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Electricity fraud detection using committee semi-supervised learning

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 Electricity fraud detection using committee
semi-supervised learning
Joaquim L. Viegas∗ , Nuno M. Cepeda† Susana M. Vieira∗
∗ IDMEC, Instituto Superior Técnico, Universidade de Lisboa, Lisboa, Portugal
† PowerData, Portugal
joaquim.viegas@tecnico.ulisboa.pt
Abstract—Electricity fraud results in significant losses to util-
ities. This paper proposes the use of a semi-supervised learning
framework to derive an electricity fraud detector from data
lacking information on the presence of fraud for the majority
of samples. Utilities are only able to make a limited number
of inspections, resulting in a lack of data representing cases of
fraud. Using a co-training by committee semi-supervised learning
framework, the detection performance is improved in comparison
to the use of supervised models only trained with labeled data.
The framework starts by training a random forest classifier on
the labeled data. Next, the unlabeled data that the model can
classify with the most confidence is added iteratively to the set
of labeled samples, augmenting the data available for model
training. The electricity fraud detector achieves a classification
performance of 84% true positive rate, 11% false positive rate
and 0.89 area under the receiver operating characteristic curve
under a positive class balance of 5% and 90% unlabeled samples
in the training data.
I. I NTRODUCTION
Electricity fraud is the premeditated manipulation of grid
equipments or utility systems with the objective of not paying
the total amount owed to the utility for energy consumed. This
type of theft results in significant losses to utilities across the
world [1].
In developing economies, in which electricity fraud is most
prevalent, it results in unsustainable situations in already
fragile environments. For example, in Jamaica in 2013, NTLs
amounted up to US$46 million, accounting for 18% of the total
fuel bill for the whole country [1]. Also, contrary to popular
belief, electricity fraud has also a strong impact in developed
economies. In the UK losses due to electricity theft have been
estimated at £173 million every year [2], [3]. In the US they
may amount to $6 thousand million [4].
In recent years, with the adoption of the smart grid concept
as the basis for electricity grid improvements, the widespread
installation of smart meters (SMs) is being carried out in
numerous countries. The SMs, in contrast to conventional
mechanical meters, have advanced communications capabil-
ities, enabling utilities to remotely collect meter readings,
control tariffs and connections. Grid assets with advanced
communications, such as SMs, extend the attack surface for
electricity fraud attacks [5]. In the past, fraud was usually done
through physical manipulation of mechanical meters or direct
connections to transformers, nowadays fraudsters can hack
meter firmware and communications to send false consumption
data [6].
Data-based detection of electricity fraud and other types
of non-technical losses has been a topic of growing interest
in scientific literature [7]. Computational intelligence and
machine learning techniques such as decision trees, neural
nets, support vector machines and fuzzy models have been
used in supervised classification schemes to identify suspect
consumer data [8], [9], [10], [11], [12]. Other studies apply
unsupervised learning approaches, identifying consumers with
irregular behavior as potential fraudsters [6], [13].
One of the most commonly identified challenges in data-
based detection of electricity fraud is the lack of ground truth
in utilities datasets [6], [14]. Electricity fraud is normally
verified through the direct inspection of consumption end-
points and grid asset by utilities employees, meaning only a
fraction of consumers have associated information indicating if
they should be labeled as fraudulent or legitimate for the train-
ing of classification models. To mitigate this challenge, this
paper proposes to use a semi-supervised learning framework
to develop classification models from a combination of labeled
and unlabeled data, which is novel in the field of electricity
fraud detection.
This paper proposes the use of the co-training by committee
(CoBC) semi-supervised learning framework for electricity
fraud detection. First, the proposed detection approach starts
by transforming consumers smart metering data and infor-
mation on features suitable for classification. Secondly, the
approach iteratively trains a random forest (RF) classifier with
data containing a majority of unlabeled samples, improving
performance in comparison to the case of supervised learning.
The structure of this paper follows: Section II explains
the electricity fraud problem and describes the ways it can
affect electricity consumption data. Section III describes the
feature engineering process used to derive indicators suitable
for classification in this application. Section IV explains the
semi-supervised learning approach used. Section V presents
the dataset user for evaluation and results achieved. Finally,
Section VI presents the main conclusions.
II. E LECTRICITY F RAUD T HREAT M ODEL
To describe the threat model and features, the following
notation is adopted: the proposed electricity fraud detection
scheme works on a smart metering dataset with N consumers.
mi ∈ <n are the energy consumption readings from consumer
i and n = r × nd , with r equal to the number of readings per
day and nd the total number of days in the dataset. Assuming are used to generated the synthetic attacks used to test the
a hourly resolution, the notation is simplified in the following proposed scheme:
way: md,hi is the consumption in hour h of day d for consumer d,h
• h1 (mi ) = αmi ,
d,h
α = random(0.1, 0.8)
i. mdi = (md,1 d,2 d,24
i , mi , ..., mi ) is the 24 hour vector of d,h h d,h
• h2 (mi( ) = β mi
consumption data in day d for consumer i. 0, hstart < h < hend
In the context of electricity fraud detection and mitigation, βh =
1, else
the threat model describes the possible ways consumers can
act to avoid paying the full amount the utility charges for hstart = random(0, 19)
the electricity they use. The attack vectors are the different δ = random(4, 24)
mechanisms consumers may use to this end. The threat model
hend = hstart + δ
considered in this work is adapted from the on proposed in
• h3 (md,h d,h
i ) = γh mi , γh = random(0.1, 0.8)
[6], which presents similarities to the attacks proposed in [15]. d,h
Most commonly, the reported sources of NTLs are fraud • h4 (mi ) = γh µ(mdi ), γh = random(0.1, 0.8)
through meter manipulation, tapping distributions line and non • h5 (md,h
i ) = µ(mi )
d
d,h d,24−h
payment. Problems in meters and utility systems, which result • h6 (mi ) = mi
in incorrect measurements, and cases of collusion with utility
III. E LECTRICITY C ONSUMPTION F EATURES
employees have also been reported [1].
The detection scheme proposed considers a smart grid Techniques for theft detection found in the literature usually
environment, including the presence of an advanced metering make use of raw consumption data [19], [6]. In order to
infrastructure (AMI), composed of SMs at the consump- mitigate difficulties dealing with variable length time-series
tion endpoints, enabling automated meter readings (AMR). data and reduce dimensionality, this paper makes use of four
SMs, in contrast to conventional mechanical meters, have different features, proposed in [13], that enable detection of
advanced communication capabilities and automatically send the possible types of attacks identified.
energy consumption readings to the utility and enable re- The consumption data characteristics translated by each one
mote control. The attack surface related to electricity fraud of the features are the following:
is considered to be growing with these equipments, new • I1 : Indicator of consumption variation. Ratio between
data attack/vulnerabilities, such as the possibility of sending current and past consumption;
false readings appear with the use of SMs [16], [6]. Current e c
• I2 , I2 : Indicators of hourly consumption pattern change.
literature on detection of electricity fraud is giving a increased Relates the hourly pattern of a day with the mean
importance to this issue [17], [18]. hourly pattern of the past. I2e uses the euclidean distance,
It is assumed that most types of electricity fraud can be changes in absolute consumption will be the most relevant
detected through the analysis of consumption data. The theft of for the indicator. I2c uses the Pearson correlation, changes
electricity should result in a reduced, null or irregular reported of dynamic can be detected;
consumption (e.g. if a consumer bypasses the meter to connect • I3 : Indicator of consumption difference in comparison
an equipment consumption will be lower than expected). When to consumers with similar characteristics. Compares the
dealing with conventional mechanical meters, electricity theft average consumption;
results in reduced or zero consumption and can be detected e c
• I4 , I4 : Indicators of hourly consumption pattern differ-
through straightforward methods such as slope analysis and ence in comparison to consumers with similar charac-
rule-based systems [14]. If advanced attackers are considered, teristics. Relates the mean hourly consumption between
fraud may be done through sending false consumption data consumers. I4e uses the euclidean distance and I4c uses
(e.g. through meter hacking) that seems legitimate [19], [6]. the Pearson correlation.
As there are no publicly available examples of these ad- The indicator of consumption variation I1 is a ratio between
vanced types of electricity theft, a number of different attacks the consumption of the last α days and the last β periods of
are considered to test the detection scheme, these are proposed α days.
in [6]:
• Random constant reduction of consumption (h1 );
Pα P24 d−j,k
j=1 k=1 mi
• Drop of consumption to zero during a random period of I1 (i, d) = 1
Pβ P α P 24 d−(l+1)j,k
(1)
β l=1 j=1 k=1 mi
the day (h2 );
• Random hourly reduction of consumption (h3 ); Indicators of hourly consumption pattern change I2ν relates
• Random hourly consumption pattern with reduced aver- the hourly pattern of a day with the mean hourly pattern of
age consumption (h4 ); the α days before. If ν is the euclidean distance (ν = e),
• Constant hourly consumption equal to the average (h5 ); changes in absolute consumption will be the most relevant for
• Reversed hourly consumption: switch consumption of the indicator. If ν is the Pearson correlation (ν = c), changes
hour 1 with hour 24, etc. (h6 ); of dynamic can be detected.
The following equations describe the way an attack starting
on day d by consumer i affects his consumption data. These I2ν (i, d) = ν(mdi , µ(md−1−α
i , ..., md−1
i )) (2)
 I3 is the indicator of consumption difference in comparison
the consumers r ∈ R with the greatest similarity. Compares
the mean consumption of the last β days to the mean con-
sumption for the same days for the consumers with the most
similar characteristics. R are the τ consumers in {1, 2, ..., N }
with lowest similarity between their characteristics si . The
similarity between consumer r and i is calculated by ν(sr , si )
with ν being the euclidean distance.
Pβ P24
1 d−j−β−1,k
β l=1 k=1 mi
I3 (i, d) = Pβ P24 d−j−β−1,k
µ({ β1 l=1 k=1 mr ∀r ∈
I4e and I4c are the indicators of hourly consumption pattern
difference in comparison to consumers with the greatest sim-
ilarity. I4ν relates the mean hourly consumption of the last α
days between consumers. If ν is the euclidean distance ν = e
changes in absolute consumption will be the most relevant for
the indicator. If ν is the Pearson correlation (ν = c), changes
of dynamic can be detected.
I4ν (i, d) = ν(µ(mid−α , ..., mdi ), µ({(md−α
r , ..., mdi )∀r ∈ R})) (4)
IV. C OMMITTEE S EMI -S UPERVISED L EARNING M ODEL
Similarly to many other potential real-world applications
of modeling for classification, obtaining a labeled dataset
for electricity fraud detection is costly and time-consuming.
Utilities can only make inspections to a limited number
of electricity consumers every year, resulting in a lack of
trustworthy information on the presence of electricity fraud
for most consumers. Semi-supervised learning attempts to
leverage unlabeled data to improve performance in comparison
to supervised learning, either modifying or reprioritizing the
hypothesis obtained from labeled samples alone [20].
A semi-supervised learning framework for electricity fraud
detection works on a dataset of features X, that represents the
consumption characteristics of consumers, and the labels Y
indicating if they are fraudulent, legitimate or information on
fraud is missing. The approach used in this paper is used to
deal with data where a majority of samples have no labels.
Let xid be the feature vector of consumer i in day d. xid =
(I1 , I2e , I2c , I3 , I3d , I3c ) is composed of the indicators presented
in Section X. X ∈ <6 is the feature dataset for N consumers
composed of the indicators of nd days:
X = (x11 , x12 , . . . , x1nd , x21 , . . . , x2nd , . . . , xN 1 , . . . , xN nd ) (5)
Y are the labels related to the feature dataset X. For each
feature vector xid , yid is equal to 1, 0 or ∅ if, respectively, the
consumer is fraudulent (positive label), legitimate (negative
label) or his fraud status is unknown. The samples with have
y = 0 or y = 1 are referred to as labeled and the ones with
y = ∅ as unlabeled.
The positive class balance refers to the percentage of
samples with fraud in a dataset with no missing labels, which
is assumed in this paper to be equal to the prior probability
of the positive label class.
A. Co-Training by Committee
The CoBC framework is based on the popular semi-
supervised learning paradigm of co-training [21], in which
multiple classifiers are trained on different sets of features,
and the recent success of ensemble learning models. This sep-
aration of the feature space is also referred in the literature as
multi-view, and is believed to result in reduced generalization
errors due to non-independent features [20].
We propose to use CoBC with a bagging ensemble learning
algorithm for detection of electricity fraud. The learning algo-
(3)
R}) rithm used is known as Random Forests (RF), which creates
a bagging ensemble of decision tree classifiers that achieve
improved accuracy and generalization in comparison to the
use of a single tree [22]. Details on the RF algorithm used are
described in Section IV-B.
The pseudo-code of Algorithm 1 describes the framework
used to obtain the committee model for electricity fraud
detection, it is based on the one proposed in [21]. It starts by
training a RF model M with the set of labeled samples, which
is applied to a randomly chosen set of unlabeled samples U 0
of dimension poolsize. In the next step, the samples with
predictions of highest confidence are selected and added to
the labeled set L with labels predicted by the model M .
The selection of samples to add labels is proportional to
the prior probability of each class Pj (e.g. if the problem is
binary, with classes positive and negative, assuming a positive
class balance and P+ of 5%, 95% of selected samples are
the ones with highest confidence of being negative). These
steps are repeated, iteratively adding new unlabeled samples
to the labeled set till all training samples are labeled or the
max iterations stopping criterion is met. In the end, the final
committee model is trained with the initial and new labeled
training samples.
B. Random forests
The base committee models used in the semi-supervised
learning framework are RF [23], these are bagging ensemble
models that combine DTs, each generated leveraging random
data samples as to maximize the generalization capabilities.
The decision trees that make part of the ensembles are
classification and regression trees (CART). The RF, used as
the committee model in the CoBC framework, follows the
specifics presented in [22] and its implementation is part of
Scikit-learn [24].
C. Electricity Fraud Detection Model
Following the framework described, the electricity fraud
detection model is obtained and used as pictured in Figure
1. Data samples of electricity consumers, including ones that
are unlabeled are transformed through feature engineering to
obtain relevant variables for model training. The RF CoBC
framework leverages this data, generating the final committee
model and labels for unlabeled training data. The final com-
mittee model can then be used to infer the presence of fraud
on the data samples of consumers under analysis (testing).
Algorithm 1 RF CoBC Framework V. E XPERIMENTAL R ESULTS
Require: L - set of labeled training samples This section presents the dataset used for evaluation and
U - set of unlabeled training samples the results achieved by the proposed detection model. The use
RF - RF learning algorithm case is similar to the one presented in [13], with the major
rn - number of trees to train in RF algorithm difference of simulation with different percentages of labeled
rd - max depth of trees samples available for training and positive class balances. A
rp - dimension of the feature subset of trees supervised RF model is trained exclusively on the labeled data
poolsize - number of unlabeled samples in pool and evaluated for comparison.
f - fraction of unlabeled samples in pool to label
Pj - prior probability of class j A. Dataset
T - maximum number of iterations
The proposed detection model is tested using a dataset based
i=1
on real consumption readings from 4232 Irish households.
while U 6= ∅ or i < T do
The dataset consists of electricity consumption data logged
M ← RF (L, rn , rd , rp )
at 30 minute intervals, for one and a half years, and surveys
Create set U 0 of poolsize samples chosen randomly
responded before the start of monitoring. This dataset is a
from U without replacement
result from the electricity customer behavior trial by the Irish
Predict the labels for U 0 with model M
Commission for Energy Regulation (CER) [25].
Select the subset S of poolsize × f samples, containing
the most confident predictions, with a class balance propor- The dataset, to include synthetic electricity fraud attack
tional to Pj samples, is generated through the following steps:
Set U 0 = U 0 − S and L = L ∪ S 1) Select five random working days from each one of the
i=i+1 four seasons;
end while 2) For every consumer and every selected day:
M ← RF (L, rn , rd , rp ) a) Generate six synthetic consumption curves for the
return model M attacks presented in Section II;
b) Compute the features presented in Section III for
the legitimate and attack consumption curves.
The survey questions used to select similar consumers for
calculation of indicators I3 , I4e and I4c are: age, employment
status, social class, number of adults in household, number of
children and type of home. Only consumers without missing
Data samples for
data are used (2515). Following the aforementioned steps, the
training
Label information resulting evaluation dataset has a total of 352100 samples.
(including missing data To achieve the percentages of labeled samples in training
for unlabeled samples)
Consumption data and and positive class balances selected for simulation, data is re-
consumer characteristics
Electricity consumption features
sampled without substitution and labels are removed.

B. Parameters
Random Forest
Feature
Co-Training by Three different types of parameters are described. The first
engineering
Committee is for the features presented in Section III. The second is for
the dataset characteristics, including positive class balance and
percentage of labeled training samples. The third is for the RF
CoBC framework presented in Section IV.
For calculation of the features:
Data samples for • I1 : α = 1 and β = 5 (indicator relates the consumption
Committee model
testing
of the past day with the 5 days before);
e c
• I2 and I2 : α = 5 (indicators relate the pattern of past 24
hours with the mean pattern of the 5 days before);
• I3 : τ = 10 and β = 5 (indicator relates the consumption
of the past 5 days with the 10 most similar consumers);
Predicted labels Predicted labels e c
• I4 and I4 : τ = 10 and α = 5 (indicators relate the mean
for testing for unlabeled
samples training samples hourly pattern of consumption of the last 5 days with the
10 most similar consumers).
The dataset and training samples were re-sampled to test
Fig. 1: Diagram for RF CoBC. multiple scenarios, resulting from the variation of positive
class balance between 5%, 10% and 20% and percentage of average model performance for varying percentages of labeled
labeled training samples between 10%, 20% and 30%. samples. The better performance of the CoBC (inductive in
Regarding the RF CoBC parameters, the RF parameters blue) compared to the supervised (orange) approach is visible
were selected through grid-search, maximizing AUC in three- for the lower percentage of labeled samples.
fold cross-validation, with the following search sets for each
parameter: rn ∈ {50, 100, 250}, rd ∈ {5, 10, 15}, rp ∈ TABLE I: Performance of RF CoBC and supervised RF on
{2, 4, 6}. The CoBC learning framework parameters are also testing data
set by grid-search: poolsize ∈ {100, 200, 400, 600, 1000}, f ∈ TPR FPR TPR - FPR AUC
{0.1, 0.2, 0.3}, T ∈ {10, 20, 40, 80, ∞}. Model L (%) B (%)
To evaluate the proposed model, different configurations, CoBC 10 5 0.84 0.11 0.73 0.89
class balances and percentages of unlabeled samples, 5-fold 10 0.88 0.11 0.78 0.93
cross-validation (CV) was used for each combination of pa- 20 0.87 0.12 0.75 0.92
20 5 0.85 0.09 0.75 0.91
rameters, dividing the dataset in 5 and, for each one of the 10 0.86 0.12 0.74 0.90
5 folds, evaluating the performance of the model using 1 20 0.90 0.13 0.77 0.93
part when trained with the remaining 4 - the performance 30 5 0.87 0.09 0.78 0.91
10 0.89 0.11 0.78 0.93
can be summarized by the mean through the 5 folds. This 20 0.89 0.11 0.77 0.94
method is considered the most conservative but may result Supervised 10 5 0.84 0.16 0.68 0.88
in high variance if the dataset is not large enough [26]. The 10 0.89 0.12 0.77 0.92
20 0.88 0.12 0.76 0.92
performance measures used are the following: 20 5 0.87 0.11 0.76 0.92
• True Positive Rate (TPR): Ratio between correctly clas- 10 0.87 0.11 0.76 0.91
20 0.91 0.14 0.77 0.93
sified cases of theft and all theft samples; 30 5 0.90 0.12 0.78 0.93
• False Positive Rate (FPR): Ration between incorrectly 10 0.88 0.11 0.78 0.92
classified benign samples and all benign samples; 20 0.90 0.12 0.78 0.94
• TPR-FPR: Difference between the last two measures;
• Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve
(AUC) [27]: translates the performance of a classification 0.8
technique independently of the threshold used (suitable
0.7
when dealing with unbalanced data).
As the model output is continuous between 0 and 1, a 0.6
threshold has to be selected and from that point samples are 0.5
TPR - FPR

labeled positive. The selected threshold tr is the one that 0.4

maximizes T P R − F P R.
0.3
C. Results 0.2 inductive
The results from evaluation of the RF CoBC framework 0.1 inductive (supervised)
and supervised RF are listed in Table I. L (%) and B (%) are, transductive
respectively, the percentage of labeled training samples and 0.0
10

20

positive class balance for the different scenarios. The values
of TPR, FPR, TPR-FPR and AUC are the average of these
measures on the testing data of five folds for the best found
CoBC configuration (poolsize = 600, f = 0.3, T = 10).
Under low positive class balance (5%) and low percentage
of labeled training samples (10%) the semi-supervised learning
framework outperforms the supervised approach (T P R −
F P R = 0.73 vs 0.68, AU C = 0.89 vs 0.88). This slight
performance increase is also verified in scenarios with smaller
class imbalance.
In scenarios with a higher percentage of labeled samples
(20% and 30%), the semi-supervised is not able to outperform
the supervised model. The CoBC framework is unable to
leverage the unlabeled data to improve the RF classification
performance in these cases or the number of labeled samples
is enough and a ceiling on performance is achieved.
The performance of the semi-supervised approach on train-
ing data is referred to as transductive performance, and on
testing data inductive performance [20]. Figures 2 pictures the
30
Labeled samples (%)
Fig. 2: Evolution of performance with percentage of labeled
training samples (assuming a 5% positive class balance).
VI. C ONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes the use of a semi-supervised learning
framework for the detection of electricity consumers com-
mitting fraud. Due to the difficulties involved in obtaining
fully labeled datasets in this field, semi-supervised learning
can improve the detection performance of typically used
supervised learning approaches by leveraging unlabeled data.
Based on the co-training by committee framework, random
forest detection models are developed and evaluated on a
dataset based on real data. Scenarios are created for 10%,
20% and 30% percentages of labeled data on the training set.
The performance evaluation results show that the proposed
approach can achieve a good classification performance of
84% true positive rate, 11% false positive rate and 0.89
area under the receiver operating characteristic curve under
a positive class balance of 5% and 90% unlabeled samples in
the training data. With supervised learning and using the same
base model, a performance of 84% true positive rate, 16% false
positive rate and 0.88 area under the curve is obtained.
Performance of the proposed approach matches the one of
supervised learning for higher percentages of labeled samples,
strongly suggesting improvements can be achieved through
the optimization of the framework used or application of
more sophisticated approaches. Possible improvements could
be obtained through a more thorough testing of parameters
and use of generative models such a deep neural nets [28].
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work was supported by FCT, through IDMEC, under
LAETA, project UID/EMS/50022/2013 and SusCity (MITP-
TB/CS/0026/2013). The work of J. L. Viegas was supported
by the PhD in Industry Scholarship SFRH/BDE/95414/2013
from FCT and Novabase. S. M. Vieira acknowledges support
by Program Investigador FCT (IF/00833/2014) from FCT,
co-funded by the European Social Fund (ESF) through the
Operational Program Human Potential (POPH).
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