1.) Almagro vs Kwan GR No. 175806 & 175810 Oct.

20, 2010

Facts: Respondents are the successors- in- interest of the Lot No. 6278-M, a 17,181 square meter parcel
of land located at Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental. On 18 September 1996, they filed with the MTC an
action for recovery of possession and damages against the occupants, on of which are the Petitioners.
MTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the remaining dry portion of Lot No. 6278-M has
become foreshore land and should be returned to the public domain.

Respondents appealed to the RTC. The RTC conducted ocular inspections of subject lot on two separate
dates: on 5 October 2001 during low tide and on 15 October 2001 when the high tide registered 1.5
meters. RTC concluded that the small portion of respondent’s property which remains as dry land is not
within the scope of the well-settled definition of foreshore and foreshore land; the small dry portion is not
adjacent to the sea; thus Respondent have the right to recover possession of the remaining small dry
portion of the subject property in question. CA affirmed said decision.

Issue: WON the disputed portion of Lot is no longer private land but has become foreshore land and is
now part of the public domain?

Held: The disputed land is not foreshore land. To qualify as foreshore land, it must be shown that the land
lies between the high and low water marks and is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.
[The land's proximity to the waters alone does not automatically make it a foreshore land.

Thus, in Republic of the Philippines v. Lensico, the Court held that although the two corners of the subject
lot adjoins the sea, the lot cannot be considered as foreshore land since it has not been proven that the
lot was covered by water during high tide.

Similarly in this case, it was clearly proven that the disputed land remained dry even during high tide.
Indeed, all the evidence supports the conclusion that the disputed portion of Lot No. 6278-M is not
foreshore land but remains private land owned by respondents.

2.) Santos vs Moreno

FACTS:

The Zobel family of Spain formerly owned vast track of marshland in the municipality of Macabebe,
Pampanga province. Called Hacienda San Esteban, it was administered and managed by the Ayala y
Cia. From the year 1860 to about the year 1924 Ayala y Cia., devoted the hacienda to the planting
and cultivation of nipa palms from which it gathered nipa sap or "tuba."

Accessibility through the nipa palms deep into the hacienda posed as a problem. Ayala y Cia.,
therefore dug canals leading towards the hacienda's interior where most of them interlinked with each
other. The canals facilitated the gathering of tuba and the guarding and patrolling of the hacienda by
security guards. By the gradual process of erosion these canals acquired the characteristics and
dimensions of rivers.

Sometime in 1925 or 1926 Ayala y Cia., sold a portion of Hacienda San Esteban to Roman Santos
who also transformed the swamp land into a fishpond. In so doing, he closed and built dikes across
Sapang Malauling Maragul, Quiñorang Silab, Pepangebunan, Bulacus, Nigui and Nasi.
The closing of the man-made canals in Hacienda San Esteban drew complaints from residents of the
surrounding communities. Claiming that the closing of the canals caused floods during the rainy
season, and that it deprived them of their means of transportation and fishing grounds, said residents
demanded re-opening of those canals.

After several petitions, the streams in question remained close.

Eighteen years later, that is in 1958, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 20562, “An Act to Prohibit,
Remove and/or Demolish the Construction of Dams, Dikes or any Other Works in Public Navigable
Waters or Waterways and in Communal Fishing Grounds, To Regulate Works in Such Waters or
Waterways and in Communal Fishing Grounds, and to Provide Penalties For Its Violation, And For
Other Purposes.”

On August 15, 1958 Senator de la Rosa requested in writing the Secretary of Public Works and
communications to proceed in pursuance of Republic Act No. 2056 against fishpond owners in the
province of Pampanga who have closed rivers and appropriated them as fishponds without color of
title.

ISSUE:
WON the streams in question belong to the public domain or to the owner of Hacienda San Esteban
according to law and the evidence submitted to the Department of Public Works and
Communications?

HELD:

We come to the question whether the streams involved in this case belong to the public domain or to
the owner of Hacienda San Esteban. If said streams are public, then Republic Act 2056 applies, if
private, then the Secretary of Public Works and Communications cannot order demolition of the dikes
and dams across them pursuant to his authority granted by said law.
First, we come to the question of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 2056.
Note that the law provides for an expeditious administrative process to determine whether or not a
dam or dike should be declare a public nuisance and ordered demolished. And to say that such an
administrative process, when put to operation, is unconstitutional is tantamount to saying that the law
itself violates the Constitution. In Lovina vs. Moreno, supra, We held said law constitutional.
Discussing now the applicability of Republic Act 2056, the same applies to two types of bodies of
water, namely
(1)public navigable rivers, streams, coastal waters, or waterways and (b) areas declared as
communal fishing ground. … The question therefore is: Are the streams in Hacienda San Esteban
which are mentioned in the petition of Benigno Musni and others, public and navigable?
One and all, the evidence, oral and documentary, presented by Roman Santos in the administrative
proceedings supports the conclusion of the lower court that the streams involved in this case were
originally man-made canals constructed by the former owners of Hacienda San Esteban and that said
streams were not held open for public use.
As stated, pursuant to Act 2152, as amended by Act 3208, the Bureau of Public Works and the
Department of Commerce and Communications locked into and settled the question of whether or not
the streams situated within Hacienda San Esteban are publicly or privately owned. We refer to the so-
called Panopio Report which contains the findings and recommendations of Eliseo Panopio, a
surveyor in the Bureau of Public Works, who
was designated to conduct formal hearings and investigation. Said report found the following streams,
among others, of private ownership.
The preponderance of the probatory facts, . . ., shows that the rivers, creeks, esteros and canals
listed in (1) have originally been constructed, deepened, widened, and lengthened by the owners of
the Hacienda San Esteban. That they have been used as means of communication from one place to
another and to the inner most of the nipales, exclusively for the employees, colonos and laborers of
the said Hacienda San Esteban. That they have never been used by the public for navigation without
the express consent of the owners of the said Hacienda.
We next consider the issue of whether under pertinent laws, the streams in question are public or
private.
Spanish Civil Code of 1889 Art. 408. The following are of private ownership:
…
5.The channels of flowing streams, continuous or intermittent, formed by rain water, and those of
brooks crossing estates which are not of public ownership.
…
Art. 71. The water-beds of all creeks belong to the owners of the estates or lands over which they
flow.

Pursuant to Article 71 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, and Article 408(5) of the
Spanish Civil
Code, channels of creeks and brooks belong to the owners of estates over which they flow. The
channels,
therefore, of the streams in question which may be classified creeks, belong to the owners of
Hacienda San
Esteban.
The said streams, considered as canals, of which they originally were, are of private ownership in
contemplation
of Article 339(l) of the Spanish Civil Code. Under Article 339, canals constructed by the State and
devoted to
public use are of public ownership. Conversely, canals constructed by private persons within private
lands and
devoted exclusively for private use must be of private ownership.

Our attention has been called to the case of Mercado v. Municipal President of Macabebe, 59 Phil.
592
The use and enjoyment of a creek, as any other property simceptible of appropriation, may be
acquired or lost through prescription, and the appellant and her predecessors in interest certainly lost
such right through the said cause, and they cannot now claim it exclusively for themselves after the
general public had been openly using the same from 1906 to 1928. . . .
In the cited case, the creek could have been of private ownership had not its builder lost it by
prescription.
Applying the principle therein enunciated to the case at bar, the conclusion would be inevitably in
favor of private ownership, considering that the owners of Hacienda San Esteban held them for their
exclusive use and prohibited the public from using them.
The case at bar should be differentiated from those cases where We held illegal the closing and/or
appropriation of rivers or streams by owners of estates through which they flow for purposes of
converting them into fishponds or other works.23 In those cases, the watercourses which were
dammed were natural navigable streams and used habitually by the public for a long time as a means
of navigation. Consequently, they belong to the public domain either as rivers pursuant to Article 407
(1) of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 or as property devoted to public use under Article 339 of the
same code. Whereas, the streams involved in this case were artificially made and devoted to the
exclusive use of the hacienda owner.
 All the other streams, being artificial and devoted exclusively for the use of the hacienda owner and
his personnel, are declared of private ownership. Hence, the dams across them should not he
ordered demolished as public nuisances.

3.) Taleon vs Sec. of Public Works (May 16, 1967)

FACTS:
Petitioner-appellant Rosita Taleon is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Lupon, Davao, which
sheacquired from her co-petitioner-appellant Miguel Solis who had constructed therein man-made
canals andfishpond dikes.
On April 17, 1961, respondent-appellee Lucia Tolentino wrote a letter-complaint to the Secretary of
Public Works stating that several fishpond operators and/or owners in Lupon, Davao have built dams
across and closed the Cabatan River, a public navigable stream, thereby depriving her and the
residents therein of passageway, fishing ground and water supply. Peitioner-appellant Taleon were
among those identified responsible for the closing of the said river.
An administrative hearing was thereafter held. On July 11, 1961, the Secretary of Public Works,
through the department undersecretary, rendered a decision finding that appellants were indeed
obstructing the Cabatan River, a Public navigable stream which used to pass inside their lands, with
the dams they constructed thereon, and ordering their demolition
Later on, Taleon was informed by the District Engineer of Davao that her dams would be demolished,
upon orders of the Executive Secretary, the administrative decision having become final and
executory.
To stop the threatened demolition, appellants filed suit in the Court of First Instance but such was
dismissed.

ISSUE:
WON the property in question is a private property and thus subject to appropriation.

HELD:
NO.
Anent the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public Works, this point has been squarely covered in Lovina
v. Moreno. There We upheld the power of the Public Works Secretary under Republic Act 2056 to
declare as a public navigable stream any alleged depression or bodies of water even inside titled
properties. That case involved a creek, located inside a titled land, which was alleged to be privately
owned. The Public Works Secretary declared it as part of a public stream which plaintiffs therein had
blocked with their dams. In sustaining the Secretary, We there ruled that such fact-finding power on
his part was merely incidental to his duty to clear all navigable streams of unauthorized obstructions
and, hence, its grant did not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial power.
And we remarked there that although the title was silent as to the existence of any stream inside the
property, that did not confer a right to the stream, it being of a public nature and not subject to private
appropriation, even by prescription.

4.) Hilario vs City of Manila (April 27, 1967)

FACTS:
Dr. Jose Hilario was the registered owner of a large tract of land, which was later on was by his son,
herein plaintiff-appellant Jose Hilario, Jr.

During the lifetime of plaintiff's father, the Hilario estate was bounded on the western side by the San
Mateo River. To prevent its entry into the land, a bamboo and lumber post dike or ditch was
constructed on the northwestern side. This was further fortified by a stonewall built on the northern
side. For years, these safeguards served their purpose. However, in 1937, a great and extraordinary
flood occurred which inundated the entire place including the neighboring barrios and municipalities.
The river destroyed the dike on the northwest, left its original bed and meandered into the Hilario
estate.

In 1945 the U.S. Army opened a sand and gravel plant within the premises5 and started scraping,
excavating and extracting soil, gravel and sand from the nearby areas the River. The operations
eventually extended northward into this strip of land.
Consequently, a claim for damages was filed with the U.S. War Department by Luis Hilario, the then
administrator of Dr. Hilario's estate.

The U.S. Army paid.6 In 1947, the plant was turned over to herein defendants-appellants and
appellee Director of Public Works who took over its operations and continued the extractions and
excavations of gravel and sand from the strip of land along an area near the River.
Plaintiff Hilario filed his complaint7 for injunction and damages against the defendants City of Manila,
Director of Public Works, et. al.

ISSUE:
WON a river, leaving its old bed, changes its original course and opens a new one through private
property, would the new riverbanks lining said course be of public ownership also?

HELD:
YES
All riverbanks are of public ownership — including those formed when a river leaves its old bed and
opens a new course through a private estate. Art. 339 of the old Civil Code is very clear. Without any
qualifications, it provides:

Property of public ownership is —

1.That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by
the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character
Moreover, as correctly contended by defendants, the riverbank is part of the riverbed. Art. 73 of the
Law of Waters which defines the phrase "banks of a river" provides:

By the phrase "banks of a river" is understood those lateral strips or zones of its bed which are
washed by the
stream only during such high floods as do not cause inundations. ... (Emphasis supplied)

The use the of words "of its bed [de sus alveos]" clearly indicates the intent of the law to consider the
banks — for all legal purposes — as part of the riverbed. The lower court also ruled — correctly —
that the banks of the River are paint of its bed.20 Since undeniably all beds of rivers are of public
ownership,21 it follows that the banks, which form part of them, are also of public ownership.

Article 70 of the Law of Waters which defines beds of rivers and creeks, provides:

The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its waters during the highest
[ordinary] floods.22 (Emphasis supplied)

Art. 372 of the old Civil Code which provides that —

Whenever a navigable or floatable river changes its course from natural causes and opens a new bed
through a
private estate, the new bed shall be of public ownership, but the owner of the estate shall recover it in
the event
that the waters leave it dry again either naturally or as the result of any work legally authorized for this
purpose.
(Emphasis supplied)

did not have to mention the banks because it was unnecessary. The nature of the banks always
follows that of the bed and the running waters of the river. A river is a compound concept consisting
of three elements: (1) the
running waters, (2) the bed and (3) the banks. 23 All these constitute the river.

Since a river is but one compound concept, it should have only one nature, i.e., it should either be
totally public or completely private. And since rivers are of public ownership,26 it is implicit that all the
three component elements be of the same nature also.

However, to dispel all possible doubts, the law expressly makes all three elements public. Thus,
riverbanks and
beds are public under Arts. 339 and 407, respectively, of the Code, while the flowing waters are
declared so
under Art. 33, par. 2 of the Law of Waters of 1866.

Articles 70, 72 and 73 of the Law of Waters speak of natural beds and their banks. Plaintiff now
equates the term "natural" with the word "original" so that a change in the course of a river would
render those articles inapplicable. However, the premise is incorrect.

"Natural" is not made synonymous to "original" or "prior condition". On the contrary, even if a river
should leave its original bed so long as it is due to the force of nature, the new course would still fall
within the scope of the definition provided above. Hence, the law must have used the word "natural"
only because it is in keeping with the ordinary nature and concept of a river always to have a bed and
banks.

Under Art. 553 of the old Civil Code, it provides:

The banks of the rivers, even when they are private, are subject in all their extension and in their
margins, in an area of three meters, to the public use easement in the general interest of navigation,
floating, fishing and salvage.

A study of the history of Art. 553 will however reveal that it was never intended to authorize the
private acquisition of riverbanks. That could not have been legally possible in view of the legislative
policy clearly enunciated in Art. 339 of the Code that all riverbanks were of public ownership. The
article merely recognized and preserved the vested rights of riparian owners who, because of prior
law or custom, were able to acquire ownership over the banks. This was possible under the Siete
Partidas which was promulgated in 1834 yet.29 Under Law 6, Title 28, Partidas 3, the banks of rivers
belonged to the riparian owners, following the Roman Law rule.30 In other words, they were privately
owned then. But subsequent legislation radically changed this rule. By the Law of Waters of August 3,
1866, riverbanks became of public ownership, albeit impliedly only because considered part of the
bed — which was public — by statutory definition.31 But this law, while expressly repealing all prior
inconsistent laws, left undisturbed all vested rights then existing.32 So privately owned banks then
continued to be so under the new law, but they were subjected by the latter to an easement for public
use.

Article 73 on Law of Waters provide. …

This was perhaps the reconciliation effected between the private ownership of the banks, on the one
hand, and
the policy of the law on the other hand, to devote all banks to public use.33 The easement would
preserve the
private ownership of the banks and still effectuate the policy of the law. So, the easement in Art. 73
only
recognized and preserved existing privately owned banks; it did not authorize future private
appropriation of
riverbanks.

The foregoing observation is confirmed by the still subsequent Law of Waters of June 13, 1879, which
was
principally based on the Law of August 3, 1865.34 Art. 36 of the new law, which was a substantial
reenactment of Art. 73 of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866.

The new law also affirmed the public ownership of rivers and their beds, and the treatment of the
banks as part of the bed.35 But nowhere in the law was there any provision authorizing the private
appropriation of the banks. What it merely did was to recognize the fact that at that time there were
privately owned banks pursuant to
the Siete Partidas, and to encumber these with an easement for public use.

However, the public nature of riverbanks still obtained only by implication. But with the promulgation
of the Civil
Code of 1889, this fact was finally made explicit in Art. 339 thereof. Riverbanks were declared as
public property
since they were destined for public use. And the first paragraph of Art. 36 of the Law of Waters of
1879 was
substantially reenacted in Art. 553 of the Code.36 Hence, this article must also be understood not as
authorizing
the private acquisition of riverbanks but only as recognizing the vested titles of riparian owners who
already
owned the banks.

The authority, then, for the private ownership of the banks is neither the old Civil Code nor the Law of
Waters of 1866 but the Siete Partidas. Unfortunately, plaintiff cannot invoke it. Law 6, Title 28, Partida
3, which provides for private ownership of banks, ceased to be of force in this jurisdiction as of 1871
yet when the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, took effect.37 Since the change in the course of the
River took place in 1937, the new banks which were formed could not have been subjected to the
provisions of the Siete Partidas which had already been superseded by then.

First of all, We are not declaring that the entire channel, i.e., all that space between the "secondary
bank" line and the "primary bank" line, has permanently become part of the riverbed. What We are
only holding is that at the time the defendants made their extractions, the excavations were within the
confines of the riverbanks then. The "secondary bank" line was the western limit of the west bank
around 1945 to 1949 only. By 1955, this had greatly receded to the line just 20 meters east of the
camachile tree in the New Accretion Area. All that space to the west of said receding line90 would still
be part of plaintiff's property — and also whatever portion adjoining the river is, at present, no longer
reached by the non-inundating ordinary floods.

Secondly, it is not correct to say that plaintiff would be deprived of his property without any
compensation at all.
Under Art. 370 of the old Civil Code, the abandoned bed of the old river belongs to the riparian
owners either fully or in part with the other riparian owners. And had the change occurred under the
Civil Code of the Philippines, plaintiff would even be entitled to all of the old bed in proportion to the
area he has lost.91

And, lastly, defendants cannot be accused of unjustly profiting at plaintiff's expense. They were not
responsible
for the shifting of the River. It was due to natural causes for which no one can be blamed. And
defendants were
extracting from public property then, under proper authorization. The government, through the
defendants, may
have been enriched by chance, but not unjustly.

Ownership; River banks.—A river bank is part of the bed of the river. “Banks of a river” refer to those
lateral strips or zones of its bed which are washed by the stream only during such high floods as do
not cause
inundations or to the point reached by the river at high tide. The nature of the banks always follows
that of the bed and the running waters of the river.

Same; Accession; River banks are of public ownership.—Since all beds of rivers are of public
ownership, the banks, which form part thereof, are also of public ownership, including those banks
which are formed when a
river leaves its old bed and opens a new course through a private estate.

Same; River bed defined.—The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its
waters during the ordinary floods.

Same; Elements of a river.—A river is composed of the running waters, the bed, and the banks.

Same; Ownership of the elements of a river.—Since rivers are of public ownership, it is implicit that all
their three component elements are also of public ownership.

Same; Meaning of natural bed of a river.—The natural bed of a river is not synonymous with its
original bed. Even if a river leaves its original bed, the new bed will still be considered its natural bed
as long as the change of course is due to the force of nature. The word “natural” must have been
used because it is in keeping with the ordinary nature and concept of a river always to have a bed
and banks.

Same; Private ownership of river banks prior to the Civil Code.— Under the Siete Partidas the banks
of rivers belonged to the riparian owners, following the rule in Roman law. Under the Law of Waters
and the old Civil
Code, all river banks are of public ownership, except river banks which had already become of private
ownership under the Siete Partidas. Privately owned river banks are subject to a public easement in
the interest of navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage.
 Same; Easement on river banks.—The easement on river banks of private ownership effectuates the
policy of the law to devote all banks to public use. However, it does not authorize future private
appropriation of
river banks.

Same; Law governing river banks formed in 1938.—River banks formed in 1938 due to the shifting of
the course of the river to a private estate are of public ownership. They cannot be considered of
private ownership under the Siete Partidas which were repealed by the Law of Waters of 1866.

Same; Physical distinction between river bed and banks.—Plants can and do grow on the banks of
rivers which plants could not have grown in the bed as the latter is constantly subject to the flow of
the waters.

5.) Martinez vs CA (56 SCRA 647) GR No. L- 31271, April 29 1974

Facts:

The spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez are the registered owners of two (2) parcels of land
located in Lubao, Pampanga. The disputed property was originally owned by one Paulino Montemayor,
who secured a "titulo real" over it way back in 1883. After the death of Paulino Montemayor the said
property passed to his successors-in-interest, Maria Montemayor and Donata Montemayor, who in turn,
sold it, as well as the first parcel, to a certain Potenciano Garcia.

Because Potenciano Garcia was prevented by the then municipal president of Lubao, Pedro Beltran, from
restoring the dikes constructed on the contested property, Garcia filed a civil case with the Court of First
Instance against Beltran to restrain the latter in his official capacity from molesting him in the possession
of said second parcel, and on even date, applied for a writ of preliminary injunction, which was issued
against said municipal president. The Court declared permanent the preliminary injunction.

On April 17, 1925. Potenciano Garcia applied for the registration of both parcels of land in his name, and
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, sitting as land registration court, granted the registration.

Thereafter, the ownership of these properties changed hands until eventually they were acquired by the
spouses.

To avoid any untoward incident, the disputants agreed to refer the matter to the Committee on Rivers and
Streams, which, after conducting an ocular inspection, reported that the parcel was not a public river but a
private fishpond owned by the herein spouses.

The Secretary of Public Works and Communications, ordered another investigation of the said parcel of
land, directing the spouses to remove the dikes they had constructed, threatening that the dikes would be
demolished should the spouses fail to comply therewith within 30 days.

Issue:

Whether the spouses are purchasers for value and in good faith on the parcel alleged to be a public river.

Held:
No, they are not.

There is no weight in the spouses' argument that, being a purchaser for value and in good faith of Lot No.
2, the nullification of its registration would be contrary to the law and to the applicable decisions of the
Supreme Court as it would destroy the stability of the title which is the core of the system of registration.
Appellants cannot be deemed purchasers for value and in good faith as in the deed of absolute
conveyance executed in their favor.

Before purchasing a parcel of land, it cannot be contended that the spouses did not know exactly the
condition of the land that they were buying and the obstacles or restrictions thereon that may be put up by
the government in connection with their project of converting Lot No. 2 in question into a fishpond.
Nevertheless, they willfully and voluntarily assumed the risks attendant to the sale of said lot. One who
buys something with knowledge of defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he acquired it in
good faith.

The ruling that a purchaser of a registered property cannot go beyond the record to make inquiries as to
the legality of the title of the registered owner, but may rely on the registry to determine if there is no lien
or encumbrances over the same, cannot be availed of as against the law and the accepted principle that
rivers are parts of the public domain for public use and not capable of private appropriation or acquisition
by prescription.

6.) MUN. OF CAVITE v ROJAS, G. R. No. L-9069, 31 March 1915

Facts: A parcel of land forming a part of the public plaza was leased to the defendants on which their
house has been constructed and had been occupying the same. The plaintiff ordered the defendants to
vacate the said land as it formed integral part of the public plaza. The defendants refused to vacate the
said land because they had acquired the right of possession to it and further alleged that the lease
agreement provided that they can only be ordered to vacate the said property if the municipality needed it
for decoration or public use.

The trial court held that the municipality had no legal claim to the property. This case was appealed
through bill of exceptions.

Issue: WON the lease agreement between the parties was valid

Ruling: The lease was null and void.

Ratio Decidendi: The defendant has no right to continue to occupy the land for it is an integral part of the
plaza which is for public use and is reserved for the common benefit. Property for public use in provinces
and in towns comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters,
the promenades, and public works of general service supported by said towns or provinces.

The said Plaza being a promenade for public use, the municipal council of Cavite could not in 1907
withdraw or exclude from public use a portion thereof in order to lease it for the sole benefit of the
defendant Hilaria Rojas. The plaintiff municipality exceeded its authority in the exercise of its powers by
executing a contract over a thing of which it could not dispose, nor is it empowered so to do. The Civil
Code, articles 1271, prescribes that everything which is not outside the commerce of man may be the
object of a contract, and plazas and streets are outside of this commerce. Therefore, it must be concluded
that the said lease is null and void.