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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

COURT OF APPEALS
MANILA

SEVENTH DIVISION

NENITA ESPIRITU ESPIRITU and

AURORA ESPIRITU CHAVEZ,
represented by EMETERIA
ESPIRITU VALENZUELA,
Petitioner,
-versus -
CA-G.R. SP No. 161425

CITY OF PARANAQUE and

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
PARANAQUE CITY, BRANCH
195, PRESIDED BY THE HON.
AIDA MACAPAGAL-FOJAS,
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------x

REPLY
(To Answer with Counterclaim of
the City of Paranaque)

PETITIONERS, by counsel, by way of reply to the Answer with

Counterclaim filed by respondent City of Paranaque (which
petitioners received last 28 November 2019), respectfully allege that:

RESPONDENT CITY OF PARANAQUE FAILED TO

PROVE JURISDICTION WAS LAWFULLY ACQUIRED
OVER THE PETITIONERS

PETITIONERS DID NOT AUTHORIZE THEIR SISTER AS

THEIR REPRESENTATIVE IN THE EXPROPRIATION
CASE

THE CAUSE OF ACTION HAS NOT YET PRESCRIBED

RESPONDENT CITY OF PARANAQUE’S COUNTER

CLAIM IS NOT JUSTIFIED IN THIS CASE

THE EXPROPRIATION, EVEN FOR A PUBLIC

PURPOSE, WAS NOT DONE IN ACCORDANCE WITH
LAW, DISREGARDING PETITIONERS’ RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS
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DISCUSSION

JURISDICTION WAS NOT

PROVEN TO HAVE BEEN
ACQUIRED OVER THE
PETITIONERS

Respondent City of Paranaque failed to prove the alleged offers

to buy their propery were in fact validly delivered to the petitioners,
nor was it proven that jurisdiction was lawfully acquired over the
petitioners, so as to consider them aware of the expropriation
proceedings instituted against them.

The failure of said respondent is apparent from the following:

1. There is no proof that the Certifications from the

Postmaster refer to the actual letters allegedly issued and
sent to the petitioners, concerning the city’s alleged offer
to purchase their property;
2. There is likewise no showing that said “Certifications”
were offered in evidence in the expropriation case, if only
to prove compliance with the requirements of
expropriation;
3. The alleged Server’s Return on the service of summons
on petitioners’ sister and alleged authorized
representative, Emeteria Valenzuela, was not found in the
records of the expropriation case when petitioners’
counsel and relatives went over the files of said case ，
after learning of the same;
4. Even if summons was indeed served on Ms. Emeteria
Valenzuela, respondent City of Paranaque failed to
produce a special power of attorney from petitioners in
favor of Emeteria Valenzuela to represent the petitioners
in the expropriation case, much less authorizing Emeteria
to engage services of counsel, namely Atty. Alberic
Alfonso to act on their behalf in the expropriation case;

Respondent City of Paranaque simply went on to depict

petitioners’ concealment of their knowledge of the expropriation case
from false inferences from their “evidence”, and from there
immediately jumped to the conclusion that petitioners are most likely
to conceal hiring Atty. Alfonso as their lawyer in the expropriation
case.

The above factual discrepancies in their supposed “evidence”

belie the respondent City of Paranaque’s desperate attempt to
enforce an expropriation done under suspicious circumstances, and
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justify taking the property of herein petitioners.

PETITIONERS DID NOT ISSUE

ANY AUTHORITY FOR THEIR
SISTER NOR THEIR NIECE
MICHELLE CAIDAS-REYES TO
BE THEIR REPRESENTATIVE IN
THE EXPROPRIATION CASE

Respondent City of Paranaque’s arguments as to the alleged

authority of petitioners’ sister goes against the established legal
principle that no one has the authority to contract for and in behalf of
another without being authorized to do so.

In the first place, the general power of attorney provided by

respondent City of Paranaque does not mention power over the
petitioners’ real properties. And it is axiomatic that a special
power of attorney is required insofar as rights over real or immovable
properties are concerned.

“Article 1874. When a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is

through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise,
the sale shall be void.

Article 1878. Special powers of attorney are necessary in the following

cases:
(1) To make such payments as are not usually considered as acts of
administration;
(2) To effect novations which put an end to obligations already in
existence at the time the agency was constituted;
(3) To compromise, to submit questions to arbitration, to renounce the
right to appeal from a judgment, to waive objections to the venue of an
action or to abandon a prescription already acquired;
(4) To waive any obligation gratuitously;
(5) To enter into any contract by which the ownership of an
immovable is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for a
valuable consideration;
(6) To make gifts, except customary ones for charity or those made to
employees in the business managed by the agent;
(7) To loan or borrow money, unless the latter act be urgent and
indispensable for the preservation of the things which are under
administration;
(8) To lease any real property to another person for more than one year;
(9) To bind the principal to render some service without compensation;
(10) To bind the principal in a contract of partnership;
(11) To obligate the principal as a guarantor or surety;
(12) To create or convey real rights over immovable property;
(13) To accept or repudiate an inheritance;
(14) To ratify or recognize obligations contracted before the agency;
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(15) Any other act of strict dominion. (n)”1

(Emphasis supplied)

While respondent City of Paranaque was able to obtain a

General Power of Attorney allegedly in favor of petitioners’ sister,
said respondent could not produce any written authority from
petitioners or their sister authorizing Atty. Alberic Alfonso to appear
and act in their behalf in the expropriation case. Respondent City of
Paranaque want this Honorable Court to believe that since petitioners
are apparently concealing their prior knowledge of the expropriation
case, the petitioners are more likely concealing Atty. Alfonso’s
engagement.

In the same vein, while respondent City of Paranaque was able

to cull an alleged “Server’s Return” from the files of the expropriation
case, respondent could not produce an authorization from the
petitioners in favor of their sister Emeteria to appear for them in the
expropriation case, much less hire the services of a lawyer for that
purpose. Respondent City of Paranaque wants that power of
Emeteria to represent her sisters inferred from the supposed General
Power of Attorney executed by them. This goes against basic legal
tenets, again, to wit:

“The power to collect and receive payments on behalf of the principal is

an ordinary act of administration covered by the general powers of an
agent. On the other hand, the filing of suits is an act of
strict dominion.

Under Article 1878 (15) of the Civil Code, a duly appointed agent
has no power to exercise any act of strict dominion on
behalf of the principal unless authorized by a special
power of attorney. An agent's authority to file suit cannot be inferred
from his authority to collect or receive payments; the grant of
special powers cannot be presumed from the grant of
general powers. Moreover, the authority to exercise special powers
must be duly established by evidence, even though it need not be in
writing.” 2

(Emphasis supplied)

The general power of attorney allegedly from petitioners were

issued in 2003, long before the respondent City of Paranaque began
proceedings of supposed expropriation over the petitioners’
properties. It cannot therefore be deemed to include the authority to
represent the petitioners in the expropriation case.
1
New Civil Code.

2
G.R. No. 186305, July 22, 2015, V-GENT, INC., Petitioner, vs. MORNING STAR TRAVEL and
TOURS, INC., Respondent.
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Moreover, the cover/consular page of the supposed document

from the petitioners in favor of Emeteria Valenzuela refers to a
Special Power of Attorney, and not a General Power of Attorney,
casting doubt on the veracity and authenticity of said document for
the purpose it is used by respondent City of Paranaque. The
supposed General Power of Attorney from petitioner Aurora Espiritu-
Chavez does not even have a signature page attached. And both
documents are merely blank/filled out forms in shaky handwriting,
indicating their sister’s address simply as San Dionisio, Paranaque
City.

Neither did petitioners authorize Michelle Caidas-Reyes to

receive payments on their behalf in the expropriation case. As
already alleged in the petition, the special power of attorney in favor
of Michelle was issued under the mistaken belief/misrepresentation
that the properties were being bought, without mention of the City of
Paranaque. Petitioners, being ordinary citizens, were not aware of
proceedings like expropriation; therefore, trusting their niece, they
issued the special power of attorney, as she requested, for a totally
different purpose.

It is therefore erroneous for the respondent City of Paranaque

to now argue that by “authorizing” Michelle for one purpose, that she
(Michelle) had authority from the petitioners for another matter,
namely the expropriation case. It is just as preposterous to posit that
by virtue of such “authorization”, petitioners were deemed aware of
the expropriation proceedings, and are thus barred from seeking
relief via the instant petition.

“As a general rule, a contract of agency may be oral. However, it must

be written when the law requires a specific form. Specifically, Article
1874 of the Civil Code provides that the contract of agency must be
written for the validity of the sale of a piece of land or any interest
therein. Otherwise, the sale shall be void. A related provision, Article
1878 of the Civil Code, states that special powers of attorney
are necessary to convey real rights over immovable
properties.

The special power of attorney mandated by law must be one that

expressly mentions a sale or that includes a sale as a necessary
ingredient of the authorized act. We unequivocably declared in Cosmic
Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals that a special power of
attorney must express the powers of the agent in clear and
unmistakable language for the principal to confer the right upon an
agent to sell real estate. When there is any reasonable doubt that the
language so used conveys such power, no such construction shall be
given the document. The purpose of the law in requiring a special
power of attorney in the disposition of immovable property is to
protect the interest of an unsuspecting owner from being
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prejudiced by the unwarranted act of another and to caution the

buyer to assure himself of the specific authorization of the putative
agent.”3

“1. It is a basic axiom in civil law embodied in our Civil Code that no one
may contract in the name of another without being authorized by
the latter, or unless he has by law a right to represent him. A
contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no
authority or the legal representation or who has acted beyond his
powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or
impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed,
before it is revoked by the other contracting party. Article 1403 (1) of
the same Code also provides:

ART. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are
justified:

(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who
has been given no authority or legal representation or who has
acted beyond his powers; ...

Out of the above given principles, sprung the creation and acceptance of
the relationship of agency whereby one party, caged the principal
(mandante), authorizes another, called the agent (mandatario), to act for
and in his behalf in transactions with third persons. The essential
elements of agency are: (1) there is consent, express or implied of the
parties to establish the relationship; (2) the object is the execution of a
juridical act in relation to a third person; (3) the agents acts as a
representative and not for himself, and (4) the agent acts within the
scope of his authority.

Agency is basically personal representative, and derivative in nature.

The authority of the agent to act emanates from the powers granted
to him by his principal; his act is the act of the principal if done
within the scope of the authority. Qui facit per alium facit se. "He who
acts through another acts himself". “4

(Emphasis supplied)

PETITIONERS’ CAUSE OF
ACTION HAS NOT YET
PRESCRIBED

3
G.R. No. 174978, July 31, 2013, SALLY YOSHIZAKI, Petitioner, vs. JOY TRAINING CENTER
OF AURORA, INC., Respondent.
4
G.R. No. L-24332, January 31, 1978, RAMON RALLOS, Administrator of the Estate of
CONCEPCION RALLOS, petitioner, vs. FELIX GO CHAN & SONS REALTY CORPORATION
and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
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The petitioners’ cause of action has not prescribed, as they

became aware of the fraud only when Michelle showed them the
letter from the City Legal Office of respondent City of Paranaque
sometime last February 2019. Said letter was even addressed to
Michelle Caidas-Reyes as the alleged representative of petitioners for
the expropriation case, which she (Michelle) was most definitely not
so authorized.

Respondent City of Paranaque’s allegation of prescription is

merely based on their specious claim that petitioners were aware of
the expropriation proceedings from the very beginning.

RESPONDENT CITY OF
PARANAQUE’S COUNTER
CLAIM NOT PROPER

The reliefs available under Rule 47, if the judgement is

annulled, are damages and attorney’s fees to the petitioner. If the
petition is dismissed, no award is mentioned for the respondent.

Moreover, the counterclaim of respondent City of Paranaque,

which is to demand delivery of the titles to petitioners’ property, is in
no way related to the cause of action of petitioners in this case,
"...does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with the
subject matter of the (petitioner’s) claim.” 5 It is merely permissive,
and as it is, cannot be granted by this Honorable Court.

NO DUE PROCESS

The main issue in this petition is the deprivation of petitioners’

property without observance of due process, made worse with
payment made to a person other than the property owners, namely
the petitioners herein. While the State’s exercise of its power of
eminent domain (through its local government units, such as
respondent City of Paranaque) is paramaount, such power is not over
and above the right of persons against the wanton and abusive
exercise thereof. Petitioners argue that not only did the respondent
City of Paranaque carry out the expropriation of their property without
their knowledge, payment therefor was made to a person not
authorized to receive the same, namely petitioners’ niece Michelle
Caidas Reyes, and thereafter the respondent City of Paranaque
wants to take possession of the said property.

“We take judicial notice of the fact that urban land reform has become a
5
November 22, 2017, G.R. No. 212904, YOLANDA VILLANUEVA-ONG, Petitioner vs. JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, Respondent
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paramount task in view of the acute shortage of decent housing in urban

areas particularly in Metro Manila. Nevertheless, despite the existence of a
serious dilemma, local government units are not given an unbridled
authority when exercising their power of eminent domain in pursuit of
solutions to these problems. The basic rules still have to be followed,
which are as follows: "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws (Art. 3, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution);
private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation (Art. 3, Section 9, 1987 Constitution)". Thus, the
exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain is not
without limitations. Even Section 19 of the 1991 Local Government Code is
very explicit that it must comply with the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws, to wit:
Sec. 19. Eminent Domain. — A local government unit may, through its
chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of
eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the
poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: . . . (Emphasis supplied).
The governing law that deals with the subject of expropriation for purposes
of urban land reform and housing is Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992) and Sections 9 and 10 of which
specifically provide as follows:
Sec. 9. Priorities in the acquisition of Land. — Lands for socialized
housing shall be acquired in the following order:
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions,
instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries;
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(d) Those within the declared Areas for Priority Development, Zonal
Improvement sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program
sites which have not yet been acquired;
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS sites
which have not yet been acquired; and
(f) Privately-owned lands.
Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous
to the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply.
The local government units shall give budgetary priority to on-site
development of government lands.
Sec. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. — The modes of acquiring lands for
purposes of this Act shall include, among others, community mortgage,
land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to
the Government, joint-venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and
expropriation. Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to
only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Provided
further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by
small property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Act.
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Provided, finally, That abandoned property, as herein defined, shall be

reverted and escheated to the State in a proceeding analogous to the
procedure laid down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court.
For the purpose of socialized housing, government-owned and foreclosed
properties shall be acquired by the local government units, or by the
National Housing Authority primarily through negotiated purchase:
Provided, That qualified beneficiaries who are actual occupants of the land
shall be given the right of first refusal.
Very clear from the abovequoted provisions are the limitations with respect
to the order of priority in acquiring private lands and in resorting to
expropriation proceedings as a means to acquire the same. Private lands
rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the
same vein, expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only when the
other modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these
conditions must be deemed mandatory because these are the only
safeguards in securing the right of owners of private property to due
process when their property is expropriated for public use.
Proceeding from the parameters laid out in the above disquisitions, we
now pose the crucial question: Did the City of Manila comply with the
abovementioned conditions when it expropriated petitioner Filstream's
properties? We have carefully scrutinized the records of this case and
found nothing that would indicate that respondent City of Manila complied
with Sec. 9 and Sec. 10 of R.A. 7279. Petitioner Filstream's properties
were expropriated and ordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila
sans any showing that resort to the acquisition of other lands listed under
Sec. 9 of RA 7279 have proved futile. Evidently, there was a violation of
petitioner Filstream's right to due process which must accordingly be
rectified.
Indeed, it must be emphasized that the State has a paramount interest in
exercising its power of eminent domain for the general good considering
that the right of the State to expropriate private property as long as it is for
public use always takes precedence over the interest of private property
owners. However, we must not lose sight of the fact that the individual
rights affected by the exercise of such right are also entitled to
protection, bearing in mind that the exercise of this superior right
cannot override the guarantee of due process extended by the law to
owners of the property to be expropriated. In this regard, vigilance
over compliance with the due process requirements is in order.” 6
(Emphasis supplied)

It is therefore pointless for respondent City of Paranaque to

harp on the “legality” of the expropriation when such was carried out
under the most suspicious of circumstances, much to the detriment
and damage of herein petitioners, leaving them no choice but to seek
relief before this Honorable Court.

6
G.R. No. 125218 January 23, 1998, FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE FELIPE S. TONGCO and THE CITY OF MANILA,
respondents. G.R. No. 128077, January 23, 1998, FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL
INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. respondents.
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PRAYER

WHEREFORE, petitioners respectfully reiterate their prayer that

the reliefs sought in the instant Petition be granted.

Petitioners likewise pray for such other reliefs as may be

deemed just and equitable under the premises.

Parañaque City for the City of Manila, 5 December 2019.

ATTY. GE ANN FRANCIA S. ROSALES

Co-Counsel for Petitioners
28 Gonzales St. Sinagtala BF Homes
Parañaque City 1700
Roll of Attorneys No. 72006
PTR No. 8049058, 10 January 2019, Manila
IBP 067320, 12 January 2019, Manila
MCLE On Process
Tel. No. 09178422668

EXPLANATION
(As required by Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)

Due to lack of personnel, time constraints, and the distance involved between the
parties that make personal service not possible, copies of this pleading have
been served on adverse parties by registered mail, unless otherwise indicated.

ATTY. GE ANN FRANCIA S. ROSALES

Copy furnished: (by registered mail/courier)

City Legal Office REGIONAL TRIAL COURT - BR. 195

City of Paranaque
Paranaque City Hall
San Antonio Avenue, Paranaque
City
RR#___________________
7th Floor, Legislative Building
Paranaque City Hall
San Antonio Avenue, Paranaque City
RR#___________________