FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

(Article II, 1987 Constitution)

The Philippines Adherence to the Doctrine of Incorporation

Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the

Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international as
part of the laws of the land. This provision is an affirmation of our
adherence to the doctrine of incorporation in international law.

Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can become part of the
sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. On
the other hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of
the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land
even if they do not derive from treaty stipulations. Generally accepted principles
of international law include international customs as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations. International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from
the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent
practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion
juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter
element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it. “General principles of law recognized by
civilized nations” are principles “established by a process of reasoning” or
judicial logic, based on principles which are “basic to legal systems generally,”
such as “general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and
justice,” and the “general principles against discrimination” which is embodied
in the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against
Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation.” These are the same
core principles which underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, and embodied
in the due process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights. (Mary Grace
Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, G R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016, En
Banc [Perez])
The Right to Self-Determination of Peoples

This right to self-determination of peoples has gone beyond mere treaty or

convention; in fact, it has now been elevated into the status of a generally
accepted principle of international law. (The Province of North Cotabato v. The
Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel, G.R. No. 183591, 568
SCRA 402, October 14, 2008, En Banc [Carpio-Morales])

The Yogyakarta Principles: Have they evolved into a generally accepted

principle of international law and, therefore, binding upon the Philippines?

We refer now to the petitioner’s invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles

(the Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity), which petitioner declares to reflect binding
principles of international law.

At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles
contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and
obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current state
of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international
law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice. X x x

Xxx

Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles,

consisting of a declaration formulated by various international law professors,
are – at best – de lege refenda – and do not constitute binding obligations on the
Philippines. X x x (Ang LADLAD LGBT Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582,
618 SCRA 32, April 8, 2010, En Banc [Del Castillo])

The Filipino First Policy

In the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the

national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos (Sec. 10, 2nd par., Art. XII of the Constitution)
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 (1997) (Bellosillo)

In this case, the SC ruled that this provision is self-executing. It was also
in this case where the Court clarified that the rule now is that all provisions of
the Constitution are presumed to be self-executing, rather than non-self-
executing. Elaborating, the Court explained that if a contrary presumption is
adopted, the whole Constitution shall remain dormant and be captives of
Congress, which could have disastrous consequences.

Also, in this case the SC held that “patrimony” simply means “heritage.”
Thus, when we speak of “national patrimony,” we refer not only to the natural
resources of the Philippines but as well as the cultural heritage of the Filipino
people.

Filipinization of Public Utilities

Wilson P. Gamboa v. Finance Secretary Margarito B. Teves, et al., G./R. No.

176579, June 28, 2011, En Banc (Carpio)

Section 11, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the 1987
Constitution mandates the Filipinization of public utilities x x x

Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of

authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except
to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized
under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens x x x.

Xxx

Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the 1986 Constitutional

Commission, reminds us that the Filipinization provision in the 1987
Constitution is one of the products of the spirit of nationalism which gripped the
1935 Constitutional Convention. The 1987 Constitution provides for the
Filipinization of public utilities by requiring that any form of authorization for
the operation of public utilities should be granted only to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the
Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens.
The provision is [an express] recognition of the sensitive and vital position of
public utilities both in the national economy and for national security. The
evident purpose of the citizenship requirement is to prevent aliens from
assuming control of public utilities, which may be inimical to the national
interest. This specific provision explicitly reserves to Filipino citizens control of
public utilities, pursuant to an overriding economic goal of the 1987 Constitution:
to conserve and develop our patrimony and ensure a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

Any citizen or juridical entity desiring to operate a public utility must

therefore meet the minimum nationality requirement prescribed in Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution. Hence, for a corporation to be granted authority
to operate a public utility, at least 60 percent of its capital must be owned by
Filipino citizens.

The crux of the controversy is the definition of the term capital. Does the
term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refer to common shares
or to the total outstanding capital stock (combined total of common and non-
voting preferred shares)?

Xxx

We agree with petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention. The term capital

in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled
to vote in the election of officers, and thus in the present case only to common
shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock comprising both common
and non–voting preferred shares.

Xxx

Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to

control, as opposed to preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, the
term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to common
shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to voter in the
election of directors, then the term capital shall include such preferred shares
because the right to participate in the control or management of the corporation
is exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors. In short, the
term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares
of stock that can vote in the election of directors.
 This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution to place in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and
management of public utilities. X x x

Xxx

To construe broadly the term capital as the total outstanding capital stock,
including both common and non-voting preferred shares, grossly contravenes the
intent and letter of the Constitution that the State shall develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. A broad
definition unjustifiably disregards who owns the all-important voting stock,
which necessarily equates to control of the public utility.

Xxx

Indisputably, construing the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution to include both voting and non-voting shares will result in the
abject surrender of our telecommunications industry to foreigners, amounting to
a clear abdication of the States constitutional duty to limit control of public
utilities to Filipino citizens. Such an interpretation certainly runs counter to the
constitutional provision reserving certain areas of investment to Filipino citizens,
such as the exploitation of natural resources as well as the ownership of land,
educational institutions and advertising businesses. The Court should never
open to foreign control what the Constitution has expressly reserved to Filipinos
for that would be a betrayal of the Constitution and of the national interest. The
Court must perform its solemn duty to defend and uphold the intent and letter
of the Constitution to ensure x x x a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, like other provisions of the
Constitution expressly reserving to Filipinos specific areas of investment, such as
the development of natural resources and ownership of land, educational
institutions and advertising business, is self-executing. There is no need for
legislation to implement these self-executing provisions of the Constitution. X x
x

Xxx
 [We] rule that the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of
directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and not to the
total outstanding capital stock (common and non-voting preferred shares.)

The Right to Life of the Unborn from Conception

The Philippine national population program has always been grounded

on two cornerstone principles: “principle of no-abortion” and the “principle of
non-coercion.” These principles are not merely grounded on administrative
policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection which expressly
provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.

When Does Life Begin?

Majority of Members of the Court are of the position that the question of
when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at
this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberations,
however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could
express their own views on this matter.

In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at
fertilization.

Xxx

Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from

conception. This is undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn
to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to
any proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen
because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the
scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the
view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.

Xxx

In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the

word “conception” which, as described and defined by all reliable and reputable
sources, means that life begins at fertilization.
 Xxx

From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the framers of the

Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both the
mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon
fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. X x x

Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not
intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. From the discussions
above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed
an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually
prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that
similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and
thus, constitutionally permissible. (James M. Imbong, et al. v. Hon. Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., et al., GR No. 204819, April 8, 2014, En Banc [Mendoza])

The Right to Health and to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology in Accord with
the Rhythm and Harmony of Nature

International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v.

Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines), et al., G.R. No. 209271, December 8,
2015, En Banc (Villarama, Jr.)

The Precautionary Principle

The precautionary principle originated in Germany in the 1960s,

expressing the normative idea that governments are obligated to “foresee and
forestall” harm to the environment. In the following decades, the precautionary
principle has served as the normative guideline for policymaking by many
national governments. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
the outcome of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development held in Rio de Janeiro, defines the rights of the people to be
involved in the development of their economies, and the responsibilities of
human beings to safeguard the common environment. It states that the long
term economic progress is only ensured if it s linked with the protection of the
environment. For the first time, the precautionary approach was codified under
Principle 15, which reads:
 In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation.

Principle 15 codified for the first time at the global level the precautionary
approach, which indicates that lack of scientific certainty is no reason to
postpone action to avoid potentially serious or irreversible harm to the
environment. It has been incorporated in various international legal
instruments. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on
Biological Diversity, finalized and adopted in Montreal on January 29, 2000,
establishes an international regime primarily aimed at regulating trade in GMOs
intended for release into the environment, in accordance with Principle 15 of the
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. X x x

The precautionary principle applies when the following conditions are

met:

1. There exist considerable scientific uncertainties;

2. There exist scenarios (or models) of possible harm that are
scientifically reasonable (that is based on some scientifically
plausible reasoning);
3. Uncertainties cannot be reduced in the short term without at the
same time increasing ignorance of other relevant factors by higher
levels of abstraction and idealization;
4. The potential harm is sufficiently serious or even irreversible for
present or future generations or otherwise morally unacceptable;
5. There is a need to act now, since effective counteraction later will
be made significantly more difficult or costly at any later time.

The Rules (of Procedure for Environmental Cases) likewise incorporated

the principle in Part V, Rule 20, which states:

PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

Sec. 1. Applicability. – When there is a lack of full scientific certainty

in establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental
 effect, the court shall apply the precautionary principle in resolving the
case before it.

The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful

ecology shall be given the benefit of the doubt.

SEC. 2. Standards for application. – In applying the precautionary

principle, the following factors, among others, may be considered: (1)
threats to human life or health; (2) inequity to present or future
generations; or (3) prejudice to the environment without legal
consideration of the environmental rights of those affected.

Under this Rule, the precautionary principle finds direct application in the
evaluation of evidence in cases before the courts. The precautionary principle
bridges the gap in cases where scientific certainty in factual findings cannot be
achieved. By applying the precautionary principle, the court may construe a set
of facts as warranting either judicial action or inaction, with the goal of
preserving and protecting the environment. This may be further evinced from
the second paragraph where bias is created in favor of the constitutional right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. In effect, the precautionary
principle shifts the burden of evidence of harm away from those likely to suffer
harm and onto those desiring to change the status quo. An application of the
precautionary principle to the rules on evidence will enable courts to tackle
future environmental problems before ironclad scientific consensus emerges.
(Annotation to the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases)

For purposes of evidence, the precautionary principle should be treated as

a principle of last resort, where application of the regular Rules of Evidence
would cause in an inequitable result for the environmental plaintiff – (a) settings
in which the risks of harm are uncertain; (b) settings in which harm might be
irreversible and what is lost is irreplaceable; and (c) settings in which the harm
that might result would be serious. When these features – uncertainty, the
possibility of irreversible harm, and the possibility of serious harm – coincide,
the case for the precautionary principle is strongest. When in doubt, cases must
be resolved in favor of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology. Parenthetically, judicial adjudication is one of the strongest fora in
which the precautionary principle may find applicability. (International Service
for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast
Asia [Philippines], et al., GR No. 209271, December 8, 2015, En Banc [Villarama])
Application of the Precautionary Principle to the Bt talong Field Trials in the
Philippines

Assessing the evidence on record, as well as the current state of GMO

research worldwide, the Court finds all the three conditions present in this case –
uncertainty, the possibility of irreversible harm and the possibility of serious
harm.

Xxx

Alongside the aforesaid uncertainties, the non-implementation of the NBF

(National Biosafety Framework) in the crucial stages of risk assessment and
public consultation, including the determination of the applicability of the EIS
(Environmental Impact Statement) requirements to GMO field testing, are
compelling reasons for the application of the precautionary principle. There
exists a preponderance of evidence that the release of GMOs into the
environment threatens to damage our ecosystems and not just the field trial sites,
and eventually the health of our people once the Bt eggplant are consumed as
food. Adopting the precautionary approach, the Court rules that the principles
of the NBF need to be operationalized first by the coordinated actions of the
concerned departments and agencies before allowing the release into the
environment of genetically modified eggplant. The more prudent course is to
immediately enjoin the Bt talong field trials and approval for its propagation or
commercialization until the said government offices shall have performed their
respective mandates to implement the NBF.

We have found the experience of India in the Bt brinjal field trials – for
which an indefinite moratorium was recommended by a Supreme Court-
appointed committee till the government fixes regulatory and safety aspects – as
relevant because majority of Filipino farmers are also small-scale farmers.
Further, the precautionary approach entailed inputs from all stakeholders,
including the marginalized farmers, not just the scientific community. This
proceeds from the realization that acceptance of uncertainty is not only a
scientific issue, but is related to public policy and involves an ethical dimension.
For scientific research alone will not resolve all the problems, but participation of
different stakeholders from scientists to industry, NGOs, farmers and the public
will provide a needed variety of perspective foci, and knowledge. (International
Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace
Southeast Asia (Philippines), et al., GR No. 209271, December 8, 2015, En Banc
[Villarama])

Field Trial Proposal of Bt (Bacillus thuringiensis) Talong

The crystal toxin genes from the soil bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt)
were incorporated into the eggplant (talong) genome to produce the protein
CrylAc which is toxic to the target insect pests. CrylAc protein is said to be highly
specific to lepidopteran larvae such as the fruit and shoot borer (FSB), the most
destructive insect pest of eggplant. (International Service for the Acquisition of
Agri-biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines), et
al., GR No. 209271, December 8, 2015, En Banc [Villarama])

Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et

al., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016, En Banc (Bersamin)

The Precautionary Principle

The principle of precaution originated as a social planning principle in

Germany. In the 1980’s, the Federal Republic of Germany used the
Vorsogeprinzip (“foresight principle”) to justify the implementation of vigorous
policies to tackle acid rain, global warming and pollution of the North Sea. It has
since emerged from a need to protect humans and the environment from
increasingly unpredictable, uncertain, and unquantifiable but possibly
catastrophic risks such as those associated with Genetically Modified Organisms
and climate change. The oft-cited Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development (1992 Rio Agenda) first embodied this principle
x x x.

In this jurisdiction, the principle of precaution appearing in the Rules of

Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC) involves matters of
evidence in cases where there is lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a
causal link between human activity and environmental effect. In such an event,
the courts may construe a set of facts as warranting either judicial action or
inaction with the goal of preserving and protecting the environment.
Application of the Precautionary Principle

It is notable x x x that the precautionary principle shall only be relevant if

there is concurrence of three elements, namely: uncertainty, threat of environmental
damage and serious or irreversible harm. In situations where the threat is relatively
certain, or that the causal link between an action and environmental damage can
be established, or the probability of occurrence can be calculated, only
preventive, not precautionary measures, may be taken. Neither will the
precautionary principle apply if there is no indication of a threat of
environmental harm, or if the threatened harm is trivial or easily reversible.

In Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association,

Inc., et al., (G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016, En Banc [Bersamin]), it was argued
that the Ordinance enacted by the City of Davao prohibiting aerial spraying of
pesticides is justified since it will protect the health of residents and the
environment against the risks posed by aerial drift of chemicals applying the
precautionary principle. The Court did not find the presence of the elements for
this principle to apply, thus, it held:

We cannot see the presence of all the elements. To begin with,

there has been no scientific study. Although the precautionary principle
allows lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a connection between
the serious or irreversible harm and the human activity, its application is
still premised on empirical studies. Scientific analysis is still a necessary
basis for effective policy choices under the precautionary principle.

Precaution is a risk management principle invoked after scientific

inquiry takes place. This scientific stage is often considered synonymous
with risk assessment. As such, resort to the principle shall not be based on
anxiety or emotion, but from a rational decision rule, based on ethics. As
much as possible, a complete and objective scientific evaluation of the risk
to the environment or health should be conducted and made available to
decision-makers for them to choose the most appropriate course of action.
Furthermore, the positive and negative effects of an activity are also
important in the application of the principle. The potential harm resulting
from certain activities should always be judged in view of the potential
benefits they offer, while the positive and negative effects of potential
precautionary measures should be considered.
 The only study conducted to validate the effects of aerial spraying
appears to be the Summary Report on the Assessment and Fact-Finding
Activities on the Issue of Aerial Spraying in Banana Plantations. Yet, the fact-
finding team that generated the report was not a scientific study that
could justify the resort to the precautionary principle. In fact, the
Sangguniang Bayan ignored the findings and conclusions of the fact-
finding team x x x.

We should not apply the precautionary approach in sustaining the

ban against aerial spraying if little or nothing is known of the exact or
potential dangers that aerial spraying may bring to the health of the
residents within and near the plantations and to the integrity and balance
of the environment. It is dangerous to quickly presume that the effects of
aerial spraying would be adverse even in the absence of evidence.
Accordingly, for lack of scientific data supporting a ban on aerial
spraying, Ordinance No. 0309-07 should be struck down for being
unreasonable.

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait, et al. v.

Secretary Angelo Reyes, et al., G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015, En Banc
(Leonardo-De Castro)

Petitioners in this case were marine mammals (toothed whales, dolphins,

and other cetacean species) but were joined by human beings as “stewards of
nature.

Are these marine mammals the proper parties to file the petition? In this
case, actually the SC did not rule squarely on this issue. The Court ruled instead
that the issue of whether these marine mammals have locus standi to file the
petition had been eliminated because of Section 5, Rules for the Enforcement of
Environmental Laws, which allows any citizen to file a petition for the
enforcement of environmental laws (Citizen’s Suit) and, in their petition, these
marine mammals were joined by human beings as “stewards of nature.”
 Service Contracts with Foreign Corporations for Exploration of Oil and
Petroleum Products (Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, 1987 Constitution)

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait, et al. v.

Secretary Angelo Reyes, et al., GR Nos. 180771 and 181527, April 21, 2015, En
Banc (Leonardo-De Castro)

In these consolidated petitions, this Court has determined that the various
issues raised by the petitioners may be condensed into two primary issues:

Procedural Issue: Locus standi of the Resident Marine Mammals and

Stewards x x x; and

Main Issue: Legality of Service Contract No. 46.

Procedural Issue

The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards, “claim” that they
have the legal standing to file this action since they stand to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in this suit, citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. They also assert
their right to sue for the faithful performance of international and municipal
environment laws created in their favor and for their benefit. In this regard, they
propound that they have a right to demand that they be accorded the benefits
granted to them in multilateral international instruments that the Philippine
Government had signed, under the concept of stipulation pour autrui.

Xxx

In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals
legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino
citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring to suit to enforce our environmental laws.
It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition
and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards x x x
having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws
concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared
to possess the legal standing to file this petition.
On the Legality of Service Contract No. 46 vis-à-vis Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution

This Court has previously settled the issue of whether service contracts
are still allowed under the 1987 Constitution. In La Bugal, we held that the
deletion of the words “service contracts” in the 1987 Constitution did not amount
to a ban on them per se. In fact, in that decision, we quoted in length, portions of
the deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission (ConCom) to
show that in deliberating on paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, they were
actually referring to service contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution,
albeit with safety measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during
the martial law regime.

Agreements involving Technical or Financial Assistance are Service Contracts

with Safeguards

From the foregoing, we are impelled to conclude that the phrase

agreements involving either technical or financial assistance, referred to in
paragraph 4, are in fact service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety,
the new ones are between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one
hand; and on the other, the government as principal or “owner” of the works. In
the new service contacts, the foreign contractors provide capital, technology and
technical know-how, and managerial expertise in the creation and operation of
large-scale mining/extractive enterprises; and the government, through its
agencies (DENR, MGB), actively exercises control and supervision over the entire
operation.

In summarizing the matters discussed in the ConCom, we established that

paragraph 4, with the safeguards in place, is the exception to paragraph 1,
Section 2 of Article XII. The following are the safeguards this Court enumerated
in La Bugal:

Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several
safeguards, among which are these requirements:

(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law
that will set standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements,
 presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions to avoid the
possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.

(2) The President shall be the signatory of the government because,

supposedly before an agreement is presented to the President for
signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels
to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.

(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall
report it to Congress to give that branch of government an opportunity
to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.

` Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this Court finds that SC-46 is

indeed null and void for noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987
Constitution.

1. The General Law on Oil Exploration

The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of

indigenous petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree
No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972. X x x

Contrary to the petitioners’ argument, Presidential Decree No. 87,

although enacted in 1972, before the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, remains
to be a valid law unless otherwise repealed x x x.

This Court could not simply assume that while Presidential Decree No. 87
had not yet been expressly repealed, it had been impliedly repealed. X x x

Consequently, we find no merit in petitioners’ contention that SC-46 is

prohibited on the ground that there is no general law prescribing the standard or
uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for service contracts involving oil
exploration and extraction.

But note must be made at this point that while Presidential Decree No. 87
may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for petroleum
exploration and extraction may be authorized, x x x the exploitation and
utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only
through a law passed by Congress, since the Tanon Strait is a NIPAS (National
Integrated Protected Areas System) area.
 2. President was not the signatory to SC-46 and the same was not
submitted to Congress

While the Court finds that Presidential Decree No. 87 is sufficient to

satisfy the requirement of a general law, the absence of the two other conditions,
that the President be a signatory to SC-46, and that Congress be notified of such
contract, renders it null and void.

As SC-46 was executed in 2004, its terms should have conformed not only
to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 87, but also those of the 1987
Constitution. X x x

Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that

the President himself enter into any service contract for the exploration of
petroleum. SC-46 appeared to have been entered into and signed only by the
DOE (Department of Energy) through its then Secretary, Vicente S. Perez, Jr.,
contrary to the said constitutional requirement. Moreover, public respondents
have neither shown nor alleged that Congress was subsequently notified of the
execution of such contract.

Public respondents’ implied argument that based on the “alter ego

principle,” their acts are also that of then President Macapagal-Arroyo’s, cannot
apply in this case. In Joson v. Torres (352 Phil. 888, 915 [1998]), we explained the
concept of the alter ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency and
its limits x x x.

Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single

executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies
of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through
the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumably the acts of the
Chief Executive.
 While the requirements in executing service contracts in paragraph 4,
Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution seem like mere formalities, they,
in reality, take on a much bigger role. As we have explained in La Bugal, they are
the safeguards put in place by the framers of the Constitution to “eliminate or
minimize the abuses prevalent during the martial law regime.” Thus, they are
not just mere formalities, which will render a contract unenforceable but not
void, if not complied with. They are requirements placed, not just in an ordinary
statute, but in the fundamental law, the non-observance of which will nullify the
contract. X x x

As this Court has held in La Bugal, our Constitution requires that the
President himself be the signatory of service agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving the exploration, development, and utilization of our
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. This power cannot be taken lightly.

In this case, the public respondents have failed to show that the President
had any participation in SC-46. Their argument that their acts are actually the
acts of then President Macapagal-Arroyo, absent proof of her disapproval, must
fail as the requirement that the President herself enter into these kinds of
contracts are embodied not just in any ordinary statute, but in the Constitution
itself. These service contracts involving the exploitation, development, and
utilization of our natural resources are of paramount interest to the present and
future generations. Hence, safeguards were put in place to insure that the
guidelines set by law are meticulously observed and likewise to eradicate the
corruption that may easily penetrate departments and agencies by ensuring that
the President has authorized or approved of these service contracts herself.

Even under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 87, it is required that
the Petroleum Board, now the DOE (Department of Energy), obtain the
President’s approval for the execution of any contract under said statute x x x.

Even if we were inclined to relax the requirement in La Bugal to harmonize

the 1987 Constitution with the aforementioned provision of Presidential Decree
No. 87, it must be shown that the government agency or subordinate official has
been authorized by the President to enter into such service contract for the
government. Otherwise, it should be at least shown that the President
subsequently approved of such contract explicitly. None of these circumstances
is evident in the case at bar.
 On the legality of Service Contract No. 46 vis-à-vis Other Laws

Xxx

Moreover, SC-46 was not executed for the mere purpose of gathering
information on the possible energy resources in the Tanon Strait as it also
provides for the parties’ rights and obligations relating to extraction and
petroleum production should oil in commercial quantities be found to exist in
the area. While Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon
which a service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be
authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present
case may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the Tanon
Strait is a NIPAS (National Integrated Protected Areas System) area. Since there
is no such law specifically allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in the
Tanon Strait, no energy resource exploitation and utilization may be done in said
protected seascape.

Academic Freedom

Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher

learning. (Sec. 5[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution)

Academic freedom of educational institutions has been defined as the

right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how
best to attain them - free from outside coercion or interference save possibly
when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere
of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. Said constitutional
provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion.
That would be to frustrate its purpose and nullify its intent. (University of San
Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 761, 774-775, March 7, 1994 [Nocon])

What are the essential freedoms subsumed in the term “academic freedom”?

In Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong (G.R. No. 99327, 27 May 1993),

this Court cited with approval the formulation made by Justice Felix Frankfurter
of the essential freedoms subsumed in the term “academic freedom”
encompassing not only “the freedom to determine x x x on academic grounds
who may teach, what may be taught (and) how it shall be taught,” but likewise
“who may be admitted to study.” We have thus sanctioned its invocation by a
school in rejecting students who are academically delinquent, or a laywoman
seeking admission to a seminary, or students violating “School Rules on
Discipline.” (Isabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc., 227 SCRA 595-
597, Nov. 8, 1993, En Banc [Vitug])

THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

The main distinction between a presidential form of government and a

parliamentary form of government

In a presidential form of government, there is the observance of the

doctrine of separation of powers; in a parliamentary government, instead of
separation of powers, there is the union of the executive and legislative branches.
In a presidential form of government, the President is elected by the people at
large; in a parliamentary government, the Prime Minister is elected not by the
people at large but by members of Parliament.

Tests of a Valid Delegation of Power

In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative

power, the Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate,
the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the
delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. (Jose Jesus M.
Disini, Jr., et al. v. The Secretary of Justice, et al., G.R. No,. 203335, Feb. 11, 2014,
En Banc [Abad])