5. Espiritu v.

Municipal Council 102 PHIL 867

FACTS: During the last world war, the market building of the town of
Pozorrubio was destroyed, and after Liberation, the market vendors began
constructing temporary and make-shifts stalls even small residences, on a
portion of the town plaza. The Municipal Treasurer collected from these
stall owners fees at the rate of P.25 per square meter a month. In time, the
whole municipal market was rehabilitated, but the owners of the structures
on the plaza failed and refused to transfer to said market place.

ISSUE: WON said desistance constitute a nuisance.

HELD: YES. There is absolutely no question that the town plaza cannot be
used for the construction of market stalls, specially of residences, and that
such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to
law. Town Plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public
use and to be made available to the public in general.

Here, the fee of P.25 per square meter collected by the Municipal
Treasurer, was not for the rent of the portion of the public plaza occupied
by the market stalls, as claimed by appellants, but rather the market stall
fees charges on all market vendors in a public market; and that there was
absolutely no contract or agreement between the appellants on one side
and the municipality on the other, about renting of the Plaza to the former.

6. Canlas v. Aquino 2 SCRA 814

FACTS: Petitioners, Arsenio L. Canlas and Adena Gonzales-Canlas, who

are husband and wife, as well as doctors of medicine by profession, were
granted a permit for the construction of a house and to operate and
maintain in said house a private hospital with an accommodation of fifteen
(15) beds, two (2) of which would be for charity cases.

Meanwhile, respondent Jaime Tayag had obtained a permit to construct a

ricemill in front of the Canlas Clinic. It appears, however, that Chapter VII of
Municipal Ordinance No. 44 of Concepcion, Tarlac, requires a sanitary
permit issued by the local health officer, for operation of any establishment
which may exhale foul odor or cause physical discomfort to such degree as
to constitute a nuisance. Purporting to act pursuant to such ordinance, the
municipal health officer of Concepcion revoked or cancelled the
aforementioned permit issued to Tayag.

Before construction began, petitioners filed a preliminary injuction. Tayag,

on his answer averred that he already had the permit from the mayor.
Thus, respondent judge ruled in his favor.

ISSUE: WON respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion.

HELD: YES. The intention of respondent Judge to prohibit the continuance

of the operation of said ricemill, should it later be found to be a nuisance, is
not sufficient to offset the harm already done to the operation of the
hospital, specially the injury suffered by the patients therein and the public
in general, which are hardly susceptible of estimation or compensation.
Needless to say, by permitting Tayag to construct his building, and
purchase and install the machinery for the operation of the ricemill,
respondent Judge exposed him to much greater damage than that which
could possibly have resulted had the writ of preliminary injunction been
maintained until the final disposition of the case. The acting City Public
Service Officer, Fernando Manalastas, recommended approval of the bid
for an incinerator with thermal power station.

7. San Rafael Homeowners v. City of Manila 46 SCRA 40

FACTS: In 1961 a pilot composting plant was in operation at the North

Harbor appropriating the sum of P15,000,000.00 for that purpose. City of
Manila advertised for and received bids for the construction of the plant in
accordance with specifications previously prepared by the respondents. Six
bids were received: four firms offered to construct a compost plant, one firm
offered to put up an incinerator with a thermal power station to generate
electricity, and another offered a combined compost and incinerating plant.

However, the Committee on Awards decided to reject all the bids on the
ground that none of them complied with the requirement in the ordinance
that the garbage and refuse disposal plant should be capable of being
operated on a self-liquidating basis. It specified various requirements and
one of them is: (3) that "the incinerator plant shall provide maximum
sanitary and health safeguards and must be able to prevent the exposure
of disease and other health hazards of the people within the plant area and
its vicinity ... in short, among other things, (that) the incinerator plant must
be "pollution-free" and never be a nuisance.

ISSUE: WON incinerator will constitute nuisance.

HELD: NO. Certainly this Court cannot and should not substitute its
judgment this early for that of the respondents and on a purely theoretical
basis rule that the bid submitted should not be opened, or if opened should
not be accepted, because not one of the plants therein offered to be
established would serve the purpose envisaged and because, if so
established, it would so pollute the environment as to constitute a nuisance.
If and when such a result becomes a reality, or at least an imminent threat,
that will be the time the petitioners may come to court. That they are not
successful now will not preclude them from doing so, because a continuing
nuisance calls for a continuing remedy.

8. Tamin v. CA GR NO. 97477 May 8, 1992

FACTS: Petitioner municipality (Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur) is

the owner of a 5,894 square meters parcel of land which is
reserved for a public plaza and constructed a municipal
gymnasium in the area financed by appropriations provided by
the national government. Private respondents by virtue of a
contract of lease entered into by the former mayor occupied a
portion of the parcel of land constructing buildings thereon
refused to vacate the premises despite demands. The
appropriations are in danger of being reverted to the national
treasury because the construction had to be stopped in view of
the refusal of the private respondents to vacate the area.

ISSUE: WON the buildings constructed by the respondents are

nuisance.
HELD: NO. The issuance of the writ of possession and ancillary
writ of demolition was improper because an administrative case
on the ownership of the land to which the respondent is a party-
in-interest is still pending. Thus, should the respondent be
declared the rightful owner of the land, the demolition shall be
prejudicial to his interest.

The buildings constructed by the respondents shall be considered

a nuisance should the pending administrative case declare that
the subject land is part of public dominion. The Civil Code
provides under Art. 694 that “A nuisance is any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition of property or anything else
which... (5) Hinders or impairs the use of property." Thus, if the
administrative case is decided against the respondent, his
continued use of the buildings hinders or impairs the use of the
property by the municipality making such building a nuisance.

9. Lucena Grand v. JAC Liner GR NO. 148339 Feb 23, 2005

FACTS: The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which provides,

inter alia, that: all buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger
jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the city and are
hereby directed to proceed to the common terminal, for picking-
up and/or dropping of their passengers; and (b) all temporary
terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable
starting from the effectivity of this ordinance. Furthermore, said
ordinance previously directed bus owners and operators to put up
their terminals "outside the poblacion of Lucena City” because
buses which indiscriminately load and unload passengers on the
city streets creates public nuisance.

ISSUE: WON public terminals are public nuisance.

HELD:NO. Terminals are not public nuisances as petitioner

argues. For their operation is a legitimate business which, by
itself, cannot be said to be injurious to the rights of property,
health, or comfort of the community. But even assuming that
terminals are nuisances due to their alleged indirect effects upon
the flow of traffic, at most they are nuisance per accidens, not
per se.

In Estate of Gregoria Francisco v. Court of Appeals, the Court

held: Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare
clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial
proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one
which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and
may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity.

Unless a thing is nuisance per se, however, it may not be abated

via an ordinance, without judicial proceedings, as was done in the
case at bar.

10. Hidalgo v. Balandan 91 PHIL 448

FACTS: Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. was the owner of an ice-plant factory in

the City of San Pablo, Laguna, in whose premises were installed two tanks
full of water. One, afternoon, plaintiff’s son, Mario Balandan, 8 years old,
while playing with other boys entered the factory premises through the
gate, to take a bath in one of said tanks. Mario died of "asphyxia secondary
to drowning.”

Court of First Instance of Laguna, took the view that the petitioner
maintained an attractive nuisance.The doctrine of attractive nuisance, of
American origin means, one who maintains on his premises dangerous
instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in
play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from
playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years
who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the
premises.

ISSUE: WON a swimming pool or water tank an instrumentality or

appliance likely to attract the little children in play.
HELD: NO. The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to
bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual
condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location.

The reason why a swimming pool or pond or reservoir of water is not

considered an attractive nuisance was lucidly explained by the Indiana
Appellate Court as follows:

Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking
in their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this danger
children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed to know
the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an artificial pool on
his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any
new danger, . . . (he) is not liable because of having created an "attractive
nuisance."