CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

Common Provisions

Section 6

1. Aruelo vs. CA 227 SCRA 311

Facts: Aruelo claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the respondent therein only five days from receipt of summons
within which to file his answer to the petition (Part VI, Rule 35, Sec. 7) and that this five-day period had lapsed when Gatchalian filed his answer.
According to him, the filing of motions to dismiss and motions for bill of particulars is prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure; hence, the filing of said pleadings did not suspend the running of the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new five-day period to file his
answer.

Issue: whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it allowed respondent Gatchalian to
file his pleading beyond the five-day period prescribed in Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

Held:No. Petitioner filed the election protest with the Regional Trial Court, whose proceedings are governed by the Revised Rules of Court.

Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before the regular courts. As expressly mandated by
Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of particulars, shall apply only to proceedings
brought before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability — These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings brought before the Commission. Part VI shall apply to
election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by courts of general or limited jurisdiction.

It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed
in election protests orquo warranto cases pending before the regular courts.

Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate
rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).

2. Mamerto T. Sevilla vs. Comelec

Before this Court is the petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order,1 filed by
petitioner Mamerto T. Sevilla, Jr., to nullify the May 14, 2012 Resolution2 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) Second Division and the October 6,
2012 Resolution3 of the Comelec en banc in SPR (BRGY-SK) No. 70-2011. These assailed Resolutions reversed and set aside the May 4, 2011 Order
of the Muntinlupa City Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 80

(MeTC), dismissing respondent Renato R. So's election protest against Sevilla.

The Facts: Sevilla and So were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Sucat, Muntinlupa City during the October 25, 2010
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. On October 26, 2010, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed Sevilla as the winner with a total of
7,354 votes or a winning margin of 628 votes over So's 6,726 total votes. On November 4, 2010, So filed an election protest with the MeTC on the
ground that Sevilla committed electoral fraud, anomalies and irregularities in all the protested precincts. So pinpointed twenty percent (20%) of the total
number of the protested precincts. He also prayed for a manual revision of the ballots.4chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Following the recount of the ballots in the pilot protested precincts, the MeTC issued an Order dated May 4, 2011 dismissing the election protest. On
May 9, 2011, So filed a motion for reconsideration from the dismissal order instead of a notice of appeal; he also failed to pay the appeal fee within the
reglementary period. On May 17, 2011, the MeTC denied the motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 6 of A.M. No. 07-04-15-SC.5chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In response, So filed a petition for certiorari on May 31, 2011 with the Comelec, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC Judge. So
faults the MeTC for its non-observance of the rule that in the appreciation of ballots, there should be a clear and distinct presentation of the specific
details of how and why a certain group of ballots should be considered as having been written by one or two persons.6chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The Comelec Second Division Ruling

In its May 14, 2012 Resolution, the Comelec Second Division granted So's petition. The Comelec Second Division held that  certiorari can be granted
despite the availability of appeals when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority, as in the case before it. It also ruled
that the assailed Order was fraught with infirmities and irregularities in the appreciation of the ballots, and was couched in general terms: "these are not
written by one person observing the different strokes, slant, spacing, size and indentation of handwriting and the variance in
writing."7chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The Comelec En Banc Ruling

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The Comelec en banc, by a vote of 3-3,8 affirmed the Comelec Second Division's ruling in its October 6, 2012 Resolution whose dispositive portion
reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Respondent judge is directed to conduct
another revision of the contested ballots in Election Protest Case No. SP-6719 with dispatch.9chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

It ruled that where the dismissal was capricious, certiorari lies as the petition challenges not the correctness but the validity of the order of dismissal. The
Comelec en banc emphasized that procedural technicalities should be disregarded for the immediate and final resolution of election cases inasmuch as
ballots should be read and appreciated with utmost liberality so that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by
technical infirmities.

It found that the MeTC Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when she did not comply with the mandatory
requirements of Section 2(d), Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC on the form of the decision in election protests involving pairs or groups of ballots written
by two persons. It noted that based on the general and repetitive phraseology of the Order, the MeTC Judge's findings were "copy-pasted" into the
decision and ran counter to the mandate of the aforementioned rule. Also, the MeTC Judge failed to mention in her appreciation of the ballots that she
examined the Minutes of Voting and Counting to ascertain whether there were illiterate voters or assisted voters in the protested
precincts.10chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Commissioner Lim's Dissent 11chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The dissent posited that So's petition should be dismissed outright as it was mired in procedural errors. First, So should have filed an appeal within five
(5) days from receipt of the MeTC's Order; a motion for reconsideration was improper as the Order amounted to the final disposition of the protest.
Second, So should not have filed the motion for reconsideration even if he believed that the Order was interlocutory since a motion for reconsideration is
a prohibited pleading. Also, he could have simply filed the petition for certiorari without the necessity of filing the motion for reconsideration. Third, the
petition for certiorari cannot be a substitute for the lost appeal. The Comelec could not even treat the certiorari as an appeal since the petition was filed
25 days after So received the assailed Order; thus, the Order already attained finality. Finally, procedural rules should not be lightly shunned in favor of
liberality when, as in this case, So did not give a valid excuse for his errors.

The Petition

The Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it gave due course to the petition for certiorari

Sevilla argues that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it entertained So's petition despite its loss of jurisdiction to entertain the petition after
the court a quo's dismissal order became final and executory due to So's wrong choice of remedy. Instead of filing an appeal within five (5) days from
receipt of the Order and paying the required appeal fee, So filed a motion for reconsideration a prohibited pleading that did not stop the running of the
prescriptive period to file an appeal. Sevilla also emphasizes that So's petition for  certiorari should not have been given due course since it is not a
substitute for an appeal and may only be allowed if there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.12chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The dismissal of the election protest was proper

Sevilla also contends that the dismissal was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion since the MeTC Judge complied with the rules; she made clear,
specific and detailed explanations pertaining to the specific strokes, figures or letters showing that the ballots had been written by one person. Granting
that the decision was tainted with errors, certiorari would still not lie because a mere error of judgment is not synonymous with grave abuse of discretion.
Lastly, a liberal application of the rules cannot be made to a petition which offers no explanation for the non-observance of the
rules.13chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On November 13, 2012,14 the Court resolved to require the Comelec and the respondent to comment on the petition and to observe the status quo
prevailing before the issuance of the assailed Comelec Second Division's Resolution of May 14, 2012 and the Comelec en banc's Resolution of October
6, 2012.15chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In his Comment, the respondent contends that the petition was filed prematurely. He emphasizes that the October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en
banc was not a majority decision considering that three Commissioners voted for the denial of the motion for reconsideration and the three others voted
to grant the same. So notes that the assailed October 6, 2012 Resolution was deliberated upon only by six (6) Commissioners because the 7th

Commissioner had not yet been appointed by the President at that time. Considering that the October 6, 2012 Resolution was not a majority decision by
the Comelec en banc, So prays for the dismissal of the petition so that it can be remanded to the Comelec for a rehearing by a full and complete
Commission.16chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The Court's Ruling

We resolve to DISMISS the petition for having been prematurely filed with this Court, and remand the case to the COMELEC for its appropriate action.

The October 6, 2012 Comelec en banc's Resolution lacks legal effect as it is not a majority decision required by the Constitution and by the Comelec
Rules of Procedure

Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution requires that "each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members, any case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution." 17 Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate, the Comelec provided in

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Section 5(a), Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure the votes required for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling when the
Comelec sits en banc, viz.:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. - (a) When sitting en banc, four (4) Members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of
transacting business. The concurrence of a majority of the Members of the Commission shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision,
resolution, order or ruling. [italics supplied; emphasis ours]

We have previously ruled that a majority vote requires a vote of four members of the Comelec en banc. In Marcoleta v. Commission on Elections, 18 we
declared "that Section 5(a) of Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure and Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution require that a majority vote of
all the members of the Comelec en banc, and not only those who participated and took part in the deliberations, is necessary for the pronouncement of a
decision, resolution, order or ruling."

In the present case, while the October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc appears to have affirmed the Comelec Second Division's Resolution
and, in effect, denied Sevilla's motion for reconsideration, the equally divided voting between three Commissioners concurring and three Commissioners
dissenting is not the majority vote that the Constitution and the Comelec Rules of Procedure require for a valid pronouncement of the assailed October
6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc.

In essence, based on the 3-3 voting, the Comelec en banc did not sustain the Comelec Second Division's findings on the basis of the three concurring
votes by Commissioners Tagle, Velasco and Yusoph; conversely, it also did not overturn the Comelec Second Division on the basis of the three
dissenting votes by Chairman Brillantes, Commissioner Sarmiento and Commissioner Lim, as either side was short of one (1) vote to obtain a majority
decision. Recall that under Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution, a majority vote of all the members of the Commission en banc is necessary to
arrive at a ruling. In other words, the vote of four (4) members must always be attained in order to decide, irrespective of the number of Commissioners
in attendance. Thus, for all intents and purposes, the assailed October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc had no legal effect whatsoever
except to convey that the Comelec failed to reach a decision and that further action is required.

The October 6, 2012 Comelec en banc's Resolution must be reheard pursuant to the Comelec Rules of Procedure

To break the legal stalemate in case the opinion is equally divided among the members of the Comelec en banc, Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure mandates a rehearing where parties are given the opportunity anew to strengthen their respective positions or arguments and
convince the members of the Comelec en banc of the merit of their case.19 Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure
reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Section 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. - When the Commission en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be
had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the
Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be
denied. [emphasis ours; italics supplied]

In Juliano v. Commission on Elections,20 only three members of the Comelec en banc voted in favor of granting Estrelita Juliano's motion for
reconsideration (from the Decision of the Comelec Second Division dismissing her petition for annulment of proclamation of Muslimin Sema as the duly
elected Mayor of Cotabato City), three members dissented, and one member took no part. In ruling that the Comelec acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it failed to order a rehearing required by the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the Court ruled:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure specifically states that if the opinion of the Comelec En Banc is equally divided, the case shall be
reheard. The Court notes, however, that the Order of the Comelec En Banc dated February 10, 2005 clearly stated that what was conducted was a mere
"re-consultation."

A "re-consultation" is definitely not the same as a "rehearing."

A consultation is a "deliberation of persons on some subject;" hence, a re-consultation means a second deliberation of persons on some subject.

Rehearing is defined as a "second consideration of cause for purpose of calling to court's or administrative board's attention any error, omission, or
oversight in first consideration. A retrial of issues presumes notice to parties entitled thereto and opportunity for them to be heard." (italics supplied). But
as held in Samalio v. Court of Appeals,

A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand.

Thus, a rehearing clearly presupposes the participation of the opposing parties for the purpose of presenting additional evidence, if any, and further
clarifying and amplifying their arguments; whereas, a re-consultation involves a re-evaluation of the issues and arguments already on hand only by the
members of the tribunal, without the participation of the parties.

In Belac v. Comelec, when the voting of the Comelec En Banc on therein petitioner's motion for reconsideration was equally divided, the Comelec En
Banc first issued an order setting the case for hearing and allowed the parties to submit their respective memoranda before voting anew on therein
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. This should have been the proper way for the Comelec En Banc to act on herein petitioner's motion for
reconsideration when the first voting was equally divided. Its own Rules of Procedure calls for a rehearing where the parties would have the opportunity
to strengthen their respective positions or arguments and convince the members of the Comelec En Banc of the merit of their case. Thus, when the
Comelec En Banc failed to give petitioner the rehearing required by the Comelec Rules of Procedure, said body acted with grave abuse of
discretion.21 (italics supplied; emphases ours)

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To the same effect, in Marcoleta v. Commission on Elections,22 the Court ruled that the Comelec en banc did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
ordered a rehearing of its November 6, 2007 Resolution for failing to muster the required majority voting. The Court held:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The Comelec, despite the obvious inclination of three commissioners to affirm the Resolution of the First Division, cannot do away with a rehearing since
its Rules clearly provide for such a proceeding for the body to have a solicitous review of the controversy before it. A rehearing clearly presupposes the
participation of the opposing parties for the purpose of presenting additional evidence, if any, and further clarifying and amplifying their arguments.

To reiterate, neither the assenters nor dissenters can claim a majority in the En Banc Resolution of November 6, 2007. The Resolution served no more
than a record of voters, lacking in legal effect despite its pronouncement of reversal of the First Division Resolution. According, the Comelec did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion in ordering a rehearing.23 (italics supplied; citation omitted)

In the present case, it appears from the records that the Comelec en banc did not issue an Order for a rehearing of the case in view of the filing in the
interim of the present petition for certiorari by Sevilla. In both the cases of Juliano and Marcoleta, cited above, we remanded the cases to the Comelec
en banc for the conduct of the required rehearing pursuant to the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Based on these considerations, we thus find that a
remand of this case is necessary for the Comelec en banc to comply with the rehearing requirement of Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition and REMAND SPR (BR GY-SK) No. 70-2011 to the Comelec en bane for the conduct of the required
rehearing under the Comelec Rules of Procedure. The Comelec en bane is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the rehearing with utmost dispatch.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Section 7

3. Cua vs. Comelec

FACTS: The first division of Comelec rendered a 2-1decision favoring the petitioner but nevertheless suspended his proclamation as winner in the lone
congressional district of Quirino due to the lack of the unanimous vote required by the procedural rules in Comelec Resolution No. 1669. Section 5 of the
said resolution states that “ A case being heard by it shall be decided with the unanimous concurrence of  all three Commissioners and its decision shall
be considered a decision of the Commission. If this required number is no to obtained, as when there is a dissenting opinion& the case may be appealed
to the Commission En Banc & in which case the vote of the majority thereof shall be the decision of the Commission. Petitioner contends that the 2-1
decision of the first division was a valid decision despite the resolution stated above  because of Art IX - A, Section 7 of the Constitution.
He argues that this applies to the voting of the Comelec both in division and En Banc. Respondent, on the other hand, insists that no decision was
reached by the first division because the required unanimous vote was not obtained! )t was also argued that no valid decision was reached by the
Comelec En Banc because only three votes were cast in favor of the petitioner and these did not constitute the majority of the body!

ISSUE: Whether the 2-1 decision of the first division was valid!

RULING: Yes. The Court held that the 2-1 decision rendered by the first 4ivision was a valid decision under Art IX - A, Section 7 of the Constitution!
5urthermore& the three members who voted to affirm the first division constituted a majority of the five members who deliberated and voted
thereon En Banc and their decision is also valid under the aforecited constitutional provision hence the proclamation of Cua on the basis of the two
aforecited decisions was a valid act that entitles him now to assume his seat in the House of Representatitves

4. Acena vs. Civil Service Commission

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari to annul the resolution of the Civil Service Commission which set aside the order of the Merit Systems Protection
Board declaring the herein petitioner as the legitimate Administrative Officer of Rizal Technological Colleges. Acena was assigned as Admin. Officer by
then President of Rizal Technological Colleges and was subsequently promoted as Associate Professor on temporary status pending his compliance to
obtain a Master’s Degree while assuming the position of Acting Admin Officer at the same time. The Board of Trustees designated Ricardo Salvador as
Acting Admin Officer and pursuant to the same, the new College President Dr. Estolas revoked the designation of the petitioner as acting Admin Officer.
Petitioner sent a letter to the CSC stating his desire to keep his appointment as Admin Officer instead of Associate Professor. Thus the latter’s
appointment was withdrawn. He also filed a complaint for injunction of damages to Dr. Estolas assailing the validity of his dismissal from his position as
violation of security of tenure. He filed another complaint for illegal termination against Dr. Estolas before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).
The CSC opined that Acena is still the Admin Officer since his appointment as Asso. Prof. was withdrawn. Dr. Estolas filed petition for review to the
Office of the President. The Presidential Staff Director referred the complaint back to the CSC. In the dispositive portion of its resolution, the CSC finds
the action of Dr. Estolas valid and set aside the previous opinion made by the CSC and the order of the MSPB. The petitioner files a petition
for certiorari against the CSC decision on jurisdictional issue. 

ISSUE: WON the CSC acted in grave abuse of discretion.

RULING: The court held that respondent Estolas filed a petition for review beyond the prescriptive period of 15 days where the decision of the MSPB
can be made appealable with the CSC. Beyond this reglementary period, the decision of the MSPB renders to be final and executory. The petition was
also filed at the wrong forum (to the office of the Pres.) The court finds the CSC to have an excess of jurisdiction of entertaining the petition and made a
reversible error of setting aside the MSPB order which has long become final and executory. The court granted the petition of the petitioner while setting
aside the decision of the CSC. 

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 5. Vital-Gozon v. CA

G.R. No. 129132 July 8, 1998

Davide, Jr., J.

Issue:  whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the matter of damages in a special civil action of mandamus.

Held: Yes. CA has jurisdiction to award damages in mandamus petitions. Sec. 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorized the rendition of
judgment in a mandamus action “commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect
the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.”  The provision makes
plain that the damages are an incident, or the result of, the defendant’s wrongful act in failing and refusing to do the act required to be done. It is
noteworthy that the Rules of 1940 had an identical counterpart provision. The Solicitor General’s theory that the rule in question is a mere procedural
one allowing joinder of an action of mandamus and another for damages, is untenable, for it implies that a claim for damages arising from the omission
or failure to do an act subject of a mandamus suit may be litigated separately from the latter, the matter of damages not being inextricably linked to the
cause of action for mandamus, which is certainly not the case.

Issue: whether or not the SolGen is authorized to represent Vital-Gozon in this case

Held: Yes. The doctrine laid down in the Urbano and Co cases already adverted to, is quite clear to the effect that the Office of the Solicitor General is
not authorized to represent a public official at any stage of a criminal case. This observation should apply as well to a public official who is haled to court
on a civil suit for damages arising from a felony allegedly committed by him (Article 100, Revised Penal Code). Any pecuniary liability he may be held to
account for on the occasion of such civil suit is for his own account. The State is not liable for the same. A fortiori, the Office of the Solicitor General
likewise has no authority to represent him in such a civil suit for damages. Here, Dr. Vital-Gozon is not charged with a crime, or civilly prosecuted for
damages arising from a crime, there is no legal obstacle to her being represented by the Office of the Solicitor General.

5. Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer

Facts: In preparation for the national elections of November 11, 1969, then respondent commissioners of the commission on elections issued an
invitation to bid call no. 127 on September 16, 1969 calling for the submission of sealed proposals for the manufacture and delivery of 1 1,000 units of
voting booths with some specifications and descriptions. Among the seventeen bidders who submitted proposals in response to the said invitation were
the herein petitioner, Filipinos Engineering and machine shop, (Filipinas for short) and the private respondent, Acme Steel Manufacturing company,
(Acme for short). However, the respondent Comelec bidding committee chairman and members submitted their memorandum on the proceedings taken
pursuant to the said invitation to bid which stated that acme's bid had to be rejected because the sample it submitted was "made of black iron sheets,
painted, and therefore not rust proof or rust resistant," and that, "it is also heavy. The committee instead recommended that Filipinas be awarded the
contract to manufacture and supply the voting booths, but that an "ocular inspection be made by all members of the commission of all the samples
before the final award be made." 5after an ocular inspection of all the samples submitted was conducted by the Comelec commissioners, and after the
commissioners noted that acme submitted the lowest bid, the Comelec issued a resolution awarding the contract (for voting booths) to acme, subject to
the condition, among others, that "(acme) improves the sample submitted in such manner as it would be rust proof or rust resistant. Two days after, the
Comelec issued purchase order no. 682 for the manufacture and supply of the 11,000 units of voting booths in favor of acme. Acme accepted the terms
of the purchase. Filipinas then filed an injunction suit with the then court of first instance of manila, docketed as civil case no. 77972, against herein
public respondents Comelec commissioners, chairman and members of the Comelec bidding committee, and private respondent acme. Filipinas also
applied for a writ of preliminary injunction. After hearing petitioner's said application, the respondent judge in an order, denied the writ prayed
for. 7 thereafter, the public respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the nature of suit, and that
the complaint states no cause of action which the respondent judge issued the questioned order dismissing civil case no. 77972. Filipinas' motion for
reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the instant appeal.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit involving an order of the Comelec dealing with an award of contract arising
from its invitation to bid; and

2. Whether or not Filipinas, the losing bidder, has a cause of action under the premises against the Comelec and acme, the winning bidder, to enjoin
them from complying with their contract.

Held: The court resolve the first issue in the affirmative pondering on to section 2, article x, 1935 Philippine constitution, section 5 of the revised election
code and section 17(5) of the judiciary act of 1948 (republic act no. 296). Nevertheless, it has been consistently held 9 that it is the Supreme Court, not
the court of first instance, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions, orders or rulings of the Comelec relative to the conduct
of elections and enforcement of election laws. The Comelec resolution awarding the contract in favor of acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-
judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not
be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the supreme court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by the
Comelec from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said order may
be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.

5
With regards to the second issue, Filipinas, the losing bidder, has no cause of action under the premises to enjoin the Comelec from pursuing its
contract with acme, the winning bidder. While it may be true that the lower court has the jurisdiction over controversies dealing with the Comelec's award
of contracts, the same being purely administrative and civil in nature, nevertheless, herein petitioner has no cause of action on the basis of the
allegations of its complaint.

Indeed, while the law requires the exercise of sound discretion on the part of procurement authorities, 10 and that the reservation to reject any or all bids
may not be used as a shield to a fraudulent award, 11 petitioner has miserably failed to prove or substantiate the existence of malice or fraud on the part
of the public respondents in the challenged award. In issuing the resolution awarding the contract for voting booths in acme's favor, the commissioners
of the Comelec had taken into account that acme's bid was the lowest; that acme was a responsible manufacturer; and that upon an ocular inspection of
the samples submitted by the bidders, acme's sample was favorable chosen subject to certain conditions cited in the resolution. In fine, the public
respondents properly exercised its sound discretion in making the award.

Finding the instant petition to be without merit aside from being moot and academic, the same is hereby dismissed.

7. Mateo v. CA

G.R. No. 113219 August 14, 1995

Puno, J.

Upon complaint of some Morong Water District (MOWAD) employees, petitioners, all Board Members of MOWAD, conducted an investigation on private
respondent Edgar Sta. Maria, then General Manager. 1 On December 13, 1992, private respondent was placed under preventive suspension and
Maximo San Diego was designated in his place as Acting General Manager. He was later dismissed on January 7, 1993.

On January 18, 1993, private respondent filed a Special Civil Action for Quo Warranto and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction 2 before the Regional
Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 78, challenging his dismissal by petitioners. The petition embodied three (3) causes of action. It reads:

xxx xxx xxx

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

xxx xxx xxx

II-2 Petitioner is the General Manager of the MOWAD since August 1984 with concomitant security of tenure in office and could not be removed either
temporarily or permanently, except for cause and only after compliance with the elementary rules of due process;

II-3 However, on December 14, 1992, contrary to the tenets of justice and fairness, as well as for want of procedural due process, the respondents
(petitioners) and members of the Board of Directors of the MOWAD have arbitrarily, whimsically, and unilaterally stopped and prohibited the petitioner
from exercising his rights and performing his duties as General Manager of the MOWAD and, in his place, have designated the respondent (petitioner)
Maximo San Diego as Acting General Manager . . .

II-4 On December 15, 1992, while petitioner was out of office on official travel, . . . thru stealth and strategy, the respondents have conspired and helped
one another in removing the petitioner from the Office of the General Manager of the MOWAD by forcibly destroying its door and locked it with a
replaced door-knob and all attempts on his part to gain access and entry proved futile; . . .

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

xxx xxx xxx

III-2 On January 7, 1993, . . . in confabulation with his co-respondents and members of the Board of Directors of the MOWAD, the respondent Aniceto G.
Mateo slapped the petitioner with an Order terminating his services as General Manger . . .

III-5 Petitioner has a clear right to the Office of General Manager of the MOWAD which is being usurped or unlawfully held by respondent Maximo San
Diego in conspiracy with his co-respondents; . . .

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

xxx xxx xxx

IV-1-a Petitioner is entitled to the relief mandated, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission, or continuance of the acts
complained of more particularly the continuous acts of repondents in stopping and prohibiting him from exercising his rights and performing his duties as
General Manager of the MOWAD and from stopping and prohibiting him to gain access and entry to office. 3

Petitioners, in turn, moved to dismiss the case on two (2) grounds: (1) the court had no jurisdiction over disciplinary actions of government employees
which is vested exclusively in the Civil Service Commission; and (2)quo warranto was not the proper remedy. 4 Respondent Judge Arturo Marave
denied the Motion to Dismiss on April 26, 1993, and the Motion for Reconsideration on June 9, 1993. 5

6
Petitioners then elevated the matter to this Court through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which was referred to respondent Court of Appeals for
adjudication. In its Decision, dated November 24, 1993, respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and in its Resolution, dated
January 11, 1994, denied the Motion for Reconsideration. 6

The main issue in this petition for review is whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Rizal has jurisdiction over Sp. Civil Case No. 014-M involving
dismissal of an employee of quasi-public corporation.

We hold that it has no jurisdiction.

There is no question that MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 198, known as the provincial Water
Utilities Act of 1973, as amended. 7 In Davao City Water District v. Civil Service Commissions 8 the Court en banc ruled that employees of government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, viz:

xxx xxx xxx

As early as Baguio Water District v. Trajano et, al., We already ruled that a water district is a corporation created pursuant to a special
law — P.D. No. 198, as amended, and as such its officers and employees are covered by the Civil Service Law.

In another case (Hagonoy Water District v. NLRC), We ruled once again that local water districts are quasi-public corporations whose employees belong
to the Civil Service. (emphasis omitted)

Indeed, the established rule is that the hiring and firing of employees of goverment-own and controlled corporations are governed by the provisions of
the Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations. 9

Presidential Decee No. 807, Executive Order No. 292, 10 and Rule II section 1 of Memorandum Circular No. 44 series of 1990 of the Civil Service
Commission spell out the initial remedy of private respondent against illegal dismissal. They categorically provide that the party aggrieved by a decision,
ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government involvingtermination of services may appeal to the Commission within fifteen (15) days.
Thereafter, private respondent could go oncertiorari to this Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the Civil
Service Commission. So We held in Mancita v. Barcinas, 11 viz:

xxx xxx xxx

[N]o appeal lies from the decision of the Service Commission, * and that parties aggrieved thereby may proceed to this Court alone on certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof, pursuant to section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution. We quote:

Sec. 7. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

The Civil Service Commission under the Constitution, is the single arbiter of all contests relating to the Civil service and as such, its judgments are
unappealable and subject only to this Court's certiorari judgment.

Mancita, however, no longer governs for under the present rule, Revised Circular No. 1-91 as amended by Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95
which took effect on June 1, 1995, final resolutions of the Civil Service Commission shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals. In any event, whether
under the old rule or present rule, Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and employees covered by
the Civil Service Law.

IN VIEW HEREOF, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated November 24, 1993 and its Resolution dated
January 1, 1994 in CA G.R. SP No. 31530 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Issue: whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Rizal has jurisdiction over a case involving dismissal of an employee of Morong Water District, a quasi-
public corporation

Held: No. MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 198, known as the provincial Water Utilities Act of
1973, as amended. Employees of government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission. Indeed, the hiring and firing of employees of government-own and controlled corporations are governed by the provisions of the Civil
Service Law and Rules and Regulations. Presidential Decree No. 807, Executive Order No. 292, and Rule II section 1 of Memorandum Circular No. 44
series of 1990 of the Civil Service Commission spell out the initial remedy of private respondent against illegal dismissal. They categorically provide that
the party aggrieved by a decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government involving termination of services may appeal to the
Commission within fifteen (15) days. Thereafter, private respondent could go on certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if he
still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the Civil Service Commission.

8. Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 May 16, 1995

7
TO: COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, ALL
MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION SERVICE, AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

SUBJECT: Rules Governing appeals to the Court of Appeals from Judgment or Final Orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies.

1. SCOPE. — These rules shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service
Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission,
Office of the President, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy
Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act 6657, Government Service Insurance
System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of
Investments, and Construction Industry Arbitration Commission.

2. CASES NOT COVERED. — These rules shall not apply to judgments or final orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines.

3. WHERE TO APPEAL. — An appeal under these rules may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided,
whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.

4. PERIOD OF APPEAL. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution or from the
date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in
accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the
payment of the full a mount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of
fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no
case to exceed another period of fifteen (15) days.

5. HOW APPEAL TAKEN. — Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review in seven (7) legible copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof
of service of a copy thereof on the adverse party and on the court or agency a  quo. The original copy of the petition intended for the Court of Appeals
shall be indicated as such by the petitioner.

Upon filing the petition for review, the petitioner shall pay to the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit
the sum of P500.00 for costs. Exemption from payment of docketing and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be granted by the Court of
Appeals upon verified motion setting forth the grounds relied upon. If the Court of Appeals denies the motion, the petitioner shall pay the docketing and
other lawful fees and deposit for costs within fifteen (15) days from notice of the denial.

6. CONTENTS OF THE PETITION. — The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the courts or
agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the
review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from,
together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record as are referred to therein and other supporting papers; and (d) state all the
specific material dates showing that it was filed within the reglementary period provided herein; and (e) contain a sworn certification against forum
shopping as required in Revised Circular No. 28-91.

7. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH REQUIREMENTS. — The failure of the petitioner to comply with the foregoing requirements regarding the
payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should
accompany the petition shall be sufficient grounds for the dismissal thereof.

8. ACTION ON THE PETITION. — The Court of Appeals may require the respondent to file a comment on the petition, not a motion to dismiss, within
ten (10) days from notice. The Court, however, may dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted manifestly for delay,
or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.

9. CONTENTS OF COMMENT. — The comment shall be filed within ten (10) days from notice in seven (7) legible copies and accompanied by clearly
legible certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein together with other supporting papers. It shall point out
insufficiencies or inaccuracies in petitioner's statement of facts and issues, and state the reasons why the petition should be denied or dismissed. A copy
thereof shall be served on the petitioner, and proof of such service shall be filed with the Court of Appeals.

10. DUE COURSE. — If upon the filing of the comment or such other pleadings or documents as may be required or allowed by the Court of Appeals or
upon the expiration of period for the filing thereof, and on the bases of the petition or the record the Court of Appeals finds  prima facie that the court or
agencies concerned has committed errors of fact or law that would warrant reversal or modification of the award, judgment, final order or resolution
sought to be reviewed, it may give due course to the petition; otherwise, it shall dismiss the same. The findings of fact of the court or agency concerned,
when supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals.

11. TRANSMITTAL OF RECORD. — Within fifteen (15) days from notice that the petition has been given due course, the Court of Appeals may re-quire
the court or agency concerned to transmit the original or a legible certified true copy of the entire record of the proceeding under review. The record to
be transmitted may be abridged by agreement of all parties to the proceeding. The Court of Appeals may require or permit subsequent correction of or
addition to the record.

12. EFFECT OF APPEAL. — The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals
shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just.

8
13. SUBMISSION FOR DECISION. — If the petition is given due course, the Court of Appeals may set the case for oral argument or require the parties
to submit memoranda within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice. The case shall be deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of the last
pleading or memorandum required by these rules or by the Court itself.

14. TRANSITORY PROVISIONS. — All petitions for certiorari against the Civil Service Commission and The Central Board of Assessment Appeals filed
and pending in the Supreme Court prior to the effectivity of this Revised Administrative Circular shall be treated as petitions for review hereunder and
shall be transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition. Petitions for certiorari against the aforesaid agencies which may be filed after the
effectivity hereof and up to June 30, 1995 shall likewise be considered as petitions for review and shall be referred to the Court of Appeals for the same
purpose.

In both instances, for purposes of the period of appeal contemplated in Section 4 hereof, the date of receipt by the Court of Appeals of the petitions thus
transferred or referred to it shall be considered as the date of the filing thereof as petitions for review, and the Court of Appeals may require the filing of
amended or supplemental pleadings and the submission of such further documents or records as it may deem necessary in view of and consequent to
the change in the mode of appellate review.

15. REPEALING CLAUSE. — Rules 43 and 44 of the Rules of Court are hereby repealed and superseded by this Circular.

16. EFFECTIVITY. — This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall take effect on June 1, 1995.

May 16, 1995.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONS

Section 2

9. Tupas vs. National Housing Corporation

Facts: On July 13, 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election with Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor in order
to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers in NHC. It was claimed that its members comprised the majority of the employees of
the corporation.  The petition was dismissed by med-arbiter Eusebio M. Jimenez in an order, dated November 7, 1977, holding that NHC "being a
government-owned and/or controlled corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or assist any labor organization for purposes of
collective bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code."

From this order of dismissal, TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations where, acting thereon in BLR Case No. A-984-77 (RO4-MED-1090-77),
Director Carmelo C. Noriel reversed the order of dismissal and ordered the holding of a certification election.  This order was, however, set aside by
Officer-in-Charge Virgilio S.J. Sy in his resolution of November 21, 1978 6 upon a motion for reconsideration of respondent NHC.

In the instant petition for certiorari, TUPAS seeks the reversal of the said resolution and prays that a certification election be held among the rank and file
employees of NHC.

Issue: Whether or not the employees of NHC have the right to form union?

Ruling: With respect to other civil servants, that is, employees of all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the government including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters and who are, therefore, covered by the civil service laws, the guidelines for the
exercise of their right to organize is provided for under Executive Order No. 180. Chapter IV thereof, consisting of Sections 9 to 12, regulates the
determination of the "sole and exclusive employees representative"; Under Section 12, "where there are two or more duly registered employees'
organizations in the appropriate organization unit, the Bureau of Labor Relations shall, upon petition order the conduct of certification election and shall
certify the winner as the exclusive representative of the rank-and-file employees in said organizational unit."

Parenthetically, note should be taken of the specific qualification in the Constitution that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" and that they shall also
participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law."

ON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the assailed resolution of the Bureau of Labor Relations, dated November 21, 1978, is ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE and the conduct of a certification election among the affected employees of respondent National Housing Corporation in accordance with
the rules therefor is hereby GRANTED

10. Salazar vs. Mathay

Facts: On January 20, 1960, petitioner Melania C. Salazar was appointed by the Auditor General´confidential agentµ in the Office of the Auditor
General, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Her appointment was noted by the Commissioner of Civil Service. On March 28, 1962 and on
February 12, 1965she was extended another appointment by way of promotion, as ´confidential agentµ in the same office.On March 18, 1966, petitioner
received a notice from the Auditor General that her services as ´confidentialagentµ have been terminated as of the close of office hours on March 31,
1966. On March 31, 1966, theAuditor General upon favorable recommendation of Mr. Pedro Encabo, Auditor of the GSIS issued anappointment to
petitioner as Junior Examiner in his office which was approved by the Commission of CivilService. On the same day, petitioner assumed the position.On
December 27, 1966, petitioner wrote the Commissioner of Civil Service requesting that she be reinstatedto her former position as ´confidential agentµ.

9
However, no action was taken on said letter. Petitioner filed apetition for mandamus with the Supreme Court to compel the Auditor General to reinstate
her to her former position but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition without prejudice to her filing the proper action to theCourt of First Instance.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not the position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential or not.
(2) Whether or not the services of petitioner as ´confidential agentµ was validly terminated on thealleged ground of loss of confidence, and if not,
whether or not she could still be reinstated to saidposition after accepting the position of Junior Examiner in the same office.

 Held: (1) The position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential. There are two instances when a positionmay be considered primarily confidential:
(1) When the President upon recommendation of theCommissioner of Civil Service (now Civil Service Commission) has declared the position to
beprimarily confidential; or (2) In the absence of such declaration when by the nature of the functionsof the office, there exists ´close intimacy between
the appointee and appointing power whichinsures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgiving or betrayals ofpersonal trust
or confidential matters of state.µ In the case before us, the provision of ExecutiveOrder No. 265, declaring ´...confidential agents in the several
department and offices of theGovernment, unless otherwise directed by the President, to be primarily confidentialµ brings withinthe fold of the
aforementioned executive order the position of confidential agent in the Office ofthe Auditor, GSIS, as among those positions which are primarily
confidential.

(2) Yes. Her position being primarily confidential, petitioner cannot complain that the termination of her services as confidential agent is in violation of her
security of tenure, primarily confidential positionsare excluded from the merit system, and dismissal at pleasure of officers or employees therein
isallowed by the Constitution.

This should not be misunderstood as denying that the incumbent of aprimarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure only of the appointing
power. It should benoted, however, that when such pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not ´removedµ or  ´dismissedµ from office ³ his term
merely ´expires,µ in much the the same way as officer, whoseright thereto ceases upon expiration of the fixed term for which he had been appointed or
elected,is not and cannot be deemed ´removedµ or ´dismissedµ therefrom, upon the expiration of saidterm.

The main difference between the former ³ the primarily confidential officer ³ and the latter isthat the latter's term is fixed of definite, whereas that of the
former is not pre-fixed, but indefinite, at the time of his appointment or election, and becomes fixed and determined when the appointingpower
expresses its decision to put an end to the services of the incumbent. W hen this even takesplace, the latter is not ´removedµ or ´dismissedµ from office
³ his term has merely ´expired.µBut even granting for the sake of argument, that petitioner's position was not primarily confidentialand that therefore her
removal from said position for loss of confidence was in violation of her  security of tenure as a civil service employee, yet by her acceptance of the
position of Junior Examiner in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS on April 1, 1976, she was deemed to have abandonedformer position of ´confidential
agentµ in the same office.

11. Corpus vs. Cuaderno

FACTS: Mariano Corpus was the Special Assistant to the Governor, In Charge of the Export Department of the Central Bank, a position declared by the
President of the Philippines as highly technical in nature.  He was administratively charged by several coemployees in the export department with
dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and violation of internal regulations of the Central Bank. He was suspended from office while an investigation
was being conducted over his complaint. The investigating committee found no basis upon which to recommend him for disciplinary action, hence,
recommended that he be immediately reinstated to his office. Despite such recommendation, the Monetary Board approved a resolution dismissing
Corpus from Office on the ground that the latter's continuance in office is prejudicial to the best interests of Central Bank. Corpus moved to reconsider
said resolution but the same was denied. He filed an action with the RTC which declared the resolution null and void. Central Bank appeals and alleges
that officers holding technical positions may be removed at any time for lack of confidence by the appointing power and that such removal is implicit in
Sec. 1 Art. XII of the Constitution which provide that : "x x x Appointments in the Civil Service, EXCEPT as to those which are policy determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness. " CB also argues that for the three classes
of positions referred to in the Constitution, lack of confidence of the one making the appointment  constitutes sufficient and legitimate cause of removal.

ISSUE: W/N the removal of Respondent by resolution of the Monetary Board on the ground of loss of confidence was valid despite the fact that the
committee which investigated the charges against him found no basis for his removal

HELD: NO. The removal of respondent on the ground of loss of confidence is a clear and evident afterthought resorted to when the charges subject
matter of the investigation were not proved or substantiated. It was a mere pretext to cure the inability to substantiate the charges upon which the
investigation proceeded. The court therefore dismissed the reason of "loss of confidence" for the dismissal of Corpus. That being so, the constitutional
mandate that No officer in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law must be applied. Persons holding
positions which are highly technical in nature must be afforded the Constitutional safeguard requiring removal to be for cause as provided by law, and if
the dismissal for "loss of confidence" be allowed, it must have basis in fact, which does not exist in the case at bar.           The exemption of the three
positions adverted to earlier from the rule requiring APPOINTMENTS to be made on the basis of Merit and fitness DOES NOT EXEMPT such positions
from the operation of the rule that no officer in the Civil Service shall be removed  except for cause as provided for by law. This rule is absolute, in
fact, the CB Charter  provided for the same absolute rule. Furthermore, the Civil Service Law which classified Corpus' position as noncompetitive
provides that such positions  are protected by the Civil Service Law and that his removal must only be for cause recognized by
law (Garcia v Exec. Secretary.) While the tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence, the
tenure of officials holding highly technical posts does not end upon mere loss of confidence.  The Consti. clearly
distinguished the primarily confidential from the highly technical, and to apply the loss of confidence rule to the latter incumbents is to ignore and erase
the differentiation expressly made by our fundamental charter. Officers holding highlytechnical positions hold office on the basis of their special skills and

10
qualifications. The court also said that if mechanics and engineers enjoy security of tenure with more reason should a highly technical
officer, as Respondent Corpus, be protected by the Constitutional provision on security of tenure. 

12. Luego vs. Civil Service Commission

Facts: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon. The appointment was described as “permanent”
but the CSC approved it as “temporary,” subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee.
Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and, accordingly directed that the
latter be appointed to said position in place of the petitioner whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to the
position by Mayor Duterte, the new mayor. The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the validity of the
respondent’s appointment.

Issue: WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee
and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement.

Held: No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority
indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary. Section 9(h),
Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter alia the power to  “…approve all appointments, whether original or
promotional, to positions in the civil service… ….and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required
qualifications.” The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being
limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the CSC Laws. CSC is without authority to
revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was better qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city
mayor.

FACTS: Petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon on 18 February 1983. The
appointment was described as “permanent” but the Civil Service Commission approved it as “temporary.” On 22 March 1984, the Civil Service
Commission found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and accordingly directed herein private
respondent in place of petitioner’s position. The private respondent was so appointed on 28 June 1984, by the new mayor; Mayor Ronald Duterte. The
petitioner is now invoking his earlier permanent appointment as well as to question the Civil Service Commission’s order and the private respondent’s
title.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better
qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment
extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil
Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Hence, the Civil Service Commission’s resolution is set aside.

13. PAGCOR vs. Rilloraza

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari praying for the reversal of the Decision dated August 31, 19991 as well as the Resolution dated November
29, 1999, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51803.

The facts are undisputed:

On November 5, 1997, administrative charges for dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and loss of
confidence, were brought against respondent Carlos P. Rilloraza, a casino operations manager of petitioner PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION (PAGCOR). Respondent allegedly committed the following acts:

Summary description of charge(s):

Failure to prevent an irregularity and violations of casino and regulations committed by co-officers during his shift on October 9, 1997.

1. During his shift of 6:00 a.m.–2:00 p.m. on October 9, 1997, four (4) personal checks with a total value of Pesos: Five Million (P5,000,000) were issued
by a small-time financier/player and were facilitated by a COM with the Treasury Division which enabled the small-time financier/player to withdraw and
receive said amount. The facilitation of the checks was not authorized by the Senior Branch Manager (SBM) or the Branch Manager for Operations
(BMO) and the COM who facilitated the checks was not on duty then.

2. He even facilitated one (1) of the personal checks with a value of Pesos: Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00).

3. He failed to stop a top-ranking officer from placing bets over and above the allowable limit of P5,000.00 per deal, he failed to stop the same officer
from playing in the big tables and lastly, he allowed the same officer to play beyond the allowable time limit of 6:00 a.m.

11
Respondent duly filed his answer during an investigation conducted by petitioner’s Corporate Investigation Unit. He narrated the events that transpired:

"When I reported for my 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. shift, on October 9, that morning I saw BM RICHARD SYHONGPAN beside TABLE #22 (BB) sitting at a
coffee table inside Area 3. While inside the Area 3, GAM RENE QUITO approached me with a check worth P500,000.00 requested by a customer for
endorsement to the Treasury. Since I’ve been out of Manila branch for 2 years and I’ve just been recalled to this branch for only more than 3 weeks, I’m
not quite familiar with the systems and I don’t know this customer. I immediately approached COM CARLOS GONZALES, who at that time was still
around, to verify regarding the said check and his immediate reply was "IT’S OKAY AND GOOD AND IT WAS GUARANTEED BY BM SYHONGPAN’. In
fact, I reconfirmed it again with COM GONZALES since he is more familiar with the systems and customers, he answered me the same. So I gave the
approval to GAM QUITO for endorsement. When I went in the office, I instructed OOS GILBERT CABANA to beep SBM VIC ADVINCULA and BMO
DARIO CORDERO to call office "ASAP" because I wanted to relay this matter to them and there were no reply from both of them. I instructed OOS
CABANA to send messages again to SBM & BMO, but still I received no reply. It was until after noontime that BMO CORDERO returned my call and I
reported the incident to him. When I was at home at around 3:30 p.m. SBM ADVINCULA returned my call and I reported the incident. I also relayed the
incident to SBM REYES.

While during my rounds, I went down to the New VIP area and there I saw BM SYHONGPAN sitting at TABLE #3(BB) and he was holding house cards
at that time. I approached and stopped him but he reacted that the bet was not his but to a CUSTOMER’S. I took his words because as a subordinate, I
respected him as one of our superior who very well know all our company’s policy esp. that an officer is not allowed to play at BIG table and are only
allowed to bet with a maximum of P5,000.00 only. So I believe it was not his bet but the said customer. At that time there was no way for me to stop the
game because I saw the said customer, named MS. CORAZON CASTILLO, whom I don’t know her [sic] since I was out of Manila Branch 2 years, and
whom BM SYHONGPAN was referring to as the player, has a lot of chips worth about P7 Million in front of her and was betting P1.5M on the banker
side which was over the maximum table limit by P500,000.00. I know we are allowed to authorize approval by raising the betting limits as per request of
the playing customers.

After the game, the chips were encashed and I instructed GAM J. EUGENIO to accompany BM SYHONGPAN to his room because he was too drunk.
When I was doing my rounds again, that’s how I found out from rumors within the gaming areas that this MS. CASTILLO was used by BM SYHONGPAN
and COM GONZALES to played [sic] in behalf of them the whole time. And I also learned that there were four checks endorsed during my shift which I
facilitated only one check worth P500,000.00 after I verified and confirmed it with COM GONZALES. With regards to the other 3 checks, I have no
knowledge about it since they, BM SYHONGPAN and COM GONZALES, kept it a secret from me. When GAM EUGENIO returned from the room of BM
SYHONGPAN he handed me some cash, which according to him, was given by BM SYHONGPAN as ‘BALATO’. I did not accept the money because at
that moment I was so mad that they involved me beyond my innocence since I am new in the branch. I then instructed GAM EUGENIO to return the
money to BM SYHONGPAN. (sic)

Finding Rilloraza’s explanation unsatisfactory, the PAGCOR Board handed down a Resolution on December 2, 1997 dismissing respondent and several
others from PAGCOR, on the grounds of dishonesty, grave misconduct and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and loss of
confidence, effective December 5, 1997. The Board also denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated December 16, 1997.

Respondent appealed to the Civil Service Commission. On November 20, 1998, the Commission issued Resolution No. 983033,2  the dispositive portion
of which provides, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the appeal of Carlos P. Rilloraza is hereby dismissed. However, the Commission finds appellant guilty only of Simple Neglect of Duty
and metes out upon him the penalty of one month and one day suspension. The assailed Resolution of PAGCOR Board of Directors is thus modified.

The Commission denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in Resolution No. 990465 dated February 16, 1999.3

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the resolution of the Commission.4 The appellate court ordered petitioner to reinstate private respondent with
payment of full backwages plus all tips, bonuses and other benefits accruing to his position and those received by other casino operations managers for
the period starting January 5, 1998 until his actual reinstatement. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,5 which was denied by the appellate court
in the assailed resolution of November 29, 1999.6

Hence, the instant petition.

PAGCOR avers that:

I THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED AND REFUSED TO CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT WAS A CONFIDENTIAL
APPOINTEE OR EMPLOYEE WHOSE TERM HAD EXPIRED BY REASON OF LOSS OF CONFIDENCE.

II THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE CSC RESOLUTIONS MODIFYING THE PENALTY METED OUT ON
RESPONDENT FROM DISMISSAL TO SUSPENSION, DESPITE THE GRAVITY OR SERIOUSNESS OF THE OFFENSES COMMITTED BY THE
LATTER ON ACCOUNT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES REPOSED IN THE RESPONDENT BY VIRTUE OF HIS
POSITION.

The wellspring of stability in government service is the constitutional guarantee of entrance according to merit and fitness and security of tenure, viz:

xxx      xxx      xxx

(2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions
which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination.

(3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.7

12
xxx      xxx      xxx

In the case at bar, we are basically asked to determine if there is sufficient cause to warrant the dismissal, not merely the suspension, of respondent
who, petitioner maintains, occupies a primarily confidential position. In this connection, Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 18698 provides:

Exemption.—All positions in the Corporation, whether technical, administrative, professional or managerial are exempt from the provisions of the Civil
Service Law, rules and regulations, and shall be governed only by the personnel management policies set by the Board of Directors. All employees of
the casinos and related services shall be classified as "Confidential" appointee.

Petitioner argues that pursuant to the aforequoted provision, respondent is a primarily confidential employee. Hence, he holds office at the pleasure of
the appointing power and may be removed upon the cessation of confidence in him by the latter. Such would not amount to a removal but only the
expiration of his term. However, there should be no lingering doubt as to the true import of said Section 16 of P.D. No. 1869. We have already
definitively settled the same issue in Civil Service Commission v. Salas,9 to wit:

In reversing the decision of the CSC, the Court of Appeals opined that the provisions of Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869 may no longer be
applied in the case at bar because the same is deemed to have been repealed in its entirety by Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. This is
not completely correct. On this point, we approve the more logical interpretation advanced by the CSC to the effect that "Section 16 of PD 1869 insofar
as it exempts PAGCOR positions from the provisions of Civil Service Law and Rules has been amended, modified or deemed repealed by the 1987
Constitution and Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987).

However, the same cannot be said with respect to the last portion of Section 16 which provides that "all employees of the casino and related services
shall be classified as ‘confidential’ appointees." While such executive declaration emanated merely from the provisions of Section 2, Rule XX of the
Implementing Rules of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the power to declare a position as policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical as
defined therein has subsequently been codified and incorporated in Section 12(9), Book V of Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of
1987. This later enactment only serves to bolster the validity of the categorization made under Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869. Be that as it
may, such classification is not absolute and all-encompassing.

Prior to the passage of the aforestated Civil Service Act of 1959, there were two recognized instances when a position may be considered primarily
confidential: Firstly, when the President, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service, has declared the position to be primarily
confidential; and, secondly, in the absence of such declaration, when by the nature of the functions of the office there exists "close intimacy" between the
appointee and appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust
or confidential matters of state.

At first glance, it would seem that the instant case falls under the first category by virtue of the express mandate under Section 16 of Presidential Decree
No. 1869. An in-depth analysis, however, of the second category evinces otherwise.

When Republic Act No. 2260 was enacted on June 19, 1959, Section 5 thereof provided that "the non-competitive or unclassified service shall be
composed of positions expressly declared by law to be in the non-competitive or unclassified service or those which are policy-determining, primarily
confidential, or highly technical in nature." In the case of Piñero, et al. vs. Hechanova, et al., the Court obliged with a short discourse there on how the
phrase "in nature" came to find its way into the law, thus:

"The change from the original wording of the bill (expressly declared by law x x x to be policy-determining, etc.) to that finally approved and enacted
(‘or which are policy determining, etc. in nature’) came about because of the observations of Senator Tañada, that as originally worded the proposed bill
gave Congress power to declare by fiat of law a certain position as primarily confidential or policy-determining, which should not be the case. The
Senator urged that since the Constitution speaks of positions which are ‘primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical  in nature,’ it is not
within the power of Congress to declare what positions are primarily confidential or policy-determining. ‘It is the  nature alone of the position that
determines whether it is policy-determining or primarily confidential.’ Hence, the Senator further observed, the matter should be left to the ‘proper
implementation of the laws, depending upon the nature of the position to be filled,’ and if the position is ‘highly confidential’ then the President and the
Civil Service Commissioner must implement the law.

To a question of Senator Tolentino, ‘But in positions that involved both confidential matters and matters which are routine, x x x who is going to
determine whether it is primarily confidential?’ Senator Tañada replied:

‘SENATOR TAÑADA: Well, at the first instance, it is the appointing power that determines that: the nature of the position. In case of conflict then it is the
Court that determines whether the position is primarily confidential or not." xxx

Hence the dictum that, at least since the enactment of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the nature of the position which finally determines whether a
position is primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical. And the Court in the aforecited case explicitly decreed that executive
pronouncements, such as Presidential Decree No. 1869, can be no more than initial determinations that are not conclusive in case of conflict. It must be
so, or else it would then lie within the discretion of the Chief Executive to deny to any officer, by executive fiat, the protection of Section 4, Article XII
(now Section 2[3], Article IX-B) of the Constitution. In other words, Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869 cannot be given a literally stringent
application without compromising the constitutionally protected right of an employee to security of tenure.[italics supplied]

The doctrinal ruling enunciated in Piñero finds support in the 1935 Constitution and was reaffirmed in the 1973 Constitution, as well as in the
implementing rules of Presidential Decree No. 807, or the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines. It may well be observed that both the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions contain the provision, in Section 2, Article XII-B thereof, that "appointments in the Civil Service, except as to those which are policy-
determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable
by competitive examination." Corollarily, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260 states that "the non-competitive or unclassified service shall be composed
of positions expressly declared by law to be in the non-competitive or unclassified service or those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or

13
highly technical in nature." Likewise, Section 1 of the General Rules in the implementing rules of Presidential Decree No. 807 states that "appointments
in the Civil Service, except as to those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technicalin nature, shall be made only according to
merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination." Let it be here emphasized, as we have accordingly italicized them,
that these fundamental laws and legislative or executive enactments all utilized the phrase "in nature" to describe the character of the positions being
classified.1âwphi1.nêt

The question that may now be asked is whether the Piñero doctrine—to the effect that notwithstanding any statutory classification to the contrary, it is
still the nature of the position, as may be ascertained by the court in case of conflict, which finally determines whether a position is primarily confidential,
policy-determining or highly technical—is still controlling with the advent of the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987, Book V of which
deals specifically with the Civil Service Commission, considering that from these later enactments, in defining positions which are policy-determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical, the phrase "in nature" was deleted.

We rule in the affirmative. The matter was clarified and extensively discussed during the deliberations in the plenary session of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission on the Civil Service provisions, to wit:

"MR. FOZ: Which department of government has the power or authority to determine whether a position is policy-determining or primarily confidential or
highly technical?

FR. BERNAS: The initial decision is made by the legislative body or by the executive department, but the final decision is done by the court. The
Supreme Court has constantly held that whether or not a position is policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, it is determined not by
the title but by the nature of the task that is entrusted to it. For instance, we might have a case where a position is created requiring that the holder of
that position should be a member of the Bar and the law classifies this position as highly technical. However, the Supreme Court has said before that a
position which requires mere membership in the Bar is not a highly technical position. Since the term ‘highly technical’ means something beyond the
ordinary requirements of the profession, it is always a question of fact.

MR. FOZ: Does not Commissioner Bernas agree that the general rule should be that the merit system or the competitive system should be upheld?

FR. BERNAS: I agree that that should be the general rule; that is why we are putting this as an exception.

MR. FOZ: The declaration that certain positions are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical has been the source of practices which
amount to the spoils system.

FR. BERNAS: The Supreme Court has always said that, but if the law of the administrative agency says that a position is primarily confidential when in
fact it is not, we can always challenge that in court. It is not enough that the law calls it primarily confidential to make it such; it is the nature of the duties
which makes a position primarily confidential.

MR. FOZ: The effect of a declaration that a position is policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical—as an exception—is to take it away
from the usual rules and provisions of the Civil Service Law and to place it in a class by itself so that it can avail itself of certain privileges not available to
the ordinary run of government employees and officers.

FR. BERNAS: As I have already said, this classification does not do away with the requirement of merit and fitness.  All it says is that there are certain
positions which should not be determined by competitive examination.

For instance, I have just mentioned a position in the Atomic Energy Commission. Shall we require a physicist to undergo a competitive examination
before appointment? Or a confidential secretary or any position in policy-determining administrative bodies, for that matter? There are other ways of
determining merit and fitness than competitive examination. This is not a denial of the requirement of merit and fitness."

It is thus clearly deducible, if not altogether apparent, that the primary purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in providing for the declaration of a
position as policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical is to exempt these categories from competitive examination as a means for
determining merit and fitness. It must be stressed further that these positions are covered by security of tenure, although they are considered non-
competitive only in the sense that appointees thereto do not have to undergo competitive examinations for purposes of determining merit and
fitness. [italics supplied]

In fact, the CSC itself ascribes to this view as may be gleaned from its questioned resolution wherein it stated that "the declaration of a position as
primarily confidential if at all, merely exempts the position from the civil service eligibility requirement." Accordingly, the Piñero doctrine continues to be
applicable up to the present and is hereby maintained. Such being the case, the submission that PAGCOR employees have been declared confidential
appointees by operation of law under the bare authority of CSC Resolution No. 91-830 must be rejected.

Justice Regalado’s incisive discourse yields three (3) important points: first, the classification of a particular position as primarily confidential, policy-
determining or highly technical amounts to no more than an executive or legislative declaration that is not conclusive upon the courts, the true test being
the nature of the position. Second, whether primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical, the exemption provided in the Charter pertains
to exemption from competitive examination to determine merit and fitness to enter the civil service. Such employees are still protected by the mantle of
security of tenure. Last, and more to the point, Section 16 of P.D. 1869, insofar as it declares all positions within PAGCOR as primarily confidential, is
not absolutely binding on the courts.

Considerations vary so as to make a position primarily confidential. Private secretaries are indisputably primarily confidential employees.10  Those
tasked to provide personal security to certain public officials have also been deemed to hold primarily confidential positions11  for obvious reasons: the
former literally are responsible for the life and well-being of the latter. Similar treatment was accorded to those occupying the posts of city legal
officer12and provincial attorney,13 inasmuch as the highly privileged nature of the lawyer-client relationship mandates that complete trust and

14
confidence must exist betwixt them. National interest has also been adjudged a factor, such that the country’s permanent representative to the United
Nations was deemed to hold her post at the pleasure of the Chief Executive.14

As casino operations manager, Rilloraza’s duties and responsibilities are:

JOB SUMMARY: The Casino Operations Manager directs, controls and supervises the Operations Division of the branch. He reports directly to the
Branch Manager or to the Branch Manager for Operations in Metro Manila branches.

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES:

1. Formulates marketing programs and plans of action for branch gaming operations in order to optimize revenue.
2. Institutes and maintains a healthy, organized, mentally alert, and highly motivated human resource for effective and efficient branch gaming
operations performance.
3. Takes measures to maintain and uphold the integrity of the casino games.
4. Reviews, analyzes, and evaluates gaming table and slot machine operations reports, including income performance.
5. Submits periodic reports to the Branch Manager.
6. Directs the opening and closing of gaming table and slot machine areas.
7. Directs the setting-up, closure or suspension of operations of gaming tables and slot machine units when deemed necessary.
8. Controls the requisition, storage, and issuance of playing cards, gaming equipment and paraphernalia, operations keys, and accountable receipts and
slips.
9. Ensures that gaming operations personnel adhere to the established House Rules, company policies and procedures.
10. Ensures that quality and efficient service is extended to casino patrons in accordance with the established House Rules, company policies and
procedures.
11. Directs and controls all activities of the Card Shuffling Center and the Card Distribution Room.
12. Issues directives, memoranda, and other official communications on branch gaming operations matters.
13. Directs the daily and periodic performance evaluation of operations personnel.
14. Requires written statements from operations personnel regarding disputes, reported irregularities and violations of House Rules, company policies
and procedures.
15. Issues or recommends disciplinary sanctions against delinquent operations personnel, as well as commendations to deserving ones.
16. Upon the Branch Manager’s approval, issues preventive suspension to erring employees pending investigation.
17. Effects immediate changes in House Rules when deemed necessary, subject to management review.
18. Approves table refill, chip yield, and dropbox yield transactions, as well as the payment for progressive link super jackpot awards.
19. Directs the cancellation of progressive link super jackpot combinations.
20. Signs chip checks in behalf of the Branch Manager.
21. Approves complimentary food and beverages to deserving players and evaluates the same for the possible extension of other amenities.
22. Settles disputes arising from gaming operations that have not been effectively settled by gaming managers and supervisors, and enforces decisions
on the interpretation of House Rules, company policies, and procedures.
23. Recommends to the Branch Manager the banning of undesirable players.
24. Orders the removal of customers or employees from the table gaming (sic) and slot machine area for justifiable reasons.
25. Implements contingency plans in case of emergencies to ensure the security and safety of customers and staff.
26. Acts on customer complaints, suggestions, and observations.
27. Chairs the Branch Infractions Committee, the Variance Committee, and other ad hoc committees of the Operations Division.
28. Represents the Operations Division in Branch Management panel meetings.
29. Apprises the Branch Manager of any incident of doubtful nature and of developments that require his immediate attention.
30. Performs other duties as may be designated by the Branch Manager.

Undoubtedly, respondent’s duties and responsibilities call for a great measure of both ability and dependability. They can hardly be characterized as
routinary, for he is required to exercise supervisory, recommendatory and disciplinary powers with a wide latitude of authority. His duties differ markedly
from those we previously ruled as not primarily confidential: for instance, PAGCOR’s Internal Security Staff;15  Management and Audit Analyst I of the
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau;16 a Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank;17the Legal Staff of the Provincial
Attorney;18 members of the Customs Police;19 the Senior Executive Assistant, Clerk I, Supervising Clerk I and Stenographer;20 and a Provincial
Administrator.21 In this sense, he is a tier above the ordinary rank-and-file in that his appointment to the position entails faith and confidence in his
competence to perform his assigned tasks. Lacking, therefore, is that amplitude of confidence reposed in him by the appointing power so as to qualify
his position as primarily confidential. Verily, we have observed that:

[i]ndeed, physicians handle confidential matters. Judges, fiscals and court stenographers generally handle matters of similar nature. The Presiding and
Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals sometimes investigate, by designation of the Supreme Court, administrative complaints against judges of first
instance, which are confidential in nature. Officers of the Department of Justice, likewise, investigate charges against municipal judges. Assistant
Solicitors in the Office of the Solicitor General often investigate malpractice charges against members of the Bar. All of these are "confidential" matters,
but such fact does not warrant the conclusion that the office or position of all government physicians and all Judges, as well as the aforementioned
assistant solicitors and officers of the Department of Justice are primarily confidential in character.22

We further note that a casino operations manager reports directly to the Branch Manager or, in Metro Manila branches, to the Branch Manager for
Operations. It does not appear from the record to whom the Branch Manager (or the Branch Manager for Operations, as the case may be) reports. It
becomes unmistakable, though, that the stratum separating the casino operations manager from reporting directly to the higher echelons renders remote
the proposition of proximity between respondent and the appointing power. There is no showing of that element of trust indicative of a primarily
confidential position, as we defined it in De los Santos v. Mallare,23 to wit:

Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential.
The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures
freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.

15
Necessarily, the point of contention now is whether there was cause for the respondent’s separation from the service. On this point, having analyzed
both parties’ arguments, we find that the Civil Service Commission did not err in declaring that Rilloraza was liable only for simple neglect of duty. In the
first place, there is no evidence to sustain a charge of dishonesty. As the latter term is understood, it implies a:

Disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity. Lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.24

In the case at bar, respondent’s explanation fails to evince an inclination to lie or deceive, or that he is entirely lacking the trait of straightforwardness.
We concur with the appellate court’s finding, thus:

Available proof unmistakably demonstrate that upon seeing BM Syhongpan playing at Table No. 3BB, respondent Rilloraza at once, told him to stop.
However, Syhongpan explained that he was merely playing for a customer, Ms. Corazon Castillo who was seated also at the table. After observing the
large number of chips in front of Ms. Castillo estimated at around P7M, respondent became convinced of the clarification given by Branch Manager
Syhongpan and he must have relied also on the word of said top ranking PAGCOR official whose representation must ordinarily be accepted and
accorded respect and credence by a subordinate like him. xxx

More importantly, the PAGCOR Adjudication Committee concluded that respondent actually attempted to stop the game where Syhongpan was playing
which was even utilized as basis by the PAGCOR Board in dismissing respondent. xxx

xxx      xxx      xxx      xxx

The allegation that respondent Rilloraza allowed Syhongpan to place bets over and above the allowable limit of P5,000.00 per deal is not anchored on a
correct premise. Respondent Rilloraza has steadfastly maintained that he is of the belief that BM Syhongpan is not playing for himself but for Ms.
Castillo. Thus, if Syhongpan is merely acting for the real casino player, then the policy of not allowing any PAGCOR official to bet beyond P5,000.00 has
no application. Respondent Rilloraza believed in good faith that the bet was not BM Syhongpan’s but of Ms. Castillo and should not be unduly punished
for his honest belief. The same reason exists for the claim that respondent allowed BM Syhongpan to play beyond 6:00 a.m. This is  non sequitur since
Rilloraza never entertained the idea that Syhongpan was the gambler.

Lastly, if only to consummate respondent’s alleged dishonesty and grave misconduct by corruptly profiting from said incident, he could have easily
pocketed the ‘balato’ given by Syhongpan, but he never did, and in fact, returned the money. xxx

xxx      xxx      xxx      xxx

On the facilitation of the swap of a P500,000.00 personal check for chips, this Court, after considering the parties involved and the circumstances of the
case, believes that respondent Rilloraza has judiciously performed all the acts necessary to protect the interests of PAGCOR and has acted as a
prudent and reasonable man. It is evident that respondent had the authority to approve the exchange of checks for gambling chips. In the exercise of
such discretion, We find that the approval by Rilloraza of the exchange was done with caution and circumspect [sic]. When he was approached by GAM
Quito for endorsement of said personal checks per request of a customer, he immediately approached COM Gonzales to verify the check who assured
him that the check was good and in fact guaranteed by Mr. Syhongpan, Davao City Branch Manager of PAGCOR. To be sure, he even reconfirmed the
same with Gonzales as he is more familiar with the systems and the customers since he has been recalled to the branch for only three (3) weeks. After
approving the endorsement, he immediately tried to contact SBM Advincula and BMO Cordero, to notify them of his action but none of them called back.
In the afternoon, both returned the call and were informed by respondent of the exchange of the chips for the check and presumably, the former ratified
or acquiesced to the action of respondent since there was no objection or complaint about the matter. xxx

These same findings negate the conclusion that respondent is guilty of misconduct or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. In  Manuel v.
Calimag, Jr.,25 we defined misconduct, thus:

Misconduct in office has been authoritatively defined by Justice Tuazon in Lacson v. Lopez in these words: "Misconduct in office has a definite and well-
understood legal meaning. By uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as
affects his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has been said at all times, it is necessary to separate the character of the man from the
character of the officer x x x. It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal from office of an officer, must have direct
relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to
discharge the duties of the office x x x.

Differently propounded in Canson v. Garchitorena, et al.,26 misconduct is "any unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned in the administration
of justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right determination of the cause. It generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful
conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent. On
the other hand, the term ‘gross’ connotes something ‘out of all measure; beyond allowance; not to be excused; flagrant; shameful’." From the facts
given, absent is that element of intent to do wrong against petitioner.

CSC Resolution No. 991936 dated August 31, 1999 classifies simple neglect of duty as a less grave offense punishable as a first offense by suspension
of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months.27 In the imposition of the proper penalty, Section 54 thereof provides, as follows: (a) the minimum of
the penalty shall be imposed where only mitigating and no aggravating circumstances are present; (b) the medium of the penalty shall be imposed
where no mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present; and (c) the maximum of the penalty shall be imposed where only aggravating and no
mitigating circumstances are present. In turn, the circumstances that may be properly considered are:

Section 53. Extenuating, Mitigating, Aggravating, or Alternative Circumstances. – In the determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating,
aggravating and alternative circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense shall be considered.1âwphi1.nêt

16
The following circumstances shall be appreciated:
a. Physical illness
b. Good faith
c. Taking undue advantage of official position
d. Taking undue advantage of subordinate
e. Undue disclosure of confidential information
f. Use of government property in the commission of the offense
g. Habituality
h. Offense is committed during office hours and within the premises of the office or building
i. Employment of fraudulent means to commit or conceal the offense
j. Length of service in the government
k. Education, or
l. Other analogous circumstances
Nevertheless, in the appreciation thereof, the same must be invoked or pleaded by the proper party, otherwise, said circumstances shall not be
considered in the imposition of the proper penalty. The Commission, however, in the interest of substantial justice may take and consider these
circumstances.

We find that the Civil Service Commission, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, correctly attributed good faith on the part of respondent. Accordingly, the
modified penalty imposed by the Civil Service Commission on the respondent which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, was proper under the
premises.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated August 31, 1999 as well as the Resolution dated November 29,
1999, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51803 are herebyAFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

14. SSS Employees Association vs. CA

Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’s demands concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before
the court action for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary
restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the court’s lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the
jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the
petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore
the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.

Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike

          Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the subject matter. 
          
Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee among workers with the right to organize and
conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and rules governing
concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that  may be enacted by Congress” referring to
Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws
concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.”
Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so. In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees
in the civil service are denominated as “government employees” and that the SSS is  one such government-controlled corporation with an original
charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s
memorandum prohibiting strikes. Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public Sector Labor-
Management Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before
the general court for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate

15. Lopez vs. Civil Service Commission

FACTS: Petitioner Lopez, along with private respondent Romeo V. Luz, Jr. and Roberto Abellana,was appointed as Assistant Harbor Master at Manila
International Container Terminal, Manila SouthHarbor and Manila North Harbor, respectively. A law was passed wherein the DOTC wasreorganized, and
the number of Assistant Harbor Master in the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) wasreduced from (3) three to (2) two. After a careful evaluation of a
placement committee of the PPA,Luz was rated third.Luz protested/appealed the appointment of Lopez, but the PPA General Manager said Luz was
notqualified for the two slots. Luz then appealed to the CSC. The CSC ordered for a re-assessmentwhich the PPA complied. Still, the CSC found that
the re-assessment was not in order. It ruled thatthe immediate supervisor of respondent Luz was in the best position to assess the competence ofthe
respondent and not a psychiatric-consultant who was merely a contractual employee andsusceptible to partiality. It directed the appointment of Luz as
the Harbor Master instead of thepetitioner Hence, the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC erred in nullifying Lopez’  appointment and instead substituting itsdecision for that of the PPA

RULING: The role of the Civil Service Commission in establishing a career service and in promotingthe morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, and
courtesy among civil servants is not disputedby petitioner Lopez. On the other hand, the discretionary power of appointment delegated to theheads of
departments or agencies of the government is not controverted by the respondents. In theappointment, placement and promotion of civil service
employees according to merit and fitness, it isthe appointing power, especially where it is assisted by a screening committee composed of personswho
are in the best position to screen the qualifications of the nominees, who should decide on theintegrity, performance and capabilities of the future

17
appointees.The law limits the Commission's authority only to whether or not the appointees possess the legalqualifications and the appropriate civil
service eligibility, nothing else. To go beyond this would be toset at naught the discretionary power of the appointing authority and to give to the
Commission atask which the law (Sec. 6, Rep. Act No. 6656) does not confer. This does not mean that theCommission's act of approving or
disapproving becomes ministerial.

The Court has defined the parameters within which the power of approval of appointments shall beexercised by the respondent Commission. In the case
of Luego v .Civil Service Commission, 143SCRA 327 [1986], the Court ruled that all the Commission is actually authorized to do is to check ifthe
appointee possesses the qualifications and appropriate eligibility: "If he does, his appointment isapproved; if not it is disapproved." We further ruled that
the Commission has no authority to revokean appointment simply because it believed that the private respondent was better qualified for thatwould have
constituted an encroachment of the discretion vested solely in the appointing authority.The Commission cannot exceed its power by substituting its will
for that of the appointing authority.Petition is GRANTED.

16. University of the Phils. and Alfredo de Torres vs. CSC

As part of its academic freedom, the University of the Philippines has the prerogative to determine who may teach its students. The Civil Service
Commission has no authority to force it to dismiss a member of its faculty even in the guise of enforcing Civil Service Rules.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the October 31, 1997 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA)2 in CA-GR SP No. 40128. The CA upheld Resolution Nos. 95-30453 and 96-10414 issued by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on May 5, 1995
and February 15, 1996, respectively. In these Resolutions, the CSC held that Petitioner "Alfredo De Torres is considered to have been dropped from the
service as of September 1, 1989. Hence, his re-employment requires the issuance of an appointment subject to the requirements of the Civil Service
Law and Rules."

De Torres' Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied in the February 25, 1998 Resolution of the Court of Appeals.5

The Facts

The undisputed factual antecedents are summarized by the Court of Appeals thus:

"Dr. Alfredo B. De Torres is an Associate Professor of the University of the Philippines in Los Baños (UPLB) who went on a vacation leave of absence
without pay from September 1, 1986 to August 30, 1989. During this period, he served as the Philippine Government'' official representative to the
Centre on Integrated Rural Development for Asia and [the] Pacific (CIRDAP).

"When the term of his leave of absence was about to expire, CIRDAP requested the UPLB for an extension of said leave of absence for another year,
but was denied by Dr. Eulogio Castillo, the then Director of the Agricultural Credit Corporation, Inc. (ACCI) of UPLB. In the same letter, Dr. Castillo
advised Dr. De Torres to report for duty at UPLB not later than September 15, 1989; while the then UPLB Chancellor Raul P. de Guzman apprised him
on the rules of the Civil Service on leaves and warned of the possibility of being considered on Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL) if he failed to
return and report for duty as directed.

"On August 27, 198[9], Dr. De Torres wrote UPLB that he had 'no alternative but x x x to pursue the matter in continuing his commitment to CIRDAP.' In
response thereto, Chancellor de Guzman warned De Torres, in a Letter dated November 20, 1989, that in case of the latter's failure to report 'within 30
days from today,' UPLB would be forced to drop him from the rolls of personnel. Despite the warning, Dr. De Torres did not report to work.

"On January 3, 1994 or after almost five years of absence without leave, Dr. De Torres wrote the incumbent Chancellor Ruben L. Villareal that he was
reporting back to duty at ACCI-UPLB effective January 3, 1994 x x x. However, Chancellor Villareal notified Dr. De Torres that 'when an employee
reports back for duty, he should have been from an approved leave …' Likewise, Director Leodegacio M. Ilag, of ACCI-UPLB, in a Letter dated February
10, 1994, informed De Torres that in the absence of any approved application for leave of absence, he [was] considered to be on AWOL. Thus, he was
advised to re-apply with UPLB.

"On June 30, 1994, Dr. De Torres wrote Chancellor Villareal seeking reconsideration [of] the two aforementioned decisions x x x. On July 4, 1994,
Chancellor Villareal reversed his earlier stand and notified De Torres that since records at UPLB [did] not show that he ha[d] been officially dropped from
the rolls he may report for duty effective January 3, 1994 x x x.

"Mesdames Juanita Baskinas and Winifreda Medina, members of Academic Personnel Committee, ACCI-UPLB, requested the Civil Service
Commission regarding the employment status of Dr. De Torres x x x.

"On May 5, 1995, the Commission issued CSC Resolution No. 95-3045 x x x, the dispositive portion of which reads:

'WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby rules that Dr. De Torres is considered to have been dropped from the service as of September 1, 1989. Hence,
his re-employment requires the issuance of appointment subject to the requirements of Civil Service Law and Rules.'

"On June 9, 1995, Dr. De Torres and the University of the Philippines at Los Baños (UPLB) filed separate requests for reconsideration of aforesaid CSC
Resolution No. 95-3045 dated May 5, 1995. In its CSC Resolution No. 96-1041 x x x, the commission denied the motion for reconsideration, further
stating that CSC Resolution No. 95-3045 [stood] and that since separation from the service [was] non-disciplinary in nature, the appointing authority may
appoint Dr. De Torres to any vacant position pursuant to existing civil service law and rules."6

The CSC rationalized its ruling in this manner:

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"It could be gleaned from the foregoing circumstances that De Torres was already on AWOL beginning September 1, 1989 since his request for
extension of leave of absence for one year was denied by then Chancellor De Guzman. It is a fact that De Torres' absence from work was not duly
authorized by UPLB. Despite the advice of Chancellor De Guzman to him that he should report for duty on or before September 5, 1989, De Torres
failed to do so. Thus, his failure to assume duty as ordered caused his automatic separation from the service."

The Ruling of the CA

From the unfavorable Resolutions of the CSC, petitioners sought recourse before the Court of Appeals. But, finding "no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or x x x excess of jurisdiction on the part of the respondent commission in the issuance of the questioned Resolution," the appellate
court dismissed the Petition for lack of merit. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the CA Resolution dated February 25, 1998. Thus,
this Petition for Review.7

Issues

Petitioners submit the following questions of law for the Court's consideration:8

"I Whether or not a new appointment is still necessary for Dr. de Torres to resume his post at the UNIVERSITY despite having remained continuously
with the Civil Service, not having been dropped from the rolls of the University, and after returning to fulfill his service contract as a government scholar.

"II Whether or not the issuance by the COMMISSION of Resolution Nos. 95-3045 and 961041, was in excess of its authority.

"III Whether or not the COMMISSION violated the Subido-Romulo Agreement which is still in force and effect.

"IV Whether or not the express repeal of the old law had the effect of doing away with the policy of automatic dropping from the government service in
favor of notice before dropping.

"V Whether or not Section 33 of Rule XVI is ultra vires as it does not relate or is not in any way connected with any specific provision of R.A. No. 2260.

"VI Whether or not Resolution No. 95-3045 violated Dr. de Torres' constitutional right to due process."

In the main, the issue is the validity of Dr. Alfredo de Torres automatic separation from the civil service due to his prolonged absence without official
leave.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

Main Issue:

Validity of Automatic Separation from the Civil Service

In brief, petitioners argue that (1) the issuance of a new appointment in favor of Petitioner De Torres is not needed, because he was not formally
dropped from the rolls of the University of the Philippines; (2) the assailed CSC Resolutions were issued in excess of authority, because the CSC had
violated the Subido-Romulo Agreement and disregarded the University's academic freedom, which includes the right to determine who may teach and
who may be dropped dropped from the service; (3) Section 33, Rule XVI of the Revised Civil Service Rules – based on which respondent justified
Petitioner De Torres' automatic separation from the service – has been repealed and superseded by PD 807, as well as by EO 292 (Administrative Code
of 1987) which decrees prior notice before actual dropping; (4) even assuming that the said provision was not repealed, the issuance of the Ruel
was ultra vires because it was not related or connected to any specific provision of the mother law, RA 2260; and (5) the assailed CSC Resolutions
violated petitioner's right to due process, because he had not been given prior notice of his actual separation.

On the other hand, respondent, through the solicitor general, contends that (1) "[I]t is of no legal moment that petitioner De Torres' name is still listed in
the rolls of UPLB faculty members since his mandatory separation from the government service was ipso jure upon his failure to report for duty within the
period prescribed by his superior"; (2) the new Civil Service Rules did not repeal but complement Section 33, Rule XVI of the Revised Civil Service
Rules, with the additional provision on notice of actual dropping; (3) Section 33 was a valid exercise by the CSC of its rule-making power to discipline
erring employees of the civil service; and (4) sufficiently constituting due notice of his separation from the service were the denial of Petitioner De Torres'
request for an extension of his leave of absence, coupled with the advice for him to report for work and the UPLB Chancellor's subsequent letter
informing him that in case he failed to report within thirty (30) days, he would be dropped from the rolls of its personnel.

We now rule on these arguments. The Civil Service Commission predicated its ruling on Section 33, Rule XVI of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which
was in effect at the time. The provision states:

"Under no circumstances shall leave without pay be granted for more than one year. If an employee who is on leave without pay for any reason fails to
return to duty at the expiration of one year from the effective date of such leave, he shall be considered automatically separated from the service;
Provided, that he shall, within a reasonable time before the expiration of his one year leave of absence without pay, be notified in writing of the expiration
thereof with a warning that if he fails to report for duty on said date, he will be dropped from the service."

According to respondent, this provision speaks of automatic separation from the service, even without prior notice and hearing. It extensively
cites Quezon v. Borromeo,9 which supposedly held that the absence of notice to or investigation of the erring employee "is not jurisdictional in cases
involving Section 33, Rule XVI of the Revised Civil Service Rules."

19
The case cited involved the chief nurse of the Iligan City Hospital who had initially been authorized to go on special study detail to take up or complete a
degree in nursing for a period of not more than twelve (12) months. Afterwards, she requested two extensions of her leave, which were both granted,
albeit charged to her accumulated leave credits and, after exhaustion thereof, without pay. Her extended leave totaled nineteen (19) months.
Subsequently, she sought a third extension of leave, which was, however, not acted upon by the authorities. Notwithstanding the lack of approval, she
remained on leave and further requested a fourth extension. By indorsement of the regional director, this fourth request was disapproved, with the
statement that her continuous leave of absence was in violation of Section 33, Rule XVI of the Civil Service Rules. Subsequently, an appointment was
issued to another person as chief nurse.

More than two years after the expiration of her last approved leave, the petitioner reported for duty, but she was informed that she had been dropped
from government service. The Court held that she had automatically been dropped from the service after failing to return to work at the end of her
approved leave. With respect to the lack of written notice of the impending expiration of her leave, with a warning that she would be dropped from the
service if she failed to report for duty upon such expiration, the Court adverted to an earlier case, Isberto v. Raquiza.10 In that case, the Court held that
the employee, who had been absent without official leave, ought to have known that he was deemed automatically separated from the service from the
time his approved leave expired. The High Court pointed out that he was not excused by his ignorance of the rule providing for automatic separation
from the service upon failure to return to work after the lapse of the leave of absence without pay.

The Court also referred to Ramo v. Elefaño,11 which had sustained the dropping of the petitioner from the service for her failure to return to duty after
the expiration of her leave of absence. The letter disapproving her request for extension of leave on the ground of Section 33, Rule XVI was
communicated to her "for her information and compliance" only after her leave had already expired.

The core of the holdings in the above-cited cases was whether the absence of prior written notice by the appropriate government agency would prevent
the dropping of the employee concerned from the service. The Court held that under the rules then prevailing, such absence did not.

This issue, however, is not determinative of the present case. There is no question that the UPLB Chancellor had advised petitioner on the Civil Service
Rules regarding leaves. The former warned the latter of the possibility of being considered on AWOL (absence without leave) and of being dropped from
the service, if he failed to return and report for duty upon the expiration of his authorized leave. Consistent with the cases discussed above, these action
constituted sufficient notice.

The pivotal issue herein, however, is whether petitioner was indeed dropped from the service by the University. By respondent's contention, Section 33
of Rule XVI automatically operates; thus, whether or not to give effect to the provision is not within the discretion of the government agency concerned.

We do not agree, insofar as institutions of higher learning are concerned. In the three cases mentioned earlier, the concerned employees
were actually dropped from the rolls by their respective agencies. As a matter of fact, inQuezon, the petitioner-employee was replaced by a new
appointee. In Isberto, the petitioner-employee's position had initially been declared vacant, then filled up by another. Also, in Ramo the school's board of
trustees passed a Resolution dropping the petitioner from the service for her failure to return to duty after the expiration of her leave of absence; it then
passed another Resolution appointing her replacement.1âwphi1.nêt

In the case at bar, however, Petitioner De Torres was never actually dropped from the service by UP. He remained in the UPLB's roll of academic
personnel, even after he had been warned of the possibility of being dropped from the service if he failed to return to work within a stated period. Indeed,
as Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs Emiliana N. Bernardo explained to the CSC in her October 12, 1994 letter: 12 "UPLB records show that no
notice or order of dropping Dr. de Torres from the rolls was ever issued by the UPLB Chancellor. On the contrary, UPLB records show that his salary
was increased several times during his absence – on January 1, 1988, March 16, 1988, and July 1, 1989. His appointment was also reclassified with
promotion in rank from Training Specialist II to Assistant Professor IV effective March 16, 1988. This promotion was approved by the UP Board of
Regents during its 1015th meeting held on August 25, 1988."

Verily, these acts are clearly inconsistent with separation or dropping from the service. Private petitioner was not only retained in the roll of personnel;
his salary was even increased three times. Moreover, he was promoted in rank with the explicit approval of the Board of Regents, the highest governing
body of UP.13 Since the commencement of the Complaint before the CSC, the University has consistently stood by his side. When respondent ruled
against him in its assailed Resolution No. 95-3045, the University promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration favoring his cause. Then, UP joined Dr. De
Torres in his appeal before the Court of Appeals, as well as in the Petition now before us. All these circumstances indubitably demonstrate that the
University has chosen not to exercise its prerogative of dismissing petitioner from its employ.

UP's actuations, in spite of Section 33, Rule XVI of the Revised Civil Service Rules, are consistent with the exercise of its academic freedom. We have
held time and again that "the University has the academic freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught,
how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study."14 Clearly, this freedom encompasses the autonomy to choose who should teach15 and,
concomitant therewith, who should be retained in its rolls of professors and other academic personnel. This Court declared in  Ateneo de Manila
University v. Capulong: "As corporate entities, educational institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to establish their policies,
academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls or pressure."16 Similarly, Vicente G. Sinco, a former UP president and delegate to the 1973
Constitutional Convention, stressed that the Constitution "definitely grants the right of academic freedom to the University as an institution as
distinguished from the academic freedom of a university professor."17

We are not unaware that academic freedom has been traditionally associated with freedom of thought, speech, expression and the press. 18 But, as
explained by Constitutional Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna during the deliberations on Section 5 (2), Article XIV19 of the 1987 Constitution, "[s]ince
academic freedom is a dynamic concept, we want to expand the frontiers of freedom, especially in education, therefore, we shall leave it to the courts to
develop further the parameters of academic freedom."20

Thus, we hold that by opting to retain private petitioner and even promoting him despite his absence without leave, the University was exercising its
freedom to choose who may teach or, more precisely, who may continue to teach in its faculty. Even in the light of the provision of the Revised Civil

20
Service Law, the Respondent CSC had no authority to dictate to UP the outright dismissal of its personnel. The former could not have done so without
trampling upon the latter's constitutionally enshrined academic freedom. Moreover, in Chang v. Civil Service Commission,21 the Court stressed that
"[t]he CSC is not a co-manager, or surrogate administrator of government offices and agencies. Its functions and authority are limited to approving or
reviewing appointments to determine their concordance with the requirements of the Civil Service Law." In short, on its own, the CSC does not have the
power to terminate employment or to drop workers from the rolls.

Needless to say, UP definitely recognizes and values petitioner's academic expertise. As the vice chancellor for academic affairs explained, "[d]ropping
him from the rolls will utterly be a waste of government funds and will not serve the best interest of the country which is suffering from 'brain-
drain'."22 Even UP President Emil Q. Javier advised Complainants Baskiñas and Medina to "give Dr. de Torres the opportunity to honor his service
obligation to the University,"23 referring to petitioner's required return service in view of a fellowship abroad earlier granted him by the institution.

Consequently, there is no need for the issuance of a new appointment in favor of Dr. De Torres. His service in UP is deemed uninterrupted during his
tenure at CIRDAP.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals and the Respondent Civil Service Commission's
Resolution Nos. 95-3045 and 96-1041 are SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

17. Navarro vs. Civil Service Commission

Facts: On June 21, 1989, cable drums were stolen worth P21, 250 from Ford Stockyard in Mariveles Bataan. The cable drums were owned by Takaoka
Engineering Construction Co. Ltd. The suspect for the stolen cable drums is the Petitioner Mario Navarro. On October 18, 1990, the Senior Deputy
Administrator of Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) approved an Order terminating the services of Navarro and finding him guilty as charged.
Navarro appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). On July 25, 1991, the MSPB rendered its decision setting aside the Order issued by
the Senior Deputy Administrator of EPZA on October 18, 1990. The decision of the MSPB also reinstated Navarro with payment and back wages and
other benefits due him from the time of his dismissal. On December 11, 1991, the MSPB denied the motion for reconsideration of the EPZA.

On November 6, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Bataan dismisses the criminal case filed against Navarro and his co-accused for qualified theft. EPZA
sought to reverse the decision of the MSPB before the CSC and on July 16, 1992, the CSC rendered its decision setting aside the MSPB’s decision
dated December 11, 1991 and the CSC found Navarro guilty of grave misconduct and reimposed the penalty of dismissal. The CSC also denied in its
Resolution dated September 11, 1992 the motion for reconsideration of Navarro.

In the recourse, Navarro claims that the CSC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction in deciding the case without
considering other pertinent evidence but the EPZA filed for the dismissal of the petition. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a manifestation to
support the plea of the Petitioner in the argument that there can be no appeal in the MSPB’s decision exonerating Navarro. On May 6, 1993, the OSG
granted the CSC 10 days to comment but no comment was filed and on August 5, 1993, the CSC filed for extension time to comment but no comment
was still filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission and the Export Processing Zone Authority acted without jurisdiction.

HELD: The MSPB rendered a favorable decision for Navarro and this fact alone should have prevented EPZA from appealing to the Commission on the
bases of prevailing jurisprudence. Under P.D. 807 or The Philippine Civil Service Law, the CSC has no appellate jurisdiction over MSPB’s decisions
exonerating officers and employees from administrative charges and P.D. 807 does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or
employees. The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative cases involving suspension for more than thirty days or removal or dismissal
from office. P.D. 807 provides that appeals shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision. The party adversely affected by the decision
refers to the government employee whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action. EPZA, for appealing MSPB’s decision
and exonerating Navarro from administrative charge and CSC, for taking recognizance of, and deciding the appeal shows that both EPZA and CSC
acted without jurisdiction.

18. Civil Service Commission vs. Dacoycoy

FACTS: Pedro Dacoycoy, respondent, is the vocational school administrator of Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades in Northern Samar. After formal
investigation by the CSC, he was found guilty of nepotism on two counts. CSC imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service. Respondent
filed motion for reconsideration, anchoring on the argument that he was not the appointing or the recommending authority. CA reversed CSC's resolution
ruling that the respondent did not appoint his 2 sons, therefore he is not guilty of nepotism.

ISSUE:  Whether or not respondent is guilty of nepotism.

DECISION: Yes. The law (Sec 59 Nepotism, (1) ) defines nepotism as all appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal governments or in
any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the 

1. Appointing or 
2. Recommending authority, or of the 
3. Chief of the bureau or office, or of 
4. The persons exercising immediate supervision over him.  The word "relative" and members of the family referred to are those related within the third
degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.

21
CSC found respondent guilty of nepotism as a result of the appointment of his 2 sons Rito, a driver and Ped, a utility worker, as their are under his
immediate supervision and control as the school administrator.

19. Santos vs. Yatco

Facts: Petitioner files for certiorari to revoke the order of respondent Judge Yatco for cancelling his previous order for execution on the parcel of land
owned by the petitioner. The said parcel of land is being occupied by Fernando Mendoñez with an agreement to pay in installment the said land to the
petitioners and that he shall voluntarily vacate the land and the payments he previously made shall be forfeited in favor of the plaintiff. A civil case was
filed by the petitioner against Mendoñez for failure to pay as per agreement of both parties. Petitioner later filed a motion for execution to take the land
back. Defendant Mendoñez moved for postponement to give both parties sufficient time to come to an agreement which was allowed by the respondent
judge. It was settled by both parties that Mendoñez will secure a GSIS loan however when he was ready to make the payment the petitioner refused to
abide with their agreement and now asking for a higher amount of money for payment. Finding no justification on the issuance of the writ of execution,
Judge Yatco quashed said order hence this petition for certiorari based on lack of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge acted in lack of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion

RULING: The court held that any judge has the jurisdiction to quash any writ of execution issued by him especially when it was improvidently issued.
There is no abuse of discretion by the judge since the defendant made an opposition and proved that there is subsequent verbal agreement that
amended the compromise hence the execution cannot be validly decreed without a hearing. The consequent ability of the defendant to meet his
obligations by securing a GSIS loan also justifies the court’s refusal to eject him from the premises by an execution. 

20. CSC, Anicia De Lima vs. Larry M. Alfonso

This is a Rule 45 petition assailing the May 21, 2007 Decision1 and August 23, 2007 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
97284, which reversed Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolution Nos. 0618213and 0619084 dated October 16, 2006 and November 7, 2006,
respectively, as well as its Order5 dated December 11, 2006, formally charging respondent Larry Alfonso with Grave Misconduct and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and preventively suspending him from his position as Director of the Human Resources Management
Department of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP).

The facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:

Respondent Larry M. Alfonso is the Director of the Human Resources Management Department of PUP. On July 6, 2006, Dr. Zenaida Pia, Professor IV
in PUP-Sta. Mesa, and Dindo Emmanuel Bautista, President of Unyon ng mga Kawani sa PUP, jointly filed an Affidavit-Complaint against Alfonso for
violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 6713, charging the latter with grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the Service, and violation of
Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. The affidavit-complaint was lodged before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). In their affidavit, Dr. Pia and
Bautista alleged, among others, that respondent repeatedly abused his authority as head of PUP’s personnel department when the latter prepared and
included his name in Special Order Nos. 0960 and 1004 for overnight services, ostensibly authorizing him to work for 24 hours straight from May 16 to
20, May 22 to 27 and May 29 to June 2, 2006. As a result thereof, Alfonso made considerable earnings for allegedly working in humanly impossible
conditions 24 hours straight daily, for three consecutive weeks.6

In support of their complaint, Dr. Pia and Bautista submitted the following documentary evidence:

1. Special Order No. 1004, s. 2006;

2. Special Order No. 0960, s. 2006;
3. Daily time records of Saturday and Overnight Services of Alfonso;
4. PUP Perm-OT overnight May 2006 payroll register;
5. Xerox copy of check no. 162833 dated May 31, 2006;
6. Summary of Alfonso’s Saturday, overnight and overtime schedule;
7. Computation of the number of hours, days and weeks that Alfonso allegedly served; and
8. Explanation of official time, night service, Saturday overtime and overnight services rendered by Alfonso for the month of May.7
On August 10, 2006, the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) of the CSC issued an order directing Alfonso to submit his counter-affidavit/comment within three
(3) days from receipt thereof.

In his Counter-Affidavit8 dated August 30, 2006, respondent averred that he only rendered overnight work on May 17, 19, 22, 24, 26, 29 and 31, 2006.
He explained that his daily time record explicitly indicates that it covers overnight services pursuant to S.O. No. 1004, series of 2006, and that an entry
such as "Day 17, arrival 8:00 PM; Day 18, departure 8:00 AM" connoted only a day of overnight work and not continuous two (2) days of rendition of
services.9

The CSC, however, found Alfonso’s explanation wanting. On October 25, 2006, it issued Resolution No. 061821 formally charging Alfonso with grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the Service, and imposing a 90-day preventive suspension against him.10

Aggrieved, respondent filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration of the preventive suspension order and requested a change of venue11 from the
CSC-Central Office to the CSC-National Capital Region (CSC-NCR). In the motion, he argued that it is the CSC-NCR regional office that has jurisdiction
over the matter pursuant to Section 6 of CSC Resolution No. 99-1936, and that to hold otherwise may deprive him of his right to appeal. 12The motion
was denied.13

Undaunted, Alfonso filed another motion for reconsideration on November 20, 2006, accompanied by a motion to admit his supplemental
answer.14 This time, however, respondent argued that the CSC had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative case filed against him.

22
According to him, it is the PUP Board of Regents that has the exclusive authority to appoint and remove PUP employees pursuant to the provisions of
R.A. No. 829215 in relation to R.A. No. 4670.16

Without ruling on the motion, Assistant Commissioner Atty. Anicia Marasigan-de Lima, head of CSC-NCR, issued an Order 17 dated December 11, 2006
directing the Office of the President of PUP to implement the preventive suspension order against respondent.18

Dissatisfied, respondent sought relief before the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition.

On May 21, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision19 in favor of Alfonso. The pertinent portion of the decision declares:

Applying the foregoing provisions, it appears that the CSC may take cognizance of an administrative case in two ways: (1) through a complaint filed by a
private citizen against a government official or employee; and (2) appealed cases from the decisions rendered by Secretaries or heads of agencies,
instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities in cases filed against officers and employees under their jurisdiction.

Indisputably, the persons who filed the affidavit-complaint against petitioner held positions in and were under the employ of PUP. Hence, they cannot be
considered as private citizens in the contemplation of the said provision. It is likewise undisputed that the subject CSC resolutions were not rendered in
the exercise of its power to review or its appellate jurisdiction but was an ordinary administrative case. Hence, the present case falls short of the
requirement that would otherwise have justified the CSC’s immediate exercise of its jurisdiction over the administrative case against petitioner.

Even assuming that the CSC may directly entertain the complaints filed with it, the doctrine of exhaustion [of] administrative remedies still prevents it
from entertaining the present administrative case. If a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be had by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on the matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be priorly exhausted.

The circumstances in this case do not justify the disregard of the doctrine. Hence, the administrative complaint should have been lodged with the PUP
board of regents.

xxx

The CA ratiocinated that since Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1341, the law creating PUP, is the special law governing PUP, then it is the Board of
Regents (BOR) that should carry out the duties of the investigating committee and has the proper authority to discipline PUP personnel corollary to the
BOR’s general powers of administration.20 According to the CA, the power of the BOR to hire carries with it the corresponding power to discipline PUP
personnel pursuant to Section 7(c) of P.D.1341, to wit:

Section 7. The Board of Regents shall have the following powers and duties in addition to his general powers of administration and the exercise of all the
powers of a corporation as provided in Section 13 of Act Numbered fourteen hundred fifty-nine as amended, otherwise known as the Philippine
Corporation Law:

xxxx

(c) To appoint, on the recommendation of the President of the University, professors, instructors, lecturers and other members of the faculty, and other
officials and employees of the University; to fix their compensation, hours of service, and such, other duties and conditions as it may deem proper, any
other provisions of the law to the contrary notwithstanding; to grant to them in his discretion, leave of absence under such regulations as it may
promulgate, any other conditions of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after an investigation and hearing shall have
been had;

xxx

This provision in the PUP Charter is substantially in accord with Section 4(h) of R.A. 8292,

Section 4. Powers and Duties of Governing Boards. – The governing board shall have the following specific powers and duties in addition to its general
powers of administration and the exercise of all the powers granted to the board of directors of a corporation under Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
68, otherwise known as the Corporation Code of the Philippines:

xxxx

(h) to fix and adjust salaries of faculty members and administrative officials and employees subject to the provisions of the revised compensation and
classification system and other pertinent budget and compensation laws governing hours of service, and such other duties and conditions as it may
deem proper; to grant them, at its discretion, leaves of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any provisions of existing law to the
contrary notwithstanding; and to remove them for cause in accordance with the requirements of due process of law.

Given the foregoing antecedents, the pivotal issue we have to resolve is whether the CSC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaint filed against
Alfonso.

We find in favor of petitioner.

Section 2(1) and Section 3, Article IX-B of our Constitution, are clear, as they provide that:

Sec. 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters.

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Sec. 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to
promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards
system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public
accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.

As the central personnel agency of the government,21 the CSC has jurisdiction to supervise the performance of and discipline, if need be, all
government employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters such as PUP. Accordingly, all
PUP officers and employees, whether they be classified as teachers or professors pursuant to certain provisions of law, are deemed, first and foremost,
civil servants accountable to the people and answerable to the CSC in cases of complaints lodged by a citizen against them as public servants.
Admittedly, the CSC has appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases decided by government departments, agencies and instrumentalities. However, a
complaint may be filed directly with the CSC, and the Commission has the authority to hear and decide the case, although it may opt to deputize a
department or an agency to conduct the investigation. Specifically, Sections 9(j) and 37(a) of P.D. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Law of
1975, provide:

SECTION 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. – The Commission shall administer the Civil Service and shall have the following powers and
function:

xxxx

(j) Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal;

xxxx

Section 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. – (a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a
penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or
dismissal from Office. A complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee in which case
it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of
the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.22

We are not unmindful of certain special laws that allow the creation of disciplinary committees and governing bodies in different branches, subdivisions,
agencies and instrumentalities of the government to hear and decide administrative complaints against their respective officers and employees. Be that
as it may, we cannot interpret the creation of such bodies nor the passage of laws such as – R.A. Nos. 8292 and 4670 allowing for the creation of such
disciplinary bodies – as having divested the CSC of its inherent power to supervise and discipline government employees, including those in the
academe. To hold otherwise would not only negate the very purpose for which the CSC was established, i.e. to instill professionalism, integrity, and
accountability in our civil service, but would also impliedly amend the Constitution itself.

In Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing,23 we explained that it is error to contend that R.A. No. 4670 conferred exclusive disciplinary authority on the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS, now Department of Education or DepEd) over public school teachers and to have prescribed
exclusive procedure in administrative investigations involving them.24 Hence, it is equally erroneous for respondent to argue that the PUP Charter and
R.A. No. 8292 in relation to R.A. 4670 confer upon the BOR of PUP exclusive jurisdiction to hear disciplinary cases against university professors and
personnel.

In Civil Service Commission v. Sojor,25 an administrative case was filed against a state university president. There, we struck down the argument that
the BOR has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide an administrative case filed against the respondent. We said:

In light of the other provisions of R.A. No. 9299, respondent’s argument that the BOR has exclusive power to remove its university officials must fail.
Section 7 of R.A. No. 9299 states that the power to remove faculty members, employees, and officials of the university is granted to the BOR "in addition
to its general powers of administration." This provision is essentially a reproduction of Section 4 of its predecessor, R.A. No. 8292, demonstrating that
the intent of the lawmakers did not change even with the enactment of the new law. x x x

xxxx

Verily, the BOR of NORSU has the sole power of administration over the university. But this power is not exclusive in the matter of disciplining and
removing its employee and officials.

Although the BOR of NORSU is given the specific power under R.A. No. 9299 to discipline its employees and officials, there is no showing that such
power is exclusive. When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be
presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both
bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.26 (Emphasis supplied)

But it is not only for this reason that Alfonso’s argument must fail. Equally significant is the fact that he had already submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the CSC when he filed his counter-affidavit27 and his motion for reconsideration and requested for a change of venue, not from the CSC to the BOR of
PUP, but from the CSC-Central Office to the CSC-NCR.28 It was only when his motion was denied that he suddenly had a change of heart and raised
the question of proper jurisdiction.29 This cannot be allowed because it would violate the doctrine of res judicata, a legal principle that is applicable to
administrative cases as well.30 At the very least, respondent’s active participation in the proceedings by seeking affirmative relief before the CSC
already bars him from impugning the Commission’s authority under the principle of estoppel by laches.31

In this case, the complaint-affidavits were filed by two PUP employees. These complaints were not lodged before the disciplinary tribunal of PUP, but
were instead filed before the CSC, with averments detailing respondent’s alleged violation of civil service laws, rules and regulations. After a fact-finding

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investigation, the Commission found that a prima facie case existed against Alfonso, prompting the Commission to file a formal charge against the
latter.32 Verily, since the complaints were filed directly with the CSC, and the CSC has opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the CSC’s
exercise of jurisdiction shall be to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. To repeat, it may, however, choose to deputize any
department or agency or official or group of officials such as the BOR of PUP to conduct the investigation, or to delegate the investigation to the proper
regional office.33 But the same is merely permissive and not mandatory upon the Commission.

We likewise affirm the order of preventive suspension issued by the CSC-NCR against respondent.

There are two kinds of preventive suspension of government employees charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension, viz: (1) preventive
suspension pending investigation; and (2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or
dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated. Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a measure intended to
enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses
against him. If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within that period, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will
automatically be reinstated. If after investigation, respondent is found innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he should be reinstated.34

The first kind, subject of the CSC Order against the respondent, is appropriately covered by Sections 51 and 52 of the Revised Administrative Code of
1987 (Executive Order No. 292) which provide:

SEC. 51. Preventive Suspension. - The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the
performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the
service.1avvphi1

SEC. 52. Lifting of Preventive Suspension. Pending Administrative Investigation. - When the administrative case against the officer or employee under
preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the
respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That when the delay in the
disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided.1avvphi1

Respondent was charged with grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. A person charged with grave misconduct is
put on notice that he stands accused of misconduct coupled with any of the elements of corruption or willful intent to violate the law or established
rules.35 Meanwhile, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is classified as a grave offense with a corresponding penalty of suspension for
six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and the penalty of dismissal for the second offense.36

In addition to the gravity of the charges against Alfonso, and equally relevant, is the opportunity available to him to use his position as Director of the
Human Resources Management Department of the university to exert undue influence or pressure on the potential witnesses that the complainants may
produce, or to tamper with the documentary evidence that may be used against him. Preventive suspension is, therefore, necessary so that
respondent’s delicate yet powerful position in the university may not be used to compromise the integrity and impartiality of the entire proceedings.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the May 21, 2007 Decision37 and August 23, 2007 Resolution38 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
97284 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Service Commission Resolution Nos. 06182139 and 06190840 dated October 16,
2006 and November 7, 2006, respectively, as well as its Order41 dated December 11, 2006 placing respondent under preventive suspension are hereby
REINSTATED. The CSC is ordered to proceed hearing the administrative case against respondent with dispatch.

SO ORDERED

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