Manila Pest Control vs WCC , 25 SCRA 700 Oct 29, 1968

Fernando, J.

It was alleged that on Feb 24, 1967, respondent Workmen’s Compensation Commission considered a
complaint filed against it by Mario Abitria for compensation submitted for decision after Abitria and a
physician testified, with petitioner’s counsel failing to appear. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
praying to present evidence, which was denied. A decision was rendered awarding respondent Abitria
Php6000 as disability compensation benefit. The petitioner said that they were not aware of the decision as
it was not furnished them. Petitioner avers that they were denied due process.

Facts: Abitria was assigned to the Research division, working 6 days a week, and receiving a compensation
monthly wage of Php 180. During his work, he was made to inhale dangerous fumes since the atmosphere in
the workplace was polluted with poisonous chemical dust. He was not extended any protective device and
he was made to life heavy objects. In July 1966, he started to experience symptoms of pulmonary
tuberculosis. He spat blood (hemoptysis) and he was diagnosed with pulmonary tuberculosis when he was
brought to the Quezon Institute. On cross examination, the doctor testified that indeed the nature of the work
involving strenuous physical exertion and other factors such as inhalation of chemicals brought about the
aggravation of the illness. Respondent was duly notified of his illness and repeated demands were made for
the compensation.

ISSUE: WON there is sufficient evidence in support of the claim for disability compensation benefits under
the Workmen’s Compensation Law

Claimant had substantially proven his case and that the illness was service connected. No valid defenses
could have been put up by the petitioner in this case. The claim of deprivation of due process is without
basis. The reason why the petitioner was not able to present evidence is because it failed to do so during the
trial itself. On the claim that it was not furnished a copy of the decision, it is the fault of petitioner’s counsel
Atty Manuel Corpuz because when such counsel received the decision, he told Gerardo Guzman, the one
who delivered the decision to him, that he was no longer handling the case, and that it should be furnished to
one Atty Manuel Camacho, and since Camacho was not around to receive the decision, it was left with a
clerk working in his law office.

Quoted from the case:

“It is one thing to exert to the utmost one's ability to protect the interest of one's client. It is quite another
thing, and this is to put it at its mildest, to take advantage of any unforeseen turn of events, if not to create
one, to delay if not to defeat the recovery of what is justly due and demandable, especially so, when as in
this case, the obligee is a necessitous and poverty-stricken man suffering from a dreaded disease, that
unfortunately afflicts so many of our countrymen and even more unfortunately requires an outlay far beyond
the means of our poverty stricken masses.”

“The ancient and learned profession of the law stresses fairness and honor; that must ever be kept in mind
by everyone who is enrolled in its ranks and who expects to remain a member in good standing.”

WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is denied. With
treble costs against petitioner to be paid by his counsel, Attorney Manuel A. Corpuz.

Austria vs. Masaquel, 20 SCRA 1247 (1967)

FACTS
 Austria was the plaintiff in a civil case involving 3 parcels of land in Pangasinan. Judge Masaquel
decided that the land subject of the case belongs to the plaintiff, the counsel of Austria immediately filed a
motion for execution of judgment and prayed they hold possession of the land. Atty. Mariano Sicat, a
previous associate of Judge Masaquel entered as new counsel of the defendant. Pedro Bravo, the defendant
in the civil case, boasts to his neighbors that with his new lawyer, he will surely win the case. This was
overheard by Domingo Austria. Mr. Austria asked his counsel to talk with Judge Masaquel in his chambers
and request that he inhibit from further hearing the case. The judge was offended and cited Mr. Austria in
direct contempt.

ISSUE
Is the order citing Mr. Austria in direct contempt valid?

RULING
No. while the court considers it improper for a litigant or counsel to see a judge, it is not an act of
contempt of court to see the judge in his chambers and requested him to disqualify himself on the ground
which the respondent might consider just and valid. The judge did not specify the reason of the direct
contempt of court. The petitioner has not misbehaved in court or in the presence of the respondent judge so
as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings. The power to punish for contempt, being drastic and
extraordinary in the nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice.
The order of direct contempt is set aside.

Silvestra Medina and Santos Medina Loraya Vs. Atty. Rufino Lizardo
A.C. No. 10533.
January 31, 2017

Facts:
 Complainant Silvestra, because of her advanced age, allegedly entrusted the owner's duplicates of
Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCTs) to respondent. However, since complainants are not the only owners
of the properties covered by said TCTs, and other heirs were asking for the original duplicate copies,
complainants went to the residence of Atty. Lizardo and requested the return of said TCTs. However,
respondent claimed that Silvestra entrusted the TCTs to him because they sold their shares in in favor of a
certain Renato Martinez (Martinez). He refused to return the subject TCTs because complainants did not
secure the written consent of Martinez.

Respondent notes that complainants only had a one-fourth share in the subject lots based on a
compromise agreement. Complainants allegedly sold this one-fourth share to Martinez, but their co-owners
resisted the transfer of the titles to said properties, forcing Silvestra and Alicia to file a Complaint for
Partition. Upon the death of Alicia, her heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale wherein said
heirs appear to have agreed to convey in favor of Martinez and his spouse all their shares.

Complainants averred that they did not notice that the subject lots were sold together with another
subject lots. Santos claims that they did not read the Extrajudicial Settlement since they trusted Atty.
Lizardo to sell only one parcel of land covering 1,000 square meters to Martinez. Hence, complainant
informed the Investigating Commissioner of their letter terminating the services of Atty. Lizardo as counsel
for total loss of trust and confidence and prayed for the latter's disbarment.

IBP:

The Investigation Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for two years. The Board of Governors of the IBP issued a Resolution adopting and approving the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thereby suspending Atty. Lizardo from the
practice of law for two years.

Ruling:
This Court resolves to adopt with modification the Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors. The
main charge against Atty. Lizardo is his alleged violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

This Court has explained the test in determining whether conflicting interests are being represented
in this wise:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument
will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed
or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the
attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents
him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge
acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of
a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty
to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.

In the case at bar, it is undeniable that complainants Silvestra and Santos, on one hand, and Martinez,
on the other, have conflicting interests with regard to the disputed property, particularly lot which
complainants assert they never sold to Martinez. Atty. Lizardo now finds himself arguing against the
ownership by Silvestra and Santos of their shares in the disputed property, which is the very legal position
he was bound to defend as their counsel in the partition case.

The Court observes that the complaint for partition in the RTC of Makati is the only case filed in
court concerning the subject properties, and Atty. Lizardo is the counsel of record therein of Silvestra and
Alicia. There is no mention of Martinez in said Complaint. These inactions make it hard for us to believe
Atty. Lizardo's claim that Martinez engaged his services concurrently with Silvestra and Alicia in the filing
of the partition case. There is no credible proof on record that Atty. Lizardo was from the beginning
engaged to represent Silvestra, Alicia and Martinez as their common counsel.

Respondent is required to deliver the property of his client when due or upon demand, and mandated
to always be loyal to them and vigilant to protect their interests, in accordance with the following provisions
of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into
his possession. Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may
be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his
client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured
for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.

Atty. Lizardo's withholding of the TCTs entrusted to him by his clients to protect another purported
client who surreptitiously acquired his services despite a conflict of interest is therefore a clear violation of
several provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. For this reason, we also uphold the grant of
complainants' prayer for the return of the subject titles which they turned over to Atty. Lizardo for
safekeeping. In any event, the return of said TCTs will not unduly prejudice Martinez who may cause his
adverse claim to be duly annotated thereon.

However, we refrain from passing upon the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that Atty.
Lizardo was guilty of deceit. The matter of fraud in the execution of said agreement which will have
implications on its validity and legal effects must be first threshed out by the parties in the appropriate
proceedings.

We find insufficient basis to hold Atty. Lizardo liable for violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon
7, Rule 7.03 at this point in time, a lighter penalty is in order. Suspension from the practice of law for one
year is sufficient in the case at bar.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Rufino C. Lizardo GUILTY of violating Canons 16 and
17, and Rules 15.03 and 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court
SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision, ORDERS
him, under pain of contempt, to return TCTs No. 3900 and 13866 to complainant Silvestra Medina within
15 days from notice of this Decision, and WARNS him that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall
be dealt with more severely.
 NILO B. DIONGZON vs. ATTY. WILLIAM MIRANO

A.C. No. 2404, August 17, 2016

Facts:

In 1979 complainant Diongzon, a businessman engaged in the fishing industry in Bacolod City,
Negros Occidental, retained respondent Atty. Mirano as his legal counsel to represent him as the plaintiff in
a civil case then pending in the City Court of Bacolod City.
In November 1981, the complainant again retained the respondent as his lawyer in relation to the execution
of two deeds of sale covering the boats the former was selling to Spouses Almanzur and Milagros Gonzales
(Gonzaleses).
In January 1982, the parties herein signed a retainer contract for legal services that covered legal
representation in cases and transactions involving the fishing business of complainant Diongzon.
In February 1982, the Gonzaleses sued Diongzon for replevin and damages, and sought the annulment of the
aforementioned deeds of sale. They were represented by Atty. Romeo Flora, the associate of respondent
Atty. Mirano in his law office.
It appears that the respondent Atty. Mirano eventually entered his appearance as the counsel for the
Gonzaleses against Diongzon. Therefore, Diongzon initiated this administrative complaint for disbarment
against the respondent by verified letter-complaint.
The respondent stated that Diongzon had been his client in a different civil case; that Diongzon had never
consulted him upon any other legal matter; that Diongzon had only presented the deeds of sale prepared by
another lawyer because he had not been contented with the terms thereof; that he had not been Diongzon's
retained counsel because the retainer agreement did not take effect; that he had returned the amount paid to
him by Diongzon; that he had appeared for the Gonzaleses only after their evidence against Diongzon had
been presented.
The complaint was referred to the IBP for investigation. The IBP Board of Governors finally recommended
that the respondent be held guilty of conflict of interest for appearing as the counsel for the "opponents of
Diongzon with whom he had an existing lawyer-client relationship, a gross violation of his ethical duties as
an attorney.

ISSUE:

Was there an attorney-client relationship established between the complainant Diongzon and Atty.
Mirano that would make the latter guilty of representing conflict of interest?

RULING:

YES.

The lawyer-client relationship begins from the moment a client seeks the lawyer's advice upon a
legal concern. The seeking may be for consultation on transactions or other legal concerns, or for
representation of the client in an actual case in the courts or other fora. From that moment on, the lawyer is
bound to respect the relationship and to maintain the trust and confidence of his client. No written
agreement is necessary to generate a lawyer-client relationship, but in formalizing it, the lawyer may present
a retainer agreement to be considered and agreed to by the client. As with all contracts, the agreement must
contain all the terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties.

In this case, the respondent presented such a retainer contract to the complainant, the terms of which
are stated below:

The CLIENT retains and employs the ATTORNEY to take charge of the legal matters of the former
in connection with his fishing business, and the attorney accepts such retainer and employment subject to
the following terms and conditions, to wit:

1. That the term of this contract shall be for two "2" years beginning February, 1982 but is deemed
automatically renewed for the same period if not terminated by both parties by virtue of an agreement to that
effect and signed by them;

2. That the compensation to be paid by the client for the services of the attorney, shall be three hundred
pesos (P300.00) a month;
3. That the attorney may be consulted at all times by CLIENT on all business requiring his professional
advice and opinion and when the ATTORNEY gives a written opinion, a copy shall be sent to the CLIENT;

4. That the duties of the attorney in this retainer contract shall include consultations, opinions, legal advices,
preparations and drafting of contracts and other legal papers, and other legal works, in connection with the
business of the CLIENT, except those cases involving trials in court, which if they are entrusted to the
ATTORNEY, shall be subject to a new agreement;

The lawyer-client relationship between the parties was duly established beginning in 1979 and lasted
until 1982. The respondent's claim that he returned the retainer fee did not alter the juridical existence of
their lawyer-client relationship. When the complainant consulted him on the sale of the boats to the
Gonzaleses, the respondent reviewed the contracts of sale in the capacity of the complainant's lawyer, and
even notarized the same. He became aware of the details of the sale by virtue of the confidentiality
generated by his lawyer-client relationship with the complainant.

A conflict of interest exists when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two opposing parties,
like when the lawyer performs an act that will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he
represented him, or when the lawyer uses any knowledge he previously acquired from his first client against
the latter.

When he appeared in court for the benefit of the Gonzaleses to try the case against the complainant,
the respondent unquestionably incurred a conflict of interest. Having become privy to the terms of the sale
subject of the civil case, the conflict of interest became unmitigated because the complainant had not
expressly consented in writing to his appearing in behalf of the Gonzaleses. It would have been more
prudent for him to have excused himself from representing either party in the civil case.

Duduaco v. Laquindanum, 466 SCRA 428 (2005)

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law
and jurisprudence but were motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty and corruption

FACTS:

Complainant Mercedes Duduaco charged respondent judge with grave misconduct, abuse of judicial
office and/or gross ignorance of the law.

This case stemmed from the motor vehicle of the respondent judge being repaired by the Toyota
shop, wherein herein complainant is the manager, wherein respondent judge refused to pay the cost of the
repair and instead told that it will be the insurance that will pay the cost. Complainant claimed that
respondent judge has a heated argument with the Service Department Manager and shouted that she was a
judge. Respondent judge asked for a demand letter and upon presentation thereof, she paid the deductible
franchise stated therein under protest. Respondent judge left the shop without the car, later on she filed case
for Replevin.
The report of the Investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals recommended the dismissal of the complaint
for lack of merit, insufficiency of evidence and reasonable doubt. He observed that respondent’s refusal to
pay the deductible franchise was not intended to violate the law. The Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) adopted the findings of the investigating officer. The OCA ruled that complainant’s insistence on
pursuing her unsubstantiated charges despite lack of personal knowledge wasted the timed and resources not
only of respondent but also of the Investigating Justice and the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Laquindanum is liable for gross ignorance of the law

RULING: No. To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to
existing law and jurisprudence but were motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty and corruption. On the
other hand, misconduct is any unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned in the administration of
justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right determination of the cause. It generally means
wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.
Respondent’s refusal to pay the deductible franchise was justified. Her insistence that the demand to pay be
in writing, together with her refusal to affix her signature in the blank form, did not amount to grave
misconduct, abuse of judicial office or gross ignorance of the law. She was only exercising her legal right.
Had respondent signed the blank form, she would be deemed to have waived her earlier protest and would
have lost the right to claim for refund.

MAQUIRAN v. GRAGEDA
AM No. RT 04-1888
Date: 11 Feb 2005

Facts:

1. This arose from cases for damages against foreign corporations (DOLE, Del Monte, Shell among others) filed with
the US courts. The US courts dismissed the case and required them to filed their claims in their home countries.
2. With this a civil case was raffled to the court of respondent judge.
3. Sometime in 1997, the cases were globally settled under a COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.
4. With this the plaintiffs and defendants moved for the approval of the SETTLEMENT. The court issued an OMNIBUS
ORDER approving the SETTLEMENT.
5. The plaintiffs moved for EXECUTION. It was granted through a WRIT OF EXECUTION. The WRIT was returned
unsatisfied.
6. Defendants in the case moved for QUASHAL OF THE WRIT and prayed for RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE to prove that
the settlement moved to be executed has already been satisfied. With this they manifested that they are willinbg
to shoulder the expenses of the judge in receiving evidence IN TEXAS, USA.
7. The judge granted the defendants’ motion.
 8. The judge wrote to the OCA asking for permission to perform the reception of evidence. While pending he also
wrote another letter, this time asking for leave to visit his daughter in the US. The second letter was granted by
the Court.
9. The judge conducted the proceeding in the Consulate Office in San Francisco.
10. This prompted COMPLAINANT to file an administrative case alleging violation of BP 129 on territorial jurisdiction
of the court when he conducted court session outside of his territory WITHOUT APPROVAL OF THE SC.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
He contends that his action was made in good faith. He relies on Section 6, Rule 135 of the RULES OF COURT
which provides that when there is no specific law or rules to carry out court’s jurisdiction, he may adopt suitable process
or mode to affect the same.

ISSUE/S
WON it was proper for the judge to receive evidence outside of his territorial jurisdiction.

RULING

NO. The proceedings abroad are outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippine Courts. He is the presiding
judge of Branch 4 of the RTC for the 11 th Judicial Region, the territorial jurisdiction of which is limited only to Panabo,
Davao Del Norte.

Cases are decided on the basis of evidence presented before the court, thus it is incumbent upon the party who is
to be benefited by such evidence to produce the same, no matter how voluminous and burdensome, in accordance with
the rules for the court’s appreciation and evaluation. It is not the JUDGE’S duty to secure these documents for the
defendants.

JUDGE IS SUSPENDED FOR SIX MONTHS.

ATTY. BRIONES

A.C. No. 5486 August 15, 2001] Formerly A.C. CBD Case No. 00-690

PONENTE: PUNO, J.:

NATURE: Arose from the continued failure of Atty. Briones to submit necessary appellant brief to the Second Division of SC

FACTS:
 Atty. Briones is the counsel of the accused-appellant Restituto Cabacan in the case: People of the Philippines vs. Restituto
Cabacan
 Atty. Briones was given notice through mail to file appellant’s brief but failed in different occasions:
o 1st: He was given 30 days to file the brief but failed (August 6, 1998).
o 2nd: Submit brief within 10 days and show cause order why Atty. Briones should not be disciplined by the Court – failed
(April 28, 1999).
 The Court referred the matter of the repeated failure of Atty. Briones to file appellant's brief to the IBP for evaluation,
report and recommendation (August 9, 1999).
  IBP Commissioner Victoria Gonzales-De Los Reyes informed Atty. Briones of the Court's referral of the matter to the IBP
and required him to file his Comment within 5 days from receipt of the letter – again, he did not file any Comment
(October 7, 1999).
 COMMISSIONER DE LOS REYES’ FINDINGS:
o People vs. Cabacan has remained pending in view of the negligence of Atty. Briones to file the required appellant's
brief.
o It is evident that he violated Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the CPR.
o She recommends that he be SUSPENDED from the practice of law profession for a period of six (6) months.
 IBP: Adopted and Approved the Report and Recommendation.
 May 26, 2000, Atty. Briones filed with the IBP a Motion for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation. He contended:
o He filed a Comment on the administrative case but the same was not considered by the investigating commissioner.
Neither did the IBP conduct a formal investigation.
 IBP: Motion is DENIED.
 On October 5, 2000, Atty. Briones filed with the Court a Manifestation praying that his Comment submitted to the IBP on
October 13, 2000 be considered by the Court.
o He failed to file an appellant’s brief in the said case because he never received a copy of the resolution requiring him
to file said brief.
o If ever a copy was received by his secretary, the latter was not able to give it to him because he had already ceased
practicing law – failing health.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Briones properly withdrew his services as counsel.

HELD: NO. He is still the counsel of record.

RATIO DECIDENDI:
 The cessation of his law practice is not an excuse for his failure to file the required brief. Even if it were true that Atty.
Briones has stopped practicing law, he still could not ignore the directives coming from the Court.
 It does not appear from the records of the said case that Atty. Briones has withdrawn his appearance. Unless he has
withdrawn his appearance in the case, the Court would still consider him as counsel for the accused-appellant and he is
expected to comply with all its orders and directives.

RULING: Atty. David P. Briones is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
Months