PUBLIC CORPORATIONS DIGEST (MIDTERM)
DISCIPLINE OF LOCAL OFFICIALS
MANDANAS V. OCHOA,
JULY 13, 2018
FACTS:
One of the key features of the 1987 Constitution is its push towards
decentralization of government and local autonomy. Local autonomy has
two facets, the administrative and the fiscal. Implementing the
constitutional mandate for decentralization and local autonomy,
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code (LGC).
The share of the LGUs, heretofore known as the Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA), has been regularly released to the LGUs. According to
the implementing rules and regulations of the LGC, the IRA is
determined on the basis of the actual collections of the National Internal
Revenue Taxes (NIRTs) as certified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIMandanas, et al. allege herein that certain collections of NIR Ts by the
Bureau of Customs (BOC) - specifically: excise taxes, value added taxes
(VATs) and documentary stamp taxes (DSTs) - have not been included in
the base amounts for the computation of the IRA; that such taxes, albeit
collected by the BOC, should form part of the base from which the IRA
should be computed because they constituted NIRTs; that, consequently,
the release of the additional amount of ₱60,750,000,000.00 to the LGUs
as their IRA for FY 2012 should be ordered; and that for the same reason
the LGUs should also be released their unpaid IRA for FY 1992 to FY
2011, inclusive, totaling ₱438,103,906,675.73.
ISSUES:
1. Is Section 284 of the LGC unconstitutional for being repugnant to
Section 6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution?
2. Can the LGUs’ just share in the national taxes be automatically
released without the need of an appropriation?
RULING:
1. There is no issue as to what constitutes the LGUs' just share
expressed in percentages of the national taxes (i.e.,30%, 35% and 40%
stipulated in subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) of Section 284 ). Yet, Section
6, supra, mentions national taxes as the source of the just share of the
LGUs while Section 284 ordains that the share of the LG Us be taken
from national internal revenue taxes instead.
Although the power of Congress to make laws is plenary in nature,
congressional lawmaking remains subject to the limitations stated in the
1987 Constitution. The phrase national internal revenue taxes engrafted
in Section 284 is undoubtedly more restrictive than the term national
taxes written in Section 6. As such, Congress has actually departed from
the letter of the 1987 Constitution stating that national taxes should be
the base from which the just share of the LGU comes. Such departure is
impermissible. Verba legis non est recedendum (from the words of a
statute there should be no departure).
Equally impermissible is that Congress has also thereby curtailed the
guarantee of fiscal autonomy in favor of the LGUs under the 1987
Constitution. Although it has the primary discretion to determine and fix
the just share of the LGUs in the national taxes (e.g., Section 284 of the
LGC), Congress cannot disobey the express mandate of Section 6, Article
X of the 1987 Constitution for the just share of the LGUs to be derived
from the national taxes.
The phrase as determined by law in Section 6 follows and qualifies the
phrase just share, and cannot be construed as qualifying the succeeding
phrase in the national taxes. The intent of the people in respect of
Page 1 of 13
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS DIGEST (MIDTERM)
Section 6 is really that the base for reckoning the just share of the LGUs
should include all national taxes. To read Section 6 differently as
requiring that the just share of LGUs in the national taxes shall be
determined by law is tantamount to the unauthorized revision of the
1987 Constitution.
2. Section 6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution commands that the
just share of the LGUs in national taxes shall be automatically released to
them.
The term automatic connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and
perfunctory; and, in the context of this case, the LGUs are not required to
perform any act or thing in order to receive their just share in the
national taxes. Section 6 does not mention of appropriation as a
condition for the automatic release of the just share to the LGUs. This is
because Congress not only already determined the just share through
the LGC's fixing the percentage of the collections of the NIRTs to
constitute such fair share subject to the power of the President to adjust
the same in order to manage public sector deficits subject to limitations
on the adjustments, but also explicitly authorized such just share to be
"automatically released" to the LGUs in the proportions and regularity
set under Section 285 of the LGC without need of annual appropriation.
The 1987 Constitution is forthright and unequivocal in ordering that the
just share of the LGUs in the national taxes shall be automatically
released to them. With Congress having established the just share
through the LGC, it seems to be beyond debate that the inclusion of the
just share of the LGUs in the annual GAAs is unnecessary, if not
superfluous. Hence, the just share of the LGUs in the national taxes shall
be released to them without need of yearly appropriation.
CAMID VS OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
JANUARY 17, 2005
FACTS:
President Diosdado Macapagal issued several Executive Orders creating
thirty-three (33) municipalities in Mindanao. Among them was Andong
in Lanao del Sur which was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 107.
Court unanimously held that the challenged Executive Orders were null
and void. A majority of five justices, led by the ponente, Justice (later
Chief Justice) Roberto Concepcion, ruled that Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code did not meet the well-settled requirements for a
valid delegation of legislative power to the executive branch.
Among the Executive Orders annulled was Executive Order No. 107
which created the Municipality of Andong. Petitioner Sultan Osop B.
Camid (Camid) represents himself as a current resident of Andong, suing
as a private citizen and taxpayer whose locus standi "is of public and
paramount interest especially to the people of the Municipality of
Andong, Province of Lanao del Sur." alleges that Andong "has
metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality with a complete set of
officials appointed to handle essential services for the municipality and
its constituents," even though he concedes that since 1968, no person
has been appointed, elected or qualified to serve any of the elective local
government positions of Andong.
Nonetheless, the municipality of Andong has its own high school, Bureau
of Posts, a Department of Education, Culture and Sports office, and at
least seventeen (17) "barangay units" with their own respective
chairmen. From 1964 until 1972, according to Camid, the public officials
of Andong "have been serving their constituents through the minimal
Page 2 of 13
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS DIGEST (MIDTERM)
means and resources with least (sic) honorarium and recognition from
the Office of the then former President Diosdado Macapagal." Since the
time of Martial Law in 1972, Andong has allegedly been getting by
despite the absence of public funds, with the "Interim Officials" serving
their constituents "in their own little ways and means."
In support of his claim that Andong remains in existence, Camid presents
to this Court a Certification issued by the Office of the Community
Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) certifying the total land
area of the Municipality of Andong, "created under Executive Order No.
107 issued [last] October 1, 1964." He also submits a Certification issued
by the Provincial Statistics Office of Marawi City concerning the
population of Andong, which is pegged at fourteen thousand fifty nine
(14,059) strong. Camid also enumerates a list of governmental agencies
and private groups that allegedly recognize Andong, and notes that other
municipalities have recommended to the Speaker of the Regional
Legislative Assembly for the immediate implementation of the revival or
re-establishment of Andong.
Camid imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DILG "in not
classifying [Andong] as a regular existing municipality and in not
including said municipality in its records and official database as [an]
existing regular municipality." He characterizes such non-classification
as unequal treatment to the detriment of Andong, especially in light of
the current recognition given to the eighteen (18) municipalities
similarly annulled by reason of Pelaez. As appropriate relief, Camid
prays that the Court annul the DILG Certification dated 21 November
2003; direct the DILG to classify Andong as a "regular existing
municipality;" all public respondents, to extend full recognition and
support to Andong; the Department of Finance and the Department of
Budget and Management, to immediately release the internal revenue
allotments of Andong; and the public respondents, particularly the DILG,
to recognize the "Interim Local Officials" of Andong.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Andong is entitled to recognition as De Facto Municipal
Corporation
RULING:
NO. The Court since held that where a municipality created as such by
executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded
legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned.
In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., the Court
considered the following factors as having validated the creation of a
municipal corporation, which, like the Municipality of Sinacaban, was
created by executive order of the President before the ruling in Pelaez v.
Auditor General:
(1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation
of the municipality had never been challenged;
(2) the fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto
suit was filed to question the validity of the executive order
creating such municipality; and
(3) the fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth
class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court
and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution
apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives.
Above all, it was held that whatever doubt there might be as to the de
jure character of the municipality must be deemed to have been put to
rest by the Local Government Code of 1991 (R. A. No. 7160), 442(d) of
Page 3 of 13
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS DIGEST (MIDTERM)
which provides that "municipal districts organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the
effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular
municipalities.
DISOMANGCOP VS SECRETARY OF DPWH
NOVEMBER 24, 2004
FACTS:
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Republic Act No. 6734 (R.A.
6734), entitled "An Act Providing for An Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao," was enacted and signed into law on 1
August 1989.
In accordance with R.A. 6734, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued
on 12 October 1990, Executive Order No. 426 (E.O. 426), entitled
"Placing the Control and Supervision of the Offices of the Department of
Public Works and Highways within the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao under the Autonomous Regional Government, and for other
purposes." Sections 1 to 3 of the Executive Order are its operative
provisions.
ARMM was formally organized on 6 November 1990. President Corazon
C. Aquino flew to Cotabato, the seat of the Regional Government, for the
inauguration. At that point, she had already signed seven (7) Executive
Orders devolving to ARMM the powers of seven (7) cabinet
departments, namely: (1) local government; (2) labor and employment;
(3) science and technology; (4) public works and highways; (5) social
welfare and development; (6) tourism; and (7) environment and
national resources.
Nearly nine (9) years later, on 20 May 1999, then Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) Secretary Gregorio R. Vigilar issued D.O.
119 known as the “Creation of Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office”.
Pursuant to Sections 6 and 25 of Executive Order No. 124 dated 30
January 1987, there is hereby created a DPWH Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office which shall have jurisdiction over all national
infrastructure projects and facilities under the DPWH within Marawi
City and the province of Lanao del Sur. The headquarters of the Marawi
Sub-District Engineering Office shall be at the former quarters of the
Marawi City Engineering Office.
Personnel of the above-mentioned Sub-District Engineering Office shall
be made up of employees of the National Government Section of the
former Marawi City Engineering Office who are now assigned with the
Iligan City Sub-District Engineering Office as may be determined by the
DPWH Region XII Regional Director.
Almost two (2) years later, on 17 January 2001, then President Joseph E.
Estrada approved and signed into law R.A. 8999. The text of the law
reads:
AN ACT ESTABLISHING AN ENGINEERING DISTRICT IN THE
FIRST DISTRICT OF THE PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL SUR AND
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. The City of Marawi and the municipalities
comprising the First District of the Province of Lanao del Sur are
Page 4 of 13
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS DIGEST (MIDTERM)
hereby constituted into an engineering district to be known as
the First Engineering District of the Province of Lanao del Sur.
SEC. 2. The office of the engineering district hereby created shall
be established in Marawi City, Province of Lanao del Sur.
Congress later passed Republic Act No. 9054 (R.A. 9054), entitled "An
Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No.
6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, as Amended." Like its forerunner, R.A. 9054 contains detailed
provisions on the powers of the Regional Government and the retained
areas of governance of the National Government.
R.A. 9054 lapsed into law on 31 March 2001. It was ratified in a
plebiscite held on 14 August 2001. The province of Basilan and the City
of Marawi also voted to join ARMM on the same date. R.A. 6734 and R.A.
9054 are collectively referred to as the ARMM Organic Acts.
On 23 July 2001, petitioners Arsadi M. Disomangcop (Disomangcop) and
Ramir M. Dimalotang (Dimalotang) addressed a petition to then DPWH
Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong, seeking the revocation of D.O. 119 and
the non-implementation of R.A. 8999. No action, however, was taken on
the petition.
Consequently, petitioners Disomangcop and Dimalotang filed the instant
petition, in their capacity as Officer-in-Charge and District
Engineer/Engineer II, respectively, of the First Engineering District of
the Department of Public Works and Highways, Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (DPWH-ARMM) in Lanao del Sur.
Petitioners seek the following principal reliefs: (1) to annul and set aside
D.O. 119; (2) to prohibit respondent DPWH Secretary from
implementing D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999 and releasing funds for public
works projects intended for Lanao del Sur and Marawi City to the
Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office and other administrative regions
of DPWH; and (3) to compel the Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) to release all funds for public works projects
intended for Marawi City and the First District of Lanao del Sur to the
DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur only; and to
compel respondent DPWH Secretary to let the DPWH-ARMM First
Engineering District in Lanao del Sur implement all public works
projects within its jurisdictional area.
The petition includes an urgent application for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and, after hearing, a writ of
preliminary Injunction, to enjoin respondent DBM Secretary from
releasing funds for public works projects in Lanao del Sur to entities
other than the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur,
and also to restrain the DPWH Secretary from allowing others besides
the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur to
implement public works projects in Lanao del Sur.
Petitioners also contend that R.A. 8999 is a piece of legislation that was
not intelligently and thoroughly studied, and that the explanatory note
to House Bill No. 995 (H.B. 995) from which the law originated is
questionable. Petitioners assert as well that prior to the sponsorship of
the law, no public hearing nor consultation with the DPWH-ARMM was
made. The House Committee on Public Works and Highways
(Committee) failed to invite a single official from the affected agency.
Finally, petitioners argue that the law was skillfully timed for signature
by former President Joseph E. Estrada during the pendency of the
impeachment proceedings.
Respondents however contended that the petitioners have no Locus
Standi or legal standing to assail the constitutionality of the law and the
Page 5 of 13
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS DIGEST (MIDTERM)
department order. They note that petitioners have no personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have locus standi in the instant case.
RULING:
The challenge to the legal standing of petitioners cannot succeed. Legal
standing or Locus Standi is defined as a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury
as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term
"interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the
decree, as distinguished from a mere interest in the question involved,
or a mere incidental interest.
A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must
show "not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is
in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way." He must show that he has been, or is about to be, denied
some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is
about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the
statute complained of.
But following the new trend, this Court is inclined to take cognizance of a
suit although it does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when
paramount interests are involved. In several cases, the Court has
adopted a liberal stance on the Locus Standi of a petitioner where the
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the
people.
In the instant case, petitioner Disomangcop holds the position of
Engineer IV. When he filed this petition, he was the Officer-in-Charge,
Office of the District Engineer of the First Engineering District of DPWH-
ARMM, Lanao del Sur. On the other hand, petitioner Dimalotang is an
Engineer II and President of the rank and file employees also of the First
Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur. Both are charged
with the duty and responsibility of supervising and implementing all
public works projects to be undertaken and being undertaken in Lanao
del Sur which is the area of their jurisdiction.
It is thus not far-fetched that the creation of the Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office under D.O. 119 and the creation of and appropriation
of funds to the First Engineering District of Lanao del Sur as directed
under R.A. 8999 will affect the powers, functions and responsibilities of
the petitioners and the DPWH-ARMM. As the two offices have apparently
been endowed with functions almost identical to those of DPWH-ARMM
First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur, it is likely that petitioners are
in imminent danger of being eased out of their duties and, not remotely,
even their jobs. Their material and substantial interests will definitely be
prejudiced by the enforcement of D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999. Such injury is
direct and immediate. Thus, they can legitimately challenge the validity
of the enactments subject of the instant case.
MARIANO v COMELEC
MARCH 7, 1995
G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995
FACTS:
This is a consolidated case petitioned by Juanitor Mariano Jr (in a
petition for prohibition) and John Osmena (as a concerned citizen and a
Page 6 of 13
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS DIGEST (MIDTERM)
taxpayer) in a separate petition, against the Municipality of Makati and
Jejomar Binay, municipal treasureer and Sangguniang Bayan of Makati.
They assailed the constitutionality of RA 7854, entitled: An Act
Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be
known as the City of Makati based on the following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land
area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds,
with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the
"three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in
violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by
special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional
provision requiring a general reapportionment law to
be passed by Congress within three (3) years following
the return of every census;
(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in
the title of the bill; and
(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census),
the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.
ISSUE:
1. WON the RA 7854 is unconstitutional? NO
2. Will the delineation violated sec 7 and 450 of LGC? NO
3. Q: is RA 7854 section 51 unconstitutional? NO
4. Is section 52 unconstitutional? No.
RULING:
1. No. Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of
the proposed city of Makati, thus:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The Municipality of Makati
shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as
the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which
shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of
Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has
jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and
beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of
Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and
Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the
Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of
Manila.
The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution
by the appropriate agency or forum of existing boundary disputes or
cases involving questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City
of Makati and the adjoining local government units.
2. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land
area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its
boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by an
inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality.
Page 7 of 13
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS DIGEST (MIDTERM)
Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established
land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2
stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory
of the municipality.
But why did RA 7854 NOT defined the metes and bound during the
time of making it?
At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial
dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort
Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of
respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that
the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to
foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which
could decide the issue.
Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil
that the requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction
of newly created or converted cities should be described by meted
and bounds, with technical descriptions" — was made in order to
provide a means by which the area of said cities may be reasonably
ascertained. In other words, the requirement on metes and bounds
was meant merely as tool in the establishment of local government
units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial
jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring
to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this
case, then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the
law has been sufficiently served.
To require such description in the law as a condition sine qua non for
its validity would be to defeat the very purpose which the Local
Government Code to seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the Code is
to empower local government units and to give them their rightful
due. It seeks to make local governments more responsive to the needs
of their constituents while at the same time serving as a vital cog in
national development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere
ground that no cadastral type of description was used in the law
would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then
becomes a case of the master serving the slave, instead of the other
way around. This could not be the intendment of the law.
3. Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The represent elective
officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the
officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and
functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly
elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their
offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate
existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall
likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and they
shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the
City of Makati.
They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X
and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution which provide:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years
and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Page 8 of 13
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS DIGEST (MIDTERM)
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be
elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
The Supreme Court cannot entertain the challenge due to the ff reason:
a. there must be an actual case or controversy;
b. he question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper
party;
c. the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and
d. the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to
the determination of the case itself.5
(In short, NO LEGAL STANDING)
The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events,
i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections;
that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-
election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that
these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a
hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano)
are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue.(Makati
residents dapat)
4. Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. — Upon its conversion into a highly-
urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2)
legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2)
existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No.
7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to commence
at the next national elections to be held after the effectivity of this
Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes, Dasmariñ as and Forbes shall
be with the first district, in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which
shall form part of the second district.
They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment6 cannot made
by a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is not
expressed in the title of the bill7 and (3) Makati's population, as per
the 1990 census, stands at only four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000).
This has been raised in Tobias vs Abalos: reapportionment of
legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the
charter of a new city. The Constitution9 clearly provides that
Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty
(250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law.
As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from
increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by
Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in
Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment
can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a
review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local
government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation
Page 9 of 13
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS DIGEST (MIDTERM)
where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied
legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative
district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI 12 of
the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the
population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall
have at least one representative. Even granting that the population
of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has
met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000).
SEMA vs COMELEC and DILANGALEN
JULY 16, 2008
The petitions seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of the legislative
district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. The Ordinance apportioned
two legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first
legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities.
Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM), created under its Organic Act, RA 6734, as amended by RA 9054.
Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanao’s
first legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having
voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held in November
1989.
FACTS:
On August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly,
exercised its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of
RA 9054, and enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201, creating
the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities
in the first district of Maguindanao. MMA Act 201 provides:
Sec. 5. The corporate existence of this province shall commence upon the
appointment by the Regional Governor or election of the governor and
majority of the regular members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
The incumbent elective provincial officials of the Province of
Maguindanao shall continue to serve their unexpired terms in the
province that they will choose or where they are residents: Provided,
that where an elective position in both provinces becomes vacant as a
consequence of the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, all
incumbent elective provincial officials shall have preference for
appointment to a higher elective vacant position and for the time being
be appointed by the Regional Governor, and shall hold office until their
successors shall have been elected and qualified in the next local
elections; Provided, further, that they shall continue to receive the
salaries they are receiving at the time of the approval of this Act until the
new readjustment of salaries in accordance with law. Provided,
furthermore, that there shall be no diminution in the number of the
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the mother province.
Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative
district, which includes Cotabato as a part thereof, shall remain.
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuan’s creation in a
plebiscite held on 29 October 2006. Hereafter, a request clarifying the
status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of
Page 10 of 13
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS DIGEST (MIDTERM)
Maguindanao into a regular province in relation to MMA ACT 201 was
filed.
In answer to Cotabato City’s query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No.
07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato
City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of
Maguindanao." However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections,
the COMELEC promulgated in March of the same year, Resolution No.
7845; stating that Maguindanao’s first legislative district is composed
only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of
these petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the
legislative district in question as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with
Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato
City).”
Sema, who was a candidate in the May 2007 elections for Representative
of "Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City," prayed for the nullification of
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the
votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contends that Shariff
Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
supplemented to the Constitution.
Sema asserts that the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7902, which maintained the status
quo in Maguindanao’s first legislative district, despite the COMELEC’s
earlier directive in Resolution No. 7845 designating Cotabato City as the
lone component of Maguindanao’s reapportioned first legislative district.
Sema further claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC
usurped Congress’ power to create or reapportion legislative districts.
However, in its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), chose not to reach the merits of the case and
merely contended that (1) Sema wrongly availed of the writ of certiorari
to nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because the COMELEC issued
the same in the exercise of its administrative, not quasi-judicial, power
and (2) Sema’s prayer for the writ of prohibition in G.R. No. 177597
became moot with the proclamation of respondent Didagen P.
Dilangalen (respondent Dilangalen) on 1 June 2007 as representative of
the legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not COMELEC acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7902;
2. Whether or not writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus
are proper to test the constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution
No. 7902;
3. Whether or not Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to
the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional.
RULING:
1. Yes. the COMELEC did not issue Resolution No. 7902 in the
exercise of its judicial or quasi-judicial functions; nor is there a law
which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to exclude from canvassing the
votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan
Province with Cotabato City." These, however, do not justify the outright
dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 because Sema also prayed
for the issuance of the writ of Prohibition; Moreover, the courts have
Page 11 of 13
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS DIGEST (MIDTERM)
long recognized the Writ of Prohibition as proper for testing the
constitutionality of election laws, rules, and regulations.
2. Yes. As given in the first ruling, the courts have long recognized the
Writ of Prohibition as proper for testing the constitutionality of election
laws, rules, and regulations. The purpose of the Writ of Certiorari is to
correct grave abuse of discretion by "any tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions." On the other hand, the
Writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board,
officer, or person to perform an act "which the law specifically enjoins as
a duty."
3. No. The creation of local government units is governed by Section
10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially
altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units –
province, city, municipality or barangay – must comply with
three conditions.
1) First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the
criteria fixed in the Local Government Code.
2) Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution.
3) Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
Under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local
legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to
reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision
of the Constitution.
There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the
delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create
municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution is followed.
For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it
must also validly delegate at the same time the power to create a
legislative district. The threshold issue then is, can Congress validly
delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legislative
districts for the House of Representatives? The answer is in the negative.
Under the present Constitution, as well as in past Constitutions, the
power to increase the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested
exclusively in Congress, as provided by Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution; which vests in Congress the power to increase, through a
law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives.
Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts.
The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the
power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress
exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not
through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The
allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased,
and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a
national law passed by Congress. The power of redistricting is
traditionally regarded as part of the power of Congress to make laws,"
Page 12 of 13
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS DIGEST (MIDTERM)

and thus is vested exclusively in Congress. Congress is a national
legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its
incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must
be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It
would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or
reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress.
An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body,
cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.
Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a
national office like the office of a district representative of Congress
because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate
only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X
of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the
ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan, is void.
HOWEVER, Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution.

Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving

Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes
autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion
legislative districts for Congress. To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly
to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to operate
outside the ARMM’s territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20,
Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the
Regional Assembly’s legislative powers within its territorial jurisdiction.
the geographic and legislative district of the First District of
Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely complies with
Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as
well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
-END-

In Summary: Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the

ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is
void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article
X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution.

Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of
provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative
districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI
of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province
without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that
every province shall have a legislative district.

Page 13 of 13