G.R. No.
L-59821 August 30, 1982 Vitug, as one of her heirs, and the other,
ROWENA F. CORONA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, ROMARICO
G. VITUG, AVELINO L. CASTILLO,
NICANOR CASTILLO, KATHLEEN D.
LUCHANGCO, GUILLERMO
LUCHANGCO, JR., ANTONIO
LUCHANGCO, RODOLFO TORRES,
REYNALDO TORRES and PURISIMA T.
POLINTAN, respondents.
N.J. Quisumbing for petitioner.
Jose F. Tiburcio for respondents
Luchangcos, Torres and Polintan.
Ricardo S. Inton for respondents
Castillos.
Rufino V. Javier for respondent Vitug.
& Administrator because she (Rowena) is
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
A Petition to review on certiorari the
judgment of the Court of Appeals 1 (CA-
G.R. No. 12404-SP) of August 11, 1981,
upholding the appointment by the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Pasig, Branch VI, of
respondent Romarico G. Vitug, as Special
Administrator, although in the Will of his
deceased wife, she had disinherited him,
as well as the Appellate Court's Resolution
of February 17, 1982 denying
reconsideration.
On November 10, 1980, Dolores
Luchangco Vitug died in New York, U.S.A.,
leaving two Wills: one, a holographic Will
dated October 3, 1980, which excluded
her husband, respondent Romarico G.
Romarico further prayed for his
a formal Will sworn to on October 24,
1980, or about three weeks thereafter,
which expressly disinherited her husband
Romarico "for reason of his improper and
immoral conduct amounting to
concubinage, which is a ground for legal
separation under Philippine Law";
bequeathed her properties in equal shares
to her sisters Exaltacion L. Allarde,
Vicenta L. Faustino and Gloria L. Teoxon,
and her nieces Rowena F. Corona and
Jennifer F. Way; and appointed Rowena F.
Corona, herein petitioner, as her
Executrix.
On November 21, 1980, Rowena filed a
petition for the probate of the Wills before
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
VI (Spec.Procs. No. 9398), and for the
appointment of Nenita P. Alonte as
presently employed in the United Nations
in New York City.
On December 2, 1980, upon Rowena's
urgent Motion, the Probate Court
appointed Nenita P. Alonte as Special
Administratrix, upon a P100,000.00 bond.
On December 12, 1980, the surviving
husband, Romarico Vitug, filed an
"Opposition and Motion" and prayed that
the Petition for Probate be denied and that
the two Wills be disallowed on the ground
that they were procured through undue
and improper pressure and influence,
having been executed at a time when the
decedent was seriously ill and under the
medical care of Dr. Antonio P. Corona,,
petitioner's husband, and that the
holographic Will impaired his legitime.
appointment as Special Administrator
because the Special Administratrix
appointed is not related to the heirs and
has no interest to be protected, besides,
the surviving spouse is qualified to
administer.
Oppositions to probate with almost
Identical arguments and prayers were also
filed by respondent (1) Avelino L. Castillo
and Nicanor Castillo, legitimate children of
Constancia Luchangco, full blood sister of
the decedent; (2) Guillermo Luchangco,
full blood brother of the decedent; (3)
Rodolfo Torres, Reynaldo Torres, and
Purisima Torres Polintan, all legitimate
children of the deceased Lourdes
Luchangco Torres, full blood sister of the
decedent.
On December 18, 1980, Nenita P. Alonte
posted her bond and took her oath of
office before a Notary Public.
On February 6, 1981, the Probate Court
set aside its Order of December 2, 1980
appointing Nenita as Special
Administratrix, and appointed instead the
surviving husband, Romarico as Special
Administrator with a bond of P200,000.00,
essentially for the reasons that under
Section 6, Rule 78, of the Rules of Court,
the surviving spouse is first in the order of
preference for appointment as
Administrator as he has an interest in the
estate; that the disinheritance of the
surviving spouse is not among the
grounds of disqualification for
appointment as Administrator; that the
next of kin is appointed only where the
surviving spouse is not competent or is
unwilling to serve besides the fact that the
Executrix appointed, is not the next of kin
but merely a niece, and that the
decedent's estate is nothing more than
half of the unliquidated conjugal
partnership property.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration with
an alternate Motion for the appointment of
co-Special Administrators to which private
respondents filed their Opposition.
Reconsideration having been denied,
petitioner resorted to a Petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals to
annul, for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion, the Order setting
aside the appointment of Nenita as Special
Administratrix and appointing in her stead
the surviving spouse Romarico.
On August 11, 1981, the Court of Appeals
found no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Probate Court and dismissed
the Petition stating that the Probate Court
strictly observed the order of preference
established by the Rules; that petitioner
though named Executrix in the alleged
Will, declined the trust and instead
nominated a stranger as Special
Administrator; that the surviving husband
has legitimate interests to protect which
are not adverse to the decedent's estate
which is merely part of the conjugal
property; and that disinheritance is not a
disqualification to appointment as Special
Administrator besides the fact that the
legality of the disinheritance would involve
a determination of the intrinsic validity of
the Will which is decidedly premature at
this stage.
On March 24, 1982, petitioner elevated Alonte, should be appointed as co-Special
the case to this Court for review on Administrator. The executrix's choice of
certiorari after her Motion for Special Administrator, considering her
Reconconsideration was turned down by own inability to serve and the wide
the Court of Appeals. latitude of discretion given her by the
testatrix in her Will (Annex "A-1"), is
Petitioner stresses that the order of
entitled to the highest consideration.
preference laid down in the Rules should
Objections to Nenita's appointment on
not be followed where the surviving
grounds of impracticality and lack of
spouse is expressly disinherited, opposes
kinship are over-shadowed by the fact
probate, and clearly possesses an adverse
that justice and equity demand that the
interest to the estate which would
side of the deceased wife and the faction
disqualify him from the trust.
of the surviving husband be represented
The three sets of Oppositors, all in the management of the decedent's
respondents herein, in the Comments estate. 2
which they respectively filed, essentially
En passant, it is apropos to remind the
claimed lack of grave abuse of discretion
Special Administrators that while they
on the part of the Appellate Court in
may have respective interests to protect,
upholding the appointment of the
they are officers of the Court subject to
surviving husband as Special
the supervision and control of the Probate
Administrator; that certiorari is improper
Court and are expected to work for the
and unavailing as the appointment of a
best interests of the entire estate, its
Special Administrator is discretionary with
smooth administration, and its earliest
the Court and is unappealable; that co-
settlement.
administratorship is impractical and
unsound and as between the surviving WHEREFORE, modifying the judgment
husband, who was responsible for the under review, the Court of First Instance
accumulation of the estate by his acumen of Rizal, Branch VI, is hereby ordered, in
and who must be deemed to have a Special Proceedings No. 9398 pending
beneficial interest in the entire estate, and before it, to appoint Nenita F. Alonte as
a stranger, respondent Court had made co-Special Administrator, properly
the correct choice; and that the legality of bonded, who shall act as such jointly with
the disinheritance made by the decedent the other Special Administrator on all
cannot affect the appointment of a Special matters affecting the estate.
Administrator.
No costs.
This Court, in resolving to give due course
to the Petition taking into account the
allegations, arguments and issues raised
by the parties, is of the considered opinion
that petitioner's nominee, Nenita F.
G.R. No. L-65800 October 3, 1986
PARTENZA LUCERNA VDA. DE
TUPAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
BRANCH XLIII of the HON. REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, respondent, and TUPAS
FOUNDATION, INC.,
private respondent-appellee.
Abraham D. Caña for petitioner-appellant.
Jose R. Edis for private respondent-
appellee.
NARVASA, J.:
Involved in this appeal is the question of
whether or not a donation inter vivos by a
donor now deceased is inofficious and
should be reduced at the instance of the
donor's widow.
Epifanio R. Tupas died on August 20, 1978
in Bacolod City, childless, leaving his
widow, Partenza Lucerna, as his only
surviving compulsory heir. He also left a
win dated May 18, 1976, which was
admitted to probate on September 30,
1980 in Special Proceedings No. 13994 of
the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental. Among the assets listed in his
will were lots Nos. 837, 838 and 839 of
the Sagay Cadastre, admittedly his private
capital. However, at the time of his death,
these lots were no longer owned by him,
he having donated them the year before
(on August 2, 1977) to the Tupas
Foundation, Inc., which had thereafter A person's prerogative to make donations
obtained title to said lots. is subject to certain limitations, one of
which is that he cannot give by donation
Claiming that said donation had left her
more than he can give by will (Art. 752,
practically destitute of any inheritance,
Civil Code). 3 If he does, so much of what
Tupas' widow brought suit against Tupas
is donated as exceeds what he can give by
Foundation, Inc. in the same Court of First
will is deemed inofficious and the donation
Instance of Negros Occidental (docketed
is reducible to the extent of such excess,
as Civil Case No. 16089) to have the
though without prejudice to its taking
donation declared inofficious insofar as it
effect in the donor's lifetime or the
prejudiced her legitime, therefore
donee's appropriating the fruits of the
reducible " ... by one-half or such
thing donated (Art. 771, Civil Code). Such
proportion as ... (might be deemed)
a donation is, moreover, collationable that
justified ... and " ... the resulting
is, its value is imputable into the
deduction ... " restored and conveyed or
hereditary estate of the donor at the tune
delivered to her. The complaint also
of his death for the purpose of
prayed for attorney's fees and such other
determining the legitime of the forced or
relief as might be proper.
compulsory heirs and the freely disposable
The Trial Court did not see things her way. portion of the estate. This is true as well
of donations to strangers as of gifts to
Upon the facts above stated, on which the
compulsory heirs, although the language
parties stipulated, 1 said Court dismissed
of Article 1061 of the Civil Code would
the complaint for lack of merit, rejecting
seem to limit collation to the latter class of
her claim on several grounds, viz.:
donations. And this has been held to be a
... (1) Article 900 relied upon by plaintiff is long-established rule in Liguez vs.
not applicable because the properties Honorable Court of Appeals, et
which were disposed of by way of al., 4 where this Court said:
donation one year before the death of
... Hence, the forced heirs are entitled to
Epifanio Tupas were no longer part of his
have the donation set aside in so far
hereditary estate at the time of his death
as inofficious: i.e., in excess of the portion
on August 20, 1978; (2) the donation
of free disposal (Civil Code of 1889,
properties were Epifanio's capital or
Articles 636, 645), computed as provided
separate estate; and (3) Tupas
in Articles 818 and 819, and bearing in
Foundation, Inc. being a stranger and not
mind that collationable gifts' under Article
a compulsory heir, the donation inter
818 should include gifts made not only in
vivos made in its favor was not subject to
favor of the forced heirs, but even those
collation under Art. 106 1, C.C.2
made in favor of strangers, as decided by
The Trial Court is in error on all counts the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision
and must be reversed. of 4 May 1899 and 16 June 1902. So that
in computing the legitimes, the value of
the property donated to herein appellant,
Conchita Liguez, should be considered
part of the donor's estate. Once again,
only the court of origin has the requisite
data to determine whether the donation is
inofficious or not. 5
The fact, therefore, that the donated
property no longer actually formed part of
the estate of the donor at the time of his
death cannot be asserted to prevent its
being brought to collation. Indeed, it is an
obvious proposition that collation
contemplates and particularly applies to
gifts inter vivos. 6 The further fact that the
lots donated were admittedly capital or
separate property of the donor is of no
moment, because a claim of
inofficiousness does not assert that the
donor gave what was not his, but that he
gave more than what was within his
power to give.
(1) determination of the value of the
property which remains at the time of the
testator's death;
(2) determination of the obligations,
debts, and charges which have to be paid
out or deducted from the value of the
property thus left;
(3) the determination of the difference
between the assets and the liabilities,
giving rise to the hereditary estate;
(4) the addition to the net value thus
found, of the value, at the time they were
made, of donations subject to collation;
and
(5) the determination of the amount of
the legitimes by getting from the total
thus found the portion that the law
provides as the legitime of each respective
compulsory heir.8
and may necessitate the production of
evidence in the Court a quo.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is
reversed and petitioner-appellant Partenza
Lucerna Vda. de Tupas is adjudged
entitled to so much of the donated
property in question, as may be found in
excess of the freely disposable portion of
the estate of Epifanio B. Tupas,
determined in the manner above-
indicated. Let the case be remanded to
the Trial Court for further appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this
decision.
SO ORDERED.

Since it is clear that the questioned
donation is collationable and that, having
been made to a stranger (to the donor) it
is, by law 7 chargeable to the freely
disposable portion of the donor's estate,
to be reduced insofar as inofficious, i.e., it
exceeds said portion and thus impairs the
legitime of the compulsory heirs, in order
to find out whether it is inofficious or not,
recourse must be had to the rules
established by the Civil Code for the
determination of the legitime and, by
extension, of the disposable portion.
These rules are set forth in Articles 908,
909 and 910 of the Code, on the basis of
which the following step-by-step
procedure has been correctly outlined:
Deducting the legitimes from the net
value of the hereditary estate leaves the
freely disposable portion by which the
donation in question here must be
measured. If the value of the donation at
the time it was made does not exceed that
difference, then it must be allowed to
stand. But if it does, the donation is
inofficious as to the excess and must be
reduced by the amount of said excess. In
this case, if any excess be shown, it shall
be returned or reverted to the petitioner-
appellant as the sole compulsory heir of
the deceased Epifanio R. Tupas.
For obvious reasons, this determination
cannot now be made, as it requires
appreciation of data not before this Court
G.R. No. L-46903 July 23,
1987
BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as
Guardian of Rosalinda de
Roma, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Candelaria de Roma had two legally
adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and
Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate on
April 30, 1971, and administration
proceedings were instituted in the Court of
First Instance of Laguna by the private
respondent as guardian of Rosalinda.
Buhay was appointed administratrix and in
due time filed an inventory of the estate.
This was opposed by Rosalinda on the
ground that certain properties earlier
donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the
fruits thereof, had not been included.1
The properties in question consisted of
seven parcels of coconut land worth
P10,297.50.2 There is no dispute regarding
their evaluation; what the parties cannot
agree upon is whether these lands are
subject to collation. The private
respondent rigorously argues that it is,
conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil
Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article
1062, claims she has no obligation to
collate because the decedent prohibited
such collation and the donation was not
officious.
The two articles provide as follows:
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who
succeeds with other compulsory heirs,
must bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he may have
received from the decedent during the
lifetime of the latter, by way of donation,
or any other gratuitous title, in order that
it may be computed in the determination
of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition.
Article 1062. Collation shall not take place
among compulsory heirs if the donor
should have so expressly provided, or if
the donor should repudiate the
inheritance, unless the donation should be
reduced as inofficious.
The issue was resolved in favor of the
petitioner by the trial court,* which held
that the decedent, when she made the
donation in favor of Buhay, expressly
prohibited collation. Moreover, the
donation did not impair the legitimes of
the two adopted daughters as it could be
accommodated in, and in fact was
imputed to, the free portion of
Candelaria's estate.3
On appeal, the order of the trial court was
reversed, the respondent court** holding
that the deed of donation contained no
express prohibition to collate as an
exception to Article 1062. Accordingly, it
ordered collation and equally divided the
net estate of the decedent, including the
fruits of the donated property, between
Buhay and Rosalinda.4
The pertinent portions of the deed of
donation are as follows:
IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking
pagmamahal, pagtingin at pagsisilbi sa
akin ng aking anak na si BUHAY DE ROMA,
kasal kay Arabella Castaneda, may
karampatang gulang, mamamayang
Pilipino at naninirahan at may pahatirang-
sulat din dito sa Lunsod ng San Pablo sa
pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay
kusang-loob kong ibinibigay,
ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na
BUHAY DE ROMA, sa kanyang mga kahalili
at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng
pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli,
ang lahat ng mga lagay ng lupa na
sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan
na ngayon pa ay siya na ang nagmamay-
aring tunay ng mga lupang ito at kanya
nang maaring ipalipat ang mga hoja
declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa kanyang
pangalan, datapwa't samantalang ako ay
nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang makikinabang
sa mga mapuputi at mamomosesion sa
mga nasabing lupa;
IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay
marami pang ibang mga pag-aari sa sapat
pang aking ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay
kong ito ay hindi masisira ang legitimate
ng mga tao na dapat magmana sa akin,
sapagkat ang mga lupang sinasabi sa
itaas ay bahagui ng aking kabuhayan na
ako ay may layang ipamigay kahit na
kaninong tao na kung tawagin ay Libre
Disposicion. 5
We agree with the respondent court that
there is nothing in the above provisions
expressly prohibiting the collation of the
donated properties. As the said court
correctly observed, the phrase "sa
pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na
mababawing muli" merely described the
donation as "irrevocable" and should not
be construed as an express prohibition
against collation.6 The fact that a donation
is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt
the subject thereof from the collation
required under Article 1061.
We surmise from the use of such terms as
"legitime" and "free portion" in the deed
of donation that it was prepared by a
lawyer, and we may also presume he
understood the legal consequences of the
donation being made. It is reasonable to
suppose, given the precise language of
the document, that he would have
included therein an express prohibition to
collate if that had been the donor's
intention.
Anything less than
such express prohibition will not suffice
under the clear language of Article
1062.1awphil The suggestion that there
was an implied prohibition because the
properties donated were imputable to the
free portion of the decedent's estate
merits little consideration. Imputation is
not the question here, nor is it claimed
that the disputed donation is officious The
sole issue is whether or not there was an
express prohibition to collate, and we see
none.
There is no need to dwell long on the
other error assigned by the petitioner
regarding the decision of the appealed
case by the respondent court beyond the
12-month period prescribed by Article X,
Section 11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution.
As we held in Marcelino v. Cruz,7 the said
provision was merely directory and failure
to decide on time would not deprive the
corresponding courts of jurisdiction or
render their decisions invalid.
It is worth stressing that the
aforementioned provision has now been
reworded in Article VIII, Section 15, of the
1987 Constitution, which also impresses
upon the courts of justice, indeed with
greater urgency, the need for the speedy
disposition of the cases that have been
clogging their dockets these many years.
Serious studies and efforts are now being
taken by the Court to meet that need.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the
petitioner. It is so ordered.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Paras and
Gancayco, JJ., concur.

The intention to exempt from collation

should be expressed plainly and
unequivocally as an exception to the
general rule announced in Article 1062.
Absent such a clear indication of that
intention, we apply not the exception but
the rule, which is categorical enough.
G.R. No. 189776 December
15, 2010
AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by
her duly appointed guardians, AGNES
P. ARELLANO and NONA P.
ARELLANO, Petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL
PASCUAL, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on
January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his
siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P.
Arellano who is represented by her
daughters1 Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and
Nona P. Arellano, and respondents
Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual.2
In a petition for "Judicial Settlement of
Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of
Administration," docketed as Special
Proceeding Case No. M-5034, filed by
respondents on April 28, 2000 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati,
respondents alleged, inter alia, that a
parcel of land (the donated property)
located in Teresa Village, Makati, which
was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by
the decedent to petitioner the validity of
which donation respondents assailed,
"may be considered as an advance
legitime" of petitioner.
Respondent’s nephew Victor was, as they
prayed for, appointed as Administrator of
the estate by Branch 135 of the Makati
RTC.3
Respecting the donated property, now
covered in the name of petitioner by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 181889 of
the Register of Deeds of Makati, which
respondents assailed but which they, in
any event, posited that it "may be
considered as an advance legitime" to
petitioner, the trial court, acting as
probate court, held that it was precluded
from determining the validity of the
donation.
Provisionally passing, however, upon the
question of title to the donated
property only for the purpose of
determining whether it formed part of the
decedent’s estate,4 the probate court
found the Deed of Donation valid in light
of the presumption of validity of notarized
documents. It thus went on to hold that it
is subject to collation following Article
1061 of the New Civil Code which reads: 5
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with
other compulsory heirs, must bring into
the mass of the estate any property or
right which he may have received from
the decedent, during the lifetime of the
latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title in order that it may be
computed in the determination of the
legitime of each heir, and in the account
of the partition.
The probate court thereafter partitioned
the properties of the intestate estate.
Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered declaring
that:
1. The property covered by TCT No.
181889 of the Register of Deeds of Makati
as part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual;
2. The property covered by TCT No.
181889 to be subject to collation;
3. 1/3 of the rental receivables due on the
property at the mezzanine and the 3rd
floor of Unit 1110 Tanay St., Makati City
form part of the estate of Angel N.
Pascual;
4. The following properties form part of
the estate of Angel N. Pascual:
a. 1/3 share in the House and Lot at 1110
Tanay St., Rizal Village Makati TCT No.
348341 and 1/3 share in the rental
income thereon;
b. 1/3 share in the Vacant Lot with an
area of 271 square meters located at
Tanay St., Rizal Village, Makati City, TCT
No. 119063;
c. Agricultural land with an area of 3.8
hectares located at Puerta Galera Mindoro
covered by OCT No. P-2159;
d. Shares of stocks in San Miguel
Corporation covered by the following
Certificate Numbers: A0011036, A006144,
A082906, A006087, A065796, A11979,
A049521, C86950, C63096, C55316,
C54824, C120328, A011026, C12865,
A10439, A021401, A007218, A0371,
S29239, S40128, S58308, S69309;
e. Shares of stocks in Paper Industries
Corp. covered by the following Certificate
Numbers: S29239, S40128, S58308,
S69309, A006708, 07680, A020786,
S18539, S14649;
f. ¼ share in Eduardo Pascual’s shares in
Baguio Gold Mining Co.;
g. Cash in Banco De Oro Savings Account
No. 2 014 12292 4 in the name of Nona
Arellano;
i. Property previously covered by TCT No.
119053 now covered by TCT No. 181889,
Register of Deeds of Makati City;
j. Rental receivables from Raul Arellano
per Order issued by Branch 64 of the
Court on November 17, 1995.
5. AND the properties are partitioned as
follows:
a. To heir Amelia P. Arellano-the property
covered by TCT No. 181889;
b. To heirs Francisco N. Pascual and
Miguel N. Pascual-the real properties
covered by TCT Nos. 348341 and 119063
of the Register of Deeds of Makati City
and the property covered by OCT No.
2159, to be divided equally between them
up to the extent that each of their share
have been equalized with the actual value
of the property in 5(a) at the time of
donation, the value of which shall be
determined by an independent appraiser
to be designated by Amelia P. Arellano,
Miguel N. Pascual and Francisco N.
Pascual. If the real properties are not
sufficient to equalize the shares, then
Francisco’s and Miguel’s shares may be
satisfied from either in cash property or
shares of stocks, at the rate of quotation.
The remaining properties shall be divided
equally among Francisco, Miguel and
Amelia. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner
faulted the trial court in holding that
I
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO
APPELLANT AMELIA PASCUAL ARELLANO
IS PART OF THE ESTATE OF ANGEL
PASCUAL, JR.
II
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO
APPELLANT IS SUBJECT TO
COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE
NEW CIVIL CODE.
III
. . . APPELLEES WHO ARE MERELY
COLLATERAL RELATIVES OF DECEASED
ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AS HIS
COMPULSORY HEIRS ENTITLED TO
LEGITIMES.
xxxx
and
V Thus, the appellate court disposed, quoted
. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE
OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL
JR. EQUALLY AMONG HIS LEGAL OR
INTESTATE HEIRS.6 (underscoring
supplied)
By Decision7 of July 20, 2009, the Court of
Appeals found petitioner’s appeal "partly
meritorious." It sustained the probate
court’s ruling that the property donated to
petitioner is subject to collation in this
wise:
Bearing in mind that in intestate
succession, what governs is the rule on
equality of division, We hold that
the property subject of donation inter
vivos in favor of Amelia is subject to
collation. Amelia cannot be considered a
creditor of the decedent and we believe
that under the circumstances, the value of
such immovable though not strictly in the
concept of advance legitime, should be
deducted from her share in the net
hereditary estate. The trial court therefore
committed no reversible error when it
included the said property as forming part
of the estate of Angel N.
Pascual.8 (citation omitted; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)1avvph!1
The appellate court, however, held that,
contrary to the ruling of the probate court,
herein petitioner "was able to submit
prima facie evidence of shares of stocks
owned by the [decedent] which have not
been included in the inventory submitted
by the administrator."
verbatim:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
present appeal is hereby PARTLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated January 29,
2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 135 in Special Proceeding
Case No. M-5034 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE insofar as the order of
inclusion of properties of the Intestate
Estate of Angel N. Pascual, Jr. as well as
the partition and distribution of the
same to the co-heirs are concerned.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the said
court for further proceedings in
accordance with the disquisitions
herein.9 (underscoring supplied)
Petitioner’s Partial Motion for
Reconsideration10 having been denied by
the appellate court by Resolution11 of
October 7, 2009, the present petition for
review on certiorari was filed, ascribing as
errors of the appellate court its ruling
I estate of property disposed of by lucrative
. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED BY
ANGEL N. PASCUAL, JR. TO PETITIONER
AMELIA PASCUAL ARELLANO IS PART OF
HIS ESTATE AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH.
II
. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED TO
PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO
COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE
NEW CIVIL CODE.
III
. . . THAT RESPONDENTS ARE
COMPULSORY HEIRS OF THEIR DECEASED
BROTHER ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AND
ARE ENTITLED TO LEGITIMES.
IV
. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE
OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL,
JR. EQUALLY AMONG PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENTS, AS HIS LEGAL OR
INTESTATE HEIRS.12 (underscoring
supplied)
Petitioners thus raise the issues of
whether the property donated to
petitioner is subject to collation; and
whether the property of the estate should
have been ordered equally distributed
among the parties.
On the first issue:
The term collation has two distinct
concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical
operation by the addition of the value of
donations made by the testator to the
value of the hereditary estate; and
second, it is the return to the hereditary
title by the testator during his lifetime.13
The purposes of collation are to secure
equality among the compulsory heirs in so
far as is possible, and to determine the
free portion, after finding the legitime, so
that inofficious donations may be
reduced.14
Collation takes place when there are
compulsory heirs, one of its purposes
being to determine the legitime and the
free portion. If there is no compulsory
heir, there is no legitime to be
safeguarded.15
The records do not show that the
decedent left any primary, secondary, or
concurring compulsory heirs. He was only
survived by his siblings, who are his
collateral relatives and, therefore, are not
entitled to any legitime – that part of the
testator’s property which he cannot
dispose of because the law has reserved it
for compulsory heirs.16
The compulsory heirs may be classified
into (1) primary, (2) secondary, and (3)
concurring. The primary compulsory heirs
are those who have precedence over and
exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate
children and descendants are primary
compulsory heirs. The secondary
compulsory heirs are those who succeed
only in the absence of the primary heirs;
the legitimate parents and ascendants are
secondary compulsory heirs. The
concurring compulsory heirs are those
who succeed together with the primary or
the secondary compulsory heirs; the
illegitimate children, and the surviving
spouse are concurring compulsory heirs.17
The decedent not having left any
compulsory heir who is entitled to any
legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his
properties, even if nothing was left for his
siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His
donation to petitioner, assuming that it
was valid,18 is deemed as donation made
to a "stranger," chargeable against the
free portion of the estate.19 There being
no compulsory heir, however, the donated
property is not subject to collation.
On the second issue:
The decedent’s remaining estate should
thus be partitioned equally among his
heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein
petitioner and respondents, pursuant to
the provisions of the Civil Code, viz:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives
shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following
articles. (underscoring supplied)
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be
brothers and sisters of the full blood, they
shall inherit in equal shares. (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

The Court of Appeals Decision ordering
the collation of the property donated to
petitioner, Amelia N. Arellano, to the
estate of the deceased Angel N. Pascual,
Jr. is set aside.

Let the records of the case be REMANDED

to the court of origin, Branch 135 of the
Makati Regional Trial Court, which is
ordered to conduct further proceedings in
the case for the purpose of determining
what finally forms part of the estate, and
thereafter to divide whatever remains of it
equally among the parties.

SO ORDERED.