EN BANC

[A.C. No. 11316. July 12, 2016.]

PATRICK A. CARONAN, complainant, vs. RICHARD A.

CARONAN a.k.a. "ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN," respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM : p

For the Court's resolution is the Complaint-Affidavit 1 filed by complainant

Patrick A. Caronan (complainant), before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), against respondent "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan," whose real name is allegedly Richard A. Caronan (respondent), for
purportedly assuming complainant's identity and falsely representing that the former
has the required educational qualifications to take the Bar Examinations and be
admitted to the practice of law.
The Facts
Complainant and respondent are siblings born to Porferio 2 R. Caronan, Jr. and
Norma A. Caronan. Respondent is the older of the two, having been born on February
7, 1975, while complainant was born on August 5, 1976. 3 Both of them completed
their secondary education at the Makati High School where complainant graduated in
1993 4 and respondent in 1991. 5 Upon his graduation, complainant enrolled at the
University of Makati where he obtained a degree in Business Administration in 1997.
6 He started working thereafter as a Sales Associate for Philippine Seven Corporation
(PSC), the operator of 7-11 Convenience Stores. 7 In 2001, he married Myrna G.
Tagpis with whom he has two (2) daughters. 8 Through the years, complainant rose
from the ranks until, in 2009, he was promoted as a Store Manager of the 7-11 Store
in Muntinlupa. 9
Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent enrolled at the
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM), where he stayed for one (1) year before
transferring to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in 1992. 10 In 1993, he was
discharged from the PMA and focused on helping their father in the family's car rental
business. In 1997, he moved to Nueva Vizcaya with his wife, Rosana, and their three
(3) children. 11 Since then, respondent never went back to school to earn a college
degree. 12
 In 1999, during a visit to his family in Metro Manila, respondent told
complainant that the former had enrolled in a law school in Nueva Vizcaya. 13
Subsequently, in 2004, their mother informed complainant that respondent passed the
Bar Examinations and that he used complainant's name and college records from the
University of Makati to enroll at St. Mary's University's College of Law in
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and take the Bar Examinations. 14 Complainant brushed
these aside as he did not anticipate any adverse consequences to him. 15
In 2006, complainant was able to confirm respondent's use of his name and
identity when he saw the name "Patrick A. Caronan" on the Certificate of Admission
to the Bar displayed at the latter's office in Taguig City. 16 Nevertheless, complainant
did not confront respondent about it since he was pre-occupied with his job and had a
family to support. 17
Sometime in May 2009, however, after his promotion as Store Manager,
complainant was ordered to report to the head office of PSC in Mandaluyong City
where, upon arrival, he was informed that the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
was requesting his presence at its office in Taft Avenue, Manila, in relation to an
investigation involving respondent who, at that point, was using the name "Atty.
Patrick A. Caronan." 18 Accordingly, on May 18, 2009, complainant appeared before
the Anti-Fraud and Computer Crimes Division of the NBI where he was interviewed
and asked to identify documents including: (1) his and respondent's high school
records; (2) his transcript of records from the University of Makati; (3) Land
Transportation Office's records showing his and respondent's driver's licenses; (4)
records from St. Mary's University showing that complainant's transcript of records
from the University of Makati and his Birth Certificate were submitted to St. Mary's
University's College of Law; and (5) Alumni Book of St. Mary's University showing
respondent's photograph under the name "Patrick A. Caronan." 19 Complainant later
learned that the reason why he was invited by the NBI was because of respondent's
involvement in a case for qualified theft and estafa filed by Mr. Joseph G. Agtarap
(Agtarap), who was one of the principal sponsors at respondent's wedding. 20 CAIHTE

Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate crimes and
commit unlawful activities, complainant took it upon himself to inform other people
that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent's real name is Richard A.
Caronan. 21 However, problems relating to respondent's use of the name "Atty. Patrick
A. Caronan" continued to hound him. In July 2013, PSC received a letter from
Quasha Ancheta Peña & Nolasco Law Offices requesting that they be furnished with
complainant's contact details or, in the alternative, schedule a meeting with him to
discuss certain matters concerning respondent. 22 On the other hand, a fellow church-
member had also told him that respondent who, using the name "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan," almost victimized his (church-member's) relatives. 23 Complainant also
received a phone call from a certain Mrs. Loyda L. Reyes (Reyes), who narrated how
respondent tricked her into believing that he was authorized to sell a parcel of land in
Taguig City when in fact, he was not. 24 Further, he learned that respondent was
arrested for gun-running activities, illegal possession of explosives, and violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22. 25
Due to the controversies involving respondent's use of the name "Patrick A.
Caronan," complainant developed a fear for his own safety and security. 26 He also
became the subject of conversations among his colleagues, which eventually forced
him to resign from his job at PSC. 27 Hence, complainant filed the present Complaint-
Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged use of the former's name and identity, and
illegal practice of law. 28
In his Answer, 29 respondent denied all the allegations against him and invoked
res judicata as a defense. He maintained that his identity can no longer be raised as an
issue as it had already been resolved in CBD Case No. 09-2362 where the IBP Board
of Governors dismissed 30 the administrative case 31 filed by Agtarap against him, and
which case had already been declared closed and terminated by this Court in A.C. No.
10074. 32 Moreover, according to him, complainant is being used by Reyes and her
spouse, Brigadier General Joselito M. Reyes, to humiliate, disgrace, malign, discredit,
and harass him because he filed several administrative and criminal complaints
against them before the Ombudsman. 33
On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CBD conducted the scheduled mandatory
conference where both parties failed to appear. 34 Instead, respondent moved to reset
the same on April 20, 2015. 35 On such date, however, both parties again failed to
appear, thereby prompting the IBP-CBD to issue an Order 36 directing them to file
their respective position papers. However, neither of the parties submitted any. 37
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera
(Investigating Commissioner) issued his Report and Recommendation, 38 finding
respondent guilty of illegally and falsely assuming complainant's name, identity, and
academic records. 39 He observed that respondent failed to controvert all the
allegations against him and did not present any proof to prove his identity. 40 On the
other hand, complainant presented clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the real
"Patrick A. Caronan." 41
Further, he noted that respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings
when he disclosed upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that: (a) his parents are Porferio
Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo; and (b) he is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan. 42
However, based on the Marriage Certificate issued by the National Statistics Office
(NSO), "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to a certain "Myrna G. Tagpis," not to Rosana
Halili-Caronan. 43
The Investigating Commissioner also drew attention to the fact that the
photograph taken of respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on
August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in the photograph in the IBP
records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan." 44 These, according to the Investigating
Commissioner, show that respondent indeed assumed complainant's identity to study
law and take the Bar Examinations. 45 Since respondent falsely assumed the name,
identity, and academic records of complainant and the real "Patrick A. Caronan"
neither obtained the bachelor of laws degree nor took the Bar Exams, the
Investigating Commissioner recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with
Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 be dropped and stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. 46 He
also recommended that respondent and the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred
from being admitted as a member of the Bar; and finally, for making a mockery of the
judicial institution, the IBP was directed to institute appropriate actions against
respondent. 47
On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-
2015-607, 48 adopting the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation.
The Issues Before the Court
The issues in this case are whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that: (a) the
name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name
"Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted to the Bar.
The Court's Ruling
After a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to
disturb the findings and recommendations of the IBP.
As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by clear and
overwhelming evidence that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent,
whose real name is Richard A. Caronan, merely assumed the latter's name, identity,
and academic records to enroll at the St. Mary's University's College of Law, obtain a
law degree, and take the Bar Examinations.
As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that he and complainant are
siblings when he disclosed upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that his parents are
Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo. 49 Respondent himself also stated that he
is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan. 50 This diverges from the official NSO records
showing that "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to Myrna G. Tagpis, not to Rosana
Halili-Caronan. 51 Moreover, the photograph taken of respondent when he was
arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the
one in the photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan." 52 Meanwhile,
complainant submitted numerous documents showing that he is the real "Patrick A.
Caronan," among which are: (a) his transcript of records from the University of
Makati bearing his photograph; 53 (b) a copy of his high school yearbook with his
photograph and the name "Patrick A. Caronan" under it; 54 and (c) NBI clearances
obtained in 2010 and 2013. 55
To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent falsely
used complainant's name, identity, and school records to gain admission to the Bar.
Since complainant — the real "Patrick A. Caronan" — never took the Bar
Examinations, the IBP correctly recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is
"Richard A. Caronan," be barred from admission to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for admission to the Bar Examination shall be
admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law course, viz.:
Section 6. Pre-Law. — No applicant for admission to the bar
examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has
satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law,
he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized
university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-
year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a
bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subject as
major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish,
history, and economics. (Emphases supplied)
In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree. While he
enrolled at the PLM in 1991, he left a year later and entered the PMA where he was
discharged in 1993 without graduating. 56 Clearly, respondent has not completed the
requisite pre-law degree.
The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on
complete his college education and earn a law degree under his real name. However,
his false assumption of his brother's name, identity, and educational records renders
him unfit for admission to the Bar. The practice of law, after all, is not a natural,
absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. 57 Rather, it
is a privilege limited to citizens of good moral character. 58 In In the Matter of the
Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations and
for Disciplinary Action as Member of the Philippine Shari'a Bar, Atty. Froilan R.
Melendrez, 59 the Court explained the essence of good moral character: DETACa

Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good
reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in
which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character
is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The
standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct
as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good
moral character includes at least common honesty. 60 (Emphasis supplied)
Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be
a member of the Bar when he assumed the name, identity, and school records of his
own brother and dragged the latter into controversies which eventually caused him to
fear for his safety and to resign from PSC where he had been working for years. Good
moral character is essential in those who would be lawyers. 61 This is imperative in
the nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation which exists between him and
his client, as well as between him and the court. 62
 Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to
have the necessary qualifications to be a lawyer. He also tarnished the image of
lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous activities, which resulted in the filing of several
criminal cases against him. Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place in
the legal profession where one of the primary duties of its members is to uphold its
integrity and dignity. 63
WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan" (respondent) is found GUILTY of falsely assuming the name, identity, and
academic records of complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant) to obtain a law
degree and take the Bar Examinations. Accordingly, without prejudice to the filing of
appropriate civil and/or criminal cases, the Court hereby resolves that:
(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 is ordered
DROPPED and STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys;
(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law or
making any representations as a lawyer;
(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of the Philippine
Bar in the future;
(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to
respondent under the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" and the
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificates issued in such
name are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED; and
(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to CIRCULATE notices
and POST in the bulletin boards of all courts of the country a
photograph of respondent with his real name, "Richard A. Caronan,"
with a warning that he is not a member of the Philippine Bar and a
statement of his false assumption of the name and identity of "Patrick A.
Caronan."
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J, Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta,
Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza and Caguioa, JJ.,
concur.
Mendoza * and Reyes, ** JJ., are on official leave.
||| (Caronan v. Caronan, A.C. No. 11316, [July 12, 2016], 789 PHIL 628-639)

SECOND DIVISION
 [A.C. No. 12121. June 27, 2018.]
(Formerly CBD Case No. 14-4322)

CELESTINO MALECDAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. SIMPSON T.

BALDO, respondent.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J : p

Before this Court is an administrative complaint 1 filed with the Office of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Baguio-Benguet Chapter (IBP Baguio-Benguet
Chapter) by Complainant Celestino Malecdan (Malecdan) against Respondent Atty.
Simpson T. Baldo (Atty. Baldo), for the latter's alleged violation of Section 9 of
Presidential Decree 1508 (P.D. 1508), otherwise known as the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, which prohibits the participation of lawyers in the proceedings
before the Lupon:
SEC. 9. Appearance of parties in person. — In all proceedings
provided for herein, the parties must appear in person without the assistance
of counsel/representative, with the exception of minors and incompetents
who may be assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Factual Antecedents
Malecdan filed a letter of complaint for Estafa, Breach of Contract and
Damages against spouses James and Josephine Baldo, before the Lupon of Barangay
Pico in La Trinidad, Benguet.
On August 14, 2014, Atty. Baldo appeared as counsel of spouses Baldo during
the hearing on the subject complaint before the Punong Barangay. 2
On August 18, 2014, Malecdan filed a Complaint-Affidavit (Complaint) before
the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter praying that proper sanctions be imposed on Atty.
Baldo for violating Section 9 of P.D. 1508. CAacTH

On August 20, 2014, the Committee on Ethics of the IBP Baguio-Benguet

Chapter furnished Atty. Baldo with a copy of the complaint and set the case for a
conciliation conference on September 12, 2014. 3
On September 15, 2014, the Complaint was endorsed to the Committee on Bar
Discipline-IBP (CBD-IBP) by the Committee on Ethics of IBP Baguio-Benguet
Chapter after the parties failed to agree on a settlement. 4
 The CBD-IBP thereafter issued an Order 5 dated September 17, 2014,
requiring Atty. Baldo to submit a duly verified Answer, within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the order. 6
On January 14, 2015, the CBD-IBP issued a Notice 7 setting the mandatory
conference/hearing of the subject complaint on February 18, 2015. 8
On February 12, 2015, Malecdan filed his Mandatory Conference Brief. 9
On February 23, 2015, the mandatory conference of the case was re-scheduled
to March 24, 2015 after Atty. Baldo failed to attend the same. 10
In his Answer 11 dated February 23, 2015, Atty. Baldo admitted that he was
present during the proceedings before the Punong Barangay. He explained that he
was permitted by the parties to participate in the said hearing, to wit:
1. The allegation in the complaint is admitted. However, the rest of the truth to
the matter is that, before entering the barangay session hall,
respondent asked permission from the officer-in-charge if he will be
allowed that before any hearing be conducted, he and the
respondent in the said barangay case, his uncle, James Baldo, be
allowed to talk to complainant Celestino Malecdan as they may be
able to amicably settle the matter on their own, of which the officer
in charge granted on the reason that the proceeding was still in the
dialogue stage;
2. Likewise, when he entered inside the barangay session hall where
complainant and his companion, Laila Alumno was waiting, respondent
again asked permission from complainant and his companion, Laila
Alumno if the latter will allow the former to join them in the
dialogue with James Baldo as the parties may amicably settle the
case on their own; IAETDc

3. Since complainant already knew respondent as they had a previous meeting at

the office of complainant's lawyer, Atty. Melissa Quitan-Corpuz
concerning the same case against James Baldo, complainant readily
permitted and allowed that parties have a dialogue on their own with
respondent joining them and without the presence of any barangay
officials. 12 (Emphasis supplied)
In an Order 13 dated March 24, 2015, Investigating Commissioner Eduardo R.
Robles gave Malecdan a period of fifteen (15) days to file a supplemental complaint
where he can incorporate other facts and circumstances which he failed to indicate in
his complaint. Atty. Baldo was likewise given a period of fifteen (15) days from his
receipt of the supplemental complaint within which to file his supplemental answer
should he wish to do so. 14
On March 31, 2015, Malecdan filed his Verified Supplemental Complaint
Affidavit, 15 wherein he insisted that he vehemently objected to the presence of Atty.
Baldo during the proceedings before the Punong Barangay, to wit:
 2. Using his influence as a lawyer, Atty. Baldo prevailed upon the
Punong Barangay and the Barangay Secretary to let him participate in
the barangay proceedings intended for the settlement of our grievance
against Spouses Josephine Baldo and James Baldo on August 14, 2014.
3. He did this over my vehement objections. I told him that he was not
supposed to be there but then he insisted. It even got to the point that we were
already arguing out loud. I resented the fact that he was there assisting and
representing his clients, the Spouses Baldo while I was not represented by
counsel. We were in a situation that Section 9 of Presidential Decree 1508
sought to prevent. 16 (Emphasis supplied)
After due proceedings, Investigating Commissioner Robles rendered a Report
and Recommendation 17 on June 2, 2015, recommending that Atty. Baldo be given a
warning. Commissioner Robles found that the language of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law is not that definite as to unqualifiedly bar lawyers from appearing
before the Lupon, nor is the language that clear on the sanction imposable for such an
appearance. 18 Commissioner Robles reasoned that the matter of appearance or non-
appearance before the Lupon is clearly addressed to a lawyer's taste of propriety: SaCIDT

x x x. The respondent ought to have known that his attendance thereat

would have caused some ruckus. That respondent chose to attend is some
measure of his lack of propriety.
Although this Commission cannot legislate good taste or an acute
sense of propriety, the Commission can definitely remind the respondent that
another act of insensitivity to the rules of good conduct will court
administrative sanctions. 19
The dispositive portion of Commissioner Robles' Report and Recommendation
reads as follows:
UPON THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully recommended that the
respondent Atty. Simpson T. Baldo be given a warning.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. 20
On June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution 21
reversing and setting aside the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and instead recommended that Atty. Baldo be reprimanded, thus:
RESOLVED to REVERSE as it is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", considering
Respondent's appearance as counsel for Spouses James and Josephine Baldo
in a Katarungan[g] Pambarangay hearing, Thus, Respondent is hereby
REPRIMANDED. 22 (Emphasis in the original and italics omitted)
The Court's Ruling
 After a judicious examination of the records and submission of the parties, the
Court upholds the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that the language of P.D.
1508 is mandatory in barring lawyers from appearing before the Lupon.
As stated in the case of Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 23 Section 9 of P.D.
1508 mandates personal confrontation of the parties because:
"x x x a personal confrontation between the parties without the
intervention of a counsel or representative would generate spontaneity
and a favorable disposition to amicable settlement on the part of the
disputants. In other words, the said procedure is deemed conducive to the
successful resolution of the dispute at the barangay level."
xxx xxx xxx
"To ensure compliance with the requirement of personal
confrontation between the parties, and thereby, the effectiveness of the
barangay conciliation proceedings as a mode of dispute resolution, the
above-quoted provision is couched in mandatory language. Moreover,
pursuant to the familiar maxim in statutory construction dictating that
'expressio unius est exclusio alterius,' the express exceptions made regarding
minors and incompetents must be construed as exclusive of all others not
mentioned." 24 (Emphasis supplied) cHECAS

Atty. Baldo's violation of P.D. 1508 thus falls squarely within the prohibition
of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which
provides:
CANON 1 — A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW
AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.
Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal
processes. A Lawyer, to the best of his ability, is expected to respect and abide by the
law, and thus, avoid any act or omission that is contrary to the same. 25 A lawyer's
personal deference to the law not only speaks of his character but it also inspires the
public to likewise respect and obey the law. 26 Rule 1.01, on the other hand, states the
norm of conduct to be observed by all lawyers. Any act or omission that is contrary
to, or prohibited or unauthorized by, or in defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards
the law is unlawful. 27 Unlawful conduct does not necessarily imply the element of
criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such element. 28
Here, Atty. Baldo admitted that he appeared and participated in the
proceedings before the Punong Barangay in violation of Section 9 of P.D. 1508. Atty.
Baldo therefore violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR in connection with Section 9 of P.D.
 1508 when he appeared as counsel for spouses James and Josephine Baldo in a
hearing before the Punong Barangay, Barangay Pico, Municipality of La Trinidad in
Benguet.
All told, the Court finds that the evidence adduced is sufficient to support the
allegations against Atty. Baldo.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Simpson T. Baldo LIABLE for
violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and he
is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act would be dealt with more severely. AHDacC

SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
 
||| (Malecdan v. Baldo, A.C. No. 12121, [June 27, 2018])

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 6593. February 4, 2010.]

MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, complainant, vs. ATTYS. ANGEL E.

GARRIDO and ROMANA P. VALENCIA, respondents.

DECISION

PER CURIAM : p

Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit 1 and a supplemental

affidavit 2 for disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty.
Garrido) and Atty. Romana. P. Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline charging them with gross immorality.
The complaint-affidavit states:

1. That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our marriage
on June 23, 1962 at San Marcelino Church, Ermita, Manila which was
solemnized by Msgr. Daniel Cortes . . .

2. That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six (6) children,
namely, Mat * Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito, Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel
 Angelo, Arnel Victorino and Madonna Angeline, all surnamed
Garrido;

3. . . .

4. That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our children, one of my
daughters, Madeleine confided to me that sometime on the later part of
1987, an unknown caller talked with her claiming that the former is a
child of my husband. I ignored it and dismissed it as a mere joke. But
when May Elizabeth, also one of my daughters told me that sometime on
August 1990, she saw my husband strolling at the Robinson's
Department Store at Ermita, Manila together with a woman and a child
who was later identified as Atty. Ramona * Paguida Valencia and
Angeli Ramona Valencia Garrido, respectively . . .

5. . . .

6. That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able to secure the
Certificate of Live Birth of the child, stating among others that the said
child is their daughter and that Atty. Angel Escobar Garrido and Atty.
Romana Paguida Valencia were married at Hongkong sometime on
1978. HITAEC

7. That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and joined Atty.
Ramona Paguida Valencia at their residence . . .

8. That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to give us our
needed financial support to the prejudice of our children who stopped
schooling because of financial constraints.

xxx xxx xxx

That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his mistress as

alleged in the same affidavit, Atty. Romana P. Valencia considering that out of
their immoral acts I suffered not only mental anguish but also besmirch
reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights; . . .

In his Counter-Affidavit, 3 Atty. Garrido denied Maelotisea's charges and

imputations. By way of defense, he alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as
he was already married to Constancia David (Constancia) when he married
Maelotisea. He claimed he married Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted ways.
He further alleged that Maelotisea knew all his escapades and understood his "bad
boy" image before she married him in 1962. As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the
years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became close to
Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved his
personal problems and his financial difficulties with his second family. Atty. Garrido
denied that he failed to give financial support to his children with Maelotisea,
emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in private schools; all
graduated from college except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary
course. 4 Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea had not been employed and had not
practiced her profession for the past ten (10) years.
Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he
became a member of the bar on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage contracted after
the death of Constancia on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children with
Maelotisea were born before he became a lawyer.
In her Counter-Affidavit, 5 Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of
Atty. Garrido. She explained that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido
since the marriage between them was void from the beginning due to the then existing
marriage of Atty. Garrido with Constancia. Atty. Valencia claimed that Maelotisea
knew of the romantic relationship between her and Atty. Garrido, as they (Maelotisea
and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship with
Atty. Garrido and had maintained this silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially
helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his second family. Atty. Valencia alleged that
Maelotisea was not a proper party to this suit because of her silence; she kept silent
when things were favorable and beneficial to her. Atty. Valencia also alleged that
Maelotisea had no cause of action against her.
In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions before the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline:
First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings 6 in view
of the criminal complaint for concubinage Maelotisea filed against them, and the
Petitions for Declaration of Nullity 7 (of marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his
marriage to Maelotisea. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied this motion
for lack of merit.
THaCAI

Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss 8 the complaints after the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City declared the marriage between Atty. Garrido and
Maelotisea "an absolute nullity." Since Maelotisea was never the legal wife of Atty.
Garrido, the respondents argued that she had no personality to file her complaints
against them. The respondents also alleged that they had not committed any immoral
act since they married when Atty. Garrido was already a widower, and the acts
complained of were committed before his admission to the bar. The IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline also denied this motion. 9
Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed
against the respondents, arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly relations with
Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six (6) children. 10 The IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline likewise denied this motion. 11
 On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan
(Investigating Commissioner San Juan) submitted her Report and Recommendation
for the respondents' disbarment. 12 The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP
Board of Governors (IBP Board of Governors) approved and adopted this
recommendation with modification under Resolution No. XVI-2004-375 dated July
30, 2004. This resolution in part states:

. . . finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on

record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Atty. Garrido
exhibited conduct which lacks the degree of morality required as members of
the bar, Atty. Angel E. Garrido is hereby DISBARRED for gross immorality.
However, the case against Atty. Romana P. Valencia is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit of the complaint.
TcICEA

Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline denied his motion under Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated January
18, 2007.
Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition for
review. He submits that under the circumstances, he did not commit any gross
immorality that would warrant his disbarment. He also argues that the offenses
charged have prescribed under the IBP rules.
Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian
considerations to retain his profession; he is already in the twilight of his life, and has
kept his promise to lead an upright and irreproachable life notwithstanding his
situation.
In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A.
Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal), Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline, filed
her Comment on the petition. She recommends a modification of the penalty from
disbarment to reprimand, advancing the view that disbarment is very harsh
considering that the 77-year-old Atty. Garrido took responsibility for his acts and tried
to mend his ways by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of his bigamous
marriage. Atty. Risos-Vidal also notes that no other administrative case has ever been
filed against Atty. Garrido.
THE COURT'S RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the IBP Board
of Governors against Atty. Garrido, and to reject its recommendation with
respect to Atty. Valencia.
General Considerations
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure — such as the
verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of
offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant — do not apply in
the determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar.
13 We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. 14
First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice
and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public. 15 The
admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the
privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the
standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that
the State may inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a
disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is
wholly his or her own; 16 effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who
brought the matter to the attention of the Court.
As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts
charged and the filing of the complaint is not material in considering the qualification
of Atty. Garrido when he applied for admission to the practice of law, and his
continuing qualification to be a member of the legal profession. From this perspective,
it is not important that the acts complained of were committed before Atty. Garrido
was admitted to the practice of law. As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo, 17 the
possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing
requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal
profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon
proper complaint, into any question concerning the mental or moral fitness of the
respondent before he became a lawyer. 18 Admission to the practice only creates the
rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to become a
lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary even
after admission to the Bar. 19 cAHIST 

Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5 (5) of the Constitution recognizes the

disciplinary authority of the Court over the members of the Bar to be merely
incidental to the Court's exclusive power to admit applicants to the practice of law.
Reinforcing the implementation of this constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court which expressly states that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among
others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required
to take before admission to the practice of law.
In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of
disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern, Maelotisea's affidavit of
desistance cannot have the effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment
proceedings. As we have stated, Maelotisea is more of a witness than a complainant in
these proceedings. We note further that she filed her affidavits of withdrawal only
after she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now available for the Court's
examination and consideration, and their merits are not affected by her desistance. We
cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to disown
or refute the evidence she had submitted, but solely becuase of compassion (and,
impliedly, out of concern for her personal financial interest in continuing friendly
relations with Atty. Garrido).
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that
show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of
the community. 20 Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
community's sense of decency. 21 We make these distinctions as the supreme penalty
of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral,
conduct. 22
In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who
contracted an unlawful second marriage or multiple marriages.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo, 23 the respondent lawyer entered into multiple
marriages and subsequently used legal remedies to sever them. We ruled that the
respondent's pattern of misconduct undermined the institutions of marriage and family
— institutions that this society looks up to for the rearing of our children, for the
development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities,
and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. In this light, no fate other than
disbarment awaited the wayward respondent.
In Villasanta v. Peralta, 24 the respondent lawyer married the complainant
while his marriage with his first wife was subsisting. We held that the respondent's act
of contracting the second marriage was contrary to honesty, justice, decency and
morality. The lack of good moral character required by the Rules of Court disqualified
the respondent from admission to the Bar.
Similar to Villasanta was the case of Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, 25 where the
respondent secretly contracted a second marriage with the daughter of his client in
Hongkong. We found that the respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of
morality required of members of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of
marriage — a sacred institution that demands respect and dignity. We also declared
his act of contracting a second marriage contrary to honesty, justice, decency and
morality.EaTCSA

In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the
admissions of Atty. Garrido established a pattern of gross immoral conduct that
warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was
reprehensible to the highest degree.
First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies;
thereafter and during the marriage, he had romantic relationships with other women.
He had the gall to represent to this Court that the study of law was his reason for
leaving his wife; marriage and the study of law are not mutually exclusive.
 Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth
he was already married to Constancia. 26 This was a misrepresentation given as an
excuse to lure a woman into a prohibited relationship.
Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea
notwithstanding the subsistence of his first marriage. This was an open admission, not
only of an illegal liaison, but of the commission of a crime.
Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia
while his two marriages were in place and without taking into consideration the moral
and emotional implications of his actions on the two women he took as wives and on
his six (6) children by his second marriage.
Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea
upon the death of Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore him a
daughter.
Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia
(who was not then a lawyer) that he was free to marry, considering that his marriage
with Maelotisea was not "valid."
Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty.
Valencia in Hongkong in an apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union entered
into while another marriage was in place.
Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously
cohabited and had sexual relations with two (2) women who at one point were both
his wedded wives. He also led a double life with two (2) families for a period of more
than ten (10) years.
Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea.
Contrary to the position advanced by Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, this was not an act
of facing up to his responsibility or an act of mending his ways. This was an attempt,
using his legal knowledge, to escape liability for his past actions by having his second
marriage declared void after the present complaint was filed against him. EHTADa

By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal

profession, specifically, violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyer's oath, and
of the ethical rules of the profession.
He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of
his admission to the Bar. 27 As a lawyer, he violated his lawyer's oath, 28 Section 20
(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, 29 and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, 30 all of which commonly require him to obey the laws of the land. In
marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he entered this second
marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He openly admitted
his bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.
 He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which commands that he "shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct"; Canon 7 of the same Code,
which demands that "[a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession"; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides that, "[a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."
As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation
and that he would set a good example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and
the laws. When he violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own personal needs
and selfish motives, he discredited the legal profession and created the public
impression that laws are mere tools of convenience that can be used, bended and
abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. In this case, he also used the law to free
him from unwanted relationships.
The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the
standards and norms expected of the legal profession by upholding the ideals and
principles embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 31 Lawyers are
bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality,
including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. 32 Lawyers are at all times subject to the
watchful public eye and community approbation. 33 Needless to state, those whose
conduct — both public and private — fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and,
after appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized. 34
Atty. Valencia
We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty.
Valencia should be administratively liable under the circumstances for gross
immorality:

. . . The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in

March 27, 1978 when they got married shall not afford them exemption from
sanctions, for good moral character is required as a condition precedent to
admission to the Bar. Likewise there is no distinction whether the misconduct
was committed in the lawyer's professional capacity or in his private life. Again,
the claim that his marriage to complainant was void ab initio shall not relieve
respondents from responsibility . . . Although the second marriage of the
respondent was subsequently declared null and void the fact remains that
respondents exhibited conduct which lacks that degree of morality required of
them as members of the Bar. 35 TECIHD

Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective
reality. 36 To have good moral character, a person must have the personal
characteristics of being good. It is not enough that he or she has a good reputation,
i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or
she is held by the public in the place where she is known. 37 The requirement of good
moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to
protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to
protect errant lawyers from themselves. 38 Each purpose is as important as the other. 
Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer,
Atty. Valencia already knew that Atty. Garrido was a married man (either to
Constancia or to Maelotisea), and that he already had a family. As Atty. Garrido's
admitted confidante, she was under the moral duty to give him proper advice; instead,
she entered into a romantic relationship with him for about six (6) years during the
subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she married Atty. Garrido with the
knowledge that he had an outstanding second marriage. These circumstances, to our
mind, support the conclusion that she lacked good moral character; even without
being a lawyer, a person possessed of high moral values, whose confidential advice
was sought by another with respect to the latter's family problems, would not
aggravate the situation by entering into a romantic liaison with the person seeking
advice, thereby effectively alienating the other person's feelings and affection from his
wife and family.
While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garrido's marriage with Maelotisea
was null and void, the fact remains that he took a man away from a woman who bore
him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would have required her to ward off Atty.
Garrido's advances, as he was a married man, in fact a twice-married man with both
marriages subsisting at that time; she should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the
very start. Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the
death of Constancia, away from legitimizing his relationship with Maelotisea and
their children. Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencia's presence and willingness,
Atty. Garrido even left his second family and six children for a third marriage with
her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the prism of law.
We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencia's expressed belief that Atty. Garrido's
second marriage to Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she felt free to marry Atty.
Garrido. While this may be correct in the strict legal sense and was later on confirmed
by the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garrido's marriage to Maelotisea, we do not
believe at all in the honesty of this expressed belief.
The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong,
not within the country. Given that this marriage transpired before the declaration of
the nullity of Atty. Garrido's second marriage, we can only call this Hongkong
marriage a clandestine marriage, contrary to the Filipino tradition of celebrating a
marriage together with family. Despite Atty. Valencia's claim that she agreed to marry
Atty. Garrido only after he showed her proof of his capacity to enter into a
subsequent valid marriage, the celebration of their marriage in Hongkong 39 leads us
to the opposite conclusion; they wanted to marry in Hongkong for the added security
of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside
Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but note that Atty. Valencia
afterwards opted to retain and use her surname instead of using the surname of her
"husband." Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to mind that her husband did not live
and cohabit with her under one roof, but with his second wife and the family of this
marriage. Apparently, Atty. Valencia did not mind at all "sharing" her husband with
another woman. This, to us, is a clear demonstration of Atty. Valencia's perverse
sense of moral values. SHTEaA

Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencia's

actions grossly immoral. Her actions were so corrupt as to approximate a criminal act,
for she married a man who, in all appearances, was married to another and with whom
he has a family. Her actions were also unprincipled and reprehensible to a high
degree; as the confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability and
engaged in a romantic relationship with him during the subsistence of his two
previous marriages. As already mentioned, Atty. Valencia's conduct could not but be
scandalous and revolting to the point of shocking the community's sense of decency;
while she professed to be the lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second family
build a house prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did not object to sharing her
husband with the woman of his second marriage.
We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited
the legal profession. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly
to the highest standards of morality. 40 In Barrientos v. Daarol, 41 we held that
lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of good moral character but must
also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead lives in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these
standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she became a member of the
legal profession.
Conclusion
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege
bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be
withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyer's lack of the essential
qualifications required of lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this privilege from Atty.
Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this reason.
In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that
the power to disbar is one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as a legal
professional and as an officer of the Court. 42
We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present
case is one of them. The records show the parties' pattern of grave and immoral
misconduct that demonstrates their lack of mental and emotional fitness and moral
character to qualify them for the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as
professionals and as officers of the court.
While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garrido's plea for compassion and his act
of supporting his children with Maelotisea after their separation, we cannot grant his
plea. The extent of his demonstrated violations of his oath, the Rules of Court and of
the Code of Professional Responsibility overrides what under other circumstances are
commendable traits of character. CAIaHS

In like manner, Atty. Valencia's behavior over a long period of time

unequivocally demonstrates a basic and serious flaw in her character, which we
cannot simply brush aside without undermining the dignity of the legal profession and
without placing the integrity of the administration of justice into question. She was
not an on-looker victimized by the circumstances, but a willing and knowing full
participant in a love triangle whose incidents crossed into the illicit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross
immorality, violation of the Lawyer's Oath; and violation of Rule
1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and

(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross
immorality, violation of Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Angel
E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P. Valencia in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and
another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido
and Rowena P. Valencia from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Carpio, Corona, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura,
Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama and Perez,
JJ., concur.

Abad, J., is on wellness leave.

Mendoza, J., is on leave.

 
||| (Garrido v. Garrido, A.C. No. 6593, [February 4, 2010], 625 PHIL 347-367)

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 10676. September 8, 2015.]

ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA, complainant, vs. ATTY. IAN

RAYMOND A. PANGALANGAN, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM : p

The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Disbarment 1 filed by Atty. Roy B. Ecraela
with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
on April 12, 2007 against Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan for his illicit relations,
chronic womanizing, abuse of authority as an educator, and "other unscrupulous
activities" which cause "undue embarrassment to the legal profession." Complainant
claims that respondent's actions involve deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and
grossly immoral conduct in violation of the Lawyer's Oath.
The Facts
Complainant and respondent were best friends and both graduated from the
University of the Philippines (UP) College of Law in 1990, where they were part of a
peer group or barkada with several of their classmates. After passing the bar
examinations and being admitted as members of the Bar in 1991, they were both
registered with the IBP Quezon City.
Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with whom
he has three (3) children. Complainant avers that while married to Jardiolin,
respondent had a series of adulterous and illicit relations with married and unmarried
women between the years 1990 to 2007. These alleged illicit relations involved:
a. AAA, 2 who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of Law, from
1990 to 1992, which complainant had personal knowledge of such illicit
relations;
b. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to 1996,
despite being already married to Jardiolin;
 c. CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also being romantically
involved with DDD;
d. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite still being
married to Jardiolin and while still being romantically involved with
CCC;
e. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the period from May
2004 until the filing of the Petition, while still being romantically
involved with CCC. 3
Complainant claims that respondent, with malice and without remorse,
deceived CCC and DDD by representing himself to be a bachelor, thereby convincing
the two women to start a love affair with him, when in truth, he was then still married
to Jardiolin. 4
Aside from these illicit affairs, complainant avers that sometime during the
period of 1998 to 2000, respondent, as a lawyer of the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel (OGCC), represented the interest of Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA) in cancellation proceedings filed by MIAA against Kendrick
Development Corporation (KDC). However, despite being a public officer and a
government counsel, respondent conspired with Atty. Abraham Espejo, legal counsel
of KDC, and assisted KDC in its case, thereby sabotaging MIAA's case, and, in effect,
that of the Philippine Government. 5
Complainant further claims that respondent even attempted to bribe then
Solicitor Rolando Martin of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in exchange for
the latter's cooperation in the dismissal of the cancellation proceedings in favor of
KDC. In return for his "earnest efforts" in assisting KDC in its case, respondent was
allegedly rewarded with a Toyota Corolla XL with plate number ULS-835 by Atty.
Espejo. The vehicle was seen several times by respondent's classmates and
officemates being driven and parked by respondent in his own home and in the OGCC
premises itself. 6
In connection with his involvement in the MIAA case, complainant claims that
respondent was summoned in a Senate inquiry concerning rampant faking of land
titles in the Philippines, which included an investigation of the alleged spurious land
titles of KDC. In Senate Committee Final Report No. 367, the Senate Blue Ribbon
and Justice & Human Rights Committees recommended that respondent be
investigated and prosecuted by the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for graft
and corruption, as well as disbarment or disciplinary sanction by this Court for grave
misconduct or violation of the Revised Penal Code. 7 CAIHTE

It was further alleged that, during the pendency of the Senate Inquiry,
respondent even attempted to conceal the evidence by requesting complainant's
parents, spouses Marcelo F. Ecraela and Visitacion B. Ecraela, to have the Toyota
Corolla XL parked in their residence in Cainta, Rizal, for an indefinite period of time.
Respondent's request, however, was refused by the spouses when they learned that the
vehicle was the subject of the Senate Inquiry. 8
It appears from the documents presented by complainant that the Ombudsman
issued a Resolution finding probable cause against respondent, and an Information
was thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic
Act No. (RA) 3019. 9
Complainant also claims that respondent abused his authority as an educator in
Manuel L. Quezon University, San Sebastian College, College of St. Benilde, and
Maryknoll College, where respondent induced his male students to engage in
"nocturnal preoccupations" and entertained the romantic gestures of his female
students in exchange for passing grades. 10
The Petition was docketed as CBD Case No. 07-1973.
In an Order 11 dated April 16, 2007, the Director for Bar Discipline, Honorable
Rogelio A. Vinluan, required respondent to file his verified answer.
In his undated Answer, 12 respondent opted not to present any counter-
statement of facts in support of his defense. Instead, respondent simply argued that the
petition suffers from procedural and substantive infirmities, claiming that petitioner
failed to substantiate the allegations or charges against him. Respondent pointed out
that Annex "J" of the Petition entitled "Arguments in Support of the Disbarment"
lacked formal requirements, and thus, should be treated as a mere scrap of paper.
Respondent also asserts that the e-mail messages attached to the petition were
inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence. 13 He claims that the identities of the owners of the e-mail messages, as
well as the allegations of illicit relations and abuse of authority, were not properly
established. Respondent further argues that the statements of complainant's witnesses
were merely self-serving and deserved scant consideration.
Complainant filed a Comment (to the Respondent's Answer), 14 stating that the
allegations in the complaint were deemed admitted by reason of respondent's failure
to make specific or even general denials of such in his Answer.
In his Reply (to the Comment filed by Complainant), 15 respondent simply
denied all of complainant's accusations in the petition, allegedly for "lack of
knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity
thereof." 16
On August 3, 2007, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Leland R.
Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid) set the case for mandatory conference on
August 28, 2007, 17 which respondent failed to attend. It appears that respondent filed
a Motion to Cancel Hearing, 18 praying for the resetting of the mandatory conference
allegedly due to a previously scheduled hearing on the same date. Respondent's
motion was opposed by complainant and eventually denied by Commissioner
Villadolid in his Order 19 dated August 28, 2007. In the same order, complainant's
Manifestation 20 praying that subpoenas be issued to several persons who shall be
complainant's hostile witnesses was granted by Commissioner Villadolid.
Accordingly, the case was scheduled for the presentation of complainant's witnesses
on September 11, 2007 and the respective subpoenas 21 were issued.
A day before the scheduled hearing, the IBP-CBD received respondent's
Motion for Reconsideration, 22 praying that the Order dated August 28, 2007 be set
aside and that the hearing be reset to sometime during the third week of October. In
said motion, respondent informed the IBP-CBD that he has viral conjunctivitis or
more commonly known as "sore eyes" and has been ordered by the doctor to rest for
at least one to two weeks while his eyes are being treated. Attached to his motion
were photocopies of two medical certificates, stating that a certain R. Pangalangan
was suffering from sore eyes.
During the scheduled hearing on September 11, 2007, complainant opposed
petitioner's motion, arguing that based on his personal verification with the court
personnel of Branch 77 of Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Parañaque City, there
was no case calendared for hearing on the date of the previous setting. Complainant
also argued that this is another ploy of respondent to delay the proceedings because he
knew that complainant worked overseas and was only in the country for a limited
period of time. Finding merit in complainant's opposition, respondent's motion was
denied and complainant was allowed to present his witnesses. 23 DETACa

Complainant presented his witnesses, as follows: Assistant Solicitor General

Karl Miranda (ASG Miranda), Ms. Laarni Morallos (Ms. Morallos), Atty. Glenda T.
Litong (Atty. Litong), Atty. Emelyn W. Corpus (Atty. Corpus), Mr. Marcelo Ecraela,
and Mrs. Visitacion Ecraela.
ASG Miranda testified on his participation in the KDC case as reflected in the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Report, as well as on his recollection that the Senate
Report had recommended the disbarment of respondent.
Ms. Morallos, Atty. Litong, and Atty. Corpus were presented to establish that
the email messages submitted by complainant indeed originated from respondent
based on their familiarity with respondent, particularly, the email messages which
contained references to his daughter, his relationship with complainant, and
respondent's high blood pressure.
Atty. Litong further testified that respondent personally introduced DDD to her
as his girlfriend and that sometime in 2002 or 2003, she saw respondent with another
girl in Glorietta despite still being married to his wife. Atty. Litong also recalled
encountering respondent at a party sometime in 2007 where he was with CCC, whom
she perceived to be respondent's girlfriend at that time. She also confirmed that
respondent had, in more than one occasion, brought with him his students during their
drinking sessions and had even one student driving for him.
 For her testimony, Atty. Corpus corroborated Atty. Litong's statements about
respondent's preoccupations with his students. Atty. Corpus also testified that DDD
called her at her office sometime in 2000 or 2001 to inform her that the latter had
broken up with respondent upon learning that he was actually married. Atty. Corpus
surmised based on her telephone conversation with DDD that respondent did not tell
the latter his actual marital status. Aside from this, Atty. Corpus also recalled that
during complainant's farewell party in February 2007, respondent introduced CCC as
his girlfriend of six years, or since the year 2000 or 2001.
To expedite the hearing, the spouses Ecraela were made to affirm the execution
of their affidavits since their testimonies were based on the affidavits that complainant
included in his petition.
Once complainant's presentation of witnesses was concluded, the mandatory
conference/hearing was terminated and the parties were directed to submit their
respective verified position papers with supporting documentary evidence within
thirty (30) days from receipt of the transcript of stenographic notes. After which, the
case was considered submitted for report and recommendation.
On September 18, 2007, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Manifestation
(with Comments), 24 pertaining to respondent's Motion to Cancel Hearing and praying
for the IBP-CBD to formally request for records from Branch 77 of MTC, Parañaque
City to verify respondent's claim that he had a hearing in said court during the first
scheduled mandatory conference. On the same date, the IBP-CBD also received
complainant's Compliance (with Comments), 25 submitting the certified photo copies
of the Senate Committee Final Report No. 367, the Resolution dated January 22, 2001
of the Ombudsman, and the Information dated June 30, 2003 filed with the
Sandiganbayan.
On January 8, 2008, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Position Paper. 26
Complainant thereafter filed two Manifestations, 27 asserting that respondent is
already barred from submitting his verified position paper and that any decision or
judgment would have to be based solely on complainant's Verified Position Paper. 28
Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
After the case was submitted for report and recommendation, Commissioner
Villadolid rendered a Report, 29 finding that there is more than sufficient evidence
establishing respondent's gross misconduct affecting his standing and moral character
as an officer of the court and member of the bar.
On the issue of respondent's alleged violations of the Revised Penal Code 30
and/or RA 3019 31 as reflected in the Senate Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution,
and the Information, Commissioner Villadolid found that despite respondent's denials,
complainant was able to present certified true copies of the relevant documents which
support his allegations in the petition.
 As for the alleged illicit affairs of respondent, Commissioner Villadolid
discredited complainant's assertion that respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct
for his alleged adulterous relations with EEE. Based on the Report, complainant was
not able to discharge the burden of proving the authenticity of the email messages
pertaining to this adulterous affair; thus, they were deemed inadmissible. However,
Commissioner Villadolid found merit in complainant's claim that respondent
committed grossly immoral conduct by having illicit relations with DDD, CCC, and
BBB, all while still married to Jardiolin, to wit:
4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded
the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution
and affirmed by our laws, which as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Article XV, Section 2 thereof clearly
provides that marriage, an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the state. aDSIHc

xxx xxx xxx

4.23 Moreover, Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule
7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides
that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct" nor shall a lawyer "engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession". 32
Accordingly, the IBP-CBD reached and gave the following conclusion and
recommendation:
V. Conclusion/Recommendations
5.1 In view of the foregoing, and considering that there is more than
sufficient evidence establishing Respondent's gross misconduct affecting his
standing and moral character as an officer of the court and member of the bar,
this Commissioner respectfully recommends that Respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years with a STERN
WARNING that Respondent should reform his conduct in a manner consistent
with the norms prescribed by the Canons of Professional Responsibility. 33
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
On March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a Resolution 34
adopting and approving, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Villadolid. As modified, the Board of Governors disbarred respondent,
thus:
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-280
CBD Case No. 07-1973
Atty. Roy B. Ecraela vs.
Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan
 RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules and considering Respondent's violations of Article XV of the
1987 Constitution, Section 2, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath, Atty. Ian
Raymundo A. Pangalangan is hereby DISBARRED and his name Ordered
Stricken Off from the Roll of Attorneys.
On July 9, 2013, the IBP received respondent's Motion for Reconsideration 35
dated July 3, 2013, to which complainant was required to submit his comment. 36
For his part, complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration (of the IBP-CBD
Report dated June 28, 2012) 37 dated August 17, 2013. Similarly, respondent was
required to comment on complainant's motion in an Order 38 dated August 27, 2013.
On the same date, complainant filed his Comment and/or Opposition (to the
Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration). 39
Subsequently, respondent filed a Comment on/Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration with Leave 40 dated September 12, 2013, as well as a Reply to the
Comment and/or Opposition 41 dated September 20, 2013.
On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution
denying respondent's motion for reconsideration. 42 Thereafter, the Director for Bar
Discipline forwarded the records of this case to this Court on November 11, 2014. 43
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether the respondent committed gross immoral
conduct, which would warrant his disbarment.
The Court's Ruling
After a thorough examination of the records, the Court agrees with the Board
of Governors' resolution finding that Atty. Pangalangan's grossly immoral conduct
was fully supported by the evidences offered.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 1 — A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. ETHIDa

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.
xxx xxx xxx
 CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and continue to
possess the legal qualifications for the profession. 44 Good moral character is not only
required for admission to the Bar, but must also be retained in order to maintain one's
good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. 45
We are not unmindful of the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension
proceedings against a member of the Bar. Thus, the Court has consistently held that
clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of administrative
penalties on a member of the Bar. This, We explained in Aba v. De Guzman, Jr.:
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one
side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It
means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133,
in determining whether or not there is preponderance of evidence, the court
may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b)
the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the
facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony;
(c) the witnesses' interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility
so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of
witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with
the greater number.
When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or there is doubt
on which side the evidence preponderates, the decision should be against the
party with the burden of proof, according to the equipoise doctrine.
To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in suspension or
disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of
innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the
allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or
disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence of
the parties are equally balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in
favor of the respondent. 46
The IBP-CBD Report sufficiently showed by preponderant evidence the
grounds by which respondent has been found committing gross immorality in the
conduct of his personal affairs.
This Court has, in numerous occasions, revoked the licenses of lawyers who
were proven to have not only failed to retain good moral character in their
professional and personal lives, but have also made a mockery of the institution of
marriage by maintaining illicit affairs.
In Guevarra v. Eala, respondent Atty. Eala was disbarred because he showed
disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law, by having an extramarital affair
with the wife of the complainant. In doing so, he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
47

A year later, Atty. Arnobit met the same fate as Atty. Eala when the Court
revoked his privilege to practice law after his philandering ways was proven by
preponderant evidence in Arnobit v. Arnobit. 48 We ruled:
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good
moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and
leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. A member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a mistress but
must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating
the impression that he is flouting those moral standards.
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that respondent's philandering ways are far removed from the
exercise of his profession would not save the day for him. For a lawyer may
be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the
actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privileges with which his license and the law invest him. To
borrow from Orbe v. Adaza, "[t]he grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138,
of the Rules of Court are not limitative and are broad enough to cover any
misconduct . . . of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity." To
reiterate, possession of good moral character is not only a condition precedent
to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the
bar. 49
Similarly, in the more recent case of Dr. Elmar O. Perez v. Atty. Tristan
Catindig, 50 the Court disbarred respondent Atty. Catindig for blatantly and
purposefully disregarding our laws on marriage by resorting to various legal strategies
to render a facade of validity to his invalid second marriage, despite the existence of
his first marriage. We said:
The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar
to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted
moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes 'a
mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.'" In various cases,
the Court has held that disbarment is warranted when lawyer abandons
his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman
who has borne him a child. 51 (emphasis ours.) AIDSTE

In the present case, complainant alleged that respondent carried on several

adulterous and illicit relations with both married and unmarried women between the
years 1990 to 2007, including complainant's own wife. Through documentary
evidences in the form of email messages, as well as the corroborating testimonies of
the witnesses presented, complainant was able to establish respondent's illicit relations
with DDD and CCC by preponderant evidence.
Respondent's main defense against the alleged illicit relations was that the
same were not sufficiently established. In his answer, respondent simply argued that
complainant's petition contains self-serving averments not supported by evidence.
Respondent did not specifically deny complainant's allegations and, instead,
questioned the admissibility of the supporting documents. Due to respondent's own
failure to attend the hearings and even submit his own position paper, the existence of
respondent's illicit relations with DDD and CCC remain uncontroverted.
The IBP-CBD Report was correct when it found that respondent violated
Article XV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded
the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution
and affirmed by our laws, which as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Article XV, Section 2 thereof clearly
provides that marriage, an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State. 52 (emphasis in the original.)
Aside from respondent's illicit relations, We agree with Commissioner
Villadolid's findings that respondent violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as well as Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD
FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 10.03 — A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
In the Petition, complainant alleged that respondent was the subject of a Senate
Inquiry and had a pending case for graft and corruption against him with the
Sandiganbayan, to wit:
13. Respondent has been recommended by the Senate Blue Ribbon
and Justice & Human Rights Committees to be investigated and prosecuted by
the Ombudsman, the same as contained in their "Committee Final Report No.
367" herein attached as Annex D;
14. Respondent has also been recommended by the above-mentioned
committees to suffer the penalty of disbarment, among others, as evidenced by
 the herein attached Annex D-1, and it is believed that a case for graft and
corruption against him is still pending with the Sandiganbayan." 53
Instead of refuting these claims, respondent merely pointed out in his Answer
that complainant failed to adduce additional evidence that a case had been filed
against him, and that complainant's statements were merely self-serving averments
not substantiated by any evidence. In his Reply, respondent even specifically denied
complainant's averments for "lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth or falsity thereof."
We agree with Commissioner Villadolid's findings in the IBP-CBD Report,
viz.: AaCTcI

4.8 It (sic) is thus indisputable that Respondent's pretensions in his

Answer were made in attempt to mislead this Commission. Respondent could
have easily admitted or denied said allegations or explained the same, as he
(sic) clearly had knowledge thereof, however, he (sic) chose to take advantage
of Complainant's position of being not present in the country and not being
able to acquire the necessary documents, skirt the issue, and mislead the
Commission. In doing so, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor,
fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03
thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to
the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice" and that "a lawyer shall observe the rules of
procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice."
4.9 Courts [as well as this Commission] are entitled to expect only
complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before
them. Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor
required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as an officer of the
Court. In view of the foregoing, the Commission finds that Respondent has
violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for
which he should be disciplined. 54 (emphasis in the original.)
In denying complainant's allegations, respondent had no other intention but to
mislead the IBP, which intention was more so established because complainant was
able to submit supporting documents in the form of certified true copies of the Senate
Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution, and Information.
We also agree with Commissioner Villadolid's finding that respondent violated
the lawyer's oath which he took before admission to the Bar, which states:
I, ___________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey laws
as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do
no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; I will not wittingly nor
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid
nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
 conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I
impose upon myself this voluntary obligations without any mental reservation
or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
In all, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a mockery
out of the institution of marriage, and taking advantage of his legal skills by attacking
the Petition through technicalities and refusing to participate in the proceedings. His
actions showed that he lacked the degree of morality required of him as a member of
the bar, thus warranting the penalty of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the Court resolves to
ADOPT the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors approving and adopting, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Accordingly, respondent Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan is found GUILTY of
gross immorality and of violating Section 2 of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution,
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03, and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath and is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the personal records of Atty. Ian
Raymond A. Pangalangan with the Office of the Bar Confidant and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, let copies of this
Decision be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
circulated by the Court Administrator to all the courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta,
Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen and
Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Reyes, * J., is on leave.
||| (Ecraela v. Pangalangan, A.C. No. 10676 , [September 8, 2015], 769 PHIL 1-20)

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 7353. November 16, 2015.]

NELSON P. VALDEZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. ANTOLIN

ALLYSON DABON, JR., respondent.
 DECISION

Per Curiam : p

This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Nelson P. Valdez

(Nelson) against Atty. Antolin Allyson M. Dabon, Jr. (Atty. Dabon) anchored on the
ground of grossly immoral and indecent conduct which transgressed the high moral
standards required for membership in the Bar.
The Position of the Complainant
Complainant Nelson charged respondent Atty. Dabon, a Division Clerk of
Court of the Court of Appeals (CA), with gross immorality for allegedly carrying on
an adulterous relationship with his wife, Sonia Romero Valdez (Sonia), which was
made possible by sexual assaults and maintained through threat and intimidation.
In his Affidavit-Complaint, 1 dated September 13, 2006, Nelson averred,
among others, that he married Sonia on January 28, 1998 in Paniqui, Tarlac; that
Sonia was employed as Court Stenographer of the CA from 1992 until her resignation
on May 15, 2006; 2 that Sonia admitted to have had an adulterous and immoral
relationship with Atty. Dabon, from 2000 to 2006, a span of more than five years; that
he came to know of the relationship only on April 18, 2006 after receiving an
anonymous text message hinting/stating about the existence of an illicit affair between
the two; and that initially, Sonia denied the affair but eventually broke down and
admitted her sexual liaison with Atty. Dabon when confronted with a text message he
received from Atty. Jocelyn Dabon (Atty. Joy), the wife of the respondent, on May 4,
2006 at about 9:47 o'clock in the morning, which stated:
Nelson, Jun and I were separating I will file an annulment anytime
soon, although I'm in great pain, I ask for your apology and forgiveness for
everything he is leaving for US and I hope he evolves into a strong and mature
person there. D cya masamang tao, just emotional and easily manipulated.
Sana don't blame him entirely bec. he is d type that never initiate things. He is
passive and tame. He was honest with me and I hope Sonia would find d
courage to tell d truth to you. I just pray for peace and fresh start for all of us.
I just want to go on with my life and use above all these for my son's sake. I
love jun and I appeal to you n asana wala ka maisip sa atin lahat. Just as I
have accepted everything. Salamat sa panahon at pangunawa. God bless. 3 TIADCc

Nelson also asserted that Sonia confessed her infidelity and described her
extramarital affair with Atty. Dabon to have been attended by sexual assaults and
maintained through intimidation and threats of exposure, humiliation and
embarrassment.
In her own Affidavit, 4 dated September 13, 2006 and attached to the
complaint, Sonia narrated that her illicit relationship with Atty. Dabon started
sometime in November 2000 and ended in March 2006 when she, bothered by her
conscience, decided to break it off; that Atty. Dabon relentlessly pursued her for years
and even admitted that he fell in love with her the first time he laid eyes on her; that
on November 13, 2000, Atty. Dabon lured her to what appeared to be a mere friendly
lunch date, managed to put sleep-inducing drug into her food or drink causing her to
feel drowsy and weak and, thereafter, brought her to Victoria Court Motel where he
sexually molested her while she was asleep; that she opted to keep silent about the
incident for fear of its adverse repercussions of shame and embarrassment to her and
her family; that she pleaded with Atty. Dabon to leave her and forget what had
happened, but the respondent instead taunted her by laughing at her misery; that since
then, Atty. Dabon succeeded in having repeated carnal knowledge of her once or
twice a week through intimidation and threats; that Atty. Dabon threatened her that he
would tell everyone that she had been playing around with him, if she would not yield
to his lascivious cravings; and that she suffered in silence for years and submitted
herself to the bestial desires of Atty. Dabon, until she even thought that she was in
love with him.
Sonia further claimed that after years of living in deception and infidelity, she
decided to call it quits with Atty. Dabon sometime in March 2006 but he could not let
go of their relationship; that Atty. Dabon started pestering and threatening her through
phone calls and handwritten messages in vile attempts to persuade her to continue
their illicit affair; that despite their break-up, Atty. Dabon still pursued his lustful
quest by bringing her to Anito Motel, along Quirino Avenue on March 10, 2006, but
she foiled his plan when she went ballistic prompting the respondent to drive her back
to the CA; that on March 13, 2006, Atty. Dabon forcibly boarded her car and pleaded
for forgiveness and reconciliation but she remained firm in her resolve to end the
affair; that she had to seek the assistance of her officemates, Atty. Heiddi Venecia
Barrozo (Atty. Barrozo) and Atty. Aileen T. Ligot (Atty. Ligot), just to convince Atty.
Dabon to alight from her car as the said incident had already drawn the attention of
several employees within the vicinity of the CA parking lot; that Atty. Dabon used the
members of his staff to relay his messages and deliver his handwritten letters to her;
that Atty. Dabon, angered by her repeated rejection, went berserk and sent her a letter
which stated, among others, that he could no longer stand her constant avoidance of
him and that he would divulge their illicit relationship to her husband; that it numbed
her with fright, so she called Atty. Joy, without disclosing her identity, and told her
that Atty. Dabon was harassing an employee at the CA; that Atty. Dabon sent a text
message to Nelson telling him of the extramarital affair; that Atty. Joy called up
Nelson and informed him that her husband, Atty. Dabon, had confessed to her the
illicit relationship; and that when she was asked by Nelson, she initially denied the
affair for fear of reprisal but, afterwards, admitted the truth and explained to him that
she was merely a victim of Atty. Dabon's threat and intimidation which led to their
illicit relationship.
Nelson further stated that Atty. Dabon's willful, flagrant and shameless conduct
was in gross defiance of the customs, values and sense of morality of the community.
He prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Dabon whose immoral acts showed his lack of
moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor and, hence, unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court. Nelson alleged that he had previously filed an
administrative complaint for "Gross Immorality" against Atty. Dabon before the CA.
Together with Sonia's Affidavit, Nelson also attached to his Affidavit-
Complaint for disbarment, the Joint Affidavit 5 executed by Atty. Barrozo and Atty.
Ligot on May 19, 2006; the Affidavit 6 of Virginia D. Ramos (Ramos), dated May 19,
2006; and the Affidavit 7 of Marie Iris Magdalene Minerva (Minerva), dated May 22,
2006, wherein the said affiants corroborated the declaration of Sonia in her affidavit.
The Position of Atty. Dabon
Respondent Atty. Dabon strongly refuted the accusation against him claiming
that the same was baseless and unfounded and that the complaint for disbarment was
merely calculated to harass, annoy and besmirch his reputation.
In his Comment, 8 Atty. Dabon denied the charges of grossly immoral and
unlawful acts through sexual assaults, abuses, threats and intimidation. He posited that
the allegations of spouses Nelson and Sonia in their respective affidavits were nothing
but pure fabrication solely intended to malign his name and honor. In support of his
prayer for the dismissal of the present disbarment case, Atty. Dabon proffered the
following arguments:
First, complainant Nelson had no personal knowledge of the alleged illicit
relationship between him and Sonia. He relied heavily on the sworn statement of
Sonia which was replete with inconsistencies and incredible and preposterous claims
which defied logic and common sense, thus, revealing the fallacy of the subject
complaint. He contended that it was highly improbable for him, a married lawyer at
that, to suddenly turn crazy and abandon all cares just to satisfy his purported lustful
hungerness by sexually assaulting Sonia, "an ordinary plain-looking 43-year old
woman with two (2) teen aged children." 9 AIDSTE

Second, nowhere in the administrative complaint of Nelson previously filed

before the CA was there any mention of any sexual assault he allegedly committed
against Sonia or of an adulterous relationship that was maintained through threats and
intimidation. Surprisingly, such allegations were included in the present complaint for
disbarment. He also pointed out that Nelson did not attach to his administrative
complaint before the CA the September 13, 2006 Affidavit of Sonia containing grave
imputations against him. Such omissions were indicative that the serious charges
against him were mere concoctions and afterthoughts designed to attain Nelson's
desire to come up with a graver accusation against him. The filing of the complaint
for disbarment was motivated by vengeance against him as Nelson was consummed
by his suspicion that he had seduced Sonia which led to the deterioration of their
marriage. He was a victim caught in the crossfire between the troubled couple, Nelson
and Sonia.
 Third, there was no truth to Sonia's allegation that he was attracted to her from
the first time he saw her much less pursued her relentlessly. He and Sonia were just
close friends. He was Sonia's confidante. She would usually confide in him her
personal woes and problems especially those concerning her husband, Nelson. It was
Sonia who aggressively sought his companionship and frequented his office, bringing
food, fruits and other goodies. The said visits were attested to by Mary Jane Tulalian
and Imelda Adan in their respective affidavits, 10 both dated April 30, 2008. His
friendship with Sonia turned sour when she learned of his plan to settle for good in the
United States with his family. Sonia began to avoid him. He exerted efforts to make
her understand his decision, but to no avail.

Fourth, the cards expressing Sonia's affection towards him as well as the
expensive gifts she gave him belied her claim that she was sexually assaulted and that
she resisted his alleged sexual advances.
Fifth, it was unlikely that Sonia would not tell anyone the grave injustice and
abuses that she allegedly suffered in his hands or report the matter to the police
considering her length of service in the Judiciary and her familiarity on how the
criminal justice system worked.
Sixth, he denied Nelson's allegation that he confessed to his wife, Atty. Joy, his
illicit relationship with Sonia. He also denied that the alleged text messages, quoted
by Nelson and Sonia in their respective affidavits, were sent by him or his wife. All
were part of an elaborate scheme to force him to immediately resign as Division Clerk
of Court from the CA.
Lastly, it was not true that he harassed Sonia through text messages and phone
calls. It was he who was the victim of harassment from Nelson, who orchestrated a
series of events that compelled him to leave the country earlier than scheduled for fear
that an untoward incident might happen to him.
On August 15, 2007, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 11
After the parties had submitted their respective verified position papers,
Investigating Commissioner Manuel T. Chan (Investigating Commissioner Chan) of
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) rendered his Report and
Recommendation, 12 dated October 2, 2008, finding that the charge against respondent
Atty. Dabon had been sufficiently proven. The recommendatory portion of the report
reads:
WHEREFORE, this Commissioner, after a thorough and exhaustive
review of the facts and applicable legal provisions, recommends that
respondent be found guilty of gross immoral conduct and, accordingly, be
disbarred and dropped from the Roll of Attorneys. 13
 On December 11, 2008, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and
approved the recommendation and issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-653, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
finding Respondent guilty of gross immoral conduct, Atty. Antolin Allyson
M. Dabon, Jr. is hereby DISBARRED and his name be stricken off from the
Roll of Attorneys. 14
Atty. Dabon filed a motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
653, but it was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XX-2012-
550, 15 dated December 14, 2012.
After due consideration, the Court resolves to adopt the findings and
recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded by the Court that possession of good
moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant
admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. This proceeds
from the lawyer's bounden duty to observe the highest degree of morality in order to
safeguard the Bar's integrity, 16 and the legal profession exacts from its members
nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from
misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of
the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality. 17
The Court explained in Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit 18 that "as officers of the court,
lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be
of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. A member of the bar and an officer of the court is not
only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a mistress but must
also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the impression
that he is flouting those moral standards." Consequently, any errant behavior of the
lawyer, be it in his public or private activities, which tends to show deficiency in
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant
suspension or disbarment. 19 AaCTcI

In the case at bench, the Court subscribes to the IBP's opinion that there was
substantial evidence showing that Atty. Dabon did have an illicit relationship with
Nelson's legal wife.
To begin with, the Court notes from the respondent's Comment that he
appeared to be perplexed as to whether or not he would admit his extramarital liaisons
with Sonia. As Investigating Commissioner Chan stated in his report, Atty. Dabon
interposed a blanket denial of the romantic involvement but at the same time, he
seemed to have tacitly admitted the illicit affair only that it was not attended by sexual
assaults, threats and intimidations. The Court also observed that he devoted
considerable effort to demonstrate that the affair did not amount to gross immoral
conduct and that no sexual abuse, threat or intimidation was exerted upon the person
of Sonia, but not once did he squarely deny the affair itself.
In other words, the respondent's denial is a negative pregnant, a denial coupled
with the admission of substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not
squarely denied. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative
expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind
favorable to the adverse party. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying
language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally
denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstance alone is denied while the fact
itself is admitted. 20 It is clear from Atty. Dabon's Comment that his denial only
pertained as to the existence of a forced illicit relationship. Without a categorical
denial thereof, he is deemed to have admitted his consensual affair with Sonia.
More telling of the existence of a romantic relationship are the notes and cards
21 that Sonia sent to Atty. Dabon containing personal and intimate messages in her
own handwriting. The messages conveyed Sonia's affection towards him as she even
referred to him as "hon" or "honey." There were also gifts she gave him on special
occasions such as signature shoes, watch and shirts. It also appeared that Sonia
frequently visited him in his office either to bring him food, fruits and other goodies
or to invite him to lunch which apparently displayed her emotional attachment to him.
Curiously, the foregoing was never refuted by Sonia. Such "ego-boosting admissions"
22 of Atty. Dabon indeed proved that a consensual relationship between him and Sonia
existed.
It has not escaped the Court's attention either that Atty. Dabon really tried hard
to win back Sonia because he could not let go of their relationship, even to the point
of pestering her with his persistent pleas for reconciliation. In one instance, Atty.
Dabon boarded Sonia's car and refused to alight unless she would talk to him. Sonia
had to seek the assistance of her officemates, Atty. Barrazo and Atty. Ligot, who
pleaded with him to alight from the vehicle. Moreover, Atty. Dabon made several
attempts to communicate with Sonia in the hope of rekindling their relationship
through letters and phone calls but she remained firm in her stand to avoid him. Such
incident was recounted by Ramos and Minerva in their respective affidavits.
Incidentally, vis-a-vis Nelson's overwhelming evidence of said harassments, he
offered only denials which was self-serving and weak under the law on evidence.
Other than his general claim that Atty. Barrazo, Atty. Ligot, Ramos, and Minerva
were biased witnesses because they were former officemates of Sonia, the respondent
did not even bother to proffer his own version of the supposed harassment incidents.
In light of the above disquisition, the Court finds Sonia's allegation that the
illicit relationship was made possible by sexual assaults and maintained through threat
 and intimidations, to be untrue. Certainly, a sexually abused woman could not be
expected to lavish her oppressor with expensive gifts or pay him affectionate
compliments or words of endearment. The natural reaction of a victim of a sexual
molestation would be to avoid her ravisher. In this case, however, it appeared that
Sonia continually remained in the company of Atty. Dabon for more than five years,
even inviting him for lunch-outs and frequenting his office to bring food whenever the
latter was preoccupied with his workload and could not go out with her to eat. Verily,
Sonia's actuations towards Atty. Dabon are in stark contrast to the expected demeanor
of one who had been repeatedly sexually abused.
Further, the Court cannot fathom why Sonia never reported the alleged sexual
abuse to the police, if such was the truth. She could have placed the respondent
behind bars and put an end to her claimed misery. Also, the Court cannot lend
credence to Sonia's claim that she merely succumbed to the respondent's sexual
advances because of his continuous threats of public exposure and humiliation. It
must be stressed that Atty. Dabon would be in a much more precarious situation if he
would carry out such threats, as this would exposed himself to countless criminal and
administrative charges. The Court believes that Nelson's allegation of sexual assaults
and continuing threat and intimidation was not established by clear preponderant
evidence. The Court is left with the most logical conclusion that Sonia freely and
wittingly entered into an illicit and immoral relationship with Atty. Dabon sans any
threat and intimidation.
Consequently, the Court quotes with approval the following observations of
Investigating Commissioner Chan on this score, thus:
Sorting out the maze of technicalities, denials and evasions of the
respondent as well as the oftentimes exaggerated language of complainant or
his wife, Sonia, and the self-exculpatory declarations of Sonia, this
Commissioner considers the following facts as established: EcTCAD

1. Respondent and Sonia are both married, not to each other, but to other
persons, and each is aware of this fact, or should have known
such fact at the start of their illicit relationship because they were
officemates at that time;
2. Respondent and Sonia engaged in an intimate and sexual relationship,
intermittent perhaps, for a period of about six years starting 2000
up to 2006;
3. Respondent and Sonia, despite protestations of Sonia that respondent
assaulted her using drugs and employing threats and blackmail to
maintain the relationship, appeared to have entered into such
illicit relationship voluntarily and also appeared to have been
fueled by their deep emotional needs, if not mutual lust, as
 shown by the fact that the illicit relationship lasted for six long
years;
4. Respondent and Sonia, despite the protestation of Sonia to the
contrary, were not really ready to give up the illicit relationship
even if they were fully aware of its immorality or its devastating
effect on their respective marriages and careers as shown by the
fact that both respondent and Sonia did not voluntarily confess to
their respective spouses their dark secret, but were only
discovered by complainant through other channels. 23
For what ethical breaches then may Atty. Dabon be held liable?
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Morality in our liberal society today is probably a far cry from what it used to
be. Notwithstanding this permissiveness, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are
burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and, hence, must handle their
personal affairs with greater caution. 24 Indeed, those who have taken the oath to assist
in the dispensation of justice should be more possessed of the consciousness and the
will to overcome the weakness of the flesh.
It has been repeatedly held that to justify suspension or disbarment, the act
complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. 25 A grossly immoral
act is one that is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. It is willful, flagrant, or
shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of
the community. 26
In the case at bench, Atty. Dabon's intimate relationship with a woman other
than his wife showed his moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community. It manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of
marriage and for his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral
depravity and low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, he has
fallen below the moral bar. Such detestable behavior warrants a disciplinary sanction.
Even if not all forms of extramarital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual
relations outside of marriage are considered disgraceful and immoral as they manifest
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws. 27
 In Advincula v. Macabata, 28 the Court elucidated as to what disciplinary
sanction should be imposed against a lawyer found guilty of misconduct. Thus:
. . . . When deciding upon the appropriate sanction, the Court must
consider that the primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings are to protect
the public; to foster public confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of
the profession; and to deter other lawyers from similar misconduct.
Disciplinary proceedings are means of protecting the administration of justice
by requiring those who carry out this important function to be competent,
honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence. While it is discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular
sanction that it may deem proper against an erring lawyer, it should neither be
arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, but
should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the
purity and independence of the bar and to exact from the lawyer strict
compliance with his duties to the court, to his client, to his brethren in the
profession and to the public.
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with great caution and only
for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct which
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral
character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which
neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a
lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly
show the lawyer's unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The dubious
character of the act charged as well as the motivation which induced the
lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or
disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
attended the commission of the offense should also be considered. HSAcaE

The penalty for maintaining an illicit relationship may either be suspension or

disbarment, depending on the circumstances of the case. 29 In case of suspension, the
period would range from one year 30 to indefinite suspension, as in the case of
Cordova v. Cordova, 31 where the lawyer was found to have maintained an adulterous
relationship for two years and refused to support his family. On the other hand, there
is a string of cases where the Court meted out the extreme penalty of disbarment, to
wit:
In Toledo v. Toledo, 32 a lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, when
he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him
a child.
In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr., 33 a lawyer was disbarred after the complainant
proved that he had abandoned her and maintained an adulterous relationship with a
married woman. The Court declared that the respondent failed to maintain the highest
degree of morality expected and required of a member of the Bar.
 In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, 34 the respondent lawyer was disbarred when he
abandoned his lawful wife and three children, lured an innocent woman into marrying
him and misrepresented himself as a "bachelor" so he could contract marriage in a
foreign land.
In Dantes v. Dantes, 35 disbarment was imposed as a penalty on the respondent
lawyer who maintained illicit relationships with two different women during the
subsistence of his marriage to the complainant. The Complainant's testimony, taken in
conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established that the
respondent breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the
law profession.
In Villatuya v. Tabalingcos, 36 the respondent lawyer was disbarred because he
was found to have entered into marriage twice while his first marriage was still
subsisting. The Court declared that he exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of
morality required of him as a member of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a
sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
In the case at bench, Atty. Dabon's misconduct and unrepentant demeanor
clearly showed a serious flaw in his character, his moral indifference to the sanctity of
marriage and marital vows, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these
could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the
administration of justice in peril. Accordingly, the Court finds the need for the
imposition of the extreme administrative penalty of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, finding the respondent Atty. Antolin Allyson M. Dabon, Jr.
GUILTY of Gross Immorality, the Court hereby DISBARS him from the practice of
law.
Let respondent's name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys immediately.
Furnish the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all court
throughout the country with copies of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta,
Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe,
Leonen and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
LEONEN, J., concurring:
This court resolves an administrative Complaint for disbarment filed by
complainant Nelson P. Valdez (Nelson) against respondent Atty. Antolin Allyson M.
Dabon, Jr., (Atty. Dabon) for gross immoral and indecent conduct unbecoming of a
member of the Bar. 1
 Nelson claims that he and his wife, Sonia Romero Valdez (Sonia), were
married on January 28, 1998 in Paniqui, Tarlac. 2 Sonia was a Court Stenographer at
the Court of Appeals from 1992 to 2006. 3 She admitted that she had an adulterous
and immoral relationship with Atty. Dabon, a Division Clerk of Court of the Court of
Appeals, from 2000 to 2006. 4 According to Nelson, Sonia told him that the illicit
affair was carried out through Atty. Dabon's sexual assaults, intimidation, and threats
on Sonia. 5
Sonia's affidavit was attached to Nelson's Complaint. In her affidavit, Sonia
claims that her sexual relationship with Atty. Dabon started when they had a friendly
lunch date on November 13, 2000. 6 Unknown to her, Atty. Dabon put a sleep-
inducing substance in either her food or drink, which caused her to feel drowsy and
weak. 7 Atty. Dabon then brought her to a motel and took advantage of her. 8 He
sexually assaulted her while she was unconscious. 9

Sonia felt ashamed of what had happened; thus, she kept the incident to herself.
10 She also feared the ramifications of the incident on her and her family. 11 Sonia
asked Atty. Dabon to forget about the incident and leave her alone. However, Atty.
Dabon threatened her that he would tell everyone they knew about it. 12 From then on,
Atty. Dabon was successful in having carnal knowledge with her once to twice a
week. 13 This went on for several years. 14
In March 2006, Sonia ended her affair with Atty. Dabon. 15 This resulted in a
series of unpleasant occasions where Sonia and Atty. Dabon publicly clashed in a
motel and inside the Court of Appeals and involved other employees of the judiciary
as well as their spouses. 16
HESIcT

For his part, Atty. Dabon denies the allegations in the Complaint. He denies the
acts constituting gross immoral conduct imputed by Nelson and Sonia. He also denies
being attracted to Sonia and drugging and sexually assaulting her. 17 At most, they
were just good friends. 18 Atty. Dabon also points to the alleged inconsistencies in the
claims of Sonia and her husband. 19 Sonia's true feelings for him are evident in the
cards she signed and sent to him, together with the expensive gifts such as signature
shoes, watches, and shirts she gave him. 20 Sonia even spent time in the United States
with him and his sons. 21
Atty. Dabon further alleges that Sonia had become emotionally dependent on
him since he was always there to listen to her problems. 22 According to Atty. Dabon,
Sonia started to act strangely when she learned of his plans to settle in the United
States for good. 23
Atty. Dabon also claims that Nelson and Sonia are good friends with the Court
of Appeals Presiding Justice Ruben Reyes as Sonia had worked as Court
Stenographer for him for three (3) years. 24 The Presiding Justice had allegedly asked
Atty. Dabon to resign, else cases would be filed against him. 25
Moreover, contrary to Nelson and Sonia's claims, it was actually Atty. Dabon
who was harassed through text messages and phone calls, which prompted him to
leave the country earlier than scheduled. 26
On August 15, 2007, this court referred the Complaint to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for investigation, report, and recommendation. 27
In his October 2, 2008 Report and Recommendation, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Investigating Commissioner Manuel T. Chan found Atty. Dabon guilty of
gross immoral conduct. 28 The Commissioner recommended that Atty. Dabon be
disbarred and dropped from the Roll of Attorneys. 29
On December 11, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-653, which adopted and approved the
recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
finding Respondent guilty of gross immoral conduct, Atty. Antolin Allyson
M. Dabon, Jr. is hereby DISBARRED and his name be stricken off from the
Roll of Attorneys. 30
Atty. Dabon filed his motion for reconsideration of the Resolution. 31 However,
this was denied by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors in
Resolution No. XX-2012-550 dated December 4, 2012:
RESOLVED to unanimously DENY Respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration there being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the
Commission and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already
been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XVIII-
2008-653 dated December 11, 2008 is hereby AFFIRMED. 32
I concur with this court's finding that Atty. Dabon is guilty of gross immoral
conduct. 33
The ponencia declares that Atty. Dabon's illicit relationship with Nelson's wife
amounts to gross immoral conduct that transgresses the Code of Professional
Responsibility, 34 thus:
In the case at bench, Atty. Dabon's intimate relationship with a woman
other than his wife showed his moral indifference to the opinion of the good
and respectable members of the community. It manifested his disrespect for
the laws on the sanctity of marriage and for his own marital vow of fidelity. It
showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the fundamental ethics
 of his profession. Indeed, he has fallen below the moral bar. Such detestable
behavior warrants a disciplinary sanction. Even if not all forms of extramarital
relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside of marriage
are considered disgraceful and immoral as they manifest deliberate disregard
of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution
and affirmed by our laws. 35
However, the ponencia also declared that Sonia's claims of sexual assaults,
threats, and intimidation are false:
In light of the above disquisition, the Court finds Sonia's allegation
that the illicit relationship was made possible by sexual assaults and
maintained through threat and intimidations, to be untrue. Certainly, a
sexually abused woman could not be expected to lavish her oppressor with
expensive gifts or pay him affectionate compliments or words of endearment.
The natural reaction of a victim of a sexual molestation would be to avoid her
ravisher. In this case, however, it appeared that Sonia continually remained in
the company of Atty. Dabon for more than five years, even inviting him for
lunch-outs and frequenting his office to bring whenever the latter was
preoccupied with his workload and could not go out with her to eat. Verily,
Sonia's actuations towards Atty. Dabon are in stark contrast to the expected
demeanor of one who had been repeatedly sexually abused.
Further, the Court cannot fathom why Sonia never reported the alleged
sexual abuse to the police, if such was the truth. She could have placed the
respondent behind bars and put an end to her claimed misery. Also, the Court
cannot lend credence to Sonia's claim that she merely succumbed to the
respondent's sexual advances because of his continuous threats of public
exposure and humiliation. It must be stressed that Atty. Dabon would be in a
much more precarious situation if he would carry out such threats, as this
would exposed [sic] himself to countless criminal and administrative charges.
The Court believes that Nelson's allegation of sexual assaults and continuing
threat and intimidation was not established by clear and preponderant
evidence. The Court is left with the most logical conclusion that Sonia freely
and wittingly entered into an illicit and immoral relationship with Atty.
Dabon sans any threat and intimidation. 36 (Emphasis supplied) caITAC

The relationship between Atty. Dabon and Sonia was consensual.

Relationships between men and women traditionally involve power exerted by one
against the other. In Garcia v. Drilon, 37 this court recognized the unequal power
relationship between a man and a woman, justifying the valid classification provided
under Republic Act No. 9262: 38
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that
women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the
widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real
differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre
 succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences . . . is the essence of true
equality."
A. Unequal power relationship between men and women
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National
Machinery for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment), violence
against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal
power relationship between women and men otherwise known as "gender-
based violence". Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are
the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while
women are nurturers, men's companions and supporters, and take on
subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men gaining more power
over women. With power comes the need to control to retain that power. And
VAW is a form of men's expression of controlling women to retain power.
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human
rights issue, passed its Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of
Violence Against Women on December 20, 1993 stating that "violence
against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations
between men and women, which have led to domination over and
discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full
advancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the crucial
social mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate positions,
compared with men." 39 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
"Sexual harassment in the workplace is not about a man taking advantage of a
woman by reason of sexual desire — it is about power being exercised by a superior
officer over his women subordinates." 40 The superior can cause the removal of the
subordinate from the workplace if the latter refuses his or, in certain cases, her
amorous advances. 41 These acts, which necessarily result in an intimidating, hostile,
and offensive working environment for subordinates, constitute sexual harassment. 42
Under A.M. No. 03-03-13-SC (Re: Rule on Administrative Procedure in
Sexual Harassment Cases and Guidelines on Proper Work Decorum in the Judiciary),
work-related sexual harassment is defined as an act of:
an official or employee in the Judiciary who, having authority, influence or
moral ascendancy over another in a work environment, demands, requests or
otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the
demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the latter. 43

It is committed when:
(a) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment,
re-employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting
said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or
 privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting,
segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate,
deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
said employee. It shall include, but shall not be limited to, the following
modes:
1. Physical, such as malicious touching, overt sexual advances,
and gestures with lewd insinuation.
2. Verbal, such as requests or demands for sexual favors, and
lurid remarks.
3. Use of objects, pictures or graphics, letters or written notes
with sexual underpinnings.
4. Other acts analogous to the foregoing.
(b) The above acts would impair the employee's rights or privileges under
existing laws; or
(c) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive
environment for the employee. 44
While Sonia was technically not a subordinate of Atty. Dabon, his actions
nevertheless resulted in an intimidating, hostile, and offensive working environment
for Sonia, especially towards the end of their illicit relationship. The gravity of Atty.
Dabon's actions should be considered in determining the proper penalty to be imposed
in this disbarment case for gross immoral conduct. ICHDca

As the Integrated Bar of the Philippines found, Atty. Dabon refused to accept
that his relationship with Sonia had already ended, to the point of harassing Sonia
publicly several times:
It has not escaped the Court's attention either that Atty. Dabon really
tried hard to win back Sonia because he could not let go of their relationship,
even to the point of pestering her with his persistent pleas of reconciliation. In
one instance, Atty. Dabon boarded Sonia's car and refused to alight unless she
would talk to him. Sonia had to seek the assistance of her officemates, Atty.
Barrazo and Atty. Ligot, who pleaded with him to alight from the vehicle.
Moreover, Atty. Dabon made several attempts to communicate with Sonia in
the hope of rekindling their relationship through letters and phone calls but
she remained firm in her stand to avoid him. Such incident was recounted by
Ramos and Minerva in their respective affidavits. Incidentally, vis-à-vis
Nelson's overwhelming evidence of said harassments, he offered only denials
which was [sic] self-serving and weak under the law on evidence. Other than
his general claim that Atty. Barrazo, Atty. Ligot, Ramos, and Minerva were
biased witnesses because they were former officemates of Sonia, the
respondent did not even bother to proffer his own version of the supposed
harassment incidents. 45
 Conduct is immoral when it is "so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show
indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community." 46
Further:
[The] conduct [to warrant disciplinary action] must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral. . . . [I]t must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under
such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of
decency." 47
Good moral character is a continuing requirement to maintain one's good
standing in the legal profession. 48 "It is the bounden duty of law practitioners to
observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar."
49

There is no fixed standard of what constitutes gross immoral conduct, or

"moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a
member of the bar." 50 Hence, "what appears to be unconventional behavior to the
straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment." 51
Disbarment is clearly warranted for gross immoral conduct that entails abuse of
power of whatever kind or nature.
In Barrientos v. Daarol, 52 the respondent was held guilty of gross immoral
conduct and was disbarred for inducing a female half his age to have sexual relations
with him after promising marriage, despite him being married already, and later on
abandoning the woman and his child.
In Tucay v. Tucay, 53 this court held that having an illicit affair with a married
woman, regardless of whether a bigamous marriage was contracted, constitutes gross
immoral conduct that merits the extreme penalty of disbarment.
In Arnobit v. Arnobit, 54 this court disbarred the respondent for abandoning his
wife and 12 children to cohabit with another woman.
In Garrido v. Garrido, 55 two lawyers who engaged in an extra-marital affair
were disbarred since their actions established a "pattern of grave and immoral
misconduct that demonstrates their lack of mental and emotional fitness and moral
character to qualify them for the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as
professionals and as officers of the court." 56
In his Comment, Atty. Dabon averred that there could not have been an illicit
affair between him and Sonia since Sonia was merely "an ordinary plain-looking
middle aged woman with two (2) teen aged children." 57 He alleged that:
It is an outrage for herein respondent for the complainant and Ms.
Valdez to accuse him of sexually assaulting the latter. There is absolutely no
iota of truth to this incredible claim of the Valdezes. Why would a man like
the respondent, a married lawyer at that with no prior encounter with the law,
would suddenly turn crazed with lust despite the aloofness and coldness of
 Ms. Valdez towards him as alleged in her affidavit, drugging her — then
dragging her to his car and sexually assaulting her in a motel? Is Ms. Valdez
that irresistibly attractive and compelling that would turn the respondent
into an unthinking sex pervert and criminal, risking everything just to get
her to satisfy his alleged lust for her? 58 (Emphasis in the original)
This statement is nothing but an attempt to obviate the consequence of his
actions by degrading the appearance of another human being. This strongly reveals
Atty. Dabon's character and the extent to which he is willing to go to gain impunity
for his infractions.
Atty. Dabon carried out illicit relations with Sonia, a married woman and his
co-worker in the judiciary, for at least five (5) years. Atty. Dabon's blasé attitude
towards the affair and its aftermath not only made a mockery of the position he holds
as member of the bar and an employee of the judiciary, but also showed his utter
disregard for laws protecting and respecting the dignity of women. He failed to meet
the high standard of morality required of his profession. He is unfit to be a member of
the bar.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote that respondent Atty. Antolin Allyson Dabon, Jr. be
DISBARRED and his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
Footnotes
||| (Valdez v. Dabon, Jr., A.C. No. 7353, [November 16, 2015], 773 PHIL 109-140)

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 10050. December 3, 2013.]

VICTORIA C. HEENAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. ERLINDA

ESPEJO, respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J : p

This resolves the administrative complaint filed by Victoria Heenan (Victoria)

against Atty. Erlinda Espejo (Atty. Espejo) before the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for violation of lawyer's oath,
docketed as CBD Case No. 10-2631.

The Facts
 Sometime in January 2009, Victoria met Atty. Espejo through her godmother,
Corazon Eusebio (Corazon). Following the introduction, Corazon told Victoria that Atty.
Espejo was her lawyer in need of money and wanted to borrow two hundred fifty
thousand pesos (PhP250,000) from her (Victoria). Shortly thereafter, Victoria went to the
house of Corazon for a meeting with Atty. Espejo where they discussed the terms of the
loan. Since Atty. Espejo was introduced to her as her godmother's lawyer, Victoria found
no reason to distrust the former. Hence, during the same meeting, Victoria agreed to
accommodate Atty. Espejo and there and then handed to the latter the amount of
PhP250,000. To secure the payment of the loan, Atty. Espejo simultaneously issued and
turned over to Victoria a check 1 dated February 2, 2009 for two hundred seventy-five
thousand pesos (PhP275,000) covering the loan amount and agreed interest. cTECHI

On due date, Atty. Espejo requested Victoria to delay the deposit of the check for
the reason that she was still waiting for the release of the proceeds of a bank loan to fund
the check. However, after a couple of months of waiting, Victoria received no word from
Atty. Espejo as to whether or not the check was already funded enough.

In July 2009, Victoria received an Espejo-issued check dated July 10, 2009 in the
amount of fifty thousand pesos (PhP50,000) 2 representing the interest which accrued
due to the late payment of the principal obligation. Victoria deposited the said check but,
to her dismay, the check bounced due to insufficiency of funds. Atty. Espejo failed to pay
despite Victoria's repeated demands.

Worried that she would not be able to recover the amount thus lent, Victoria
decided to deposit to her account the first check in the amount of PhP275,000, but
without notifying Atty. Espejo of the fact. However, the said check was also dishonored
due to insufficiency of funds.

Victoria thereafter became more aggressive in her efforts to recover her money.
She, for instance, personally handed to Atty. Espejo a demand letter dated August 3,
2009. 3 When Atty. Espejo still refused to pay, Victoria filed a criminal complaint
against Atty. Espejo on August 18, 2009 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and
Estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, before the Quezon City
Prosecutor's Office. 4

Atty. Espejo disregarded the notices and subpoenas issued by the Quezon City
Prosecutor's Office which she personally received and continued to ignore Victoria's
demands. She attended only one (1) scheduled preliminary investigation where she
promised to pay her loan obligation. 5 ADcEST

In November 2009, Atty. Espejo issued another check dated December 8, 2009 in
the amount of two hundred seventy five thousand pesos (PhP275,000.). However, to
Victoria's chagrin, the said check was again dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. 6
 Atty. Espejo did not file any counter-affidavit or pleading to answer the charges
against her. On November 17, 2009, the case was submitted for resolution without Atty.
Espejo's participation. 7

Victoria thereafter filed the instant administrative case against Atty. Espejo before
the CBD.

On March 1, 2010, the CBD, through Director for Bar Discipline Alicia A. Risos-
Vidal, issued an Order 8 directing Atty. Espejo to submit her Answer to Victoria's
administrative complaint failing which would render her in default. The warning,
notwithstanding, Atty. Espejo did not submit any Answer.

On May 5, 2010, IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Malala (Commissioner

Villanueva-Malala) notified the parties to appear for a mandatory conference set on June
2, 2010. The notice stated that non-appearance of either of the parties shall be deemed a
waiver of her right to participate in further proceedings. 9

At the mandatory conference, only Victoria appeared. 10 Thus, Commissioner

Villanueva-Malala issued an Order 11 noting Atty. Espejo's failure to appear during the
mandatory conference and her failure to file an Answer. Accordingly, Atty. Espejo was
declared in default. Victoria, on the other hand, was directed to file her verified position
paper, which she filed on June 11, 2010. 12 THaAEC

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

In its Report and Recommendation 13 dated July 15, 2010, the CBD
recommended the suspension of Atty. Espejo from the practice of law and as a member
of the Bar for a period of five (5) years. The CBD reasoned:

The failure of a lawyer to answer the complaint for disbarment despite

due notice and to appear on the scheduled hearings set, shows his flouting
resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrates his deficiency for his oath
of office as a lawyer, which deserves disciplinary sanction.

Moreover, respondent['s] acts of issuing checks with insufficient funds

and despite repeated demands [she] failed to comply with her obligation and her
disregard and failure to appear for preliminary investigation and to submit her
counter-affidavit to answer the charges against her for Estafa and Violation of
BP 22, constitute grave misconduct that also warrant disciplinary action against
respondent.

On December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors passed a Resolution 14 adopting

the Report and Recommendation of the CBD with the modification lowering Atty.
Espejo's suspension from five (5) years to two (2) years. Atty. Espejo was also ordered to
return to Victoria the amount of PhP250,000 within thirty (30) days from receipt of
notice with legal interest reckoned from the time the demand was made. The Resolution
reads:TEDAHI

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously

ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws
and rules, and considering respondent's grave misconduct, Atty. Erlinda Espejo
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and
Ordered to Return to complainant the amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand
(P250,000.00) Pesos within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice with legal
interest reckoned from the time the demand was made.

On August 8, 2013, the CBD transmitted to this Court the Notice of the Resolution
pertaining to Resolution No. XX-2012-419 along with the records of this case. 15

The Court's Ruling

We sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt its recommendation in part.

Atty. Espejo did not deny obtaining a loan from Victoria or traverse allegations
that she issued unfunded checks to pay her obligation. It has already been settled that the
deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned. 16 Verily, lawyers must at all times
faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients. In
Tomlin II v. Moya II, We explained that the prompt payment of financial obligations is
one of the duties of a lawyer, thus: TaCSAD

In the present case, respondent admitted his monetary obligations to the

complaint but offered no justifiable reason for his continued refusal to pay.
Complainant made several demands, both verbal and written, but respondent
just ignored them and even made himself scarce. Although he acknowledged his
financial obligations to complainant, respondent never offered nor made
arrangements to pay his debt. On the contrary, he refused to recognize any
wrong doing nor shown remorse for issuing worthless checks, an act
constituting gross misconduct. Respondent must be reminded that it is his duty
as a lawyer to faithfully perform at all times his duties to society, to the bar, to
the courts and to his clients. As part of his duties, he must promptly pay his
financial obligations. 17

The fact that Atty. Espejo obtained the loan and issued the worthless checks in her
private capacity and not as an attorney of Victoria is of no moment. As We have held in
several cases, a lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his
profession but also for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity. While the
Court may not ordinarily discipline a lawyer for misconduct committed in his non-
professional or private capacity, the Court may be justified in suspending or removing
him as an attorney where his misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional dealings is
so gross in character as to show him morally unfit and unworthy of the privilege which
his licenses and the law confer. 18

In Wilkie v. Limos, We reiterated that the issuance of a series of worthless checks,

which is exactly what Atty. Espejo committed in this case, manifests a lawyer's low
regard for her commitment to her oath, for which she may be disciplined. Thus: cSIHCA

We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored
for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness
for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty
and good moral character as to render her unworthy of public confidence. The
issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of
respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest
and public order. It also manifests a lawyer's low regard to her commitment to
the oath she has taken when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably
tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in high esteem.

xxx xxx xxx

In Barrios v. Martinez, we disbarred the respondent who issued

worthless checks for which he was convicted in the criminal case filed against
him.

In Lao v. Medel, we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and
the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a
lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year suspension from the practice of law.
The same sanction was imposed on the respondent-lawyer in Rangwani v. Dino
having been found guilty of gross misconduct for issuing bad checks in payment
of a piece of property the title of which was only entrusted to him by the
complainant. 19

Further, the misconduct of Atty. Espejo is aggravated by her unjustified refusal to

obey the orders of the IBP directing her to file an answer to the complaint of Victoria and
to appear at the scheduled mandatory conference. This constitutes blatant disrespect for
the IBP which amounts to conduct unbecoming a lawyer. In Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit,
We held that a lawyer must maintain respect not only for the courts, but also for judicial
officers and other duly constituted authorities, including the IBP:

The misconduct of respondent is aggravated by his unjustified refusal to

heed the orders of the IBP requiring him to file an answer to the complaint-
affidavit and, afterwards, to appear at the mandatory conference. Although
 respondent did not appear at the conference, the IBP gave him another chance to
defend himself through a position paper. Still, respondent ignored this directive,
exhibiting a blatant disrespect for authority. Indeed, he is justly charged with
conduct unbecoming a lawyer, for a lawyer is expected to uphold the law and
promote respect for legal processes. Further, a lawyer must observe and
maintain respect not only to the courts, but also to judicial officers and other
duly constituted authorities, including the IBP. Under Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court, the Court has empowered the IBP to conduct proceedings for the
disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys. 20 aSDHCT

Undoubtedly, Atty. Espejo's issuance of worthless checks and her blatant refusal
to heed the directives of the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office and the IBP contravene
Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 7, Rule 7.03; and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provide:

CANON 1 — A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,

OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE
LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01. — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE

INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

CANON 11 — A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE

RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICES AND
SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

We find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years, as
recommended by the IBP, commensurate under the circumstances. DAHCaI

We, however, cannot sustain the IBP's recommendation ordering Atty. Espejo to
return the money she borrowed from Victoria. In disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to
continue as a member of the Bar. Our only concern is the determination of respondent's
administrative liability. Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial action
which the parties may choose to file against each other. 21 Furthermore, disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but rather investigations
by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. The only question for determination
in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as
a member of the Bar. Thus, this Court cannot rule on the issue of the amount of money
that should be returned to the complainant. 22

WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Erlinda B. Espejo GUILTY of gross misconduct

and of violating Canons 1, 7 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We
SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for two (2) years, effective immediately.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar
Confidant and recorded in the personal files of respondent.

SO ORDERED. aAHDIc

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama,
Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Leonardo-de Castro, J., is on official leave.

||| (Heenan v. Espejo, A.C. No. 10050, [December 3, 2013], 722 PHIL 528-537)

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 10573. January 13, 2015.]

FERNANDO W. CHU, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE C. GUICO,

JR., respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM : p

Fernando W. Chu invokes the Court's disciplinary authority in resolving this

disbarment complaint against his former lawyer, respondent Atty. Jose C. Guico, Jr.,
whom he has accused of gross misconduct.

Antecedents

Chu retained Atty. Guico as counsel to handle the labor disputes involving his
company, CVC San Lorenzo Ruiz Corporation (CVC). 1 Atty. Guico's legal services
included handling a complaint for illegal dismissal brought against CVC (NLRC Case
No. RAB-III-08-9261-05 entitled Kilusan ng Manggagawang Makabayan (KMM)
Katipunan CVC San Lorenzo Ruiz Chapter, Ladivico Adriano, et al. v. CVC San Lorenzo
Ruiz Corp. and Fernando Chu). 2 On September 7, 2006, Labor Arbiter Herminio V.
Suelo rendered a decision adverse to CVC. 3 Atty. Guico filed a timely appeal in behalf
of CVC.

According to Chu, during a Christmas party held on December 5, 2006 at Atty.

Guico's residence in Commonwealth, Quezon City, Atty. Guico asked him to prepare a
substantial amount of money to be given to the NLRC Commissioner handling the appeal
to insure a favorable decision. 4 On June 10, 2007, Chu called Atty. Guico to inform him
that he had raised P300,000.00 for the purpose. Atty. Guico told him to proceed to his
office at No. 48 Times Street, Quezon City, and to give the money to his assistant,
Reynaldo (Nardo) Manahan. Chu complied, and later on called Atty. Guico to confirm
that he had delivered the money to Nardo. Subsequently, Atty. Guico instructed Chu to
meet him on July 5, 2007 at the UCC Coffee Shop on T. Morato Street, Quezon City. At
the UCC Coffee Shop, Atty. Guico handed Chu a copy of an alleged draft decision of the
NLRC in favor of CVC. 5 The draft decision 6 was printed on the dorsal portion of used
paper apparently emanating from the office of Atty. Guico. On that occasion, the latter
told Chu to raise another P300,000.00 to encourage the NLRC Commissioner to issue the
decision. But Chu could only produce P280,000.00, which he brought to Atty. Guico's
office on July 10, 2007 accompanied by his son, Christopher Chu, and one Bonifacio
Elipane. However, it was Nardo who received the amount without issuing any receipt. 7

Chu followed up on the status of the CVC case with Atty. Guico in December
2007. However, Atty. Guico referred him to Nardo who in turn said that he would only
know the status after Christmas. On January 11, 2008, Chu again called Nardo, who
invited him to lunch at the Ihaw Balot Plaza in Quezon City. Once there, Chu asked
Nardo if the NLRC Commissioner had accepted the money, but Nardo replied in the
negative and simply told Chu to wait. Nardo assured that the money was still with Atty.
Guico who would return it should the NLRC Commissioner not accept it. 8

On January 19, 2009, the NLRC promulgated a decision adverse to CVC. 9 Chu
confronted Atty. Guico, who in turn referred Chu to Nardo for the filing of a motion for
reconsideration. After the denial of the motion for reconsideration, Atty. Guico caused
the preparation and filing of an appeal in the Court of Appeals. Finally, Chu terminated
Atty. Guico as legal counsel on May 25, 2009. 10 CcTIDH

In his position paper, 11 Atty. Guico described the administrative complaint as

replete with lies and inconsistencies, and insisted that the charge was only meant for
harassment. He denied demanding and receiving money from Chu, a denial that Nardo
corroborated with his own affidavit. 12 He further denied handing to Chu a draft decision
printed on used paper emanating from his office, surmising that the used paper must have
been among those freely lying around in his office that had been pilfered by Chu's
witnesses in the criminal complaint he had handled for Chu. 13

Findings and Recommendation of the

IBP Board of Governors

IBP Commissioner Cecilio A.C. Villanueva found that Atty. Guico had violated
Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding
and receiving P580,000.00 from Chu; and recommended the disbarment of Atty. Guico in
view of his act of extortion and misrepresentation that caused dishonor to and contempt
for the legal profession. 14

On February 12, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the findings of IBP
Commissioner Villanueva in its Resolution No. XX-2013-87, 15 but modified the
recommended penalty of disbarment to three years suspension, viz.:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously

ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A," and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules and considering Respondent's violation of Canon 1, Rules 1.01
and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Jose C. Guico, Jr. is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years with
Warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely and Ordered to Return the amount of Five Hundred Eighty Thousand
(P580,000.00) Pesos with legal interest within thirty (30) days from receipt of
notice.

Atty. Guico moved for reconsideration, 16 but the IBP Board of Governors denied
his motion for reconsideration on March 23, 2014 in Resolution No. XXI-2014-173. 17

Neither of the parties brought a petition for review vis-à-vis Resolution No. XX-
2013-87 and Resolution No. XXI-2014-173.

Issue

Did Atty. Guico violate the Lawyer's Oath and Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding and receiving P580,000.00 from Chu
to guarantee a favorable decision from the NLRC?

Ruling of the Court

 In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests on the complainant to
establish respondent attorney's liability by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.
Indeed, this Court has consistently required clearly preponderant evidence to justify the
imposition of either disbarment or suspension as penalty. 18

Chu submitted the affidavits of his witnesses, 19 and presented the draft decision
that Atty. Guico had represented to him as having come from the NLRC. Chu credibly
insisted that the draft decision was printed on the dorsal portion of used paper emanating
from Atty. Guico's office, 20 inferring that Atty. Guico commonly printed documents on
used paper in his law office. Despite denying being the source of the draft decision
presented by Chu, Atty. Guico's participation in the generation of the draft decision was
undeniable. For one, Atty. Guico impliedly admitted Chu's insistence by conceding that
the used paper had originated from his office, claiming only that used paper was just
"scattered around his office." 21 In that context, Atty. Guico's attempt to downplay the
sourcing of used paper from his office was futile because he did not expressly belie the
forthright statement of Chu. All that Atty. Guico stated by way of deflecting the
imputation was that the used paper containing the draft decision could have been easily
taken from his office by Chu's witnesses in a criminal case that he had handled for Chu,
22 pointing out that everything in his office, except the filing cabinets and his desk, was
"open to the public . . . and just anybody has access to everything found therein." 23 In
our view, therefore, Atty. Guico made the implied admission because he was fully aware
that the used paper had unquestionably come from his office. DaHISE

The testimony of Chu, and the circumstances narrated by Chu and his witnesses,
especially the act of Atty. Guico of presenting to Chu the supposed draft decision that had
been printed on used paper emanating from Atty. Guico's office, sufficed to confirm that
he had committed the imputed gross misconduct by demanding and receiving
P580,000.00 from Chu to obtain a favorable decision. Atty. Guico offered only his
general denial of the allegations in his defense, but such denial did not overcome the
affirmative testimony of Chu. We cannot but conclude that the production of the draft
decision by Atty. Guico was intended to motivate Chu to raise money to ensure the
chances of obtaining the favorable result in the labor case. As such, Chu discharged his
burden of proof as the complainant to establish his complaint against Atty. Guico. In this
administrative case, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion. 24

What is the condign penalty for Atty. Guico?

In taking the Lawyer's Oath, Atty. Guico bound himself to:

. . . maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; . . . support its

Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
 constituted authorities therein; . . . do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court; . . . delay no man for money or malice . . . .

The Code of Professional Responsibility echoes the Lawyer's Oath, to wit:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

The sworn obligation to respect the law and the legal processes under the Lawyer's
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility is a continuing condition for every
lawyer to retain membership in the Legal Profession. To discharge the obligation,
every lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client that would
involve defiance of the very laws that he was bound to uphold and obey, 25 for he or
she was always bound as an attorney to be law abiding, and thus to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the Legal Profession. 26 Verily, he or she must act and
comport himself or herself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in
the integrity of the Legal Profession. 27 Any lawyer found to violate this obligation
forfeits his or her privilege to continue such membership in the legal profession.

Atty. Guico willingly and wittingly violated the law in appearing to counsel Chu
to raise the large sums of money in order to obtain a favorable decision in the labor case.
He thus violated the law against bribery and corruption. He compounded his violation by
actually using said illegality as his means of obtaining a huge sum from the client that he
soon appropriated for his own personal interest. His acts constituted gross dishonesty and
deceit, and were a flagrant breach of his ethical commitments under the Lawyer's Oath
not to delay any man for money or malice; and under Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility that forbade him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. His deviant conduct eroded the faith of the people in him
as an individual lawyer as well as in the Legal Profession as a whole. In doing so, he
ceased to be a servant of the law.

Atty. Guico committed grave misconduct and disgraced the Legal Profession.
Grave misconduct is "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and
implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment." 28 There is no question that
any gross misconduct by an attorney in his professional or private capacity renders him
unfit to manage the affairs of others, and is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of
suspension or disbarment, because good moral character is an essential qualification for
the admission of an attorney and for the continuance of such privilege. 29 SICaDA

Accordingly, the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend him

from the practice of law for three (3) years would be too soft a penalty. Instead, he should
be disbarred, 30 for he exhibited his unworthiness of retaining his membership in the
legal profession. As the Court has reminded in Samonte v. Abellana: 31

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that

whoever is granted the privilege to practice law in this country should
remain faithful to the Lawyer's Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve
their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to
falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up one's
misdeeds committed against clients and the rest of the trusting public,
evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice law
and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law Profession. It
deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.

Lastly, the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Guico be
ordered to return the amount of P580,000.00 to Chu is well-taken. That amount was
exacted by Atty. Guico from Chu in the guise of serving the latter's interest as the client.
Although the purpose for the amount was unlawful, it would be unjust not to require
Atty. Guico to fully account for and to return the money to Chu. It did not matter that this
proceeding is administrative in character, for, as the Court has pointed out in Bayonla v.
Reyes: 32

Although the Court renders this decision in an administrative proceeding

primarily to exact the ethical responsibility on a member of the Philippine Bar,
the Court's silence about the respondent lawyer's legal obligation to restitute the
complainant will be both unfair and inequitable. No victim of gross ethical
misconduct concerning the client's funds or property should be required to still
litigate in another proceeding what the administrative proceeding has already
established as the respondent's liability. . . .

ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. JOSE

S. GUICO, JR. GUILTY of the violation of the Lawyer's Oath, and Rules 1.01 and
1.02, Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and DISBARS him from
membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. His name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to Atty. Guico's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and to all courts and quasi-judicial offices in the country for their
information and guidance.
 SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del
Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen and Jardeleza,
JJ., concur.

Brion, * J., is on leave.

||| (Chu v. Guico, Jr., A.C. No. 10573, [January 13, 2015], 750 PHIL 246-258)

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 5816. March 10, 2015.]

DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, complainant,vs.ATTY. TRISTAN A.

CATINDIG and ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO, respondents.

DECISION

PER CURIAM : p

Before the Court is an administrative complaint 1 for disbarment filed by Dr.

Elmar O. Perez (Dr. Perez) with the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 27, 2002
against Atty. Tristan A. Catindig (Atty. Catindig) and Atty. Karen E. Baydo (Atty.
Baydo) (respondents) for gross immorality and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The Facts

In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends
since the mid-1960's when they were both students at the University of the Philippines,
but they lost touch after their graduation. Sometime in 1983, the paths of Atty. Catindig
and Dr. Perez again crossed. It was at that time that Atty. Catindig started to court Dr.
Perez. 2

Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon
Gomez (Gomez),having married the latter on May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist
Church in Ermita, Manila, which was followed by a Catholic wedding at the Shrine of
Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. 3 Atty. Catindig however claimed that he only
married Gomez because he got her pregnant; that he was afraid that Gomez would make
a scandal out of her pregnancy should he refuse to marry her, which could have
jeopardized his scholarship in the Harvard Law School. 4

Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a
foreign country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry
her once the divorce had been decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig
and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez claimed
that Atty. Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree was lawful and valid and that
there was no longer any impediment to their marriage. 5

Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in
the United States of America (USA).Their union was blessed with a child whom they
named Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic. 6

Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity
since the divorce decree that was obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and
Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws. When she confronted Atty. Catindig about
it, the latter allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union once he obtains
a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the laws of the Philippines. He
also promised to legally adopt their son. 7 cCaATD

Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize
their union by filing a petition to nullify his marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her
that he would still have to get the consent of Gomez to the said petition. 8

Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter 9 in
the mail informing her of Atty. Catindig's scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that
sometime later, she came upon a love letter 10 written and signed by Atty. Catindig for
Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to
Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his "impediment is removed." Apparently, five
months into their relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to put a halt to their
affair until such time that he is able to obtain the annulment of his marriage. On August
13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity of his marriage to Gomez.
11

On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved
to an upscale condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was
frequently seen. 12

In a Resolution 13 dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed the respondents to

file their respective comments, which they separately did on November 25, 2002. 14
 Atty. Catindig, in his Comment, 15 admitted that he married Gomez on May 18,
1968. He claimed, however, that immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs
that she was incapable of complying with her marital obligations, as she had serious
intimacy problems; and that while their union was blessed with four children, their
relationship simply deteriorated.

Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984.

They then consulted Atty. Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven),a mutual friend, on how the
agreement to separate and live apart could be implemented. Atty. Joven suggested that
the couple adopt a property regime of complete separation of property. She likewise
advised the couple to obtain a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic for whatever
value it may have and comfort it may provide them. 16

Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each executed a Special
Power of Attorney addressed to a Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal,
Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under its
laws. Atty. Catindig likewise admitted that a divorce by mutual consent was ratified by
the Dominican Republic court on June 12, 1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed
a Joint Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 133, which was granted on June 23, 1984. 17

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact
that the divorce decreed by the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the
Philippines. Notwithstanding that she knew that the marriage of Atty. Catindig and
Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty.
Catindig married Dr. Perez in July 1984 in the USA. 18

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since
his previous marriage to Gomez was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez
because he loved her and that he was afraid of losing her if he did not. He merely desired
to lend a modicum of legitimacy to their relationship. 19

Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually,
he left their home in October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from developing. 20

He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his
relationship with Dr. Perez started to fall apart as early as 1997. He asserted that Atty.
Baydo joined his law firm only in September 1999; and that while he was attracted to her,
Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and in fact rejected him. He likewise pointed out that
Atty. Baydo resigned from his firm in January 2001. 21

For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She
claimed that Atty. Catindig began courting her while she was employed in his firm. She
however rejected Atty. Catindig's romantic overtures; she told him that she could not
reciprocate his feelings since he was married and that he was too old for her. She said that
despite being turned down, Atty. Catindig still pursued her, which was the reason why
she resigned from his law firm. 22 AECIaD

On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from
notice. 23

On June 2, 2003, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued an Order
24 setting the mandatory conference of the administrative case on July 4, 2003, which
was later reset to August 29, 2003. During the conference, the parties manifested that
they were already submitting the case for resolution based on the pleadings already
submitted. Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit their respective
position papers within 10 days from notice. Respondents Atty. Catindig and Atty. Baydo
filed their position papers on October 17, 2003 25 and October 20, 2003, 26 respectively.
Dr. Perez filed her position paper 27 on October 24, 2003.

Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the

IBP-CBD issued a Report and Recommendation, 28 which recommended the disbarment
of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality, violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out
that Atty. Catindig's act of marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that his
previous marriage to Gomez still subsisted was a grossly immoral and illegal conduct,
which warrants the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The Investigating Commissioner
further opined that:

In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the
admissions of Atty. Catindig established a pattern of grossly immoral conduct
that warrants fustigation and his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt
or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.

There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a professor of law,

both in his official and personal conduct, must display exemplary behavior.
Respondent's bigamous marriage and his proclivity for extramarital adventurism
have definitely caused damage to the legal and teaching professions. How can
he hold his head up high and expect his students, his peers and the community
to look up to him as a model worthy of emulation when he failed to follow the
tenets of morality? In contracting a second marriage notwithstanding knowing
fully well that he has a prior valid subsisting marriage, Atty. Catindig has made
a mockery of an otherwise inviolable institution, a serious outrage to the
generally accepted moral standards of the community. 29
 On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge
against Atty. Baydo be dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez failed to present clear
and preponderant evidence in support of the alleged affair between the respondents.

Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution, 30

which adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration 31 of the December 10, 2011 Resolution

of the IBP Board of Governors, claiming that the Investigating Commissioner erred in
relying solely on Dr. Perez's uncorroborated allegations. He pointed out that, under
Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, a complaint for disbarment must be
supported by affidavits of persons having knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or
by such documents as may substantiate said facts. He said that despite the absence of any
corroborating testimony, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to Dr. Perez'
testimony.

He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention of committing any felony; that
he never concealed the status of his marriage from anyone. In fact, Atty. Catindig
asserted that he had always been transparent with both Gomez and Dr. Perez.

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution 32 dated December 29, 2012,
denied Atty. Catindig's motion for reconsideration.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed gross immorality,
which would warrant their disbarment.

Ruling of the Court

After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the
circumstances of this case, the Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of
the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral

or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
 Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,33 the Court held:

[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as

far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning.
Good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the
legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one's good
standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more
than just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will
to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant
thing if it is wrong. This must be so because "vast interests are committed to his
care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his
client's property, reputation, his life, his all." 34 (Citation omitted)

In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer
may be removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia,for grossly immoral
conduct. Thus:

Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what

grounds. — A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis ours) DaTICE

"A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or
deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor." 35 Immoral
conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community.
Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community's sense of decency. The
Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from
conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct. 36

Contracting a marriage during

the subsistence of a previous
 one amounts to a grossly
immoral conduct.

The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from
Atty. Catindig's own admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly
immoral; it is not only corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.

Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice — a wedding in the Central
Methodist Church in 1968, which was then followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983,
Atty. Catindig started pursuing Dr. Perez when their paths crossed again. Curiously, 15
years into his first marriage and four children after, Atty. Catindig claimed that his first
marriage was then already falling apart due to Gomez' serious intimacy problems.

A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation from
Gomez, dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains, obtained a divorce decree from a
court in the Dominican Republic, and married Dr. Perez in the USA all in the same year.
Atty. Catindig was so enchanted with Dr. Perez at that time that he moved heaven and
earth just so he could marry her right away — a marriage that has at least a semblance of
legality.

From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained
from the court in the Dominican Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he
and Gomez were both Filipino citizens at that time. He knew that he was still validly
married to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his previous marriage be properly
declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This
notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint
Atty. Catindig's sense of social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and purposeful
disregard of our laws on marriage.

It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr.
Perez in the USA. Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage
remained valid, the logical conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the USA
for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent
marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction.

Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig's claim is true, it matters not
that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted
to various legal strategies in order to render a façade of validity to his otherwise invalid
marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so unprincipled that it is
reprehensible to the highest degree.

Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal
actions he resorted to in order to give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig
left her and their son. It was only at that time that he finally decided to properly seek the
nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was then already entranced with the
much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his firm.

While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue
Atty. Baydo, in itself, cannot be considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms
part of the pattern showing his propensity towards immoral conduct. Lest it be
misunderstood, the Court's finding of gross immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty.
Catindig's desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent marriage during
the subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez. HSEIAT

"The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue
as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the
community, conduct for instance, which makes 'a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage.'" 37 In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is
warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship
with another woman who has borne him a child. 38

Atty. Catindig's subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one
definitely manifests a deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. By his own admission,
Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of marriage, taking advantage of his
legal skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality
required of him as a member of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of disbarment.

The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be exercised
with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the
bar. Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end
desired, disbarment should never be decreed. Nevertheless, in this case, the seriousness of
the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar, as it appears to be the most
appropriate penalty.

Atty. Catindig's claim that Dr. Perez's allegations against him are not credible
since they are uncorroborated and not supported by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court, deserves scant consideration. Verily, Atty. Catindig himself
admitted in his pleadings that he indeed married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his previous
marriage with Gomez still subsisted. Indubitably, such admission provides ample basis
for the Court to render disciplinary sanction against him.

There is insufficient evidence to

prove the affair between the
respondents.
 The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there is a
dearth of evidence to prove the claimed amorous relationship between the respondents.
As it is, the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim was mere
allegation, an anonymous letter informing her that the respondents were indeed having an
affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig.

The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings

against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof
rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence
required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. 39

The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by Dr. Perez only
proves that the latter indeed received a letter informing her of the alleged relations
between the respondents; it does not prove the veracity of the allegations therein.
Similarly, the supposed love letter, if at all, only proves that Atty. Catindig wrote Atty.
Baydo a letter professing his love for her. It does not prove that Atty. Baydo is indeed in
a relationship with Atty. Catindig.

WHEREFORE,in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court resolves

to ADOPT the recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross immorality
and of violating the Lawyer's Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig
in the Office of the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, copies of this Decision shall be furnished to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the Court Administrator to all appellate and trial
courts.

The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of evidence. ECaTDc

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J.,Carpio, Velasco, Jr.,Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin,

Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr.,Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe and Leonen,
JJ.,concur.

||| (Perez v. Catindig, A.C. No. 5816, [March 10, 2015], 755 PHIL 297-312)
 EN BANC

[A.C. No. 10868. January 26, 2016.]

[Formerly CBD Case No. 07-2041]

CHERYL E. VASCO-TAMARAY, complainant, vs. ATTY.

DEBORAH Z. DAQUIS, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM : p

Pretending to be counsel for a party in a case and using a forged signature in a

pleading merit the penalty of disbarment.
Cheryl E. Vasco-Tamaray (Vasco-Tamaray) filed a Complaint-Affidavit before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on July 30, 2007, alleging that respondent Atty.
Deborah Z. Daquis (Atty. Daquis) filed, on her behalf, a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage without her consent and forged her signature on the Petition. 1
She also alleged that Atty. Daquis signed the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage as "counsel for petitioner," referring to Vasco-Tamaray. 2
Vasco-Tamaray stated that Atty. Daquis was not her counsel but that of her
husband, Leomarte Regala Tamaray. 3 To support her allegation, she attached the
Affidavit 4 of Maritess Marquez-Guerrero. The Affidavit states:
1. Sometime in October 2006, I accompanied Cheryl Tamaray in going to East
Café at Rustan's Makati to meet with her husband Leomarte Tamaray;
2. We arrived at the said place at around 7:00 pm and Leomarte introduced to
us (Cheryl and I) Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis as his lawyer. He further told
us that Atty. Daquis' husband also worked in Japan and that's how he got
to know the latter and got her services;
3. Among other things, Leomarte told Cheryl that the reason for that meeting
and the presence of Atty. Daquis was because he had decided to file a
case to annul his marriage with Cheryl;
4. Cheryl was shocked and just cried. After awhile [sic], Leomarte's brother
arrived and shortly after, the group left;
5. The next instance that I saw Atty. Daquis was when we (Cheryl and I) went
to McDonald's-Greenbelt where Atty. Daquis tried to convince her not
to oppose Leomarte's decision to have their marriage annulled[.] 5
(Emphasis supplied) aScITE
 Vasco-Tamaray narrated that in December 2006, Atty. Daquis informed her
"that a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Muntinlupa City." 6 In February 2007, Atty. Daquis asked her to appear
before the City Prosecutor's Office of Muntinlupa City. 7
On March 5, 2007, Vasco-Tamaray appeared before the City Prosecutor's
Office and met Atty. Daquis. She asked Atty. Daquis to give her a copy of the Petition
but Atty. Daquis refused. 8
Vasco-Tamaray stated that she obtained a copy of the Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage from Branch 207 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa
City. She was surprised to see that the Petition was allegedly signed and filed by her. 9
Vasco-Tamaray alleged that she did not file the Petition, that her signature was
forged by Atty. Daquis, and that her purported community tax certificate appearing on
the jurat was not hers because she never resided in Muntinlupa City. 10 She attached a
Certification issued by the Sangguniang Barangay of Putatan, Muntinlupa City stating
that she was "never . . . a resident of #9 Daang Hari Street, Umali Compound,
Summitville Subdivision, Barangay Putatan." 11 She also attached a Certification
issued by Barangay Talipapa stating that she has been a resident of "#484-J
Saguittarius St., Solville Subd., Barangay Talipapa, Novaliches, Quezon City . . .
from 2000 till present." 12
Vasco-Tamaray also alleged that the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage was Atty. Daquis' idea, consented to by Leomarte Tamaray. 13
She further alleged that she had never received any court process. The Petition
states that her postal address is "09 Daang Hari St., Umali Comp., Summitville Subd.,
Putatan, Muntinlupa City[,]" 14 which is the address of her husband's family. The
return slips of the notices sent by the trial court were received by Encarnacion T.
Coletraba and Almencis Cumigad, relatives of Leomarte Tamaray. 15
Atty. Daquis filed an Answer countering that her client was Vasco-Tamaray,
complainant herself, and not complainant's husband. She alleged that Vasco-Tamaray
knew of the Petition as early as October 2006, not December 2006. 16
With regard to the community tax certificate, Atty. Daquis explained that when
she notarized the Petition, the community tax certificate number was supplied by
Vasco-Tamaray. 17 Atty. Daquis' allegation was supported by the Joint Affidavit of
her staff, Ma. Dolor E. Purawan (Purawan) and Ludy Lorena (Lorena). 18
Purawan and Lorena detailed in their Joint Affidavit that they knew Vasco-
Tamaray to be a client of Atty. Daquis and that they never saw Atty. Daquis forge
Vasco-Tamaray's signature. Purawan stated that she typed the Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage and that the community tax certificate was provided by Vasco-
Tamaray. 19
 Atty. Daquis alleged that Vasco-Tamaray wanted her to call and demand
money from Leomarte Tamaray but she refused to do so. 20
Atty. Daquis argued that Vasco-Tamaray had a copy of the Petition. When
Vasco-Tamaray requested another copy on March 5, 2007, Atty. Daquis was unable
to grant her client's request because she did not have a copy of the Petition with her at
that time. 21
Atty. Daquis further alleged that Vasco-Tamaray conceived an illegitimate son
with a certain Reuel Pablo Aranda. The illegitimate son was named Charles Dino
Vasco. Reuel Pablo Aranda signed the Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of
Paternity portion of the birth certificate. 22
The Commission on Bar Discipline required the parties to submit their position
papers, 23 but based on the record, only Vasco-Tamaray complied. 24
The Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the dismissal of the
Complaint because Vasco-Tamaray failed to prove her allegations. The Commission
on Bar Discipline noted that Vasco-Tamaray should have questioned the Petition or
informed the prosecutor that she never filed any petition, but she failed to do so. 25
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline in
the Resolution dated September 27, 2014. 26
The issue for resolution is whether respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis should
be held administratively liable for making it appear that she is counsel for
complainant Cheryl Vasco-Tamaray and for the alleged use of a forged signature on
the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
This court finds that respondent violated Canons 1, 7, 10, and 17 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. The charge against respondent for violation of Canon
15 is dismissed.
I
By pretending to be counsel for complainant, respondent violated Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and failed to uphold her duty of
doing no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any falsehood in court as stated in the
Lawyer's Oath. 27
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
HEITAD

RULE 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.
 In this case, respondent merely denied complainant's allegation that she was
Leomarte Tamaray's counsel 28 but was unable to rebut the other allegations against
her.
Respondent admitted that she met complainant in October 2006, 29 but did not
refute 30 the statement in Maritess Marquez-Guerrero's Affidavit that Leomarte
Tamaray introduced her as his lawyer. 31 Likewise, respondent admitted that she met
with complainant subsequently, 32 but did not refute Maritess Marquez-Guerrero's
statement that in one of the meetings, she tried to convince complainant not to oppose
Leomarte Tamaray's decision to annul their marriage. 33
Respondent argued in her Answer that she was the counsel for complainant. 34
Yet, there is no explanation how she was referred to complainant or how they were
introduced. It appears, then, that respondent was contacted by Leomarte Tamaray to
file a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. As
stated in Maritess Marquez-Guerrero's Affidavit, "Leomarte told Cheryl that the
reason for that meeting and the presence of Atty. Daquis was because he had decided
to file a case to annul his marriage with Cheryl[.]" 35
Based on this, it seems Leomarte Tamaray intended to file the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. However, respondent made it appear that
complainant, not her client Leomarte Tamaray, was the petitioner. There is a
probability that respondent did not want Leomarte Tamaray to be the petitioner
because he would have to admit that he entered into a bigamous marriage, the
admission of which may subject him to criminal liability.
In addition, if it is true that complainant was respondent's client, then there
appears to be no reason for respondent to advise her "not to oppose Leomarte's
decision to have their marriage annulled." 36
The records of this case also support complainant's allegation that she never
received any court process because her purported address in the Petition is the address
of Leomarte Tamaray. The Petition states that complainant is "of legal age, Filipino
citizen, married with postal address at 09 Daang Hari St., Umali Comp., Summitville
Subd., Putatan, Muntinlupa City[.]" 37
The Certificate of Marriage of complainant and Leomarte Tamaray states that
Leomarte's residence is at "Summitvil[l]e Subv [sic], Muntinlupa," while
complainant's residence is at "Hermosa St. Gagalangin, Tondo, Manila." 38 Assuming
that complainant lived with her husband after they were married, complainant most
likely did not receive court processes because she left their home before the filing of
the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. As written in the Minutes of the
meeting before the Office of the City Prosecutor:
P[etitioner] & R[espondent] met sometime in 1993 through his secretary.
They became sweethearts in 1993 and their relationship as steadies lasted until
1996;
 During the 3 years of their union, petitioner knew respondent's family as she
even sleeps in their house; Theirs was also a long distance relationship as
respondent worked in Japan;
Upon respondents [sic] return to the Philippines they got married in Feb.
1996. They had no children, as respondent immediately left for Japan on
March 11, 1996;
Respondent returned to the Philippines but unfortunately he brought another
woman. As a result, petitioner left their house. 39 (Emphasis supplied)
Further, complainant cannot be faulted for her failure to inform the prosecutor
that she did not file any petition for declaration of nullity of marriage because during
the meeting on March 5, 2007, complainant had no knowledge that the Petition was
filed in her name. 40 She obtained a copy of the Petition after the March 5, 2007
meeting. 41
In Yupangco-Nakpil v. Uy, 42 this court discussed Canon 1, Rule 1.01, as
follows:
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as it is applied to the members of the
legal professions, engraves an overriding prohibition against any form of
misconduct, viz.:
CANON 1 — A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
The gravity of the misconduct — determinative as it is of the errant
lawyer's penalty — depends on the factual circumstances of each case.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Verily, members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or
omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in
the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. By no insignificant
measure, respondent blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar,
but also that of the legal profession. In other words, his conduct fell short of
the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice. 43
When respondent filed the Petition as counsel for complainant when the truth
was otherwise, she committed a falsehood against the trial court and complainant. ATICcS

II
Respondent violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 when she
allowed the use of a forged signature on a petition she prepared and notarized. 44
 Complainant alleged that her signature on the Petition was forged. 45
Respondent merely denied complainant's allegation. 46
The Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was signed by a certain
"CVasco." 47 The records of this case show that complainant has used two signatures.
In her identification cards issued by the University of the East, she used a signature
that spelled out "CVasco." 48 In her Complaint-Affidavit against respondent,
complainant used a signature that spelled out "CTamaray." 49
A comparison of the signatures appearing on the Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage and on complainant's identification cards show a difference in the
stroke of the letters "c" and "o." Further, complainant's signatures in the documents 50
attached to the records consistently appear to be of the same height. On the other
hand, her alleged signature on the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage has
a big letter "c." 51 Hence, it seems that complainant's signature on the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was forged.
While there is no evidence to prove that respondent forged complainant's
signature, the fact remains that respondent allowed a forged signature to be used on a
petition she prepared and notarized. 52 In doing so, respondent violated Canon 7, Rule
7.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01. These canons state:
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession, and support the activities of the integrated bar.
RULE 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
RULE 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
In Embido v. Pe, Jr., 53 Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Salvador N. Pe, Jr. was
found guilty of violating Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and was meted the penalty of disbarment
for falsifying a court decision "in a non-existent court proceeding." 54 This court
discussed that:
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
fraudulent transactions can justify a lawyer's disbarment or suspension from
the practice of law. Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the court
decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of moral
turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of
justice in this country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was to
mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby
became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar. 55
 In a similar manner, respondent's act of allowing the use of a forged signature
on a petition she prepared and notarized demonstrates a lack of moral fiber on her
part.
Other acts that this court has found violative of Canon 7, Rule 7.03 are:
engaging in a scuffle inside court chambers; 56 openly doubting paternity of his own
son; 57 hurling invectives at a Clerk of Court; 58 harassing occupants of a property; 59
using intemperate language; 60 and engaging in an extramarital affair. 61
Furthermore, allowing the use of a forged signature on a petition filed before a
court is tantamount to consenting to the commission of a falsehood before courts, in
violation of Canon 10.
In Spouses Umaguing v. De Vera, 62 this court discussed the importance of
Canon 10, Rule 10.01, as follows:
The Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of
the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from
consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to
the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as
well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe
and maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by
others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of
honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the
Code of Professional Responsibility. In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do
any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead,
or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice." 63 (Emphasis supplied)
III
This court further finds that respondent violated Canon 17, which states:
CANON 17 — A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Respondent failed to protect the interests of her client when she represented
complainant, who is the opposing party of her client Leomarte Tamaray, in the same
case.
The responsibilities of a lawyer under Canon 17 were discussed in Penilla v.
Alcid, Jr.: 64
TIADCc

The legal profession dictates that it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a
lawyer to accord the highest degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the
protection of the client's interest. The most thorough groundwork and study
must be undertaken in order to safeguard the interest of the client. The honor
bestowed on his person to carry the title of a lawyer does not end upon taking
the Lawyer's Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys. Rather, such honor
attaches to him for the entire duration of his practice of law and carries with it
the consequent responsibility of not only satisfying the basic requirements but
 also going the extra mile in the protection of the interests of the client and the
pursuit of justice[.] 65
Respondent is reminded of the duties and responsibilities of members of the
legal profession, as discussed in Tenoso v. Echanez: 66
Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is
imbued with public interest and that "a lawyer owes substantial duties not
only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and
to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State
— the administration of justice — as an officer of the court." Accordingly,
"[l]awyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency,
but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing." 67 (Citations omitted)
IV
This court notes that respondent may have violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 when
she entered her appearance as counsel for complainant 68 even though she was
engaged as counsel by Leomarte Tamaray. 69 Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with his client.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The rationale for Canon 15 was discussed in Samson v. Era: 70
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent
situations wherein a lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is
directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. In the same way, a
lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a
substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only
if the former client consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in
the fiduciary obligation of loyalty. Throughout the course of a lawyer-client
relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client's case,
including the weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge and information
gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred and
guarded with care. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing,
for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of justice. The nature of
that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest
degree.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The spirit behind this rule is that the client's confidence once given
should not be stripped by the mere expiration of the professional employment.
 Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything that
will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which the lawyer
previously represented the client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of
the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation. In this regard, Canon
17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly declares that: "A
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him."
The lawyer's highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the
client at all hazards and costs even to himself. The protection given to the
client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor
is it affected by the client's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining
another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the
death of the client. 71
The test to determine whether conflict of interest exists was discussed in
Hornilla v. Salunat: 72
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf
of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his
duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This
rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be
used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer
will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his
first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will
be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge
acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney
from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof. 73 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Respondent was engaged by Leomarte Tamaray to be his counsel. 74 When the
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was filed, respondent signed the
Petition as counsel for complainant. 75 If respondent was indeed engaged as counsel
by complainant, then there is conflict of interest, in violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03.
AIDSTE

However, there is nothing on record to show that respondent was engaged as

counsel by complainant. Hence, this court finds that respondent did not commit
conflict of interest.
V
On a final note, Rule 139-B has been amended by Bar Matter No. 1645 dated
October 13, 2015. Section 12 of Rule 139-B now provides that:
Rule 139-B. Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys
 xxx xxx xxx
Section 12. Review and recommendation by the Board of Governors. —
(a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP
Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to
it by the Investigator with his report.
(b) After its review, the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total
membership, shall recommend to the Supreme Court the
dismissal of the complaint or the imposition of disciplinary
action against the respondent. The Board shall issue a resolution
setting forth its findings and recommendations, clearly and
distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on which it is based.
The resolution shall be issued within a period not exceeding
thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the
submission of the Investigator's report.
(c) The Board's resolution, together with the entire records and all
evidence presented and submitted, shall be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final action within ten (10) days from
issuance of the resolution.
(d) Notice of the resolution shall be given to all parties through their
counsel, if any. 76
Under the old rule, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines was given the power to "issue a decision" 77 if the lawyer complained of
was exonerated or meted a penalty of "less than suspension or disbarment." 78 In
addition, the case would be deemed terminated unless an interested party filed a
petition before this court. 79
The amendments to Rule 139-B is a reiteration that only this court has the
power to impose disciplinary action on members of the bar. The factual findings and
recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline and the Board of Governors
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are recommendatory, subject to review by this
court. 80
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis is found GUILTY of
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and Canon
17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The charge for violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 against respondent Atty.
Deborah Z. Daquis is DISMISSED.
The penalty of DISBARMENT is imposed upon respondent Atty. Deborah Z.
Daquis. The Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to remove the name of Deborah
Z. Daquis from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to
be appended to respondent's personal record as attorney, to the Integrated Bar of the
 Philippines, and to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all
courts throughout the country for their information and guidance.
This Resolution takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta,
Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen and
Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Caguioa, * J., is on official leave.
(Vasco-Tamaray v. Daquis, A.C. No. 10868 [Formerly CBD Case No. 07-2041]
|||

(Resolution), [January 26, 2016], 779 PHIL 191-214)

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 8172. April 12, 2016.]

ALEX NULADA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ORLANDO S. PAULMA,

respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p

The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint 1 for

disbarment by reason of dishonesty and conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude filed by complainant Alex Nulada (complainant) against respondent Atty.
Orlando S. Paulma (respondent).
The Facts
Complainant alleged that on September 30, 2005, respondent issued in his
favor a check in the amount of P650,000.00 as payment for the latter's debt. Because
of respondent's standing as a respected member of the community and his being a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Miagao, 2 Province of
Iloilo, complainant accepted the check without question. 3
Unfortunately, when he presented the check for payment, it was dishonored
due to insufficient funds. Respondent failed to make good the amount of the check
despite notice of dishonor and repeated demands, prompting complainant to file a
criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22 4 against
respondent, 5 before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Province of Iloilo,
docketed as I.S. No. 2006-637, 6 which issued a Resolution 7 dated May 26, 2006
recommending the filing of the appropriate information against respondent before the
Municipal Trial Court of Miagao, Province of Iloilo (MTC). 8 Subsequently, said
information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2604. 9
After due proceedings, the MTC rendered a Decision 10 dated October 30, 2008
finding respondent guilty of violation of BP 22 and ordering him to pay the amount of
P150,000.00 as fine, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay.
Furthermore, he was ordered to pay: (1) the sum of P650,000.00 representing the
amount of the check with interest pegged at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum computed from the time of the filing of the complaint; (2) filing fees in the
amount of P10,000.00; and (3) attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00 plus
appearance fees of P1,500.00 per hearing. 11
Records show that respondent appealed his conviction to the Regional Trial
Court of Guimbal, Iloilo, Branch 67 (RTC), docketed as Criminal Case No. 346. 12 In
a Decision 13 dated March 13, 2009, the RTC affirmed in toto the MTC ruling. On
April 16, 2009, the RTC Decision became final and executory. 14
Prior to the promulgation of the RTC Decision, or on February 12, 2009,
complainant filed this administrative complaint before the Court, through the Office
of the Bar Confidant.
In his defense, 15 respondent denied that he committed dishonesty against
complainant, as prior to September 30, 2005, he informed the latter that there were
insufficient funds to cover the amount of the check. Respondent claimed that he
merely issued the check in order to accommodate a friend in whose favor he obtained
the loan, stressing that he did not personally benefit from the proceeds thereof. 16
Unfortunately, said friend had died and respondent had no means by which to pay for
the amount of the check. 17 He also claimed that complainant threatened him and used
his unfunded check to the latter's personal advantage. 18
Thereafter, the Court, in its Resolution dated November 14, 2011, 19 referred
this administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for its
investigation, report, and recommendation.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
After conducting mandatory conferences, the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) of the IBP issued a Report and Recommendation 20 dated June 26, 2013,
recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months for violation of the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), as well as for having been found guilty of a crime involving
moral turpitude. 21
It found that the offense for which respondent was found guilty of, i.e.,
violation of BP 22, involved moral turpitude, and that he violated his lawyer's oath
and the CPR when he committed the said offense. Stressing the importance of the
lawyer's oath, the IBP held that by his conviction of the said crime, respondent has
shown that he is "unfit to protect the administration of justice or that he is no longer of
good moral character" 22 which justifies either his suspension or disbarment. 23 CAIHTE

Subsequently, or on October 10, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued a

Notice of Resolution 24 adopting and approving with modification the IBP's Report
and Recommendation dated June 26, 2013, suspending respondent from the practice
of law for a period of two (2) years for having violated the lawyer's oath and the CPR,
as well as for having been found guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude. 25
The Issue Before the Court
The issue advanced for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent
should be administratively disciplined for having been found guilty of a crime
involving moral turpitude.
The Court's Ruling
The Court sustains the findings and conclusions of the CBD of the IBP, as
approved, adopted, and modified by the IBP Board of Governors.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;
grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice,
or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
Canon 1 of the CPR mandates all members of the bar "to obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law . . . ." Rule 1.01 thereof specifically provides that
"[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." By
taking the lawyer's oath, a lawyer becomes a guardian of the law and an indispensable
instrument for the orderly administration of justice. 26 As such, he can be disciplined
for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, which renders him unfit to
continue to be an officer of the court. 27
In Enriquez v. De Vera, 28 the Court discussed the purpose and nature of a
violation of BP 22 in relation to an administrative case against a lawyer, as in this
case, to wit:
[BP] 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the
banking system and the legitimate public checking account users. The
gravamen of the offense defined and punished by [BP] 22 [. . .] is the act of
 making and issuing a worthless check, or any check that is dishonored upon
its presentment for payment and putting it in circulation; the law is designed
to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of
issuing checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the practice
is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated.
xxx xxx xxx
Being a lawyer, respondent was well aware of the objectives and
coverage of [BP] 22. If he did not, he was nonetheless presumed to know
them, for the law was penal in character and application. His issuance of the
unfunded check involved herein knowingly violated [BP] 22, and exhibited
his indifference towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public
interest and public order. He thereby swept aside his Lawyer's Oath that
enjoined him to support the Constitution and obey the laws. 29
Clearly, the issuance of worthless checks in violation of BP Blg. 22 indicates a
lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of
personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public
confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action. 30
In this case, respondent's conviction for violation of BP 22, a crime involving
moral turpitude, had been indubitably established. Such conviction has, in fact,
already become final. Consequently, respondent violated the lawyer's oath, as well as
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, as aptly found by the IBP and, thus, must be
subjected to disciplinary action.
In Heenan v. Espejo, 31 the Court suspended therein respondent from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years when the latter issued checks which were
dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. In A-1 Financial Services, Inc. v. Valerio, 32
the same penalty was imposed by the Court to respondent who issued worthless
checks to pay off her loan. Likewise, in Dizon v. De Taza, 33 the Court meted the
penalty of suspension for a period of two (2) years to respondent for having issued
bouncing checks, among other infractions. Finally, in Wong v. Moya II, 34 respondent
was ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, because
aside from issuing worthless checks and failure to pay his debts, respondent also
breached his client's trust and confidence to his personal advantage and had shown a
wanton disregard of the IBP's Orders in the course of its proceedings. Accordingly,
and in view of the foregoing instances when the erring lawyer was suspended for a
period of two (2) years for the same violation, the Court finds it appropriate to mete
the same penalty to respondent in this case.
As a final word, it should be emphasized that membership in the legal
profession is a privilege burdened with conditions. 35 A lawyer is required to observe
the law and be mindful of his or her actions whether acting in a public or private
capacity. 36 Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish his
reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public's faith in the legal profession as
 a whole. 37 In this case, respondent's conduct fell short of the exacting standards
expected of him as a member of the bar, for which he must suffer the necessary
consequences. DETACa

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Orlando S. Paulma is hereby SUSPENDED

from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon his receipt of this
Resolution. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with
more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in Atty. Paulma's personal record with
the Office of the Bar Confidant, and copies be served to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts
in the land.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Bersamin, Del
Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Leonen, Jardeleza and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Peralta, * J., is on official leave.
||| (Nulada v. Paulma, A.C. No. 8172 (Resolution), [April 12, 2016], 784 PHIL 309-318)

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 9226. June 14, 2016.]

(Formerly CBD 06-1749)

MA. CECILIA CLARISSA C. ADVINCULA, complainant, vs. ATTY.

LEONARDO C. ADVINCULA, respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J : p

This administrative case stemmed from the complaint for disbarment dated
June 16, 2006 brought to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty.
Leonardo C. Advincula (Atty. Advincula) by no less than his wife, Dr. Ma. Cecilia
Clarissa C. Advincula (Dr. Advincula).
In her complaint, 1 Dr. Advincula has averred that Atty. Advincula committed
unlawful and immoral acts; 2 that while Atty. Advincula was still married to her, he
had extra-marital sexual relations with Ma. Judith Ortiz Gonzaga (Ms. Gonzaga); 3
that the extra-marital relations bore a child in the name of Ma. Alexandria Gonzaga
Advincula (Alexandria); n 4 that Atty. Advincula failed to give financial support to
their own children, namely: Ma. Samantha Paulina, Ma. Andrea Lana, and Jose
Leandro, despite his having sufficient financial resources; 5 that he admitted in the
affidavit of late registration of birth of Alexandria that he had contracted another
marriage with Ms. Gonzaga; 6 that even should Atty. Advincula prove that his
declaration in the affidavit of late registration of birth was motivated by some reason
other than the fact that he truly entered into a subsequent marriage with Ms. Gonzaga,
then making such a declaration was in itself still unlawful; 7 that siring a child with a
woman other than his lawful wife was conduct way below the standards of morality
required of every lawyer; 8 that contracting a subsequent marriage while the first
marriage had not been dissolved was also an unlawful conduct; 9 that making a false
declaration before a notary public was an unlawful conduct punishable under the
Revised Penal Code; 10 and that the failure of Atty. Advincula to provide proper
support to his children showed his moral character to be below the standards set by
law for every lawyer. 11 Dr. Advincula prayed that Atty. Advincula be disbarred. 12
In his answer, 13 Atty. Advincula denied the accusations. He asserted that
during the subsistence of his marriage with Dr. Advincula but prior to the birth of
their youngest Jose Leandro, their marital relationship had deteriorated; that they
could not agree on various matters concerning their family, religion, friends, and
respective careers; that Dr. Advincula abandoned the rented family home with the two
children to live with her parents; that despite their separation, he regularly gave
financial support to Dr. Advincula and their children; that during their separation, he
got into a brief relationship with Ms. Gonzaga; and that he did not contract a second
marriage with Ms. Gonzaga. 14
Atty. Advincula further acknowledged that as a result of the relationship with
Ms. Gonzaga, a child was born and named Alexandra; 15 that in consideration of his
moral obligation as a father, he gave support to Alexandra; 16 that he only learned that
the birth of Alexandra had been subsequently registered after the child was already
enrolled in school; 17 that it was Ms. Gonzaga who informed him that she had the
birth certificate of Alexandria altered by a fixer in order to enroll the child; 18 that he
strived to reunite his legitimate family, resulting in a reconciliation that begot their
third child, Jose Leandro; that Dr. Advincula once again decided to live with her
parents, bringing all of their children along; that nevertheless, he continued to provide
financial support to his family and visited the children regularly; that Dr. Advincula
intimated to him that she had planned to take up nursing in order to work as a nurse
abroad because her medical practice here was not lucrative; that he supported his
wife's nursing school expenses; 19 that Dr. Advincula left for the United States of
America (USA) to work as a nurse; 20 that the custody of their children was not
entrusted to him but he agreed to such arrangement to avoid further division of the
family; 21 that during the same period he was also busy with his law studies; 22 that
Dr. Advincula proposed that he and their children migrate to the USA but he opposed
the proposal because he would not be able to practice his profession there; 23 that Dr.
Advincula stated that if he did not want to join her, then she would just get the
children to live with her; 24 that when Dr. Advincula came home for a vacation he was
not able to accompany her due to his extremely busy schedule as Chief Legal Staff of
the General Prosecution Division of the National Bureau of Investigation; 25 and that
when they finally met arguments flared out, during which she threatened to file a
disbarment suit against him in order to force him to allow her to bring their children to
the USA. 26 Atty. Advincula prayed that the disbarment case be dismissed for utter
lack of merit. 27CAIHTE

Findings and Recommendations of the IBP-CBD

After exhaustive hearings, Commissioner Angelito C. Inocencio of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) rendered the following findings and
observations, and recommended the following sanctions, to wit:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Based on Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility for
Lawyers comes this provisions (sic): "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
This means that members of the bar ought to possess good moral
character. Remember we must (sic) that the practice of law is a mere
privilege. The moment that a lawyer no longer has the required qualifications
foremost of which is the presence of that character earlier mentioned, the
Honorable Supreme Court may revoke the said practice.
No doubt, Respondent Leanardo (sic) C. Advincula, probably due to
the weakness of the flesh, had a romance outside of marriage (sic) with Ma.
Judith Ortiz Gonzaga. This he admitted.
From such affair came a child named Ma. Alexandria. He supported
her as a moral obligation.
How, then, must we categorize his acts? It cannot be denied that he
had committed an adulterous and immoral act.
Was his conduct grossly immoral?
Before answering that, let us recall what the highest Court of the Land
defined as immoral conduct: "that conduct which is willful, flagrant or
shameless and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good
and respectable members of the community." 28
xxx xxx xxx
It is the Commissioner's view that what he did pales when compared to
Respondent Leo Palma's case earlier cited.
In that case, the Honorable Supreme Court stressed that Atty. Palma
had made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and
dignity.
 The highest Court of the Land intoned in the same case: "But what
respondent forgot is that he has also duties to his wife. As a husband, he is
obliged to live with her; observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; and render
help and support."
Deemed favorable to Respondent's cause were the various exhibits he
presented evidencing the fact that he supported their children financially. Such
conduct could not illustrate him as having championed a grossly immoral
conduct.
Another factor to consider is this: Complainant should share part of the
blame why their marriage soured. Their constant quarrels while together
would indicate that harmony between them was out of the question.
The possibility appears great that she might have displayed a temper
that ignited the flame of discord between them.
Just the same, however, while this Commissioner would not
recommend the supreme penalty of disbarment for to deprive him of such
honored station in life would result in irreparable injury and must require
proof of the highest degree pursuant to the Honorable Supreme Court's ruling
in Angeles vs. Figueroa, 470 SCRA 186 (2005), he must be sanctioned.
And the proof adduced is not of the highest degree.
VI. RECOMMENDATION
In the light of the foregoing disquisition, having, in effect,
Respondent's own admission of having committed an extra-marital affair and
fathering a child, it is respectfully recommended that he be suspended from
the practice of law for at least one month with the additional admonition that
should he repeat the same, a more severe penalty would be imposed.
It would be unjust to impose upon him the extreme penalty of
disbarment. What he did was not grossly immoral. 29
The IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted the findings and
recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner with slight modification of the
penalty, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and considering respondent's admission of engaging in a
simple immorality and also taking into account the condonation of his extra-
marital affair by his wife, Atty. Leonardo C. Advincula is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) months. 30
 Atty. Advincula accepted the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors as
final and executory, and manifested in his compliance dated February 26, 2013, as
follows: DETACa

1. That on 28 November 2011 this Honorable Court issued a resolution

suspending the undersigned Attorney from the practice of law for two
(2) months under "A.C. No. 9226 (formerly CBD Case No. 06-1749)
(Ma. Cecilia Clarissa C. Advincula vs. Atty. Leonardo C. Advincula) . . .
2. That on 30 October 2012 in faithful compliance with the above order, the
undersigned attorney applied for Leave for two (2) months starting
November up to December thereby refraining himself from the practice
of law as Legal Officer on the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) . .
.
3. That the undersigned Attorney would like to notify this Honorable Court of
his compliance with the above resolution/order so that he may be able to
practice his law profession again. 31
Ruling of the Court
The good moral conduct or character must be possessed by lawyers at the time
of their application for admission to the Bar, and must be maintained until retirement
from the practice of law. In this regard, the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Accordingly, it is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the Court,
must not only be in fact of good moral character, but must also be seen to be of good
moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of
the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the Court is
required not only to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but
also to conduct himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that
he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable
profession and attain its basic ideals, whoever is enrolled in its ranks should not only
master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing
fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import,
as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. 32
 Immoral conduct has been described as conduct that is so willful, flagrant, or
shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of
the community. To be the basis of disciplinary action, such conduct must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of
decency. 33
On different occasions, we have disbarred or suspended lawyers for immorality
based on the surrounding circumstances of each case. In Bustamante-Alejandro v.
Alejandro, 34 the extreme penalty of disbarment was imposed on the respondent who
had abandoned his wife and maintained an illicit affair with another woman.
Likewise, disbarment was the penalty for a lawyer who carried on an extra-marital
affair with a married woman prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage was
null and void, while he himself was also married. 35 In another case we have
suspended for two years, a married attorney who had sired a child with a former
client. 36 In Samaniego v. Ferrer, 37 suspension of six months from the practice of law
was meted on the philandering lawyer.
Yet, we cannot sanction Atty. Advincula with the same gravity. Although his
siring the child with a woman other than his legitimate wife constituted immorality,
he committed the immoral conduct when he was not yet a lawyer. The degree of his
immoral conduct was not as grave than if he had committed the immorality when
already a member of the Philippine Bar. Even so, he cannot escape administrative
liability. Taking all the circumstances of this case into proper context, the Court
considers suspension from the practice of law for three months to be condign and
appropriate.
As a last note, Atty. Advincula manifested in his compliance dated February
26, 2013 that he had immediately accepted the resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors suspending him from the practice of law for two months as final and
executory; that he had then gone on leave from work in the NBI for two months
starting in November and lasting until the end of December, 2012; and that such leave
from work involved refraining from performing his duties as a Legal Officer of the
NBI.
The manifestation of compliance is unacceptable. A lawyer like him ought to
know that it is only the Court that wields the power to discipline lawyers. The IBP
Board of Governors did not possess such power, rendering its recommendation
against him incapable of finality. It is the Court's final determination of his liability as
a lawyer that is the reckoning point for the service of sanctions and penalties. As such,
his supposed compliance with the recommended two-month suspension could not be
satisfied by his going on leave from his work at the NBI. Moreover, his being a
government employee necessitates that his suspension from the practice of law should
include his suspension from office. A leave of absence will not suffice. This is so
considering that his position mandated him to be a member of the Philippine Bar in
good standing. The suspension from the practice of law will not be a penalty if it does
not negate his continuance in office for the period of the suspension. If the rule is
different, this exercise of reprobation of an erring lawyer by the Court is rendered
inutile and becomes a mockery because he can continue to receive his salaries and
other benefits by simply going on leave for the duration of his suspension from the
practice of law.aDSIHc

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND DECLARES ATTY. LEONARDO

C. ADVINCULA GUILTY of immorality; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of
law for a period of THREE MONTHS EFFECTIVE UPON NOTICE HEREOF,
with a STERN WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he
commit the same offense or a similar offense; DIRECTS ATTY. ADVINCULA to
report the date of his receipt of the Decision to this Court; and ORDERS the Chief of
the Personnel Division of the National Bureau of Investigation to implement the
suspension from office of ATTY. ADVINCULA and to report on his compliance in
order to determine the date of commencement of his suspension from the practice of
law.
Let a copy of this Decision be made part of the records of the respondent in the
Office of the Bar Confidant; and furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Civil Service Commission for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Perez, Mendoza,
Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Brion, * Peralta ** and Jardeleza, **** JJ., are on official leave.
Del Castillo, *** J., is on wellness leave.
Leonen, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Separate Opinions
LEONEN, J., concurring:

Before his admission to the bar, respondent Atty. Leonardo C. Advincula —

who was married to complainant Dr. Ma. Cecilia Clarissa C. Advincula — entered
into a brief extra-marital relationship with Ma. Judith Gonzaga, with whom he had a
child. 1
The standard of morality and the rules of conduct under the Code of
Professional Responsibility are applicable only to lawyers. These are not enforced
against persons who have not taken the lawyer's oath.
 A lawyer's commitment to the lawyer's oath or any standard of morality and
conduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility starts only upon taking that
oath.
Oaths are not senseless utterances. Lawyers who take their oath consent to this
Court's administrative jurisdiction over their actions. The oath is essentially a promise
to act consistently with the value-expectations of this Court.
The significance of the oath rests on many assumptions. Taking the oath
implies notice to the person of the standards he or she is expected to abide by. It not
only implies consent to, but also assumes consciousness of those standards. The
person allowed to take the oath is assumed to have the capacity to consider and
control his or her actions accordingly.
For these reasons, violation of the oath or of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is deemed to merit this Court's imposition of a penalty.
When a lawyer takes the oath, any action inconsistent with the oath or with the
Code of Professional Responsibility may be interpreted as a willful disregard of the
standards embodied in the oath or the Code of Professional Responsibility. As
expressed in our Rules of Evidence, a person is presumed to know and intend "the
ordinary consequences of his [or her] voluntary act." 2 The oath places "penalty"
under the great scope of "ordinary consequence" of a lawyer's actions.
On the other hand, without the taking the oath, we cannot presume a person's
conscious and careful consideration of his or her acts in conforming with this Court's
moral and behavioral standards. Without the taking the oath, administrative penalties
do not rise to the level of ordinary consequence of a person's actions.
This Court, as guardian of constitutional rights, should lead other institutions
by exemplifying through its processes the import of the principle of due process. 3 A
person cannot adjust his or her past actions now to conform to the standards imposed
by an oath he or she takes after. It is unreasonable to expect a person to abide by
standards that he or she cannot be presumed to know and apply to actions he or she
can no longer control.
Respondent cannot be expected to abide by the standards imposed by the
lawyer's oath or by the Code of Professional Responsibility. At that time, this Court
had no administrative jurisdiction over his actions. He was not yet a lawyer when he
entered into a relationship with Ma. Judith Gonzaga during his marriage with
complainant.
Imposing a penalty for respondent's actions before he took the lawyer's oath
reduces the oath to nothing but a frivolous ceremony. We undermine the significance
of the oath if, on that basis, we penalize a person for his or her actions, whether or not
he or she subscribed to that oath.
 While possession of good morals is required before and during one's
membership to the bar, 4 the bases and effects of the finding that one meets or does
not meet the standard of morality are different in these instances.
For admission to the bar, good morals are solely based on a person's actions
before his or her admission. A person found to be lacking of the required good morals
is disqualified from membership in the bar. A person's actions, on which the finding
that a person has met the required good morals is based, are looked into for purposes
of admission — not penalty.
On the other hand, for retaining membership in the bar, the lawyer's actions
while he or she is a member are looked into. These acts may be the bases of
administrative penalty. ETHIDa

However, this is not to say that a lawyer's actions before his or her admission
cannot be the bases of his or her removal from the bar. After all, a person who has not
met the moral standards before admission should not even be admitted to the bar.
Thus, if for some reason, grossly immoral acts not considered by this Court during
application are later made known and proved to this Court, this Court may choose to
remove him or her without disregarding evidence of any possible moral
transformation that could have taken place later. 5
However, this Court should not be too quick to judge a person's actions as
grossly immoral so as to constitute unfitness to become a member of the bar.
In Reyes v. Wong, 6 this Court has ruled that for an act to be administratively
punishable for gross immorality, "it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree." 7 Further:
[T]he same must be established by clear and convincing proof, disclosing a
case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of its
disciplinary power. . . . Likewise, the dubious character of the act done as well
as the motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated. 8
There are different aspects of morality. Morality may be religious or secular. In
Perfecto v. Esidera: 9
Morality refers to what is good or right conduct at a given
circumstance. In Estrada v. Escritor, this court described morality as "'how
we ought to live' and why."
Morality may be religious, in which case what is good depends on the
moral prescriptions of a high moral authority or the beliefs of a particular
religion. Religion, as this court defined in Aglipay v. Ruiz, is "a profession of
faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator." A conduct
is religiously moral if it is consistent with and is carried out in light of the
divine set of beliefs and obligations imposed by the active power.
Morality may also be secular, in which case it is independent of any
divine moral prescriptions. What is good or right at a given circumstance does
 not derive its basis from any religious doctrine but from the independent
moral sense shared as humans. 10 (Citations omitted)
In the same case, this Court stated that the rule against immorality should have
a secular basis. Our jurisdiction to determine what is moral or immoral should only be
limited to conduct that affects public interest. Immoral conduct, if made the basis for
imposing administrative penalty, should refer to conduct as officers of the court. It
must be of such depravity as to reduce the public's confidence in our laws and in our
judicial system, 11 thus:
The non-establishment clause bars the State from establishing, through
laws and rules, moral standards according to a specific religion. Prohibitions
against immorality should be based on a purpose that is independent of
religious beliefs. When it forms part of our laws, rules, and policies, morality
must be secular. Laws and rules of conduct must be based on a secular
purpose.
In the same way, this court, in resolving cases that touch on issues of
morality, is bound to remain neutral and to limit the bases of its judgment on
secular moral standards. When laws or rules refer to morals or immorality,
courts should be careful not to overlook the distinction between secular and
religious morality if it is to keep its part in upholding constitutionally
guaranteed rights.
There is the danger of "compelled religion" and, therefore, of negating
the very idea of freedom of belief and non-establishment of religion when
religious morality is incorporated in government regulations and policies. As
explained in Estrada v. Escritor:
Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in
formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies
and morals would require conformity to what some might
regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers
would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of
conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled
religion" anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if
government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would
tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly
disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would
not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide
full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear
that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class
citizens. Expansive religious freedom therefore requires that
government be neutral in matters of religion; governmental
reliance upon religious justification is inconsistent with this
policy of neutrality.
xxx xxx xxx
 . . . We have jurisdiction over matters of morality only insofar as it
involves conduct that affects the public or its interest.
cSEDTC

Thus, for purposes of determining administrative liability of lawyers

and judges, "immoral conduct" should relate to their conduct as officers of the
court. To be guilty of "immorality" under the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer's conduct must be so depraved as to reduce the
public's confidence in the Rule of Law. Religious morality is not binding
whenever this court decides the administrative liability of lawyers and persons
under this court's supervision. At best, religious morality weighs only
persuasively on us. 12 (Citations omitted)
Respondent had a relationship with another woman during his marriage with
complainant. Out of that extra-marital relationship, a child was born. All these had
happened before he became a lawyer.
Indeed, some may find respondent's actions before becoming a lawyer
immoral. However, these do not constitute grossly immoral conduct that is so corrupt
and reprehensible for this Court to consider him unfit to be a member of the bar.
The dubious character of respondent's actions and his ill-motive were not
clearly demonstrated. Respondent's extra-marital relationship happened during his and
complainant's temporary separation. At the time of respondent's application for bar
admission, his relationship with his alleged mistress, whom he claimed he did not
marry, had already ended. He was already reunited with complainant, his wife. As a
result of their reconciliation, they even had their third child, Jose Leandro.
In light of respondent's reconciliation with complainant prior to becoming a
lawyer, his actions cannot be described as so depraved as to possibly reduce the
public's confidence in our laws and judicial system.
ACCORDINGLY, I concur in the result.
||| (Advincula v. Advincula, A.C. No. 9226, [June 14, 2016])

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 5573. November 21, 2017.]

GIZALE O. TUMBAGA, complainant, vs. ATTY. MANUEL P.

TEOXON, respondent.

DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J : p

Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Gizale O.

Tumbaga against respondent Atty. Manuel P. Teoxon, charging him with gross
immorality, deceitful and fraudulent conduct, and gross misconduct. The parties
hereto paint contrastive pictures not only of their respective versions of the events but
also of their negative portrayals of each other's character. They are, thus, separately
outlined below.

The Complaint

In a verified complaint 1 dated October 9, 2001 filed directly with the Court,
complainant narrated that she met respondent sometime in September 1999. He was
then the City Legal Officer of Naga City from whom complainant sought legal advice.
After complainant consulted with him a few times, he visited her often at her
residence and brought gifts for her son, Al Greg Tumbaga. Respondent even
volunteered to be the godfather of Al Greg. In one of his visits, respondent assured
complainant's mother that although he was already married to Luzviminda Balang, 2
his marriage was a sham because their marriage contract was not registered. In view
of respondent's persistence and generosity to her son, complainant believed his
representation that he was eligible to marry her.
Complainant averred that on December 19, 1999, she moved in with
respondent at the Puncia Apartment in Naga City. In April 2000, she became
pregnant. Respondent allegedly wanted to have the baby aborted but complainant
refused. After the birth of their son, Billy John, respondent spent more time with
them. He used their apartment as a temporary law office and he lived there for two to
three days at a time.
After Billy John was baptized, complainant secured a Certificate of Live Birth
from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Naga City and gave it to respondent to sign.
He hesitantly signed it and volunteered to facilitate its filing. After respondent failed
to file the same, complainant secured another form and asked respondent to sign it
twice. On February 15, 2001, the Certificate of Live Birth was registered.
Thereafter, complainant related that respondent rarely visited them. To make
ends meet, she decided to work in a law office in Naga City. However, respondent
compelled her to resign, assuring her that he would take care of her financial needs.
As respondent failed to fulfill his promise, complainant sought assistance from the
Office of the City Fiscal in Naga City on the second week of March 2001. In the early
morning of the conference set by said office, respondent gave complainant an
affidavit of support and told her there was no need for him to appear in the
conference. Complainant showed the affidavit to Fiscal Elsa Mampo, but the latter
advised her to have the respondent sign the affidavit again. Fiscal Mampo was unsure
of the signature in the affidavit as she was familiar with respondent's signature.
Complainant confronted respondent about the affidavit and he half-heartedly affixed
his true signature therein.
AaCTcI

In May 2001, complainant went to respondent's office as he again reneged on

his promise of support. To appease her anger, respondent executed a promissory note.
However, he also failed to honor the same.
In June 2001, complainant moved out of the Puncia Apartment as respondent
did not pay the rentals therefor anymore. In the evening of September 9, 2001,
respondent raided complainant's new residence, accompanied by three SWAT
members and his wife. Visibly drunk, respondent threatened to hurt complainant with
the bolo and the lead pipe that he was carrying if she will not return the personal
belongings that he left in their previous apartment unit. As respondent barged into the
apartment, complainant sought help from the SWAT members and one of them was
able to pacify respondent. Respondent's wife also tried to attack complainant, but she
too was prevailed upon by the SWAT members. The incident was recorded in the
police blotter.
To corroborate her allegations, complainant attached the following documents
to her complaint, among others: (a) pictures showing respondent lying in a bed
holding Billy John, 3 respondent holding Billy John in a beach setting, 4 complainant
holding Billy John in a beach setting, 5 respondent holding Billy John in a house
setting, 6 and respondent and complainant seated beside each other in a restaurant; 7
(b) the Certificate of Live Birth of Billy John with an Affidavit of
Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity showing respondent's signature; 8 (c) the
affidavit of support 9 executed by respondent; (d) the promissory note 10 executed by
respondent; (e) the police blotter entry 11 dated September 9, 2001; and (f) copies of
pleadings 12 showing the signature of respondent. acEHCD

Respondent's Answer

In his answer, 13 respondent denied the allegations in the complaint. He

asserted that complainant merely wanted to exact money from him.
Respondent alleged that he became the godfather of complainant's son, Al
Greg, but he was only one of four sponsors. He began to visit complainant's residence
to visit his godson. He also denied being the father of Billy John since complainant
supposedly had several live-in partners. He cited the affidavit of Antonio Orogo,
complainant's uncle, to attest to his allegations. According to the affidavit, Al Greg is
the son of the complainant's live-in partner named Orac Barrameda. Complainant
allegedly used Al Greg to extort money from Alfrancis Bichara, the former governor
of Albay, with whom complainant also had a sexual relationship.
Respondent denied that he lived together with complainant at the Puncia
Apartment since he was already married. As complainant was his kumadre, he would
pass by her house whenever he visited the house of Representative Sulpicio S. Roco,
Jr. Respondent was then a member of Representative Roco's legislative staff.
Sometimes, respondent would leave a bag of clothing in complainant's house to save
money for his fare in going to the office of Representative Roco in the House of
Representatives in Quezon City. In one instance, complainant and her mother refused
to return one of his bags such that he was forced to file a replevin case. The Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Naga City decided the case in his favor.
Respondent also claimed that complainant falsified his signature in the
Certificate of Live Birth of Billy John so he filed a complaint for the cancellation of
his acknowledgment therein. Complainant allegedly made it look like he appeared
before Notary Public Vicente Estela on February 15, 2001, but he argued that it was
physically impossible for him to have done so as he attended a hearing in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur that day. He also contended
that complainant forged his signature in the Affidavit of Support.
As to the pictures of respondent with Billy John, he argued that the same
cannot prove paternity. He explained that in one of his visits to Al Greg, complainant
left Billy John in his care to keep the child from falling off the bed. However,
complainant secretly took his picture as he was lying in the bed holding Billy John.
As to his picture with Billy John taken at the beach, respondent alleged that at that
time complainant gave Billy John to respondent as she wanted to go swimming.
While he was holding the child, complainant secretly took their picture. Respondent
accused complainant of taking the pictures in order to use the same to extort money
from him. This is the same scheme allegedly used by complainant against her
previous victims, who paid money to buy peace with her.
Respondent further alleged that politics was also involved in the filing of the
complaint as complainant was working in the office of then Representative Luis
Villafuerte, the political opponent of Representative Roco.
Respondent attached to his answer the following documents, among others: (a)
the affidavit of Antonio Orogo; 14 (b) the Decision 15 dated May 8, 2006 of the
MTCC of Naga City in Civil Case No. 11546, which is the replevin case; (c) copies of
the Minutes of Proceedings 16 and the Order 17 of the RTC of Libmanan, Camarines
Sur, both dated January 15, 2001, showing that respondent attended a hearing therein
on said date; and (d) a photocopy 18 of respondent's credit card and automated teller
machine (ATM) card showing his signature.

The Proceedings before the IBP

Commission on Bar Discipline

The parties appeared before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline for a few
hearings and the marking of their respective evidence. Complainant marked the
following documents, among others, in addition to those already attached to the
complaint: (a) a picture 19 showing respondent seated in a restaurant with
complainant hugging him; (b) a receipt 20 issued by the Clerk of Court of the MTCC
of Naga City, enumerating the objects (consisting mostly of items of clothing)
returned by complainant to respondent in the replevin case; and (c) receipts 21
purportedly showing respondent's payment of the rentals for complainant's apartment
unit.SDHTEC

On motion of complainant, the IBP issued an order 22 directing respondent,

complainant, and Billy John to undergo DNA testing in the DNA laboratory of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to determine the child's paternity. Upon
motion 23 from respondent, however, the IBP annulled its prior order in the interest of
the speedy disposition of the case. 24
On November 14, 2008, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued its
Report and Recommendation, 25 finding that respondent maintained an illicit affair
with complainant and that he should be meted the penalty of suspension for a period
of two (2) years.
In the Resolution No. XVIII-2009-15 26 dated February 19, 2009, the IBP
Board of Governors approved the above recommendation and increased the
recommended period of suspension to three (3) years.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration 27 of the above resolution.
Attached thereto were: (a) the affidavits 28 of Representative Roco and respondent's
wife, Minda B. Teoxon, which allegedly refuted complainant's contention that
respondent lived with complainant at the Puncia Apartment in Naga City; (b) the
transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) dated May 10, 2005 29 in Civil Case No.
11546 for replevin, wherein complainant supposedly admitted to her past
relationships; and (c) a letter 30 from the University of Nueva Caceres that informed
respondent that he was chosen to be the recipient of its Diamond Achiever Award.
The IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reconsideration in its
Resolution No. XX-2012-539 31 dated December 14, 2012.
The IBP thereafter transmitted the record of the case to the Court for final
action.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court agrees with the conclusion of the IBP that the actuations of
respondent in this case showed his failure to live up to the good moral conduct
required of the members of the legal profession.
We held in Advincula v. Advincula 32 that:
The good moral conduct or character must be possessed by lawyers at
the time of their application for admission to the Bar, and must be maintained
until retirement from the practice of law. In this regard, the Code of
Professional Responsibility states:
 Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Accordingly, it is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the
Court, must not only be in fact of good moral character, but must also be seen
to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest
moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar
and officer of the Court is required not only to refrain from adulterous
relationships or keeping mistresses but also to conduct himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those
moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession
and attain its basic ideals, whoever is enrolled in its ranks should not only
master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord
continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of
much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the
possession of legal learning.
Immoral conduct has been described as conduct that is so willful,
flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community. To be the basis of disciplinary action,
such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral, that is, it must
be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to
be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. (Citations
omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides for the imposition of the
penalty of disbarment or suspension if a member of the Bar is found guilty of
committing grossly immoral conduct, to wit:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so. x x x.
 In order to justify the imposition of the above administrative penalties on a
member of the Bar, his/her guilt must first be established by substantial evidence. 33
As explained in Re: Rafael Dimaano, 34 substantial evidence or that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
After a thorough review of the records of the case, the Court upholds the
findings of the IBP as there is indeed substantial evidence that respondent committed
gross immorality by maintaining an extramarital affair with complainant.
One of the key pieces of evidence that the IBP considered in ruling against
respondent is the Decision dated May 8, 2006 of the MTCC of Naga City in Civil
Case No. 11546 for replevin.
In said case, respondent made it appear that he was merely seeking to recover
personal belongings that he left behind at one time in complainant's house. The items
included a traveling bag with various articles of clothing and file folders of cases that
he was handling. He also tried to recover the pieces of furniture that he allegedly
bought for the complainant, which the latter failed to reimburse as promised. These
include a brass bed with foam mattress, a plastic dining table with six plastic chairs, a
brass sala set with a center table, and a plastic drawer. For her defense, complainant
argued that the respondent gradually left the items of clothing in their apartment unit
during the period that they cohabited therein from time to time. She also said that the
furniture were gifts to her and Billy John.
In its decision, the MTCC did rule in favor of respondent. However, the
following elucidation by the MTCC is quite telling:
To the Court, this is one case that should not have been brought to
court because [respondent] could have resorted to a more diplomatic or tactful
way of retrieving his personal belongings rather than going on record with a
lot of pretext and evasion as if the presiding judge is too naive to appreciate
human nature and the truth. [Respondent] would have done well if he was
gentleman, candid and responsible enough to admit his misadventure and
accept responsibility for his misdeeds rather than try to distort facts and avoid
facing the truth. It is not manly.
Of course, the [MTCC] is fully convinced that the personal belongings
listed in the complaint [are] owned by him and the [furniture] that were
eventually sold by [complainant] was bought by him, even without showing
any receipts for it. However, the [MTCC] is not persuaded by his allegation
that he left his bag with [complainant] because he was in a hurry in going to
Manila. He boldly declared in [the trial court] that he has three residences in
Naga City and of all places he had to leave his shirt and underwear with a lady
whom he had visited "only twice."
[Respondent] could deny all the way up to high heaven that he has no
child with [complainant] but the [MTCC] will forever wonder why the latter
 would refuse to part with the shirts and pants unless she is a bare-face
extortionist. But to the [MTCC], she did not appear to be so. In fact, the
[MTCC] had the occasion to observe [complainant] with two little handsome
boys who appeared to be her sons. Hence, this lends credence to the fact that
she might have really demanded money in exchange for the shirts and pants to
support her children.
Be that as it may, the [MTCC] is duty bound to apply the law. There is
no issue on the ownership of the personal belongings contained in a bag
allegedly left by the [respondent] in the house of [complainant].
xxx xxx xxx
However, as far as the [furniture] is concerned, like the brass bed, sala
set, dining table and plastic drawer, the [MTCC] is not persuaded by
[respondent's] claim that he meant to be paid by [complainant] for it.
[Respondent] is a lawyer and although he is not engage[d] in the buying and
selling of [furniture] he should have known that if he really intended to be
paid back for it, he should have asked [complainant] to [sign] a promissory
note or even a memorandum. As it is, he failed to show any evidence of such
an undertaking. That it was a gift of love is more like it. 35
The IBP posited that the above ruling was more than sufficient to prove that
respondent tried to distort the truth that he and complainant did live together as
husband and wife in one apartment unit. The Court agrees with the IBP on this matter.
AScHCD

The MTCC plainly disbelieved respondent's claim that he merely left his bag
of clothing in complainant's house before he left for his place of work in Metro
Manila — a claim which he likewise made in the present case. The trial court further
posited that the pieces of furniture sought to be recovered by respondent were indeed
bought by him but the same were intentionally given to complainant out of love.
Clearly, the MTCC was convinced that respondent and complainant were involved in
an illicit relationship that eventually turned sour and led to the filing of the replevin
case.
A perusal of the above decision reveals that the findings and conclusions
therein were arrived at by the MTCC after a trial on the merits of the case. In other
words, the trial court first heard the parties and received their respective evidence
before it rendered a decision. As such, the trial court cannot be accused of arriving at
the aforementioned findings lightly.
Accordingly, the Court finds no reason to mistrust the observations and
findings of the MTCC. Respondent did not even point out any reason for us to do so.
While the issues in the replevin case and the instant administrative case are indeed
different, they share a common factual backdrop, i.e., the parties' contrasting account
of the true nature of their relationship. From the evidence of both parties, the MTCC
chose the complainant's version of the events. Incidentally, it was respondent himself
who brought to light the existence of the MTCC decision in the replevin case when he
attached the same to his answer in the present case to substantiate his narration of
facts. Thus, he cannot belatedly plead that the decision be disregarded after the
statements and findings therein were used against him.
Complainant further attached pictures of respondent with her and Billy John as
proof of their romantic relations. A perusal of these pictures convinces this Court that
while the same cannot indeed prove Billy John's paternity, they are nevertheless
indicative of a relationship between complainant and respondent that is more than
merely platonic.
One of the annexed pictures shows the couple in a restaurant setting, smiling at
the camera while seated beside each other very closely that their arms are visibly
touching. Another picture shows the couple in the same setting, this time with
complainant smiling as she embraced respondent from behind and they were both
looking at the camera. From the facial expressions and the body language of
respondent and complainant in these pictures, the same unfailingly demonstrate their
unmistakable closeness and their lack of qualms over publicly displaying their
affection towards one another. Thus, the attempts of respondent to downplay his
relationship with complainant flop miserably. Curiously, respondent did not bother to
explain the aforesaid pictures.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent only managed to comment on the
pictures of himself with Billy John. Even then, respondent's accounts as to these
pictures are too flimsy and incredible to be accepted by the Court. Respondent
previously admitted to the genuineness of the pictures but not to the alleged
circumstances of the taking thereof. 36 However, respondent's allegation that the
pictures were surreptitiously taken by complainant falls flat on its face. The pictures
clearly show that he and Billy John were looking directly at the camera when the
pictures were taken. Moreover, the angles from which the pictures were taken suggest
that the person taking the same was directly in front of respondent and Billy John.
In his motion for reconsideration of the IBP Board of Governors Resolution
No. XVIII-2009-15, respondent further argued that the pictures were not conclusive
and the admission of the same was not in accordance with the Rules of Court as
nobody testified on the circumstances of the taking of the pictures and the accuracy
thereof. 37 The IBP correctly disregarded this argument given that technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings.
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial
sense. 38
With respect to the affidavit of support, the promissory note, and the
Certificate of Live Birth of Billy John that contained an Affidavit of
Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity, respondent likewise failed to provide
sufficient controverting evidence therefor.
 In the affidavit of support and the promissory note, respondent supposedly
promised to provide monetary support to Billy John, whom he acknowledged as his
illegitimate son. Respondent verbally repudiated said documents, pointing out that the
same were typewritten while he used a computer in his office, not a typewriter. 39
Respondent further accused complainant of falsifying his signatures therein and, to
prove his charge, he submitted photocopies of his credit card and ATM card that
allegedly showed his customary signatures.
The Court, still, finds this refutation wanting. To the naked eye, the sample
signatures in the credit card and ATM card do appear to be different from the ones in
the affidavit of support, the promissory note, and the Certificate of Live Birth.
However, we likewise compared the sample signatures to respondent's signatures in
his pleadings before the IBP and other documents submitted in evidence and we find
that the signatures in the two sets appear to be likewise dissimilar, which suggests
respondent uses several different signatures. Thus, respondent's claim of forgery is
unconvincing. Moreover, as the IBP noted, the records of the case do not indicate if
he filed criminal charges against complainant for her alleged acts of falsification.
As to the Certificate of Live Birth of Billy John, respondent did file a
complaint for the cancellation of his acknowledgment therein. Thus, the Court will no
longer discuss the parties' arguments regarding the validity of respondent's signature
in said certificate of birth as the issue should be threshed out in the proper proceeding.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent attached the affidavit of Antonio
Orogo in order to belie complainant's allegations and that she merely wanted to exact
money from respondent. In the affidavit, Orogo claimed that respondent did not live
with complainant in the Puncia Apartment in Naga City. Orogo further accused
complainant and her mother of engaging in the practice of extorting money from
various men since she was just 11 years old. The alleged instances of extortion
involved the complainant falsely accusing one man of rape and falsely claiming to
another man that he was the father of her first child.
The Court can hardly ascribe any credibility to the above affidavit. Given the
materiality of Orogo's statements therein, not to mention the gravity of his accusations
against complainant and her mother, he should have been presented as a witness
before the IBP investigating commissioner in order to confirm his affidavit and give
complainant the opportunity to cross-examine him. For whatever reason, this was not
done. As it is, Orogo's affidavit lacks evidentiary value. In Boyboy v. Yabut, 40 we
cautioned that: AcICHD

It is not difficult to manufacture charges in the affidavits, hence, it is

imperative that their truthfulness and veracity be tested in the crucible of
thorough examination. The hornbook doctrine is that unless the affiants
themselves take the witness stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits,
those affidavits must be excluded from the proceedings for being inadmissible
and hearsay x x x. (Citation omitted.)
 In like manner, the Court cannot give much weight to the affidavits of
Representative Roco and Minda B. Teoxon, both of whom attested to the statements
of respondent regarding his places of residence during the time material to this case. It
should be stressed that said affidavits were executed only on June 15, 2009 or about
four months after the IBP Board of Governors issued its Resolution No. XVIII-2009-
15 on February 19, 2009, which affirmed respondent's culpability for grossly immoral
conduct. This attenuates the credibility of the statements as the same were only given
as corroborative statements at so late a time given the relevancy thereof.
In the face of the accusations and the evidence offered against him, respondent
was duty-bound to meet the same decisively head-on. As the Court declared in Narag
v. Narag: 41
While the burden of proof is upon the complainant, respondent has the
duty not only to himself but also to the court to show that he is morally fit to
remain a member of the bar. Mere denial does not suffice. Thus, when his
moral character is assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his
cherished profession is imperiled, he must meet the charges squarely and
present evidence, to the satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court,
that he is morally fit to have his name in the Roll of Attorneys. x x x. (Citation
omitted.)
Unfortunately, respondent failed to prove his defense when the burden of
evidence shifted to him. He could neither provide any concrete corroboration of his
denials in this case nor satisfactorily prove his claim that complainant was merely
extorting money from him.
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent should be held liable
for having illicit relations with complainant. As to whether respondent also sired
complainant's second child, Billy John, the Court finds that the same was not
sufficiently established by the evidence presented in this case. The paternity and/or
acknowledgement of Billy John, if indeed he is respondent's illegitimate child, must
be alleged and proved in separate proceedings before the proper tribunal having
jurisdiction to hear the same.
As to the penalty that should be imposed against respondent in this case, the
Court had occasion to rule in Samaniego v. Ferrer, 42 that:
We have considered such illicit relation as a disgraceful and immoral
conduct subject to disciplinary action. The penalty for such immoral conduct
is disbarment, or indefinite or definite suspension, depending on the
circumstances of the case. Recently, in Ferancullo v. Ferancullo, Jr., we ruled
that suspension from the practice of law for two years was an adequate
penalty imposed on the lawyer who was found guilty of gross immorality. In
said case, we considered the absence of aggravating circumstances such as an
adulterous relationship coupled with refusal to support his family; or
maintaining illicit relationships with at least two women during the
 subsistence of his marriage; or abandoning his legal wife and cohabiting with
other women. (Citations omitted.)
However, considering respondent's blatant attempts to deceive the courts and
the IBP regarding his true relationship with complainant, we agree with the IBP Board
of Governors that the proper penalty in this instance is a three-year suspension from
the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Manuel P. Teoxon
GUILTY of gross immorality and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of three (3) years effective upon notice hereof, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be punished with a
more severe penalty. caITAC

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as a

member of the Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, ** Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Jardeleza,
Caguioa, Martires, Tijam and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
Sereno, * C.J., is on leave.
Velasco, Jr., *** and Reyes, Jr., *** JJ., are on official leave.
Leonen, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Separate Opinions
LEONEN, J., concurring:
This case involves a verified administrative complaint by Petitioner Gizale O.
Tumbaga (Tumbaga) against Atty. Manuel P. Teoxon (Atty. Teoxon) for gross
immorality, deceitful and fraudulent conduct, and gross misconduct.
I concur in the ponencia's finding that Atty. Teoxon is guilty of the charges
against him and should be administratively liable.
Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.
In relation to this, Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides that an
attorney may be removed or suspended from the bar for deceit or grossly immoral
conduct:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;
grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
 or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice,
or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes,
malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
Good moral character is necessary for a lawyer to practice the profession. An
attorney is expected not only to be professionally competent, but to also have moral
integrity. 1 As such, grossly immoral conduct is a ground for disbarment.
However, to warrant an administrative penalty, a lawyer's immoral conduct
must be so gross as to be "willful, flagrant, or shameless," so much so that it "shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community." 2 Grossly immoral conduct must be an act that is "so corrupt and false as
to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree."
3
There is no fixed formula to define what constitutes grossly immoral conduct.
The determination depends on the circumstances. In Arciga v. Maniwang, 4
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as
to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and
obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the
bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the
straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
xxx xxx xxx
There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be in consonance
with the canons of the moral code but he is not subject to disciplinary action
because his misbehavior or deviation from the path of rectitude is not
glaringly scandalous. It is in connection with a lawyer's behavior to the
opposite sex where the question of immorality usually arises. Whether a
lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of
marriage should be characterized as "grossly immoral conduct" will depend
on the surrounding circumstances. 5
This Court has further ruled that to respect constitutionally-protected rights, the
determination of what constitutes immoral conduct should be independent of religious
beliefs and ought to be based on secular moral standards.
Thus, in Perfecto v. Esidera: 6
The non-establishment clause bars the State from establishing, through
laws and rules, moral standards according to a specific religion. Prohibitions
against immorality should be based on a purpose that is independent of
religious beliefs. When it forms part of our laws, rules, and policies, morality
 must be secular. Laws and rules of conduct must be based on a secular
purpose.
In the same way, this court, in resolving cases that touch on issues of
morality, is bound to remain neutral and to limit the bases of its judgment on
secular moral standards. When laws or rules refer to morals or immorality,
courts should be careful not to overlook the distinction between secular and
religious morality if it is to keep its part in upholding constitutionally
guaranteed rights.
There is the danger of "compelled religion" and, therefore, of negating
the very idea of freedom of belief and non-establishment of religion when
religious morality is incorporated in government regulations and policies . . .
xxx xxx xxx
This court may not sit as judge of what is moral according to a
particular religion. We do not have jurisdiction over and is not the proper
authority to determine which conduct contradicts religious doctrine. We have
jurisdiction over matters of morality only insofar as it involves conduct that
affects the public or its interest. (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied) 7
This principle extends to the determination of morality in administrative cases
against lawyers and judges. As stated, this Court "ha[s] jurisdiction over matters of
morality only insofar as it involves conduct that affects the public or its interest."
Thus, lawyers and judges may only be held administratively liable for immoral
conduct when it relates to their conduct as officers of the court, such that it affects the
public's confidence in the Rule of Law:
Thus, for purposes of determining administrative liability of lawyers
and judges, "immoral conduct" should relate to their conduct as officers of the
court. To be guilty of "immorality" under the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer's conduct must be so depraved as to reduce the
public's confidence in the Rule of Law. Religious morality is not binding
whenever this court decides the administrative liability of lawyers and persons
under this court's supervision. At best, religious morality weighs only
persuasively on us. 8
Given these standards and parameters, in Anonymous Complaint v. Dagala, 9 I
opined that this Court should not appoint itself as the curator of all alleged immoral
conduct of lawyers. As in all cases of gross immorality, it depends on the
circumstances, with the overall consideration being whether or not it affects the
lawyer's public conduct as an officer of the court.
In Dagala, an anonymous complaint alleged that Judge Exequil L. Dagala
(Judge Dagala) brandished a high-powered firearm during an altercation and took part
in illegal logging. 10 The complaint mentioned in passing that there were rumors of
Judge Dagala maintaining several mistresses. 11 From this, the issue of immorality
arose. In explaining the situation, Judge Dagala admitted to having children outside
his marriage but alleged that he and his wife have chosen to live separately, with the
former regularly sending financial support to the latter. 12 Judge Dagala explained
that his wife has knowledge of his other children. 13 Neither his wife nor his children
were shown to have complained from this arrangement. 14 Judge Dagala stated that
his wife had forgiven and forgotten him, and has submitted to the idea that they were
"not really meant for each other and for eternity." 15 In finding that Judge Dagala is
not guilty of gross immorality, I stated:
I appreciate the ponente's acknowledgment that "immorality only
becomes a valid ground for sanctioning members of the Judiciary when the
questioned act challenges his or her capacity to dispense justice." This affirms
this Court's principle that our jurisdiction over acts of lawyers and judges is
confined to those that may affect the people's confidence in the Rule of Law.
There can be no immorality committed when there are no victims who
complain. And even when they do, it must be shown that they were directly
damaged by the immoral acts and their rights violated. A judge having
children with women not his wife, in itself, does not affect his ability to
dispense justice. What it does is offend this country's predominantly religious
sensibilities.
We should not accept the stereotype that all women, because they are
victims, are weak and cannot address patriarchy by themselves. The danger of
the State's over-patronage through its stereotype of victims will be far
reaching. It intrudes into the autonomy of those who already found their voice
and may have forgiven.
The highest penalty should be reserved for those who commit
indiscretions that (a) are repeated, (b) result in permanent rearrangements that
cause extraordinary difficulties on existing legitimate relationships, or (c) are
prima facie shown to have violated the law. The negligence or utter lack of
callousness of spouses who commit indiscretions as shown by their inability
to ask for forgiveness, their concealment of the act from their legitimate
relationships, or their lack of support for the children born out of wedlock
should be aggravating and considered for the penalty to be imposed.
VII
Many of us hold the view that it is unethical to breach one's fervent
commitments in an intimate relationship. At times however, the breach is not
concealed and arises as a consequence of the couple's often painful realization
that their marriage does not work. In reality, there are couples who already
live separately and whose children have grown and matured understanding
that their environment best nurtured them when their natural parents do not
live with each other with daily pain.
xxx xxx xxx
It is time that we show more sensitivity to the reality of many families.
Immorality is not to be wielded high-handedly and in the process cause shame
on many of its victims. It should be invoked in a calibrated manner, always
keeping in mind the interests of those who have to suffer its consequences on
 a daily basis. There is a time when the law should exact accountability; there
is also a time when the law should understand the humane act of genuine
forgiveness. 16 (Citations omitted)
The circumstances in Dagala are different from the case at bar.
First, the instant complaint is one for gross immorality and is commenced by
Tumbaga as the misled paramour directly affected by Atty. Teoxon's acts. Tumbaga
asserts that Atty. Teoxon assured her and her mother that his marriage was a sham.
There was fraud committed on Tumbaga. ICHDca

Second, there is substantial evidence to support the allegation that Atty.

Teoxon did have an extramarital affair with Tumbaga. Atty. Teoxon failed to prove
that Tumbaga was only seeking to exact money from him.
Third, it is not shown or alleged that Atty. Teoxon's wife was aware of or
consented to his extramarital affair with Tumbaga. Tumbaga even alleged that Atty.
Teoxon's wife attacked her during the September 9, 2001 raid; thus, showing hostility,
which may indicate that the latter had objections to their relations.
Fourth, there is no showing that Atty. Teoxon was repentant. He even still
denies his relations with Tumbaga and even accuses her of extortion.
As to Billy John, his paternity remains to be proved definitely and should be
the subject matter of a separate case. However, assuming Atty. Teoxon is Billy John's
father, which is what is stated in the latter's Birth Certificate, Atty. Teoxon's denial of
his paternity and withdrawal of financial support may even amount to violence against
women and children under Republic Act No. 9262. 17
These circumstances show that Atty. Teoxon is guilty of gross immorality. He
displayed that he lacked good moral character, acting dishonestly and with deceit.
Moreover, in denying his relations with Tumbaga, he displayed a lack of
accountability and integrity. His actions injured others.
Deceit and lack of accountability and integrity reflect on his ability to perform
his functions as a lawyer, who is always expected to act and appear to act lawfully
and honestly and must uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. 18 A
lawyer is expected not only to have good moral character, but must also appear to
have good moral character. In Tolosa v. Cargo this Court said: 19
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral
character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading
lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More
specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required
to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must
also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
belief that he is flouting those moral standards. 20 (Citation omitted)
Atty. Teoxon failed in these respects as a lawyer. cDHAES
 ACCORDINGLY, I concur in the result finding Atty. Manuel P. Teoxon
GUILTY of GROSS IMMORALITY.
Footnotes
||| (Tumbaga v. Teoxon, A.C. No. 5573, [November 21, 2017])

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 11156. March 19, 2018.]

[Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3680]

MICHELLE YAP, complainant, vs. ATTY. GRACE C. BURI,

respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J : p

The instant case stemmed from the complaint of Michelle Yap against
respondent Atty. Grace C. Buri for refusing to pay her monetary obligation and for
filing a criminal case of Estafa against her based on false accusations.
AScHCD

The factual backdrop of the case is as follows:

Complainant Michelle Yap was the vendor in a contract of sale of a
condominium unit, while Atty. Grace C. Buri, Yap's close friend and her daughter's
godmother, was the vendee. Buri made an offer to purchase the property but asked for
the reduction of the price from P1,500,000.00 to P1,200,000.00. After consulting with
her husband, Yap agreed. Of the total amount of purchase price of P1,200,000.00,
P200,000.00 remains unpaid. Buri insisted that she would just pay the balance on
installment starting in but without specifying the amount to be paid on each
installment. Because she trusted the respondent, Yap gave Buri the full and immediate
possession of the condominium unit upon completion of the P1,000,000.00 despite the
outstanding balance and even without the necessary Deed of Absolute Sale. However,
when Yap finally asked for the balance in January 2011, Buri said she would pay it on
a monthly installment of P5,000.00 until fully paid. When Yap disagreed, Buri said
she would just cancel the sale. Thereafter, Buri also started threatening her through
text messages, and then later on filed a case for estafa against her.
Buri alleged in the criminal case that when she found out that the sale of the
condominium unit was made without the consent of Yap's husband, Yap cancelled the
sale and promised to return the amount of P1,000,000.00 initially paid. Despite
several demands, however, she failed and refused to return the money. Thus, Buri was
constrained to file a case for estafa against Yap. Said case was later dismissed.
Yap then filed an administrative complaint against Buri for the alleged false
accusations against her.
When ordered to submit her answer, Buri failed to comply. She did not even
appear during the mandatory conference. Thus, the mandatory conference was
terminated and the parties were simply required to submit their respective position
papers. However, only Yap complied with said order.
On July 2, 2014, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) recommended Buri's suspension to wit: 1
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, undersigned
Commissioner recommends to impose the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months upon the respondent, Atty.
Grace C. Buri, and for her to pay the complainant the amount of
PhP200,000.00 upon execution by complainant and spouse of the Deed of
Absolute Sale of the condominium unit subject of the sale between the parties.
On January 31, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-
2015-062, 2 which adopted the foregoing recommendation but with modification,
thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A," finding Respondent's violation of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Hence, Atty. Grace C. Buri is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. The order to pay
P200,000.00 is deleted without prejudice to the filing of proper action by
Complainant in Court.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds no sufficient reason to overturn the findings and

recommendation of the IBP that Buri must be disciplined accordingly.
Here, instead of paying Yap the remaining balance of the purchase price of the
condominium unit, Buri opted to simply threaten her and file a criminal case against
her. Obviously, this strategy was to intimidate Yap and prevent her from collecting
the remaining P200,000.00. When given a chance to defend herself, Buri chose to stay
silent and even refused to file an answer, attend the hearing, or to submit her position
paper, despite due notice. Hence, Yap's. version of the facts stands and remains
uncontroverted.
 Buri's unwarranted tenacity simply shows, not only her lack of responsibility,
but also her lack of interest in clearing her name, which, as pronounced in case law, is
indicative of an implied admission of the charges levelled against her. 3
Buri's persistent refusal to pay her obligation despite frequent demands clearly
reflects her lack of integrity and moral soundness; she took advantage of her
knowledge of the law and clearly resorted to threats and intimidation in order to get
away with what she wanted, constituting a gross violation of professional ethics and a
betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. 4
Buri indubitably swept aside the Lawyer's Oath that enjoins her to support the
Constitution and obey the laws. She forgot that she must not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the
same. She also took for granted the express commands of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of
the CPR. AcICHD

Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:

CANON 1 — A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
xxx xxx xxx
While Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the CPR state:
CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
The foregoing canons require of Buri, as a lawyer, an enduring high sense of
responsibility and good fidelity in all her dealings and emphasize the high standard of
honesty and fairness expected of her, not only in the practice of the legal profession,
but in her personal dealings as well. A lawyer must conduct himself with great
propriety, and his behavior should be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times. For,
as officers of the courts and keepers of the public's faith, they are burdened with the
highest degree of social responsibility and are thus mandated to behave at all times in
a manner consistent with truth and honor. Likewise, the oath that lawyers swear to
impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest degree of good faith, fairness
and candor in their relationships with others. Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for
any conduct, whether in their professional or in their private capacity, if such conduct
renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the court. 5
 That Buri's act involved a private dealing with Yap is immaterial. Her being a
lawyer calls for — whether she was acting as such or in a non-professional capacity
— the obligation to exhibit good faith, fairness and candor in her relationship with
others. There is no question that a lawyer could be disciplined not only for a
malpractice in his profession, but also for any misconduct committed outside of his
professional capacity. Buri's being a lawyer demands that she conduct herself as a
person of the highest moral and professional integrity and probity in her dealings with
others. 6
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the practice of law is imbued with
public interest and that a lawyer owes substantial duties, not only to his client, but
also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the public, and takes part in
the administration of justice, one of the most important functions of the State, as an
officer of the court. Accordingly, lawyers are bound to maintain, not only a high
standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.
7
Time and again, the Court has stressed the settled principle that the practice of
law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment
of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A
high sense of morality, honesty, and fair dealing is expected and required of a member
of the bar. The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that he shall be of good moral
character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to the admission to the
legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain one's good
standing in the profession. Consequently, a lawyer can be deprived of his license for
misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the Court after giving him the
opportunity to be heard. 8
Verily, Buri has fallen short of the high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity, and fair dealing expected of her. On the contrary, she employed her
knowledge and skill of the law in order to avoid fulfillment of her obligation, thereby
unjustly enriching herself and inflicting serious damage on Yap. Her repeated failure
to file her answer and position paper and to appear at the mandatory conference
aggravate her misconduct. These demonstrate high degree of irresponsibility and lack
of respect for the IBP and its proceedings. Her attitude severely stains the nobility of
the legal profession. 9
The Court sustains the modified recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors. The Court has held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes
gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one (1) year-suspension
from the practice of law. 10 The Court likewise upholds the deletion of the payment
of the P200,000.00 since the same is not intrinsically linked to Buri's professional
engagement. Disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the determination
of the respondent lawyer's administrative and not his civil liability. Thus, when the
 claimed liabilities are purely civil in nature, as when the claim involves money owed
by the lawyer to his client in view of a separate and distinct transaction and not by
virtue of a lawyer-client relationship, the same should be threshed out in a separate
civil action. 11
TAIaHE

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court SUSPENDS

Atty. Grace C. Buri from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year and WARNS
her that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be included in the personal records of Atty. Grace
C. Buri and entered in her file in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of
the Court Administrator, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, * Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
 
||| (Yap v. Buri, A.C. No. 11156, [March 19, 2018])

FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 10145. June 11, 2018.]

OLIVER FABUGAIS, complainant, vs. ATTY. BERARDO C.

FAUNDO JR., respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J : p

In both their professional and personal lives, lawyers must conduct themselves
in such a way that does not reflect negatively upon the legal profession.

Factual Antecedents

This is a Complaint 1 filed by complainant Oliver Fabugais (complainant)

against Atty. Berardo C. Faundo, Jr. (respondent lawyer), for gross misconduct and
conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for having allegedly engaged in illicit and immoral
relations with his wife, Annaliza Lizel B. Fabugais (Annaliza).
 In her Sinumpaang Salaysay, 2 then 10-year old girl Marie Nicole Fabugais
(Marie Nicole), daughter of complainant, alleged that sometime in October 2006, she,
along with her mother, Annaliza, Ate Mini (Michelle Lagasca), and a certain Ate Ada
(Ada Marie Campos), stayed in a house in Ipil, Zamboanga-Sibugay, that belonged to
respondent lawyer, whom Marie Nicole referred to as "Tito Attorney." Marie Nicole
said that when night-time fell, respondent lawyer slept in the same bed with her and
her mother and that she saw respondent lawyer embracing her mother while they were
sleeping.
Marie Nicole further recounted that the next morning, while she was watching
television along with her mother, Ate Mimi and Ate Ada, respondent lawyer who just
had a shower, and clad only in a towel or "tapis," suddenly entered the room; that she
(Marie Nicole) along with her Ate Mimi and her Ate Ada, were told to step outside
the room (either by respondent lawyer, or by her mother Annaliza), while her mother
and respondent lawyer remained inside the room.
Because of these developments, complainant filed a case for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage with Annaliza, with prayer for the custody of their minor
children. In said case, respondent lawyer entered his appearance as collaborating
counsel for Annaliza. 3
Complainant moreover narrated that, on February 17, 2007, while he was
driving his motorcycle along the San Jose Road in Baliwasan, Zamboanga City,
respondent lawyer, who was then riding in tandem in another motorcycle with his
own driver, slowed down next to him (complainant) and yelled at him angrily, "Nah,
cosa man?!" ("So, what now?!"); that he (complainant) also noticed that respondent
lawyer kept following and shouting at him (complainant), and even challenged him to
a fistfight, and threatened to kill him. 4
Complainant further alleged that respondent lawyer also harassed his sister on
February 27, 2007 by chasing and trailing after her car. 5
In his Answer, 6 respondent lawyer asserted that the chasing incident actually
took place on February 16, 2007, and that it was in fact complainant himself who
stared menacingly at him (respondent lawyer) while he was riding a motorcycle in
tandem with his driver. Respondent lawyer sought to reinforce this assertion through
the affidavit of respondent lawyer's driver, Romeo T. Mirasol, 7 and two other
individuals. 8
Respondent lawyer denied that he had any immoral relations with Annaliza. He
claimed that he was merely assisting Annaliza in her tempestuous court battle with
complainant for custody of her children. Respondent lawyer asserted that when Marie
Nicole's maternal grandmother, Ma. Eglinda L. Bantoto, sought out his help in this
case, he told them that they could hide in his (respondent lawyer's) parents' house in
Ipil. 9
 Respondent lawyer claimed that the cordial relationship he had with Annaliza
could be traced to her being the stepdaughter of his (respondent lawyer's) late uncle,
and also to her having been his former student at the Western Mindanao State
University in Zamboanga City. Respondent lawyer insisted that he was incapable of
committing the misconduct imputed to him for three simple reasons to wit: because he
is a good father to his three children, because he is a respected civic leader, and
because he had never been the subject even of a complaint with the police. He
claimed that complainant filed the instant complaint simply "to harass him from
practicing his legitimate profession, and for no other reason." 10
Upon recommendation of the IBP-ZAMBASULTA Chapter Board, this case
was forwarded to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors
(BOG) in April 26, 2007. 11 And, in an Order dated August 2, 2007 this case was then
consolidated with a similar case filed by the same complainant against the same
respondent. 12

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner

In his Report and Recommendation, 13 IBP Investigating Commissioner

Dennis A. B. Funa (Investigating Commissioner) found respondent lawyer guilty of
violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) month.
The Investigating Commissioner noted that on the accusation that respondent
lawyer had chased complainant in his motorcycle on February 17, 2007, this
accusation had not been fully substantiated with convincing evidence. He opined that
"there [was] doubt as to whether the incident did occur with the [respondent lawyer's]
presence and participation. [Since] the motorcycles were moving fast and the parties
were wearing helmets[, the] identity of respondent [lawyer] could not be
[categorically] established." 14
The Investigating Commissioner likewise found no sufficient evidence to
establish that respondent lawyer harassed complainant's sister.
However, the Investigating Commissioner found respondent lawyer to have
acted inappropriately with Annaliza which created the appearance of immorality, viz.:
As can be gleaned from the records of the hearing, no categorical
sexual activity took place between respondent and complainant's wife. One
would need to inject a bit of imagination to create an image of something
sexual. But as can be read, no sexual activity took place based on the witness'
account.
However, it would be erroneous to conclude that respondent's behavior
was in total and complete accord with how a lawyer should behave,
particularly in the presence of a minor. Was respondent's behavior toward a
woman, in the presence of her minor daughter of 11 years, proper and in
 keeping with the dignity of the legal profession? It is clear that there was
impropriety on the part of respondent.
In Tolosa v. Cargo (A.M. No. 2385, March 8, 1989), the Court held
that creating the appearance that a lawyer is flouting with moral standards is
sanctionable. Thus, while the charge of immorality, viz[.], adulterous
relationship, was not factually established, certain behavior of the respondent
did not escape notice of the Court.
In this case, while sexual immorality was not established, respondent
should be held to account for his inappropriate behavior which created the
image or appearance of immorality especially in the presence of a minor girl.
Respondent's act of lying in bed with another married woman, while he
himself is a married man, in the presence of the woman's daughter could raise
suspicions, as in fact it did. x x x.
Respondent should have been considerate of the feelings and
perceptions of other people, particularly of minor children. 15
The Investigating Commissioner, thus, recommended respondent lawyer's
suspension for one (1) month for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Report and Recommendation of the IBP-BOG

The IBP-BOG in its Resolution No. XIX-2011-302 16 adopted and approved

the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Sometime in 2011, complainant's counsel Atty. Mario Frez (Atty. Frez) filed a
Notice, Manifestation, and Motion for Withdrawal 17 from this case, stating that
complainant had passed away on June 12, 2011; and that he was not sure whether
complainant's heirs were still willing to pursue the disbarment case against respondent
lawyer since he has had no contact with the complainant since June 1, 2009; and he
has had no information as to the whereabouts of complainant's heirs.
Notwithstanding the Motion for Withdrawal filed by Atty. Frez and
considering the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondent lawyer in 2013,
the IBP-BOG issued on June 21, 2013 a Resolution 18 denying respondent lawyer's
motion for reconsideration.
Pursuant to Section 12 (c) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, this case is
before us for final action.

Our Ruling

We find substantial merit in the findings of facts of the IBP. And we reject
respondent lawyer's highly implausible defense that the complainant filed the instant
case for no other reason but simply "to harass him from practicing his legitimate
profession." 19 There is absolutely nothing in the record to support it.
It bears stressing that this case can proceed in spite of complainant's death and
the apparent lack of interest on the part of complainant's heirs. Disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers are sui generis in nature: they are intended and
undertaken primarily to look into the conduct or behavior of lawyers, to determine
whether they are still fit to exercise the privileges of the legal profession, and to hold
them accountable for any misconduct or misbehavior which deviates from the
mandated norms and standards of the Code of Professional Responsibility, all of
which are needful and necessary to the preservation of the integrity of the legal
profession. Because not chiefly or primarily intended to administer punishment, such
proceedings do not call for the active service of prosecutors. 20
We first rule on the accusation relative to the chasing incidents. This Court
agrees with the IBP's findings that the evidence presented by complainant upon this
point was insufficient to establish the fact that respondent lawyer had committed the
alleged acts against the complainant and his sister.
We now turn to the accusation in regard to the immoral acts claimed to have
been committed by respondent lawyer with complainant's wife Annaliza. The issue to
be resolved here is this: Did respondent lawyer in fact commit acts that are grossly
immoral, or acts that amount to serious moral depravity, that would warrant or call for
his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law?
"Immoral conduct" has been defined as that conduct which is so willful,
flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community. 21 This Court has held that for such conduct to warrant
disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt
and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree." 22
It is not easy to state with accuracy what constitutes "grossly immoral
conduct," let alone what constitutes the moral delinquency and obliquity that renders a
lawyer unfit or unworthy to continue as a member of the bar in good standing. 23
In the present case, going by the eyewitness testimony of complainant's
daughter Marie Nicole, raw or explicit sexual immorality between respondent lawyer
and complainant's wife was not established as a matter of fact. Indeed, to borrow the
Investigating Commissioner's remark: "[o]ne would need to inject a bit of imagination
to create an image of something sexual." 24
That said, it can in no wise or manner be argued that respondent lawyer's
behavior was par for the course for members of the legal profession. Lawyers are
mandated to do honor to the bar at all times and to help maintain the respect of the
community for the legal profession under all circumstances. 25 Canon 7 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility provides:
 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility further provides:
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave
in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
"There is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a
high-toned morality is more imperative than that of the law." 26 As officers of the
court, lawyers must in fact and in truth be of good moral character. They must
moreover also be seen or appear to be of good moral character; and be seen or appear
to — live a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. 27
Members of the bar can ill-afford to exhibit any conduct which tends to lessen in any
degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty, and the integrity of the
legal profession. 28 The Courts require adherence to these lofty precepts because any
thoughtless or ill-considered actions or actuations by any member of the Bar can
irreversibly undermine public confidence in the law and, consequently, those who
practice it. 29
The acts complained of in this case might not be grossly or starkly immoral in
its rawness or coarseness, but they were without doubt condemnable. Respondent
lawyer who made avowals to being a respectable father to three children, and also to
being a respected leader of his community apparently had no qualms or scruples about
being seen sleeping in his own bed with another man's wife, his arms entwined in
tender embrace with the latter. Respondent lawyer's claim that he was inspired by
nothing but the best of intentions in inviting another married man's wife and her 10-
years old daughter to sleep with him in the same bed so that the three of them could
enjoy a good night's rest in his airconditioned chamber, reeks with racy, ribald humor.
And in aggravation of the aforementioned unseemly behavior, respondent
lawyer apparently experienced neither qualms nor scruples at all about exploding into
the room occupied by a married man's wife and her 10-year old daughter and their
two other women companions clad with nothing else but a "tapis" or a towel. Of
course, respondent lawyer sought to downplay this boorish impropriety by saying in
his Motion for Reconsideration that he was wearing a malong and not tapis at that
time. And, of course, this plea will not avail because his scanty trappings gave him no
license to intrude into a small room full of women. Respondent lawyer could have
simply asked everyone in the room to step outside for a little while. Or he could have
donned his clothing elsewhere. But these things seemed to have been totally lost to
respondent lawyer's density. Indeed, respondent lawyer seemed to have forgotten that
there are rules other men — decent men, — live by.
Respondent lawyer's defense that he was a "respectable father with three
children" and that he was a "respected civic leader" to boot, flies in the face of a
young girl's perception of his diminished deportment. It does not escape this Court's
attention that the 10-year old Marie Nicole called respondent lawyer "Tito Attorney."
Indeed, by calling respondent lawyer as "Tito Attorney" Marie Nicole effectively
proclaimed her avuncular affection for him, plus her recognition of his being a
member of the legal profession. We believe that Marie Nicole must have been a bit
disappointed with what she saw and observed about the manners, predilections and
propensities of her "Tito Attorney." In fact, a close examination of Marie Nicole's
testimony cannot fail to show that in Marie Nicole's young mind, it was clearly not
right, appropriate or proper for her "Tito Attorney" to be sharing the same bed with
her and her mother, and for her mother to remain alone in the same room with her
"Tito Attorney," while this "Tito Attorney" was dressing up. In all these happenings, a
modicum of decency should have impelled this "Tito Attorney" to behave more
discreetly and more sensitively, as he could not have been unaware that Marie Nicole
was observing him closely and that she could be forming her impressions of lawyers
and the legal profession by the actions and the behavior of this, her "Tito Attorney."
In deciding upon the appropriate sanction to be imposed upon respondent
lawyer in this case, this Court is ever mindful that administrative disciplinary
proceedings are essentially designed to protect the administration of justice and that
this lofty ideal can be attained by requiring that those who are honored by the title
"Attorney" and counselor at law are men and women of undoubted competence,
unimpeachable integrity and undiminished professionalism, men and women in whom
courts and clients may repose confidence. 30 This Court moreover realizes only too
well that the power to disbar or suspend members of the bar ought always to be
exercised not in a spirit of spite, hostility or vindictiveness, but on the preservative
and corrective principle, with a view to safeguarding the purity of the legal
profession. Hence, that power can be summoned only in the service of the most
compelling duty, which must be performed, in light of incontrovertible evidence of
grave misconduct, which seriously taints the reputation and character of the lawyer as
an officer of the court and as a member of the Bar. 31 It goes without saying moreover
that it should not be exercised or asserted when a lesser penalty or sanction would
accomplish the end desired. 32
In the context of the circumstances obtaining in this case, and hewing to
jurisprudential precedence, and considering furthermore that this is respondent
lawyer's first offense, this Court believes that a one-month suspension from the
practice of law, as recommended by the IBP, would suffice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent lawyer Atty. Berardo C.
Faundo, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month,
reckoned from receipt of a copy of this Decision. He is hereby WARNED to be more
careful and more circumspect in all his actions, and to be mindful of the kind of
example he holds up, especially to impressionable young people, lest he brings upon
himself a direr fate the second time around.
 Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the personal records of Atty.
Berardo C. Faundo, Jr. as a member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-de Castro, * Jardeleza and Gesmundo, *** JJ., concur.
Tijam, ** J., is on official leave.
||| (Fabugais v. Faundo Jr., A.C. No. 10145, [June 11, 2018])

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 8962. July 9, 2018.]

JILDO A. GUBATON, complainant, vs. ATTY. AUGUSTUS

SERAFIN D. AMADOR, respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p

This administrative case arose from an affidavit-complaint 1 for disbarment

filed by complainant Jildo A. Gubaton (complainant) against respondent Atty.
Augustus Serafin D. Amador (respondent) on the ground of gross immoral conduct
and/or immorality.

The Facts

Complainant alleged that respondent, a former Assistant Prosecutor at the City

Prosecutor's Office in Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, was having an illicit romantic
relationship with his wife, Ma. Bernadette R. Tenorio-Gubaton (Bernadette), since
2005 up to the present. 2
He averred that it was in the early part of 2008, while working in the United
States of America (USA), when he discovered the illicit relationship. Complainant
and Bernadette's house helper informed him through a phone call that a man whom
she knows to be "Fiscal Amador" often visits Bernadette. The house helper also told
him that respondent spends nights at their house and stays with Bernadette in their
bedroom. When complainant called Bernadette's dental clinic to verify the
information, it was the secretary who took his call. Upon inquiry, the latter confirmed
that respondent and Bernadette have been carrying on an illicit affair. 3
Sometime in August 2009, complainant returned to the country. On his first
night home, despite his pleas, Bernadette refused to lie and sleep with him; instead,
she demanded that he sleep in another room, to which he acceded in order to avoid
any argument. Since then, Bernadette has refused to sleep with him. Further,
complainant discovered some birth-control pills and condoms in their house, in
Bernadette's dental clinic, and in her handbag. When he confronted her about it, she
merely denied ownership thereof. He also alleged that Bernadette wrote love
letters/notes 4 to respondent, as in fact, one of these letters had the word "fiscal" 5 on
it. 6
CAIHTE

Complainant likewise alleged that he personally saw respondent and

Bernadette together in various places in Malaybalay City. At one instance, he saw
them kissing while inside a vehicle; when he approached to confront them, respondent
ran away. 7
The illicit affair of respondent and Bernadette was known to other people as
well. Complainant's sister, Nila Canoy, 8 told him about it during phone calls while he
was still in the USA, 9 as narrated in her affidavit. 10 Likewise, Carlos Delgado
(Delgado), Chief of Barangay Public Safety Office in Poblacion, Malaybalay City,
and one Edgar Navarez (Navarez), an employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) and a resident of Casisang, Malaybalay City, knew of the affair and executed
their respective affidavits 11 relative thereto.
In defense, 12 respondent denied all the allegations against him. He claimed
that he was merely acquainted with Bernadette and they would only see each other on
various occasions and social gatherings. He also denied the incident where
complainant allegedly saw him and Bernadette kissing inside a vehicle. 13

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

After due proceedings, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), through Commissioner Jose Alfonso M.
Gomos (Commissioner Gomos), issued a Report and Recommendation 14 dated June
27, 2012 recommending the dismissal of the affidavit-complaint for insufficiency of
evidence.
Commissioner Gomos found that the information supplied by complainant and
Bernadette's house helper, Bernadette's clinic secretary, and complainant's sister, Nila,
about the alleged illicit affair were purely hearsay. Likewise, the supposed love
letters/notes offered in evidence did not prove that the same were written by
Bernadette to respondent. Similarly, the affidavit executed by Delgado did not
positively refer to respondent, while that of Navarez contained general statements of
an affair between respondent and Bernadette. 15 As for the affidavit executed by Nila,
the same is clearly biased in view of the latter's relationship with complainant. 16
Finally, with respect to the incident where complainant allegedly saw respondent and
Bernadette kissing inside a vehicle and attempted to confront them, Commissioner
Gomos found the same to be contrary to human experience, reasoning that an
offended husband would be expected to do more than just confront them under the
circumstances. 17
In a Resolution 18 dated June 22, 2013, however, the IBP Board of Governors
reversed the June 27, 2012 Report and Recommendation, and instead, suspended
respondent from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. Respondent moved
for reconsideration, 19 which was denied in a Resolution 20 dated April 20, 2017.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue for the Court's consideration is whether or not grounds exist to
hold respondent administratively liable.

The Court's Ruling

The Court concurs with the conclusion of the IBP Board of Governors that
respondent should be held administratively liable with modification, however, as
regards the penalty to be imposed.
It is fundamental that the quantum of proof in administrative cases is
substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other
minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. 21 DETACa

In this case, substantial evidence exist to prove complainant's claim that

respondent had illicit affairs with Bernadette and hence, should be adjudged guilty of
gross immorality.
As per complainant's own account, he actually saw respondent and Bernadette
together on various intimate occasions. In fact, he attempted to confront them at one
time when he saw them kissing inside a vehicle, although respondent was able to
evade him. 22 The Court is inclined to believe that complainant's imputations against
respondent are credible, considering that he had no ill motive to accuse respondent of
such a serious charge — much more a personal scandal involving his own wife —
unless the same were indeed true.
Complainant's statements were corroborated by the affidavit executed by
Navarez, who works in BIR, Malaybalay City as a messenger and therefore, goes
around the city in relation to his work. Navarez categorically stated that respondent
and Bernadette have been carrying on an illicit affair while complainant was in the
USA, and further averred that he had seen them together on different intimate
occasions. He even saw them kissing each other at one instance. 23 Notably, it must
be highlighted that Navarez is a neutral and disinterested witness and hence, his
declarations deserve ample consideration.
Moreover, complainant's sister, Nila, described to complainant, while the latter
was in the USA, how respondent would often visit Bernadette and spend the night in
their residence, while she was still living with Bernadette and their children thereat.
She narrated that Bernadette first introduced respondent to her as a "cousin" from
Davao City. However, the two would often have lunch in the house and thereafter,
respondent would even spend some time with Bernadette inside the latter's bedroom.
Nila likewise recounted that whenever the two of them arrived home in one vehicle,
they would kiss each other before alighting therefrom. 24
In this relation, it may not be amiss to point out that complainant offered in
evidence love letters/notes supposedly written by Bernadette to respondent to prove
the existence of their illicit relationship. The authenticity of these love letters/notes,
although not expressly shown to be written by Bernadette or received by respondent,
were not refuted. Consequently, they lend credibility to complainant's claim.
Finally, it should be clarified that while the information supplied by
complainant and Bernadette's house helper and Bernadette's clinic secretary about the
alleged illicit affair constitute hearsay, the same should not be completely disregarded.
Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only the fact that such
statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The
doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations communicated
to a witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth
or falsity, they were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such statements is
not secondary but primary, for in itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is
circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact. Accordingly, the hearsay rule
does not apply, and hence, the statements are admissible as evidence. 25 Verily,
complainant personally attests that the information about the illicit affair between
respondent and his wife have been relayed to him by complainant's house helper and
Bernadette's clinic secretary. Clearly, the making of such statements is
circumstantially relevant to this case and therefore, may be considered in evidence
against respondent. Besides, in Re: Verified Complaint dated July 13, 2015 of Umali,
Jr. v. Hernandez: 26
The relaxation of the hearsay rule in disciplinary administrative
proceedings against judges and justices where bribery proceedings are
involved is not a novel thought in this Court; it has been advocated in the
Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Arturo D. Brion in the administrative
case of justice Ong before this Court. The Opinion essentially maintained that
the Court could make a conclusion that bribery had taken place when the
circumstances — including those derived from hearsay evidence —
 sufficiently prove its occurrence. It was emphasized that [t]o satisfy the
substantial evidence requirement for administrative cases, hearsay
evidence should necessarily be supplemented and corroborated by other
evidence that are not hearsay. 27 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Given that the purported hearsay are supplemented and corroborated by other
evidence that are not hearsay, the Court finds no cogent reason not to apply the same
pronouncement to this particular case. aDSIHc

For his part, respondent only proffered a bare denial of the imputed affair. He
insists that he was merely acquainted with Bernadette and that they would only see
each other during social gatherings or by pure accident. The thrust of his denial was
that, although they would see each other on occasion, such meetings were innocent, as
in instances when she gave him a short ride from his office to the trial court, the times
when he visited her dental clinic for a procedure and during its anniversary
celebration, and when he "bumped" into her at a department store and she apologized
to him for her husband's jealousy. 28
Suffice it to say that "[d]enial is an intrinsically weak defense. To merit
credibility, it must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability. If
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence [as in this case] it is negative and
self-serving, deserving no greater value than the testimony of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters." 29 In any event, the Court observes that the alleged
"accidental" and "innocent" encounters of respondent and Bernadette are much too
many for comfort and coincidence. Such encounters actually buttress the allegations
of the witnesses that they carried on an illicit affair.
All told, the Court finds that substantial evidence — which only entail
"evidence to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might
conceivably opine otherwise" — exist to prove complainant's accusation of gross
immorality against respondent.
Based on jurisprudence, extramarital affairs of lawyers are regarded as
offensive to the sanctity of marriage, the family, and the community. When lawyers
are engaged in wrongful relationships that blemish their ethics and morality, the usual
recourse is for the erring attorney's suspension from the practice of law, if not
disbarment. 30 This is because possession of good moral character is both a condition
precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain
membership in the legal profession. 31 Under the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession, and support the activities of the integrated bar.
 Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
The penalty for maintaining an illicit relationship may either be suspension or
disbarment, depending on the circumstances of the case. In case of suspension, the
period would range from one year 32 to indefinite suspension. 33 Under the given
circumstances, the Court sees fit to impose on respondent a penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. 34
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Augustus Serafin D. Amador is found guilty
of gross immorality. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Respondent's suspension from the practice of law shall take effect immediately
upon his receipt of this Decision. He is DIRECTED to immediately file a
Manifestation to the Court that his suspension has started, copy furnished all courts
and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance as counsel. ETHIDa

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
entered in respondent's personal records as a member of the Philippine Bar, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, * Peralta, Caguioa and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
 
||| (Gubaton v. Amador, A.C. No. 8962 , [July 9, 2018])

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 11981. July 3, 2018.]

LEAH B. TADAY, complainant, vs. ATTY. DIONISIO B. APOYA,

JR., respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM : p
 Before this Court is a Verified Complaint-Affidavit 1 filed before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Dionisio B. Apoya, Jr.
(respondent) for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) in authoring
a fake decision of a court.
cDHAES

Sometime in 2011, Leah B. Taday (complainant), an overseas Filipino worker

(OFW) staying in Norway, asked her parents in the Philippines, Virgilio and
Natividad Taday, to seek legal services for the nullification of her marriage.
Complainant's parents found respondent and contracted his legal services. On April
17, 2011, a Retainer Agreement 2 was executed between respondent and
complainant's parents indicating that respondent's acceptance fee was P140,000.00, to
be paid on a staggered basis.
According to complainant, respondent was informed that she was staying in
Norway and respondent assured her that this would not be an issue as he can find
ways to push for the resolution of the case despite her absence.
Respondent drafted a Petition for Annulment of Marriage 3 (petition) dated
April 20, 2011, which he allegedly sent to complainant for her signature. After
notarizing the petition, respondent filed it before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City (RTC). The case was then raffled to Branch 131, docketed as Civil Case No. C-
22813.
On November 17, 2011, while complainant was on vacation in the Philippines
4 and after paying respondent his legal fees amounting to P14,500.00, 5 respondent
delivered a Decision 6 dated November 16, 2011 which granted the annulment of
complainant's marriage. The said decision was promulgated by a certain Judge Ma.
Eliza Becamon-Angeles of RTC Branch 162. Complainant became suspicious as the
said decision came from a different branch presided by a different judge where the
case was originally filed. Complainant's family became skeptical as the said decision
seemed to come too soon and was poorly crafted.
Confused with the turn of events, verifications were made to ascertain the
validity of the decision. Complainant discovered that both Branch 162 and Judge Ma.
Eliza Becamon-Angeles do not exist in the RTC. Frustrated with the incident,
complainant, through her parents, sought the withdrawal of respondent as her counsel
from the case.
However, instead of withdrawing as counsel, respondent filed an urgent motion
to withdraw the petition. In its Order 7 dated June 25, 2012, the RTC Branch 131
granted the said motion and the case was dropped from the civil docket of the court.
Complainant and her parents sought the legal services of Atty. Alexander M.
Verzosa (Atty. Verzosa) of the Verzosa Lauengco Jimenez and Abesames Law Offices
for their predicament. Atty. Verzosa sent a Letter 8 dated February 26, 2013, to
respondent calling his attention regarding the payment of his attorney's fees and the
purported fake decision of RTC Branch 162.
 In his Answer, 9 respondent denied being informed that complainant was an
OFW and claimed that he was made to believe that she was merely in the Bicol
province, hence, he agreed to draft the petition and gave it to complainant's parents for
her signature. The petition was returned to respondent with complainant's signature so
he notarized and filed it before the court.
Respondent denied delivering any decision relative to the annulment case of
complainant. He asserted that the said decision was only a product of her imagination.
Respondent likewise denied that he filed an urgent motion to withdraw the petition in
the RTC, Branch 131. He claimed that he merely drafted the said motion and gave it
to complainant's parents but he never signed it.
After the parties submitted their respective position papers, the case was
submitted for decision.

IBP Report and Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation, 10 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline

(Commission) found that respondent committed several violations of the Code,
particularly, Rules 1.01, 1.02 and Canon 1. The Commission held that respondent
notarized the Verification and Certification of Non Forum Shopping 11 of the petition,
even though complainant was not personally present as she was then in Norway.
The Commission also found that respondent authored a fake decision. It opined
that the said decision was fake because it bore the same format and grammatical
errors as that of the petition prepared by respondent. The Commission disregarded the
defense of respondent that it was complainant's parents who made the fake decision. It
stressed that any reasonable mind would know that a fake decision would not benefit
complainant. Moreover, complainant's parents continuously paid the legal fees of
respondent, which would show their lack of intent to create the fabricated decision. ASEcHI

The Commission further underscored that when respondent was confronted

with the fake decision, he filed an urgent motion to withdraw the petition before RTC
Branch 131. It highlighted that when the new counsel of complainant questioned
respondent regarding these irregularities, he did not respond.
Based on these circumstances, the Commission concluded that the fake
decision originated from respondent and that he violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon
1 of the Code. It recommended the penalty of suspension of two (2) years from the
practice of law.
In its Resolution No. XXI-2015-100 12 dated January 31, 2015, the IBP Board
of Governors (Board) modified the recommended penalty of two (2) years suspension
to a penalty of disbarment.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the IBP
Board in its Resolution No. XXII-2016-508 13 dated September 23, 2016.
 Respondent filed a second motion for reconsideration but it was also denied by
the Board in its Resolution No. XXII-2017-951 14 dated April 19, 2017.

The Court's Ruling

The Court adopts the findings of the Commission and agrees with the
recommendation of the IBP Board to disbar respondent.
All those in the legal profession must always conduct themselves with honesty
and integrity in all their dealings. Members of the bar took their oath to conduct
themselves according to the best of their knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients and to delay no man for money or
malice. These mandates apply especially to dealings of lawyers with their clients
considering the highly fiduciary nature of their relationship. 15
It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law during good behavior
and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment
of the court after opportunity to be heard has afforded him. Without invading any
constitutional privilege or right, and attorney's right to practice law may be resolved
by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to
hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. 16 In
disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the
court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. 17
In this case, the Court finds that respondent violated Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and
1.02 of the Code and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

Respondent notarized the

petition even though the
affiant was not present

Notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routinary act. It is imbued with

public interest and only those who are qualified and authorized may act as notaries
public. 18 Notarization converts a private document to a public document, making it
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document
is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public
must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their
duties. 19
The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a notary public should not
notarize a document unless the signatory to the document personally appeared before
the notary public at the time of the notarization, and personally known to the notary
public or otherwise identified through competent evidence of identity. At the time of
notarization, the signatory shall sign or affix with a thumb or other mark in the notary
public's notarial register. The purpose of these requirements is to enable the notary
public to verify the genuineness of the signature and to ascertain that the document is
the signatory's free act and deed. If the signatory is not acting on his or her own free
will, a notary public is mandated to refuse to perform a notarial act. A notary public is
also prohibited from affixing an official signature or seal on a notarial certificate that
is incomplete. 20
In this case, on April 20, 2011, respondent notarized the verification and
certification of non forum shopping in the petition filed before RTC Branch 131
supposedly executed by complainant as the affiant. At that time, however, complaint
was not in the Philippines because she was still in Norway working as an OFW.
Undoubtedly, respondent violated the notarial rules when he notarized a document
without the personal presence of the affiant. ITAaHc

Respondent gave a flimsy excuse that he was not informed that complainant
was not in the Philippines when he notarized the verification and certification on non
forum shopping. Assuming arguendo that this is true, he should have refrained from
notarizing such document until complainant personally appear before him. In
addition, respondent should have explained to complainant and her parents that he can
only notarize and file the petition before the court once complainant returns to the
Philippines. Lamentably, instead of informing his client about the rules of
notarization, respondent proceeded with the notarization of the document and gave a
false assurance that the case of complainant would still continue even in her absence.
In Gaddi v. Atty. Velasco, 21 the Court held that for notarizing a document
without ascertaining the identity and voluntariness of the signatory to the document,
for affixing his signature in an incomplete notarial certificate, and for dishonesty in
his pleadings, the lawyer failed to discharge his duties as notary public and breached
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code.
Similarly, in Ferguson v. Atty. Ramos 22 the Court held that when a lawyer
affixes his signature and notarial seal on a deed of sale, he leads the public to believe
that the parties personally appeared before him and attested to the truth and veracity
of the contents thereof. The act of notarizing a document without the presence of the
parties is fraught with dangerous possibilities considering the conclusiveness on the
due execution of a document that the courts and the public accord to notarized
documents.
Here, respondent notarized the verification and certification of non forum
shopping even though complainant did not personally appear before him. Not only did
he violate the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, he also violated Canon 1 and Rule
1.01 of the Code.
Respondent authored a fake
decision and delivered it
to his client

Aside from improperly notarizing a petition, respondent committed an even

graver transgression by drafting a fake decision and delivering it to his client in guise
of a genuine decision.
In this case, respondent delivered a decision dated November 16, 2011, to
complainant, which purportedly granted the petition for annulment of marriage in her
favor. This decision is marred by numerous and serious irregularities that point to
respondent as the author thereof.
First, the decision came from a certain Judge Ma. Eliza Becamon-Angeles of
RTC Branch 162. Yet, a verification from the RTC revealed that the said judge and
the branch were non-existent.
Second, the fake decision is starkly the same as the petition prepared and filed
by respondent. A reading of the fake decision shows that the statement of facts, issues
and the rationale therein are strikingly similar, if not exactly alike, with the petition.
Even the grammatical errors in both documents are similar. The fake decision was so
poorly crafted because it merely copied the petition filed by respondent. Moreover,
the font and spacing in the caption of the petition and the fake decision are one and
the same. Glaringly, respondent did not give any credible explanation regarding the
similarity of the fake decision and the petition he drafted.
Third, when respondent was confronted by complainant and her parents about
the fake decision, respondent immediately filed an urgent motion to withdraw the
petition before RTC Branch 131. Respondent provided a poor excuse that he merely
prepared the said motion but did not file it. However, it is clear from the order dated
June 25, 2012 of RTC Branch 131 that the motion was filed by respondent and the
case was indeed withdrawn. 23
Lastly, when complainant's case was dropped from the civil docket of RTC
Branch 131 at the instance of respondent, complainant and her parents sought the
assistance of another lawyer. Atty. Verzosa, through a letter dated February 26, 2013,
confronted respondent regarding the payment of attorney's fees and the fake decision
which respondent gave to complainant. However, respondent neither answered nor
denied the allegation of complainant's new counsel.
In his last ditch attempt to escape liability, respondent argued that the fake
decision was drafted by complainant's parents. The Court finds this completely
absurd. On November 17, 2011, complainant's parents had just paid respondent's
staggering acceptance fee as evidenced by a Receipt. 24 On the other hand, the fake
decision was dated November 16, 2011. Thus, it is illogical for complainant's parents
to draft a fake decision when they regularly paid for the services of respondent to
legally and rightfully represent their daughter's case. As opined by the Commission,
any reasonable mind would know that a fake decision would not benefit complainant,
thus, complainant's parents have nothing to gain from it. CHTAIc

Based on the foregoing circumstances, the Court concludes that respondent

indeed authored the fake decision in order to deceive complainant that he won the
legal battle in her favor. Fortunately, complainant was prudent in protecting her rights
and discovered that the decision given to her by respondent was fake. Surely,
respondent's acts resulted to complainant's injuries and has tarnished the noble image
of the legal profession.

Proper penalty

The Court finds that complainant has established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence that: (1) respondent notarized the verification and certification
of non forum shopping of the petition without the personal presence of complainant;
(2) respondent is the author of the fake decision to deceive complainant that her
petition for annulment of marriage was granted; and (3) respondent retaliated against
complainant for confronting him with the fake decision by withdrawing the petition in
the court, resulting into the dropping of the case from the civil docket of the court.
These acts constitute violations of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the Code, to
wit:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
RULE 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
RULE 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
Respondent also violated Section 2, Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice, which states that:
SECTION 2. Prohibitions. — x x x
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as
signatory to the instrument or document —
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the
notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified
by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by
these Rules.
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his
office as an attorney, for violation of the lawyer's oath and/or for breach of the ethics
of the legal profession as embodied in the Code. For the practice of law is a
profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who
 are qualified and who possess good moral character. The appropriate penalty for an
errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts. 25
In Krursel v. Atty. Abion, 26 the lawyer therein drafted a fake order from this
Court in order to deceive her client. The Court stated that she made a mockery of the
judicial system. Her conduct degraded the administration of justice and weakened the
people's faith in the judicial system. She inexorably besmirched the entire legal
profession. The penalty of disbarment was imposed against the lawyer.
Similarly, in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza, 27 the
penalty of disbarment was imposed against the lawyer who falsified an official receipt
from the Court to cover up his misdeeds. The Court stated that since the lawyer
clearly failed the standards of his noble profession, he did not deserve to continue as a
member of the bar.
In this case, respondent committed unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful
conduct, and lessened the confidence of the public in the legal system. Instead of
being an advocate of justice, he became a perpetrator of injustice. His reprehensible
acts do not merit him to remain in the rolls of the legal profession. Thus, the ultimate
penalty of disbarment must be imposed upon him.
WHEREFORE, the Court adopts the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Board of Governors and finds Atty. Dionisio B. Apoya, Jr. GUILTY
of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Section 2, Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He is
DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name ordered stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys, effective immediately. EATCcI

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to
be entered into Atty. Dionisio B. Apoya, Jr.'s records. Copies shall likewise be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa, Martires, Tijam, Reyes, Jr. and
Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
||| (Taday v. Apoya, Jr., A.C. No. 11981, [July 3, 2018])

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 10021. September 18, 2018.]

 AAA, 1 complainant, vs. ATTY. ANTONIO N. DE LOS REYES,
respondent.

[A.C. No. 10022. September 18, 2018.]

AAA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ANTONIO N. DE LOS REYES,

respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM : p

Before the Court are two administrative complaints filed by complainant AAA
seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Antonio De Los Reyes (respondent Atty.
De Los Reyes) on the grounds of sexual harassment and gross immoral conduct. AAA
claims that respondent Atty. De Los Reyes violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he committed acts which are unlawful, dishonest, immoral and
deceitful which warrant his disbarment.

The Factual Antecedents

In her undated Complainant's Position Paper, AAA narrated the following:

Sometime in February 1997, [AAA] was hired as secretary to
[respondent Atty. De Los Reyes], then Vice-President of the Legal and
Administrative Group of [National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation]
NHMFC.
[AAA] became a permanent employee with a plantilla position of
private secretary 1, pay grade 11, on a co-terminus status with [respondent
Atty. De Los Reyes]. She later learned that it was [respondent Atty. De Los
Reyes] who facilitated her rapid promotion to her position soon after
becoming his secretary.
Sometime in the last quarter of 1997, [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes]
offered to take [AAA] home in his NHMFC issued service vehicle telling her
that her residence on J.P. Rizal Street, Makati was along his route. From then
on it became a daily routine between them, which continued even after [AAA]
moved to Mandaluyong City. CAIHTE

Sometime in the last quarter of 1998, [AAA] began to feel very

uncomfortable with the situation when she realized that [respondent Atty. De
Los Reyes] was becoming overly possessive and demanding to the extent that
she could not refuse his offer to bring her home; her telephone calls were
being monitored by [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] who constantly asked
her who she was talking with on the telephone and would get mad if she told
him that it was a male person; she would be called to his office during office
hours just to listen to his stories about his life, how he was raised by a very
strict father, a former NBI director, how unhappy he was with his wife who
treated him like a mere boarder in their house and sometimes just to sit there
doing nothing in particular, simply because he wanted to see her. He also sent
or left her love notes.
[AAA] tried to avoid [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] who vacillated
between being verbally abusive toward her, cursing and shouting invectives at
her whenever she did, and overly solicitous the next moment, apparently to
placate her.
On 11 December 1998, when she refused his offer to take her home,
he got angry with her and shouted "putangina mo." She tried to get away from
him but he blocked her path, grabbed her arm and dragged her to the parking
area and pushed her inside his service vehicle. He drove off, ignoring her cries
and pleas to stop and let her get off. He slapped her twice and she became
hysterical. She opened the car door and attempted to jump but he was able to
grab her jacket and dropped her off somewhere in Makati. She reported the
incident to the police.
[AAA] did not file a formal report or complaint against [respondent
Atty. De Los Reyes] as she thought that it would be futile. She told Atty.
Fermin Arzaga [then Senior Vice-President for Finance at NHMFC] what
happened and showed him her bruises on her wrists. She told him of her plan
to resign and he asked her not to resign and instead to request for a transfer.
Despite his advice, she sent a resignation letter that was received by the
Personnel Department on 22 December 1998. DETACa

On the same date, both the manager and the assistant manager talked
to [AAA] and persuaded her to reconsider her resignation by promising her
that she would be re-assigned to the Office of the President, as stated in an
Office Order dated 21 January 1999.
On 22 January 1999, [AAA] reported to the Office of the President.
But even before she could start working in her new assignment, she was told
to return to her former post as private secretary of [respondent Atty. De Los
Reyes].
[AAA] later learned from [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] that he had
called up Atty. Arzaga and told him not to interfere ("huwag kang
makialam"). He told her that her position was co-terminus with his, being his
private secretary.
Much as she wanted to pursue her plan to resign, [AAA's] financial
position at that time left her with no choice but to continue working as
[respondent Atty. De Los Reyes'] secretary. [Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes]
knew that [AAA] was the sole breadwinner of her family, as her father had
deserted them when she was but 8 years old, leaving her to care for her sick
mother, a two-year-old niece and two sisters who were still in school.
[Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] exploited his knowledge to force
[AAA] to continue working for him as his secretary. He moved in on her
steadily, making it plain to all that she was his property, isolating her from the
other people in the office who did not want to cross him, dominating and
humiliating her. He eventually made it clear to her that he was determined to
make her his mistress and overpowered her resistance by leaving her no
choice but to succumb to his advances or lose her job.
From then on, she became his sex slave who was at his beck and call at
all times for all kinds of sexual services ranging from hand-jobs in his vehicle
to sexual intercourse in his office. She could not even refuse him without
risking physical, verbal and emotional abuse.
[AAA] become despondent with her situation, knowing that she was
the object of gossip and ridicule among her officemates. She felt so helpless
and frustrated that she thought of committing suicide on countless occasions.
Coming to the office was such an ordeal that she often suffered from all sorts
of illnesses such as fever, stomachaches, sore throat, and migraine which gave
her a convenient reason to absent herself, but did not deter [respondent Atty.
De Los Reyes] from calling and texting her or even coming to her house to
personally check on her. aDSIHc

[AAA] attempted to put a stop to [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes's]

obsession with her by flaunting an American as her boyfriend. [Respondent
Atty. De Los Reyes] went into a jealous rage when he learned about it.
xxx xxx xxx
It seemed that [AAA] could never escape from the clutches of
[respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] who always found a way to ensure that she
would always end up being re-assigned to his office, even after she was
assigned to other units. He continued to bring her home, no matter that her
residence was now in Canlubang, Laguna. He also continued to see her [in]
his office at least twice a day, even sending an assistant to fetch her when she
refused to go.
In January 2003, [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] continued to keep a
tight watch over her even when [AAA] went on official study leave to attend
her CGFNS review classes. He insisted on personally bringing [AAA] to and
from her classes or he made sure that his official driver took her there using
his official vehicle when he could not personally accompany her.
[AAA] failed to take her exam in March 2003 and requested a leave of
absence to take the July 2003 exam. She stopped seeing [respondent Atty. De
Los Reyes] and refused to see or talk to him completely.
[Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] kept sending [AAA] text messages
that she ignored and even requested for a change of number of her cell phone.
 After a month of not receiving anything from him, she thought he had already
given up on her but she was wrong.
He now trained his sight on [Ma. Victoria] Marivic Alpajaro, a good
friend and officemate of [AAA], who had now become the object of his ire
and jealousy because of her apparent closeness to [AAA].
His threats to fire Marivic compelled [AAA] to seek him out and plead
with him to spare her friends. On 10 July 2003, they met outside the office
and he insisted that they go back together to the office to show everyone that
everything was still the same between them. She refused and ran out of the
restaurant. He followed and wrapped his arms around her but she evaded him.
He was shouting "mahal kita" in public, to her great embarrassment. He
attempted to stop her but she threatened that she will throw herself in the path
of oncoming vehicles if he persisted. 2ETHIDa

AAA filed another Complaint-Affidavit dated November 19, 2004, with the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
alleging that respondent Atty. De Los Reyes still continued to harass her and her
colleagues (Ma. Victoria Alpajaro and Mercedita Lorenzana) who agreed to be her
witnesses in her earlier complaint. According to AAA, respondent Atty. De Los
Reyes filed baseless charges against her and her sympathetic officemates before the
Office of the Ombudsman, and sought their preventive suspension without affording
them due process through an initial administrative investigation at the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). She added that because of what respondent
Atty. De Los Reyes did to her, she suffered from various illnesses, insomnia,
listlessness, suicidal feelings, and was diagnosed as suffering from Major Depressive
Disorder with manifested symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder by Dr.
Norietta Calma-Balderama, a psychiatrist at the Department of Psychiatry and
Behavioral Medicine at the University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital
(UP-PGH).
In his defense, respondent Atty. De Los Reyes denied AAA's allegations
relating to the alleged sexual harassment and gross immorality for lack of factual and
legal bases. In his Consolidated Position Paper for the Respondent dated May 16,
2005, respondent Atty. De Los Reyes contended that AAA's complaint-affidavits
were not sufficient in form and substance as required under the Rules of Court and
should be dismissed for being mere scraps of paper. According to respondent Atty. De
Los Reyes, the complaints failed to state the ultimate facts or particulars, approximate
dates, and other details of the sexual acts or advances that he allegedly committed, in
violation of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against
him. He averred that AAA's lame excuse for her omission allegedly due to her fear
that she would be exposing herself to shame and humiliation after her colleagues
would know of the details of her complaint is unbelievable.
Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes further stated that AAA's affidavits were
replete with inconsistencies and unrealistic statements that are contrary to human
nature. Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes denied her allegations and explained the
following points: cSEDTC

(a) He offered his service vehicle not only to AAA but also to other employees
of NHMFC who lived along his route; and it was AAA herself who requested that she
be brought home together with other employees;
(b) NHMFC has corporate policies prohibiting the long use of telephones by
the employees for personal purposes;
(c) The incident reported by AAA that she was grabbed and dragged into his
service vehicle is highly incredible as it would have been readily noticed by many
employees because it was immediately after office hours;
(d) He did not ask for any sexual favors in his office or in his service vehicle
considering the location of the office which was very accessible to other employees
including the security guard by the door that is always open; and respondent Atty. De
Los Reyes always sat on the front passenger side of his service vehicle with his
driver;
(e) The requests for transfer of assignment made by AAA did not mention that
it was because of respondent Atty. De Los Reyes or of any sexual harassment that she
suffered at his hands; and
(f) The complaints for disbarment filed by AAA against respondent Atty. De
Los Reyes were purely in retaliation since he was conducting investigations against
AAA and her two friends at the NHMFC.
Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes also countered the Certification issued by Dr.
Calma-Balderama of the UP-PGH Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Medicine
as a mere scrap of paper and without any probative value since said certification was
not made under oath or subscribed to, and was not supported by any clinical or
psychological report.
Finally, respondent Atty. De Los Reyes asserted that assuming the alleged
grounds for disbarment regarding the claim for sexual harassment were true, the same
had already prescribed since they occurred in 1999 or more than three years prior to
the institution of the complaints.

The Findings of the IBP

In the Report and Recommendation dated June 6, 2011, the CBD-IBP

Commissioner found respondent Atty. De Los Reyes guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended the penalty of one (1) year
suspension. The Investigating Commissioner opined that there was no indication that
AAA was not telling the truth, and that she acceded to the numerous incidents of
sexual intercourse because of fear of reprisals or consequences if she refused. The
Commissioner explained thus: SDAaTC

We also take note that there is an apparent ambivalence or hesitancy in

the use of the word "rape" by herein complainant. This is because the
numerous sexual intercourse occurred with the complainant's seeming
consent. However, such cannot be characterized as voluntary. Complainant
acceded to the sexual intercourse because of fear of reprisals or consequences
if she did not. Whether there is actual rape, as it is defined in the Revised
Penal Code, would not be relevant in this disbarment case since the sexual
intercourse coupled with unspoken threats of dire consequences would
nonetheless constitute grave misconduct.
Respondent has also raised the argument of prescription. While there
could be a prescriptive period under the Anti-Sexual Harassment Law, there is
no prescriptive period for grave misconduct in disbarment proceedings and the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Disbarment proceedings are sui generis.
3
In Resolution No. XX-2012-254 dated July 21, 2012, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved with modification the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A," and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and finding Respondent guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Antonio De Los Reyes is hereby
SUSPENDED [INDEFINITELY]. 4
Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the IBP Board of Governors in Resolution No. XX-2013-311 dated March
21, 2013, thus:
RESOLVED to unanimously DENY [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes']
Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse the
Resolution and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already
been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-
2012-254 dated July 21, 2012 is hereby AFFIRMED. 5 acEHCD

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether or not respondent Atty. De Los Reyes
committed acts amounting to sexual harassment and gross immoral conduct in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility which would warrant his
disbarment.
 The Court's Ruling

After due consideration, we adopt the findings and conclusions of the

Investigating Commissioner, as sustained by the IBP Board of Governors.
The pertinent provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01. — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and support the activities of the integrated bar.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 7.03. — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
In Valdez v. Dabon, 6 we explained that the possession of good moral character
is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to
the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession, to wit:
Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded by the Court that possession
of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing
requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the
legal profession. This proceeds from the lawyer's bounden duty to observe the
highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the Bar's integrity, and the
legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called
upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts
constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court
demand no less than the highest degree of morality. SDHTEC

The Court explained in Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit that "as officers of the
court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also
be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community. A member of the bar and an officer
of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or
keeping a mistress but must also behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the
public by creating the impression that he is flouting those moral standards."
Consequently, any errant behavior of the lawyer, be it in his public or private
activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity
or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.
Thus, lawyers are duty-bound to observe the highest degree of morality and
integrity not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their career in order
to safeguard the reputation of the legal profession. Any errant behavior, be it in their
public or private life, may subject them to suspension or disbarment. Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court expressly states that members of the Bar may be disbarred
or suspended for any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of their oath.
In Ventura v. Samson, 7 we explained that immoral conduct involves acts that
are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion
of the upright and respectable members of the community. It is gross when it is so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as
to shock the community's sense of decency.
Here, we rule that the records of this administrative case sufficiently
substantiate the findings of the CBD-IBP Investigating Commissioner, as well as the
IBP Board of Governors, that indeed respondent Atty. De Los Reyes committed acts
of gross immorality in the conduct of his personal affairs with AAA that show his
disregard of the lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A perusal of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) taken during the June
30, 2006 hearing of the instant case shows AAA's straightforward testimony of her
ordeal at the hands of respondent Atty. De Los Reyes: AScHCD

Atty. [Angelito] Lo [Counsel for respondent Atty. De Los Reyes]:

Q. You said that you were being raped twice a week by the respondent?
AAA:
A. Yes, sir.
COMM. FUNA:
   Twice a week for how many weeks?
AAA:
   I guess it's from 1999 to more or less 2000.
COMM. FUNA:
   For clarification, what do you mean by rape?
AAA:
   I was forced . . . he forced me to have sex with him.
COMM. FUNA:
   In what sense? Conversation?
AAA:
   Other than that, sir. Most of the time, I was not allowed . . . from the very
start, I was not allowed to use the C.R.
COMM. FUNA:
   No, no, no. Do you know what rape is?
AAA:
   Yes. I was forced to have sex with him. There [were] some instances that he
would go inside the C.R. while I'm still inside. He would push me and
force me to have sex with him. Tinutulak nya ako pababa.
COMM. FUNA:
   I have to clarify this kasi it's vague. We need to know exactly what
happened. Nagtinginan lang kayo sa mata, what happened? AcICHD

AAA:
   I was inside the C.R. I'm using the restroom, pumasok sya.
COMM. FUNA:
   Did he touch any part of your body?
AAA:
   Yes.
COMM. FUNA:
   Was there a sexual intercourse between you and the respondent?
AAA:
   Yes.
COMM. FUNA:
   There was?
AAA:
   Yes.
COMM. FUNA:
   How many times?
AAA:
   At most is twice a week.
COMM. FUNA:
   Now, you will be raped and yet you did not report to the police?
AAA:
   I'm so scared and I don't know kung may maniniwala sa akin.
COMM. FUNA:
   You will be raped and yet you continue to work.
AAA:
   As I have mentioned in my Affidavit, I am the sole breadwinner in my
family. I tried to leave the office, I tried to look for a job. TAIaHE

COMM. FUNA:
   So when you go to work, you know that you will be raped. . .
AAA:
   Because I have to fend [for] my whole family. My mother is sick. I don't
have a father. I have my other siblings to support, I have my niece. It's
really hard for me but . . . (Witness crying)
COMM. FUNA:
   So, iyong subsequent rapes were done with your consent? Would you say
that?
AAA:
   It's an exchange to maintain my job.
COMM. FUNA:
   So you consented because you believe that you will lose your job?
AAA:
   That's what . . . kasi my position is co-terminus with him. It's permanent but
still co-terminus with him. Sabi nya nga, I'm working [at] his pleasure.
It's up to him anytime if he wants to fire me. He can do that.
COMM. FUNA:
   Atty. Ambrosio, how would you characterize that?
ATTY. [MINERVA] AMBROSIO [Counsel for AAA]:
   Which one, sir? She's raped, plain and simple, sir, sexual harassment.
COMM. FUNA:
   Would you go to this office . . . (interrupted)
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
   Sir, why are you laughing?
COMM. FUNA:
   . . . if you know that you will be raped?
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
   Sir. . . (unintelligible) to understand.
COMM. FUNA:
   Tomorrow, you know that you will be raped. . . (Comm. Funa and Atty.
Ambrosio talking at the same time) cDHAES
 ATTY. AMBROSIO:
   [She's] telling you wala siyang choice. That's the whole essence of sexual
harassment because a woman is forced to continue working or to
continue in this particular position because she has no choice. If she
doesn't consent to his sexual advances, she gets fired or she gets
demoted or she will get a deduction in her pay. See, that's plain and
simple sexual harassment. This is . . . (unintelligible) I do not
understand. You're all laughing here. This is a woman crying telling
you . . . there's injustice being done to this woman. 8
Clearly, the above-quoted excerpt from the TSN dated June 30, 2006, shows
that respondent Atty. De Los Reyes is guilty of "sextortion" which is the abuse of his
position or authority to obtain sexual favors from his subordinate, the complainant, his
unwilling victim who was not in a position to resist respondent's demands for fear of
losing her means of livelihood. The sexual exploitation of his subordinate done over a
period of time amounts to gross misbehavior on the part of respondent Atty. De Los
Reyes that affects his standing and character as a member of the Bar and as an officer
of the Court. All these deplorable acts of respondent Atty. De Los Reyes puts the
legal profession in disrepute and places the integrity of the administration of justice in
peril, thus warranting disciplinary action from the Court. 9
It bears emphasizing that an administrative case for disbarment is sui generis
and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case but is intended to
cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members for the protection
of the public and of the courts. It is an investigation on the conduct of the respondent
as an officer of the Court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar. 10
This Court held in Pena v. Aparicio 11 that:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a
suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. x x x Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question
for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of
justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have
proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x.
ASEcHI

While we agree with the findings of the IBP, we, however, consider the
recommended penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law not
commensurate with the gravity of the acts committed by respondent Atty. De Los
Reyes.
 In a number of administrative cases involving illicit sexual relations and gross
immorality, this Court imposed upon the erring lawyers various penalties ranging
from suspension to disbarment, depending on the circumstances. In De Leon v.
Pedreña, 12 we suspended the respondent from the practice of law for two years for
rubbing complainant's leg with his hand, putting complainant's hand on his crotch
area, and pressing his finger on complainant's private part. In Tumbaga v. Teoxon, 13
the respondent was suspended for three years from the practice of law for committing
gross immorality by maintaining an extramarital affair with complainant. This Court,
in Zaguirre v. Castillo, 14 meted the penalty of indefinite suspension on Atty. Castillo
when he had an illicit relationship with a woman not his wife and sired a child with
her, whom he later on refused to recognize and support. In Dantes v. Dantes, 15 the
respondent was disbarred when he engaged in illicit relationships with two different
women during the subsistence of his marriage to complainant. We also ruled in
Arnobit v. Arnobit, 16 that respondent's act of leaving his wife and 12 children to
cohabit and have children with another woman constitutes grossly immoral conduct,
for which respondent was disbarred. Likewise, in Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 17 we
disbarred respondent, Chairman of the College of Medicine, for his acts of enticing
the complainant, who was then a student in the said college, to have carnal knowledge
with him under the threat that she would fail in all of her subjects if she refused
respondent.
In Ventura v. Samson, 18 this Court has reminded that the power to disbar must
be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously
affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a
member of the bar. Disbarment should not be imposed where a lesser penalty may
accomplish the desired goal of disciplining an erring lawyer. In the present case,
however, respondent Atty. De Los Reyes's actions show that he lacks the degree of
morality required of him as a member of the legal profession, thus warranting the
penalty of disbarment. Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes is disbarred for his gross
misbehavior, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good
moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing
requirement to the practice of law. 19
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Antonio N. De Los Reyes
GUILTY of gross immoral conduct and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule
7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law. ITAaHc

Let a copy of this Decision be made part of the records of respondent Atty. De
Los Reyes in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, let copies of this Decision be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
 SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-de Castro, C.J., Bersamin, Del Castillo, Leonen, Jardeleza,
Caguioa, Tijam, A.B. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo and J.C. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Carpio, * J., is on official leave.
Peralta, ** J., is on official business.
Perlas-Bernabe, *** J., took no part.
 
Footnotes
||| (AAA v. De Los Reyes, A.C. Nos. 10021 & 10022, [September 18, 2018])

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 8335. April 10, 2019.]

AMALIA R. CENIZA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ELISEO B. CENIZA,

JR., respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM : p

The abandonment by an attorney of his legitimate family in order to cohabit

with a married woman constitutes gross immorality that warrants his disbarment. 1
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received the complainant's letter-
complaint denouncing the immoral conduct committed by her husband, a member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. 2 She submitted therewith her affidavit detailing
the grounds for her denunciation. 3
The complainant stated that she and the respondent were married on November
12, 1989 at the Sacred Heart Parish in Cebu City; that in time they had two children,
Marie Agnes (Agnes) and Christopher Chuck; 4 that on April 21, 2008, he told her
that he would be attending a seminar in Manila, but because she had some business to
attend to in General Santos City, he seemingly agreed to her request to forego with his
trip to Manila; and that upon her return from General Santos City on April 26, 2008,
however, he had already moved out of their home, taking along with him his car and
personal belongings.
 On May 23, 2008, the complainant went to the Mandaue City Hall where the
respondent worked as a legal officer in order to inquire about his situation. She
learned from members of his staff that they had suspected him of carrying on an extra-
marital affair with one Anna Fe Flores Binoya (Anna). On the next day, the
complainant, accompanied by her daughter and a nephew, went to the address
provided by the staff to verify the information. They were able to meet Anna's sister
who informed them that she had moved out of their address; that Anna and her second
husband, Atty. Eliseo Ceniza, Jr., the herein respondent, had been living together in
Aldea Subdivision; and that in the evening of said date the complainant and her
daughter proceeded to the new address where they found and confronted the
respondent, who simply denied having committed any wrongdoing. aDSIHc

On July 9, 2008, the respondent commenced a civil action seeking the

declaration of nullity of his marriage with the complainant, 5 alleging her
psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code.
On August 11, 2008, the respondent visited the complainant at work and
requested her to agree to the nullification of their marriage. She refused and instead
pleaded with him to avoid displaying his paramour in public. Her pleas
notwithstanding, he continued with the illicit relationship.
On November 18, 2008, the complainant brought a complaint for immorality
against the respondent in the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB-V-A-10-0345-G).
On April 2, 2009, the complainant sent a letter to President Macapagal-Arroyo
alleging therein that her husband had abandoned her and their children in order to live
with another woman.
On May 18, 2009, the Presidential Action Center of the Office of the President
forwarded the complainant's letter to President Macapagal-Arroyo to the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC). 6 In due course, the OBC directed the respondent to comment
on the complaint against him.
On October 26, 2009, the respondent filed his comment, 7 wherein he denied
having engaged in immoral conduct and maintained that Anna had only been a
business partner. He insisted that he had moved in with his parents after leaving their
family home; and that he had left the complainant because her behavior had become
unbearable.
In the meantime, on August 5, 2011, the Office of the Ombudsman issued its
decision in OMB-V-A-10-0345-G, 8 in which it found the respondent guilty of
disgraceful and immoral conduct for having an extra-marital affair with a woman in
violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees which required that:
. . . all public officials and employees shall at all times be accountable to the
people and shall discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity,
 competence, and loyalty, act with patriotism and justice, lead modest lives,
and uphold public interest over personal interest. 9
The Office of the Ombudsman disposed:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby
rendered finding respondent ELISEO B. CENIZA guilty of Disgraceful and
Immoral Conduct. The said respondent is hereby meted the penalty of
SUSPENSION from the service for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS without
pay with a stern warning that subsequent violations of similar nature will be
dealt with a more severe penalty. 10ETHIDa

The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which upheld the
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman. 11

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

On October 7, 2010, Commissioner Salvador Hababag of the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), to which the complaint
against the respondent had been referred for investigation, submitted his findings and
recommended the dismissal of the complaint, opining that the respondent be
cautioned to be more circumspect in his actuations to avoid the impression of
committing immorality.
Commissioner Hababag rendered the following observations, to wit:
The issue is whether or not respondent is guilty of immorality in his
relationship with Anna Fe Binoya.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
the good and respectable members of the community.
To be the basis of disciplinary action, the lawyer's conduct must not
only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the common sense of decency. (Emma T. Dantes vs. Atty. Crispin
Dantes A.C. No. 6486 September 22, 2004).
Upon the other hand good moral character is a requirement not only
upon one's application for admission but it is rather a continuing requirement
even after admission for the enjoyment of the privilege to practice. Good
moral character includes at least common honesty. (Boyong vs. Oblema, 7
SCRA 859).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully
recommended that the administrative suit be dismissed but with WARNING
to the respondent to be more circumspect in his actuation to avoid the
impression of committing immorality. 12
 On February 13, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued its Resolution No.
XX-2013-148 adopting the recommendation of Commissioner Hababag, 13 to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A," and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, the case is hereby DISMISSED. However, the Warning
imposed against respondent is hereby ordered deleted.
On February 26, 2014, the case was considered closed and terminated for
failure of the complainant to seek a reconsideration or appeal by petition for review.
14
On June 4, 2014, however, the complainant transmitted a letter of appeal vis-à-
vis the resolution of February 26, 2014, attaching thereto her motion for
reconsideration. 14 cSEDTC

Thereupon, the Court referred the case to the OBC for report and evaluation.
Upon the recommendation of the OBC, 15 the Court set aside its resolution of
February 26, 2014, and required the respondent to comment on the complainant's
motion for reconsideration. 16
On February 23, 2016, the Court promulgated a resolution referring the case to
the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. 17
On March 1, 2017, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXII-
2017-889 denying the motion for reconsideration.

Issue

Should the respondent be disciplined for the actions attributed to him by the
complainant?

Ruling of the Court

We disagree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors for the
dismissal of the charge of immorality.
It appears to us that Commissioner Hababag utterly failed to conscientiously
discharge his responsibility as the factfinder; and that he also did not properly
appreciate the facts in relation to the relevant laws and the canons of ethics. All that
he accomplished was to rehash the principles of law that he believed were applicable,
but without calibrating such principles to whatever facts were found by him to be
established. He did not even explain why the principles were relevant to the case of
the respondent. Such nonchalant discharge of the responsibility of fact-finding was
almost perfunctory, certainly lackluster, and bereft of the requisite enthusiasm. What
makes it worse for the timid, if not lethargic, recommendation was the unquestioning
affirmance by the IBP Board of Governors, which seemingly failed to even notice the
glaring inadequacy.
For sure, the finding of insufficient evidence against the respondent was
unwarranted. He had not even put forward anything of substance in his defense. He
had been content with merely denying the imputed wrongdoing, but his denial did not
disprove the substantial evidence adduced against him. He had been sufficiently
shown to have abandoned his legitimate spouse and family in order to live with a
married woman. AIDSTE

The findings made by the Office of the Ombudsman in the administrative case
brought against the respondent more than sufficed to show his immorality, thereby
showing his failure to live up to the legal and ethical obligations of a lawyer. In this
regard, we adopt and reiterate the apt findings of the Office of the Ombudsman, to
wit:
Respondent is adamant in his denial that he has a relationship with
Binoya. He insists that complainant's accusation that he was having an affair
with Binoya was purely speculative and unsupported by evidence.
Complainant, for her part, presented affidavits not only of their
daughter, Marie Agnes ("Marie"), but also of two others, namely: Roberto
Joseph Galvan ("Galvan") and Gabriel Jadraque ("Jadraque").
Marie declared, in part, that:
9. That we found out on May 24, that he had another
woman named Anna Fe Flores Binoya, and he was currently
living with her in Block 11, Lot 27, Aldea Subd., Timpolok,
Lapulapu City.
10. That I was there in Umapad dump site when I met
Myrna Flores, Ann's mother, Ann and Ann's daughter. She
tried to deny her relationship with my father, but just a few
minutes after, I heard her three aunts tell us that she had a new
husband. She identified the new husband as Atty. Eliseo B.
Ceniza, Jr.
Meanwhile, Galvan alleged that:
2. That I have been living at Aldea Buena Subdivision,
Timpolok, Mactan, Lapu-Lapu City since February 2005;
3. That I regularly stroll in our subdivision on board my
bicycle or motorcycle with my kids;
4. That on several occasions in the month of December
2008 and January 2009, I saw the black Honda care (sic) with
plate no. YDX 692 or sometimes the red Toyota Corolla care
(sic) with plate no. GEJ 877 belonging to ATTY. ELISEO B.
CENIZA, JR., parked in front of the house located on Block 11
Lot 27 of Aldea Buena Subdivision;
5. That more particularly, I have seen these vehicles
parked for long periods of time and in some days overnight at
the said place;
6. That on December 22, 2008 at around 8:00 PM, I
personally saw ATTY. ELISEO B. CENIZA, JR. taking
dinner, half-naked, facing the table in the above-mentioned
house together with a woman whom I later identified as ANN
FLORES from the picture that AMALIA R. CENIZA showed
me;
7. That I saw them again inside the house on December
23, 2008 at around nine o'clock in the morning up to past
twelve o'clock noontime; AaCTcI

Finally, Jadraque averred that:

That sometime on the first week of January 2009, Mrs.
Amalia R[.] Ceniza approached me and sought assistance to
conduct a surveillance of her husband's activities.
That Mrs. Ceniza provided me information that her
husband has a girlfriend who is residing at blk 11, lot 27[,]
ALDEA BUENA SUBD.[,] Timpolok[,] Lapu-Lapu City
Cebu, which she also believed that her husband frequently slept
there at night and most of the time uses their car a RED
TOYOTA with LTO plate GEJ-877;
That on the nineth(sic) of January Mrs. Ceniza
contacted me thru my mobile phone that the classes of her
daughter will end at 6:30 in the afternoon at Cebu Doctor's
College at Mandaue City and her husband will be the one to
pick up and brought [her] home.
That at about 6:00 in the afternoon that day[,] I went
ahead with a videocam with me in Blk 11, Lot 27[,] ALDEA
BUENA SUBD.[,] Timpolok[,] Lapu-lapu City and
strategically positioned myself in order to observed(sic) the
place and the activities of the people in the surroundings;
That few minutes after I saw a RED TOYOTA with
LTO plate GEJ-877 approaching the place this time I
remembered the car mentioned by Mrs. Ceniza that [was]
frequently driven by her husband, so I immediately turn[ed] on
the video cam, and while the tape is running[,] I saw the RED
TOYOTA with LTO Plate GEJ-877 parked in front of the
house #27[,] at the same time[,] I saw one lady [who] went out
 from the house and proceeded to the gate and unlocked it then
she went back inside the house;
That a moment after, one man went out from the driver
aside of the RED TOYOTA with LTO Plate # GEJ-877
wearing white T-shirt and proceeded to the house #27, he
opened the gate[,] went inside, then he locked it and proceeded
to the main door of the house where the lady who unlocked the
gate waited near the main door;
(sic) That later[,] I identify (sic) the man who went out
from n the RED TOYOTA with LTO Plate GEJ-877 and
proceeded to the house #27 as ATTY. ELISEO B. CENIZA
JR.
Complainant likewise proffered photographs proving her claim that
respondent frequents Binoya's house, as well as, proofs that the place which
her husband visits was indeed owned by Binoya. Complainant also adduced
evidence to the effect that facts of marriage appear in the Office of the City
Civil Registrar, Cebu City, between Binoya and a certain Ebrahaim Angeles
Yap who were married on 18 October 2002 at Al Khariah Mosque, San
Nicolas, Mambaling, Cebu City. The corresponding Certificate of Marriage
was likewise submitted.
Vis-à-vis complainant's overwhelming allegations, respondent offered
only self-serving denials. It is elementary that denials are weak especially if
unsupported by evidence. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must
be buttressed with strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.
It bears stressing that aside from his general claim that complainant
only wanted to destroy his reputation and that the instant complaint is purely a
vendetta on her part, respondent did not even attempt to present countervailing
evidence to substantiate his bare allegations.
No less than respondent's own daughter, Marie Agnes, spoke her piece
about the nature of her father's association with Binoya. His daughter is a
budding teen-ager and has already attained a certain level of maturity to
understand the dynamics of the relationship of her parents. EcTCAD

Moreover, the photographs and declarations of Galvan and Jadraque

negate respondent's assertion that he merely visits Binoya as a business
associate. His vehicles were seen in front of Binoya's house for long periods
of time and in some days, on overnight stays. He was also seen in Binoya's
house half-naked while having a meal. Under the prevailing circumstances,
these cannot be deemed as actuations of a business partner or the usual
business meetings as respondent insists.
It is true that complainant was unable to present photograph/s of
respondent and Binoya together. Still, from the foregoing, she has given
several pieces of evidence which yield the unmistakable conclusion that
respondent and Binoya are having an illicit affair. Under the present scheme
 of things, these circumstances meet the requirement of substantial evidence in
administrative proceedings. In the extant case, there is such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion that
respondent and Binoya are engaged in an illicit relationship.
We are cognizant of the fact that cases like this usually entail a 'He
said-She said' version. However, complainant was able to build her case
against respondent. As afore-discussed, complainant presented evidence to
support her claims. There were documentary evidence and affidavits proving,
to the best of her ability, her accusations against respondent. 19
The CA upheld the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman, observing as
follows: 20
Petitioner [Atty. Ceniza] maintains that the insinuations and
accusations that he is having a relationship with Anna Fe Binoya is unfounded
and baseless. Petitioner claims that he had a friendly relationship with the
family of Anna Fe, and that they are far from being intimate. Petitioner
contends that public respondent based its findings purely on circumstantial
evidence. Petitioner emphasizes that not even a picture of him and Anna Fe
was ever presented. Instead, the circumstantial evidence relied upon by public
respondent at most would only prove that indeed the petitioner visited Anna
Fe at her residence. A grave charge of disgraceful and immoral conduct
according to petitioner requires direct and competent evidence which is absent
in the extant case.
Petitioner's protestations fail to persuade. Evidence on record is awash
of the immoral and disgraceful conduct of petitioner. We find no reason
therefore to disturb the findings of public respondent that petitioner is guilty
of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct.
xxx xxx xxx
In the face of the evidence presented by private respondent, the bare
denial and self-serving statements of petitioner crumble. The positive and
categorical assertions of private respondent and the uncontradicted statements
of the witnesses that they saw petitioner staying overnight at Anna Fe's house
on numerous occasions, have sufficiently established the administrative
liability of petitioner. They reasonably and logically lead to the conclusion
that petitioner was intimately and scandalously involved with Anna Fe. In
fact, petitioner even admitted having visited Anna Fe's home several times but
claimed that Anna Fe is her distant relative and client. If this was so, petitioner
could have presented proof showing his business transaction with Anna Fe.
Also, petitioner's claim that Anna Fe is his distant blood relative is wanting of
any evidence. Nonetheless, if petitioner and Anna Fe are indeed relatives, this
fact would not help prove petitioner's innocence from the charge of immoral
conduct. Rather, it would only make petitioner's actions appear more
scandalous and distasteful and would only tend to validate petitioner's
inclination to thoughtless indiscretions.
 Also quite untenable is petitioner's protestation that the evidence
presented would prove at most his causal visits to his friend and relative Anna
Fe. In his vain attempt for absolution, petitioner pointed out that neither a
single photograph of him and Anna Fe going out together was ever presented
nor even an allegation that they were seen holding hands or that they had a
'friendly kiss, or beso-beso.'
HSAcaE

It is morally reprehensible for a married man or woman to maintain

intimate relations with another person of the opposite sex other than his or her
spouse. In the context of and during such an illicit affair, acts which are
otherwise morally acceptable (such as having lunch or dinner, working
overtime or watching a movie together) become tainted with immorality when
done by a married man or woman with a person not his or her spouse. These
otherwise innocent acts (like petitioner's casual visits to Anna Fe's house and
his overnight stays) are deemed unclean because they are done in furtherance
of and in connection with something immoral.
Moreover, immorality is not confined to sexual matters, but includes
conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency,
depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant or shameless conduct
showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the
community, and as an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public
welfare.
The Court will not deviate from the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman
as fully affirmed by the CA.
The members of the legal profession must conform to the highest standards of
morality because the Code of Professional Responsibility mandated them so, to wit:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
There is no question that a married person's abandonment of his or her spouse
in order to live and cohabit with another constitutes immorality. The offense may
even be criminal — either as concubinage or as adultery. Immoral conduct, or
immorality, is that which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference
to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. As a basis of
disciplinary action, such immoral conduct, or immorality must be so corrupt as to
virtually constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency. 21 That the illicit partner is himself or herself married
compounds the immorality.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant.
The Court will exercise its disciplining authority only if the case against the
respondent is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. Given the
serious and far-reaching consequences of disbarment, only a clearly preponderant
showing can warrant the imposition of the harsh penalty of disbarment. 22
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a
whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other; it means evidence that
is more convincing as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto. 23HESIcT

Herein, the complainant presented clearly preponderant evidence showing that

the respondent, while being lawfully married to her, had maintained an illicit
relationship with a married woman. It is of no moment that she presented no direct
evidence of the illicit relationship between him and his mistress; or that her proof of
his immorality was circumstantial. Direct evidence is that evidence which proves a
fact in issue directly without any reasoning or inferences being drawn on the part of
the factfinder. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which indirectly proves a fact
in issue; the factfinder must draw an inference or reason from circumstantial evidence.
24 The lack of direct evidence should not obstruct the adjudication of a dispute, for
circumstantial evidence may be available for the purpose. The Rules of Court has
really made no distinction between direct evidence of a fact and evidence of
circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred. 25 Thus, for the
respondent to insist that the complainant did not discharge her burden of proof
because she did not adduce direct evidence of the immorality is utterly fallacious. As
the records amply indicated, the circumstantial evidence adduced herein compelled
the conclusion that he had abandoned the complainant and their children in order to
cohabit with his married mistress.
Time and again, the Court has pointed out that when the integrity or morality
of a member of the Bar is challenged, it is not enough that he or she denies the charge,
for he or she must meet the issue and overcome the evidence presented on the charge.
He or she must present proof that he or she still maintains the degree of integrity and
morality expected of him or her at all times. 26 The respondent failed in this regard.
AcICHD

In keeping with the high standards of morality imposed upon every lawyer, the
respondent should have desisted from the illicit relationship with his mistress, and
should have avoided the impression on the part of the public that he was defying the
moral standards required of him. 27 His leaving his wife and family to cohabit with
his married mistress definitely transgressed the clearly-defined bounds of decency and
morality. His transgression inflicted on his wife and children a lot of suffering,
including depression, as borne out by one child's attempt at suicide out of despair for
what he had caused to their family. These circumstances were more than sufficient to
establish the charge of gross immorality.
That the immoral conduct of the respondent pertained to his private life did not
diminish the gravity of his ethical violation. In Advincula v. Advincula, 28 we have
exhorted all lawyers to always conduct themselves in a manner as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that they are flouting the moral standards
of the legal profession, thusly:
. . . it is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the Court, must not
only be in fact of good moral character, but must also be seen to be of good
moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and
officer of the Court is required not only to refrain from adulterous
relationships or keeping mistresses but also to conduct himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and
attain its basic ideals, whoever is enrolled in its ranks should not only master
its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing
fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater
import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal
learning.
Indeed, any lawyer guilty of gross misconduct should be suspended or
disbarred even if the misconduct relates to his or her personal life for as long as the
misconduct evinces his or her lack of moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor. 29 Every lawyer is expected to be honorable and reliable at all times, for a
person who cannot abide by the laws in his private life cannot be expected to do so in
his professional dealings. 30
In view of the foregoing, the respondent's immoral conduct violated Rule 1.01
and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
We now deal with the penalty to be imposed.
In Narag v. Narag, 31 the Court disbarred the respondent attorney for
abandoning his family and living with his paramour. In Dantes v. Dantes, 32 the Court
disbarred the respondent attorney for having maintained two illicit relationships,
thereby not keeping up with the strict requirements of law for the continued practice
of the noble profession. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, 33 disbarment was
also imposed on the respondent who had abandoned his wife and maintained an illicit
affair with another woman. Likewise, in Guevarra v. Eala, 34 disbarment was the
penalty for a lawyer who carried on an extra-marital affair with a married woman
while he was also married.
By his scandalous and highly immoral conduct, therefore, the respondent
showed that he did not possess the requisite good moral character needed for the
continued practice of law. He deserves the extreme penalty of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY.
ELISEO B. CENIZA, JR. guilty of gross immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 and
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; DISBARS him from the
practice of law effective upon receipt of this decision; and ORDERS his name
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
 Let a copy of this decision be attached to the respondent's personal record in
the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Furnish a copy of this decision to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its
information and guidance; and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED. TAIaHE

Bersamin, C.J., Carpio, Peralta, Caguioa, A.B. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, J.C.
Reyes, Jr., Hernando, Carandang and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
Del Castillo * and Jardeleza, *** JJ., are on official leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, *** J., is on leave.
Leonen, J., I concur. See separate opinion.
||| (Ceniza v. Ceniza, Jr., A.C. No. 8335, [April 10, 2019])

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 9354. August 20, 2019.]

[Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3655]

MARIFE A. VENZON, complainant, vs. ATTY. AMADOR B.

PELEO III, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM : p

The Case
Respondent Atty. Amador B. Peleo III is charged with violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and Section 3 (D) of
Republic Act 9262 (RA 9262) or the Anti-Violence against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004 for his alleged refusal to provide child support to his son, a
minor.
The Complaint-Affidavit
In her Complaint-Affidavit dated December 1, 2011, Marife Venzon
essentially alleged:
 Sometime in 1996, respondent frequented San Jose, Occidental Mindoro to
attend to the cases of his former townmates in Cavite. 1 On May 6, 1996, she met
respondent whom she engaged to handle her petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with her husband. In no time, she got close to respondent as he really
exerted effort to earn her trust. 2 By the time the judicial decree 3 of annulment of her
marriage came out, they were already in a serious relationship. On April 17, 1998, she
gave birth to respondent's son. 4
In the beginning and up until 2003, respondent responsibly acted as a family
man. Sometime in 1997, he purchased a two-storey apartment in Sampaloc, Manila.
He leased it out but reserved a space at the ground floor. It was converted into a
bedroom where she and their son stayed whenever she had their son checked-up at the
UST Hospital. 5 In 1999, they jointly purchased a residential lot in Facoma, Brgy.
Labangan, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro where they built a house for her and their
son. 6
During the succeeding years, however, respondent no longer visited them as
frequently as before. Then he stopped giving them financial support and even ignored
her pleas to give it back to them. 7
On December 7, 2006, respondent drew an undertaking captioned "Kasulatan
ng Pagbibigay ng Ari-Arian at Sustento," 8 viz.:
Dapat mabatid ng lahat:
Ako, Amador B. Peleo III, Pilipino, nasa hustong gulang at may
tirahan sa Pob. 3, Gen. E. Aguinaldo, Cavite, ay nagsabi ng mga sumusunod:
Na ako ay nagmamay-ari ng mga sumusunod:
1. Lupa at bahay na naroroon sa Facoma, Labangan, San Jose, Occ. Mindoro;
2. Isang apartment sa Maynila sa 850 Don Quijote St., Sampaloc, Manila.
Na ang mga nabanggit na ari-arian ay kusang loob kong ibinibigay kay
Niño Amador Venzon Peleo III, anak ko kay Marife A. Venzon ng San Jose
Occidental, Mindoro;
Na aking ding bibigyan ng suporta buwan-buwan panggastos and nasabi kong
anak at susuportahan ko rin ang pag-aaral niya hanggang sa makatapos ng
kolehiyo.
Sa katunayan ng lahat ng ito ay inilagda ko ang aking pangalan ngayon
December 7, 06 dito sa San Jose, Occ. Mindoro.
(Sgd.) Amador B. Peleo III
xxx xxx xxx
Conforme: Marife A. Venzon
 But respondent did not fulfill his undertaking and continued to ignore her pleas
for support. She was, thus, constrained to seek assistance from the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP).
IBP NCLA-Senior Deputy Atty. Dante Mercado wrote 9 respondent urging
him to at least provide his child's basic needs so he may avoid liability for economic
abuse under RA 9262.
During their meeting at the IBP office, she and respondent jointly drew a
Kasunduan, 10 viz.:
Dapat mabatid ng lahat:
Ang kasunduan ito ay ginawa at pinagtibay nina:
AMADOR B. PELEO III, Pilipino, naninirahan sa Gen. Aguinaldo, Cavite at
siyang tatawagin Unang Panig;
at
MARIFE VENZON, Pilipino, naninirahan sa San Jose, Occ. Mindoro at
siyang tatawagin na Ikalawang Panig:
PINAGKASUNDUAN
1. Ang Unang Panig ay hahatian (50:50) si Niño Amador V. Peleo sa renta sa
bahay na naroroon sa 850 Don Quijote St., Sampaloc, Manila;
2. Sina Niño Amador Peleo at kanyang ina na si Marife Venzon lamang ay
binibigyan ko ng pahintulot na siyang tumira sa isang maliit sa kuarto sa
silong ng apartment;
3. Ang 900 metro kuadrado lupa na naroroon sa Bo. Labangan, San Jose, Occ.
Mindoro at galing kay Teodolfo Talactac ay ibinibigay ko kay Niño Amador
V. Peleo ang ganap na pagmamay-ari;
4. Bibigyan ko si Niño Amador V. Peleo ng karampatan kaparte kung
mabenta ang nasabing apartment.
Sa katunayan ng lahat ng ito ay inilagda namin ang aming pangalan ngayon
Hunyo 28, 2011 dito sa Pasig City.
 

(Sgd.) Amador Peleo

(Sgd. Marife Venzon)
III

Ikalawang Panig Unang Panig

 
But again respondent did not honor his undertaking. She recalled that right
after they met at the IBP office, she received respondent's text: "Wala ka ni katiting
na karapatan para ipaayos ang kwarto. Kung ano ang ayos niyan ngayon ay hindi mo
ito pwedeng baguhin o galawin at hindi kita pinahihintulutan na ayusin, baguhin,
maglagay ng anumang improvement diyan sa kwarto otherwise you will be criminally
liable, kuha mo at alisin mo na rin diyan ang sabi mong gamit mo."
On September 30, 2011, she sent copy of the "Kasunduan" to Eusebia Jacob, a
tenant in respondent's apartment. The "Kasunduan" informed Eusebia Jacob that half
of the monthly rent on the apartment would go to her. She learned, however, that
respondent's sister, Romana Peleo Bellostrino was already collecting the rent.
Aside from his deliberate refusal to provide support for their son, she knew of
respondent's propensity for dishonesty, unethical conduct, and immorality, viz.:
1. In filling up the blank spaces on his son's Certificate of Live Birth, he
indicated that they got married on May 1, 1996 in Manila when in truth they never got
married. In fact, they only met for the first time on May 6, 1996.
2. Respondent was legally married to Erlinda Sierra when he intimately got
involved with her. He remained a married man before, during, and after he sired a son
with her. He led her to believe he was determined to sever his marital ties with his
wife by filing a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. As it tuned out,
he never actually meant it to be. He never prosecuted the case until it got dismissed
for failure to prosecute, thus:
ORDER
It appearing that this case has been pending since July 31, 1998
without petitioner exerting any effort to prosecute this case.
ACCORDINGLY, and pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised
Rules of Court, this case is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED. 11
3. He had been having illicit affairs with many other women, e.g., — a
seamstress from Bacoor, Cavite, a housemaid from Calintaan, Occidental Mindoro,
and another woman from Capiz with whom he fathered a child named Amadora.
4. He fraudulently secured a Senior Citizen (SC) card although he was only
forty five (45) years old. He unabashedly availed of the twenty percent (20%)
discount privilege on plane tickets for his out-of-town court hearings.
Respondent's Comment
In his Comment 12 dated June 8, 2012, respondent denied that he was not
giving child support. He claimed that from 2009 until 2011, complainant had been
receiving the monthly apartment rent of P12,000.00. On October 2011, in lieu of the
cash allowance she was demanding, he gave her a 900-square meter property within a
subdivision in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. As for complainant's other accusations,
he basically riposted:
 1. He filled out his son's birth certificate indicating that he and complainant got
married on a certain date and place because he did not want his son to be humiliated
or called "putok sa buho."
2. He did not intend to deceive complainant when he filed the petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage with his first wife. The reason why he failed to
prosecute the case was a purely personal matter.
3. He secured a Senior Citizen card solely to avail of the discount privileges
granted to cardholders.
By Resolution 13 dated August 1, 2012, the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation
or decision within ninety (90) days. The scheduled preliminary conference was
dispensed with following several cancellations. The parties were required instead to
file their verified position papers. Only complainant complied.
Report and Recommendation of the Committee on Bar Discipline- IBP
(CBD-IBP)
In its Report and Recommendation 14 dated December 19, 2013, the CBD-
IBP, through Commissioner Eldrid C. Antiquiera found respondent liable for gross
immorality and violation of Canon 1 of the CPR for Lawyers. Respondent was found
to have failed to live up to the exacting standards of the legal profession by having
sexual relation with a woman other than his wife, aggravated by his utter refusal to
give support to the child he fathered with his paramour. The CBD-IBP recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.
Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
Under Resolution No. XXI-2014-812, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to
adopt the CBD-IBP's Report and Recommendation pertaining to respondent's liability
for gross immorality. As for the penalty, it held that respondent should be disbarred,
thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A," and considering Respondent's act of gross
immorality, and his falsification of public documents to feign his marriage to
Complainant and acquire a Senior Citizen Card with intent to use it and avail
of the 20% discount, Atty. Amador B. Peleo III is hereby DISBARRED and
his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
Ruling
We adopt the factual findings, legal conclusions, and penalty recommended by
the IBP Board of Governors.
 Respondent is charged with violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, 15 forbidding lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, or deceitful conduct. The specific acts he allegedly committed are as
follows:
1. Maintaining a sexual relation with complainant when his marriage with his
spouse had not been terminated.
2. Maintaining several other faithless relations with other women while in
permanent relations with his spouse and complainant.
3. Misusing the legal process of filing a petition for nullity of marriage to
convince complainant that he was truly determined to end his marriage with his wife.
4. Falsifying entries in his son's birth certificate.
5. Failing to give child support.
6. Seriously disrespecting the authority and dignity of the IBP when he
disregarded an agreement brokered by the IBP between him and complainant.
7. Deceiving the government and private businesses by availing of the Senior
Citizens' card to which he was not entitled.
Clearly, we are not deciding respondent's professional fitness on the basis of a
single and one-off private event in his life. As a rule, we do not interfere with the
privacy right to make decisions on who a lawyer would want to pair himself or herself
with. It is the lawyer's decision to make. As stated in a Concurring Opinion in
Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003:
Clearly, "immorality" as a category of offense for the dismissal of a
public servant or a judicial employee should not be construed as any violation
of moral prescriptions. Otherwise, this tack would only embroil this Court in
the eternal debate on divergent moral theories and systems. For a public
servant, the pivotal question in determining administrative culpability ought to
be whether the challenged conduct was ultimately prejudicial to public
service. We cannot snoop into bedrooms and peer under bed covers without
running afoul of every person's constitutionally protected individuality. Quite
interestingly, in American jurisprudence, conduct affecting one's personal
character has been excluded from the ambit of actionable behavior. It stressed:
"But conduct amounting to mere irregularity or merely affecting one's
character as a private individual is not usually covered by the term
'malconduct'."
It is more than a matter of sympathy; it is a clear does of justice indeed
to conclude that respondent did not fail to live up to her ethical obligations; in
conscience and in law, this Court should be the last, and never, to cast the
stone and stamp the badge of infamy upon her legitimate desire for personal
security and safety that in reality has bothered no one, least of all, our own
judicial institution.
 What we have here is the confluence of respondent's acts which already spill
beyond what happens inside the privacy of one's intimate space. For respondent's acts
here do not just concern him as a private individual. They have crossed the line
between what essentially belongs to an individual's right to privacy on one hand, and
a pattern of conduct symptomatic of a clear disregard for the rights of others by
misapplying his knowledge of the law and his profession as a lawyer, on the other.
This is the nexus that makes us act. We are taking objective action because
respondent's pattern of conduct has already impacted on his professional fitness and
status as a member of the Bar. Consider:
First. Respondent maintained sexual relation with complainant and several
other faithless contemporaneous relations while his marriage with his lawful spouse
was still subsisting. He was not just in love and lonely and in good faith to establish
another solid foundation for a life-long partnership when he paired with complainant.
He made complainant just one of his flings. His pattern of faithlessness, especially his
indiscriminate liaisons, with emphasis on the fact that complainant was his vulnerable
client when he first pursued her — is a clear and present danger to the profession
where utmost fiduciary obligations must be observed. The victims here are the spouse
and the institution of marriage.
In the following cases, respondent lawyers were ordered disbarred for engaging
in illicit relations with women, albeit, they were still lawfully married to their
respective spouses:
In Guevarra v. Eala, 16 respondent was found guilty of grossly immoral
conduct and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 17 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
In Ecraela v. Pangalangan, 19 respondent was also found guilty of gross
immorality and of violating Section 2, Article XV of the 1987 Constitution, and
Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 20 Canon 7, Rule 7.03, 21 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 22 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
In Dantes v. Dantes, 23 respondent was held guilty of, and ordered disbarred
for, grossly immoral conduct.
Finally, in Bustamante v. Alejandro, 24 respondent was held liable for gross
immorality.
Second. Respondent misused the legal process by filing a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage without any serious intention to prosecute it. He
clearly did it only as a ploy to convince complainant that he was truly decided to end
his marriage with his lawful wife. His excuse that his failure to prosecute was a
"purely personal matter" is flimsy. In any event, if truly he did not use the same as a
mere ploy to serve an illicit purpose, he should have formally withdrawn it. As it was,
however, he just left it there to clog the already clogged docket of the court and
waited till it was dismissed.
 Lawyers are ordained to avoid casual resort to judicial processes for their
personal gain. As officers of the court, they ought to foster respect for court
procedures and processes and be the frontline of defense against those who wittingly
and willingly misuse and/or abuse them. Court processes are, and should forever be,
available only for the redress of genuine grievances and should not be used to suit the
whims of unscrupulous individuals. By his actions, respondent undeniably misused
and abused the court processes to suit his whims. Respondent is guilty of violating
Canon 10, Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, viz.:
CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD
FAITH TO THE COURT
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 10.03 — A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
Third. Respondent falsified the place and date of marriage entries in the birth
certificate of his son. Falsification is a crime. Falsification of a public document
aggravates this crime. That he did so to give the impression to the public that his son
is of legitimate status is foisting a fraud on both the public and his son. This act shows
that he is not only prone to committing a crime, something that should already impact
on his fitness to remain as a lawyer, but is also a serial fraudster.
Time and again, lawyers have been reminded of the oath they took, upon
admission to the legal profession, to do no falsehood. This solemn promise does not
and will never waver. No amount of justification will suffice to excuse a lawyer from
any act of falsification. As held in Apolinar-Petilo v. Atty. Maramot: 25
The respondent cannot be relieved by his justifications and
submissions. As a lawyer, he should not invoke good faith and good intentions
as sufficient to excuse him from discharging his obligation to be truthful and
honest in his professional actions. His duty and responsibility in that regard
were clear and unambiguous. In Young v. Batuegas, 23 this Court reminded
that truthfulness and honesty had the highest value for attorneys, thus:
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his
admission to the Bar that he will do no falsehood nor consent
to the doing of any in court and he shall conduct himself as a
lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. He
should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high
vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the
facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at
correct conclusion. The courts, on the other hand, are entitled
to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and
pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to
defend his client's rights and is expected to display the utmost
 zeal in defense of his client's cause, his conduct must never be
at the expense of truth. 24
Fourth. Respondent has repeatedly failed to give child support to his son, a
minor. This is contrary to law. Under the Family Code 26 he as a parent is obliged to
support and provide everything indispensable for his son's sustenance, dwelling,
clothing, medical attendance, education, and transportation. 27 Too, he has the duty to
instruct his children according to right precepts and good example and to give them
love, companionship, and understanding, as well as moral and spiritual guidance. 28
Respondent failed in this respect. Not only has he evaded his duty to support his son
and deprived him of the love and affection he deserves from him as his father, he has
also displayed an abusive and rude behavior toward his son's mother. He has,
therefore, shown himself to be truly unbecoming of a member of the legal profession.
Fifth. Respondent seriously disrespected the IBP's authority and dignity when
he disregarded an agreement brokered by the IBP between him and complainant. He
defied the undertaking which he voluntarily made before an officer of the IBP. His
lack of respect for the authority of the IBP constitutes disrespect for this Court as
well. For the IBP is integrated by the Supreme Court to assist in the administration of
justice, elevate the standards of the legal profession, and enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibilities more effectively. 29 Canon 7 of the CPR mandates:
Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and support the activities of the integrated bar.
Sixth. Respondent has been deceiving the government and private businesses
by continuously availing of the Senior Citizens' discount when he is not legally
entitled thereto. He admitted that he applied for, and was issued, a Senior Citizen
card. He has been using it to enjoy twenty percent (20%) discount on specific goods
and services. This he did by misrepresenting himself as sixty (60) years old when in
truth, he was only then forty-five (45). This is plain dishonesty and fraud, again, a
transgression of his series of transgressions of his lawyer's oath to do no falsehood.
His temerity in claiming he did it "for discount purposes only" 30 shows an
unscrupulous disregard and disrespect of the law which as a lawyer he ought to have
been the first to uphold. It runs afoul of his duty to promote the dignity of the legal
profession and preserve the confidence of the public in lawyers.
By these six (6) counts of unlawful, immoral, dishonest, or deceitful conduct,
respondent has lost his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar. He is ordered
disbarred.
Indeed, public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Hence, every lawyer is
duty bound to act and comport himself or herself in such a manner that would
promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. 31 Respondent's
conduct does not help in that regard, but worse, directly encourages people to
 entertain themselves with jokes about lawyers and the legal profession as the butt of
their unflattering jokes.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Amador B. Peleo III is found GUILTY of
GROSS UNLAWFUL, DISHONEST and DECEITFUL CONDUCT in violation
of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is ORDERED
DISBARRED from the practice of law, his name, STRICKEN OUT the Roll of
Attorneys.
Let copy of this Decision be: (1) entered into the personal records of Atty.
Amador B. Peleo III with the Office of the Bar Confidant; (2) furnished to all chapters
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and (3) circulated by the Court Administrator
to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, A.B. Reyes, Jr., J.C.
Reyes, Jr., Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting and Zalameda, JJ., concur.
Bersamin, * C.J. and Gesmundo, ** J., are on official leave.
Caguioa, J., is on leave.
||| (Venzon v. Peleo III, A.C. No. 9354, [August 20, 2019])

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 10439. September 3, 2019.]

ANNALIZA C. CHAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. REBENE C.

CARRERA, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM : p

Before the Court is a Complaint-Affidavit 1 filed by complainant, Annaliza C.

Chan, on September 11, 2009 charging respondent, Atty. Rebene C. Carrera, with
Gross Misconduct.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In her complaint, Chan alleged that she met Carrera sometime in July 2006
while she was a trainee at Max's Restaurant. At that time, he was dining with a
woman companion she thought was Carrera's wife. She was surprised when Carrera
later introduced himself as a widower. After two (2) weeks, Carrera returned and
requested for Chan to be his server. While waiting for his food, he told her that he just
settled a case and earned P4 million. He then proceeded to ask her several questions
such as whether she was interested in studying nursing or caregiving in a school that
he owned in Dagupan City. After his meal, he left his calling card with her, but she
threw the same away. From that time onwards, Carrera frequented the restaurant and
requested for Chan to assist him. They had conversations where Carrera promised
Chan a lot of things. He showed interest in pursuing her and even visited her house to
meet her parents. At one point, however, Chan told Carrera that it was best he pursued
somebody else as she was still married albeit separated. She told him that her husband
left her for another woman and that she was raising their daughter alone. Carrera,
however, did not seem to mind. He even represented that he can annul her marriage
for her and support her daughter. Eventually, Chan grew fond of Carrera. He was able
to convince her to join him on a trip to Hong Kong. Upon their return, he bought a
house for them in Quezon City as well as a car for her with a special plate number
"ANA" inspired by her name. They then went to his school in Dagupan City where he
called for a board meeting during which he introduced her as his fiancé and a new
member of the board of trustees. 2
In September 2008, however, around the time when Chan and Carrera moved
to another house at Project 8, Quezon City, Chan discovered that Carrera was not in
fact a widower and that his wife was still alive. Even though his wife was confined in
an institution, he was still validly married to her. Chan further discovered that Carrera
also had a child with another woman. Because of this, Chan wanted to leave Carrera.
Unfortunately, she found out that she was pregnant with his child. Nevertheless, while
Chan decided to stay with Carrera, their relationship was no longer harmonious.
Throughout her pregnancy, Carrera often scolded her and treated her badly. He
accused her of stealing his credit card and withdrawing from his account. In one
instance, Carrera even denied being the father of the child she was carrying. Aside
from this, Chan often caught Carrera having illicit relationships with other women.
When confronted, he would usually make empty promises to change his ways. Chan
thought about the welfare of their child and felt that she had no choice but to remain
with Carrera. 3 CAIHTE

Despite his infractions, Chan nonetheless helped Carrera during his time of
need. When his business suffered from irreversible losses, she worked hard as his
paralegal and referred him clients. Because of her help, he was able to recover his
losses, save his school from closing, and was even able to purchase more properties.
Still, Carrera refused to give up his womanizing. This time, when Chan confronted
Carrera about it, he got furious, asked her to leave their home, to return the car he
gave her, and forbade her from working as his paralegal. He also consistently
humiliated her such that when she would visit his office to ask for financial support
for their son, he would utter invective words first before giving her money. 4
 For his part, Carrera denied the accusations against him. He alleged that the
instant complaint was merely part of Chan's elaborate plan of extorting money from
him. On Chan's narration of facts, Carrera admitted that he met her at Max's
Restaurant when he was having lunch with a lady executive at St. Luke's Medical
Center. He admitted that her smile and stare were so sweet and attractive that he gave
her his calling card and that he dined at the restaurant almost every week. When she
found out that he was going to Hong Kong, he granted her request and brought her
along as she shared that she wanted to experience her first plane ride. There, their
relationship intensified. Upon their return, Carrera initially brought Chan home to the
house of her bachelor uncle's house where she lived. However, he was pressured into
looking for a house for her in Novaliches, Quezon City when she told him that she
was at risk of being harassed by her uncle who was physically attracted to her.
Instantly, he bought a house for her and her daughter. But Chan did not stop there.
She asked Carrera to leave his legitimate family and stay with her at the newly-
purchased house. Since he was already emotionally attached, he acceded. He told his
daughter of his decision to leave his original home in Commonwealth Avenue,
Quezon City, and lived with Chan in said house from September 2006 to September
2008, the time when they transferred to another house at Project 8, Quezon City. 5
On December 4, 2007, Chan and Carrera's son, Rebene C. Carrera, Jr., was
born. According to Carrera, from the time that he and Chan began living together up
until the present, he was never remiss in providing for her, her daughter, and their son.
He bought them houses, cars, toys, clothes, and enrolled their son at an educational
center even when he was only 1-and-1/2 years old. In fact, he even paid for her
education at St. Joseph's College where she took her Master of Arts in Special
Education. This notwithstanding, Chan became very unreasonable. She prevented
Carrera from seeing his own children of his previous relationship. She also became
very jealous of all his lady friends and would often create a scene at his office when
these ladies were merely his friends and business associates. Unsatisfied, Chan even
clamored for the transfer of the Project 8 house and car in her name. But Carrera
refused to give in to Chan's unreasonable demands any longer. On August 29, 2009,
he decided to move out of their house and back to his legitimate family's abode. 6
Contrary to the claims of Chan, moreover, Carrera maintains that there is no
truth to the assertion that he told her that he was a widower. She knew from the very
beginning that he was married and that his wife was incapacitated and confined at
Estrella's Half-way House due to her "schizophrenia." She also knew that he was
living in his house with the children he had with said wife. Carrera further claims that
he informed Chan that the lady he was eating with during their first encounter at
Max's Restaurant was not his wife but his classmate from high school who was an
executive at St. Luke's Medical Center and who accompanied him at his check-up at
said hospital. In fact, it was Chan who initially told him that she was single and that
she told him of the fact that she was married only when they were in Hong Kong. 7
 In the end, Carrera insisted that his only "sin" was that he was so sympathetic
and charitable to Chan who was never satisfied with his generosity and with whom he
fell deeply in love with. But this had nothing to do with his qualifications as a
provider of the family and as lawyer. On the contrary, he was nothing but respectable
having been a member of the Academe for more than 20 years, a Director and
Treasurer of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Pangasinan Chapter, and a member
of the bar in good standing since his admission in 1980. As such, he asked for
compassion given that his infraction did not amount to the kind of "grossly immoral
conduct" he was accused of engaging in. DETACa

In a Report and Recommendation 8 dated August 9, 2010, the Investigating

Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) recommended that Carrera be admonished and warned. In a
Resolution 9 dated December 14, 2012, however, the Board of Governors (BOG) of
the IBP approved, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and suspended Carrera from the practice of law for three
(3) years. Subsequently, the BOG issued another Resolution 10 on February 11, 2014
affirming its previous resolution, but with the modification that Carrera is suspended
from the practice of law for one (1) year instead of three (3) years.
The Court's Ruling
In view of the circumstances of the instant case, the Court finds that the
actuations of Carrera warrant the penalty of disbarment from the practice of law and
not merely suspension therefrom as found by the BOG.
Prefatorily, the Court notes Chan's disinterest in pursuing her complaint against
Carrera as she initially manifested in her Verified Position Paper 11 dated June 6,
2010 and, in several pleadings, thereafter. She insists that she was merely induced into
filing the same by some individuals who had a personal grudge against Carrera. At the
time of her filing, she was angry and furious at Carrera who was leaving her for his
wife who was seriously ill. She realized soon after, however, that she was only being
irrational. In fact, Chan recounts that she originally wrote her complaint in Tagalog
but was translated in English by a lady staff in the IBP. While the translation was
blessed with Chan's consent, she revealed that she no longer read the same. It turned
out that the translation was an exaggeration of the original complaint written in
Tagalog. Accordingly, she seeks the withdrawal of her complaint. 12
We resolve to deny Chan's request.
In the first place, the Court is aware of the Investigating Commissioner's
observation that Chan was not represented by counsel when she sought the
withdrawal of her complaint. In the second place, We sustain the Investigating
Commissioner's finding that Chan's motion to withdraw does not serve as a bar for the
investigation of the administrative case against Carrera. Section 5, Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court provides that "no investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by
reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the
charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same." This rule finds
application in Ferancullo v. Atty. Ferancullo 13 where We held that:
x x x In view of its nature, administrative proceedings against lawyers are not
strictly governed by the Rules of Court. As we held in In re Almacen, a
disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal
but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers.
Hence, an administrative proceeding continues despite the desistance of a
complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same. 14
From the foregoing precepts, the Court holds that the Investigating
Commissioner correctly denied Chan's request for the withdrawal of her complaint,
proceeding with the investigation of the allegations against Carrera. It is a
fundamental principle that members of the legal profession must conform to the
highest standards of morality and that the Court is duty-bound to ensure compliance
therewith. As such, any deviation initially raised as the private concern of a
complainant becomes a matter of judicial interest. Indeed, Chan may very well be
disinterested in pursuing the instant complaint, but this shall not necessarily set
Carrera free from any liability he may have already incurred.
But at any rate, even if We sustain Chan's contention that the English
translation exaggerated the allegations she raised in her Tagalog complaint, both
parties never denied, and even expressly admitted, that they freely engaged in an
extra-marital affair. They cohabited under one roof from September 2006 to August
2009, or practically for a period of three (3) years, despite the fact that they were still
legally married to their respective spouses. They also produced a child who they
named after Carrera. This fact, standing alone, suffices to hold Carrera
administratively liable for grossly immoral conduct. No amount of exaggeration can
change the attending circumstances of the instant case.
At this juncture, We reproduce the provisions of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility below:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. aDSIHc

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely

reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Time and again, the Court has ruled that a married person's abandonment of his
or her spouse in order to live and cohabit with another constitutes immorality. The
offense may even be criminal — either as concubinage or as adultery. Immoral
conduct, or immorality, is that which is so wilful, flagrant, or shameless as to show
indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. As a
basis of disciplinary action, such immoral conduct, or immorality must be so corrupt
as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the common sense of decency. That the illicit partner is himself or herself
married compounds the immorality. 15
The facts of the present case are beyond dispute. Both Chan and Carrera
acknowledged their undeniable love affair, with the latter designating the same as a
"chemistry of two consensual adults." At the same time, both of them did not deny the
reality that they were still legally married to another. In a heartbeat, they left their
respective homes and moved into a house that Carrera had bought and where they
wilfully resided for a good three (3) years. It is in said house that they played husband
and wife to each other and father and mother to their child. All of these facts, both
parties do not contest. At most, their disagreement lies merely in the alleged time
when each found out about the fact that the other was still legally married to his or her
spouse. But the precise date and time one discovered the other party's existing
marriage cannot affect the outcome of the case for both parties nonetheless openly and
deliberately cohabited despite knowledge of their status, separating only when their
relationship had turned sour.
It is this clear and outright admission that is the basis for Carrera's disbarment.
His endless accomplishments listed in his curriculum vitae cannot render him
innocent of the charges against him. On the contrary, the Court wonders how despite
all these achievements in his professional career, Carrera allowed himself to falter in
such a highly scandalous manner. His level of knowledge and experience should have
alerted him of his duty to keep with the standards of morality imposed on every
lawyer. To recall, he even proposed to Chan his services in annulling her marriage.
Hence, all of this could have been avoided had he made an effort to make things right.
In Amalia R. Ceniza v. Atty. Ceniza, Jr., 16 the Court enunciated that any lawyer
guilty of gross misconduct should be suspended or disbarred even if the misconduct
relates to his or her personal life for as long as the misconduct evinces his or her lack
of moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Every lawyer is expected to
be honorable and reliable at all times, for a person who cannot abide by the laws in his
private life cannot be expected to do so in his professional dealings.
As regards the penalty to be imposed, the Court has been consistent. In Ceniza,
17 as well as in Narag v. Atty. Narag, 18 Dantes v. Atty. Dantes, 19 Bustamante-
Alejandro v. Atty. Alejandro, 20 and Guevarra v. Atty. Eala, 21 We resolved to disbar
the respondents therein for abandoning their legitimate spouses and maintaining illicit
affairs with another. By necessary implication, as a consequence of Carrera's
scandalous and highly immoral conduct, the Court similarly finds him to be deserving
of the extreme penalty of disbarment, although three (3) of its members considered
the penalty too harsh.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DECLARES respondent Atty. Rebene C.
Carrera guilty of Gross Immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03 of the
 Code of Professional Responsibility, DISBARS him from the practice of law
effective upon receipt of this Decision, and ORDERS his name stricken off the Roll
of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the respondent's personal record in
the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Furnish a copy of this Decision to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its
information and guidance; and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts of the Philippines.
ETHIDa

SO ORDERED.
Bersamin, C.J., Carpio, Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa,
A.B. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, J.C. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier,
Inting and Zalameda, JJ., concur.
 
||| (Chan v. Carrera, A.C. No. 10439, [September 3, 2019])

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 210554. August 5, 2015.]

DAVID YU KIMTENG, MARY L. YU, WINNIE L. YU, VIVIAN L.

YU, ROSA GAN, LILIAN CHUA WOO YUKIMTENG, SANTOS
YU, MARCELO YU, AND SIN CHIAO YU LIM, petitioners, vs.
ATTY. WALTER T. YOUNG, ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR.,
ATTY. JOVITO GAMBOL, AND ATTY. DAN REYNALD R.
MAGAT, practicing law under the Firm name, Young Revilla
Gambol & Magat, and JUDGE OFELIA L. CALO, Presiding Judge
of Branch 211 of the Regional Trial Court, Mandaluyong City,
respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J : p

A disbarred lawyer's name cannot be part of a firm's name. A lawyer who

appears under a firm name that contains a disbarred lawyer's name commits indirect
contempt of court.
 Through this Petition, 1 petitioners ask that law firm, Young Revilla Gambol &
Magat, and Judge Ofelia L. Calo (Judge Calo), be cited in contempt of court under
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. 2 Anastacio Revilla, Jr. (Revilla) was disbarred on
December 2009 in an En Banc Resolution of this court in A.C. No. 7054 entitled Que
v. Atty. Revilla, Jr. 3
David Yu Kimteng, Mary L. Yu, Winnie L. Yu, Vivian L. Yu, Rosa Gan,
Lilian Chua Woo Yukimteng, Santos Yu, Marcelo Yu, and Sin Chiao Yu Lim are the
majority stockholders of Ruby Industrial Corporation. 4
In Majority Stockholders of Ruby Industrial Corporation v. Lim, et al., 5 this
court ordered the liquidation of Ruby Industrial Corporation and transferred the case
to the appropriate Regional Trial Court branch to supervise the liquidation. 6
The liquidation was raffled to Branch 211 of the Regional Trial Court in
Mandaluyong City, 7 presided by Judge Calo. 8
Walter T. Young (Atty. Young), Jovito Gambol (Atty. Gambol), and Dan
Reynald Magat (Atty. Magat) are lawyers practicing under the firm, Young Revilla
Gambol & Magat. 9 They entered their appearance in the liquidation proceedings as
counsels for the liquidator. 10
An Opposition 11 was filed against the appearance of Young Revilla Gambol &
Magat on the ground that Revilla was already disbarred in 2009. 12
Young Revilla Gambol & Magat filed a Reply 13 to the Opposition stating that
the firm opted to retain Revilla's name in the firm name even after he had been
disbarred, with the retention serving as an act of charity. 14
Judge Calo overruled the opposition to the appearance of Young Revilla
Gambol & Magat and stated that Atty. Young could still appear for the liquidator as
long as his appearance was under the Young Law Firm and not under Young Revilla
Gambol & Magat. 15 Young Law Firm does not exist.
Thus, petitioners David Yu Kimteng, Mary L. Yu, Winnie L. Yu, Vivian L.
Yu, Rosa Gan, Lilian Chua Woo Yukimteng, Santos Yu, Marcelo Yu, and Sin Chiao
Yu Lim filed this Petition under Rule 71 to cite respondents Atty. Walter T. Young,
Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr., Atty. Jovito Gambol, Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat, and
Judge Ofelia L. Calo in contempt.
This court required respondents to comment on the Petition. 16 Respondent law
firm Young Revilla Gambol & Magat filed its Comment 17 on April 14, 2014, while
respondent Atty. Gambol filed a separate Comment. 18
On April 16, 2014, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to File Consolidated
Reply. 19 This was granted in the Resolution 20 dated June 18, 2014. In the same
Resolution, this court denied petitioners' Motion to Consider Case Submitted without
Comment from [Judge Calo] 21 and ordered the parties to await Judge Calo's
comment. 22
 Counsel for petitioners subsequently filed a Manifestation, 23 informing this
court that they have yet to receive a copy of Judge Calo's Comment. 24 No Comment
was filed by Judge Calo.
I
Petitioners cite San Luis v. Pineda 25 and United States v. Ney, et al. 26 to
support their argument that the use of a disbarred lawyer's name in the firm name is
tantamount to contempt of court. 27
Private Respondents Atty. Young and Atty. Magat counter that they
maintained Revilla's name in the firm name for sentimental reasons. 28
Atty. Young and Atty. Magat explained that they did not intend to deceive the
public 29 and that in any case, the retention of Revilla's name "does not give added
value to the [law firm] nor does it enhance the standing of the member lawyers
thereof." 30
They further argue that: aScITE

The non-deletion of [Anastacio E. Revilla's] name in the Young Law Firm's

name is no more misleading than including the names of dead or retired
partners in a law firm's name. It is more for sentimental reasons. It is a
fraternal expression to a former brother in the profession that the Private
Respondents fully understand, his [referring to Revilla] principled albeit
quixotic advocacy. 31
Private respondents point out that the Balgos Law Firm is derailing the
liquidation of Ruby Industrial Corporation by filing this Petition for contempt because
the Balgos Law Firm resents that its nominee was not elected as liquidator. 32 Private
respondents add that petitioners have continuously blocked Ruby Industrial
Corporation's unsecured creditors from obtaining relief, as shown by the number of
times that Ruby Industrial Corporation's cases have reached this court. 33
Private respondents also raise the issue of forum shopping in their Comment
because petitioners allegedly filed a disbarment Complaint against them before the
Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines. One of the grounds
for disbarment cited by petitioners was the use of Revilla's name in their firm name. 34
Private respondent Atty. Gambol filed a separate Comment, 35 arguing that
from the time Revilla was disbarred, he no longer practiced law. 36
Private respondent Atty. Gambol stated that he passed the 1990 Bar
Examination but took his oath in July 2006. 37 He is a junior member of the Young
Revilla Magat & Gambol law firm and "has no power and/or authority [to decide]
who should be removed from the firm's name[.]" 38
Private respondent Atty. Gambol argues that in all the cases he handled after
Revilla's disbarment, he omitted Revilla's name from the firm name in the pleadings
that he signed. Such deletion was through his own initiative. 39
 Petitioners filed their Reply, 40 with petitioners addressing respondents'
allegations that they remained silent on the disbarment case they had filed by citing
Rule 139-B, Section 18 of the Rules of Court, 41 which provides that:
Rule 139-B. Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys
xxx xxx xxx
Section 18. Confidentiality. — Proceedings against attorneys shall be private
and confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be
published like its decisions in other cases.
Petitioners argue that liability for contempt is separate from disciplinary action;
hence, no forum shopping was committed. 42
Petitioners did not address private respondents' allegations regarding the delay
in the liquidation of Ruby Industrial Corporation.
The issues in this case are:
First, whether private respondents Atty. Walter T. Young, Atty. Jovito
Gambol, and Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat are in contempt of court when they
continued to use respondent Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.'s name in their firm name even
after his disbarment;
Second, whether private respondents Atty. Walter T. Young, Atty. Jovito
Gambol, and Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat are in contempt of court for deliberately
allowing a disbarred lawyer to engage in the practice of law;
Third, whether private respondent Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is in contempt of
court for continuing to practice law even after disbarment;
Fourth, whether public respondent Judge Ofelia L. Calo is in contempt of court
when she held that respondent Atty. Walter T. Young can appear in court as long as it
is under the Young Law Firm, which is a non-existent firm; and
Lastly, whether the filing of this Petition despite the pendency of a disbarment
complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines constitutes forum shopping.
II
Rule 71, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and
hearing. — After charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given
to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by
the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his
official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or
judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being
 dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of
any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to
enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of
ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the
person adjudged to be entitled thereto; HEITAD

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or

proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this
Rule;
(d)  Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as
such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the
custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.
(Emphasis supplied)
This court has defined contempt of court as:
a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense,
contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a
legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly
behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its
proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted and
more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice,
or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is generic, embracing
within its legal signification a variety of different acts. 43 (Emphasis in the
original, citations omitted)
In this case, respondents committed acts that are considered indirect contempt
under Section 3 of Rule 71. In addition, respondents disregarded the Code of
Professional Responsibility when they retained the name of respondent Revilla in
their firm name.
Canon 3, Rule 3.02 states:
Rule 3.02. In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed name
shall be used. The continued use of the name of a deceased partner is
permissible provided that the firm indicates in all its communications that said
partner is deceased.
Respondents argue that the use of respondent Revilla's name is "no more
misleading than including the names of dead or retired partners in a law firm's name."
44

III
 Maintaining a disbarred lawyer's name in the firm name is different from using
a deceased partner's name in the firm name. Canon 3, Rule 3.02 allows the use of a
deceased partner's name as long as there is an indication that the partner is deceased.
This ensures that the public is not misled. On the other hand, the retention of a
disbarred lawyer's name in the firm name may mislead the public into believing that
the lawyer is still authorized to practice law.
The use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name was the issue in the
consolidated cases Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name "Sycip,
Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo" and In the matter of the Petition for
Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name "Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta &
Reyes." 45 Petitioners prayed that they be allowed to continue including Atty.
Alexander Sycip's and Atty. Herminio Ozaeta's names in their firm names. 46 This
court denied the petitions, explaining that there is a possibility of deception in the use
of a deceased partner's name. 47 Also, Article 1815 of the Civil Code 48 shows that the
partners in a partnership should be "living persons who can be subjected to liability."
49 Further, the use of a deceased partner's name is not a custom in the Philippines. 50
On the contrary, the local custom shows that the firm name usually identifies the
senior members or partners of a law firm. 51 Justice Aquino dissented, stating that:
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition
that it be indicated in the letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that
Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the
period when they served as partners should be stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the
names of their deceased founders is to retain the clients who had customarily
sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from
the goodwill attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law
practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was
followed before the war by the law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the
death of Judge Ross, the founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph
and Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an indication of
the year when he died. No one complained that the retention of the name of
Judge Ross in the fine name was illegal or unethical. 52
The use of a deceased partner's name in a law firm's name was allowed upon
the effectivity of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with the requirement that
"the firm indicates in all its communications that said partner is deceased." 53
On the other hand, this court has ruled that the use of the name of a person who
is not authorized to practice law constitutes contempt of court.
In San Luis v. Pineda, this court has held that "[n]eedless to say, [the] practice
of law by one who is disbarred constitutes contempt of court." 54 United States v. Ney,
et al. involved J. Garcia Bosque who was denied admission to the bar because he
chose to remain a Spanish subject during the cession of the Philippines under the
Treaty of Paris. 55 Bosque entered into an arrangement with Ney, a practicing
attorney, and established "Ney & Bosque." 56 Bosque did not personally appear in
courts but the papers of their office were signed "Ney and Bosque-C.W. Ney,
Abogado." 57 The matter was referred to the then Attorney-General, and contempt
proceedings were instituted 58 At that time, Section 232 of the Code of Civil
Procedure defined contempt of court as:
1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order,
judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge;
ATICcS

2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his

official duties or in his official transactions. 59
This court found that Atty. Ney was in contempt of court and held that:
Under the second subdivision of [Section 232], Bosque is obviously
not answerable, inasmuch as he was not an officer of the court. On the other
hand, under this subdivision, the defendant Ney, as an admitted attorney, is
liable if his conduct amounted to misbehavior. We are of the opinion that it
did. In the offense of Bosque in holding himself out as a general practitioner
Ney participated, and for the improper signature of the pleadings he was
chiefly and personally responsible. 60
In Cambaliza v. Atty. Cristal-Tenorio, 61 Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio used
a letterhead indicating that Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr. was a senior partner in the Cristal-
Tenorio Law Office when, in fact, he was not a lawyer. 62 This court held that:
A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent
himself as a lawyer and to practice law is guilty of violating
Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which read as follows:
Canon 9 — A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly
assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
Rule 9.01 — A lawyer shall not delegate to any
unqualified person the performance of any task which by law
may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good
standing.
The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding
oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of
livelihood or in consideration of his services. Holding one's self out as a
lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose like identifying
oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or
associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of law.
Such acts constitute unauthorized practice of law.
xxx xxx xxx
 The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public
policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found
duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on
the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he
fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The
purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the
incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to
see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession
enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid
of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency,
personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject
to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law." 63
(Citations omitted)
From the time respondent Revilla was disbarred in 2009, it appears that no
efforts were exerted to remove his name from the firm name. Thus, respondents Atty.
Young and Atty. Magat are held liable for contempt of court.
Rule 71, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the
imposable penalties for indirect contempt:
SEC. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. — If the respondent is
adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial
Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a fine
not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
months, or both. If he is adjudged guilty of contempt committed against a
lower court, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos
or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) month, or both. If the contempt
consists in the violation of a writ of injunction, temporary restraining order or
status quo order, he may also be ordered to make complete restitution to the
party injured by such violation of the property involved or such amount as
may be alleged and proved.
The writ of execution, as in ordinary civil actions, shall issue for the
enforcement of a judgment imposing a fine unless the court otherwise
provides. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of Rule 71, Section 7, a fine of P30,000.00 each is imposed on
respondents Atty. Young and Atty. Magat.
IV
Respondent Atty. Gambol filed a separate Comment, explaining that he
dropped respondent Revilla's name from the firm name in the pleadings that he filed
in several courts. Respondent Atty. Gambol's explanation is supported by the
allegations in the Comment filed by respondents Atty. Young and Atty. Magat stating:
 In fact, when co-Private Respondent Gambol, initially cowed perhaps, by the
same intimidation worked upon him by the Complainants' counsel in another
case, asked permission to delete [Anastacio E. Revilla's] name in the Young
Law Firm's name in the pleadings that he (i.e. Private Respondent Gambol)
would subsequently file, Respondent Young allowed him to do so. 64
This court recognizes respondent Atty. Gambol's effort to avoid misleading the
public by removing respondent Revilla's name in the pleadings he filed. Thus, the
Complaint against him is dismissed.
Petitioners included Revilla as a respondent, but they did not serve copies of
the Petition and subsequent pleadings upon him. Respondent Revilla also did not
receive a copy of this court's Resolution requiring respondents to comment. Thus, this
court shall refrain from ruling upon respondent Revilla's liability. TIADCc

V
With regard to respondent Judge Calo, petitioners pray that she be cited in
contempt for allowing respondent Atty. Young's appearance as long as it was under
the Young Law Firm. A photocopy of the Order 65 was attached to the Petition. A
portion of Judge Calo's Order states:
Although this court grants the appearance of Atty. Walter Young for
the Liquidator, his appearance however shall be allowed only if in the name of
the Young Law Firm, managed by the said counsel, and not under the name of
the Law Firm of Young Revilla Gambol and Magat. This is to avoid any
misconception that a disbarred lawyer, Revilla, continues to practice law. 66
Petitioners argue that respondent Judge Calo's Order is an indirect violation of
"the proscription against the participation of . . . disbarred lawyer[s]" 67 in court.
Further, the Young Law Firm does not exist. 68
Respondent Judge Calo was required to file a Comment on the Resolution 69
dated February 24, 2014, but she did not comply.
From petitioners' allegations, it appears that respondent Judge Calo committed
an error in judgment when she allowed respondent Atty. Young's appearance under
the Young Law Firm. However, this Petition to cite respondent Judge Calo in
contempt is not the proper remedy. Maylas, Jr. v. Judge Sese 70 discussed the
remedies available to litigants as follows:
[T]he law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities
being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The
ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as
normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in
construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle)
include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final
order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against
error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e.,
whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are
 inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a
motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.
Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary
proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or
suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or
extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as
the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are
prerequisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges
concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after
the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals
have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or
administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed. 71 (Citation
omitted)
Whether petitioners availed themselves of judicial remedies was not stated in
their Petition. Nevertheless, this court cannot ignore the possible effect of respondent
Judge Calo's Order. Thus, the Complaint against respondent Judge Calo shall be re-
docketed as an administrative matter. Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
SECTION 11. . . . The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to
discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted thereon.
Also, Rule 4, Section 3(a) of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court 72
provides that the administrative functions of this court include "disciplinary and
administrative matters involving justices, judges, and court personnel[.]"
VI
As to the allegation of forum shopping, petitioners do not deny that they filed a
Complaint for disbarment. They argue, however, that they did not mention the
disbarment proceedings against respondents in view of Rule 139-B, Section 18 of the
Rules of Court, which states that disbarment proceedings are private and confidential.
73 In addition, a Petition for contempt under Rule 71 and a Complaint for disbarment
are different from each other.
The filing of a Complaint for disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the filing of this Petition for contempt under Rule 71 do not constitute
forum shopping. Forum shopping has been defined as:
when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely
by some other court. 74
The elements of forum shopping are:
 (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in
both actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts; and
(c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. 75
This court has explained that disbarment proceedings are sui generis, and are
not akin to civil or criminal cases. 76 A disbarment proceeding "is intended to cleanse
the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the
public and the courts." 77 AIDSTE

Also, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' findings are recommendatory, and
the power to sanction erring members of the bar lies with this court. 78
As discussed by this court in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan: 79
The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is broader
[than] the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be committed
both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where
the contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes
professional misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the
Supreme Court. Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme
Court's disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not
the misconduct with which the respondent is charged also constitutes
contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt of court does not
exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. The
disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to
the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyers [sic] is not
merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called
upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving
disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct,
pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes both
professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against
him and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.
80 (Citations omitted)

WHEREFORE, respondents Atty. Walter T. Young and Atty. Dan Reynald R.

Magat are found in contempt of court for using a disbarred lawyer's name in their firm
name and are meted a fine of P30,000.00 each.
The Complaint against Atty. Jovito Gambol is DISMISSED. This is without
prejudice to any disciplinary liabilities of respondents Atty. Walter T. Young, Atty.
Dan Reynald R. Magat, and Judge Ofelia L. Calo.
The counsels are ordered to make the necessary amendments in relation to the
use of the disbarred lawyer's name including changes in their signage, notice of
 appearances, stationeries, and like material within a period of five (5) days from
receipt.
The Complaint against respondent Judge Ofelia L. Calo is also ordered re-
docketed as an administrative matter.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to
be appended to private respondents' personal records as attorneys, to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and to the Office of the Court Administrator for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
||| (Yu Kimteng v. Young, G.R. No. 210554, [August 5, 2015])

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 10557. July 10, 2018.]

(Formerly CBD Case No. 07-1962)

JERRY M. PALENCIA, complainant, vs. Atty. PEDRO L.

LINSANGAN, Atty. GERARD M. LINSANGAN, and Atty.
GLENDA M. LINSANGAN-BINOYA, respondents.

DECISION

PER CURIAM : p

Before us is a complaint 1 filed by Jerry M. Palencia (complainant) against

Attorneys (Attys.) Pedro L. Linsangan, Gerard M. Linsangan 2 and Glenda
Linsangan-Binoya (respondents) for disciplinary action.
Complainant was an overseas Filipino worker seafarer who was seriously
injured during work when he fell into the elevator shaft of the vessel M/T "Panos G"
flying a Cyprus flag. 3 After initial treatment in Singapore, complainant was
discharged and flown to the Philippines to continue his medical treatment and
rehabilitation. While confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital, one "Moises," and later
Jesherel L. Millena (Jesherel), paralegals in respondents' law office, approached
complainant. They convinced him to engage the services of respondents' law office in
order to file a suit against his employers for indemnity. 4 After several visits from the
paralegals and respondent Atty. Pedro Linsangan, complainant executed (1) an
Attorney-Client Contract, 5 and (2) a Special Power of Attorney, 6 where he engaged
the legal services of respondents and Gurbani & Co., a law firm based in Singapore,
and agreed to pay attorney's fees of 35% of any recovery or settlement obtained for
both.
After execution of the contract, complainant, through the efforts of
respondents, was paid by his employer the following amounts: US$60,000.00 as
indemnity and US$20,000.00 under their collective bargaining agreement. From these
amounts, respondents charged complainant attorney's fees of 35%. 7
Respondents and Gurbani & Co. also filed a tort case against the owners of
"Panos G" before the High Court of Singapore (Singapore case). For this case,
respondents engaged the services of Papadopoulos, Lycourgos & Co., a law firm
based in Cyprus, to draft a written opinion on the issues involving Cyprus law, among
others. 8 They also engaged the services of retired Justice Emilio Gancayco (Justice
Gancayco) for his expert opinion regarding various issues raised by defendant's
lawyer and representatives. 9 Thereafter, negotiations led to a settlement award in
favor of complainant in the amount of US$95,000.00. Gurbani & Co. remitted to
respondents the amount of US$59,608.40. 10 From this amount, respondents
deducted: (1) US$5,000.00 as payment to Justice Gancayco; (2) their attorney's fees
equivalent to 35%; and (3) other expenses, leaving the net amount of US$18,132.43
for complainant. 11CAIHTE

Respondents tendered the amount of US$20,756.05 (representing the

US$18,132.43) to complainant, which the latter refused. 12 As complainant contested
the amount comprised of the expenses and attorney's fees deducted, the following
civil actions ensued between complainant and respondents:
(1) On September 12, 2005, respondents filed an action for preliminary
mandatory injunction (Civil Case No. 05113475) before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila to compel complainant to receive the
amount tendered. 13 This case was dismissed by the RTC, and the
dismissal was eventually upheld by this Court on July 7, 2008. 14
(2) On September 22, 2005, complainant filed with the RTC of Ligao City an
action for accounting, remittance of settlement amounts and damages
(Civil Case No. 2401 or accounting case). 15 On June 16, 2011, the
RTC ruled in favor of complainant and ordered respondents to make
proper accounting, among others. 16 Although the RTC upheld the
stipulated attorney's fees as binding between the parties, it determined
that the fees are lumped for both respondents and Gurbani & Co. 17 On
appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's Decision but reduced the rate of
attorney's fees to 10%. 18 This Court affirmed the CA Decision in our
Resolution dated February 20, 2013 in G.R. No. 205088. An Entry of
Judgment was issued on August 8, 2013.
 On March 28, 2007, complainant also filed the subject letter-complaint 19 with
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). He
requested that an investigation be conducted and the corresponding disciplinary action
be imposed upon respondents for committing the following unethical acts: (1)
refusing to remit the amount collected in the Singapore case worth US$95,000.00, and
in offering only US$20,756.05; (2) depositing complainant's money into their own
account; and (3) engaging in "ambulance chasing" by deploying their agents to
convince complainant to hire respondents' services while the former was still
bedridden in the hospital.
In their answer, 20 respondents explained that complainant retained
respondents and Gurbani & Co.'s services in 2004 for purposes of filing a claim
against the ship owner, its agents and principals. This led to the filing of a claim
before the Singapore High Court. They averred that on April 29, 2005, Gurbani & Co.
advised respondents of the settlement of the claim in Singapore for US$95,000.00. 21
On June 20, 2005, respondents sent a letter to complainant informing him that they
already received the settlement amount and requested him to come to the former's
office to get his net share. 22 Complainant went to respondents' law office on June 28,
2005 where respondents tendered to the former his net share of US$20,756.05. 23
However, complainant unjustly refused to accept the amount. Complainant also
refused their tender of payment in their letter dated August 3, 2005. 24 On September
12, 2005, respondents even filed a "consignation case" (Civil Case No. 05113475)
before the RTC of Manila. 25 DETACa

Respondents denied that they deposited the amount to their own account. They
claimed that the amount of US$20,756.05 has been placed for safekeeping in a vault
located inside their office ever since. 26 On May 3, 2007, after their receipt of the
complaint and the IBP-CBD's Order dated April 3, 2007, they decided to deposit the
money with Bank of the Philippine Islands in an interest savings account, in trust for
complainant. 27
As to the allegations of ambulance chasing, respondents averred that they
provide free legal advice to the public. It was in the course of this public service when
they met complainant. 28
After proceedings, the IBP-CBD in its Report and Recommendation 29 ruled
that respondents violated the canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR): (1) in soliciting legal business through their agents while complainant was in
the hospital; (2) in failing to account for, and deliver the funds and property of his
client when due or upon demand; and (3) in hiring the services of a foreign law firm
and another lawyer without prior knowledge and consent of complainant of the fees
and expenses to be incurred. 30 The IBP-CBD found that all three respondents
connived and thus recommended that all respondents be suspended from the practice
of law for a period of one year. It also directed respondents to comply with the
Decision in the accounting case (Civil Case No. 2401) in favor of complainant. 31
 The IBP Board of Governors adopted the Report and Recommendation. 32
After respondents' motion for reconsideration 33 and complainant's opposition 34
thereto, the IBP Board of Governors modified the penalty and increased respondents'
suspension from the practice of law to two years with warning, and ordered
respondents to return the 5% of the amount assessed to complainant as attorney's fees.
35
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondents
Attys. Pedro L. Linsangan and, Gerard M. Linsangan. We, however, absolve
respondent Atty. Glenda M. Linsangan-Binoya for lack of any evidence as to her
participation in the acts complained of.

The practice of law is a profession and not a business. 36 Lawyers are

reminded to avoid at all times any act that would tend to lessen the confidence of the
public in the legal profession as a noble calling, including, among others, the manner
by which he makes known his legal services.
A lawyer in making known his legal services must do so in a dignified manner.
37 They are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers. 38 The CPR explicitly states that "[a] lawyer shall
not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business." 39
Corollary to this duty is for lawyers not to encourage any suit or proceeding for any
corrupt motive or interest. 40 Thus, "ambulance chasing," or the solicitation of almost
any kind of business by an attorney, personally or through an agent, in order to gain
employment, is proscribed. 41
Here, there is sufficient evidence to show that respondents violated these rules.
No less than their former paralegal Jesherel admitted that respondent Atty. Pedro
Linsangan came with her and another paralegal named Moises, to Manila Doctors
Hospital several times to convince complainant to hire their services. 42 This is a far
cry from respondents' claim that they were merely providing free legal advice to the
public. Moreover, while respondents deny Jesherel's connection with their law firm,
this was sufficiently rebutted by complainant when he presented Jesherel's resignation
letter as received by respondents' firm. 43 In employing paralegals to encourage
complainant to file a lawsuit against his employers, respondents indirectly solicited
legal business and encouraged the filing of suit. These constitute malpractice 44 which
calls for the exercise of the court's disciplinary powers and warrants serious sanctions.
45 aDSIHc

II
 The relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary. 46 This
relationship holds a lawyer to a great degree of fidelity and good faith especially in
handling money or property of his clients. 47 Thus, Canon 16 and its rules remind a
lawyer to: (1) hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into
his possession; 48 (2) deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand subject to his retaining lien; 49 and (3) account for all money or property
collected or received for or from his client. 50
Money collected by a lawyer on a judgment rendered in favor of his client
constitutes trust funds and must be immediately paid over to the client. 51 As he holds
such funds as agent or trustee, his failure to pay or deliver the same to the client after
demand constitutes conversion. 52 Thus, whenever a lawyer collects money as a result
of a favorable judgment, he must promptly report and account the money collected to
his client. 53
It is the lawyer's duty to give a prompt and accurate account to his client. Upon
the collection or receipt of property or funds for the benefit of the client, his duty is to
notify the client promptly and, absent a contrary understanding, pay or remit the same
to the client, less only proper fees and disbursements, as soon as reasonably possible.
54 He is under absolute duty to give his client a full, detailed, and accurate account of
all money and property which has been received and handled by him, and must justify
all transactions and dealings concerning them. 55 And while he is in possession of the
client's funds, he should not commingle it with his private property or use it for his
personal purposes without his client's consent. 56
Here, respondents claim that they promptly accounted for the total award of
US$95,000.00, and after deducting their fees, tendered the amount of US$20,756.05.
Complainant, however, refused to accept the amount because he contested both the
expenses and the separate deduction of attorney's fees by respondents and Gurbani &
Co.
We find that while respondents gave prompt notice to complainant of their
receipt of money collected in the latter's favor, they were amiss in their duties to give
accurate accounting of the amounts due to complainant, and to return the money due
to client upon demand.
The Attorney-Client Contract between the parties states: "We/I hereby
voluntarily agree and bind ourselves, our heirs and assigns to pay Atty. Pedro L.
Linsangan and his collaborating Singapore counsels, the sum equivalent to thirty-five
[35%] percent of any recovery or settlement obtained." 57 Clearly, the stipulated rate
referred to the combined professional fees of both respondents and their collaborating
Singapore counsel, Gurbani & Co. 58 Nevertheless, respondents proceeded to deduct
separate fees on top of the amount already deducted by Gurbani & Co. Complainant
contested this deduction and refused to accept the amount being tendered by
respondents. Since a claim for attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very action
in which the services of a lawyer had been rendered, or in a separate action, 59
respondents, instead of forcibly deducting their share, should have moved for the
judicial determination and collection of their attorney's fees. The fact alone that a
lawyer has a lien for his attorney's fees on money in his hands collected for his client
does not entitle him to unilaterally appropriate his client's money for himself. 60 ETHIDa

Worse, respondents allegedly kept the money inside the firm's vault for two
years until they were made aware of the disciplinary complaint against them before
the IBP-CBD. However, as noted by the IBP-CBD in its Report and
Recommendation:
[T]he defense of respondents that they kept in their office vault the share of
complainant as computed by them in the amount of US$18,132.43, hence,
they forgot the same and remembered it only when they received the Order of
this Commission for them to file an Answer to complainant's Complaint
[which is more than 2 years] is rather highly incredible considering that it
involves a substantial amount, the series of communications between the
parties, and the Civil cases subsequently filed. 61 (Italics in the original.)
Even if we give credence to this explanation, it is improper for the lawyer to
put his client's funds in his personal safe deposit vault. 62 Funds belonging to the
client should be deposited in a separate trust account in a bank or trust company of
good repute for safekeeping. 63
It is apparent from the foregoing that respondents failed to handle their client's
money with great degree of fidelity. Respondents also showed their lack of good faith
when they appropriated for themselves more than what is allowed under their
contract. They have demonstrated that the payment of their attorney's fees is more
important than their fiduciary and faithful duty of accounting and returning what is
rightfully due to their client. More, they also failed to observe proper safekeeping of
their client's money. Respondents violated the trust reposed in them, and
demonstrated their lack of integrity and moral soundness. 64 Respondents' flagrant
and malicious refusal to comply with the CPR amounts to gross misconduct. 65 This
warrants the imposition of disciplinary sanctions. 66

III

The practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of

which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral character.
67 Thus, the violation of the lawyer's oath and/or breach of the ethics of the legal
profession embodied in the CPR may, depending on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts, result in the suspension or disbarment of a
member of the Bar. 68
While we find respondents Attys. Pedro Linsangan and Gerard Linsangan to
have violated Rule 1.03, Rule 2.03, Canon 3, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, and Rule 16.03
of the CPR, the records do not support respondent Atty. Glenda Linsangan-Binoya's
participation in their unethical activities. Complainant himself admits that he only
dealt with respondents Attys. Pedro and Gerard Linsangan. 69 Thus, we hold that the
case against Atty. Glenda Linsangan-Binoya be dismissed.
For his violation of the proscription on ambulance chasing, we have previously
imposed the penalty of suspension of one year. 70 We find no reason not to impose
the same penalty here.
On the other hand, the penalty for violation of Canon 16 of the CPR usually
ranges from suspension for six months, to suspension for one year, or two years, and
even disbarment depending on the amount involved and the severity of the lawyer's
misconduct. 71 In addition, the penalty for gross misconduct consisting in the failure
or refusal, despite demand, of a lawyer to account for and to return money or property
belonging to a client has been suspension from the practice of law for two years. 72
Complainant, who was impaired for life, was constrained to file this complaint and
the action for accounting because of his lawyers' lack of fidelity and good faith in
handling the award he received. We recognize, however, respondents' efforts in
tendering payment, albeit of an improper amount, to complainant, as well as the fact
that this is their first offense. The imposition of a one year suspension is sufficient
under the circumstances. 73 cSEDTC

This penalty of one year suspension for the second infraction is justified, and
does not deserve a further reduction. The fact that it is respondents' first
administrative case cannot serve to mitigate the penalty. In Cerdan v. Gomez, 74
respondent there was still suspended for a period of one year, after already taking into
account that it was his first offense. More, there are several decisions which support
the imposition of the one year suspension for similar violations. 75 In Viray v.
Sanicas, 76 the court imposed a one year penalty for the same infraction even after
exercising its "compassionate judicial discretion." 77
More importantly, respondents' acts do not merely constitute a violation of
Canon 16 and its rules, but already amounts to gross misconduct. 78 First,
respondents breached the trust reposed in them when they betrayed the express
language of their Attorney-Client Contract that they are only entitled to a single 35%
attorney's fees together with the Singapore counsels. In the process, respondents have
also unjustly retained for themselves the 35% of the settlement award amounting to
US$95,000.00 — which is more or less US$33,250.00 or roughly around P1.5 million
pocketed, and also immensely disparaging to the US$20,756.05 they tendered to
complainant. Second, their actions following complainant's objection manifests their
disregard of their fiduciary duties. For two years, respondents insisted on, and forcibly
deducted the amount when there are alternative avenues to determine the correct
amount of attorney's fees. They instead treaded to a path where they advanced their
own interests ahead of their client's. Third, respondents also mishandled their client's
money when they did not exercise proper safekeeping over it; they failed to deposit it
in a separate trust account in a bank or trust company of good repute for safekeeping
but co-mingled it with their own funds. Undoubtedly, the gravity of these acts
amounts to gross misconduct that warrants, at the very least, a suspension. 79
For both violations, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors of the imposition of two-year suspension for respondents Attys. Pedro L.
Linsangan and Gerard M. Linsangan. We emphasize that this penalty of two years of
suspension corresponds to the compounded infractions of the violations of Rule 1.03,
Rule 2.03, Canon 3, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, and Rule 16.03 of the CPR: (1) the
penalty of suspension of one year is imposed for the violation of the proscription on
ambulance chasing; and (2) the penalty of one year suspension for gross misconduct
consisting in the failure or refusal, despite demand, of a lawyer to account for and to
return money or property belonging to a client.
To reiterate, there is no basis, and would even be unjust under the
circumstances, to reduce the penalty imposed on respondents. Quite the contrary,
respondents should find themselves so fortunate that for all their exploits, including
their ambulance chasing, this Court would only impose a two-year suspension.
Finally, we note that this Court, in G.R. No. 205088, has already affirmed the
CA's ruling as to the issue of how much respondents can collect from complainant as
attorney's fees. This judgment has long attained finality and, in fact, appears to be set
for execution. For this reason, we do not adopt the IBP Board of Governors'
recommendation for respondents to return to complainant 5% of the amount assessed.
The principle of immutability of judgments behooves us from making any further
statements on this particular issue.SDAaTC

WHEREFORE, we find respondents Attys. Pedro L. Linsangan and Gerard

M. Linsangan GUILTY. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondents Attys. Pedro
Linsangan and Gerard Linsangan from the practice of law for TWO YEARS
effective upon finality of this Decision, with a WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. The complaint
against Atty. Glenda M. Linsangan-Binoya is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, * Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Perlas-Bernabe, Jardeleza, Caguioa, Martires, Tijam, Reyes, Jr. and Gesmundo, JJ.,
concur.
Leonen, J., ** is on official business.
Separate Opinions
VELASCO, JR., J., dissenting:

I dissent on the penalty imposed upon respondents Atty. Pedro L. Linsangan

and Atty. Gerard M. Linsangan as I am of the view that a two (2)-year suspension
from the practice of law is too harsh under the circumstances of the case.
 In the Attorney-Client Contract 1 executed by the parties, complainant agreed
to pay the respondents' firm and its collaborating Singapore counsels, Gurbani & Co.,
attorney's fees equivalent to thirty-five percent (35%) of any recovery or settlement
obtained. A case was thereafter filed before the High Court of Singapore wherein the
total amount of US$95,616.90 was awarded to complainant. From the said amount,
Gurbani & Co. deducted US$27,587.67 covering their fees and expenses,
US$8,398.33 that they paid to Papadopoulos, Lycourgos & Co., and remitted to
respondents the net amount of US$59,608.40. 2
Thereafter, respondents promptly informed complainant that they have
received the settlement amount from the Singapore case and requested the former to
come to their office to get his net share. When complainant went to respondents'
office, Atty. Pedro L. Linsangan explained to him the fees and expenses deducted by
Gurbani & Co, thus leaving the balance of US$59,608.40 remitted to them. Atty.
Pedro L. Linsangan further explained that after deducting their attorney's fees and
expenses from US$59,608.40, complainant's net share amounted to US$18,132.43. 3
Atty. Pedro L. Linsangan then tendered the total amount of US$20,756.05 4
(including the US$18,132.43) to complainant, which the latter refused as he contested
the fees and expenses deducted by Gurbani & Co. and respondents.
Through a letter dated August 3, 2005, respondents, again, asked complainant
to come to their office to receive the amount of US$20,756.05 within ten (10) days
from receipt; otherwise, respondents will file an action for consignation. 5 However,
as complainant found the amount being tendered by respondents erroneous and
unacceptable, civil actions ensued between the parties. Thus, complainant filed an
action for Accounting, Remittance of Settlement Amounts and Damages (Civil Case
No. 10678) while respondents filed a complaint for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
to compel complainant to receive the said amount offered. Respondents' case was
dismissed with finality while the trial court ruled in favor of complainant and ordered
respondents to make proper accounting, among others. The CA affirmed the trial
court's ruling but reduced the rate of attorney's fees to 10%. 6 The said ruling had also
attained finality and has been set for execution. 7acEHCD

Based on the foregoing facts, it cannot be denied that respondents gave prompt
notice to complainant of the receipt of money collected in the latter's favor. It is also
clear that respondents made several attempts to immediately pay complainant after
deducting what they believe is the correct amount due them as attorney's fees and
disbursements.
What respondents failed to do, however, is to promptly provide complainant
with a detailed and accurate accounting of the fees and expenses incurred in pursuing
the Singapore case. Nonetheless, I am of the view that such indiscretion did not
equate to a gross violation of Canons 16 8 and 17 9 of the CPR.
Gross violation connotes a flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply 10 with
a certain set of rules, in this case the CPR. To exemplify, in Del Mundo v. Capistrano,
11 despite collecting several fees from his client, respondent lawyer Atty. Capistrano
neglected to inform the former of the status of her case and to file the agreed petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage. Worse, Atty. Capistrano failed to account for
and return the funds entrusted to him. Thus, the Court ruled that the conversion of
funds entrusted to Atty. Capistrano constitutes gross violation of professional ethics
and betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Yet, he was meted a penalty
of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year only.
In Egger v. Duran, 12 respondent lawyer Atty. Duran breached his duty when
he failed to prepare, much less file, the appropriate pleading to initiate therein
complainant's case before the proper court. He also did not return complainant's
money despite demand and earlier promise to do so. Further, Atty. Duran exhibited a
patent lack of respect for the Commission and its proceedings through his repeated
and deliberate failure to appear in the scheduled hearings in an attempt to wiggle
away from having to explain and ventilate his side. Worse, he did not file an answer
to controvert the allegations in the complaint. As such, Atty. Duran is found guilty of
violating Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR.
Despite the foregoing violations, however, the penalty imposed upon him was
suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months only.
Clearly, the foregoing cases illustrate a wrongful intention on the part of the
erring lawyers therein. Their acts were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate
the law, or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. 13 Nevertheless, the
respective penalties imposed upon the erring lawyers therein were lighter than the
two-year (2-year) suspension imposed by the ponencia in the instant case.
In this case, respondents did not demonstrate the same callous and disdainful
disregard of the law. They showed fidelity to complainant's cause by pursuing his
claims against his employers which resulted in a successful settlement. Thereafter,
respondents promptly notified complainant of their receipt of the settlement amount
and attempted to deliver the net proceeds due to complainant. Respondents'
indiscretion lies in their erroneous computation and application of attorney's fees
which they already rectified by filing their Compliance 14 with the trial court's order
for accounting and submission of receipts in connection with the final decision in
Civil Case No. 10678. Given these circumstances, I believe that respondents are
entitled to some measure of forbearance.
As for their alleged violation of Canon 2 15 of the CPR, the facts of the case
indicate a strong possibility that respondents committed ambulance chasing by
soliciting legal business through agents. At any rate, considering that this is
respondents' first administrative case and they fully participated in the proceedings
before the IBP, I find the penalty of two-year (2-year) suspension too harsh.
Accordingly, I urge the Court to show compassion to respondents in light of the
mitigating circumstances above pointed out. SDHTEC
 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, for committing infractions and
professional misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, I vote
to impose upon respondents Atty. Pedro L. Linsangan and Atty. Gerard M. Linsangan
the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6)
MONTHS with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.
 
Footnotes
||| (Palencia v. Linsangan, A.C. No. 10557, [July 10, 2018])

FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 10465. June 8, 2016.]

SPOUSES LAMBERTO V. EUSTAQUIO AND GLORIA J.

EUSTAQUIO, complainants, vs. ATTY. EDGAR R. NAVALES,
respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p

For the Court's resolution is a Complaint 1 dated January 16, 2010 filed by
complainants spouses Lamberto V. Eustaquio and Gloria J. Eustaquio (complainants)
against respondent Atty. Edgar R. Navales (respondent), praying that respondent be
meted the appropriate disciplinary sanction/s for failing to pay rent and to vacate the
apartment he is leasing despite demands.
The Facts
Complainants alleged that they are the owners of an apartment located at 4-D
Cavite St., Barangay Paltok, SFDM, Quezon City, which they leased to respondent
under a Contract of Lease 2 dated April 16, 2005. However, respondent violated the
terms and conditions of the aforesaid contract when he failed to pay monthly rentals
in the aggregate amount of P139,000.00 and to vacate the leased premises despite
repeated oral and written demands. 3 This prompted complainants to refer the matter
to barangay conciliation, where the parties agreed on an amicable settlement, whereby
respondent promised to pay complainants the amount of P131,000.00 on July 16,
2009 and to vacate the leased premises on July 31, 2009. Respondent eventually
reneged on his obligations under the settlement agreement, constraining complainants
to file an ejectment case 4 against him before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 40 (MeTC-Br. 40), docketed as Civil Case No. 09-39689.
Further, complainants filed the instant case before the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), contending that respondent miserably
failed to exemplify honesty, integrity, and respect for the laws when he failed and
refused to fulfil his obligations to complainants. 5
Despite notices, 6 respondent failed to file his Answer, to appear in the
mandatory conference, and to file his position paper.
Meanwhile, the MeTC-Br. 40 promulgated a Decision 7 dated December 8,
2009 in the ejectment case in favor of the complainants and, accordingly, ordered
respondent to vacate the leased premises and to pay complainants the following
amounts: (a) P139,000.00 representing unpaid rentals as of July 2009; (b) further
rental payments of P8,000.00 per month starting August 17, 2009 until the actual
surrender of said premises to complainants; (c) attorney's fees in the amount of
P20,000.00; and (d) cost of suit. 8
During the pendency of the case, respondent was appointed as an Assistant
City Public Prosecutor of Quezon City. 9
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation 10 dated February 8, 2011, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable and,
accordingly, recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a stern warning that a repetition of
the same shall be dealt with more severely. 11 It was found that respondent displayed
unwarranted obstinacy in evading payment of his debts, as highlighted by his
numerous promises to pay which he eventually reneged on. In this light, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondent violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and, thus, should be held
administratively liable. 12
In a Resolution 13 dated September 28, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the aforesaid report and recommendation. Thereafter, the Court
issued a Resolution 14 dated September 15, 2014 adopting and approving the findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations of the IBP and, accordingly, meted
respondent the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more
severely.
As per Registry Return Card No. 957, 15 respondent received the Court's order
of suspension on October 16, 2014. 16 Records are bereft of any showing that
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and, thus, the Court's order of
suspension against him became final and executory.
Events Following the Finality of Respondent's Suspension
 On September 7, 2015 and upon request from the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), a Certification 17 was issued by the MeTC of Quezon City,
Branch 38 (MeTC-Br. 38) stating that respondent has been appearing before it as an
Assistant City Prosecutor since September 2014 up to the present. In connection with
this, the MeTC-Br. 38 wrote a letter 18 dated September 8, 2015 to the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC), inquiring about the details of respondent's suspension from the
practice of law. In view of the foregoing, the OCA indorsed the matter to the OBC for
appropriate action. 19
Despite due notice from the Court, 20 respondent failed to file his comment to
the aforementioned Certification issued by MeTC-Br. 38.
The OBC's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation 21 dated February 10, 2016, the OBC
recommended that respondent be further suspended from the practice of law and from
holding the position of Assistant City Prosecutor for a period of six (6) months, thus,
increasing his total suspension period to one (1) year, effective immediately. 22 It
found that since respondent received the order of suspension against him on October
16, 2014 and did not move for its reconsideration, such order attained finality after the
lapse of 15 days therefrom. As such, he should have already served his suspension. In
this relation, the OBC ratiocinated that since respondent was holding a position which
requires him to use and apply his knowledge in legal matters and practice of law, i.e.,
Assistant City Prosecutor, he should have ceased and desisted from acting as such.
However, as per the Certification dated September 7, 2015 of the MeTC-Br. 38,
respondent never complied with his order of suspension. In view thereof, the OBC
recommended to increase respondent's suspension from the practice of law and from
holding the position of Assistant City Prosecutor for an additional period of six (6)
months. 23
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue presented for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent
should be held administratively liable.
The Court's Ruling
After due consideration, the Court sustains the findings and recommendation of
the OBC and adopts the same in its entirety.
It is settled that the Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice
of law. As such, when the Court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law,
he must desist from performing all functions requiring the application of legal
knowledge within the period of suspension. This includes desisting from holding a
position in government requiring the authority to practice law. 24 The practice of law
embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. It includes performing acts which are
characteristic of the legal profession, or rendering any kind of service which requires
the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. 25
In the instant case, the OBC correctly pointed out that the Court's Resolution 26
dated September 15, 2014 suspending respondent from the practice of law for a period
of six (6) months became final and executory fifteen (15) days after respondent
received a copy of the same on October 16, 2014. Thus, respondent should have
already commenced serving his six (6)-month suspension. However, respondent never
heeded the suspension order against him as he continued discharging his functions as
an Assistant City Prosecutor for Quezon City, as evidenced by the Certification 27
issued by MeTC-Br. 38 stating that respondent has been appearing before it as an
Assistant City Prosecutor since September 2014 up to the present.
Section 9 of Republic Act No. (RA) 10071, 28 otherwise known as the
"Prosecution Service Act of 2010," provides the powers and functions of prosecutors,
to wit:
Section 9. Powers and Functions of the Provincial Prosecutor or City
Prosecutor. — The provincial prosecutor or the city prosecutor shall:
(a) Be the law officer of the province of the city officer, as the
case may be;
(b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of
crimes, misdemeanors and violations of penal laws and
ordinances within their respective jurisdictions, and have the
necessary information or complaint prepared or made and filed
against the persons accused. In the conduct of such
investigations he/she or any of his/her assistants shall receive
the statements under oath or take oral evidence of witnesses,
and for this purpose may by subpoena summon witnesses to
appear and testify under oath before him/her, and the
attendance or evidence of an absent or recalcitrant witness may
be enforced by application to any trial court; and
(c) Have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors
and violations of city or municipal ordinances in the courts at
the province or city and therein discharge all the duties incident
to the institution of criminal actions, subject to the provisions
of the second paragraph of Section 5 hereof.
Verily, a plain reading of the foregoing provision evidently shows that the
government office of Assistant City Prosecutor requires its holder to be authorized to
practice law. Hence, respondent's continuous discharge of his functions as such
constitutes practice of law and, thus, a clear defiance of the Court's order of
suspension against him.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any
lawful order of a superior court and wilfully appearing as an attorney without
authority to do so — acts which respondent is guilty of in this case — are grounds for
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law, to wit:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;
grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent, the Court, in Lingan v.
Calubaquib, 29 Feliciano v. Bautista-Lozada, 30 and Ibana-Andrade v. Paita-Moya, 31
consistently imposed an additional six (6)-month suspension from the practice of law
to erring lawyers who practiced law despite being earlier suspended. Under the
foregoing circumstances, the Court deems it proper to mete the same penalty to
respondent in addition to the earlier six (6)-month suspension already imposed on
him, as recommended by the OBC. Thus, respondent's total period of suspension from
the practice of law — and necessarily, from the holding the position of Assistant City
Prosecutor as well — should be fixed at one (1) year.
As a final note, it must be stressed that "[d]isbarment of lawyers is a
proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of unworthy members of the bar. It
is intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal profession. While the
Supreme Court has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers through this kind of
proceedings, it does so in the most vigilant manner so as not to frustrate its
preservative principle. The Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, is
inclined to impose a less severe punishment if, through it, the end desire of reforming
the errant lawyer is possible." 32
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edgar R. Navales is found GUILTY of
violating Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, he is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for an additional period of six (6) months
from his original six (6)-month suspension, totalling one (1) year from service of this
Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will
be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies
of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of
Justice, and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them
to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
 SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-de Castro, ** Bersamin and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Sereno, * C.J., is on leave.
||| (Spouses Eustaquio v. Navales, A.C. No. 10465, [June 8, 2016])

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 11754. October 3, 2017.]

JOAQUIN G. BONIFACIO, complainant, vs. ATTY. EDGARDO O.

ERA and ATTY. DIANE KAREN B. BRAGAS, respondents.

DECISION

TIJAM, J : p

This administrative case arose from a verified Affidavit-Complaint 1 filed

before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) by complainant Joaquin G.
Bonifacio (Bonifacio) against respondents Atty. Edgardo O. Era (Atty. Era) and Atty.
Diane Karen B. Bragas (Atty. Bragas) for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).

The Facts

Sometime in 2003, an illegal dismissal case was lodged against Bonifacio and
his company, Solid Engine Rebuilders Corporation entitled Gil Abucejo, Edgar
Besmano, Efren Sager, Darlito Sosa, Gerardo G. Talosa, and Salvador Villanueva v.
Solid Engine Rebuilders Corporation and/or Joaquin G. Bonifacio, docketed as
NLRC NCR Case No. 00-05-05953-03. Complainants therein (Abucejo Group) were
represented by Era and Associates Law Office through Atty. Era. 2
On June 15, 2004, the Labor Arbiter found Bonifacio and the corporation liable
for illegal dismissal and, consequently, ordered them to pay Abucejo Group their
separation pay, full backwages and pro-rated 13th month pay. More specifically,
Bonifacio and his corporation were ordered to pay a partially computed amount of
P674,128 for the separation pay and full backwages, and P16,050.65 for the 13th
month pay. 3 Bonifacio and the corporation brought their case up to the Supreme
Court but they suffered the same fate as their appeals and motions were decided
against them. 4
Thus, on January 26, 2006, a Writ of Execution 5 was issued to implement the
June 15, 2004 Decision. A Notice of Garnishment dated February 6, 2006 was
likewise issued. 6 Two alias writs dated May 8, 2008 7 and April 16, 2013 8 were
later on issued, directing the sheriff to collect the sum of P4,012,166.43, representing
the judgment award plus interest and attorney's fees.
Meanwhile, an administrative complaint was filed against Atty. Era for
representing conflicting interests entitled Ferdinand A. Samson v. Atty. Edgardo O.
Era, docketed as A.C. No. 6664. 9 In a July 16, 2013 Decision, this Court found Atty.
Era guilty of the charge and imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for two years, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES Atty.
EDGARDO O. ERA guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, and Canon
17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the
practice of law for two years effective upon his receipt of this decision, with a
warning that his commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this decision be included in the personal record of Atty.
EDGARDO O. ERA and entered m [sic] his file in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower courts by the
Office of the Court Administrator, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for its guidance.
SO ORDERED. 10
On November 28, 2013, the scheduled public auction over Bonifacio's and/or
the corporation's properties in the business establishment was conducted to implement
the alias writ. Atty. Era actively participated therein. He attended the public auction
and tendered a bid for his clients who were declared the highest bidders. On the same
day, a certificate of sale was issued, which Atty. Era presented to the corporation's
officers and employees who were there at that time. Armed with such documents,
Atty. Era led the pulling out of the subject properties but eventually stopped to
negotiate with Bonifacio's children for the payment of the judgment award instead of
pulling out the auctioned properties. Atty. Era summoned Bonifacio's children to
continue with the negotiation in his law office. On behalf of his clients, their counter-
offer for the satisfaction of the judgment award went from P6 Million to P9 Million.
11
As the parties were not able to settle, on December 3, 2013, Attys. Era and
Bragas went back to Bonifacio's business establishment together with their clients and
several men, and forced open the establishment to pull out the auctioned properties.
This was evidenced by the videos presented by Bonifacio in the instant administrative
complaint. 12
This prompted Bonifacio to file a criminal complaint for malicious mischief,
robbery, and trespassing with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasay City. In its
Resolution 13 dated March 31, 2014, the Office of the City Prosecutor found probable
cause to indict Attys. Era and Bragas for grave coercion. 14
Meanwhile, Atty. Era's name remains to appear in pleadings filed before the
NLRC and this Court sometime in February and April, 2014 with regard to the subject
labor case. 15
On August 8, 2014, Bonifacio filed the instant administrative complaint. 16
In their Answer, 17 Attys. Era and Bragas alleged that Bonifacio has no
personal knowledge as to what transpired on November 28, 2013 and December 3,
2013 as the latter was not present therein at that time. 18 Hence, his allegations of
force, threat, and intimidation in the execution of the judgment is without basis. 19 In
his defense, Atty. Era further argued that he did not violate the Court's order of
suspension from the practice of law as he merely acted as his clients' attorney-in-fact
pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney 20 (SPA) dated May 3, 2006. It is Atty. Era's
theory that with such SPA, he was not engaged in the practice of law in representing
his clients in the implementation of the alias writ. He added that he never signed any
document or pleading on behalf of his clients during his suspension. For Atty. Bragas,
being an associate of Era and Associates Law Firm, she was merely representing the
Abucejo Group as said law firm's clients. Anent the Php6 Million to 9 Million
counter-offer that they made, Attys. Era and Bragas explained that the parties were
still on negotiation, hence, both parties are free to have their own computations, which
they could respectively accept or otherwise. 21
In his Report and Recommendation 22 dated March 17, 2015, Investigating
Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera recommended the dismissal of the instant
administrative complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
The Investigating Commissioner found nothing wrong with the indication of a
suspended lawyer's name in a pleading considering that the same was not signed by
the latter. There was also no proof that a pleading was prepared by Atty. Era. On the
other hand, there was no impediment against Atty. Bragas to sign the pleadings. There
was also no proof that in doing so, Atty. Bragas was assisting suspended Atty. Era in
filing a pleading. Neither the presence of Atty. Era during the public auction and the
negotiations was an implication or proof that Atty. Era was engaging in the practice of
law during his suspension. According to the Investigating Commissioner, anybody,
not exclusively lawyers, can be present at an auction sale or negotiation.
As to whether Attys. Era and Bragas violated any rules/laws in the
implementation of the judgment by using force, threat, and intimidation, the
Investigating Commissioner noted that complainant contradicted such imputations by
filing the following pleadings, to wit: (1) a Motion to Close and Terminate Case 23
dated December 18, 2013, acknowledging the full satisfaction of the judgment award
and even prayed for Attys. Era and Bragas' clients to take possession of the remaining
machines in his business establishment; (2) a Manifestation 24 dated March 12, 2014,
wherein complainant stated that he has surrendered the vehicles listed in the
certificate of sale; (3) an Omnibus Motion with Entry of Appearance Motion to
Withdraw and Motion to Reiterate Motion to Close and Terminate Case and release of
TRO Bond 25 dated February 4, 2014; (4) A Motion for Consignation with Motion to
Lift Levy 26 dated October 29, 2014; and (5) a Motion to Withdraw Complaint 27
dated December 10, 2013 on the criminal case for Malicious Mischief, Robbery, and
Trespassing against Attys. Era and Bragas. In fine, the Investigating Commissioner
ratiocinated that in acknowledging the satisfaction of the judgment in the labor case
and withdrawing the criminal case that he filed against Attys. Era and Bragas with
regard to the implementation of the said judgment, complainant contradicted and
demolished his own allegation that the satisfaction of the judgment was improperly
and unlawfully implemented. 28
Thus, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the administrative
charges against Attys. Era and Bragas be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. 29
The IBP Board of Governors (Board), in its Resolution No. XXI-2015-270 30
dated April 18, 2015 reversed and set aside the Investigating Commissioner's findings
and conclusions:
RESOLUTION No. XXI-2015-270
CBD Case No. 14-4300
Joaquin G. Bonifacio vs.
Atty. Edgardo O. Era and
Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas
RESOLVED to REVERSE as it is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and
considering Atty. Era's continued engagement in the practice of law during
the period of his suspension by admittedly participating in the negotiation for
the payment of money judgment including pegging of interest he acted as his
clients advocate instead as an agent in view of the presence also of his client
in the negotiation, for holding office and admittedly summoned the
complainant's children to determine the money judgment. Hence, Atty.
Edgardo O. Era is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three
(3) years.
RESOLVED FURTHER, for her assistance in the unauthorized
practice of law of Atty. Edgardo O. Era, Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month.
In its Extended Resolution 31 dated October 17, 2016, the IBP Board of
Governors found Atty. Era's argument that he merely acted pursuant to an SPA given
to him untenable. The Board explained that the invoked SPA gave Atty. Era the
authority to appear and represent the Abucejo Group only on the May 4, 2006 auction
and did not include the November 28, 2013 auction. Also, while he was authorized to
receive payment on behalf of his clients, the SPA specifically stated that said
payments should be made in the form of checks and not machinery or property. Thus,
Atty. Era had no authority under the SPA to represent his clients during the November
28, 2013 auction and to pull out and receive the corporation's machines as payment of
the judgment award. At any rate, according to the Board, Atty. Era's clients relied on
his legal knowledge in having the judgment award satisfied. Clearly, Atty. Era
violated Section 28, 32 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. 33
Corollary to this, the Board also found Atty. Bragas liable for allowing and
assisting Atty. Era to engage in an unauthorized practice of law. The Board concluded
that Atty. Bragas ought to know that Atty. Era's acts during the satisfaction of the
alias writ could be performed only by a member of the bar in good standing. 34
Pursuant to Section 12 (b), 35 Rule 139-B of the Rules, the records of the
instant case were transmitted to this Court.
No motion for reconsideration or petition for review was filed by either party
as of June 29, 2017.
Necessarily, the Court will now proceed to give its final action on the instant
administrative case, the issues being: (1) Did Atty. Era engage in the practice of law
during his suspension therefrom that would warrant another disciplinary action
against him?; and (2) In the affirmative, is Atty. Bragas guilty of directly or indirectly
assisting Atty. Era in his illegal practice of law that would likewise warrant this
Court's exercise of its disciplining authority against her?
We sustain the findings and recommendations of the Board of Governors.

Atty. Era's acts constituted

"practice of law."

On this matter, Our pronouncement in the landmark case of Renato L.

Cayetano v. Christian Monsod, et al. 36 is on point. Thus, We quote herein the
relevant portions of the said Decision, viz.:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge
and the application of legal principles and technique to
serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the
conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to
 clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken
for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney
engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where
he is held out to be an attorney, using a letterhead describing
himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters,
negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and
fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his
associate." (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court.
(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E.
650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
"x x x for valuable consideration engages in the business of
advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their
rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as
an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any
court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity
performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise
stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights under the law,
or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court
or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the
practice of law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and
Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,
(105 Phil. 173, 176-177) stated:
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings
on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken
for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating
an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have
been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and
drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves
the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jur. pp. 262, 263).
xxx xxx xxx
 The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting
orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the
practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public
service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line
of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys
engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he
is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the
statute." (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to
give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires
the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23) 37
(Emphasis supplied)
In Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana v. Atty. Yolando F. Bustamante, 38 We
succinctly ruled that the term practice of law implies customarily or habitually
holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of
livelihood or in consideration of services. Holding one's self out as a lawyer may be
shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such as identifying oneself as an attorney,
appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a
law office for the general practice of law. 39
In this case, it is undisputed that Atty. Era committed the following acts: (1)
appeared on behalf of his winning clients in the public auction of the condemned
properties; (2) tendered bid in the auction for his clients; (3) secured the certificate of
sale and presented the said document to the corporation's officers and employees
present in the premises at that time; (4) insisted that his clients are now the new
owners of the subject properties, hence, should be allowed entry in the premises; (5)
initiated the pull out of the properties; and (6) negotiated with Bonifacio's children in
his law office as regards the payment of the judgment award with interest instead of
pulling out the properties. 40
It is true that being present in an auction sale and negotiating matters relating
to the same may not be exclusively for lawyers, as opined by the Investigating
Commissioner. However, in this case, as aptly put by the Board in its Resolution,
Atty. Era's acts clearly involved the determination by a trained legal mind of the legal
effects and consequences of each course of action in the satisfaction of the judgment
award. 41 Precisely, this is why his clients chose Atty. Era to represent them in the
public auction and in any negotiation/settlement with the corporation arising from the
labor case as stated in the SPA being invoked by Atty. Era. 42 Such trained legal mind
is what his clients were relying upon in seeking redress for their claims. This is
evident from the fact that they agreed not to enter into any amicable settlement
without the prior written consent of Atty. Era, the latter being their lawyer. 43 It could
readily be seen that the said SPA was executed by reason of Atty. Era being their
legal counsel. Thus, We are one with the Board's submission that the said SPA cannot
be invoked to support Atty. Era's claim that he was not engaged in the practice of law
in performing the acts above-cited as such SPA cunningly undermines the suspension
ordered by this Court against Atty. Era, which We cannot countenance.

Atty. Era was engaged in an

unauthorized practice of law during
his suspension

As mentioned, Atty. Era was suspended from the practice of law for a period of
two years in this Court's Decision dated July 16, 2013. He performed the above-cited
acts on the same year, specifically November to December 2013. Indubitably, Atty.
Era was engaged in an unauthorized law practice.
Atty. Era's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful order of this Court,
which under Section 27, 44 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is a sufficient cause for
suspension or disbarment. Further, Atty. Era's intentional maneuver to circumvent the
suspension order not only reflects his insubordination to authority but also his
disrespect to this Court's lawful order which warrants reproach. Members of the bar,
above anyone else, are called upon to obey court orders and processes. 45 Graver
responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the
courts and to show respect to their processes. 46
This case is not novel. We had previously disciplined erring lawyers who
continue in their practice despite being suspended by the Court. In Rodrigo A. Molina
v. Atty. Ceferino R. Magat, 47 this Court suspended Atty. Magat from the practice of
law for practicing his profession despite this Court's previous order of suspension.
Likewise in another case, We suspended a lawyer for continuing in her practice
despite the clear language of this Court's suspension order. 48
In view of the foregoing, We agree with the Board of Governors' Resolution,
finding Atty. Era guilty of willfully disobeying the lawful order of this Court
warranting the exercise of Our disciplining authority. We also adopt the Board's
recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed upon Atty. Era, i.e., three years
suspension from the practice of law, taking into account that this is his second
infraction.

Atty. Bragas is guilty of assisting Atty.

Era in his unauthorized practice of
law and, thus, must likewise be
reproved.
 There is no question that Atty. Bragas has knowledge of Atty. Era's suspension
from the practice of law and yet, she allowed herself to participate in Atty. Era's
unauthorized practice. Clearly, Atty. Bragas violated the CPR, specifically:
CANON 9 — A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.

Indeed, it is a lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law. Such duty is founded upon public interest and policy,
which requires that law practice be limited only to individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. 49

As correctly observed by the Board, Atty. Bragas ought to know that Atty.
Era's acts constitutive of law practice could be performed only by a member of the
Bar in good standing, which Atty. Era was not at that time. Hence, she should have
not participated to such transgression.
Being an associate in Atty. Era's law firm cannot be used to circumvent the
suspension order. The factual circumstances of the case clearly shows that Atty.
Bragas did not act to replace Atty. Era as counsel for his and/or the law firm's clients
during the latter's suspension. Atty. Bragas merely assisted Atty. Era, who admittedly
was the one actively performing all acts pertaining to the labor case he was handling.
Considering the foregoing, We also adopt the Board's recommendation as
regards Atty. Bragas' guilt in the violation of the CPR.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Edgardo O. Era is found
GUILTY of willfully disobeying this Court's lawful order and is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, while Atty.
Diane Karen B. Bragas is likewise found GUILTY of violating CANON 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for one (1) month, effective immediately from receipt of this Decision. Also, both
Attys. Era and Bragas are WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense,
or a commission of another offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of respondents as
members of the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Bersamin,
Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa, Martires, Reyes, Jr. and
Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
||| (Bonifacio v. Era, A.C. No. 11754, [October 3, 2017], 819 PHIL 170-185)
 FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 10267. June 18, 2018.]

HELEN GRADIOLA, * complainant, vs. ATTY. ROMULO A.

DELES, respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J : p

This is a Complaint 1 for disbarment filed by Helen Gradiola (Helen), charging

respondent lawyer Atty. Romulo A. Deles (respondent lawyer) with violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 9.01 and Rule 9.02 of Canon 9;
and Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 thereof. 2
Helen claimed that respondent lawyer was her counsel in a civil case then
pending before the Court of Appeals (CA) docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 63354. 3
Helen asserted that respondent lawyer abetted the unauthorized practice of law when
he assigned or delegated his professional duties as her lawyer to "Atty. Ernesto S.
Araneta" ("Atty. Araneta"). Helen alleged that instead of attending full time to her
case, respondent lawyer allowed "Atty. Araneta" to do the legal research works and
the preparation of various pleadings relative to the civil case.
Moreover, Helen averred that she was assured the case was in "good hands"
because respondent lawyer and "Atty. Araneta" have a "contact" in the CA in Cebu
City. Helen narrated that she was told that the CA in Cebu City had reconsidered its
April 28, 2005 Decision, as she was shown a photocopy of a November 13, 2006
Resolution 4 of the CA in Cebu City which, this time, declared her and her spouse as
the owners of the four lots subject-matter of the said CA-G.R. CV No. 63354. Helen
added that respondent lawyer nonetheless cautioned that their adversaries in the case
had appealed to the Supreme Court, hence they had to prepare their own "position
paper" 5 to support the appeal before this Court. And, that naturally, this would
inevitably entail monetary expenses.
"Atty. Araneta" soon billed Helen for these expenses and issued her all the
receipts 6 for these payments. These receipts all bore the signatures "Atty.
Ernie/Ernesto Araneta." From May 2005 until October 26, 2006, Helen paid this
"Atty. Araneta" a total of P207,500.00. Helen claimed that this "Atty. Araneta" split
the attorney's fees with respondent lawyer.
However, to her chagrin and dismay, Helen discovered that this "Atty.
Araneta" had not only been disbarred from the practice of law; but worse, the
aforementioned November 13, 2006 CA Resolution was a total fabrication, even as
the "position paper" that was supposedly filed with this Court was an utter simulation.
With this discovery, Helen went herself to the CA in Cebu City, and there found out,
as a matter of fact, that she and her husband had lost their case, as shown in a genuine
copy of the February 10, 2006 CA Resolution, 7 which denied their Motion for
Reconsideration, as well as their Supplemental Manifestation in Support of their
Motion for Reconsideration in said CA-G.R. CV No. 63354. And, even more
distressing, the records likewise revealed that this genuine Resolution had become
final and irrevocable, thereby forever foreclosing their right to pursue further reliefs in
the case.
Whereupon, Helen immediately filed with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City
a criminal complaint 8 for estafa through falsification of public document against
respondent lawyer and "Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta." The City Prosecutor of Bacolod
City found Helen's criminal complaint well grounded, and instituted a criminal
information therefor, now pending before Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bacolod City. 9
Helen likewise filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against
respondent lawyer before the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP). This is the case at bench.
The IBP issued its Order 10 directing respondent lawyer to submit his Answer.
In a Manifestation, 11 John P. Deles (John), respondent lawyer's eldest son, informed
the IBP, that about three weeks before receipt of the IBP's Order, his father suffered a
stroke and underwent a brain surgery. John implored the IBP to hold in abeyance this
administrative case until his father is finally able to physically and intelligently file an
Answer to Helen's complaint. John claimed that at that time, his father could hardly
move and could not talk. He submitted pictures of his father and a medical certificate.
Helen, however, asserted that the proceedings could not be indefinitely
suspended considering that respondent lawyer could very well hire his own counsel.
12
John then filed a Supplemental Manifestation 13 informing the IBP that his
father was "in a vegetative state" and committing to update the IBP of his father's
medical condition.
The Investigating Commissioner, however, denied John's request and directed
respondent lawyer to file his Answer. 14
Atty. Carlito V. Mampang Jr. (Atty. Mampang) tendered the required Answer
15 to the administrative complaint, which was signed by John, and not by respondent
lawyer. Atty. Mampang qualified in the Answer that it was his friend John who
secured his services pro bono. The counsel averred, that as of the date of filing the
Answer, respondent lawyer, dependent on his children's help, could not communicate
to explain his side as he remained in a vegetative state, unable to speak, and had lost
his motor skills.
Notably, the Answer filed on respondent lawyer's behalf relied chiefly on (a)
"Atty. Araneta's" counter-affidavit 16 dated August 21, 2008 which the latter
submitted to the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City; and (b) "Atty. Araneta's" letter 17
addressed to Helen's counsel dated June 4, 2008.
The Answer further painted respondent lawyer as a victim too of the chicanery
perpetrated by "Atty. Araneta," and that respondent lawyer was not Helen's counsel of
record; that although respondent lawyer's name appeared in the fictitious pleadings,
the signatures appearing thereon were not by respondent lawyer. To substantiate this
claim, Atty. Mampang submitted for comparison machine or xerox copies of
respondent lawyer's alleged pleadings 18 in some cases whereon he signed as counsel
of record.
Report and Recommendation 19 of the Investigating Commissioner and the Board of
Governors
On February 23, 2010, the Investigating Commissioner, Oliver A. Cachapero,
recommended respondent lawyer's suspension from the practice of law for one year
for violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9, and Rule 10.1 and Rule 10.2 of Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Rejecting the defense that respondent lawyer was in no way at all involved in
CA-G.R. CV No. 63354, the Investigating Commissioner found that Helen had
consistently maintained that she directly employed and dealt solely with respondent
lawyer as her counsel; and that, indeed, the pleadings that Helen submitted in
evidence before the IBP showed that these were signed and subscribed by respondent
lawyer as Helen's counsel.
Furthermore, based on "Atty. Araneta's" counter-affidavit which, among
others, mentioned "Carlo Sanchez" as "contact man" in Cebu City, the Investigating
Commissioner had reasonable grounds to believe that "Atty. Araneta" (as well as
respondent lawyer) was part of a wide-ranging racket that plagued, and even extended
to the CA at Cebu City — a racket which enabled Ernesto (and by extension
respondent lawyer) to bilk and milk unsuspecting litigants of huge sums of money in
exchange for the "successful" follow-up of cases, which in this case, turned out to be
nothing else but a fly-by-night hustle and swindle. The Investigating Commissioner
also gave short shrift to respondent lawyer's claim that Helen in fact knew of "Atty.
Araneta's" scheme, especially of the fact that he had a "contact man" in the CA in
Cebu, and pointed to the fact that Helen had never ever mentioned this "Carlo
Sanchez" in her complaint. The Investigating Commissioner even doubted the
existence of "Carlo Sanchez," and suggested that "Carlo Sanchez" could be a mere
lure or decoy to divert attention away from the committed shenanigans. Thus, the
Investigating Commissioner concluded:
 With the foregoing disquisition, the performance of a series of odious
acts which saw the hapless Complainant being extorted huge amount of
money and the participation of Respondent are all too evident. Respondent's
participation and knowledge of the same in every stage can be traced from his
willfull introduction of Araneta into the defense panel of Complainant. 20
The IBP Board of Governors in Resolution No. XX-2013-511, 21 adopted and
approved the Investigating Commissioner's findings and recommendation.

The Court's Ruling

There seems to be truth that "Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta" was not a lawyer at all
as Helen was made to believe. His name does not appear in the Law List, 22 and there
seems to be truth to the information Helen gathered that this "Atty. Ernesto S.
Araneta" was disbarred because in A.C. No. 1109 (which this Court promulgated on
April 27, 2005), this Court ordered the disbarment of a certain "Atty. Ernesto S.
Araneta" due to his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
While "Atty. Araneta" admitted of his involvement in a fraudulent scheme in
defrauding litigants that included Helen, we cannot immediately conclude that
respondent lawyer himself was likewise part of this racket that duped Helen. It must
be stressed that, because of his medical condition, respondent lawyer could not yet
explain his side. While indeed, an Answer was filed, it was John who signed the same
and not respondent lawyer. As such, we still cannot consider respondent lawyer to
have been adequately represented.
A full-dress investigation involving a careful evaluation of evidence from both
of the parties is necessary to resolve factual issues. The serious imputations hurled at
respondent lawyer warrant an observance of due process, i.e., to accord him the
opportunity to explain his side of the story. We explained:
Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type
proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be
heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is
no denial of due process. x x x The standard of due process that must be met
in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as
fairness is not ignored. In other words, it is not legally objectionable for being
violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based
solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by
the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct
testimony." 23
We note that Atty. Mampang candidly declared that it was John who consulted
him and sought his legal services, and, thus, it cannot be said that respondent lawyer
voluntarily and intelligently accepted Atty. Mampang to represent him. Respondent
lawyer, with his condition, could not even communicate with Atty. Mampang
regarding the case at the time of filing of the Answer, which compelled the counsel to
merely rely on the available documents. In effect, Atty. Mampang substituted his
judgment for that of respondent lawyer.
Significantly, the Answer contained the following disavowals by Atty.
Mampang:
5. That the Respondent as of now may be said to have lost most of his essential
human faculties, such as speech, motor, even his bowel movement, and
he eat[s] only through the help of his children. Literally, he is in
vegetative state, and his life is dependent only on the help, both physical
and financial, of his children. He was discharged from the hospital, not
because he has recovered but rather because his children do not have
money anymore to pay for his hospital bills. As of now, the only
"medical development" is that the tube used in feeding him was
removed, and he is feeding through the help of his daughter, the younger
sister of John P. Deles;
6. That it is on this premise that this counsel has to rely solely on the documents
available, such as those annexed in the complaint filed by the
complainant, as Respondent cannot convey any idea pertinent to the
actual incidents of this case that would explain his side on the
allegations contained in the complaint.
xxx xxx xxx
7. That [neither] this counsel [nor Respondent's son John Deles] have in [their]
possession, neither [do they have] other relevant documents x x x so that
this answer for the Respondent is simply couched on facts, documents
and records available, [primarily] the Affidavit-Complaint of Helen
Gradiola[. This] counsel cannot in anyway relate, comprehend or
decipher [communication] from [Respondent], as he is incapable of
uttering, communicating or responding to any question[s] ask[ed] of
him; 24
With respondent lawyer not yet in a position to factually dispute the
accusations and defend himself, and considering that there was no established lawyer-
client relationship at all between him and Atty. Mampang, albeit the latter acted for
respondent lawyer's best interest, proceeding with the investigation of the
administrative case against him would amount to a denial of a fair and reasonable
opportunity to be heard.
This Court has consistently held that an attorney enjoys the legal presumption
that he is innocent of charges against him until the contrary is proved, and that as an
officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with
his oath. 25 "For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the
respondent [lawyer] must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.
Indeed, considering the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar, the Court has consistently held that a clear preponderant evidence
 is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty." 26 "The burden of
proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the shoulders of the
complainant." 27
Under the circumstances, both duty and conscience impel us to remand this
administrative case for further proceedings. Fairness cannot be ignored.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XX-2013-511 of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. This case is
ordered REMANDED to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for further investigation, report and recommendation. The Integrated
Bar of the Philippines is hereby instructed to: 1) require respondent lawyer's son, John
P. Deles, to provide an update on his father's health condition and, on the basis of
such update; 2) to hold the case in abeyance if respondent lawyer's stroke aftermath
has significantly impaired his cognitive ability and speech that he is not capable of
presenting his defense or 3) to direct respondent lawyer to file his Answer and
continue with the proceedings if he is found to be medically fit and his condition
having improved over time, having regained his cognitive and communication skills.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-de Castro, ** Jardeleza, Tijam and Gesmundo, *** JJ., concur.
||| (Gradiola v. Deles, A.C. No. 10267, [June 18, 2018])

FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 10567. February 25, 2015.]

WILFREDO ANGLO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE MA. V.

VALENCIA, ATTY. JOSE MA. J. CIOCON, ATTY. PHILIP Z.
DABAO, ATTY. LILY UY-VALENCIA, ATTY. JOEY P. DE LA
PAZ, ATTY. CRIS G. DIONELA, ATTY. RAYMUNDO T.
PANDAN, JR., * ATTY. RODNEY K. RUBICA, ** and ATTY.
WILFRED RAMON M. PEÑALOSA, respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p

This is an administrative case stemming from a complaint-affidavit 1 dated

December 4, 2009 filed by complainant Wilfredo Anglo (complainant) charging
respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V. Valencia (Atty. Valencia), Jose Ma. J. Ciocon (Atty.
Ciocon), Philip Z. Dabao (Atty. Dabao), Lily Uy-Valencia (Atty. Uy-Valencia), Joey P.
De La Paz (Atty. De La Paz), Cris G. Dionela (Atty. Dionela), Raymundo T. Pandan, Jr.
(Atty. Pandan, Jr.), Rodney K. Rubica (Atty. Rubica), and Wilfred Ramon M. Peñalosa
(Atty. Peñalosa; collectively, respondents) of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), specifically the rule against conflict of interest.

The Facts

In his complaint-affidavit, complainant alleged that he availed the services of the

law firm Valencia Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law
Office (law firm), of which Attys. Valencia, Ciocon, Dabao, Uy-Valencia, De La Paz,
Dionela, Pandan, Jr., and Rubica were partners, for two (2) consolidated labor cases 2
where he was impleaded as respondent. Atty. Dionela, a partner of the law firm, was
assigned to represent complainant. The labor cases were terminated on June 5, 2008 upon
the agreement of both parties. 3

On September 18, 2009, a criminal case 4 for qualified theft was filed against
complainant and his wife by FEVE Farms Agricultural Corporation (FEVE Farms) acting
through a certain Michael Villacorta (Villacorta). Villacorta, however, was represented
by the law firm, the same law office which handled complainant's labor cases. Aggrieved,
complainant filed this disbarment case against respondents, alleging that they violated
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR, 5 to wit:

CANON 15 — A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS

AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH
HIS CLIENTS.

xxx xxx xxx

RULE 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by

written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
AEHTIC

xxx xxx xxx

CANON 21 — A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES

AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.

In their defense, 6 respondents admitted that they indeed operated under the name
Valencia Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office, but
explained that their association is not a formal partnership, but one that is subject to
certain "arrangements." According to them, each lawyer contributes a fixed amount every
month for the maintenance of the entire office; and expenses for cases, such as
transportation, copying, printing, mailing, and the like are shouldered by each lawyer
separately, allowing each lawyer to fix and receive his own professional fees exclusively.
7 As such, the lawyers do not discuss their clientele with the other lawyers and
associates, unless they agree that a case be handled collaboratively. Respondents claim
that this has been the practice of the law firm since its inception. They averred that
complainant's labor cases were solely and exclusively handled by Atty. Dionela and not
by the entire law firm. Moreover, respondents asserted that the qualified theft case filed
by FEVE Farms was handled by Atty. Peñalosa, a new associate who had no knowledge
of complainant's labor cases, as he started working for the firm after the termination
thereof. 8

Meanwhile, Atty. Dionela confirmed that he indeed handled complainant's labor

cases but averred that it was terminated on June 13, 2008, 9 and that complainant did not
have any monthly retainer contract. 10 He likewise explained that he did not see the need
to discuss complainant's labor cases with the other lawyers as the issue involved was very
simple, 11 and that the latter did not confide any secret during the time the labor cases
were pending that would have been used in the criminal case with FEVE Farms. He also
claimed that the other lawyers were not aware of the details of complainant's labor cases
nor did they know that he was the handling counsel for complainant even after the said
cases were closed and terminated. 12

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation 13 dated September 26, 2011, the IBP

Commissioner found respondents to have violated the rule on conflict of interest and
recommended that they be reprimanded therefor, with the exception of Atty. Dabao, who
had died on January 17, 2010. 14

The IBP found that complainant was indeed represented in the labor cases by the
respondents acting together as a law firm and not solely by Atty. Dionela. Consequently,
there was a conflict of interest in this case, as respondents, through Atty. Peñalosa,
having been retained by FEVE Farms, created a connection that would injure
complainant in the qualified theft case. Moreover, the termination of attorney-client
relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in
conflict with that of the former client. 15

In a Resolution 16 dated February 12, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the IBP Commissioner's Report and Recommendation with modification.
Instead of the penalty of reprimand, the IBP Board of Governors dismissed the case with
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration 17 thereof, which the IBP Board of
Governors granted in its Resolution 18 dated March 23, 2014 and thereby (a) set aside its
February 12, 2013 Resolution and (b) adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner's
Report and Recommendation, with modification, (1) reprimanding the respondents for
violation of the rule on conflict of interest; (2) dismissing the case against Atty. Dabao in
view of his death; and (3) suspending Atty. Dionela from the practice of law for one year,
being the handling counsel of complainant's labor cases. DHcTaE

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondents are guilty of
representing conflicting interests in violation of the pertinent provisions of the CPR.

The Court's Ruling

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR provide:

CANON 15 — A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS

AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH
HIS CLIENTS.

xxx xxx xxx

RULE 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by

written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

xxx xxx xxx

CANON 21 — A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES

AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT RELATIONSHIP IS TERMINATED.

In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat, 19 the Court explained the concept of conflict of

interest in this wise:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of

two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client,
it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it
for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be
opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only
cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those
in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is
conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the
attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any
matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his
new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
 acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of
his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. 20

As such, a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests

oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the
same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles
of public policy and good taste. 21

In this case, the Court concurs with the IBP's conclusions that respondents
represented conflicting interests and must therefore be held liable. As the records bear
out, respondents' law firm was engaged and, thus, represented complainant in the labor
cases instituted against him. However, after the termination thereof, the law firm agreed
to represent a new client, FEVE Farms, in the filing of a criminal case for qualified theft
against complainant, its former client, and his wife. As the Court observes, the law firm's
unethical acceptance of the criminal case arose from its failure to organize and implement
a system by which it would have been able to keep track of all cases assigned to its
handling lawyers to the end of, among others, ensuring that every engagement it accepts
stands clear of any potential conflict of interest. As an organization of individual lawyers
which, albeit engaged as a collective, assigns legal work to a corresponding handling
lawyer, it behooves the law firm to value coordination in deference to the conflict of
interest rule. This lack of coordination, as respondents' law firm exhibited in this case,
intolerably renders its clients' secrets vulnerable to undue and even adverse exposure,
eroding in the balance the lawyer-client relationship's primordial ideal of unimpaired trust
and confidence. Had such system been institutionalized, all of its members, Atty. Dionela
included, would have been wary of the above-mentioned conflict, thereby impelling the
firm to decline FEVE Farms' subsequent engagement. Thus, for this shortcoming, herein
respondents, as the charged members of the law firm, ought to be administratively
sanctioned. Note that the Court finds no sufficient reason as to why Atty. Dionela should
suffer the greater penalty of suspension. As the Court sees it, all respondents stand in
equal fault for the law firm's deficient organization for which Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and
Canon 21 of the CPR had been violated. As such, all of them are meted with the same
penalty of reprimand, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
infraction would be dealt with more severely. THADEI 

As a final point, the Court clarifies that respondents' pronounced liability is not
altered by the fact that the labor cases against complainant had long been terminated.
Verily, the termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to
represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The client's
confidence once reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of professional
employment. 22
 WHEREFORE, respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V. Valencia, Jose Ma. J. Ciocon,
Lily Uy-Valencia, Joey P. De La Paz, Cris G. Dionela, Raymundo T. Pandan, Jr., Rodney
K. Rubica, and Wilfred Ramon M. Peñalosa are found GUILTY of representing
conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and are therefore REPRIMANDED for said violations, with
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar infraction would be dealt
with more severely. Meanwhile, the case against Atty. Philip Dabao is DISMISSED in
view of his death.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondents' personal records as attorneys. Further, let copies of this
Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin and Perez, JJ., concur.

||| (Anglo v. Valencia, A.C. No. 10567, [February 25, 2015], 755 PHIL 1-10)

THIRD DIVISION

[A.C. No. 7387. November 7, 2016.]

MANUEL ENRIQUE L. ZALAMEA, and MANUEL JOSE L.

ZALAMEA, petitioners, vs. ATTY. RODOLFO P. DE GUZMAN, JR.
and PERLAS DE GUZMAN, ANTONIO, VENTURANZA,
QUIZON-VENTURANZA, and HERBOSA LAW FIRM,
respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, ** J : p

This is a Petition for Disbarment which petitioners Manuel Enrique L. Zalamea

and Manuel Jose L. Zalamea filed against their lawyer, Atty. Rodolfo P. de Guzman,
Jr., for acquiring their property by virtue of their lawyer-client relationship, in
violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The following are the factual antecedents of the case:
 In 2000, petitioners Manuel Enrique Zalamea and Manuel Jose Zalamea (the
Zalamea brothers) sought respondent Atty. Rodolfo P. de Guzman, Jr.'s advice on the
properties of their ailing mother, Merlinda L. Zalamea, who had a property situated at
Scout Limbaga, Quezon City under her name. When Merlinda passed away, De
Guzman then prepared a letter for a possible tax-free transfer of the Scout Limbaga
property to the Merlinda Holding Corporation which was sought to be incorporated to
handle Merlinda's estate, and notarized the incorporation papers of said corporation.
In September 2001, the Zalameas put up EMZEE FOODS, INC., (EMZEE) a
corporation engaged in lechon business, with De Guzman providing the capital and
operational funds. Sometime in 2002, Manuel Enrique informed De Guzman about
the property located at Speaker Perez St. (Speaker Perez property) which was then
under the name of Elarfoods, Inc. (Elarfoods), a corporation owned and run by the
Zalamea brothers' aunts and uncles. Since said property had been mortgaged to Banco
de Oro (BDO), the bank foreclosed it when Elarfoods failed to pay the loan. Elarfoods
likewise failed to redeem the property, resulting in the consolidation of the ownership
over the property in BDO's name.
Later, Manuel Enrique approached De Guzman and convinced him to help in
the reacquisition of the Speaker Perez property from BDO. De Guzman thus
negotiated with BDO and was able to secure a deal over the property for P20 Million.
The bank required 10% downpayment of the total price or P2 Million, to be paid in
thirty-six (36) monthly installments, without interest. Due to lack of funds on Manuel
Enrique's part, De Guzman's wife, Angel, agreed to shoulder the P2 Million
downpayment in order not to lose the good opportunity, but under the condition that
the Speaker Perez property would later be transferred in the name of a new
corporation they had agreed to form, the EMZALDEK Venture Corporation, a
combination of the names EMZEE Foods, Zalamea, and Dek de Guzman. By this
time, EMZEE had also relocated to Speaker Perez.
Subsequently, Angel was forced to pay the monthly installments and the
additional 20% required for EMZEE to be able to transfer its office to the Speaker
Perez property, since Manuel Enrique still could not produce sufficient funds and
EMZEE continued to incur losses. All in all, Angel paid P13,082,500.00.
Not long after, the relationship between the Zalamea brothers and the Spouses
De Guzman turned sour. The Spouses De Guzman wanted reimbursement of the
amounts which they had advanced for the corporation, while the Zalamea brothers
claimed sole ownership over the Speaker Perez property. Hence, the brothers filed a
disbarment case against De Guzman for allegedly buying a client's property which
was subject of litigation.
After a careful review and evaluation of the case, the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended the dismissal
of the complaint against De Guzman for lack of merit on October 12, 2011. 1 On
December 29, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution 2 adopting and
approving the recommended dismissal of the complaint, thus: DHITCc

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously

ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A," and finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
that the complaint is without merit, the same is hereby DISMISSED.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings and
recommendations of the IBP.
An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of
his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated
in Section 27, 3 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. 4
Under Article 1491 of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited to acquire by
purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the
mediation of another, their client's property and rights in litigation, hence:
ART. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even
at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of
another:
xxx xxx xxx
5. Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of
superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees
connected with the administration of justice, the property and
rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court
within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their
respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of
acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with
respect to the property and rights which may be the object of
any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession.
6. Any others specially disqualified by law.
Indeed, the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property or interest in litigation
is a breach of professional ethics and constitutes malpractice. The persons mentioned
in Article 1491 are prohibited from purchasing said property because of an existing
trust relationship. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property
and rights in litigation because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and
rights, as well as with the client. The very first Canon of the Code of Professional
Responsibility 5 provides that "a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for law and legal process." Canon 17 states that "a
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him, while Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust
all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Further,
Section 3, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer to take an
oath to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities.
And for any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred by the
Court. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal
system. The transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and
reprehensible act which the Court will never countenance. 6
Here, the accusation against De Guzman stemmed from his wife's purchase of
the Speaker Perez property from BDO when Manuel Enrique did not have the means
to buy it. The Zalameas claim that De Guzman, as their counsel, could not acquire the
property, either personally or through his wife, without violating his ethical duties. De
Guzman therefore has breached the same when his wife purchased the subject
property. cEaSHC

However, the prohibition which the Zalameas invoke does not apply where the
property purchased was not involved in litigation. De Guzman clearly never acquired
any of his client's properties or interests involved in litigation in which he may take
part by virtue of his profession. There exists not even an iota of proof indicating that
said property has ever been involved in any litigation in which De Guzman took part
by virtue of his profession. True, they had previously sought legal advice from De
Guzman but only on how to handle their mother's estate, which likewise did not
involve the contested property. Neither was it shown that De Guzman's law firm had
taken part in any litigation involving the Speaker Perez property.
The prohibition which rests on considerations of public policy and interests is
intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client on account of his
fiduciary and confidential relationship with him. De Guzman could not have possibly
exerted such undue influence, as a lawyer, upon the Zalameas, as his clients. In fact, it
was Manuel Enrique who approached the Spouses De Guzman and asked them if they
would be willing to become business partners in a lechon business. It was also
Manuel Enrique who turned to De Guzman for help in order to reacquire the already
foreclosed Speaker Perez property. They had agreed that De Guzman would simply
pay the required downpayment to BDO and EMZEE would pay the remaining balance
in installment. And when EMZEE continued suffering losses, Angel took care of the
monthly amortizations so as not to lose the property.
Clearly, the relationship between the Spouses De Guzman and the Zalamea
brothers is actually one of business partners rather than that of a lawyer and client.
Atty. De Guzman's acquisition of the Speaker Perez property was a valid consequence
of a business deal, not by reason of a lawyer-client relationship, for which he could
not be penalized by the Court. De Guzman and his wife are very well allowed by law
to enter into such a transaction and their conduct in this regard was not borne out to
have been attended by any undue influence, deceit, or misrepresentation.

WHEREFORE, SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 9422. November 19, 2018.]

ATTY. FLORANTE S. LEGASPI, complainant, vs. ATTY. EL CID

C. FAJARDO, respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p

For the Court's resolution is an administrative complaint 1 dated February 29,

2012 filed before the Court by complainant Atty. Florante S. Legaspi (complainant)
against respondent Atty. El Cid C. Fajardo (respondent) praying that the latter be
administratively sanctioned for his alleged acts constituting conflict of interest.

The Facts

Complainant alleged that on July 31, 2008, he, on behalf of his client, Cristina
Gabriel (Gabriel), initiated the case entitled "Cristina Gabriel v. [Jannet] 2 Malino,
Carl Blum Blomary 3 and the Register of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro," 4 docketed as
Civil Case No. CV-08-5950 before the Regional Trial Court of Calapan City, Oriental
Mindoro, Branch 40 (RTC). On December 10, 2010, the RTC issued a Decision 5 on
the basis of a Compromise Agreement 6 signed by both parties. 7 aScITE

Notably, a day before the issuance of such Decision, or on December 9, 2010,

respondent filed a formal entry of appearance 8 stating that he was acting as
collaborating counsel for one of the defendants, Jannet Malino (Malino). More than a
month later, or on January 18, 2011, respondent filed with the RTC the following: (a)
a Special Power of Attorney 9 purportedly executed by Gabriel appointing him as her
attorney-in-fact; and (b) an Ex-Parte Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss 10 where he affixed
his signature as Gabriel's attorney-in-fact. 11 Thereafter, respondent, purportedly on
behalf of Gabriel, filed an undated notice 12 terminating complainant's services as
counsel due to loss of trust and confidence. Complainant then opposed the Ex-Parte
Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss, as well as the said notice, contending that: there was no
prior advice from Gabriel; the reasons presented in the motion to dismiss had no legal
and factual bases; the RTC ruling on the case had already become final and executory;
and Gabriel had yet to satisfy his legal fees although she already obtained a favorable
judgment with the help of complainant. 13 In the Orders dated February 3, 2011 14
and February 18, 2011, 15 the RTC ruled in favor of complainant, holding that the
pleadings and motions purportedly filed by respondent on behalf of Gabriel were
irregular, and in any case, must be denied for being moot and academic in view of its
ruling which had long become final and executory. 16
In view of the foregoing, complainant filed the instant complaint accusing
respondent of representing conflicting interests by appearing as collaborating counsel
for Malino, and thereafter, acting as attorney-in-fact for Gabriel. 17
In his defense, 18 while respondent admitted to complainant's narration of
facts, he nevertheless maintained, inter alia, that his acts do not amount to
representing conflicting interests, as his being Gabriel's attorney-in-fact, by filing
pleadings on her behalf and furnishing copies thereof to complainant, were simply
clerical in nature, and thus, did not amount to acting as a lawyer/counsel for Gabriel.
19
In a Resolution 20 dated December 5, 2012, the Court referred the matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for its investigation, report, and
recommendation. HEITAD

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation 21 dated January 4, 2014, the Investigating

Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly,
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months for violating the principle of conflict of interest under Rules 15.01 and 15.03,
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). 22
The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent's acceptance of
Gabriel's appointment as her attorney-in-fact in Civil Case No. CV-08-5950, while at
the same time acting as collaborating counsel for Malino in the same case, is clearly a
conflict of interest. It was ratiocinated that even assuming arguendo that respondent's
functions as Gabriel's attorney-in-fact were merely clerical in nature, it is nevertheless
undeniable that he placed himself in a situation where he could easily manipulate one
side to gain an advantage for the other. In this regard, the Investigating Commissioner
even pointed out that respondent himself admitted that he accepted Gabriel's
appointment as her attorney-in-fact as it was advantageous to Malino. 23 aDSIHc

In a Resolution 24 dated June 5, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the
Investigating Commissioner's report and recommendation, with modification
increasing the recommended period of suspension to one (1) year. Respondent moved
for reconsideration 25 but the same was denied in a Resolution 26 dated November
28, 2017. Consequently, the assailed Resolution, together with the entire records, was
elevated to the Court for final action. 27 Albeit unnecessary, respondent filed a
petition for review on certiorari 28 before the Court. 29

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be

administratively sanctioned for the acts complained of.

The Court's Ruling

The Court adopts the findings and recommendations of the Investigating

Commissioner, as modified by the IBP Board of Governors.
The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued
with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality
that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client's most confidential
information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between
them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her
lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the
lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all
dealings and transactions with the client. 30 In this regard, Rules 15.01 and 15.03,
Canon 15 of the CPR, respectively state: ETHIDa

CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in

all his dealings and transactions with his clients.
Rule 15.01 — A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall
ascertain as soon as practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict
with another client or his own interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform the
prospective client.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
TIADCc

An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly

fiduciary nature of their relationship, sound public policy dictates that he be
prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties.
An attorney may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel
for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. This rule
is so absolute that good faith and honest intention on the erring lawyer's part do not
make it inoperative. The reason for this is that a lawyer acquires knowledge of his
former client's doings, whether documented or not, that he would ordinarily not have
acquired were it not for the trust and confidence that his client placed on him in the
light of their relationship. It would simply be impossible for the lawyer to identify and
erase such entrusted knowledge with faultless precision or lock the same into an iron
box when suing the former client on behalf of a new one. 31 In other words, a lawyer
is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former
client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally
unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and
good taste. 32
In Hornilla v. Salunat, 33 the Court laid down the parameters in determining
the presence of conflict of interest, to wit:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in
behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim,
but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for
one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the
other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence
has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the
acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act
which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he
represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation
to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof. 34 (Emphases and underscoring supplied) AIDSTE

In this case, it is clear that respondent indeed violated the rule on conflict of
interest when he entered his appearance for defendant Malino in Civil Case No. CV-
08-5950, and thereafter, accepted his appointment as attorney-in-fact for Gabriel, who
was the plaintiff in the same case, and even submitted pleadings and motions on
Gabriel's behalf therein. As aptly remarked by the Investigating Commissioner, "it is
undeniable that [respondent] placed himself in a situation where he could as easily
manipulate one side to gain an advantage for the other." 35 Jurisprudence provides
that "it behooves attorneys, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only
thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice." 36 Thus, even if respondent's
intentions in accepting Gabriel's designation as attorney-in-fact were honest and in
good faith, the fact remains that his actions constitute representing conflicting
interests, for which he must be administratively sanctioned.
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent, case law in Aniñon v.
Sabitsana, Jr. 37 and Santos Ventura Horcoma Foundation, Inc. v. Funk 38 similarly
 instructs that in instances where an erring lawyer represents conflicting interests,
he/she is meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year. Thus, the Court finds it appropriate to impose upon respondent such penalty,
as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors. SDAaTC

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. El Cid C. Fajardo is found guilty of

violating Rules 15.01 and 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year, effective immediately upon his receipt of this Decision. He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Further, he is DIRECTED to report to this Court the date of his receipt of this
Decision to enable it to determine when his suspension from the practice of law shall
take effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to
be appended to respondent's personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for its information and guidance, the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country. AaCTcI

SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Caguioa, A.B. Reyes, Jr. and J.C. Reyes, Jr., *JJ., concur.
||| (Legaspi v. Fajardo, A.C. No. 9422, [November 19, 2018])
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court DISMISSES the Petition for
Disbarment against Atty. Rodolfo P. de Guzman, Jr. for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Perez, Reyes and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., * J., is on official leave.
||| (Zalamea v. De Guzman, Jr., A.C. No. 7387, [November 7, 2016], 798 PHIL 1-7)

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 1346. July 25, 2017.]

PACES INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. ATTY.

EDGARDO M. SALANDANAN, respondent.

DECISION
PERALTA, J : p

This is a complaint which Paces Industrial Corporation (Paces) filed against its
former lawyer, Atty. Edgardo M. Salandanan, for allegedly committing malpractice
and/or gross misconduct when he represented conflicting interests. caITAC

The procedural and factual antecedents of the instant case are as follows:
Sometime in October 1973, Salandanan became a stockholder of Paces, and
later became its Director, Treasurer, Administrative Officer, Vice-President for
Finance, then its counsel. As lawyer for Paces, he appeared for it in several cases such
as in Sisenando Malveda, et al. v. Paces Corporation (NLRC R-04 Case No. 11-
3114-73) and Land & Housing Development Corporation v. Paces Corporation (Civil
Case No. 18791). In the latter case, Salandanan failed to file the Answer, after filing a
Motion for a Bill of Particulars, which the court had denied. As a result, an order of
default was issued against Paces. Salandanan never withdrew his appearance in the
case nor notified Paces to get the services of another lawyer. Subsequently, a decision
was rendered against Paces which later became final and executory.
On December 4, 1973, E.E. Black Ltd., through its counsel, sent a letter to
Paces regarding the latter's outstanding obligation to it in the amount of P96,513.91.
In the negotiations that transpired thereafter, Salandanan was the one who represented
Paces. He was likewise entrusted with the documents relative to the agreement
between Paces and E.E. Black Ltd.
Meanwhile, disagreements on various management policies ensued among the
stockholders and officers in the corporation. Eventually, Salandanan and his group
were forced to sell out their shareholdings in the company to the group of Mr. Nicolas
C. Balderama on May 27, 1974.
After said sell-out, Salandanan started handling the case between E.E. Black
Ltd. and Paces, but now, representing E.E. Black Ltd. Salandanan then filed a
complaint with application for preliminary attachment against Paces for the collection
of its obligation to E.E. Black Ltd. He later succeeded in obtaining an order of
attachment, writ of attachment, and notices of garnishment to various entities which
Paces had business dealings with.
Thus, Paces filed a complaint against Salandanan. It argued that when he acted
as counsel for E.E. Black Ltd., he represented conflicting interests and utilized, to the
full extent, all the information he had acquired as its stockholder, officer, and lawyer.
On the other hand, Salandanan claimed that he was never employed nor paid as a
counsel by Paces. There was no client-lawyer contract between them. He maintained
that his being a lawyer was merely coincidental to his being a stockholder-officer and
did not automatically make him a lawyer of the corporation, particularly with respect
to its account with E.E. Black Ltd. He added that whatever knowledge or information
he had obtained on the operation of Paces only took place in the regular, routinary
course of business as him being an investor, stockholder, and officer, but never as a
lawyer of the company.
After a thorough and careful review of the case, the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended Salandanan's
suspension for one (1) year on November 2, 2011. 1 On September 28, 2013, the IBP
Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2013-120 2 adopting and approving,
with modification, the aforementioned recommendation, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules and considering that the Respondent violated the conflict of
interest rule, Atty. Edgardo M. Salandanan is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) years.
On August 8, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXI-
2014-413, 3 denying Salandanan's motion for reconsideration and affirming
Resolution No. XX-2013-120.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds no justifiable reason to deviate from the findings and
recommendations of the IBP.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR) provide:
CANON 15 — A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS
AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS
WITH HIS CLIENTS.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 21 — A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES
AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED. ICHDca

Under the aforecited rules, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from

representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any
manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated
cases. 4 Conflict of interest exists when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of
two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is
the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the
other client. In short, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him
when he argues for the other client. This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the
acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also
whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the
full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of said duty. 5 The
prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste. 6
The prohibition against conflict of interest rests on the following five (5)
rationales: 7
First, the law seeks to assure clients that their lawyers will represent them with
undivided loyalty. A client is entitled to be represented by a lawyer whom the client
can trust. Instilling such confidence is an objective important in itself.
Second, the prohibition against conflicts of interest seeks to enhance the
effectiveness of legal representation. To the extent that a conflict of interest
undermines the independence of the lawyer's professional judgment or inhibits a
lawyer from working with appropriate vigor in the client's behalf, the client's
expectation of effective representation could be compromised.
Third, a client has a legal right to have the lawyer safeguard confidential
information pertaining to it. Preventing the use of confidential information against the
interests of the client to benefit the lawyer's personal interest, in aid of some other
client, or to foster an assumed public purpose, is facilitated through conflicts rules that
reduce the opportunity for such abuse.
Fourth, conflicts rules help ensure that lawyers will not exploit clients, such as
by inducing a client to make a gift or grant in the lawyer's favor.
Finally, some conflict-of-interest rules protect interests of the legal system in
obtaining adequate presentations to tribunals. In the absence of such rules, for
example, a lawyer might appear on both sides of the litigation, complicating the
process of taking proof and compromise adversary argumentation.
Even the termination of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a
lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client.
The spirit behind this rule is that the client's confidence once given should not be
stripped by the mere expiration of the professional employment. Even after the
severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything that will injuriously affect
his former client in any matter in which the lawyer previously represented the client.
Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the
previous relation. In this regard, Canon 17 of the CPR expressly declares that: "A
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him." The lawyer's highest and most unquestioned duty is to
protect the client at all hazards and costs even to himself. The protection given to the
client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it
affected by the client's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any
other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client. 8
It must, however, be noted that a lawyer's immutable duty to a former client
does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer's employment with the
client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the
client's interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and
not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated. 9
Here, contrary to Salandanan's futile defense, he sufficiently represented or
intervened for Paces in its negotiations for the payment of its obligation to E.E. Black
Ltd. The letters he sent to the counsel of E.E. Black Ltd. identified him as the
Treasurer of Paces. Previously, he had likewise represented Paces in two (2) different
cases. It is clear, therefore, that his duty had been to fight a cause for Paces, but it later
became his duty to oppose the same for E.E. Black Ltd. His defense for Paces was
eventually opposed by him when he argued for E.E. Black Ltd. Thus, Salandanan had
indisputably obtained knowledge of matters affecting the rights and obligations of
Paces which had been placed in him in unrestricted confidence. The same knowledge
led him to the identification of those attachable properties and business organizations
that eventually made the attachment and garnishment against Paces a success. To
allow him to utilize said information for his own personal interest or for the benefit of
E.E. Black Ltd., the adverse party, would be to violate the element of confidence
which lies at the very foundation of a lawyer-client relationship. TCAScE

The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations

wherein a lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to
any of his present or former clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to
represent a client involving the same or a substantially related matter that is materially
adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after consultation.
The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty. Throughout the course of a
lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client's
case, including the weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge and information
gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred and guarded with
care. 10 It behooves lawyers, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but
also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice. 11 The nature of that relationship is,
therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. 12
 In the absence of the express consent from Paces after full disclosure to it of
the conflict of interest, Salandanan should have either outrightly declined representing
and entering his appearance as counsel for E.E. Black Ltd., or advised E.E. Black Ltd.
to simply engage the services of another lawyer. Unfortunately, he did neither, and
must necessarily suffer the dire consequences. 13
Applying the above-stated principles, the Court agrees with the IBP's finding
that Salandanan represented conflicting interests and, perforce, must be held
administratively liable for the same. 14
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court SUSPENDS
Atty. Edgardo M. Salandanan from the practice of law for three (3) years effective
upon his receipt of this decision, with a warning that his commission of a similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be included in the personal record of Atty. Edgardo
M. Salandanan and entered in his file in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of
the Court Administrator, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin, Del
Castillo, Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa, Martires, Tijam and
Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
(Paces Industrial Corp. v. Salandanan, A.C. No. 1346, [July 25, 2017], 814 PHIL 93-
|||

102)

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 12008. August 14, 2019.]

PALALAN CARP FARMERS MULTI-PURPOSE COOP,

represented by BEVERLY DOMO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ELMER
A. DELA ROSA, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM : p

A mistake repeated more than once is a decision. 1

 "A mistake repeated more than once is a decision." 2 And there is a variation to
that. "You can't make the same mistake twice. The second time you make it, it's not a
mistake anymore, it's a choice. ENOUGH!" 3 A mistake is corrected at once; and not
repeated. More so when the mistake has already been called out and heavily
penalized.
Respondent Atty. Elmer A. Dela Rosa has been suspended from the practice of
law for three (3) years effective September 26, 2016. His infractions consisted of
borrowing a substantial amount of money from his client-spouses. Not only was he
unable to pay despite demand, he even denied he owed them anything. 4 Atty. Elmer
A. Dela Rosa is here once again being accused of breaching his fiduciary duties on
money matters affecting this time his Client-Cooperative and its farmer-beneficiaries.
Antecedents
Complainant Palalan CARP Farmers Multi-Purpose Cooperative was the
registered owner of a sizeable tract of prime agricultural land (111.4 hectares) situated
in Barangay Lumbia, Cagayan De Oro City. The land was covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-170 (TCT No. T-170). Complainant acquired the land
pursuant to a Certificate of Land Ownership Award issued by the Department of
Agrarian Reform in 1992. As a Cooperative, it held legal title to the land on behalf of
its members as its beneficial owners of the land.
In 1995, the Cooperative, among others, was sued by the Philippine Veterans
Bank for annulment of TCT No. T-170, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-086. The case
was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Cagayan De Oro City.
In 1997, the Cooperative engaged Respondent and his law office to represent it
in Civil Case No. 95-086. 5 Under their retainer agreement, 6 Respondent and his law
office were to be paid P3,339.00 a month and a contingent fee of five percent (5%) of
the settlement award, sale proceeds of the sale of the land, disturbance compensation,
or fair market value of the land.HCaDIS

Meantime, on February 12, 2000, the Cooperative executed a special power of

attorney authorizing Respondent to do the following acts on its behalf:
1. negotiate for the sale of the land or issue to any interested broker further
limited or conditional authority to negotiate with and/or introduce
prospective buyers;
2. execute any and all documents which may be necessary to consummate the
sale transaction;
3. open an account with a bank of Respondent's choice, in the name of the
Cooperative with its Chairperson Paz Genilla as co-signatory; and
4. collect, accept, or demand all the sale proceeds on the land due the
Cooperative and to deposit the same to its account.
 Seven (7) years later, on June 12, 2007, the Cooperative revoked Respondent's
special power of attorney. To this, Respondent reacted by presenting to the
Cooperative a copy of General Assembly Resolution No. 1 dated March 19, 2008
showing that members of the Cooperative's new governing board had actually
retained Respondent as the Cooperative's counsel and "reconfirming all previous
authorities granted him by the General Assembly." General Assembly Resolution No.
1 and the other related General Assembly Resolutions appeared to have been adopted
by the new set of officers/board members led by one Lino D. Sajol.
For its part, the old set of officers/board members led by Beverly Domo
opposed Lino D. Sajol's leadership.
Back to Civil Case No. 95-086, the trial court rendered its Decision dated May
14, 2008, dismissing the case on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case. Not long after, the Cooperative's 111.1484 hectare property got sold with
Respondent, no less, brokering the sale. Reports had it that Respondent was already
able to book a buyer as early as February of 2008. Later reports had it though that the
sale actually took place on August 7, 2009 to one Diana Biron. 7 Respondent did not
reveal to the Cooperative the circumstances surrounding the sale, let alone, the buyer's
identity. He invariably claimed to have been bound to keep confidential the buyer's
identity. He did not dispute though that it was he who processed the sale and paid the
farmers-beneficiaries their respective shares in the purchase price.
The Administrative Complaint
Believing that Respondent was engaging in conflict of interest, the Cooperative
charged him with gross misconduct for multiple violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).
On November 13, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Misamis
Oriental Chapter, Cagayan de Oro City, referred the Complaint to the IBP-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). It was docketed CBD Case No. 08-2327.
On November 24, 2008, Investigating Commissioner Fernandez ordered
Respondent to answer the complaint but the latter did not comply therewith. On April
17, 2009 the complaint was set for mandatory conference, during which, both the
Cooperative's representative and Respondent appeared. On even date, Respondent
filed his verified answer. Investigating Commissioner Fernandez set another
mandatory conference on May 13, 2009. On that date though, the Cooperative's
representative no longer appeared. The mandatory conference was, thus, deemed
terminated as of that date. The parties were then ordered to file their respective
position papers with supporting evidence as attachments. Only the Cooperative
complied.
In addition to the present administrative case, the Cooperative initiated a civil
action for annulment of the sale brokered by Respondent and the actions of the new
governing board led by Lino D. Sajol. The case was docketed Civil Case No. 2010-
299 and raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cagayan De Oro City.
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
In his Report and Recommendation dated June 1, 2010, Investigating
Commissioner Fernandez recommended that the Complaint be dismissed without
prejudice. He opined that since the complaint arose from the seminal issue of which
between the two (2) warring groups is truly the Cooperative's governing board, the
resolution of the administrative case should await the outcome of Civil Case No.
2010-299 where such seminal issue is being currently litigated. AHCETa

The Recommendation of the IBP-Board of Governors

By its Extended Resolution dated November 28, 2015, the IBP-Board of
Governors declined the recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Fernandez,
pronouncing that to be able to determine which of the two (2) warring groups truly
represents the Cooperative, one need only to refer to the records of the Cooperative
Development Authority pertaining to which governing Board was actually registered
therein. On the merits, the Extended Resolution bore the following findings:
1. Respondent did not act with diligence and competence when he allowed
Civil Case No. 95-086 (Philippine Veterans Bank v. Palalan CARP
Farmers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, et al.) to drag on for about ten
(10) years until May 14, 2008 when the trial court finally dismissed the
case on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the
case. On this score, Respondent violated Subsection 20 (g), Rule 138,
Rules of Court and Rule 1.03, 8 Canon 12, 9 and Rule 12.04 10 of the
CPR.
2. Respondent violated Rule 15.03 11 of the CPR which prohibits a lawyer
from engaging in conflict of interest. Respondent engaged in conflict of
interest when he demanded that the sale of the land be done only
through his intervention.
3. Respondent breached his sworn duty to protect his client's interest when he
refused to divulge to the latter the identity of the buyer of the land in
violation of Canons 15 12 and 17 13 and Rule 16.01 14 of the CPR.
4. Respondent verbally abused the farmer-beneficiaries, in violation of Rule
8.01 15 of the CPR.
5. Respondent improperly compelled the Cooperative to sell the land at an
extremely low price of P30.00 per square meter in violation of Canon
15, Rules 15.01 16 and 15.03 and Canon 17 of the CPR.
The IBP-Board of Governors concluded that Respondent preferred to protect
his own personal pecuniary interest over the interest of his client and its members. For
Respondent's multiple infractions, the IBP-Board of Governors recommended the
extreme penalty of Disbarment. 17
In his motion for reconsideration, 18 Respondent asserted that the sale of the
land to the undisclosed buyer bore the board's authorization through Lino D. Sajol's
group.
The Cooperative's then Chairperson, Fernando Bermoy opposed the motion for
reconsideration. He maintained that the bona fide Chairpersons and authorized
representatives of the Cooperative from 2007 to 2010 were actually Beverly Domo
and Perfecto Saliga, Jr., respectively, He clarified that Lino Sajol's group did not have
any authority to bind the Cooperative at any time between 2007 and 2010. He also
revealed that it was a certain Diana G. Biron who actually purchased the lot. 19
Notably, Respondent did not dispute the identification of Diana G. Biron as the buyer
of the land. By Resolution dated May 27, 2017, the IBP-Board of Governors denied
Respondent's motion for reconsideration.
Issues
1. Did Respondent violate Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and
Rules 1.03, 8.01, 12.04, 15.03, 16.01 and Canons 12, 15, and 17 of the
CPR?
2. In the affirmative, what appropriate penalty should be imposed on
Respondent? ScHADI

Ruling

Respondent violated several provisions

of the CPR in relation to Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court governs the disbarment and
suspension of attorneys, viz.:
Section 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by the Supreme Court;
grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice,
or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers constitute
malpractice.
Misconduct has been defined as an intentional wrongdoing or a deliberate
violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. 20 It is grave where the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule are
present. Otherwise, it is only simple. 21
What lies at the core of Respondent's multiple serious infractions has been his
motivation to willfully, voluntarily, and knowingly engage in conflict of interest to
serve his own personal pecuniary interest at all cost.
The rule against conflict of interest is expressed in Canon 15, Rules 15.01 and
15.03 of the CPR. It means the existence of a substantial risk that a lawyer's loyalty to
or representation of a client would be materially and adversely affected by the
lawyer's own interest or the lawyer's duties to another client, a former client, or a third
person, during the various stages of the professional relationship. 22 The rule
stipulates that a lawyer cannot act or continue to act for a client when there is a
conflict of interest, except as provided in Rule 15.03 itself — securing the written
consent of all the parties concerned after full disclosure to them of the facts.
The rule against conflict of interest is founded on the bedrock of lawyer-client
relationship — it is a fiduciary relationship. The lawyer, therefore, has a duty of
loyalty to the client. The duty of confidentiality, the duty of candor, and the duty of
commitment to the client's cause are all derivatives of the ultimate duty of loyalty.
For example, a conflict may arise when the lawyer has information from one
client that is relevant to another client's or a prospective client's matter. The lawyer
owes a duty to one client not to reveal the information but owes a duty to the other
client or prospective client to disclose the information. Because the lawyer cannot
fulfill both duties at the same time he or she is confronted with conflict of interest.
Conflicts may also arise because of the lawyer's own financial interests, which
could impair client representation and loyalty. This is reasonably obvious where a
lawyer is asked to advise the client in respect of a matter in which the lawyer or a
family member has a material direct or indirect financial interest. The conflict of
interest is exacerbated when the lawyer, without full and honest disclosure to the
client of the consequences of appointing him or her as an agent with the power to sell
a piece of property, willfully and knowingly accepts such an appointment. When the
lawyer engages in conduct consistent with his or her appointment as an agent, this
new relationship may obscure the line on whether certain information was acquired in
the course of the lawyer-client relationship or by reason of agency, and may
jeopardize the client's right to have all information concerning the client's affairs held
in strict confidence.aICcHA

The relationship may in some circumstances permit exploitation of the client

by the lawyer as he or she still is, after all, the lawyer from whom the client seeks
advice and guidance.
The IBP-Board of Governors here correctly found that at its most basic
element, Respondent's conflict of interest hinges on the fact that while he may want a
quick sale to be able to earn at once, Complainant would want a sale that brings the
most profit.
But this is not all.
Respondent was obviously taking instructions from the unidentified buyer
when he did not reveal the latter's identity to his client which itself authorized him to
forge the sale. Too, while he may not be fully responsible in delaying Civil Case No.
95-086, he did not actively pursue its quick end even though it was the most
appropriate thing, he as a lawyer, should have done. As it was, Respondent appeared
to have had a different agendum in which expediting the case was not the most
profitable for him because the land then was still statutorily barred from being sold,
conveyed, or alienated.
Respondent insisted and demanded that he alone negotiate for and effect the
sale of the land. But when the time to sell came, he did not reveal to his client and its
farmers-beneficiaries the details of the sale itself, let alone, the buyer's identity.
Respondent even sowed fear in the minds of the farmers-beneficiaries who expressed
reservations on the fairness of the terms of the sale especially with respect to the
extremely low price of P30.00 per square meter. Respondent told them that in reality
they had a very slim chance of winning the case filed by Philippine Veterans Bank.
Hence, if they do not accept the sale now they would end up with nothing at all. With
the ultimate objective of closing the sale and even after he got spurned by the sitting
members of the Board at that time, Respondent just took it upon himself to side with
the opposition group which wanted to establish and assert themselves as the new
leaders of the Cooperative. Hence, his determination of which between the two (2)
opposing groups may properly give instructions about the sale was patently tainted by
his own private interest to earn from the sale of the land. He knew he could only
ensure his private interest if he was able to simultaneously continue not only as the
Cooperative's lawyer but as the Cooperative's agent authorized to sell the land and to
actually consummate it. He may have also forgotten he was the lawyer of the
Cooperative which has a personality distinct from its members. As it was, instead of
staying neutral for the sake of maintaining order within the organization of the
Cooperative, Respondent chose to side with Lino D. Sajol just so he could complete
the sale of its only asset. Hornilla v. Salunat 23 explains when a lawyer engages in
conflict of interest:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf
of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his
duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This
rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be
used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer
will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his
 first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will
be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge
acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney
from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof.
The prohibition against conflict of interest is founded on the principles of
public policy and good taste. 24 Further, the prohibition against conflict of interest
rests on the following five (5) rationales as outlined in Paces Industrial Corp. v.
Salandanan, 25 viz.:
The prohibition against conflict of interest rests on the following five
(5) rationales:
First, the law seeks to assure clients that their lawyers will represent
them with undivided loyalty. A client is entitled to be represented by a lawyer
whom the client can trust. Instilling such confidence is an objective important
in itself.
Second, the prohibition against conflicts of interest seeks to enhance
the effectiveness of legal representation. To the extent that a conflict of
interest undermines the independence of the lawyer's professional judgment or
inhibits a lawyer from working with appropriate vigor in the client's behalf,
the client's expectation of effective representation could be compromised. EHaASD

Third, a client has a legal right to have the lawyer safeguard

confidential information pertaining to it. Preventing the use of confidential
information against the interests of the client to benefit the lawyer's personal
interest, in aid of some other client, or to foster an assumed public purpose, is
facilitated through conflicts rules that reduce the opportunity for such abuse.
Fourth, conflicts rules help ensure that lawyers will not exploit clients,
such as by inducing a client to make a gift or grant in the lawyer's favor.
Finally, some conflict-of-interest rules protect interests of the legal
system in obtaining adequate presentations to tribunals. In the absence of such
rules, for example, a lawyer might appear on both sides of the litigation,
complicating the process of taking proof and compromise adversary
argumentation.
Respondent had proven himself disloyal to his client — exploitative,
untrustworthy, and a double-dealer. The client's land had been sold. The client did not
know who the buyer was. Respondent acted to protect the buyer's interest, and in all
likelihood, his as well. The client did not know and still does not know how much was
actually paid for the land. Money flowed from an account set-up by Respondent
himself and although under the Cooperative's name, Respondent alone had access to
it. The cash proceeds of the sale have not been accounted for to this date.
 A lawyer is prohibited from acting or continuing to act for a client where there
is a conflict of interest, except when there is a written consent of all concerned after a
full disclosure of the facts. Here, there was no consent to speak of at all. Instead of
halting his legal representation of the Cooperative to avoid conflict of interest, he
stubbornly continued to engage therein i.e., his seeming obsession to sell the land in
question. He even managed to secure alleged General Assembly Resolutions to
validate his objective of selling the land.
The rule against conflict of interest requires a lawyer to decline a retainer from
a prospective client or withdraw from a client's ongoing matter. This, Respondent did
not do, obviously for monetary considerations arising from the sale of the land. A
lawyer should examine whether a conflict of interest exists not only from the outset
but throughout the duration of a retainer because new circumstances or information
may establish or reveal a conflict of interest. Respondent did not have the
circumspection as his professional judgment has been obscured by the singular
objective of selling the land to his undisclosed buyer.
Indeed, Respondent had acted with corrupt intent to flagrantly disregard
established ethical rules, and his conduct amounts to grave misconduct.

Disbarment is the appropriate penalty for

Respondent's repeated professional
infractions

This is the second time Respondent is being accused of breaching his fiduciary
duties all because of money. In Spouses Concepcion v. Dela Rosa, 26 he borrowed
money from his clients-spouses. On demand by his clients-spouses, he just altogether
did not pay his creditors. He even denied being indebted to them. For this infraction,
he was ordered suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years effective
September 26, 2016. No sooner had he started serving the penalty when the
infractions here came to light. They are not just a reincarnation of the same breach of
the rule against conflict of interest but one which dwarfs the first in terms of the
number of persons affected, the amounts involved, and the audacity and temerity of
its commission.
It has been ruled that "[d]isbarment should never be decreed where any lesser
penalty could accomplish the end desired. Undoubtedly, a violation of the high moral
standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty,
including suspension and disbarment. These penalties are imposed with great caution,
because they are the most severe forms of disciplinary action and their consequences
are beyond repair." 27 DaIAcC

We understand this is the rule. But the threshold here has been passed. This is
the second time in a very short span of time that Respondent must answer to a
situation of conflict of interest involving substantial amounts of money. He has been
warned the first time; he has not made amends to undo the consequences of his
 indiscretions and greed this second time. He was punished with three (3) years of
suspension, but to no avail, as no sooner could he complete the service of the penalty
than he is again before the IBP and the Court reviewing his actuations.
In Pacana v. Pascual-Lopez, 28 the disbarred lawyer collected money and
properties from the client and failed to account for them as she was also representing
clients with interests adverse to the former. 29 The situation here is similar to Pacana.
Respondent was involved conflict of interest and guilty of failure to account for the
funds owing their clients.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Respondent Atty. Elmer A. Dela Rosa
GUILTY of gross misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
He is DISBARRED from the practice of law. The Office of the Bar Confidant is
DIRECTED to strike out the name of Elmer A. Dela Rosa from the Roll of
Attorneys. This Resolution is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated
proceedings to be initiated against Respondent.
The Office of the Bar Confidant should attach a copy of this Decision to
Respondent's records in its custody. Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts in the country.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin, C.J., Carpio, Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa,
A.B. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, J.C. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier,
Inting and Zalameda, JJ., concur.
(Palalan Carp Farmers Multi-Purpose Coop v. Dela Rosa, A.C. No. 12008, [August 14,
|||

2019])

FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 10543. March 16, 2016.]

NENITA D. SANCHEZ, petitioner, vs. ATTY. ROMEO G.

AGUILOS, respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J : p
 This administrative case relates to the performance of duty of an attorney
towards his client in which the former is found and declared to be lacking in
knowledge and skill sufficient for the engagement. Does quantum meruit attach when
an attorney fails to accomplish tasks which he is naturally expected to perform during
his professional engagement?
Antecedents
Complainant Nenita D. Sanchez has charged respondent Atty. Romeo G.
Aguilos (respondent) with misconduct for the latter's refusal to return the amount of
P70,000.00 she had paid for his professional services despite his not having
performed the contemplated professional services. She avers that in March 2005, she
sought the legal services of the respondent to represent her in the annulment of her
marriage with her estranged husband, Jovencio C. Sanchez; that the respondent
accepted the engagement, fixing his fee at P150,000.00, plus the appearance fee of
P5,000.00/hearing; that she then gave to him the initial amount of P90,000.00; 1 that
she had gone to his residence in May 2005 to inquire on the developments in her case,
but he told her that he would only start working on the case upon her full payment of
the acceptance fee; that she had only learned then that what he had contemplated to
file for her was a petition for legal separation, not one for the annulment of her
marriage; that he further told her that she would have to pay a higher acceptance fee
for the annulment of her marriage; 2 that she subsequently withdrew the case from
him, and requested the refund of the amounts already paid, but he refused to do the
same as he had already started working on the case; 3 that she had sent him a letter,
through Atty. Isidro S.C. Martinez, to demand the return of her payment less whatever
amount corresponded to the legal services he had already performed; 4 that the
respondent did not heed her demand letter despite his not having rendered any
appreciable legal services to her; 5 and that his constant refusal to return the amounts
prompted her to bring an administrative complaint against him 6 in the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) on March 20, 2007.
In his answer dated May 21, 2007, 7 the respondent alleges that the
complainant and her British fiancée sought his legal services to bring the petition for
the annulment of her marriage; that based on his evaluation of her situation, the more
appropriate case would be one for legal separation anchored on the psychological
incapacity of her husband; that she and her British fiancée agreed on P150,000.00 for
his legal services to bring the action for legal separation, with the fiancée paying him
P70,000.00, as evidenced by his handwritten receipt; 8 that for purposes of the petition
for legal separation he required the complainant to submit copies of her marriage
contract and the birth certificates of her children with her husband, as well as for her
to submit to further interviews by him to establish the grounds for legal separation;
that he later on communicated with her and her fiancée upon finalizing the petition,
but they did not promptly respond to his communications; that in May 2005, she
admitted to him that she had spent the money that her fiancée had given to pay the
balance of his professional fees; and that in June 2005, she returned to him with a note
at the back of the prepared petition for legal separation essentially requesting him not
to file the petition because she had meanwhile opted to bring the action for the
annulment of her marriage instead.
The respondent admits that he received the demand letter from Atty. Martinez,
but states that he dismissed the letter as a mere scrap of paper because the demand
lacked basis in law. It is noted that he wrote in the last part of his answer dated May
21, 2007 in relation to the demand letter the following:
Hence, respondent accordingly treated the said letter demand for
refund dated 15 August 2005 (Annex "B" of the complaint) as a mere scrap of
paper or should have been addressed by her counsel ATTY. ISIDRO S.C.
MARTINEZ, who unskillfully relied on an unverified information furnished
him, to the urinal project of the MMDA where it may serve its rightful
purpose. 9cSEDTC

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) summoned the parties to a
mandatory conference on August 3, 2007, 10 but only the complainant and her counsel
attended the conference. On his part, the respondent sent a letter dated July 20, 2007
to the IBP-CBD to reiterate his answer. 11 Due to his non-appearance, the IBP-CBD
terminated the conference on the same day, but required the complainant to submit a
verified position paper within 10 days. She did not submit the position paper in the
end.
In his commissioner's report dated July 25, 2008, 12 IBP Investigating
Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. declared that the respondent's insistence that he
could have brought a petition for legal separation based on the psychological
incapacity of the complainant's husband was sanctionable because he himself was
apparently not conversant with the grounds for legal separation; that because he
rendered some legal services to the complainant, he was entitled to receive only
P40,000.00 out of the P70,000.00 paid to him as acceptance fee, the P40,000.00 being
the value of the services rendered under the principle of quantum meruit; and that,
accordingly, he should be made to return to her the amount of P30,000.00.
IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. observed that the
respondent's statement in the last part of his answer, to the effect that the demand
letter sent by Atty. Martinez in behalf of the complainant should be treated as a scrap
of paper, or should have been addressed "to the urinal project of the MMDA where it
may serve its rightful purpose," was uncalled for and improper; and he opined that
such offensive and improper language uttered by the respondent against a fellow
lawyer violated Rule 8.01 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. ultimately recommended as
follows:
 The undersigned Commissioner is most respectfully recommending
the following:
(1) To order the respondent to return to the complainant the amount of
P30,000.00 which he received for the purpose of preparing a
petition for legal separation. Undersigned believes that
considering the degree of professional services he has extended,
the amount of P40,000.00 he received on March 10, 2005 would
be sufficient payment for the same.
(2) For failure to distinguish between the grounds for legal separation
and annulment of marriage, respondent should be sanctioned. AIDSTE

(3) Lastly, for failure to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness towards

his colleagues and for using offensive or improper language in
his pleading, which was filed right before the Commission on
Bar Discipline, he must also be sanctioned and disciplined in
order to avoid repetition of the said misconduct.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is most respectfully
recommended that Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos be ordered to return to
complainant Nenita D. Sanchez the amount of P30,000.00 which the former
received as payment for his services because it is excessive.
It is also recommended that the Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for failure to show his
respect to his fellow lawyer and for using offensive and improper language in
his pleadings.
Through Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated September 20, 2008, 14 the IBP
Board of Governors affirmed the findings of Investigating Commissioner De La
Rama, Jr., but modified the recommendation of the penalty, viz.:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED AND APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and considering respondent's failure to show respect to his
fellow lawyer and for showing offensive and improper words in his pleadings,
Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos, is hereby WARNED and Ordered to Return the
Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos to complainant within thirty (30) days
from receipt of notice. 15
The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, 16 which the IBP Board of
Governors denied through Resolution No. XXI-2014-177 dated March 23, 2014. 17
Issues
The two issues for consideration and resolution are: (a) whether or not the
respondent should be held administratively liable for misconduct; and (b) whether or
not he should be ordered to return the attorney's fees paid.
 Ruling of the Court
We adopt and affirm Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 and Resolution No. XXI-
2014-177, but modify the recommended penalty.
1.
Respondent was liable for misconduct,
and he should be ordered to return
the entire amount received from the client
The respondent offered himself to the complainant as a lawyer who had the
requisite professional competence and skill to handle the action for the annulment of
marriage for her. He required her to pay P150,000.00 as attorney's fees, exclusive of
the filing fees and his appearance fee of P5,000.00/hearing. Of that amount, he
received the sum of P70,000.00.
On the respondent's conduct of himself in his professional relationship with the
complainant as his client, we reiterate and adopt the thorough analysis and findings by
IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. to be very apt and cogent, viz.:
As appearing in Annex "4", which is the handwritten retainer's
contract between the respondent and the complainant, there is a sweeping
evidence that there is an attorney-client relationship. The respondent agreed to
accept the case in the amount of P150,000.00. The acceptance fee was agreed
upon to be paid on installment basis. Excluded in the agreement is the
payment of appearance fee, filing fee and other legal documentation.
That next question is — for what case the P150,000.00 was intended
for? Was it intended for the filing of the annulment case or legal separation?
In the verified Answer filed by the respondent, even the latter is quite
confused as to what action he is going to file in court. The intention of the
British national and the complainant was to get married. At that time and
maybe up to now, the complainant is still legally married to a certain Jovencio
C. Sanchez. That considering that the two are intending to get married, we can
safely assume that the complainant was contemplating of filing a petition for
annulment of marriage in order to free her from the marriage bond with her
husband. It is only then, granting that the petition will be granted, that the
complainant will be free to marry the British subject. The legal separation is
but a separation of husband and wife from board and bed and the marriage
bond still exists. Granting that the petition for legal separation will be granted,
one is not free to marry another person.
A reading of the answer filed by the respondent would show that he
himself is not well versed in the grounds for legal separation. He stated the
following;
. . . respondent suggested to them to file instead a legal
separation case for the alleged psychological incapacity of her
husband to comply with his marital obligations developed or of
 their marriage on February 6, 1999. (please see par. 2 of the
Answer).
If the intention was to file a petition for legal separation, under A.M.
02-11-11-SC, the grounds are as follows:
Sec. 2. Petition. —
(a) Who may and when to file — (1) A petition for
legal separation may be filed only by the husband or the wife,
as the case may be, within five years from the time of the
occurrence of any of the following causes:
(a) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive
conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a
child of the petitioner;
(b) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the
petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
(c) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the
petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to
engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or
inducement; AaCTcI

(d) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to

imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned;
(e) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the
respondent;
(f) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent:
(g) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent
bigamous marriage, whether in or outside the Philippines;
(h) Sexual infidelity or perversion of the respondent;
(i) Attempt on the life of petitioner by the respondent;
or
(j) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without
justifiable cause for more than one year.
Psychological incapacity, contrary to what respondent explained to the
complainant, is not one of those mentioned in any of the grounds for legal
separation.
Even in Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
psychological incapacity is never a ground for the purpose of filing a petition
for legal separation.
On the other hand, psychological incapacity has always been used for
the purpose of filing a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage.
 That as provided for by Article 36 of the New Family Code, it states
that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
That lawyers shall keep abreast of the legal developments and
participate in continuing legal education program (Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility) in order to prevent repetition of such kind of
advise that respondent gave to the complainant. In giving an advise, he should
be able to distinguish between the grounds for legal separation and grounds
for annulment of marriage. But as the respondent stated in his answer, it
appears that he is mixed up with the basic provisions of the law. 18
Clearly, the respondent misrepresented his professional competence and skill
to the complainant. As the foregoing findings reveal, he did not know the distinction
between the grounds for legal separation and for annulment of marriage. Such
knowledge would have been basic and expected of him as a lawyer accepting a
professional engagement for either causes of action. His explanation that the client
initially intended to pursue the action for legal separation should be disbelieved. The
case unquestionably contemplated by the parties and for which his services was
engaged, was no other than an action for annulment of the complainant's marriage
with her husband with the intention of marrying her British fiancée. They did not
contemplate legal separation at all, for legal separation would still render her
incapacitated to re-marry. That the respondent was insisting in his answer that he had
prepared a petition for legal separation, and that she had to pay more as attorney's fees
if she desired to have the action for annulment was, therefore, beyond comprehension
other than to serve as a hallow afterthought to justify his claim for services rendered.
As such, the respondent failed to live up to the standards imposed on him as an
attorney. He thus transgressed Canon 18, and Rules 18.01, 18.02 and 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 18 — A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rules 18.01 — A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which
he knows or should know that he is not qualified to render. However, he
may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as
collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02 — A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without
adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
(Emphasis supplied)
 The next to be dealt with is the matter of the attorney's fees. We can easily
agree that every attorney is entitled to have and receive a just and reasonable
compensation for services performed at the special instance and request of his client.
As long as the attorney is in good faith and honestly trying to represent and serve the
interests of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for such services. 19
The attorney's fees shall be those stipulated in the retainer's agreement between
the client and the attorney, which constitutes the law between the parties for as long as
it is not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or public order. 20
The underlying theory is that the retainer's agreement between them gives to the client
the reasonable notice of the arrangement on the fees. Once the attorney has performed
the task assigned to him in a valid agreement, his compensation is determined on the
basis of what he and the client agreed. 21 In the absence of the written agreement, the
lawyer's compensation shall be based on quantum meruit, which means "as much as
he deserved." 22 The determination of attorney's fees on the basis of quantum meruit is
also authorized "when the counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able to finish the case
to its conclusion." 23 Moreover, quantum meruit becomes the basis of recovery of
compensation by the attorney where the circumstances of the engagement indicate
that it will be contrary to the parties' expectation to deprive the attorney of all
compensation.
Nevertheless, the court shall determine in every case what is reasonable
compensation based on the obtaining circumstances, 24 provided that the attorney does
not receive more than what is reasonable, in keeping with Section 24 of Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, to wit: EcTCAD

Section 24.  Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. — An

attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a
reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the
subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion
of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may
disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional
knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid
therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
The court's supervision of the lawyer's compensation for legal services rendered is not
only for the purpose of ensuring the reasonableness of the amount of attorney's fees
charged, but also for the purpose of preserving the dignity and integrity of the legal
profession. 25
The respondent should not have accepted the engagement because as it was
later revealed, it was way above his ability and competence to handle the case for
annulment of marriage. As a consequence, he had no basis to accept any amount as
attorney's fees from the complainant. He did not even begin to perform the
contemplated task he undertook for the complainant because it was improbable that
the agreement with her was to bring the action for legal separation. His having
supposedly prepared the petition for legal separation instead of the petition for
annulment of marriage was either his way of covering up for his incompetence, or his
means of charging her more. Either way did not entitle him to retain the amount he
had already received. SDHTEC

The written receipt dated March 10, 2005 shows that the respondent received
P70,000.00 as acceptance fee. His refusal to return the amount to the complainant
rested on his claim of having already completed the first phase of the preparation of
the petition for legal separation after having held conferences with the complainant
and her British fiancée. In this respect, IBP Investigating Commission De la Rama, Jr.
opined that the respondent could retain P40,000.00 of the P70,000.00 because the
respondent had rendered some legal services to the complainant, specifically: (a)
having the complainant undergo further interviews towards establishing the ground
for legal separation; (b) reducing into writing the grounds discussed during the
interviews based on her statement in her own dialect (Annexes 1 and 2) after he could
not understand the written statement prepared for the purpose by her British fiancée;
(c) requiring her to submit her marriage contract with her husband Jovencio C.
Sanchez (Annex 3), and the certificates of live birth of her four children: Mary Joy,
Timothy, Christine, and Janette Anne, all surnamed Sanchez (Annexes 4, 5, 6 and 7);
and (d) finalizing her petition for legal separation (Annex 8) in the later part of April,
2007.
The opinion of IBP Investigating Commission De la Rama, Jr. in favor of the
respondent was too generous. We cannot see how the respondent deserved any
compensation because he did not really begin to perform the contemplated tasks if,
even based on his version, he would prepare the petition for legal separation instead
of the petition for annulment of marriage. The attorney who fails to accomplish the
tasks he should naturally and expectedly perform during his professional engagement
does not discharge his professional responsibility and ethical duty toward his client.
The respondent was thus guilty of misconduct, and may be sanctioned according to
the degree of the misconduct. As a consequence, he may be ordered to restitute to the
client the amount received from the latter in consideration of the professional
engagement, subject to the rule on quantum meruit, if warranted.
Accordingly, the respondent shall be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for his
misrepresentation of his professional competence, and he is further to be ordered to
return the entire amount of P70,000.00 received from the client, plus legal interest of
6% per annum reckoned from the date of this decision until full payment.
2.
Respondent did not conduct himself
with courtesy, fairness and candor towards
his professional colleague
The Rules of Court mandates members of the Philippine Bar to "abstain from
all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation
of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged." 26 This duty of lawyers is further emphasized in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, whose Canon 8 provides: "A lawyer shall conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel." Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 specifically
demands that: "A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper."
The Court recognizes the adversarial nature of our legal system which has
necessitated lawyers to use strong language in the advancement of the interest of their
clients. 27 However, as members of a noble profession, lawyers are always impressed
with the duty to represent their clients' cause, or, as in this case, to represent a
personal matter in court, with courage and zeal but that should not be used as license
for the use of offensive and abusive language. In maintaining the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession, a lawyer's language — spoken or in his pleadings — must be
dignified. 28 As such, every lawyer is mandated to carry out his duty as an agent in the
administration of justice with courtesy, dignity and respect not only towards his
clients, the court and judicial officers, but equally towards his colleagues in the Legal
Profession. AScHCD

The respondent's statement in his answer that the demand from Atty. Martinez
should be treated "as a mere scrap of paper or should have been addressed by her
counsel . . . to the urinal project of the MMDA where it may service its rightful
purpose" constituted simple misconduct that this Court cannot tolerate.
In his motion for reconsideration, the respondent tried to justify the offensive
and improper language by asserting that the phraseology was not per se uncalled for
and improper. He explained that he had sufficient cause for maintaining that the
demand letter should be treated as a mere scrap of paper and should be disregarded.
However, his assertion does not excuse the offensiveness and impropriety of his
language. He could have easily been respectful and proper in responding to the letter.
As penalty for this particular misconduct, he is reprimanded, with the stern
warning that a repetition of the offense will be severely punished.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476
dated September 20, 2008 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors, with the MODIFICATION that Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos is hereby
FINED P10,000.00 for misrepresenting his professional competence to the client, and
REPRIMANDS him for his use of offensive and improper language towards his
fellow attorney, with the stern warning that a repetition of the offense shall be
severely punished.
The Court ORDERS Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos to RETURN to the complainant
within thirty (30) days from notice the sum of P70,000.00, plus legal interest of 6%
per annum reckoned from the date of this decision until full payment.
 Let copies of this decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Romeo
G. Aguilos as a member of the Philippine Bar, and be furnished to the Office of the
Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Perlas-Bernabe and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
||| (Sanchez v. Aguilos, A.C. No. 10543, [March 16, 2016])

FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 9119. March 12, 2018.]

EUGENIO E. CORTEZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. HERNANDO P.

CORTES, respondent.

DECISION

TIJAM, J : p

The instant controversy arose from a Complaint-Affidavit 1 filed by

complainant Eugenio E. Cortez 2 against respondent Atty. Hernando P. Cortes (Atty.
Cortes) for grave misconduct, and violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code for
Professional Responsibility.caITAC

Complainant alleged that he engaged the services of Atty. Cortes as his counsel
in an illegal dismissal case against Philippine Explosives Corporation (PEC). He
further alleged that he and Atty. Cortes had a handshake agreement on a 12%
contingency fee as and by way of attorney's fees. 3
Atty. Cortes prosecuted his claims for illegal dismissal which was decided in
favor of complainant. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission ordering PEC to pay complainant the total amount of
One Million One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,100,000) in three staggered payments.
PEC then issued City Bank Check No. 1000003986 dated March 31, 2005 in the
amount of Five Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P550,000), Check No. 1000003988 in
the amount of Two Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P275,000) dated April
15, 2005, and Check No. 1000003989 also in the amount of Two Hundred Seventy-
Five Thousand Pesos (P275,000) dated April 30, 2005, all payable in the name of
complainant. 4
 Complainant narrated that after the maturity of the first check, he went to
China Bank, Southmall Las Piñas with Atty. Cortes and his wife to open an account to
deposit the said check. Atty. Cortes asked complainant to wait outside the bank while
he personally, for and in his behalf, facilitated the opening of the account. After thirty
minutes, he was asked to go inside and sign a joint savings account with Atty. Cortes.
5
On April 7, 2005, complainant alleged that when he was about to withdraw the
amount of the initial check deposited, Atty. Cortes arrived with his wife and ordered
the bank teller to hold off the transaction. When complainant asked why he did that,
Atty. Cortes answered that 50% of the total awarded claims belongs to him as
attorney's fees. When complainant questioned him, Atty. Cortes became hysterical
and imposingly maintained that 50% of the total awarded claims belongs to him. 6
Complainant then tried to pacify Atty. Cortes and his wife and offered to pay
P200,000, and when Atty. Cortes rejected it, he offered the third check amounting to
P275,000, but Atty. Cortes still insisted on the 50% of the total award. Complainant
was then forced to endorse the second and third checks to Atty. Cortes, after which he
was able to withdraw the proceeds of the first check. With the help of the lawyers in
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), complainant was able to have the drawer
of the checks cancel one of the checks endorsed to Atty. Cortes before he was able to
encash the same.
Atty. Cortes, in his Answer, admitted that his services were engaged by
complainant to pursue the labor claims. He, however, denied that they agreed on a
12% contingency fee by way of attorney's fees. 7
Atty. Cortes claimed that complainant is a relative of his, but considering that
the case was to be filed in Pampanga and he resided in Las Piñas, he would only
accept the case on a fifty-fifty sharing arrangement. 8
Atty. Cortes alleged that the checks were issued pursuant to the pre-execution
agreement reached by the parties at the office of Labor Arbiter Herminio V. Suelo. He
and complainant agreed that the amount of the first check be divided fifty-fifty, the
whole of the second check would be the complainant's, and the third check would be
his. 9
Atty. Cortes further alleged that he had to assist complainant in the opening of
an account to deposit the checks. Atty. Cortes had to convince the bank manager to
accept the checks issued in the name of Eugene E. Cortez despite the fact that
complainant's ID's are all in the name of Eugenio E. Cortez. 10 He claimed that
anyone in his place would have demanded for the holding off of the transaction
because of the base ingratitude, patent deception and treachery of complainant. 11
Atty. Cortes posited that the check forms part and parcel of the judgment
award to which he had a lien corresponding to his attorney's fees and complainant
should have at least invited him to witness the "harvest of the fruits." 12
 Atty. Cortes insisted that the alleged 12% agreement is false, being merely a
concoction of complainant's fertile and unstable mind. He also pointed out that the
fifty-fifty sharing arrangement is not unconscionably high because the complainant
was given the option to hire other lawyers, but still he engaged his services. 13
After hearing and submission of position papers, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, in a Report and Recommendation dated April 11, 2007, recommended the
six-month suspension of Atty. Cortes. It ruled that a contingent fee arrangement
should generally be in writing, and that contingent fees depend upon an express
contract without which the lawyer can only recover on the basis of quantum meruit. It
also pointed out that the Labor Code establishes a limit as to the amount of attorney's
fees that a lawyer may collect or charge his client in labor cases.
The report and recommendation was adopted and approved by the IBP Board
of Governors in an August 17, 2007 Resolution:
RESOLUTION NO. XVIII-2007-74
CBD Case No. 05-1482
Eugenio E. Cortez vs.
Atty. Hernando P. Cortes
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution
as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for violation of
Article 11(b) of the Labor Code, Atty. Hernando P. Cortes is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months and Ordered to
Return to complainant whatever amount he received in excess of the 10%
allowable attorney's fees in labor case (sic).
ICHDca

TOMAS N. PRADO
National Secretary 14

A motion for reconsideration 15 was filed by Atty. Cortes, which was denied
by the IBP Board of Governors. 16
The issue, plainly, is whether or not the acts complained of constitute
misconduct on the part of Atty. Cortes, which would subject him to disciplinary
action.
We rule in the affirmative.
We have held that a contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction. It is
generally recognized as valid and binding, but must be laid down in an express
contract. 17 The case of Rayos v. Atty. Hernandez 18 discussed the same succinctly,
thus:
 A contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction and is
generally recognized as valid and binding but must be laid down in an
express contract. The amount of contingent fee agreed upon by the parties is
subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal services only if
the suit or litigation prospers. A much higher compensation is allowed as
contingent fee in consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if
the suit fails. Contracts of this nature are permitted because they redound to
the benefit of the poor client and the lawyer especially in cases where the
client has meritorious cause of action, but no means with which to pay for
legal services unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a contract for a
contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of the litigation. Oftentimes, the
contingent fee arrangement is the only means by which the poor and helpless
can seek redress for injuries sustained and have their rights vindicated. 19
(Emphasis Ours)
In this case, We note that the parties did not have an express contract as
regards the payment of fees. Complainant alleges that the contingency fee was fixed
at 12% via a handshake agreement, while Atty. Cortes counters that the agreement
was 50%.
The IBP Commission on Discipline pointed out that since what respondent
handled was merely a labor case, his attorney's fees should not exceed 10%, the rate
allowed under Article 111 20 of the Labor Code.
Although we agree that the 50% contingency fee was excessive, We do not
agree that the 10% limitation as provided in Article 111 is automatically applicable.
The case of Masmud v. NLRC (First Division), et al., 21 discussed the matter
of application of Article 111 of the Labor Code on attorney's fees:
There are two concepts of attorney's fees. In the ordinary sense,
attorney's fees represent the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by
his client for the legal services rendered to the latter. On the other hand,
in its extraordinary concept, attorney's fees may be awarded by the court
as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing
party, such that, in any of the cases provided by law where such award can be
made, e.g., those authorized in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, the amount is
payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the
award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part
thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
Contrary to Evangelina's proposition, Article 111 of the Labor Code
deals with the extraordinary concept of attorneys fees. It regulates the
amount recoverable as attorney's fees in the nature of damages sustained
by and awarded to the prevailing party. It may not be used as the
standard in fixing the amount payable to the lawyer by his client for the
legal services he rendered. 22 (Emphasis Ours)
 It would then appear that the contingency fees that Atty. Cortes required is in
the ordinary sense as it represents reasonable compensation for legal services he
rendered for complainant. Necessarily, the 10% limitation of the Labor Code would
not be applicable. Beyond the limit fixed by Article 111, such as between the lawyer
and the client, the attorney's fees may exceed 10% on the basis of quantum meriut. 23
We, however, are hard-pressed to accept the justification of the 50% contingency fee
that Atty. Cortes is insisting on for being exorbitant.
Generally, the amount of attorney's fees due is that stipulated in the retainer
agreement which is conclusive as to the amount of the lawyers compensation. In the
absence thereof, the amount of attorney's fees is fixed on the basis of quantum meruit,
i.e., the reasonable worth of the attorneys services. 24 Courts may ascertain also if the
attorney's fees are found to be excessive, what is reasonable under the circumstances.
In no case, however, must a lawyer be allowed to recover more than what is
reasonable, pursuant to Section 24, Rule 138 25 of the Rules of Court. 26
Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "A lawyer shall
charge only fair and reasonable fees." Rule 20.01 of the same canon enumerates the
following factors which should guide a lawyer in determining his fees:
(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the
proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the
IBP Chapter to which he belongs; TCAScE

(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the
client from the service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
Here, as set out by Atty. Cortes himself, the complainant's case was merely
grounded on complainant's alleged absence without leave for the second time and
challenging the plant manager, the complainant's immediate superior, to a fist fight.
He also claimed that the travel from his home in Las Piñas City to San Fernando,
Pampanga was costly and was an ordeal. We likewise note that Atty. Cortes admitted
that complainant was a close kin of his, and that complainant appealed to his services
because, since his separation from work, he had no visible means of income and had
so many mouths to feed. These circumstances cited by Atty. Cortes to justify the fees,
 to Our mind, does not exculpate Atty. Cortes, but in fact, makes Us question all the
more, the reasonableness of it.
We believe and so hold that the contingent fee here claimed by Atty. Cortes
was, under the facts obtaining in this case, grossly excessive and unconscionable. The
issues involved could hardly be said to be novel and Atty. Cortes in fact already knew
that complainant was already hard up. We have held that lawyering is not a
moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants. 27 Law advocacy, it has been
stressed, is not capital that yields profits. 28 The returns it births are simple rewards
for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which
enjoy a greater deal of freedom from governmental interference, is impressed with a
public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation. 29
Here, considering that complainant was amenable to a 12% contingency fee,
and which we likewise deem to be the reasonable worth of the attorney's services
rendered by Atty. Cortes under the circumstances, Atty. Cortes is hereby adjudged to
return to complainant the amount he received in excess of 12% of the total award. If
the Law has to remain an honorable profession and has to attain its basic ideal, those
enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also,
by their lives, accord continuing fidelity to such tenets and principles. 30
We, however, find that the recommended suspension of six months is too harsh
and considering that Atty. Cortes is nearing ninety years old and that there was no
question that Atty. Cortes was able to get a favorable outcome, a reduction of the
suspension is proper. We then reduce and sanction Atty. Cortes to a three-month
suspension from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Hernando P. Cortes is
found GUILTY of violation of Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months, and is
ordered to return to complainant Eugenio E. Cortez the amount he received in excess
of the 12% allowable attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-de Castro, ** Del Castillo and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Sereno, * C.J., is on leave.
||| (Cortez v. Cortes, A.C. No. 9119, [March 12, 2018])

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 11246. June 14, 2016.]

ARNOLD PACAO, complainant, vs. ATTY. SINAMAR LIMOS,

respondent.
 DECISION

PER CURIAM : p

Before this Court is a verified complaint 1 filed on November 4, 2011 by

Arnold Pacao (complainant), seeking the disbarment of Atty. Sinamar Limos (Atty.
Limos) for conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar.
The Facts
Sometime in March 2008, complainant's wife Mariadel Pacao, former vault
custodian of BHF Pawnshop (BHF) branch in Mandaluyong City, was charged with
qualified theft by BHF. At the preliminary investigation, Atty. Limos appeared as
counsel for BHF. Thereafter, the case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City. 2
To buy peace, the complainant initiated negotiation with BHF, through Atty.
Limos, for a possible settlement. A meeting was then arranged between the
complainant and Atty. Limos, where the latter represented that she was duly
authorized by BHF. After a series of negotiations, Atty. Limos relayed that BHF is
demanding the sum of P530,000.00 to be paid in full or by installments. Further
negotiation led to an agreement whereby the complainant would pay an initial amount
of P200,000.00 to be entrusted to Atty. Limos, who will then deliver to the
complainant a signed affidavit of desistance, a compromise agreement, and a joint
motion to approve compromise agreement for filing with the court. 3
On October 29, 2009, the complainant gave the initial amount of P200,000.00
to Atty. Limos, who in turn, signed an Acknowledgment Receipt 4 recognizing her
undertakings as counsel of BHF. However, Atty. Limos failed to meet the terms of
their agreement. Notwithstanding such failure, Atty. Limos still sought to get from the
complainant the next installment amount of their purported agreement, but the latter
refused. 5
Thereafter, in June 2010, the complainant met BHF's representative, Camille
Bonifacio, who informed him that Atty. Limos was no longer BHF's counsel and was
not authorized to negotiate any settlement nor receive any money in behalf of BHF.
The complainant also learned that BHF did not receive the P200,000.00 initial
payment that he gave to Atty. Limos. 6
This prompted the complainant to send a demand letter 7 to Atty. Limos to
return the P200,000.00 initial settlement payment, but the latter failed and refused to
do so. 8
The complainant then filed a disbarment case against Atty. Limos before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). The
IBP-CBD required Atty. Limos to file an answer but she did not file any responsive
pleading. 9 A mandatory conference was then set on March 1 and 29, 2012, and April
19, 2012, but Atty. Limos failed to attend. Thereafter, the IBP-CBD ordered the
parties to submit their position paper, but once again, Atty. Limos did not bother to
submit her position paper.
On May 5, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the
disbarment of Atty. Limos. 10 The Investigating Commissioner found enough
evidence on record to prove that Atty. Limos committed fraud and practiced deceit on
the complainant to the latter's prejudice by concealing or omitting to disclose the
material fact that she no longer had the authority to negotiate and conclude a
settlement for and on behalf of BHF, nor was authorized to receive the P200,000.00
from the complainant. Atty. Limos was likewise ordered to return to the complainant
the full amount of P200,000.00 with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum
from the date of her receipt of the said amount to the date of her return of the full
amount. 11
In a Resolution 12 dated April 19, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the Investigating Commissioner's report and recommendation.
On March 8, 2016, the IBP transmitted the notice of the resolution and the case
records to the Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. 13
As per verification of the Court, neither party has filed a motion for reconsideration or
a petition for review thereafter.
cSEDTC

The Issue
Whether or not the instant disbarment complaint constitutes a sufficient basis
to disbar Atty. Limos from the practice of law? 14
Ruling of the Court
To begin with, the Court notes that this is not the first time that Atty. Limos is
facing an administrative case, for she had already been twice suspended from the
practice of law, by this Court, for three months each in Villaflores v. Atty. Limos 15
and Wilkie v. Atty. Limos. 16 In Villaflores, Atty. Limos received attorney's fees of
P20,000.00 plus miscellaneous expenses of P2,000.00, but she failed to perform her
undertaking with her client; thus she was found guilty of gross negligence and
dereliction of duty. Likewise, in Wilkie, Atty. Limos was held administratively liable
for her deceitful and dishonest conduct when she obtained a loan of P250,000.00 from
her client and issued two postdated checks in the latter's favor to pay the said loan
despite knowledge of insufficiency of funds to cover the same. In both cases, the
Court, gave Atty. Limos a warning that repetition of the same or similar acts by her
will merit a more severe penalty.
Once again, for the third time, Atty. Limos is facing an administrative case
before this Court for receiving the amount of P200,000.00 from the complainant
purportedly for a possible amicable settlement with her client BHF. However, Atty.
Limos was no longer BHF's counsel and was not authorize to negotiate and conclude
a settlement for and on behalf of BHF nor was she authorized to receive any money in
behalf of BHF. Her blunder is compounded by the fact that she did not turn over the
money to BHF, nor did she return the same to the complainant, despite due demand.
Furthermore, she even tried to get the next installment knowing fully well that she
was not authorized to enter into settlement negotiations with the complainant as her
engagement as counsel of BHF had already ceased.
The fact that this is Atty. Limos' third transgression exacerbates her offense.
The foregoing factual antecedents demonstrate her propensity to employ deceit and
misrepresentation. It is not too farfetched for this Court to conclude that from the very
beginning, Atty. Limos had planned to employ deceit on the complainant to get hold
of a sum of money. Such a conduct is unbecoming and does not speak well of a
member of the Bar.
Atty. Limos' case is further highlighted by her lack of regard for the charges
brought against her. Similar with Wilkie, despite due notice, Atty. Limos did not
bother to answer the complaint against her. She also failed to file her mandatory
conference brief and her verified position paper. Worse, Atty. Limos did not even
enter appearance either personally or by counsel, and she failed to appear at the
scheduled date of the mandatory conferences which she was duly notified. 17
By her failure to present convincing evidence, or any evidence for that matter,
to justify her actions, Atty. Limos failed to demonstrate that she still possessed the
integrity and morality demanded of a member of the Bar. Her seeming indifference to
the complaint brought against her was made obvious by her unreasonable absence
from the proceedings before the IBP. Her disobedience to the IBP is, in fact, a gross
and blatant disrespect for the authority of the Court.
Despite her two prior suspensions, still, Atty. Limos is once again
demonstrating to this Court that not only is she unfit to stay in the legal profession for
her deceitful conduct but is also remiss in following the dictates of the Court, which
has supervision over her. Atty. Limos' unwarranted obstinacy is a great insolence to
the Court which cannot be tolerated.
The present case comes clearly under the grounds given in Section 27, 18 Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Court, however, does not hesitate to impose
the penalty of disbarment when the guilty party has become a repeat offender.
Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of Atty. Limos' prior
misconduct which grossly degrades the legal profession, the imposition of the
ultimate penalty of disbarment is warranted.
In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon Atty. Limos, the Court is aware
that the power to disbar is one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as a
legal professional and as an officer of the Court. 19 However, Atty. Limos' recalcitrant
attitude and unwillingness to heed with the Court's warning, which is deemed to be an
 affront to the Court's authority over members of the Bar, warrant an utmost
disciplinary sanction from this Court. Her repeated desecration of her ethical
commitments proved herself to be unfit to remain in the legal profession. Worse, she
remains apathetic to the need to reform herself. SDAaTC

"[T]he practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon
those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required
by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions." 20 "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men
in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to
ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office, and sets
a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body
politic." 21
Indeed, Atty. Limos has disgraced the legal profession. The facts and evidence
obtaining in this case definitely establish her failure to live up to her duties as a
lawyer in accordance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, thereby making her unworthy to
continue as a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sinamar Limos, having violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility by committing grave misconduct and willful
insubordination, is DISBARRED and her name ordered STRICKEN OFF the Roll
of Attorneys effective immediately.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the records of Atty. Sinamar Limos.
Further, let other copies be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the
Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts
in the country for their information and guidance.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED. AaCTcI

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin, Perez,

Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Brion * and Del Castillo, * JJ., are on official leave.
Peralta ** and Jardeleza, ** JJ., are on official business.
Footnotes
||| (Pacao v. Limos, A.C. No. 11246, [June 14, 2016])

EN BANC
 [A.C. No. 11099. September 27, 2016.]

LILY FLORES-SALADO, MINDA FLORES-LURA, and FE V.

FLORES, complainants, vs. ATTY. ROMAN A. VILLANUEVA, JR.,
respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J : p

Disbarment proceedings based on falsification or forgery of public documents

should not be the occasion to establish the falsification or forgery. Such bases should
first be duly and competently established either in criminal or civil proceedings
appropriate for that purpose.
The Case
We hereby consider and resolve the disbarment complaint lodged against Atty.
Roman A. Villanueva, Jr. for allegedly falsifying a public document concerning
realty, and for allegedly concealing his true age in order to secure his appointment as
state prosecutor.
Antecedents
Lily Flores-Salado, Minda Flores-Lura, Anacorito Flores, Angel Flores, Jr.,
and Fe Flores presented their adverse claim 1 on the parcel of land situated in Nasipit,
Agusan del Norte and registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7919
of the Registry of Deeds of Agusan del Norte under the names of Spouses Roman
Villanueva, Jr. and Rosario L. Alipao. 2 The Register of Deeds annotated the adverse
claim on January 23, 2007 as Entry No. 67251. 3 On December 27, 2007, an affidavit
of waiver/withdrawal, which appeared to have been signed by them, 4 was also
annotated on TCT No. 7919 as Entry No. 72573. 5 On March 26, 2008, the Register of
Deeds canceled TCT No. 7919, 6 and issued two new TCTs in the name of the
respondent. 7
On October 29, 2009, complainants Lily Flores-Salado, Minda Flores-Lura,
and Fe Flores lodged their complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
charging the respondent with gross dishonesty on the basis of their assertion therein
that they had not signed the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal. 8 They thereby further
charged him with dishonesty for concealing his true age in order to secure his
appointment in 2006 as a state prosecutor. They avered that he was disqualified for
the position because he had already been 70 years old at the time of his appointment, 9
having been born on June 26, 1936; that they submitted as proof: (1) the residence
certificate issued in the name of "Isabelo Villanueva, Jr.," whom they claimed was the
respondent himself, stating June 26, 1936 as his birthdate; 10 (2) the deed of
extrajudicial partition of the estate of Roman Villanueva, Sr. showing that the
respondent was 14 years old when he signed the document as "Isabelo Villanueva"; 11
(3) the certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Tupi, South Cotabato 12
showing that he was 26 years old when he got married on December 24, 1961; and (4)
the affidavits respectively executed by his siblings, Francisca V. Flores 13 and Tarcela
V. Sajulan. 14
The respondent denied the charges, and imputed ill-motives to the
complainants in filing the disbarment complaint against him. 15 He contended that the
complainants did not present sufficient proof showing that he had falsified the
affidavit of waiver/withdrawal; and asserted that the basis for the partition of the
contested property had been the compromise agreement entered into by him and his
siblings, including Francisca, the complainants' mother; 16 and that he had been born
on November 29, 1943, as indicated in his birth certificate. 17
IBP Report and Recommendation
After due hearing, Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez of the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) submitted his report and recommendation 18 finding the
respondent liable for gross misconduct in relation to the forged the affidavit of
waiver/withdrawal, and recommended his two-year suspension from the practice of
law. Commissioner Fernandez dismissed the charge of dishonesty in relation to the
respondent's age because his birth certificate prevailed over the documents submitted
by the complainants. 19
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XX-
2013-278 20 adopting the report and recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez,
viz.:
ICHDca

RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-278

CBD Case No. 10-2684
Lily Salado, et al. vs.
Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr.
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A," and finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and
considering that Respondent was guilty of gross misconduct when he falsified
an Affidavit of Waiver/Withdrawal by reason of which TCT Nos. RT-8320
and 8381 in his name were issued, Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr. is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years. However, the
charge of falsifying his age to qualify as DOJ Prosecutor is hereby Dismissed
for lack of merit. 21 (Bold emphasis in the original)
 The parties respectively sought reconsideration. 22 On June 6, 2015, the IBP
Board of Governors denied the respondent's motion for reconsideration but granted
that of the complainants, to wit:
RESOLUTION NO. XXI-2015-417
CBD Case No. 10-2684
Lily Salado, et al.
Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr.
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there being
no cogent reason to reverse the findings and resolution subject of the motion,
it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out
and taken into consideration.
RESOLVED FURTHER, to GRANT the Complainants' Motion for
Reconsideration, considering Respondent's gross dishonesty by making
himself younger when he applied as Public Prosecutor in the Department of
Justice. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-278, dated March 20, 2013, is hereby
AFFIRMED with modification, increasing the penalty imposed on Atty.
Roman A. Villanueva, Jr. to Suspension from the practice of law for three
(3) years. 23 (Bold emphasis in the original)
Issue
Should the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for gross
misconduct and gross dishonesty?
Ruling of the Court
We reverse the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
considering that the charges were not competently substantiated.
I
Falsification must be proved in the
appropriate criminal or civil proceeding,
not in the disbarment proceeding
The complainants support their allegations of falsification by presenting the
affidavit of waiver/withdrawal itself and its annotation on TCT No. 7919; and by
denying their having signed the same. However, such proof was inadequate to
establish that the respondent had been the author of the alleged falsification of the
affidavit of waiver/withdrawal. TCAScE

We emphasize that allegations of falsification or forgery must be competently

proved because falsification or forgery cannot be presumed. 24 As such, the
allegations should first be established and determined in appropriate proceedings, 25
like in criminal or civil cases, for it is only by such proceedings that the last word on
the falsity or forgery can be uttered by a court of law with the legal competence to do
so. A disbarment proceeding is not the occasion to determine the issue of falsification
or forgery simply because the sole issue to be addressed and determined therein is
whether or not the respondent attorney is still fit to continue to be an officer of the
court in the dispensation of justice. 26 Accordingly, we decline to rule herein whether
or not the respondent had committed the supposed falsification of the affidavit of
waiver/withdrawal in the absence of the prior determination thereof in the appropriate
proceeding.
Moreover, the complainants have hereby challenged the due execution and
authenticity of the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal, a notarized document. 27 In view of
this, the complainants' mere denial of having signed the affidavit of
waiver/withdrawal did not suffice to overcome the positive value of it as a notarized
document. 28 It is settled that notarization converts a private document into a public
document, whereby the document becomes entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face. 29 The notarized document then has in its favor the presumption of regularity,
and to overcome the presumed regularity of its execution, whoever alleges the
contrary should present evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant. 30
II
The birth certificate is the best evidence
of the respondent's date of birth
The complainants have also charged the respondent with dishonesty for having
concealed his true age in order to secure his appointment as a state prosecutor. They
have presented in support of the charge the residence certificate issued in the name of
one "Isabelo Villanueva, Jr."; an extrajudicial settlement signed by one "Isabelo
Villanueva"; the certificate issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Tupi, South
Cotabato showing that the respondent was 26 years old when he got married in 1961;
and the affidavits of the respondent's two siblings.
In contrast, the respondent submitted his certificate of birth that indicated his
birthdate as "November 29, 1943."
Still, the complainants doubted the veracity of the respondent's birth certificate
on the ground of its having been belatedly registered at his own instance.
The Court nonetheless finds for the respondent.
Firstly, as previously emphasized, the allegation of the falsity of the affidavit
of waiver/withdrawal should first be determined in the appropriate criminal or civil
proceeding, not in this proceeding for disbarment. Consequently, we desist from
definitively ruling on the weight of the evidence presented by the complainants.
Secondly, a birth certificate consists of entries related to the fact of birth in
public records, and is made in the performance of duty by the local civil registrar as a
public officer. 31 It is thus treated as the prima facie evidence of the fact of one's birth,
and can be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 32 As such,
the birth certificate submitted by the respondent was decisive on the date of his birth
in the absence of clearer and more convincing contrary evidence.
 Thirdly, the veracity of the respondent's birth certificate cannot be successfully
assailed on the basis alone of its being belatedly entered in the local civil registry.
This is because the State expressly allows the late registration of births not only at the
instance of the father, mother, or guardian in case the person whose birth is to be
registered is under 18 years of age, but also at the instance of the person himself when
already of age. 33 To accord with such policy of the State, the fact of late registration
of the respondent's birth should not adversely affect the validity of the entries made in
his birth certificate.
cTDaEH

And, finally, it is fitting to state that the complainants bore the burden of proof
in this disbarment proceeding against the respondent. They must establish their
charges of falsification and dishonesty by convincing and satisfactory proof. 34
Surmises, suspicion and conjectures are not bases of finding his culpability. 35 The
foregoing disquisitions on the falsification show that the complainants did not
discharge their burden of proof thereon. They also did not convincingly establish that
the respondent had willfully adjusted his true age to secure his appointment as a state
prosecutor. Indeed, the appointment happened on February 22, 2006, 36 but his late
registration of his birth occurred on July 3, 2006. 37 If the intention for the late
registration was to make it appear that he still met the age requirement for public
prosecutors, he should have effected the late registration prior to the appointment, not
several months subsequently. In addition, he submitted a "Voter Certification"
showing him to be a registered voter of Balagtas (Bigaa), Bulacan on September 20,
2003, and to have been born on November 29, 1943. 38 Under the circumstances, that
he had intentionally adjusted his birthdate to enable himself to meet the age
requirement for the position of state prosecutor three years later became plainly
improbable.
III
Disbarment or suspension complaints against lawyers
in the public service involving their qualifications
should be initially investigated by the agencies or offices
having administrative supervision over them
The Court finds the need to clarify that although it may entertain a disbarment
or suspension complaint brought against a lawyer employed in the government
service whether or not the complaint pertained to an act or conduct unrelated to the
discharge of his official functions, 39 the investigation should be carried out by the
agency or office having administrative supervision over him or her when the
allegations of the complaint relate to the qualifications of the respondent to be
appointed to the public office.
Accordingly, any questions pertaining to the qualifications of the respondent to
be appointed as a state prosecutor should be directed to the Secretary of Justice who
had administrative supervision over him under the law, 40 and not to this Court in the
guise of the disbarment complaint. The complaint for disbarment is sui generis, and
 the proceeding thereon should focus only on the qualification and fitness of the
respondent lawyer to continue membership in the Bar. 41
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the disbarment complaint against
Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr. for lack of factual and legal merit.
SO ORDERED. cSaATC

Sereno, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Del Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Perlas-
Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Carpio, * J., is on wellness.
Leonardo-de Castro, ** J., is on official business.
Brion, *** J., is on leave.
Reyes, **** J., is on sick leave.
(Flores-Salado v. Villanueva, Jr., A.C. No. 11099, [September 27, 2016], 796 PHIL 40-
|||

51)

FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 5333. March 13, 2017.]

ROSA YAP PARAS, complainant, vs. JUSTO DE JESUS PARAS,

respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p

This administrative case stemmed from the disbarment complaint 1 (1995

complaint) filed by Rosa Yap Paras (complainant) against her husband Justo de Jesus
Paras (respondent) for which he was suspended from the practice of law for a year.
The issues before the Court now are (a) whether respondent should be held
administratively liable for allegedly violating his suspension order and (b) whether his
suspension should be lifted.

The Facts

In a Decision 2 dated October 18, 2000, the Court suspended respondent from
the practice of law for six (6) months for falsifying his wife's signature in bank
documents and other related loan instruments, and for one (1) year for immorality and
abandonment of his family, with the penalties to be served simultaneously. 3
Respondent moved for reconsideration 4 but the Court denied it with finality in a
Resolution 5 dated January 22, 2001.
On March 2, 2001, complainant filed a Motion 6 to declare in contempt and
disbar respondent and his associate, Atty. Richard R. Enojo (Atty. Enojo), alleging
that respondent continued to practice law, and that Atty. Enojo signed a pleading
prepared by respondent, in violation of the suspension order. 7 Moreover, complainant
claimed that respondent appeared before a court in Dumaguete City on February 21,
2001, thereby violating the suspension order. 8 On March 26, 2001, complainant filed
a second motion for contempt and disbarment, 9 claiming that, on March 13, 2001,
Atty. Enojo again appeared for Paras and Associates, in willful disobedience of the
suspension order issued against respondent. 10 Complainant filed two (2) more
motions for contempt dated June 8, 2001 11 and August 21, 2001 12 raising the same
arguments. Respondent and Atty. Enojo filed their respective comments, 13 and
complainant filed her replies 14 to both comments. Later on, respondent filed a
Motion to Lift Suspension 15 dated May 27, 2002, informing the Court that he
completed the suspension period on May 22, 2002. Thereafter, respondent admitted
that he started accepting new clients and cases after the filing of the Motion to Lift
Suspension. 16 Also, complainant manifested that respondent appeared before a court
in an election case on July 25, 2002 despite the pendency of his motion to lift
suspension. In view of the foregoing, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for report and recommendation. 17
On March 26, 2003, complainant filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Clarificatory
Order 18 on the status of respondent' suspension, essentially inquiring whether
respondent can resume his practice prior to the Court's order to lift his suspension. 19
Meanwhile, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received the same inquiry through
a Letter 20 dated March 21, 2003 signed by Acting Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) Judge Romeo Anasario of the Second MCTC of Negros Oriental.
Accordingly, the Court referred the foregoing queries to the OBC for report and
recommendation. 21
In a Report and Recommendation 22 dated June 22, 2004, the OBC
recommended that the Court issue an order declaring that respondent cannot engage in
the practice of law until his suspension is ordered lifted by the Court. 23 Citing case
law, the OBC opined that the lifting of a lawyer's suspension is not automatic upon
the end of the period stated in the Court's decision and an order from the Court lifting
the suspension is necessary to enable him to resume the practice of his profession. In
this regard, the OBC noted that: (a) respondent's suspension became effective on
May 23, 2001 upon his receipt of the Court resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration with finality; and (b) considering that the suspensions were to be
served simultaneously, the period of suspension should have ended on May 22,
2002. 24 To date, however, the Court has not issued any order lifting the suspension.
CAIHTE
 Soon thereafter, in a Resolution 25 dated August 2, 2004, the Court directed
the IBP to submit its report and recommendation on the pending incidents referred to
it. Since no report was received until 2013, the Court was constrained to issue a
Resolution 26 dated January 20, 2014, requiring the IBP to submit a status report
regarding the said incidents. In response, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline sent
a letter 27 to the Court, conveying that the Board of Governors had passed a
Resolution dated April 15, 2013 affirming respondent's suspension from the practice
of law. 28 However, in view of the pendency of respondent's motion for
reconsideration before it, the IBP undertook to transmit the case records to the Court
as soon as said motion is resolved. 29 Thereafter, in a letter 30 dated September 22,
2015, the IBP advised the Court that it denied respondent's motion for
reconsideration. The Court received the records and relevant documents only on
February 15, 2016. 31

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In the Report and Recommendation 32 dated January 16, 2012, instead of

resolving only the pending incidents referred to the IBP, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner examined anew the 1995 complaint filed against respondent which had
been resolved with finality by the Court in its Decision dated October 18, 2000 and
Resolution dated January 22, 2001. The Investigating Commissioner recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years for falsifying
his wife's signature in the bank loan documents and for immorality. 33
In a Resolution 34 dated April 15, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the Report and Recommendation dated January 16, 2012, with
modification decreasing the recommended penalty to suspension from the practice of
law for one (1) year. 35 Aggrieved, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, 36
alleging that his administrative liability based on the charges in the 1995 complaint
had been settled more than a decade ago in the Court's Decision dated October 18,
2000. He added that to suspend him anew for another year based on the same grounds
would constitute administrative double jeopardy. He stressed that the post-decision
referral of this case to the IBP was limited only to pending incidents relating to the
motion to declare him in contempt and his motion to lift the suspension. Such motion
was, however, denied in a Resolution dated June 7, 2015. 37

The Issues before the Court

The core issues in this case are: (a) whether respondent should be
administratively held liable for practicing law while he was suspended; and (b)
whether the Court should lift his suspension.

The Court's Ruling

 At the outset, the Court notes that the instant matters referred to the IBP for
investigation, report, and recommendation pertain to respondent's alleged violation of
the suspension order and his request for the Court to lift the suspension order.
However, the IBP Investigating Commissioner evidently did not dwell on such
matters. Instead, the IBP Investigating Commissioner proceeded to determine
respondent's liability based on the 1995 complaint filed by herein complainant —
which was already resolved with finality by no less than the Court itself. To make
things worse: (a) the IBP Board of Governors failed to see the IBP Investigating
Commissioner's mishap, and therefore, erroneously upheld the latter's report and
recommendation; and (b) it took the IBP more than a decade to resolve the instant
matters before it. Thus, this leaves the Court with no factual findings to serve as its
basis in resolving the issues raised before it.
Generally, the IBP's formal investigation is a mandatory requirement which
may not be dispensed with, except for valid and compelling reasons, 38 as it is
essential to accord both parties an opportunity to be heard on the issues raised. 39
Absent a valid fact-finding investigation, the Court usually remands the
administrative case to the IBP for further proceedings. 40 However, in light of the
foregoing circumstances, as well as respondent's own admission that he resumed
practicing law even without a Court order lifting his suspension, the Court finds a
compelling reason to resolve the matters raised before it even without the IBP's
factual findings and recommendation thereon.
According to jurisprudence, the "practice of law embraces any activity, in or
out of court, which requires the application of law, as well as legal principles, practice
or procedure[,] and calls for legal knowledge, training[,] and experience." 41 During
the suspension period and before the suspension is lifted, a lawyer must desist from
practicing law. 42 It must be stressed, however, that a lawyer's suspension is not
automatically lifted upon the lapse of the suspension period. 43 The lawyer must
submit the required documents and wait for an order from the Court lifting the
suspension before he or she resumes the practice of law. 44
In this case, the OBC correctly pointed out that respondent's suspension period
became effective on May 23, 2001 and lasted for one (1) year, or until May 22, 2002.
Thereafter, respondent filed a motion for the lifting of his suspension. However, soon
after this filing and without waiting for a Court order approving the same, respondent
admitted to accepting new clients and cases, and even working on an amicable
settlement for his client with the Department of Agrarian Reform. 45 Indubitably,
respondent engaged in the practice of law without waiting for the Court order lifting
the suspension order against him, and thus, he must be held administratively liable
therefor.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any
lawful order of a superior court and willfully appearing as an attorney without
authority to do so — acts which respondent is guilty of in this case — are grounds for
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law, 46 to wit:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;
grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent, prevailing case law 47
shows that the Court consistently imposed an additional suspension of six (6) months
on lawyers who continue practicing law despite their suspension. Thus, an additional
suspension of six (6) months on respondent due to his unauthorized practice of law is
proper. The Court is mindful, however, that suspension can no longer be imposed on
respondent considering that just recently, respondent had already been disbarred from
the practice of law and his name had been stricken off the Roll of Attorneys in Paras
v. Paras. 48 In Sanchez v. Torres, 49 the Court ruled that the penalty of suspension or
disbarment can no longer be imposed on a lawyer who had been previously disbarred.
50 Nevertheless, it resolved the issue on the lawyer's administrative liability for
recording purposes in the lawyer's personal file in the OBC. Hence, the Court held
that respondent therein should be suspended from the practice of law, although the
said penalty can no longer be imposed in view of his previous disbarment. In the same
manner, the Court imposes upon respondent herein the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months, although the said penalty can no longer
be effectuated in view of his previous disbarment, but nonetheless should be adjudged
for recording purposes. That being said, the issue anent the propriety of lifting his
suspension is already moot and academic. DETACa

As for Atty. Enojo, complainant insists that by signing a pleading dated

February 21, 2001 51 and indicating therein the firm name Paras and Associates, Atty.
Enojo conspired with respondent to violate the suspension order.
Complainant's contention is untenable.
As a lawyer, Atty. Enojo has the duty and privilege of representing clients
before the courts. Thus, he can sign pleadings on their behalf. The Court cannot give
credence to complainant's unsubstantiated claim that respondent prepared the pleading
and only requested Atty. Enojo to sign it. Furthermore, the pleading averted to by
complainant was dated February 21, 2001, when respondent's suspension was not yet
effective. Thus, the contempt charge against Atty. Enojo must be denied for lack of
merit.
 As a final note, the Court reminds the IBP to meticulously, diligently, and
efficiently act on the matters referred to it for investigation, report, and
recommendation, and to submit its report with reasonable dispatch so as to ensure
proper administration of justice. Any inordinate delay cannot be countenanced.
WHEREFORE, respondent Justo de Jesus Paras is hereby found GUILTY of
violating Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, he is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. However,
considering that respondent has already been previously disbarred, this penalty can no
longer be imposed.
The motion to declare Atty. Richard R. Enojo in contempt is DENIED for lack
of merit.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies
of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country
for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Del Castillo and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
||| (Paras v. Paras, A.C. No. 5333 (Resolution), [March 13, 2017], 807 PHIL 153-164)

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 9000. January 10, 2018.]

TOMAS P. TAN, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. HAIDE V. GUMBA,

respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J : p

This case is an offshoot of the administrative Complaint 1 filed by Tomas P.

Tan, Jr. (complainant) against Atty. Haide V. Gumba (respondent), and for which
respondent was suspended from the practice of law for six months. The issues now
ripe for resolution are: a) whether respondent disobeyed a lawful order of the Court by
not abiding by the order of her suspension; and b) whether respondent deserves a
stiffer penalty for such violation.

Factual Antecedents

According to complainant, in August 1999, respondent obtained from him a

P350,000.00 loan with 12% interest per annum. Incidental thereto, respondent
executed in favor of complainant an undated Deed of Absolute Sale 2 over a 105-
square meter lot located in Naga City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
2055 3 under the name of respondent's father, Nicasio Vista. Attached to said Deed
was a Special Power of Attorney 4 (SPA) executed by respondent's parents
authorizing her to apply for a loan with a bank to be secured by the subject property.
Complainant and respondent purportedly agreed that if the latter failed to pay the loan
in or before August 2000, complainant may register the Deed of Absolute Sale with
the Register of Deeds (RD). 5
Respondent failed to pay her loan when it fell due. And despite repeated
demands, she failed to settle her obligation. Complainant attempted to register the
Deed of Absolute Sale with the RD of Naga City but to no avail because the aforesaid
SPA only covered the authority of respondent to mortgage the property to a bank, and
not to sell it. 6
Complainant argued that if not for respondent's misrepresentation, be would
not have approved her loan. He added that respondent committed dishonesty, and
used her skill as a lawyer and her moral ascendancy over him in securing the loan.
Thus, he prayed that respondent be sanctioned for her infraction. 7
In his Commissioner's Report 8 dated February 9, 2009, Commissioner Jose I.
de la Rama, Jr. (Commissioner de la Rama) faulted respondent for failing to file an
answer, and participate in the mandatory conference. He further declared that the SPA
specifically authorized respondent to mortgage to property with a bank. He stressed
that for selling the property, and not just mortgaging it to complainant, who was not
even a bank, respondent acted beyond her authority. Having done so, she committed
gross violation of the Lawyer's Oath as well as Canon 1, 9 Rule 1.01, 10 and Canon 7
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As such, he recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
In the Resolution No. XIX-2010-446 12 dated August 8, 2010, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines-Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) resolved to adopt and approve
the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner de la Rama.

Action of the Supreme Court

Thereafter, the Court issued a Resolution 13 dated October 5, 2011, which

sustained the findings and conclusion of the IBP. The Court nonetheless found the
reduction of the penalty proper, pursuant to its sound judicial discretion and on the
facts of the case. Accordingly, it suspended respondent from the practice of law for
six months, effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of same or similar
act will be dealt with more severely.
On March 14, 2012, the Court resolved to serve anew the October 5, 2011
Resolution upon respondent because its previous copy sent to her was returned
unserved. 14 In its August 13, 2012 Resolution, 15 the Court considered the October
5, 2011 Resolution to have been served upon respondent after the March 14, 2012
Resolution was also returned unserved. In the same resolution, the Court also denied
with finality respondent's motion for reconsideration on the October 5, 2011
Resolution.
Subsequently, Judge Margaret N. Armea (Judge Armea) of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities of Naga City, Branch 2 wrote a letter 16 inquiring from the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) whether respondent could continue representing her
clients and appear in courts. She also asked the OCA if the decision relating to
respondent's suspension, which was downloaded from the internet, constitutes
sufficient notice to disqualify her to appear in courts for the period of her suspension.
According to Judge Armea, her inquiry arose because respondent represented a
party in a case pending in her court; and, the counsel of the opposing party called
Judge Armea's attention regarding the legal standing of respondent to appear as
counsel. Judge Armea added that respondent denied that she was suspended to
practice law since she (respondent) had not yet received a copy of the Court's
resolution on the matter.
In her Answer/Comment 17 to the query of Judge Armea, respondent
countered that by reason of such downloaded decision, Judge Armea and Executive
Judge Pablo Cabillan Formaran III (Judge Formaran III) of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Naga City disallowed her appearance in their courts. She insisted that
service of any pleading or judgment cannot be made through the internet. She further
claimed that she had not received an authentic copy of the Court's October 5, 2011
Resolution.
On January 22, 2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) referred the
October 5, 2011 Resolution to the OCA for circulation to all courts. 18 In response, on
January 30, 2013, the OCA issued OCA Circular No. 14-2013 19 addressed to the
courts, 20 the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor (CSP), Public Attorney's Office
(PAO), and the IBP informing them of the October 5, 2011 and August 13, 2012
Resolutions of the Court.

IBP's Report and Recommendation

Meanwhile, in its Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-359 21 dated March 21,

2013, the IBP-BOG resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation
22 of Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero (Commissioner Cachapero) to dismiss the
complaint against respondent. According to Commissioner Cachapero, there is no rule
allowing the service of judgments through the internet; and, Judge Armea and Judge
Formaran III acted ahead of time when they implemented the suspension of
respondent even before the actual service upon her of the resolution concerning her
suspension.

Statement and Report of the OBC

In its November 22, 2013 Statement, 23 the OBC stressed that respondent
received the August 13, 2012 Resolution (denying her motion for reconsideration on
the October 5, 2011 Resolution) on November 12, 2012 per Registry Return Receipt
No. 53365. Thus, the effectivity of respondent's suspension was from November 12,
2012 until May 12, 2013. The OBC also pointed out that suspension is not
automatically lifted by mere lapse of the period of suspension. It is necessary that an
order be issued by the Court lifting the suspension to enable the concerned lawyer to
resume practice of law.
The OBC further maintained in its November 27, 2013 Report 24 that
respondent has no authority to practice law and appear in court as counsel during her
suspension, and until such time that the Court has lifted the order of her suspension.
Thus, the OBC made these recommendations:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully
recommended that:
1. Respondent be REQUIRED to file a sworn statement with motion to
lift order of her suspension, attaching therewith certifications from the Office
of the Executive Judge of the court where she practices [h]er profession and
IBP Local Chapter of which she is affiliated, that she has ceased and desisted
from the practice of law from 12 November 2012 to 12 May 2013,
immediately; and
2. The IBP be REQUIRED to EXPLAIN within 72 hours why they
should not be sanctioned for disciplinary action for issuing said Notice of
Resolution No. XX-2013-353, dated 21 March 2013, purportedly dismissing
this case for lack of merit. 25
On February 19, 2014, the Court noted 26 the OBC Report, and directed
respondent to comply with the guidelines relating to the lifting of the order of her
suspension as enunciated in Maniago v. Atty. De Dios. 27
Upon the request of respondent, on December 2, 2014, the OBC issued a
Certification, 28 which stated that respondent had been ordered suspended from the
practice of law for six months, and as of the issuance of said certification, the order of
her suspension had not yet been lifted.

Complaint against the OCA, the OBC and Atty. Paraiso

 On February 6, 2015, respondent filed with the RTC a verified Complaint 29
for nullity of clearance, damages, and preliminary injunction with urgent prayer for a
temporary restraining order against the OCA, the OBC, and Atty. Nelson P. Paraiso
(Atty. Paraiso). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2015-0007.
Essentially, respondent accused the OCA and the OBC of suspending her from
the practice of law even if the administrative case against her was still pending with
the IBP. She likewise faulted the OBC for requiring her to submit a clearance from its
office before she resumes her practice of law after the suspension. In turn, she argued
that Atty. Paraiso benefited from this supposed "bogus suspension" by publicly
announcing the disqualification of respondent to practice law.
In its Answer, 30 the OCA argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
action, which seeks reversal, modification or enjoinment of a directive of the Court.
The OCA also stressed that respondent should raise such matter by filing a motion for
reconsideration in the administrative case, instead of filing a complaint with the RTC.
It also stated that the issuance of OCA Circular No. 14-2013 was in compliance with
the Court's directive to inform all courts, the CSP, the PAO, and the IBP of the
suspension of respondent.
For its part, the OBC declared in a Report 31 dated March 24, 2015 that during
and after the period of her suspension, without the same having been lifted,
respondent filed pleadings and appeared in courts in the following cases:
x x x (1) Civil Case No. 2013-0106 (Romy Fay Gumba v. The City Assessor
of Naga City, et al.), (2) Civil Case No. RTC 2006-0063 (Sps. Jaime M.
Kalaw, et al. v. Fausto David, et al.), (3) Other Spec. Proc. No. RTC 2012-
0019 (Petition for Reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21128 of
the Registry of Deeds of Naga City v. Danilo O. Laborado). 32
The OBC likewise confirmed that as of the time it issued the March 24, 2015
Report, the Court had not yet lifted the order of suspension against respondent. The
OBC opined that for failing to comply with the order of her suspension, respondent
deliberately refused to obey a lawful order of the Court. Thus, it recommended that a
stiffer penalty be imposed against respondent.
On June 4, 2015, the OBC reported that the RTC dismissed Civil Case No.
2015-0007 for lack of jurisdiction, and pending resolution was respondent's motion
for reconsideration. 33

Issue

Is respondent administratively liable for engaging in the practice of law during

the period of her suspension and prior to an order of the Court lifting such
suspension?
 Our Ruling

Time and again, the Court reminds the bench and bar "that the practice of law
is not a right but a mere privilege [subject] to the inherent regulatory power of the
[Court]." 34 It is a "privilege burdened with conditions." 35 As such, lawyers must
comply with its rigid standards, which include mental fitness, maintenance of highest
level of morality, and full compliance with the rules of the legal profession. 36
With regard to suspension to practice law, in Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, 37 the
Court laid down the guidelines for the lifting of an order of suspension, to wit:
1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice
of law, the Court shall render a decision imposing the penalty;
2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory
upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a
motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall
render the decision final and executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a
Sworn Statement with the Court, through the Office of the Bar
Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from the practice of
law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her
suspension;
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the
IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has
pending cases handled by him or her, and/or where he or she has
appeared as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent's
compliance with the order of suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under
oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment,
or disbarment, as may be warranted. 38
Pursuant to these guidelines, in this case, the Court issued a Resolution dated
October 5, 2011 suspending respondent from the practice of law for six months
effective immediately. Respondent filed her motion for reconsideration. And, on
November 12, 2012, she received the notice of the denial of such motion per Registry
Return Receipt No. 53365.
While, indeed, service of a judgment or resolution must be done only
personally or by registered mail, 39 and that mere showing of a downloaded copy of
the October 5, 2011 Resolution to respondent is not a valid service, the fact, however,
that respondent was duly informed of her suspension remains unrebutted. Again, as
stated above, she filed a motion for reconsideration on the October 5, 2011
Resolution, and the Court duly notified her of the denial of said motion. It thus
follows that respondent's six months suspension commenced from the notice of the
denial of her motion for reconsideration on November 12, 2012 until May 12, 2013.
In Ibana-Andrade v. Atty. Paita-Moya, 40 despite having received the
Resolution anent her suspension, Atty. Paita-Moya continued to practice law. She
filed pleadings and she appeared as counsel in courts. For which reason, the Court
suspended her from the practice of law for six month in addition to her initial one
month suspension, or a total of seven months.
Too, in Feliciano v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada, 41 respondent therein, Atty.
Lozada, appeared and signed as counsel, for and in behalf of her husband, during the
period of her suspension from the practice of law. For having done so, the Court ruled
that she engaged in unauthorized practice of law. The Court did not give weight to
Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith as she was very well aware that when she
represented her husband, she was still serving her suspension order. The Court also
noted that Atty. Lozada did not seek any clearance or clarification from the Court if
she can represent her husband in court. In this regard, the Court suspended Atty.
Lozada for six months for her willful disobedience to a lawful order of the Court.
Similarly, in this case, the Court notified respondent of her suspension.
However, she continued to engage in the practice law by filing pleadings and
appearing as counsel in courts during the period of her suspension.
It is common sense that when the Court orders the suspension of a lawyer from
the practice of law, the lawyer must desist from performing all functions which
require the application of legal knowledge within the period of his or her suspension.
42 To stress, by practice of law, we refer to "any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and experience.
It includes performing acts which are characteristic of the legal profession, or
rendering any kind of service which requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge
or skill." 43 In fine, it will amount to unauthorized practice, and a violation of a lawful
order of the Court if a suspended lawyer engages in the practice of law during the
pendency of his or her suspension. 44
As also stressed by the OBC in its March 24, 2015 Report, during and even
after the period of her suspension and without filing a sworn statement for the lifting
of her suspension, respondent signed pleadings and appeared in courts as counsel.
Clearly, such acts of respondent are in violation of the order of her suspension to
practice law.
Moreover, the lifting of a suspension order is not automatic. It is necessary that
there is an order from the Court lifting the suspension of a lawyer to practice law. To
note, in Maniago, the Court explicitly stated that a suspended lawyer shall, upon the
expiration of one's suspension, file a sworn statement with the Court, and that such
statement shall be considered proof of the lawyer's compliance with the order of
suspension.
 In this case, on February 19, 2014, the Court directed respondent to comply
with the guidelines for the lifting of the suspension order against her by filing a sworn
statement on the matter. However, respondent did not comply. Instead, she filed a
complaint (Civil Case No. 2015-0007) against the OCA, the OBC and a certain Atty.
Paraiso with the RTC. For having done so, respondent violated a lawful order of the
Court, that is, to comply with the guidelines for the lifting of the order of suspension
against her.
To recapitulate, respondent's violation of the lawful order of the Court is two-
fold: 1) she filed pleadings and appeared in court as counsel during the period of her
suspension, and prior to the lifting of such order of her suspension; and 2) she did not
comply with the Court's directive for her to file a sworn statement in compliance with
the guidelines for the lifting of the suspension order.
Under Section 27, 45 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from practice of law for willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, among other grounds. Here, respondent willfully disobeyed
the Court's lawful orders by failing to comply with the order of her suspension, and to
the Court's directive to observe the guidelines for the lifting thereof. Pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence, the suspension for six (6) months from the practice of law
against respondent is in order. 46
WHEREFORE, Atty. Haide V. Gumba is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for an additional period of six (6) months (from her original six (6)
months suspension) and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense
will be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Haide V. Gumba is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of her
receipt of this Decision, to determine the reckoning point when her suspension shall
take effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar
Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and
guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of this
Decision to the record of respondent as member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin, Leonen and Martires, JJ., concur.
||| (Tan, Jr. v. Gumba, A.C. No. 9000, [January 10, 2018])

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 5473. January 23, 2018.]

 GENE M. DOMINGO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ANASTACIO E.
REVILLA, JR., respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM : p

A disbarred lawyer who is found to have committed an offense that constitutes

another ground prior to his eventual disbarment may be heavily fined therefor. The
Court does not lose its exclusive jurisdiction over his other disbarrable act or
actuation committed while he was still a member of the Law Profession.

The Case

Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment instituted by Gene Domingo
(complainant) against Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. (respondent), 1 alleging that the
latter deliberately and feloniously induced and persuaded the former into releasing
almost half a million pesos on the false pretense of having performed and
accomplished legal services for him.

Antecedents

The complainant is an American citizen of Filipino descent. During a visit to

the Philippines in 2000, he sought the services of a lawyer to handle the cases to be
filed against his cousin Melchor Arruiza and to work on the settlement of the estate of
his late mother Judith Arruiza. 2 In April 2000, petitioner met respondent, a lawyer
recommended by a friend. Petitioner informed respondent about his need for the
services of a lawyer for the rescission of Melchor Arruiza's adoption and for the
settlement of his mother's estate. 3
The complainant alleged that the respondent represented to him that he would
take on the cases in behalf of the law firm of Agabin Verzola Hermoso Layaoen & De
Castro, where he worked as an associate. He assured petitioner that the law firm was
able and willing to act as his legal counsel in the cases he intended to institute against
his adopted brother, and to undertake the transfer of his mother's properties to his and
his children's names. 4 Trusting the representations of respondent, the complainant
agreed to engage respondent and his law firm, and paid the initial amount of
P80,000.00.
 Being based in the United States of America, the complainant maintained
constant communication with respondent often through electronic mail (e-mail) and
sometimes by telephone to get updates on the cases. The complainant alleged that
based on his correspondences with respondent, the latter made several
misrepresentations, as follows:
[a)] He [had] filed the annulment of adoption of Melchor Arruiza in Abra,
stating that the hearing would commence by the end of May 2000; and
that the trial had been brought to completion;
[b)] He was processing the transfer of the titles of the properties [in the names
of petitioner and his children;]
[c)] He processed the cancellation of the adverse claim of Melchor Arruiza
annotated on the two titles of the properties, claiming that he was there
at the Land Registration Authority in Quezon City for the final approval
of the cancellation;
[d)] He was processing the payment of taxes and other fees on the properties to
be transferred, including capital gains tax, transfer tax, registration fees
and documentary stamp tax;
[e)] That he was negotiating with the Bureau of Internal Revenue to reduce the
tax from P80,000.00 to P10,000.00;
[f)] That the new titles in the names of petitioner's children would be ready by
July 20, 2000;
[g)] That the new titles in the children's names were issued;
[h)] That Melchor Arruiza opposed the cancellation of the adoption, and boasted
that he knew many big time politicians in Abra who would help him;
[i)] That the Judge x x x handling the case for the cancellation of the adoption
[would] rule in petitioner's favor only if he would give to the Judge 10%
of the value of the property in Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque
City;
[j)] That the Judge agreed on x x x P200,000.00 but he (respondent) needed an
additional P50,000.00 "for the boys" in the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court; CAIHTE

[k)] That the Judge [already wrote] a decision in petitioner's favor, but [for his
protection insisted upon a kaliwaan of the copy of the decision and the
payment;]
[l)] That the Judge received the money and [already promulgated the] decision
in petitioner's favor;
[m)] That said decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals and eventually to
the Supreme Court where respondent was working doubly hard to
influence [a favourable] outcome;
 [n)] That the Supreme Court had to meet en banc on the decision of the Abra
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge in petitioner's favor; and
[o)] That in consideration of all the above transactions, he (respondent) needed
money [totalling] P433,002.61 [as payment to the Judge, BIR and
related agencies, actual expenses and legal fees], [but requested] the
payment in staggered amounts and on different dates. 5
Based on the respondent's representation as to how justice was achieved in the
Philippines, the complainant was constrained to give to the respondent the requested
amounts in the belief that he had no choice. 6 The complainant would repeatedly
request the original or at the very least copies of the decisions and the titles by e-mail,
facsimile (fax) or courier service, but respondent repeatedly failed to comply with the
requests, giving various reasons or excuses. The respondent even volunteered to meet
with the complainant in the United States of America to personally deliver the
promised documents. The respondent never went to the United States of America to
meet with the complainant. He also did not turn over the requested documents to the
latter. Even worse, the respondent ultimately tried to avoid the complainant by cutting
off communications between them.
Given the respondent's evasion, the complainant decided to write the law firm
of Agabin Verzola Hermoso Layaoen & De Castro to inform them of the fraudulent
actions of the respondent. 7 The complainant was surprised to be informed by the law
firm that he had never been its client. 8 The law firm also told him that the respondent
had been forced to resign from the law office because of numerous complaints about
his performance as a lawyer. 9
Hence, the complainant terminated the services of the respondent for refusal to
respond and to surrender the alleged documents in his possession. He engaged the
services of another law firm to verify the status of the cases allegedly brought by
respondent in petitioner's behalf. The new law firm secured a certification from the
RTC of Abra to the effect that no case against Melchor Arruiza had been filed. The
complainant also discovered that none of the representations of the respondent, as
enumerated above, had come to pass because all of such representations were sham
and intended to induce him to remit almost half a million pesos to the respondent. 10
On July 24, 2001, the complainant filed his complaint for disbarment in this
the Court accusing the respondent of committing acts in violation of Canons 1, 2, 13,
15 & 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 11
On August 22, 2001, the Court required the respondent to comment. 12
In his comment dated October 21, 2001, 13 the respondent denied the
accusations, and countered as follows:
a) Petitioner wanted to have the adoption of Melchor D. Arruiza by his
late mother Judith D. Arruiza granted by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Dolores-San Juan in the Province of Abra annulled because he
had not been informed about the adoption which affected his inheritance,
particularly with respect to the two parcels of land located in Parañaque City.
Petitioner related to respondent why he (petitioner) filed the action for
annulment of adoption in the RTC in Parañaque City, but Branch 258 of the
RTC dismissed the petition on January 19, 2000 for lack of jurisdiction over
the case;
b) Following the dismissal of the case, petitioner desperately wanted to
revive it in the RTC in Abra. Petitioner also wanted the annotation of rights,
title and interest of Melchor Arruiza as a legally adopted son of his late
mother on the two titles cancelled, and to have the properties transferred in the
names of petitioner's children;
c) Respondent explained to petitioner that it would be very hard to
revive the case because the order of adoption issued on May 25, 1979 had
long become final and executory;
d) It would also be inconvenient for petitioner to pursue the
cancellation case considering that he was a permanent resident of the United
States of America and the need for his personal presence at the RTC in Abra
to testify against his adopted brother;
e) Respondent further told petitioner that his law firm at the time did
not allow its members to handle personal cases, especially if the cases were
filed in far flung provinces; and that the particular case of annulment of the
judgment of adoption, being a special proceeding, would take years to finish
inasmuch as the losing party would likely elevate the matter up to the
Supreme Court and would be very costly in terms of expenses and attorney's
fees;
f) Respondent claimed that petitioner still profusely pleaded with him
to pursue the case no matter how much it would cost him, as long as his
adopted brother was prevented from inheriting from the estate of his mother;
g) Respondent tried to talk some sense into petitioner, particularly that
it was only just and fair that his adopted brother would inherit from their
mother, but petitioner could not be swayed;
h) Even though respondent sensed the greediness, wickedness and
scheming design of petitioner, he still accepted the engagement to handle the
case of annulment of the judgment of adoption, as well as to have the
annotations at the back of the titles cancelled and eventually have the
properties transferred in the names of petitioner's children;
i) Respondent proposed that petitioner pay P500,000.00, more or less,
as the total package of expenses and attorney's fees; petitioner agreed to the
proposal and promised to remit the amount by installment upon his return to
the United States of America, and to send the special power of attorney
authorizing respondent to bring the case against Melchor Arruiza;
j) As a means of protecting the interest of petitioner, respondent
offered to issue a check for P500,000.00 as a security for the amount to be
 remitted by petitioner from his United States of America account; his offer of
the check was to give a sign of his good faith, because his primary aim was to
provide the best and effective legal services petitioner needed under the
circumstances;
k) Respondent then prepared an affidavit of self-adjudication for
petitioner respecting the two properties registered in the name of petitioner's
late mother; he caused the publication of the affidavit in a tabloid;
l) Respondent informed petitioner that there was no way for him to
win the annulment case unless he personally appeared and testified against his
adopted brother, but petitioner said that he could not personally testify
because he feared for his life due to Abra being an NPA-infested area;
m) On August 27, 2001, respondent went on and filed the complaint
for annulment of the adoption in the RTC in Abra, docketed as Civil Case No.
1989, even without any firm assurance from petitioner that he would
personally appear in court;
n) After the filing of the case, petitioner started making unreasonable
demands, like having an immediate decision from the RTC in Abra in his
favor, the cancellation of the adverse claim of his adopted brother on the titles
of the properties, and transferring the titles in the names of petitioner's three
children;
o) Respondent tried to explain to petitioner that his demands were
impossible to meet because civil and special proceedings cases take years to
finish inasmuch as the aggrieved parties would elevate the cases up to the
Supreme Court; and that the cancellation of the adverse claim would depend
on the outcome of the case they filed, but his refusal to appear and testify was
still a problem;
p) Petitioner still adamantly insisted that respondent comply with his
demands, or else he would sue him if he did not. 14
On November 26, 2001, the Court referred the complaint for disbarment and
the comment to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation or decision. 15
The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP conducted hearings. The
case was then submitted for resolution after the complainant and the respondent
submitted their manifestation and reply/counter manifestation, respectively.

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation dated September 6, 2002, 16 the IBP-CBD

found the respondent guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility with
respect to negligence in the performance of his duties towards his client, and
recommended the penalty of reprimand with a stern warning that a repetition of the
offense would warrant a more severe penalty. It ruled that the proceeding before it
was basically a disciplinary proceeding; that it could only decide on the fitness of
respondent to continue in the practice of law; 17 that it could not go beyond the
sanctions that could be imposed under the Rules of Court; that it had the power to
require the restitution of the client's money as part of the penalty; that it could only
order the restitution of whatever amount that was given by petitioner to respondent
but not other monetary claims of petitioner like travel and plane fare and litigation
expenses, which were properly within the jurisdiction of other authorities; 18 and that,
accordingly, it ordered respondent to immediately deliver to petitioner the amount of
P513,000.00, plus interest computed at the legal rate.
In Resolution No. XV-2002-597 passed on October 19, 2002, 19 the IBP Board
of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation dated
September 6, 2002 of the Investigating Commissioner.
On January 14, 2003, the complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 20
praying that Resolution No. XV-2002-597 be reconsidered and set aside, and that the
appropriate penalty of disbarment, or, at the very least, suspension be imposed on the
respondent.
On January 25, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed and adopted
Resolution No. XV-2003-49 21 denying the complainant's Motion for
Reconsideration on the ground that the Board had no jurisdiction to consider and
resolve the matter by virtue of its having already been endorsed to the Court.
Meanwhile, on January 29, 2003, the Court issued a resolution: (1) noting the
resolution of the IBP-CBD reprimanding the respondent; and (2) directing him to
inform the IBP of his compliance with the resolution. 22
After the IBP denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, the complainant
filed his petition dated March 6, 2003. 23
On April 3, 2003, the respondent filed his Manifestation and Motion praying
that the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors be reconsidered and set aside. 24
On April 30, 2003, the Court noted the IBP's denial of the complainant's
Motion for Reconsideration for lack of jurisdiction, and the respondent's
Manifestation and Motion; and took cognizance of the March 6, 2003 petition of the
complainant, and required the respondent to file his Comment. 25
On October 20, 2003, the Court took note of the respondent's Comment with
Motion for Reconsideration, and required the complainant to file his Reply. 26 After
requesting an extension of time to file his Reply, the complainant filed his Reply on
December 8, 2003. 27

Ruling of the Court

 In its findings, the IBP concluded that the respondent was guilty of negligence
in the performance of his duties to his client, and recommended that: (a) he be
reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition of his conduct would be dealt
with more severely; and (b) he be ordered to return the sums of money totalling
P513,000.00 he had received from the complainant. DETACa

After reviewing the established circumstances of the case, the Court accepts
the findings against the respondent but modifies the recommended penalty
considering that his violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility constituted
deliberate defraudation of the client instead of mere negligence.
Firstly, the respondent misled the complainant into thinking that it would be
his law firm that was to take on the case. Secondly, despite the fact that he had
intimated to the complainant that it would be highly unlikely to still have the adoption
decree nullified due to the decree having long become final and executory, he
nonetheless accepted the case. Thirdly, he told the complainant that he had already
instituted the action for the annulment of the adoption despite not having yet done so.
Fourthly, he kept on demanding more money from the complainant although the case
was not actually even moving forward. Fifthly, he continued to make up excuses in
order to avoid having to furnish to the complainant the requested copies of court
documents that, in the first place, he could not produce. And, lastly, he claimed that
he intended to return the money to the complainant but instead sent the latter a stale
check.
All these acts, whether taken singly or together, manifested the respondent's
dishonesty and deceit towards the complainant, his client, in patent violation of Rule
1.01 28 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
We note that the respondent filed the case for the annulment of the adoption
decree only on August 27, 2001 29 after the complainant had sent him the demand
letter dated April 10, 2001. 30 Such filing was already during the pendency of the
administrative investigation of the complaint against him in the IBP. Had the
complainant not threatened to charge him administratively, he would not have filed
the petition for annulment of the adoption at all.
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
The Court has consistently held, in respect of this Rule, that the mere failure of the
lawyer to perform the obligations due to the client is considered per se a violation. 31
Despite the fact that the complainant engaged his services and advanced sums
of money to cover the court fees and related expenses to be incurred along the way,
the respondent did not file the petition for annulment. His conduct was reprehensible
because it amounted to dishonesty and plain deceit. His filing of the petition for
annulment later on did not mitigate his sin because he did so only because he had
meanwhile received the complainant's demand letter that contained the threat of filing
administrative charges against him. Moreover, he repeatedly did not inform the
complainant on the actual status of the petition although the latter regularly sought to
be updated. Instead, the respondent kept on making up excuses and conjured up
pretenses to make it appear that the case was moving along. His conduct of accepting
money for his legal services in handling the annulment of the adoption decree, and of
failing to render the contracted legal services violated Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. 32 Also, the highly fiduciary and confidential relation of
attorney and client required that he as the lawyer should promptly account for all the
funds received from, or held by him for, the complainant as the client. 33
Furthermore, the respondent did not abide by the mandate of Canon 15 that
required members of the Legal Profession to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in
all their dealings and transactions with their clients.
In their conversations, the respondent told the complainant that the judge
handling the case would rule in their favor only if he would be given 10% of the value
of the property at Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, and that the handling judge
consequently agreed on the fee of P200,000.00 but needed an additional P50,000.00
"for the boys" in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. In doing so, the
respondent committed calumny, and thereby violated Rules 15.06 and 15.07 of Canon
15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 15.06 — A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any
public official, tribunal or legislative body.
Rule 15.07 — A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the
laws and principles of fairness.
Members of the Bench are tasked with ensuring that the ends of justice are
served. Such negative imputations against them and the collegial bodies of the
Judiciary on the part of the respondent tended to erode the trust and confidence of the
people in our judicial system. The Court should not take such conduct of the
respondent lightly considering that the image of the Judiciary was thereby diminished
in the eyes of the public; hence, the Court must severely reprove the respondent.
The respondent's commission of various offenses constituting professional
misconduct only demonstrated his unworthiness to remain as a member of the Legal
Profession. He ought to be disbarred for such offenses upon this complaint alone. A
review of his record as an admitted member of the Bar shows, however, that in Que v.
Revilla, Jr., 34 the Court had disbarred him from the Legal Profession upon finding
him guilty of violations of the Lawyers Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon
10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20 (d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court. In view of his prior disbarment, we can no longer impose the appropriate
penalty of disbarment as deserved because we do not have double or multiple
disbarments in this jurisdiction. 35
 In the meanwhile, on February 15, 2016, the respondent filed a so-called Most
Respectful Motion to Dismiss 36 in which he adverted to the earlier submission
through his Manifestation filed on April 24, 2015 37 of the copy of the amicable
settlement he had concluded with the complainant to the effect that, among others, he
had already paid back to the latter, through his lawyer (Atty. Hope Ruiz Valenzuela),
the amount of P650,000.00 "as full and complete settlement of the Complainant's
claims against the Respondent." He thereby sought the dismissal of the complaint out
of "justice and fairness."
In the resolution promulgated on September 22, 2015, the Court merely noted
without action the Manifestation dated April 21, 2015. 38
The Most Respectful Motion to Dismiss on the ground of the amicable
settlement between the parties cannot be granted. Although the amicable settlement
obliterated the legal obligation to return to the complainant the amounts obtained by
deceit, the respondent was not entitled to demand the dismissal of the charges against
him for that reason. He ought to have known that his professional responsibilities as
an attorney were distinct from his other responsibilities. To be clear, the primary
objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline
the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by
protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove
from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their Lawyer's Oath has
proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the
Bar. 39
Moreover, the practice of law is a privilege heavily burdened with conditions.
40 Every attorney is a vanguard of our legal system, and, as such, is expected to
maintain not only legal proficiency but also a very high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity, and fair dealing in order that the people's faith and confidence in the legal
system are ensured. 41 He must then conduct himself, whether in dealing with his
clients or with the public at large, as to be beyond reproach at all times. 42 Any
violation of the high moral standards of the Legal Profession justifies the imposition
on the attorney of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. 43
Verily, the respondent's deceitful conduct as an attorney rendered him directly
answerable to the Court on ethical, professional and legal grounds despite the fact that
he and the complainant had amicably settled any differences they had that might have
compelled the complainant to bring the complaint against him.
In fine, the gravity of the respondent's professional misconduct and deceit
should fully warrant his being permanently barred from reinstatement to the ranks of
the Philippine Bar and from having his name restored in the Roll of Attorneys. aDSIHc

However, circumstances attendant in his case should be considered and

appreciated in mitigating the penalty to be imposed. 44
 The first of such circumstances related to the context of the engagement
between the parties. Upon reflecting on the adverse effects on his inheritance from his
late mother of his cousin's adoption by her, the complainant had engaged the
respondent's legal services and representation for the purpose of nullifying or undoing
the adoption. At the outset, the respondent was candid in explaining to the
complainant that the prosecution of the case would be complicated mainly because the
adoption had been decreed in 1979 yet, and also because the complainant, as a
permanent resident of the United States of America, would be thereby encountering
difficulties and high costs, aside from untold inconvenience due to his physical
presence in the country being needed every now and then. 45 The respondent's candid
explanations notwithstanding, the complainant persisted in pursuing the case,
impelling the respondent to take on the engagement.
Another circumstance is that the respondent had already returned to the
complainant the amount of P650,000.00 the former had received from the latter on
account of the professional engagement. The returned amount was in full and
complete settlement of the latter's claims. 46 Judicial precedents exist in which the
Court treated the return in full of the money the respondent attorneys had received
from their complaining clients as mitigating circumstances that lowered the penalties
imposed. 47 For sure, the voluntary restitution by the respondent herein of the amount
received in the course of the professional engagement, even if it would not lift the
sanction meted on him, manifested remorse of a degree on his part for his
wrongdoing, and was mitigating in his favor.
And, thirdly, the Court cannot but note the respondent's several pleas for
judicial clemency to seek his reinstatement in the ranks of the Philippine Bar. 48 He
has backed up his pleas by adverting to his personal travails since his disbarment. He
claims, too, that his health has been failing of late considering that he had been
diagnosed to be suffering from chronic kidney disease, stage five, and has been
undergoing dialysis three times a week. 49 His advancing age and the fragile state of
his health may also be considered as a mitigating factor. 50 In addition, it is
noteworthy that he has been devoting some time to Christian and charity pursuits, like
serving with humility as a Lay Minister at St. Peter Church in Quezon City and as a
regular lecturer on the Legal Aspects of Marriage. 51
Pleas for judicial clemency reflected further remorse and repentance on the part
of the respondent. 52 His pleas appear to be sincere and heartfelt. In human
experience, remorse and repentance, if coupled with sincerity, have always been
regarded as the auspicious start of forgiving on the part of the offended, and may
eventually win even an absolution for the remorseful. The Court will not be the last to
forgive though it may not forget.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, perpetual disqualification from being
reinstated will be too grave a penalty in light of the objective of imposing heavy
penalties like disbarment to correct the offenders. 53 The penalty ought to be
 tempered to enable his eventual reinstatement at some point in the future. Verily,
permanently barring the respondent from reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys by
virtue of this disbarrable offense will deprive him the chance to return to his former
life as an attorney.
To start the respondent on the long road to reinstatement, we fine him in the
amount of P100,000.00, a figure believed to be a fair index of the gravity of his
misdeeds. Less than such amount might undeservedly diminish the gravity of his
misdeeds. At this juncture, it is relevant to note that he committed the offense
complained of herein before the Court disbarred him in A.C. 7054. Meting the stiff
fine despite his disbarment is a way for the Court to assert its authority and
competence to discipline all acts and actuations committed by the members of the
Legal Profession. The Court will not waver in doing so.
But the fine comes with the stern warning to the respondent that he must
hereafter genuinely affirm his remorse and start to demonstrate his readiness and
capacity to live up once again to the exacting standards of conduct demanded of every
member of the Bar in good standing and of every officer of the Court; 55 otherwise,
he would be sanctioned with greater severity.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND DECLARES ATTY. ANASTACIO
REVILLA, JR. GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rules 15.06 and 15.07
of Canon 15, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
but, in view of his continuing disbarment, hereby METES the penalty of FINE of
P100,000.00.
This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to: (a) the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their
information and guidance; (b) the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and (c) the Office
of the Bar Confidant to be appended to the respondent's personal record as a member
of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Bersamin,
Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, Tijam, Reyes, Jr. and Gesmundo,
JJ., concur.
Caguioa * and Martires, ** JJ., are on leave.
 
||| (Domingo v. Revilla, Jr., A.C. No. 5473, [January 23, 2018])

SECOND DIVISION
 [A.C. No. 9257. March 5, 2018.]
[Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3490]

EDGAR M. RICO, complainant, vs. ATTY. REYNALDO G.

SALUTAN, respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J : p

The present case was initiated through a letter complaint to Judge Antonio P.
Laolao, Sr., Presiding Judge of Municipal Trial Court, Branch 6, Davao City, against
respondent Atty. Reynaldo G. Salutan for purportedly misleading the court and for
contempt of court.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
Complainant Edgar M. Rico explained that his relatives were plaintiffs in a
civil case for Forcible Entry before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Branch 4, Davao City. The court had ordered the defendants to restore plaintiffs'
possession of the subject properties, remove all structures that had been introduced on
the same, and to pay reasonable sum for their occupation of the properties.
Milagros Villa Abrille, one of the defendants in the aforementioned case, filed
a separate case for Unlawful Detainer against Rico covering the same property. On
November 6, 2001, the MTCC ordered Rico to vacate the premises. Subsequently, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MTCC ruling and issued a Writ of
Execution.
On July 9, 2004, the court's sheriff executed a Return Service stating that the
writ could not be served on Rico since the property subject of the case was different
from the lot which Rico was occupying. Thereafter, Villa Abrille, through her
counsel, respondent Atty. Salutan, filed a motion for the issuance of an Alias Writ of
Execution. On May 15, 2007, the sheriff executed a Return of Service again since the
alias writ could not be enforced for the same reason as the first time. On April 4,
2008, Villa Abrille once again filed a motion for the issuance of another Alias Writ of
Execution, which, this time, the MTCC denied. Hence, Villa Abrille went to the Court
for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus to compel the MTCC to issue another Writ of
Execution and for the sheriff to implement the same. The Court, however, dismissed
the case.
For the fourth (4th) time, Villa Abrille filed another motion for the issuance of
a Writ of Execution. This time, the MTCC granted it. Consequently, the court sheriff
issued a Final Notice to Vacate to Rico on June 10, 2010. On June 15, 2010, the same
sheriff led the demolition of the house and other improvements on the property. Thus,
Rico filed the administrative complaint against Atty. Salutan.
For his part, Atty. Salutan denied the charges and argued that he merely
advocated for his client's cause and did the same within the bounds of the law and of
the rules. He merely did what a zealous lawyer would naturally do in representation of
his client.
On January 2, 2013, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) recommended the dismissal of the administrative complaint
against Atty. Salutan, to wit:
Foregoing premises considered, the undersigned believes and so holds
that the complaint is without merit. Accordingly, he recommends
DISMISSAL of the same. 1
On March 21, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-
2013-357, 2 which adopted the abovementioned recommendation, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the case is
hereby DISMISSED.
Thereafter, Rico moved for reconsideration of said Resolution. On March 23,
2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed another resolution, Resolution No. XXI-
2014-183, 3 denying said motion for reconsideration and approving its 2013
Resolution, to wit:
RESOLVED to DENY Complainant's Motion for Reconsideration, there being
no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and it being a
mere reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out and
taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-357 dated March 21,
2013 is hereby AFFIRMED.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings and
recommendation of the IBP that the instant administrative complaint against Atty.
Salutan must be dismissed.
In administrative proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant.
For the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must
be established by convincing and satisfactory proof. 4
Here, despite the charges hurled against Atty. Salutan, Rico failed to show any
badge of deception on the lawyer's part. There was no court decision declaring that
Villa Abrille's title was fake or that it had encroached on Rico's property. All that
Atty. Salutan did was to zealously advocate for the cause of his client. He was not
shown to have misled or unduly influenced the court through misinformation. He
merely persistently pursued said cause and he did so within the bounds of the law and
the existing rules. He succeeded at finally having the writ of execution, albeit at the
fourth (4th) time, implemented.
The Court has consistently held that an attorney enjoys the legal presumption
that he is innocent of the charges against him until the contrary is proved, and that as
an officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his duties in accordance
with his oath. Burden of proof, on the other hand, is defined in Section 1 of Rule 131
as the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish
his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. 5
Weight and sufficiency of evidence, under Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, is
not determined mathematically by the numerical superiority of the witnesses
testifying to a given fact. It depends on its practical effect in inducing belief for the
party on the judge trying the case. 6
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of
guilt is substantial evidence, which is that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, the
complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his
complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent
to proof. Likewise, charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given
credence. Besides, the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence — as opposed to
preponderance of evidence — is more in keeping with the primordial purpose of and
essential considerations attending this type of cases. As case law elucidates,
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended
to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, it also
involves neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor. It may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by
their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture,
there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. 7
In the case at bar, Rico seriously failed to discharge said burden of proof. He
failed to establish his claims through relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
 accept as adequate to support a conclusion — that is that Atty. Salutan indeed misled
the court, directly or indirectly, in the course of championing his client's cause.
In a court battle, there must necessarily be a victor and a vanquished. A vain
effort from the vanquished litigant should not, however, cause him to immediately
accuse the victor of resorting to deceptive ploy or tactics, especially when he had been
given sufficient opportunity to counter every move of the victor in court. One should
be magnanimous enough to acknowledge the triumph of one who had waged a fair
legal battle against another in a court of law.
Members of the Bar must be reminded that enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is
no less a virtue, if channeled in the right direction. However, it must be circumscribed
within the bounds of propriety and with due regard for the proper place of courts in
our system of government. While zeal or enthusiasm in championing a client's cause
is desirable, unprofessional conduct stemming from such zeal or enthusiasm is always
disfavored. 8 Such undesirable conduct, however, is not shown to be extant in this
case.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court DISMISSES the
instant Complaint against Atty. Reynaldo G. Salutan for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, * Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
||| (Rico v. Salutan, A.C. No. 9257, [March 5, 2018])

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 5580. July 31, 2018.]

SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. as represented

by REBECCA V. LABRADOR, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROBERTO
B. ROMANILLOS, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM : p

For resolution is the Letter 1 dated April 21, 2014, filed by respondent Atty.
Roberto B. Romanillos who seeks judicial clemency in order to be reinstated in the
Roll of Attorneys.
 Records show that respondent was administratively charged by complainant
San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. for representing conflicting interests and for
using the title "Judge" 2 despite having been found guilty of grave and serious
misconduct in the consolidated cases of Zarate v. Judge Romanillos. 3
The factual and legal antecedents are as follows:
In 1985, respondent represented San Jose Homeowners Association,
Inc. (SJHAI) before the Human Settlements Regulation Commission (HSRC)
in a case[, docketed as HSRC Case No. REM-021082-0822 (NHA-80-309),]
against Durano and Corp., Inc. (DCI) for violation of the Subdivision and
Condominium Buyer's Protection Act (P.D. No. 957). SJHAI alleged that Lot
No. 224 was designated as a school site in the subdivision plan that DCI
submitted to the Bureau of Lands in 1961 but was sold by DCI to spouses
Ramon and Beatriz Durano without disclosing it as a school site.
While still the counsel for SJHAI, respondent represented Myrna and
Antonio Montealegre in requesting for SJHAI's conformity to construct a
school building on Lot No. 224 to be purchased from Durano.
When the request was denied, respondent applied for clearance before
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in behalf of
Montealegre. Petitioner's Board of Directors terminated respondent's services
as counsel and engaged another lawyer to represent the association.
Respondent also acted as counsel for Lydia Durano-Rodriguez who
substituted for DCI in Civil Case No. 18014 entitled "San Jose Homeowners,
Inc. v. Durano and Corp., Inc." filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 134. Thus, SJHAI filed a disbarment case against
respondent for representing conflicting interests, docketed as Administrative
Case No. 4783.
In her Report dated August 3, 1998, Investigating Commissioner
Lydia A. Navarro of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) made the following findings:
. . . Respondent failed to observe [the] candor and
fairness in dealing with his clients, knowing fully well that the
Montealegre case was adverse to the Complainant wherein he
had previously been not only an active board member but its
corporate secretary having access to all its documents
confidential or otherwise and its counsel in handling the
implementation of the writ of execution against its developer
and owner, Durano and Co.[,] Inc.
Moreso, when Respondent acted as counsel for the
substituted defendant Durano and Co.[,] Inc., Lydia Durano-
Rodriguez; the conflict of interest between the latter and the
Complainant became so revealing and yet Respondent
proceeded to represent the former.
 xxx xxx xxx
For his defense of good faith in doing so; inasmuch as
the same wasn't controverted by the Complainant which was
his first offense; Respondent must be given the benefit of the
doubt to rectify his error subject to the condition that should he
commit the same in the future; severe penalty will be imposed
upon him. 4
The Investigating Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the
complaint with the admonition that respondent should observe extra care and
diligence in the practice of his profession to uphold the dignity and integrity
beyond reproach.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, which [the Court] noted
in [its] [R]esolution dated March 8, 1999.
Notwithstanding the admonition, respondent continued representing
Lydia Durano-Rodriguez before the Court of Appeals 5 and the Court 6 and
even moved for the execution of the decision.
Thus, a second disbarment case was filed against respondent for
violation of the March 8, 1999 Resolution in A.C. No. 4783 and for his
alleged deceitful conduct in using the title "Judge" although he was found
guilty of grave and serious misconduct.
Respondent used the title "Judge" in his office letterhead,
correspondences and billboards which was erected in several areas within the
San Jose Subdivision sometime in October 2001.
In his Comment and Explanation, 7 respondent claimed that he
continued to represent Lydia Durano-Rodriguez against petitioner despite the
March 8, 1999 Resolution because it was still pending when the second
disbarment case was filed. He maintained that the instant petition is a rehash
of the first disbarment case from which he was exonerated. Concerning the
title "Judge[,]" respondent stated that since the filing of the instant petition, he
had ceased to attach the title to his name. 8 (Italics supplied)
In a Decision 9 dated June 15, 2005, the Court found merit in the complaint,
and thus, held respondent guilty of violating the lawyer's oath, as well as Rules 1.01,
3.01 and 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, resulting in his disbarment
from the practice of law:
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos is
DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in respondent's record as a
member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED. 10 (Emphasis in the original)
The Court En Banc ruled in this wise:
It is inconsequential that petitioner never questioned the propriety
of respondent's continued representation of Lydia Durano-Rodriguez.
The lack of opposition does not mean tacit consent. As long as the lawyer
represents inconsistent interests of two (2) or more opposing clients, he is
guilty of violating his oath. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility specifically mandates that a lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure. Incidentally, it is also misleading for respondent to insist that
he was exonerated in A.C. No. 4783.
We agree with the IBP that respondent's continued use of the title
"Judge" violated Rules 1.01 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in deceitful conduct and
from using any misleading statement or claim regarding qualifications or legal
services. The quasi-judicial notice he posted in the billboards referring to
himself as a judge is deceiving. It was a clear attempt to mislead the
public into believing that the order was issued in his capacity as a judge
when he was dishonorably stripped of the privilege.
Respondent did not honorably retire from the judiciary. He resigned
from being a judge during the pendency of Zarate v. Judge Romanillos, where
he was eventually found guilty of grave and serious misconduct and would
have been dismissed from the service had he not resigned.
In that case, respondent was found guilty of illegal solicitation and
receipt of P10,000.00 from a party litigant. We ruled thus:
Considering the foregoing, respondent Judge Roberto
B. Romanillos is hereby found guilty of grave and serious
misconduct affecting his integrity and honesty. He deserves the
supreme penalty of dismissal. However, respondent, in an
obvious attempt to escape punishment for his misdeeds,
tendered his resignation during the pendency of this case. . . .
Consequently, we are now precluded from dismissing
respondent from the service. Nevertheless, the ruling in People
v. Valenzuela (135 SCRA 712 [1985]), wherein the respondent
judge likewise resigned before the case could be resolved, finds
application in this case. Therein it was held that the rule that
the resignation or retirement of a respondent judge in an
administrative case renders the case moot and academic, is not
a hard and fast rule. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
ACCORDINGLY, in view of our aforestated finding
that respondent Judge Romanillos is guilty of grave and serious
misconduct which would have warranted his dismissal from the
service had he not resigned during the pendency of this case,
 and it appearing that respondent has yet to apply for his
retirement benefits and other privileges if any; the Court,
consistent with the penalties imposed in Valenzuela (supra.),
hereby orders the FORFEITURE of all leave and retirement
benefits and privileges to which herein respondent Judge
Romanillos may be entitled WITH PREJUDICE to
reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of government, including government-owned
or controlled agencies or corporations.
SO ORDERED. 11
The penalty imposed upon him in said case included forfeiture of all
leave and retirement benefits and privileges to which he may be entitled with
prejudice to reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of government, including government-owned or controlled
agencies or corporations. Certainly, the use of the title "Judge" is one of such
privileges.
xxx xxx xxx
This is not respondent's first infraction as an officer of the court and a
member of the legal profession. He was stripped of his retirement benefits and
other privileges in Zarate v. Judge Romanillos. 12 In A.C. No. 4783, he got
off lightly with just an admonition. Considering his previous infractions,
respondent should have adhered to the tenets of his profession with extra
fervor and vigilance. He did not. On the contrary, he manifested undue
disrespect to our mandate and exhibited a propensity to violate the laws. He is
thus unfit to discharge the duties of his office and unworthy of the trust and
confidence reposed on him as an officer of the court. His disbarment is
consequently warranted. 13 (Additional emphasis and italics supplied)
Aggrieved, respondent filed on July 16, 2005 a Motion for Reconsideration
and/or Plea for Human Compassion, 14 praying that the penalty imposed be reduced
from disbarment to suspension for three (3) to six (6) months. The Court denied the
aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution 15 dated August 23, 2005.
On April 16, 2006, respondent wrote a letter 16 addressed to the Chief Justice
and the Associate Justices of the Court, begging that compassion, mercy, and
understanding be bestowed upon him by the Court and that his disbarment be lifted.
The same was, however, denied in a Resolution 17 dated June 20, 2006.
Unperturbed, respondent wrote letters dated June 12, 2007 18 and January 17,
2010 19 addressed to the Court, praying for the Court's understanding, kindness and
compassion to grant his reinstatement as a lawyer. The aforementioned letters were
denied for lack of merit in Resolutions dated August 14, 2007 20 and May 31, 2011 21
respectively.
 Almost nine (9) years from his disbarment, or on April 21, 2014, respondent
filed the instant Letter once more praying for the Court to reinstate him in the Roll of
Attorneys.
In a Resolution 22 dated June 25, 2014, the Court referred the aforementioned
letter to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and
recommendation thereon within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.
Acting on the Report and Recommendation 23 dated November 18, 2016
submitted by the OBC, the Court, in a Resolution 24 dated January 10, 2017, directed
respondent to show proof that he is worthy of being reinstated to the Philippine Bar
by submitting pieces of documentary and/or testimonial evidence, including but not
limited to letters and attestations from reputable members of the society, all vouching
for his good moral character.
In compliance with the Court's Resolution dated January 10, 2017, respondent
submitted forty (40) letters from people, all vouching for his good moral character:
 
Relationship
Date of Testimony/ies in favor
Name to
Letter of respondent
respondent
1) Jaime B. Trinidad March 7, Friend Respondent is a person
2017 25 of good moral character
since 1990.
2) Teodoro Adriatico March 9, Tennis buddy Respondent is kind,
Dominguez (Marketing 2017 26 friendly, very
Director, Philippines & approachable, quick to
Sea Ayerst Philippines, help with free legal
Ayerst International; advice/counsel.
Director, Senior Citizens
Assn. of Bgy. BF; Past
Coordinator, Member of
the Lay Ministers
Resurrection of Our Lord
Parish, BFHP; Past Grand
Knight, F. Navigator, Dist.
Deputy Knights of
Columbus Council 7147;
U.P. Pan Xenia; and
UTOPIA, Ateneo)
3) Carolina L. Nielsen March 20, Neighbor Respondent graciously
2017 27 rendered free legal
advice to her and her
family.
4) Arnaldo C. Cuasay Undated 28 Brother-in- After his disbarment,
law respondent dedicated his
life to taking care of his
sick wife, who

5) Atty. Manuel Laserna, Jr. March 28,
(Founder, Former 2017 29
Chairman and President,
Las Piñas City Bar
Association, Inc.; Former
Director, Secretary and
Vice President, IBP
PPLLM Chapter; Former
Professor of Law, FEU
Institute of Law; Third
Placer, 1984 Bar
Examinations; and Partner,
Laserna Cueva-Mercader
Law Offices)
6) Patricia C. Sison and Marie Undated
Louise Kahn Magsaysay Statement 30
(Chairman and President,
Philippine Ballet Theatre,
Inc. (PBT))
7) Francisco C. Cornejo
(President, U.P. Alumni
Association)
8) Dr. Artemio I. Panganiban,
Jr. (President, Professional
Academy of the
eventually died a few
years after.
Respondent also
provided support to his
children's education and
other needs as well as
helping relatives and
friends. Respondent also
provided community
services in Muntinlupa
and his hometown in
Cebu.
Colleague Respondent served as a
former president of the
Las Piñas City Bar
Association.
Respondent
implemented various
seminars, dialogues and
other Bar activities.
Clients Respondent is the
adviser of the PBT.
Respondent advised
PBT Board members
regarding urgent
problems affecting
company operations.
Respondent also
provided PBT with
appropriate guidelines
regarding the manner in
which they should
conduct their duties
affecting PBT's legal
and financial
obligations.
March 24, Friend Respondent is a person
2017 31 of good moral character,
especially in his
business dealings.
March 9, Friend Respondent is a person
2017 32 of good moral character
since 1968.
 Philippines)
9) Dean Dionisio G.
Magpantay (Chairman and
President, Asian+ Council
of Leaders,
Administrators, Deans and
Educators in Business)
10) Maximo A. Ricohermoso
(President, Rotary Club of
Mandaue North; and
Chairman, Seaweed
Industry Association of the
Philippines, Inc.)
11) Arsenio M. Bartolome III
(First Chairman/President,
Bases Conversion
Development Authority;
and Former President,
Philippine National Bank)
12) Rodigilio M. Oriino
(Former President, Rotary
Club of Uptown Manila)
13) Epimaco M. Densing, Jr.
(Former Chapter President,
Philippine Institute of
Certified Public
Accountants, Cagayan de
Oro Chapter; Charter
Chapter President,
Government Association
of CPAs, Cebu Chapter;
and Former Chapter Head,
Brotherhood of Christian
Businessmen &
Professionals, Parañaque
Chapter)
March 20, Colleague Respondent and
2017 33 Magpantay served
together in the
Federation of
Homeowners
Association Executive
Board in the mid and
end of the 1990s, and in
their Church and
community service with
the Knights of
Columbus in mid 2000,
until the present.
March 10, Colleague Respondent is a fellow
2017 34 Rotarian at the Rotary
Club of Mandaue North,
Mandaue City, Cebu,
since the early 1980s.
March 8, Colleague Respondent helps his
2017 35 PWD brother-in-law,
Mr. Manuel H. Reyes, in
his business
transactions.
March 13, Co-employee Respondent was his co-
2017 36 employee in the Legal
Department of FNCB
Finance.
Respondent has not
done any wrong doing
that will affect his good
moral character and
profession as a lawyer.
Undated 37 Friend Respondent is a friend
for over 20 years, whom
he knows as a person of
good moral character.
14) Mamerto A. Marcelo, Jr Undated 38 Colleague Respondent was
employed as one of the
lawyers in the
Collection Department
of FNCB Finance, of
which Marcelo was then
a Vice President.
Later on, Marcelo hired
respondent as a legal
consultant in a
telecommunications
company the former
later worked with.
15) Atty. Eleuterio P. Ong March 14, Friend Respondent is known to
Vaño (Former National 2017 39 Atty. Vaño as a
President, Philippine respectable person of
Association of Real Estate good moral character.
Boards, Inc.)
16) Domingo L. Mapa March 7, Colleague Respondent is "one with
(President, Santos Ventura 2017 40 [them]" 41 in pursuing
Hocorma Foundation, Inc.) their advocacies in their
scholarship program.
17) Ernesto M. Caringal March 7, Colleague Caringal hired
(President, Abcar 2017 42 respondent as Vice
International Construction President for
Corporation) Administration of his
company even after he
was disbarred in 2005
because Caringal
believes respondent is a
person of good moral
character.
18) Rolando L. Sianghio March 14, Colleague Respondent rendered
(President, Lacto Asia 2017 43 voluntary service as
Pacific Corporation) Adviser-Consultant of
the Directors of the
Habitat for Humanity
and i-Homes in their
programs for housing
for the poor.
19) PSSupt. Marino Ravelo March 10, Business Respondent is Ravelo's
(Retired PDEA Director) 2017 44 Partner business partner in the
sourcing and supply of
nickel and chromite raw
ores from Zambales to
their local customers.
Respondent has never
been involved in any
shady business deals.
20) Atty. Tranquilino R. Gale March 14, Former Respondent was the
(Legal Counselor & 2017 45 partner in former law firm partner
Consultant) law firm of Atty. Gale, prior to
respondent's
appointment as RTC
judge.
Respondent is honest
and of good moral
character in his public
and private dealings
even after he was
disbarred.
21) Godofredo D. Asunto March 8, Colleague Asunto availed of
(President, Waterfun 2017 46 respondent's legal
Condominium Bldg. 1, services in resolving his
Inc. (Homeowners collection cases.
Association); and Retired
Bank Executive)
22) Rosalind E. Hagedorn March 9, Colleague In view of his good
2017 47 values to the profession,
Respondent was
recommended by
Hagedorn to act as legal
counsel of her valued
clients and friends.
23) Antonio A. Navarro III March 9, Friend Respondent was known
2017 48 to Navarro as a person
of good moral character
since 1988 up to the
present.
24) Peter A. Yap March 10, Community Respondent was known
2017 49 Friend to Yap as a person of
good moral character
since 1975 up to the
present.
25) Teodora S. Ocampo March 12, Colleague Respondent worked
(Professor, De La Salle 2017 50 with Ocampo in a power
University) project installation in
2000.
Sender claims she found
respondent to be an
ethical, trustworthy and
a person of high
integrity.
26) Valentin T. Banda (Retired March 12, Friend Respondent's
Bank Officer, Philippine 2017 51 disbarment has turned
Veterans Bank) him into a new person.
27) Atty. Samuel A. Nuñez March 13, Friend Respondent has been
2017 52 active in the community
 affairs while staying in
Cebu.
28) Atty. Ramon C. Gonzaga, March 18, Former Atty. Gonzaga, Jr. stated
Jr. 2017 53 partner in that he has not heard
law firm that respondent was
involved in any charge
or complaint, morally or
otherwise, even after he
was disbarred.
29) Efren Z. Palugod March 8, Friend Respondent is of good
(Chairman, Plaza Loans 2017 54 moral character.
Corporation) Respondent stayed in
touch with Palugod
whenever respondent
would go to Cebu every
now and then for his
coal supply business.
30) Rodolfo G. Pelayo March 7, Colleague Despite being disbarred,
(Chairman, Power & 2017 55 respondent involved
Synergy, Inc.) himself in worthwhile
activities as senior
citizen and offered his
services as business
consultant to their
company, Power &
Synergy, Inc. and
friends.
31) Sol Owen G. Figues Undated 56 Friend Respondent should be
reinstated as a lawyer
again in order for him to
"continue his [G]ood
Samaritan work to the
common people that
seeks justice and
guidance in times of
trouble and grief." 57
32) Col. Jose Ely D. Alberto March 24, Acquaintance Respondent was known
GSC (INF) (Internal 2017 58 to Navarro as a person
Auditor, Philippine Army) of good moral character
since 2000 up to the
present.
33) Atty. Albert L. Hontanosas March 8, Friend Respondent has
2017 59 integrity, independence,
industry and diligence.
Respondent should be
given a second chance
to serve the Filipino
masses as a bonafide
member of the
 Philippine Bar.
34) Antonio E. De Borja March 17, Friend Respondent provides
(Former Councilor, 2017 60 free legal assistance to
Baliwag, Bulacan; and the poor, who were
President, Early Riser victims of injustice,
Assembly, Baliwag, through his son who is
Bulacan) also a lawyer.
35) Tomas Barba Tan March 9, Client Respondent is a person
(President, Cebu 2017 61 of good moral character.
Adconsultants, Inc.)
36) Engr. Daniel D. March 11, Friend Respondent is very
Villacarlos (Operations 2017 62 dependable, fair and a
Manager, Hi-Tri very respectable person
Development Corp.) both on the tennis courts
in Parañaque City where
they are both members
until now and inside the
court of law when he
was still active as an
excellent and reputable
lawyer.
Respondent's conduct of
sportsmanship in BF
Homes Tennis Club and
as a person is
exemplary.
37) Roy Bufi (President, The March 9, Friend Respondent is known to
Bas Corporation) 2017 63 Bufi as kind, generous
and is very professional
when it comes to work.
38) Remigio R. Viola (Retired March 13, Former Respondent is his
Municipal Administrator, 2017 64 colleague business consultant
Municipality of Baliwag, because respondent is
Bulacan) known to Viola for
being a community
leader.
39) Leonardo U. Lindo March 20, Friend Respondent is a strong
2017 65 supporter of their social
and civic activities to
provide free medical
services to the less
fortunate members of
the society.
40) Felipe De Sagun Undated 66 Friend In 2003, respondent
handled their case
against Metrobank and
won the case for them.
Respondent is
trustworthy, reliable and
 honest.

The Court's Ruling

The Court denies the present appeal.

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. 67 It is not a
natural, absolute or constitutional right granted to everyone who demands it, but
rather, a special privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate
special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. 68 The same
reasoning applies to reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When exercising its inherent
power to grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it that only those who establish
their present moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar.
Thus, though the doors to the practice of law are never permanently closed on a
disbarred attorney, the Court owes a duty to the legal profession as well as to the
general public to ensure that if the doors are opened, it is done so only as a matter of
justice. 69
The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law is
whether the lawyer has sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and
character. The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence
that he or she is again worthy of membership in the Bar. The Court will take into
consideration his or her character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and
character of the charge/s for which he or she was disbarred, his or her conduct
subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment
and the application for reinstatement. 70
Clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be
balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts. The Court will grant
it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing of
potential and promise are indispensable. 71
The principle which should hold true not only for judges but also for lawyers,
being officers of the court, is that judicial "[c]lemency, as an act of mercy removing
any disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of public confidence in
the courts. [Thus,] [t]he Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited.
Proof of reformation and a showing of potential and promise are indispensable." 72
In the case of Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Judicial Clemency, 73 the Court laid down
the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. 74 These shall include
but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the
officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges
or judges associations and prominent members of the community with
 proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an
administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a
strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty 75 to
ensure a period of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has
productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him
a chance to redeem himself. 76
4. There must be a showing of promise 77 (such as intellectual aptitude,
learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the
development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant
skills), as well as potential for public service. 78
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify
clemency.
In the case of Bernardo v. Atty. Mejia, 79 the Court, in deciding whether or not
to reinstate Atty. Mejia, considered that 15 years had already elapsed from the time he
was disbarred, which gave him sufficient time to acknowledge his infractions and to
repent. The Court also took into account the fact that Atty. Mejia is already of
advanced years, has long repented, and suffered enough. The Court also noted that he
had made a significant contribution by putting up the Mejia Law Journal containing
his religious and social writing; and the religious organization named "El Cristo
Movement and Crusade on Miracle of the Heart and Mind." Furthermore, the Court
considered that Atty. Mejia committed no other transgressions since he was disbarred.
80
In Adez Realty, Inc. v. CA, 81 the Court granted the reinstatement of the
disbarred lawyer (found to be guilty of intercalating a material fact in a CA decision)
and considered the period of three (3) years as sufficient time to do soul-searching and
to prove that he is worthy to practice law. In that case, the Court took into
consideration the disbarred lawyer's sincere admission of guilty and repeated pleas for
compassion. 82
In Valencia v. Atty. Antiniw, 83 the Court reinstated Atty. Antiniw (who was
found guilty of malpractice in falsifying a notarized deed of sale and subsequently
introducing the document in court) after considering the long period of his disbarment
(almost 15 years). The Court considered that during Atty. Antiniw's disbarment, he
has been persistent in reiterating his apologies to the Court, has engaged in
humanitarian and civic services, and retained an unblemished record as an elected
public servant, as shown by the testimonials of the numerous civic and professional
organizations, government institutions, and members of the judiciary. 84
In all these cases, the Court considered the conduct of the disbarred attorney
before and after his disbarment, the time that had elapsed from the disbarment and the
application for reinstatement, and more importantly, the disbarred attorneys' sincere
realization and acknowledgment of guilt. 85
Here, while more than ten (10) years had already passed since his disbarment
on June 15, 2005, respondent's present appeal has failed to show substantial proof of
his reformation as required in the first guideline above.
The Court is not persuaded by respondent's sincerity in acknowledging his
guilt. While he expressly asks for forgiveness for his transgressions in his letters to
the Court, respondent continues to insist on his honest belief that there was no conflict
of interest notwithstanding the Court's finding to the contrary. Respondent asserted in
all his letters to the Court that:
I also did not [do] and I do not deny the fact that in the year 1985, I
filed ONLY a single motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution on
behalf of said San Jose Homeowners Association against the Durano & Co.,
Inc. before the HLURB in a case for completion of development under P.D.
957, and that later in the year 1996, I handled another HLURB case for the
respondents Durano/Rodriguez in the said case filed by the San Jose
Homeowners Association, for the declaration of the school site lot as an
open space, on the basis of my firm belief that I was given a prior consent
to do so by the said association, pursuant to its Board Resolution, dated
March 14, 1987, a copy of which is attached and made an integral part hereof,
as Annex "A" and also because of my honest belief that there was no
conflict of interest situation obtaining under the circumstances, as those
cases are totally unrelated [and] distinct from each other, pursuant to the
jurisprudences that I had cited in my ANSWER in this disbarment case.
86 (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, the testimonials submitted by respondent all claim that
respondent is a person of good moral character without explaining why or submitting
proof in support thereof. The only ostensible proof of reformation that respondent has
presented are the following:
1. The Letter dated March 7, 2017 signed by Domingo L. Mapa, President of
Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc., averring that respondent is
"one with [them] in pursuing [their] advocacies in [their] scholarship x
x x;" 87
2. The Letter dated March 13, 2017 signed by Atty. Samuel A. Nuñez,
claiming that respondent has been active in community affairs while
staying in Cebu; 88
3. The undated Letter signed by Sol Owen G. Figues, humbly asking that
respondent be reinstated again in order for him to "continue his [G]ood
Samaritan work to the common people that seeks justice and guidance
in times of trouble and grief;" 89
 4. The undated Letter of Arnaldo C. Cuasay, the brother-in-law of respondent,
stating that after his disbarment, respondent provided community
services in Muntinlupa and in his hometown in Cebu; 90
5. The Letter dated March 14, 2017 signed by Rolando L. Sianghio, President
of Lacto Asia Pacific Corporation, stating that respondent rendered
voluntary service as Adviser-Consultant of the Directors of the Habitat
for Humanity in their programs for housing for the poor; 91
6. The Letter dated March 17, 2017 signed by Antonio E. De Borja, a friend of
respondent, where Borja claimed that respondent provides free legal
assistance to the poor, who were victims of injustice, through his son
who is also a lawyer; 92
7. The Letter dated March 20, 2017 signed by Leonardo U. Lindo, a friend of
respondent, which stated that respondent is "[a strong supporter of
their] social [and] civic activities to provide free medical services to the
less fortunate members of the society;" 93
8. The Letter dated March 20, 2017 signed by Dean Dionisio G. Magpantay,
Chairman and President of Asian+ Council of Leaders, Administrators,
Deans and Educators in Business, stating that he personally knows
respondent having served together in their church and community
service with the Knights of Columbus in the mid-2000s until the
present; 94 and
9. The Letter dated March 20, 2017 signed by Carolina L. Nielsen, a neighbor
of respondent, where she claimed that respondent "[graciously rendered
free legal advice to her and her family.]" 95
Still, aside from these bare statements, no other proof was presented to specify
the actual engagements or activities by which respondent had served the members of
his community or church, provided free legal assistance to the poor and supported
social and civic activities to provide free medical services to the less fortunate, hence,
insufficient to demonstrate any form of consistency in his supposed desire to reform.
The other testimonials which respondent submitted, particularly that of Ernesto
M. Caringal, President of Abcar International Construction Corporation, who stated
that "[he hired respondent as Vice President for Administration of his company even
after] he was disbarred in 2005," 96 and that of Police Senior Superintendent Marino
Ravelo (Ret.), who stated that "[he is the business partner of respondent] in the
sourcing and supply of nickel and chromite raw ores from Zambales to [their] local
customers," 97 all relate to respondent's means of livelihood after he was disbarred;
hence, these are incompetent evidence to prove his reformation which connotes
consistent improvement subsequent to his disbarment. If at all, these testimonials
contradict respondent's claim that he and his family were having financial difficulties
due to his disbarment, to wit:
 Since then up to now, I and my family had been marginally surviving
and still continue to survive, from out of the measly funds that I have been
able to borrow from our relatives and my former clients (who, of course I
don't expect to continue lending to me indefinitely) to whom I promised to
repay my debts upon the resumption of my law practice. 98
To add, no other evidence was presented in his appeal to demonstrate his
potential for public service, or that he — now being 71 years of age — still has
productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to
redeem himself. Thus, the third and fourth guidelines were neither complied with. 99
While the Court sympathizes with the predicaments of disbarred lawyers —
may it be financial or reputational in cause — it stands firm in its commitment to the
public to preserve the integrity and esteem of the Bar. As held in a previous case, "in
considering [a lawyer's] application for reinstatement to the practice of law, the duty
of the Court is to determine whether he has established moral reformation and
rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling of sympathy or pity." 100
The practice of law is a privilege, and respondent has failed to prove that he
has complied with the above-discussed guidelines for reinstatement to the practice of
law. The Court, therefore, denies his petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe,
Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa, Martires, Tijam, Reyes, Jr. and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., took no part, relation to a party.
(San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Romanillos, A.C. No. 5580 (Resolution),
|||

[July 31, 2018])

THIRD DIVISION

[A.C. No. 12125. February 11, 2019.]

CELIANA B. BUNTAG, FLORA ARBILERA, VETALIANO

BONGO, SEBASTIAN BONGO, PETRONILO BONGO, LEO
BONGO, and RAUL IMAN, complainants, vs. ATTY. WILFREDO S.
TOLEDO, respondent.

RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J : p

The burden of proof lies on the party making the allegation. In a disbarment
complaint, the allegations of the complainant must be proven with substantial
evidence.
Celiana Bongo-Buntag (Buntag), Flora Arbilera, Vetaliano Bongo, Sebastian
Bongo, Petronilo Bongo, Leo Bongo, and Raul Iman (Buntag, et al.) filed a
Disbarment Complaint 1 against Atty. Wilfredo S. Toledo (Atty. Toledo), their former
counsel in several criminal and civil cases. 2
Buntag, et al., claimed that despite knowing that they were indigents, Atty.
Toledo demanded money from them several times. 3 To produce the money he asked
for, they had to borrow money from their neighbors and from financial institutions
with high interest rates, miring them in debt. 4
Buntag, et al., also alleged that Atty. Toledo brought companions to their house
without prior notice. He introduced them as "dignitaries" 5 and demanded that they
serve them lechon, sugpo, and white "nokus." 6
Moreover, Buntag, et al., claimed that Atty. Toledo forced them to lie during
their hearings and cross-examinations, and to sign documents without understanding
their contents. 7 He even supposedly refused to conduct any inspection of the property
to help them prove their ownership over the property. 8
Further, Buntag, et al., alleged that Atty. Toledo did not take any action against
the judge assigned on their cases, even if the judge was clearly biased against them. 9
He also failed to update them on the status of their cases. They would later be
surprised to find out that they had already been convicted of the charge against them.
10
Buntag, et al., added that Atty. Toledo handled a civil case despite a conflict of
interest: he served as counsel for Ma. Teresa Edar Schaap (Schaap) 11 in a case where
Buntag, et al., were the plaintiffs. 12
Buntag, et al., claimed that Atty. Toledo became indifferent when he noticed
that they could no longer afford to pay him, so they asked him to withdraw as their
counsel. 13
On November 28, 2011, Atty. Toledo filed an Omnibus Motion for a Bill of
Particulars and Extension of Time to File Answer. 14 He requested Buntag, et al., to
"enumerate the specific material facts and dates when he allegedly borrowed money
from them [and] brought people to their houses to eat as 'dignitaries[.]'" 15 He also
asked them to provide the specific incidents that involved his "alleged lying, conflict
of interest[,] and mishandling[.]" 16
On July 4, 2012, Buntag, et al., filed an Urgent Manifestation 17 where they
stated that a Bill of Particulars was a prohibited pleading under Rule III, Section 2 of
the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline. 18 They maintained that
Atty. Toledo should not have assumed that his Motion was automatically approved so
he should have filed his answer. 19
A Mandatory Conference was set at 11:30 a.m. on September 10, 2012. 20
Atty. Toledo filed an Omnibus Motion for Resetting of September 10, 2012
Mandatory Conference with Reiteration for a Bill of Particulars and Extension of
Time to File Answer. 21 The Motion for a Bill of Particulars was denied, but the
Motion for Resetting and Extension to File Answer was granted. 22 The Mandatory
Conference was reset several times due to Atty. Toledo's repeated Motions. 23
In his Answer, 24 Atty. Toledo denied all the allegations thrown against him.
He also attached the Affidavits of Arturo Arboladura (Arboladura) 25 and Vitaliano
Dumangcas (Dumangcas) 26 to support his claims that he did not neglect his duties as
complainants' counsel, and that he did not demand huge sums of money from them.
Arboladura, a beach resort operator in Panglao, Bohol, attested that he first met
Atty. Toledo sometime in 1998. The lawyer, he said, helped him create the Panglao
Peace Multi-Purpose Cooperative and register it with the Cooperative Development
Authority. He also attested that Atty. Toledo recruited his clients, the members of the
Bongo family (or Buntag, et al., in this case), to be part of the cooperative. 27
Arboladura stated that on two (2) occasions, Buntag, accompanied by Atty.
Toledo, asked for his help in paying the bail bond of her family members who had
been charged with estafa and illegal possession of unlicensed firearms. He lent her a
total of P50,000.00, 28 stating that he would not have lent her any money had it not
been for Atty. Toledo's intercession. 29
Arboladura attested that the Bongo family had several criminal cases lodged
against them by their relatives and the buyers of the parcels of land they had inherited
from their grandparents. He testified that Atty. Toledo solely handled all their cases
pro bono. Arboladura would sometimes get invited by Buntag to a thanksgiving party
for Atty. Toledo when a case against them was dismissed, or when a family member
was acquitted. 30
Dumangcas, Atty. Toledo's messenger, attested that the lawyer had many poor
clients in Panglao and Dauis in Bohol whose cases he had accepted without pay. He
claimed that Atty. Toledo sometimes even used his own money to pay his clients' bail
bond. 31
Dumangcas attested that the Bongo family had been Atty. Toledo's clients as
early as 1999, and that he handled at least 16 civil and criminal cases filed against
them pro bono. 32
On February 27, 2014, the Mandatory Conference was deemed terminated
when both parties failed to appear. The parties were then directed to submit their
respective position papers. 33
 In their Position Paper, 34 Buntag, et al., claimed that because Atty. Toledo did
not submit his Answer, he must be declared in default and judgment must be rendered
in their favor. 35
In his Position Paper, 36 Atty. Toledo reiterated his denial of complainants'
allegations. 37 He claimed to have represented them pro bono for over 10 years 38
and, in many of their cases, personally paid the docket fees 39 and miscellaneous
costs such as postage stamps and photocopying of pleadings. 40
Atty. Toledo denied that he brought persons in Buntag, et al.'s house without
notice, or that he demanded that they prepare food for his guests. He maintained that
he only went to their house when he was invited during a fiesta celebration or family
occasions. 41
Atty. Toledo also denied forcing Buntag, et al., to lie on their cases. He pointed
out a case of forcible entry and damages, where it was revealed in a hearing that
Buntag had already signed three (3) deeds of sale in favor of the defendant. Upon this
discovery, Buntag engaged the services of another lawyer. Yet, despite having been
discharged as their lawyer, he still continued to fulfill his duties as their counsel. 42
Atty. Toledo further asserted that when he represented Schaap, there was no
conflict of interest since Buntag, et al., were not parties to the case. Besides, he added,
Schaap's case was executed by the sheriff even before they became his clients. 43
Atty. Toledo claimed that he represented Buntag, et al., to the best of his
abilities. Case in point, even if they discharged him as their counsel, he still filed a
Motion for Reconsideration for one (1) of their cases, as the court had not yet acted
upon their Notice of Withdrawal as Counsel. 44
On July 11, 2016, Commissioner Mario V. Andres (Commissioner Andres) of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline recommended 45
dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Atty. Toledo. He found that Buntag,
et al., failed to substantiate their claims against the lawyer. 46 Nonetheless, he
recommended that Atty. Toledo be directed to show cause why he should not be
sanctioned for still acting as Buntag, et al.'s counsel despite being discharged. Thus:
RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that for failing to overcome the burden
of proof required in disbarment cases, the administrative complaint against
Respondent Atty. Wilfredo S. Toledo be DISMISSED and he be ordered to
SHOW CAUSE why he should not be sanctioned for encroaching upon the
business of another lawyer. 47 (Emphasis in the original)
On November 5, 2016, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines adopted Commissioner Andres' findings of fact, but deleted the
recommendation for the issuance of a show cause order against Atty. Toledo: 48
 RESOLVED to ADOPT the findings of fact and recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner dismissing the complaint but MODIFYING
the same by deleting the recommendation for the issuance of a show cause
order on matters not contained in the original complaint.
RESOLVED FURTHER to direct CIBD Director IPG Ramon S.
Esguerra to prepare an extended resolution explaining the Board's action. 49
In an Extended Resolution, 50 Commission on Bar Discipline Director Ramon
S. Esguerra (Director Esguerra) recommended that the Complaint against Atty.
Toledo be dismissed for lack of evidence. He stressed that despite being discharged as
counsel, Atty. Toledo was still the counsel of record. Thus, the lawyer only acted in
the best interest of his clients when he filed a Notice of Appeal on their behalf. 51
The dispositive portion of the Extended Resolution read:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the Complaint
against Atty. Toledo be dismissed for lack of evidence. Moreover, it is
respectfully submitted that Atty. Toledo had the duty to file the Notice of
Appeal on behalf of Complainants despite the Notice for his discharge, and as
such, cannot be directed to explain said action. 52
The issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not respondent Atty.
Wilfredo S. Toledo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Complaint must be dismissed.
It is well-established that the allegations in a disbarment complaint must be
proven with substantial evidence. 53 Spouses Boyboy v. Atty. Yabut, Jr. 54 defines the
standard of substantial evidence for an administrative complaint:
The standard of substantial evidence required in administrative
proceedings is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. While
rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be
controlling, the obvious purpose being to free administrative boards from the
compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which
would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate
the administrative order, this assurance of a desirable flexibility in
administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without basis
in evidence having rational probative force. 55 (Citations omitted)
Here, complainants failed to present any evidence to adequately support their
allegations against respondent. They failed to state how much he supposedly
demanded from them. They also did not attach receipts of the payment they had sent
him to support their claim of unreasonable demand of money. Receipts from financial
institutions could have supported their allegations that the unreasonable demand of
money caused them to borrow money with high interest rates.
 Complainants alleged that they were forced to sign documents without
understanding their contents. These documents should have been annexed to their
Complaint to show this Court what these were. If they were forced to lie during
hearings and cross-examinations, the stenographic notes would have shown the
statements they wanted to dispute. As Commissioner Andres observed:
Complainants accuse Respondent of directing them to tell lies which
caused them to be bewildered when they were being cross-examined. They
offered no evidence to prove this accusation other than their Affidavit
Complaint. In their Affidavit Complaint, they did not indicate in which case
they were told to lie and what lies they were made to tell. The Respondent on
the other hand denies this accusation and alleges that it was the other way
around. According to Respondent, this allegation pertains to a Forcible Entry
and Damages case filed by the Complainants against a certain Paz Mandin-
Trotin where it turned out during the hearing that Celiana Bongo-Buntag, one
of the Complainants, signed three deeds of sale in favor of Paz
Mandin[-]Trotin.
The Respondent cannot be made administratively liable on the basis of
mere general accusations such as this without proof. 56 (Citations omitted)
Complainants made various accusations 57 of impropriety and violations of the
lawyer's oath against respondent. However, save for their bare allegations, they failed
to attach records or other pieces of evidence to substantiate their Complaint. The little
evidence that they did proffer failed to support their accusations or bolster their case
against him. 58
This Court will not penalize lawyers unless it is unmistakably shown that they
are unfit to continue being a member of the Bar. 59 In Advincula v. Atty. Macabata:
60
As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party who makes
the allegations — ei incumbit probation, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per
rerum naturam factum negantis probation nulla sit. In the case at bar,
complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of proof required of
her. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation
is not synonymous with guilt.
xxx xxx xxx
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with great caution and only
for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct which
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral
character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which
neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a
lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly
show the lawyer's unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The dubious
 character of the act charged as well as the motivation which induced the
lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or
disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
attended the commission of the offense should also be considered. 61
(Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
Nonetheless, it has not escaped this Court's attention that respondent's
lackadaisical attitude toward his professional dealings with complainants led in part to
the controversy pending before this Court.
It is indeed laudable that respondent does not limit his legal assistance only to
those who can afford his services and that he generously provides legal services to
everyone who asks for help. Yet, his failure to put in writing his contractual
agreements with his clients, paying or not, added to the confusion on the obligations
and expectations of each party in their attorney-client relationship.
A retainer or written agreement between a lawyer and the client lists the scope
of the services to be offered by the lawyer and governs the relationship between the
parties. Without a written agreement, it would be difficult to ascertain what the parties
committed to; hence, a party may be emboldened to make baseless demands from the
other party, presenting his or her own interpretation of the verbal agreement into
which they entered.
Here, complainants accuse respondent of demanding money from them on
several occasions despite their indigence. Respondent denied their accusations, and
asked that they specify the instances he had asked for money, along with the amounts
he purportedly demanded from them.
If the parties had executed a written agreement, issues on lawyer's fees and
other expenses incurred during a trial would not have arisen, as each party would
know his or her obligations under the retainer agreement. As it was, complainants
seemed unaware of what was expected of them as clients, leading them to make
blanket accusations of impropriety against respondent.
To prevent a similar predicament from happening in the future, respondent is
directed to henceforth execute written agreements with all of his clients, even those
whose cases he is handling pro bono.
WHEREFORE, the Administrative Complaint against respondent Atty.
Wilfredo S. Toledo is DISMISSED for lack of merit. However, he is DIRECTED to
henceforth reduce into writing all of his agreements for legal services with his clients,
and is given a STERN WARNING that a similar infraction in the future will merit a
more severe response from this Court.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Buntag v. Toledo, A.C. No. 12125 (Resolution), [February 11, 2019])
 FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 9512. February 5, 2018.]

ROBERTO P. MABINI, complainant, vs. ATTY. VITTO A.

KINTANAR, respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J : p

Before the Court is an administrative Complaint 1 filed by Roberto P. Mabini

(complainant) against Atty. Vitto A. Kintanar (respondent) for misconduct on the sole
ground that he notarized a document executed by his wife, Evangeline C. Kintanar
(Evangeline). ETHIDa

Factual Antecedents

In his Position Paper, 2 complainant stated, that sometime in November 2003,

Regina Alamares (Regina) approached him and his wife, Mercedes M. Mabini
(Mercedes), to sell her 3,317-square meter realty located in Daraga, Albay. Said
property was identified as Lot No. 1959, and covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 251 (1904). Regina made known to complainant and Mercedes that said
title was lost but its duplicate certificate may be secured from the Register of Deeds
(RD). Complainant and Mercedes nonetheless bought the property. Later,
complainant filed a petition for issuance of second owner's duplicate copy of OCT
251 (1904), which the Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted. On March 2, 2005, the
RD of Albay issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-133716 covering the property
in the names of complainant and Mercedes over the property.
Complainant further averred that, in March 2012, however, respondent's wife,
Evangeline, filed a complaint against him (complainant), among other persons, for
reconveyance, annulment of title, damages with prayer for preliminary injunction or
restraining order before the RTC of Legaspi City. Attached to said complaint was an
Affidavit of Lost Owner's Duplicate Copy of Title 3 executed by Evangeline and
notarized by respondent on April 25, 2002, and registered in his notarial book under
Doc. No. 172, Page No. 35, Book No. 33, Series of 2002.
According to complainant, respondent knew that he (respondent) was not
authorized to notarize a document of his wife, or any of his relative within the fourth
civil degree, whether by affinity or consanguinity; thus, for having done so,
respondent committed misconduct as a lawyer/Notary Public.
 For his part, respondent countered that the subject Affidavit purportedly
executed by his wife appeared to have been notarized on April 25, 2002; as such, it
was governed by Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which did not prohibit a
Notary Public from notarizing a document executed by one's spouse. He likewise
stated that, granting for argument's sake that he indeed notarized said Affidavit, he did
not violate the law as the document involved was a mere affidavit, not a bilateral
document or contract. 4
Because of his demise on July 24, 2013, complainant's spouse, Mercedes,
substituted him as complainant in the case. 5 On October 26, 2013, Mercedes died.
Her and complainant's children 6 substituted her in the case. 7

Report and Recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

On August 25, 2015, Commissioner Almira A. Abella-Orfanel. (Investigating

Commissioner) found respondent guilty of misconduct and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for six months. 8 She opined that relatives by
affinity are relatives by virtue of marriage. She stressed that "[i]f the law prohibits
notarization of acts done by relatives by affinity, it is but logical that the law also
prohibit[s] the notarization of the root cause of such relationship, the spouse. Without
the spouse, said prohibition will not exist." 9 She added that since the law treats
spouses as one upon their marriage, it follows that the notarization of the spouse's act
is disallowed considering that a person cannot notarize his or her own act.

Notice of Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG)

In its Resolution No. XXII-2015-98, the IBP-BOG resolved to modify the

recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in that respondent was imposed a
stiffer penalty of six months' suspension from the practice of law; immediate
revocation of his commission as Notary Public; and, a two-year disqualification as
Notary Public.

Issue

Whether respondent committed misconduct by notarizing his wife's affidavit of loss in

2002.

Our Ruling

It is a truism that the duties performed by a Notary Public are not just plain
ministerial acts. They are so impressed with public interest and dictated by public
policy. Such is the case since notarization makes a private document into a public
one; and as a public document, it enjoys full credit on its face. 10 However, a lawyer
cannot be held liable for a violation of his duties as Notary Public when the law in
effect at the time of his complained act does not provide any prohibition to the same,
as in the case at bench.
In Heirs of Pedro Alilano v. Atty. Examen, 11 the Court explicitly decreed that
the Spanish Notarial Law of 1889 was repealed by the 1917 Revised Administrative
Code. It added that it was only in 2004 that the Court passed the Revised Rules on
Notarial Practice, to wit:
cSEDTC

Prior to 1917, governing law for notaries public in the Philippines was
the Spanish Notarial Law of 1889. However, the law governing Notarial
Practice is changed with the passage of the January 3, 1916 Revised
Administrative Code, which took effect in 1917. In 2004, the Revised Rules
on Notarial Practice was passed by the Supreme Court.
In Kapunan, et al. v. Casilan and Court of Appeals, the Court had the
opportunity to state that enactment of the Revised Administrative Code
repealed the Spanish Notarial Law of 1889. x x x 12
In said case, respondent Atty. Examen was charged with violating the Notarial
Law when he notarized in 1984 the absolute deed of sale executed by his brother and
the latter's wife. The Court held that Atty. Examen was competent to notarize said
document because the Revised Administrative Code did not prohibit a Notary Public
from notarizing any document of a relative. 13
Moreover, in Aznar Brothers Realty Co. v. Court of Appeals, 14 the Court
reiterated that indeed the Spanish Notarial Law of 1889 was repealed by the Revised
Administrative Code and its Chapter 11 governed notarial practice at the time the
subject deed therein was notarized in 1964. 15
Too, in Ylaya v. Atty. Gacott, 16 the Court made an express pronouncement
that the subject documents therein notarized in 2000 and 2001 were not covered by
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, viz.:
We note that the respondent has not squarely addressed the issue of his
relationship with Reynold, whom the complainant alleges to be the
respondent's uncle because Reynold is married to the respondent's maternal
aunt. However, this is of no moment as the respondent cannot be held liable
for violating Section 3 (c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC because the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001 and the MOA dated April 19, 2000 were
notarized by the respondent prior to the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC
on July 6, 2004. The notarial law in force in the years 2000-2001 was Chapter
11 of Act No. 2711 (the Revised Administrative Code of 1917) which did not
contain the present prohibition against notarizing documents where the parties
are related to the notary public within the 4th civil degree, by affinity or
consanguinity. Thus, we must likewise dismiss the charge for violation of
A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC. 17
 Considering the foregoing, there is indeed no basis to hold respondent liable
for misconduct for notarizing his wife's Affidavit in 2002.
To recall, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of misconduct
because he notarized the affidavit of his wife on April 25, 2002. Nevertheless, at the
time of such notarization, it was the 1917 Revised Administrative Code that covered
notarial practice. As elucidated in Alilano and Ylaya, during the effectivity of said
Code, a Notary Public was not disallowed from notarizing a document executed by a
relative. Neither was there a prohibition for a Notary Public to notarize a document
executed by his or her spouse.
As discussed, the 1917 Revised Administrative Code repealed the Spanish
Notarial Law. In turn, the provisions anent notarial practice embodied in the Revised
Administrative Code were superseded by the passage of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. This only means that any prohibition enumerated in the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice does not cover the acts made by a Notary Public earlier, including
those executed in 2002.
All told, the Court holds that respondent did not violate any of his duties as
Notary Public when he notarized the affidavit of his wife on April 25, 2002.
WHEREFORE, the Complaint against Atty. Vitto A. Kintanar is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Jardeleza and Tijam, JJ., concur.
||| (Mabini v. Kintanar, A.C. No. 9512, [February 5, 2018])

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 7186. March 13, 2018.]

ROMEO A. ZARCILLA and MARITA BUMANGLAG,

complainants, vs. ATTY. JOSE C. QUESADA, JR., respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM : p

Before us is a Petition for Disbarment 1 dated February 9, 2006 filed by

complainants Romeo A. Zarcilla (Zarcilla) and Marita Bumanglag (Bumanglag)
against respondent Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. (Atty. Quesada) for gross misconduct.
acEHCD
 The facts are as follows:
On August 5, 2002, complainant Zarcilla executed an Affidavit-Complaint 2
against respondent Atty. Quesada and complainant Marita Bumanglag, among others,
for falsification of public documents docketed as I.S. No. 02-128-SF. Zarcilla alleged
that Bumanglag conspired with certain spouses Maximo Quezada and Gloria Quezada
(Spouses Quezada) and Atty. Quesada to falsify a Deed of Sale 3 dated April 12, 2002
by making it appear that his parents, Perfecto G. Zarcilla and Tarcela A. Zarcilla, sold
a parcel of land under TCT No. T-18490 in favor of the Spouses Quezada despite
knowledge that his parents were already deceased since March 4, 2001 and January 9,
1988, respectively, as per Death Certificates 4 issued by the Office of the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Santo Tomas, La Union. Said signing of deed of sale was allegedly
witnessed by a certain Norma Zafe and Bumanglag, and notarized by Atty. Quesada.
Other than the alleged falsified deed of sale, Zarcilla also claimed that on
March 20, 2002, the Spouses Quezada filed a petition for the administrative
reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 18490 where they presented the Joint
Affidavit of his then already deceased parents, the spouses Perfecto Zarcilla and
Tarcela A. Zarcilla as the petitioners. 5 Said Joint-Affidavit of the Spouses Quezada
was again notarized by Atty. Quesada.
However, on October 9, 2002, Bumanglag executed a Counter-affidavit 6 in
the same case where she claimed to be the real owner of the property after Perfecto
Zarcilla sold the same to her mother. Bumanglag also stated therein that she facilitated
the sale transaction to the Spouses Quezada which, in effect, exonerated her co-
respondents, including Atty. Quesada, the pertinent portion of which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
6. That after the death of my mother I needed money to pay for the
expenses she incurred when she was sick and need medication and all the (sic)
to pay for the expenses of her burial. I offered to sell the property to Spouses
MAX QUEZADA and GLORIA QUEZADA. I showed them the Deed of Sale
between PERFECTO ZARCILLA and my mother. I also showed them the
paper that my mother signed giving me the land;
7. That the Spouses Quezada told me that they will buy the land
provided I will be the one to transfer the said land to their name. They gave
me an advance payment so that I could transfer the land to them. I made it
appear that PERFECTO ZARCILLA sold the property to the said
spouses because the title of the land was still in the name of Perfecto
Zarcilla. I did not have [any] criminal intent when I did it because the
land no longer belong to Perfecto Zarcilla. I did all the subsequent acts like
Petition for Reconstitution in the name of Perfecto Zarcilla because then, the
title was still in his name. However, there was no damage to the heirs of
PERFECTO ZARCILLA because the land had long been sold to my mother
and the sons and daughters no longer had no legal claim to the said land;
 8. That SPOUSES MAXIMO QUEZADA & GLORIA QUEZADA
did not falsify any document because I was the one who facilitated the
transaction knowing that the land I was selling really belonged to me. Not
one of my brothers and (sic) sisters never (sic) complained when I sold the
land. I just delivered the document to the Spouses MAXIMO QUEZADA
& GLORIA QUEZADA including the title in their name. I was paid the
balance after the Certificate of Title in their name was finally delivered. 7
All other respondents in the said falsification case, except for Atty. Quesada,
also filed their respective counter-affidavits where they reiterated Bumanglag's
admission. 8
In a Resolution 9 dated April 14, 2003, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of La Union held Bumanglag only to undergo trial. All other respondents, including
Atty. Quesada who did not even file his counter-affidavit, were exonerated for
insufficiency of evidence.
Both Zarcilla and Bumanglag filed their respective motions for
reconsideration, but both were denied. Consequently, Bumanglag was indicted for
four counts of falsification of public documents before the Municipal Trial Court of
Sto. Tomas, La Union, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 3594, 3595, 3597, and 3598.
However, Zarcilla later on withdrew said cases when he learned that
Bumanglag was not aware of the contents of her counter-affidavit when she signed
the same. He also found out that Bumanglag was deceived by her co-accused,
including Atty. Quesada. Thus, upon the motion of Zarcilla, in an Order 10 dated July
27, 2005, the court dismissed all falsification cases against Bumanglag.
In a Resolution 11 dated June 26, 2006, the Court resolved to require Atty.
Quesada to file a comment on the complaint against him.
On August 28, 2006, Atty. Quesada file a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Comment 12 due to voluminous workload. On September 18, 2006, Atty. Quesada
filed a second motion for extension to file comment. In a Resolution 13 dated
November 20, 2006, the Court granted Atty. Quesada's motions for extension with a
warning that the second motion for extension shall be the last and that no further
extension will be given.
On September 26, 2007, due to Atty. Quesada's failure to file a comment on
the complaint against him within the extended period which expired on October 17,
2006, the Court resolved to require Atty. Quesada to (a) show cause why he should
not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt from such failure, and (b) comply
with the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 by submitting the required comment. 14
Due to Atty. Quesada's failure to comply with the Show Cause Resolution
dated September 26, 2007, the Court resolved to (a) impose upon Atty. Quesada, a
fine of P1,000.00, and (b) require Atty. Quesada to comply with the Resolution dated
June 26, 2006 by filing the comment required therein. 15 SDHTEC
 No payment of fine was made as of January 13, 2009 as evidenced by a
Certification 16 which was issued by Araceli Bayuga, Supreme Court Chief Judicial
Staff Officer.
Again, failing to comply with the directives of the Court to pay the fine
imposed against him and to submit his comment, the Court, in a Resolution 17 dated
February 16, 2009, resolved to (a) impose upon Atty. Quesada an additional fine of
P1,000.00, or a penalty of imprisonment of five (5) days if said fines are not paid
within 10 days from notice, and (b) order Atty. Quesada to comply with the
Resolution dated June 26, 2006 to submit his comment on the complaint against him.
Atty. Quesada was also warned that should he fail to comply, he shall be ordered
arrested and detained by the National Bureau of Investigation until he shall have made
the compliance or until such time as the Court may order.
Despite repeated notices and warnings from the Court, no payment of fine was
ever made as of September 3, 2010 as evidenced by a Certification 18 which was
issued by Araceli Bayuga, Supreme Court Chief Judicial Staff Officer. On December
28, 2010, another Certification 19 was issued anew showing no record of payment of
fine by Atty. Quesada.
Thus, in a Resolution 20 dated March 9, 2011, the Court resolved to (1)
increase the fine imposed on Atty. Quesada to P3,000.00, or imprisonment of ten (10)
days if such fine is not paid within the prescribed period; and (2) require Atty.
Quesada to comply with the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 by submitting the
required comment on the complaint.
No payment of fine was made as of July 12, 2011, as evidenced by a
Certification 21 which was issued by Araceli Bayuga, Supreme Court Chief Judicial
Staff Officer.
It appearing that Atty. Quesada failed to comply with the numerous
Resolutions of the Court to pay the fine imposed upon him and submit comment on
the complaint against him, in a Resolution 22 dated August 24, 2011, the Court
ordered the arrest of Atty. Quesada, and directed the NBI to arrest and detain him
until he shall have complied with the Court's Resolution dated March 9, 2011.
Subsequently, the Court issued a Warrant of Arrest. 23
Apparently forced by his looming detention, after five (5) years, Atty. Quesada
filed his Comment 24 dated October 10, 2011, in compliance with Resolution dated
June 26, 2006. He claimed that he is a victim of political harassment, vengeance and
retribution, and that the instant case against him was filed solely for the purpose of
maligning his person. Attached to his compliance was postal money order in the
amount of P3,000.00 as payment for the fine imposed upon him.
In a Letter 25 dated October 10, 2011, Atty. Ricardo S. Pangan, Jr., Regional
Director of the NBI, informed the Court that Atty. Quesada voluntarily surrendered
before the agents of the NBI on October 11, 2011, and claimed that he had already
complied with the Resolution of the Court. Atty. Quesada submitted a copy of his
comment and payment of fine, thus, on the same day, Atty. Quesada was immediately
released from custody.
On February 1, 2012, the Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 26
During the mandatory conference before the IBP-Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD), only Bumanglag and her counsel appeared. Atty. Quesada
failed to appear thereto, thus, the mandatory conference was reset to July 11, 2012.
However, on July 11, 2012, Atty. Quesada failed again to appear, thus, the mandatory
conference was reset anew to July 25, 2012. Meanwhile, Bumanglag informed the
IBP-CBD that co-complainant Romeo Zarcilla passed away in 2005.
On July 23, 2012, Atty. Quesada requested that the mandatory conference be
reset due to health reasons. He submitted his Medical Certificate dated May 2, 2012
showing that he underwent a head operation and that he is still on recovery period.
On July 25, 2012, Atty. Quesada failed again to appear, thus, the parties were
directed to appear on August 23, 2012 and submit their respective verified position
papers. However, on August 23, 2012, only Bumanglag and her counsel appeared,
and Atty. Quesada failed to appear anew. Thus, considering that the parties were duly
notified of the hearing, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
On May 30, 2014, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation,
recommended that respondent Atty. Quesada be disbarred from the practice of law.
In a Resolution No. XXI-2015-097 dated January 31, 2015, the IBP-Board of
Governors resolved to adopt and approve the report and recommendation of the IBP-
CBD.
RULING
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. 27
The issue to be determined is whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an
officer of the court in the dispensation of justice. Hence, an administrative proceeding
for disbarment continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer
the charges against him despite numerous notices.
However, in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of
proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial
evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary
powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof. As in this case, considering the serious consequence of the
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that
clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the
administrative penalty. 28 AScHCD

Thus, in the instant case, the allegations of falsification or forgery against Atty.
Quesada must be competently proved because falsification or forgery cannot be
presumed. As such, the allegations should first be established and determined in
appropriate proceedings, like in criminal or civil cases, for it is only by such
proceedings that the last word on the falsity or forgery can be uttered by a court of
law with the legal competence to do so. A disbarment proceeding is not the occasion
to determine the issue of falsification or forgery simply because the sole issue to be
addressed and determined therein is whether or not the respondent attorney is still fit
to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice. Accordingly,
We decline to rule herein whether or not the respondent had committed the supposed
falsification of the subject affidavit in the absence of the prior determination thereof in
the appropriate proceeding. 29
We, however, noted that Atty. Quesada violated the notarial law for his act of
notarizing the: (1) Deed of Sale 30 dated April 12, 2002 purportedly executed by and
between the spouses Maximo F. Quezada and Gloria D. Quezada, the buyers, and
complainant Zarcilla's parents, the spouses Tarcela Zarcilla and Perfecto Zarcilla; and
the (2) Joint Affidavit 31 dated March 20, 2002 purportedly executed by the spouses
Tarcela Zarcilla and Perfecto Zarcilla for the reconstitution of TCT No. T-18490,
when in both occasions the spouses Tarcela Zarcilla and Perfecto Zarcilla could no
longer execute said documents and appear before Atty. Quesada since they have long
been deceased as evidenced by their death certificates. Tarcela Zarcilla died on
January 9, 1988, while Perfecto Zarcilla died on March 4, 2001. 32
Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice stresses the
necessity of the affiant's personal appearance before the notary public:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as
signatory to the instrument or document —
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the
notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise
identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules.
Thus, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who
signed the same is the very same person who executed and personally appeared before
him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. Without the
appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question, the notary
public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the
acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act or deed.
Here, Atty. Quesada's act of notarizing the deed of sale appeared to have been done to
perpetuate a fraud. This is more evident when he certified in the acknowledgment
thereof that he knew the vendors and knew them to be the same persons who executed
the document. When he then solemnly declared that such appeared before him and
acknowledged to him that the document was the vendor's free act and deed despite the
fact that the vendors cannot do so as they were already deceased, Atty. Quesada
deliberately made false representations, and was not merely negligent.
Thus, by his actuations, Atty. Quesada violated not only the notarial law but
also his oath as a lawyer when he notarized the deed of sale without all the affiant's
personal appearance. His failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not
only damage to those directly affected by the notarized document but also in
undermining the integrity of a notary public and in degrading the function of
notarization. The responsibility to faithfully observe and respect the legal solemnity of
the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is more pronounced when the notary public is
a lawyer because of his solemn oath under the Code of Professional Responsibility to
obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Lawyers
commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of
their offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public
interest. 33
Time and again, We have held that notarization of a document is not an empty
act or routine. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who
are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private
document into a public document, thus, making that document admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full
faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large
must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and
appended to a private instrument. 34
For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the
public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined. Hence, a
notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same
are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest
to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The purpose of this requirement is
to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the
acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act and
deed. 35
Aside from Atty. Quesada's violation of his duty as a notary public, what this
Court find more deplorable was his defiant stance against the Court as demonstrated
by his repetitive disregard of the Court's directives to file his comment on the
complaint. Despite several Court resolutions, notices, directives and imposition of
fines for Atty. Quesada's compliance and payment, he ignored the same for more than
five years. Consequently, this case has dragged on for an unnecessary length of time.
More than five (5) years have already elapsed from the time the Court issued the first
Resolution dated June 26, 2006 which required Atty. Quesada to file his comment
until his eventual submission of comment on October 10, 2011. It took a warrant of
arrest to finally move Atty. Quesada to file his Comment and pay the fines imposed
upon him. While the Court has been tolerant of his obstinate refusal to comply with its
directives, he shamelessly ignored the same and wasted the Court's time and
resources.
And even with the submission of his comment, he did not offer any apology
and/or any justification for his long delay in complying with the directives/orders of
this Court. We surmised that when Atty. Quesada finally complied with the Court's
directives, his compliance was neither prompted by good faith or willingness to obey
the Court nor was he remorseful of his infractions but was actually only forced to do
so considering his impending arrest. There is, thus, no question that his failure or
obstinate refusal without justification or valid reason to comply with the Court's
directives constitutes disobedience or defiance of the lawful orders of Court,
amounting to gross misconduct and insubordination or disrespect. 36 AcICHD

Atty. Quesada's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this
Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone is a
sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. His cavalier attitude in repeatedly
ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial
institution. His conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. We have
repeatedly held that a Court's Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor
should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively." Atty. Quesada's
obstinate refusal to comply with the Court's orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant
flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful orders
which this Court will not tolerate." 37
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice,
or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
As an officer of the court, it is a lawyer's duty to uphold the dignity and
authority of the court. The highest form of respect for judicial authority is shown by a
lawyer's obedience to court orders and processes. 38 Considering Atty. Quesada's
 predisposition to disregard not only the laws of the land but also the lawful orders of
the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and
good demeanor. Worse, with his repeated disobedience to this Court's orders, Atty.
Quesada displayed no remorse as to his misconduct which, thus, proved himself
unworthy of membership in the Philippine Bar. Clearly, Atty. Quesada is unfit to
discharge the duties of an officer of the court and deserves the ultimate penalty of
disbarment.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, We find respondent ATTY. JOSE
C. QUESADA JR. GUILTY of gross misconduct and willful disobedience of lawful
orders rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He
is, thus, ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken-off of
the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately. We, likewise, REVOKE his incumbent
notarial commission, if any, and PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIES him from being
commissioned as a notary public.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which
shall forthwith record it in the personal file of respondent. All the Courts of the
Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which shall disseminate copies
thereof to all its Chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the
Republic of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, ** Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa, Martires, Tijam, Reyes, Jr. and
Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
Sereno, * C.J., is on leave.
 
||| (Zarcilla v. Quesada, Jr., A.C. No. 7186, [March 13, 2018])

FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 9676. April 2, 2018.]

IN RE: DECISION DATED SEPTEMBER 26, 2012 IN OMB-M-A-

10-023-A, ETC. AGAINST ATTY. ROBELITO * B. DIUYAN

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J : p

The Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao) furnished the Court a copy of its
September 26, 2012 Decision 1 in Case No. OMB-M-A-10-023-A (Andrea M.
Camilo v. Raul C. Brion, Agrarian Reform Program Technologist (SG-10), Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office, Mati, Davao Oriental). In the said Decision, the Office of
the Ombudsman noted, viz.: HTcADC

On a final note, this Office finds it unsettling that the Deed of Partition
submitted before the DAR was notarized by Atty. Robellito B. Diuyan on 23
July 2003, when one of the signatories therein, Alejandro F. Camilo, had
earlier died on 23 August 2001. On this matter, let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Supreme Court of the Philippines for its information and
appropriate action.
In a Resolution 2 dated July 24, 2013, this Court treated the September 26,
2012 Decision in OMB-M-A-10-023-A and the Deed of Partition as an administrative
complaint against respondent Atty. Robelito B. Diuyan and required the latter to file a
comment thereon. 3
In a letter 4 dated October 30, 2013, and by way of comment, respondent
admitted notarizing the Deed of Partition in his capacity as District Public Attorney of
the Public Attorney's Office in Mati City and all of Davao Oriental. He claimed that:
[The] signature as Notary Public in that [July 23, 2003] Deed of
Partition subject matter of the complaint was indeed mine. I was still
connected with the Public Attorney's Office as District Public Attorney at that
time. I retired on April 20, 2008. My function [included] the execution and/or
notarization of a document x x x.
In the case at bar, eight (8) persons appeared before me with the
document deed of partition prepared by them subject matter of the complaint.
I asked them one by one if the document is true and correct [and] with their
Community Tax Certificates, they answered me in the affirmative and after
being satisfied with their answer I notarized the document for free as they are
considered as indigents. Of course, they signed it one by one in front of me. 5
In a Resolution 6 dated February 3, 2014, the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
A mandatory conference was set on May 29, 2014 7 in Pasig City; however,
respondent was unable to attend the same since he had not fully recovered from a
debilitating stroke that he suffered in 2012; he cannot stand or walk unassisted; has
difficulty speaking; and only relies on his meager monthly pension of P12,000.00.
Thus, in an Order 8 dated May 29, 2014, the mandatory conference was terminated
and respondent was required to submit his Position Paper.
By way of explanation, respondent narrated in his Position Paper 9 that:
 x x x I have nothing to do with present [charge]. [A]s public officer[,] I
[enjoy] the presumption of good faith and regularity in [the discharge] of my
function as Chief Public Attorney in Mati and all in Davao Oriental x x x;
there is no showing that I have committed any wrong since x x x becoming a
lawyer and member of x x x the [I]ntegrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as
[during my] 22 years of x x x service in [the Public Attorney's Office] and in
my private life x x x.
With regard to the deed of partition x x x there is no showing that it
was done with irregularity x x x.
On July 23, 2003 the parties in the document appeared and requested
to have their document notarized for free[. A]s Public Attorney I am bound to
do so [since the affiants were indigents] I x x x then read the said document
and asked them if this is true and [they] answered in the positive. Then having
been satisfied of their answer I let them [sign] one by one in front of me after
which I notarized the same for free. [The] parties [were] personally present
and acknowledged that they [were the] same parties to the document and [they
showed] to me their respective CTC. 10
In a Report and Recommendation 11 dated September 24, 2014, the IBP-
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found respondent guilty of violating the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice. While it found no deceit or malice on the part of the
respondent, and even considered the fact that respondent was a former public official
with no previous record of misconduct, as well as the fact that the affiants in the
subject Deed of Partition were farmers who did not have any IDs and only had
Community Tax Certificates (CTCs) to present and prove their identities, the IBP-
CBD nonetheless found him grossly negligent in the performance of his functions.
The IBP-CBD thus recommended as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the undersigned finds
respondent guilty of breach of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and
accordingly, recommends revocation of his notarial commission, if any, for
one (1) year, effective immediately. He is WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. 12
In a Resolution 13 dated December 14, 2014, the IBP-Board of Governors
(BOG) adopted the IBP-CBD's Report and Recommendation but increased the
recommended penalty, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding Respondent [guilty] for violation of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Atty. Robellito R. Diuyan's notarial
commission if presently commissioned is immediately REVOKED. Further,
he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned for two (2) years and
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. 14
 The case is now before us for final disposition.

Issue

Whether respondent should he held administratively liable for notarizing a

Deed of Partition on the basis of the affiants' CTCs. aScITE

Our Ruling

This Court finds nothing irregular with respondent's act of notarizing the Deed
of Partition on July 23, 2003 on the basis of the affiants' CTCs. The law applicable at
the time of the notarization only required the presentation of the CTCs.
In Mabini v. Atty. Kintanar, 15 this Court dismissed the administrative
complaint filed against the lawyer therein because the lawyer complied with the
notarial law extant at the time of notarizing the contested document, to wit:
It is a truism that the duties performed by a Notary Public are not just
plain ministerial acts. They are so impressed with public interest and dictated
by public policy. Such is the case since notarization makes a private document
into a public one; and as a public document, it enjoys full credit on its face.
However, a lawyer cannot be held liable for a violation of his duties as Notary
Public when the law in effect at the time of his complained act does not
provide any prohibition to the same, as in the case at bench. (Emphasis
supplied; citation omitted)
Similarly, respondent notarized the Deed of Partition on July 23, 2003, or prior
to the effectivity of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, 16 of which he is being held
accountable by the IBP. However, when the Deed was notarized on July 23, 2003, the
applicable law was the notarial law under Title IV, Chapter 11, Article VII of the
Revised Administrative Code, 17 Section 251 of which states:
SECTION 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of (cedula)
residence tax. — Every contract, deed, or other document acknowledged
before a notary public shall have certified thereon that the parties thereto have
presented their proper (cedula) residence certificates or are exempt from the
(cedula) residence tax, and there shall be entered by the notary public as a part
of such certification the number, place of issue, and date of each (cedula)
residence certificate as aforesaid.
In addition, Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 465 18 also reiterated the need to
present a residence certificate when acknowledging documents before a notary public,
viz.:
Section 6. Presentation of residence certificate upon certain
occasions. — When a person liable to the taxes prescribed in this Act
 acknowledges any document before a notary public, x x x it shall be the duty
of such person or officer of such corporation with whom such transaction is
had or business done or from whom any salary or wage is received to require
the exhibition of the residence certificates showing the payment of the
residence taxes by such person: Provided, however, That the presentation of
the residence certificate shall not be required in connection with the
registration of a voter.
xxx xxx xxx (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, it was incorrect for the IBP to have applied the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice in holding respondent liable for notarizing the Deed of Partition. To reiterate,
the Deed was notarized on July 23, 2003. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice were
not yet in effect at that time.
Here, respondent was then the District Public Attorney in Mati, Davao Oriental
when affiants, who were indigent farmers and who did not have any personal
identification card or any other form of competent evidence save for their CTCs, 19
requested the notarization of the Deed of Partition. These eight individuals who
approached him presented themselves to be the affiants of the said Deed and signed
the same in respondent's presence. There was nothing irregular on the face of the
Deed that would have alerted respondent to ask probing questions or inquire about the
circumstances behind the execution of the said instrument. On the contrary, the Deed
was a valid exercise of the farmers' right to divide the title in their favor as
beneficiaries. The Ombudsman affirmed this when it dismissed the administrative
case filed against an agrarian reform officer concerning the Deed. In fact, the
Ombudsman ruled that "[t]he eventual breaking of TCT 20 CLOA 21 No. 454 into
individual titles in favor of the farmer-beneficiaries named in said collective CLOA is
not irregular as it is, in fact, provided by DAR 22 rules and regulations." 23
In fine, respondent did not violate any of his duties as Notary Public when he
notarized the Deed of Partition on July 23, 2003.
WHEREFORE, the Complaint against respondent Atty. Robelito B. Diuyan is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-de Castro, **** Jardeleza and Tijam, JJ., concur.
Sereno, ** C.J., *** is on leave.
||| (In Re: Diuyan, A.C. No. 9676, [April 2, 2018])

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 12289. April 2, 2019.]

 ATTY. ANASTACIO T. MUNTUERTO, JR.; ATTY. RAMON
JOSE G. DUYONGCO; ATTY. MARIO Y. CAVADA; and ATTY.
CHAD RODOLFO M. MIEL, complainants, vs. ATTY. GERARDO
WILFREDO L. ALBERTO, respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, C.J : p

A lawyer who notarizes documents without a notarial commission, and assists

and abets the unauthorized practice of law by a non-lawyer, deliberately violates the
Lawyer's Oath and transgresses the canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
He thereby manifests a lack of respect for the law and dishonesty, and deserves to be
severely punished.

Antecedents

We hereby consider and resolve the disbarment complaint filed by the

complainants charging the respondent with falsification of public documents, and
wilful and deliberate violations of his oath as a lawyer, and of the mandatory rules of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. 1
The complainants aver that the respondent was the counsel of record of
Cristeto E. Dinopol, Jr., who had instituted an action for reconveyance and recovery
of possession and damages against Singfil Hydro Builders in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 47, in Masbate City docketed as Civil Case No. 6835; that the
respondent had attached to the complaint a supplemental agreement and an amended
joint venture agreement separately acknowledged before him as a notary public for
and in Cavite City; that he had antedated his notarizations; that, however, the Notarial
Division of the RTC in Cavite City certified that it had "no record of any
Commission/Order appointing a certain Atty. Gerardo Wilfredo L. Alberto as Notary
Public for the City of Cavite nor of any documents notarized by him, more specifically
a document denominated as Supplemental & Amended Joint Venture Agreement;" 2
that he had not indicated his MCLE 3 certificate of compliance number and the date
of issue of such certificate; 4 that realizing that the complaint he had filed was fatally
defective, he had his client sign and file the so-called Motion for Prior Leave of Court
to Admit the Herein Attached Amended Complaint, with the amended complaint
attached; and that the respondent had further falsified the supposed secretary's
certificate to make it appear that he had been duly appointed as the acting corporate
secretary of Singtrader JV Corporation, and that a resolution had been adopted by said
corporation authorizing Cristeto E. Dinopol, Jr. as its representative relative to the
filing of the necessary and proper actions. 5
Upon receipt of the administrative complaint against the respondent, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) directed him to file his answer. However, he
did not comply, and for that reason he was declared in default. 6
The IBP then conducted a mandatory conference on June 18, 2016, but the
respondent did not attend the same despite notice. Furthermore, he did not file his
position paper. 7CAIHTE

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

In her Report and Recommendation dated January 31, 2017, IBP Investigating
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala found the charges against the respondent
established, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for five years,
to wit:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, we respectfully recommend that
respondent, ATTY. GERARDO WILFREDO L. ALBERTO, be
SUSPENDED for a period of FIVE (5) YEARS from receipt hereof as a
lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. 8
On November 27, 2017, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the findings and
recommendation of IBP Investigation Commissioner Villanueva-Maala, viz.:
RESOLVED to ADOPT the findings of fact and recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner, but modifying the recommended penalty to
SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW for five (5) years.
RESOLVED FURTHER to recommend the imposition upon
respondent of a FINE of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) for disregarding
the Orders of the Commission. 9
The respondent did not appeal or move for reconsideration.

Issue

Did the respondent violate the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility: (a) by notarizing documents without having been issued a notarial
commission; (b) by allowing a non-lawyer to sign a motion filed in court; and (c) by
failing to indicate his MCLE compliance number in the complaint filed in connection
with a pending case?
 Ruling of the Court

We ADOPT with MODIFICATION the findings and recommendation of the

IBP Board of Governors.

The respondent notarized the supplemental agreement and the amended joint
venture agreement attached to the complaint he filed in Civil Case No. 6835. 10
According to the findings by IBP Investigating Commissioner Villanueva-Maala, he
held no notarial commission when he notarized the documents. Such lack of the
notarial commission was confirmed by the certification issued by the Office of the
Clerk of Court of the RTC in Cavite City to the effect that said office had no record of
any commission appointing the respondent a notary public for and in the City of
Cavite. 11
The respondent should be subjected to strong disciplinary action for notarizing
the documents without authorization or commission to do so.
To start with, the act of the respondent constituted a blatant violation of the
injunction of the Lawyer's Oath to obey the laws. The law thereby violated is the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, which expressly defines a notary public as "any
person commissioned to perform official acts under the [2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice]." 12 The commission, which is the grant of authority to perform notarial
acts, 13 is issued upon due application by the Executive Judge of the province or city
where the applicant is to have a regular place of work or business after a summary
hearing conducted by the Executive Judge following the publication of the notice of
summary hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in said province or city, and
after posting of the notice of summary hearing in a conspicuous place in the offices of
the Executive Judge and of the Clerk of Court. 14 Clearly, the exercise of the
authority to notarize cannot simply be done by anyone.
The significance of the office of the notary public cannot be taken for granted.
The notarial act is invested with public interest, such that only those who are qualified
or authorized may act and serve as notaries public. 15 The Court has expounded on
the character of the office of the notary public in Bernardo Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,
16 stating thusly:
The principal function of a notary public is to authenticate documents.
When a notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of the
document under his hand and seal he gives the document the force of
evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring documents to be
acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the solemnity which
should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to authorize such
documents to be given without further proof of their execution and delivery.
 Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon
him by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or
consent to the doing of any. Failing in this, he must accept the consequences
of his unwarranted actions.DETACa

And, secondly, the respondent, by making it appear that he had been duly
commissioned to act as notary public, thereby vested the documents with evidentiary
value. Yet, because of the absence of a notarial commission in his favor, he foisted a
deliberate falsehood on the trial court. He became guilty of dishonesty. He also
trivialized the solemnity of notarizing the documents. Such effrontery transgressed the
prohibition against unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct on his part as an
attorney made explicit in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." 17

II

The resolution issued in Bar Matter No. 1922, 18 as amended, required the
respondent to disclose in all the pleadings, motions and other papers he filed in court
of information on his compliance with the MCLE program of the Supreme Court. The
resolution reads as follows:
In the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated January 14, 2014 in the
above-cited administrative matter, the Court RESOLVED, upon the
recommendation of the MCLE Governing Board, to:
(a) AMEND the June 3, 2008 resolution by repealing the phrase
"Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the
case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records" and replacing it
with "Failure to disclose the required information would subject the counsel
to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action"; and
(b) PRESCRIBE the following rules for non-disclosure of current
MCLE compliance/exemption number in the pleadings:
(i) The lawyer shall be imposed a fine of P2,000.00 for
the first offense, P3,000.00 for the second offense and
P4,000.00 for the third offense;
(ii) In addition to the fine, counsel may be listed as a
delinquent member of the Bar pursuant to Section 2, Rule 13 of
Bar Matter No. 850 and its implementing rules and regulations;
and
(iii) The non-compliant lawyer shall be discharged from
the case and the client/s shall be allowed to secure the services
of a new counsel with the concomitant right to demand the
return of fees already paid to the non-compliant lawyer.
 However, the respondent did not disclose his MCLE certificate of compliance
number and the date of issue of the certificate in the complaint he filed in Civil Case
No. 6835 of the RTC in Masbate City. Such non-disclosure was a flagrant
disobedience to the aforequoted terms of the resolution issued in Bar Matter No.
1922.
It is good to mention that the respondent seemed to be a repeat violator of the
requirement for disclosure under the resolution issued in Bar Matter No. 1922. He had
been observed to have been guilty of the same omission in A.C. No. 12131, 19 where
the Court noted his having defied the order for him to submit his MCLE compliance,
to wit:
With regard to the case docketed as SEC-MC13-138 pending before
RTC Mandaluyong City, Branch 211, complainant also appeared as counsel
for and signed the pleadings without a certificate of compliance for MCLE IV.
Also, in its order dated August 19, 2014, the RTC directed complainant to
show cause for his failure to comply with the directives of the court for him to
submit his MCLE compliance. Up to the present, complainant has yet to
comply with the order of the court. aDSIHc

III

The respondent was also liable for the charge of assisting and abetting the
unauthorized practice of law by a non-lawyer because he had a non-lawyer sign and
file the so-called Motion for Prior Leave of Court to Admit the Herein Attached
Amended Complaint despite him being the counsel of record of the plaintiff in Civil
Case No. 6835. He thereby patently breached both the letter and spirit of Rule 9.01,
Canon 9 of the Code, which states:
Rule 9.01 — A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of
the Bar in good standing.
The preparation and signing of any pleading, motion or other paper to be
submitted in court in connection with any pending matter constitute legal work within
the context of the practice of law. Verily, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court, the signature on the pleading, motion or other paper serves as a certification
that the signing attorney "has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed
for delay." Such formal assurance cannot be undertaken and given except by a regular
member of the Philippine Bar in good standing. It is also necessary to stress that the
high responsibility for conducting the litigation pertains only to the enrolled attorney
of the party in whose behalf the pleading, motion or other paper is submitted in court.
He may delegate the signing of the pleading, motion or other paper to another lawyer,
but not to a non-lawyer. 20
 In Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio, 21 the Court, holding that the lawyer's duty to
prevent, or, at the very least, not to assist in the unauthorized practice of law is
founded on public interest and policy, pointed out that:
x x x Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive
right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to
withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar
from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and
not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer
to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the
profession enjoin him not to permit the professional services or his name to be
used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any
agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his
part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law. 22
In fine, the responsibility of signing the so-called Motion for Prior Leave of
Court to Admit the Herein Attached Amended Complaint was personal to the
respondent as the attorney of record. That he delegated it to a non-lawyer was an
abdication of the responsibility that subjected him to sanction.

IV

We next consider the penalty with which to sanction the respondent.

The Court has held lawyers administratively liable for notarizing documents
without having been issued their notarial commissions. In Nunga v. Viray, 23 the
Court suspended a lawyer for three years for notarizing an instrument without a
commission. In Zoreta v. Simpliciano, 24 the lawyer was suspended from the practice
of law for two years, and permanently barred from being commissioned as a notary
public for notarizing several documents after the expiration of his commission. In
Mariano v. Echanez, 25 the Court suspended the erring lawyer from the practice of
law for two years and permanently barred him from being commissioned as a notary
public for performing notarial acts without a valid notarial commission.
The respondent's act of having the representative of his corporate client sign
the so-called Motion for Prior Leave of Court to Admit the Herein Attached Amended
Complaint submitted to the RTC could be equated to the censurable act in Tapay v.
Bancolo, 26 where the lawyer had allowed a non-lawyer to sign a pleading filed in
court. The offending lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for one year.
In addition, the respondent's failure to comply with the directives of the IBP to
do certain acts in relation to the investigation of the administrative charge brought
against him — specifically, that he did not file his answer, and his verified position
 paper despite being required to do so — exhibited defiance towards the IBP's
directives. Such defiance should not be overlooked, but ought to be treated as an
aggravating circumstance of his liability in this case. This treatment would constantly
remind him that the IBP, as the investigator designated by the Court itself to
investigate the charge brought against him, was discharging a public duty in the
Court's name and stead, and should be respected in its discharge of the duty.
In view of all the foregoing, the Court deems it to be just and proper to adopt
the IBP Board of Governors' recommendation to suspend the respondent from the
practice of law for a period of five years effective upon receipt of this decision, and to
bar him permanently from being commissioned as notary public in the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the Court SUSPENDS respondent ATTY. GERARDO
WILFREDO L. ALBERTO from the practice of law for five (5) years effective
upon receipt of this decision; PERMANENTLY BARS him from being
commissioned as Notary Public in the Philippines effective upon his receipt of this
decision; and STERNLY WARNS him that a stiffer penalty will be imposed should
he commit a similar offense hereafter.
Let this decision be attached to the records of ATTY. GERARDO
WILFREDO L. ALBERTO in the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines; and be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator for
proper dissemination to all courts throughout the country. ETHIDa

SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Peralta, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, A.B. Reyes,
Jr., Gesmundo, Carandang and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
Jardeleza, * J., is on official business.
J.C. Reyes, Jr., ** J., is on official leave.
Hernando, *** J., is on leave.
 
||| (Muntuerto, Jr. v. Alberto, A.C. No. 12289, [April 2, 2019])