoples' free exercise of their right to self-
determination necessitates fundamental changes in the overall socio-political system. Setting
up an autonomous region is not just a matter of enacting national laws, defining structures,
and choosing regional officials. We have seen how this works in practice under the present
system: the results have been dismal, even by the government's own admission.

Genuine regional autonomy can only be achieved if indigenous peoples themselves

collectively and unrelentingly assert their rights, using all necessary forms and arenas of mass
action. They must participate fully in political processes that truly empower their communities
and their basic sectors, from the grassroots upward. This way, indigenous peoples build their

21
own capacity for autonomous rule at all levels and guarantee a truly democratic content in the
formal laws and structures of regional autonomy.

We restate some of the important principles that have framed the efforts of the Cordillera
Peoples Alliance in developing the concept of genuine regional autonomy in the Cordillera:

1. Genuine people's democracy and full national freedom

GRA hinges on the existence of genuine people's democracy throughout the Philippines.
Genuine democracy means, first and foremost, that the vast masses of Filipinos (most of them
peasants) enjoy equitable access to land and natural resources. It requires the enforcement of a
genuine agrarian reform program throughout the country and full guarantees of ancestral land
rights in indigenous peoples' territories.

Without this condition, there can be no basic social equality among the people. The tendency
will be, as it is now, for landless peasants, settlers and indigenous peoples to fight among
themselves for the use of marginalized lands and pitiable resources thrown their way by the
state, big landowners and big business. The indigenous peoples have always been the worst
victims in such situations.

Secondly, genuine democracy requires the full exercise of people's democratic power on the
local as well as national levels. It means putting an end to traditional elitist politics, with its
pseudo-democratic processes and upper-class biases. The age-old dominance of elitist
politics is the real reason why attempts to attain GRA under this system have failed. To fight
for GRA in the Cordillera is to fight for full democracy in the whole country.

GRA also requires the Filipino people's full exercise of national sovereignty in the face of the
persistence of imperialism. It was US imperialism that had succeeded, where Spanish
colonialism had not, in conquering the Cordillera and Mindanao early in this century and
opening them up to foreign plunder and exploitation. Western powers have stubbornly held on
to their strategic interests in these resource-rich regions. The imperialist-led mining lobby is
especially notorious for shooting down any attempt to assert indigenous peoples' control over
their land and resources.

As the Cordillera's indigenous peoples fight for their rights, they must join the rest of the
Filipino people in the overall struggle for full national freedom and people's democracy. In
short, for us to win GRA, we must join the nation in effecting a total revamp of the Philippine
social system.

2. Ancestral land rights

For the Cordillera indigenous peoples, the fight for ancestral lands is at the very core of the
struggle for self-determination. A truly autonomous region should have the basic political
mandate to guarantee full ancestral land rights (something sorely missing in both RA 6766
and RA 8438). To provide for this, the state at its highest legislative level must finally and
explicitly declare as null and void the anti-democratic Regalian Doctrine and to repeal
oppressive land laws and provisions -- something that IPRA has decisively failed to do.

While a fundamental national law must provide the national mandate for protecting ancestral
lands, the regional autonomous government must take the lead in legislation, executive policy,

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actual enforcement, dispute settlement, economic planning, and social research. It is this
central role of an autonomous region in the Cordillera that was miserably missed in the
crafting of IPRA.

3. Socio-economic development
Contrary to anti-autonomy propaganda, GRA is not anti- development. But we insist, as
indigenous peoples, that socio- economic development programs must bring real long-term
benefits to our communities; provide us stronger collective control over our local economies;
ensure equitable access to resources among our population; and enhance local self-reliance,
self- sufficiency, and environmental protection. The GRA government must develop and
implement its own models of all-rounded and balanced socio-economic development of the
region and its communities, in contrast with the current "development programs" that have
reduced the Cordillera into a mere resource-extraction and mega-tourism area.

4. Community-based processes and structures of self-rule, indigenous socio-political systems

Under a truly autonomous setup, the Cordillera's indigenous peoples should be able to enjoy
the right to determine the most appropriate forms, structures and processes of democratic self-
rule, from the regional down to the village level. In all cases, there must be guarantees that
the main organs of self-rule at the various levels are law-making assemblies composed of
representatives freely chosen by our peoples from among their own ranks. These assemblies
will ensure that the Cordillera masses are fully represented -- as distinct peoples, as
populations of standard territorial units and special areas where applicable, and as social
sectors.

Various indigenous socio-political systems, combined with customary laws, should be

seriously studied on the ground, so that these are better understood, recognized and respected.
National laws as well as the GRA government must allow these systems to persist and to
develop further, on the basis of the people's actual practice and acceptance, and within the
overall framework of democratic self-government.

5. Human rights
In equal measure with the rest of the Filipino people, the civil and political liberties of
indigenous peoples, as well as their other human rights, must be promoted against all forms of
state repression. All oppressive laws and discriminatory practices affecting indigenous
peoples must be repealed.

Both indigenous and non-indigenous peoples living within the Cordillera should be part of the
autonomous region and enjoy all its benefits and protection. While we emphasize indigenous
peoples' rights to redress historical and current wrongs done to them, there must be no "ethnic
cleansing," "repartition along ethnic lines," and practices that amount to unjust reverse
discrimination.

6. Indigenous cultures
Under a truly democratic system and within a truly autonomous region, the various cultures of
indigenous peoples will be protected and developed based on the distinct circumstances,
needs, efforts, and aspirations of each people. At the same time, it must be recognized that
while indigenous cultures persist, they also evolve over time and are not immune to change
and external influences. Indigenous peoples must have the freedom to make or to accept

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cultural innovations and adaptations, but at their own pace and for their own long-term
benefit.

The GRA government must help ensure that respect for the Cordillera's indigenous cultures is
observed nationwide, from the level of legislation, actual policies and practices of various
social institutions, to mass media and public habit. Campaigns must be launched to correct
cultural biases and rectify discriminatory practices.

Within the region, ethnic diversity must be recognized and allowed to flourish. At the same
time, the GRA government must encourage the growth of a common Cordillera culture as
well as support the development of a national, popular, and progressive Filipino culture.

7. Territorial integrity
The highlands of the Gran Cordillera compose the historical homeland of our indigenous
peoples, and naturally comprise the core territory of the genuine autonomous region. The
present boundaries of the six provinces provide a working approximation of the GRA's initial
territory. The indivisibility and political integrity of the Cordillera as one region is essential
to the concept of GRA, and any attempt to exclude one or more of its constituent provinces
from the region is unacceptable.

A continuing process of research, information-sharing and consultation must be conducted

throughout the region and its peripheries, with the participation of all affected communities, in
order to refine and stabilize the actual boundaries of the GRA. Plebiscites must only be used
to resolve boundary issues if all efforts at local consensus-building fail.

Conclusion

We realize that it is no easy task to finally achieve genuine regional autonomy as the basic
framework for our indigenous peoples' free exercise of their right to self-determination. We
have never entertained that illusion, even at the height of the CPA's success in lobbying the
1986 Constitutional Commission for substantial provisions on regional autonomy and
indigenous peoples' rights. However, we exert our utmost efforts every day to bring our
peoples' aspirations for GRA closer and closer to reality.

At present, the government is considering renewed efforts to revive its stalled autonomy
scheme. Again, there is some talk of Congress coming up with a third autonomy law and
holding another plebiscite to have it ratified. Given the government's record in its first and
second attempts, and the worsening environment of traditional-elitist politics combined with
local warlordism, we are definitely not pinning any of our hopes in any third attempt to foist a
bogus autonomous setup on the Cordillera region. If ever such a setup succeeds, it will most
likely result in the mere introduction of some modifications on the present CAR setup as
defined in EO 220 -- a complete travesty of regional autonomy.

A second possibility is that the government will completely abandon the idea of Cordillera
regional autonomy, in favor of the establishment of a regular administrative region that will
keep safely within the parameters of the Local Government Code. Combined with a
drastically-diluted Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act, such an arrangement may still be claimed

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by the government as a "satisfactory and realistic solution" to the long-standing demands of
indigenous peoples. But it would merely prove our point that GRA is impossible under the
existing national political setup.

The third possibility, of course, is that the long years of work and tremendous effort by the
progressive forces and mass movements among the Filipino people, including the cumulative
gains achieved by the CPA and the indigenous peoples' struggles in the Cordillera region, will
sooner or later add up.

We see in the next several years the gradual accumulation of more and more positive factors
gained in the various people's struggles nationwide and within our region. We are optimistic
that a growing number of progressive forces in the country, including those waging armed
struggles and working among indigenous peoples, are on a path of political convergence
while pursuing their own strategic initiatives to institute basic changes in the nation's socio-
political system. We are optimistic that ultimately, these changes will pave the way for the
Cordillera's indigenous peoples to finally attain GRA, as we continue to assert our right to
self-determination in the new millennium.

Cordillera Peoples Alliance

Baguio City, Philippines
April 20, 1999

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