investigation and based on competent proofs, no less.
This is all the more so when as in this
SECTION 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof.
COMPLAINTS AGAINST JUDGES MUST FIRST BE REFERRED TO THE SUPREME
COURT
However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken
against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers.
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of
the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power,
it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance
with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without
running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by
the Constitution, for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the
Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their
personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this
Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending
case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination. The
Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit
its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public
respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. [Maceda vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 102781, April
22, 1993]
REQUIRED QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE IF ADMINISTRATIVE CASES AGAINST
JUDGES
The rules even in an administrative case demands that if the respondent Judge should be
disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence presented against him
should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. The judiciary, to which respondent
belongs, no less demands that before its member could be faulted, it should be only after due
case the charges are penal in nature.
The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable
doubt. Such is the rule where the charges on which the removal is sought is misconduct in
office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. The general rules in regard to
admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply. [Raquiza vs. Castañeda, Jr., A.M. No.
1312-CFI, January 31, 1978]
MACEDA VS. VASQUEZ
221 SCRA 464 [1993]
FACTS: Petitioner Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda seeks the review of the following orders of
the office of the Ombudsman:
1.) The order dated September 18, 1991 denying ex parte motion refer to the SC filed by the
Petitioner and
2.) The order dated November 22, 1951 denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration
and directing petitioners to file his counter affidavit and other controverting evidences.
In his affidavit-complaint, respondent Napoleon Abiera asserts that petitioner falsely certified
that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or determination for a
period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998 where in
truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in the cases that have
been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly
falsified his certificate of service.
Petitioner counters that he had been granted by this court an extension of 90 days to decide
said cases, and that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case since the offense
charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under control of
this Court.
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain criminal complaints for the
alleged falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the supreme court to the SC, and
assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the SC.
HELD: The Court disagrees with the first part if the petitioners basic argument, there is
nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge
unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate is administratively liable
to the SC for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Sec. 1 Rule 140 of the rules of Court
and criminally liable to the state under the revised Penal Code for his felonious Act.
However, we agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken
against him by this Court with regard to his certificate of service, the investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers. Articles VIII, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the
SC administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the presiding Justice
of the CA that can oversee the judge's and court personnel's compliance commit any violation
thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of
the doctrine separation of power.
The Ombudsman cannot justify it's investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by
Constitution, for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the
constitution grating supervisory powers to SC overall courts and their personnel, but likewise
undermines the independence of the judiciary. Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the
matter of petitioner's certificate of service to this court for determination of whether said
certificate reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary
records to make such determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel this court, as one of the
three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this
matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit complaint. CHAVEZ VS JBC
The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively, the FACTS: In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the
question before us is this, should a judge, having been granted by this court an extension of JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
time to decide before him, report these cases in his certificate of service. As this question had Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the
not yet been raised these cases less resolved by, this Court how could be the Ombudsman JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the
resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the resolution of this question. representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator
In fine, where the criminal complaint against a judge or other court employees arises from Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents)
their administrative duties, the ombudsman must defer action on said complaints and refer the simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that
same to this Court for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy
the scope of their administrative duties. Wherefore, the instant petition is hereby granted. The is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate
Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the complaint filed by the public respondent Atty. and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of “Congress,”
Napoleon Abiera and to refer the same to this court for appropriate action. such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under
the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both
houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to
legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a
representative from Congress,” it should mean one representative each from both Houses
which comprise the entire Congress.

ISSUES:
1. Are the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been
met in this case? 2. Is the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House
of Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members unconstitutional? 3. What is the
effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of the JBC is unconstitutional?
HELD:
1. Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the
person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non
are present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of
government is put in issue. The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that
petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief
Justice. While it is true that a “personal stake” on the case is imperative to have locus standi,
this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the
Court and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise
screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this
regard, the JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the
land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the
Court’s ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the
positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the composition of
the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a
judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for
rectification of legal blunders.
2. Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of
Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.
From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that the
provision is clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and
places the same under the supervision of the Court. Then it goes to its composition where the
regular members are enumerated: a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
retired member of the Court and a representative from the private sector. On the second part
lies the crux of the present controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or special members of the
JBC composed of the Chief Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and “a
representative of Congress.”
JARDELEZA vs. SERENO
IMPORTANT RULING RELATED TO THE PROVISION/DOCTRINE:
1987 Consti deleted Congress’ subsidiary and corrective power in SEC 5(5) ART 8
1. March 6, 2014: opening for application & recommendation for position vacated after
compulsory retirement of Assoc Justice Abad
a. UP Dean Danila Concepcion nominated Francis H. Jardeleza
2. June 16/17: Jardeleza received phone calls from former CA Assoc Justice
(incumbent JBC) Lagman who informed him that CJ Sereno was invoking SEC 2
RULE 10 JBC-009 against him
a. Was directed to be available on June 30 where he would be informed of
objections of his integrity
i. Jardeleza filed letter-petition to Court to exercise constitutional
power of supervision over JBC
3. June 30: Carpio (resource person to shed light on classified legal memorandum)
clarified objection to Jardeleza’s integrity
a. Sereno questioned his ability to discharge the duties of his office over his
handling of int’l arbitration case for the govt
b. NOTE: Jardeleza not present but was directed to Court’s anterooms where
DOJ Sec de Lima informed him that Carpio appeared before JBC and
disclosed confidential info which made his integrity dubious
4. Told Sereno he would defend himself only if provided due process
a. Demanded Sereno execute a sworn statement specifying her objections and
that he be allowed to cross-examine her
i. Same directive to Carpio
 b. Gave written statement re views on situations and requested JBC to defer its
meeting considering that Court En Banc would meet the next day to act on
his pending letter-petition
5. JBC continued deliberations and voting for nominees for short list (4)
a. INQUIRER: Court’s Spokesman Atty Theodore Te revealed there were 5
nominees but 1 could not be included because of invocation of RULE 10
SEC 2 JBC RULES
6. Present petition for certiorari + mandamus + TRO to compel JBC to include him in
short list since he garnered sufficient votes (4 out of 6)
7. JARDELEZA POSITIONS:
a. Sereno and JBC violated his right to due process in events leading up to and
during vote on short list last June 30
i. Sereno did not afforded him opportunity to be heard + acted as
prosec/witness/judge in case (grave abuse)
ii. JBC simply ordered him to be available for June 30 meeting and that
objections be made known that day
iii. Didn’t even know identity of his accusers (except for verbal info that
Carpio testified against him)
b. JBC committed grave abuse of discretion in excluding him from short list of
nominees, in violation of its own rules
i. Claimed UNANIMITY REQUIREMENT doesn’t apply when JBC
member raises objection to integrity
1. Lone objector part of body set to vote (unfair)
c. Ministerial on JBC to include Jardeleza on short list
i. MAJORITY VOTE should apply
d. Unlawful exclusion of petitioner from short list impairs Pres’s constitutional
power to appoint
i. Constrained to choose among 4 instead of 5
8. JBC COMMENTS:
a. Certiorari only available against tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions
b. Mandamus cannot compel discretionary act
i. Inclusion in short list discretion of JBC
c. No denial of due process prior to voting process
i. Lagman + de Lima talked to him but he refused to shed light on
allegations against him come June 30
ii. Cross-examine not a demandable right in case since JBC not a fact-
finding body, nor a court/agency
iii. Hearing to determine veracity also discretionary
d. Applicant included in short list when obtains affirmative vote of all members
of JBC except when SEC 2 RULE 10 invoked and integrity is challenged
(unanimous vote required)
i. Sereno’s vote was not counted
e. Violated Code of Professional Responsibility and Code of Professional
Ethics when sued as SolGen (defender of govt)
f. Pres has until Aug 20 to appoint :. Can’t be restrained by TRO
ISSUES:
1. W/N Court has jurisdiction YES
2. W/N Issues against Jardeleza befit “Q or challenges on integ” YES
3. W/N right to due process available for JBC proceedings in general YES
4. W/N Jardeleza should be included in short list YES
NOTE: not a Q of constitutionality of JBC Rule but on its APPLICATION
RULING:
1. THE COURT HAS POWER OF SUPERVISION OVER JBC
a. SEC 8 ART 8 Consti: creation of JBC + supervision by SC
b. SUPERVISION: power of oversight or authority to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties (oversight powers)
i. See to it that rules are followed but themselves do not lay down such
rules nor do they have discretion to modify or replace them (may
order it done/redone)
c. HOWEVER, cannot file for writ of mandamus (just certiorari)
i. Mandamus will not issue to control/review discretion of public
officer where law imposes upon same the right and duty to exercise
his judgment
ii. Certiorari is proper remedy to question act of branch or
instrumentality of govt on ground of grave abuse
A. Even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions
2. EXTRAMARITAL AFFAIR AND INSIDER-TRADING VALID “Q OF
INTEGRITY” BUT NOT HIS HANDLING OF CASE
a. There must be a showing that the act complained of is, at least, linked to
moral character of the person
b. OG INVOCATION: “inability to discharge duties of his office as shown in a
legal memorandum related to his manner of representing the govt in a legal
dispute”
i. Sereno shared with JBC details of Jardeleza’s chosen manner of
framing govt’s position in a case and how this could have been
detrimental to nat’l interest
A. Sereno disagreed with his legal strategy as expressed by
group of international lawyers
ii. Discretion as a lawyer has no connection to treacherous intent to
trounce upon country’s interests or betray constitution (no bearing on
moral choices)
A. “A lawyer is not an insurer of victory for clients he
represents. An infallible grasp of legal principles and
techniques by a lawyer is a utopian ideal.”
c. AFFAIR + INSIDER-TRADING: invoked for first time ONLY during June
30 meeting from newspaper reports that Sereno might raise issues of
“immorality” against Jardeleza
i. Incidents when Jardeleza was still the General Counsel of San Mig
Corp
ii. However, there are standards of morality/decency which every
member of the Judiciary must adhere
iii. IMMORALITY: includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or
indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or
is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing indiff to opinions
of respectable community members and inconsiderate attitude
towards good order/pub welfare
3. DUE PROCESS RIGHT AVAILABLE AND DEMANDABLE
a. The fact that a proceeding is SUI GENERIS and impressed with discretion
does not automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due process
i. SUI GENERIS (context: disciplinary proceedings): neither purely
civil nor criminal; involve investigations by the Court into conduct
of one of its officers, not the trial of an action or a suit.
ii. Disciplinary proceedings (as a whole) are aimed to verify and finally
determine, if a lawyer charged is still qualified to benefit from rights
and privileges that members in legal profession invoke.
b. Observance of due process neither negates nor renders illusory the
fulfillment of the duty of JBC to recommend
i. Not expected to strictly apply rules of evidence in assessment of an
objection. But to hear the side of the person challenged complies
with dictates of fairness for the only test that an exercise of
discretion must surmount is that of soundness
c. Subsequent issuance of JBC-010 puts grave import of right of applicant to be
informed and, corollary, the right to be heard
i. JBC-010: “any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be
filed with the Secretary within 10 days thereof; the
complaint/opposition shall be in writing, under oath, and in 10
legible copies; the Sec of Council shall furnish the candidate a
copy of the complaint or opposition against him; the candidate shall
have 5 days from receipt thereof within which to file his comment to
the complaint/opposition, if he so desires; and the candidate can be
made to explain the complaint or opposition against him.”
d. Jardeleza was denied of due process in denial of right to be informed of
charges against him and riht to answer the same with vigorous contention
and active participation in the proceedings
4. SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN SHORT LIST FOR VIOLATION BY JBC OF
ITS OWN RULES AND PROCEDURE AND THE BASIC TENETS OF DUE
PROCESS
a. NOTE: ruling is not an endorsement of Jardeleza’s appointment as member
of Court since President still remains the ultimate judge of a candidate’s
worthiness
NOTE:
- UNANIMITY RULE VALID by express provision of JBC-009
 oSEC 2 RULE 10: “In every case where integrity of an applicant who is not
otherwise disqualified for nomination is raised or challenged, the
affirmative vote of all Members of Council must be obtained for favorable
consideration of his nomination”
- THERE IS A NEED TO REVISIT JBC’S INTERNAL RULES
o Provision on unanimity rule is vague and unfair and can be misused or
abused resulting in the deprivation of an applicant’s right to due process
 Invocation of unanimity rule is effectively a veto power over the
collective will of majority. Any assertion by a member after voting
seems to be unfair since it effectively gives him/her veto power over
the collective votes of the other members
 Integrity as a ground needs to be defined.
 It should explicitly provide who can invoke it as a ground against a
candidate (outsider or member)
 Must still meet minimum req of due process
o Altho it is still up to JBC to fine-tune rules considering the peculiar nature of
its function.
FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA v. JUDICIAL, GR No. 211833, 2015-04-07
Facts:
Presiding Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva (petitioner) directly came to this Court via a
Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus, and Certiorari, and Declaratory Relief[1] under Rules 65
and 63 of the Rules of Court,... respectively, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to assail the policy of the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC), requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they
can qualify as applicant to... second-level courts, on the ground that it is unconstitutional, and
was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province,
Region XI, which is a first-level court. On September 27, 2013, he applied for the vacant
position of
Presiding Judge in the following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City;
Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur.
In a letter[2] dated December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and
Nomination, informed the petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates for the
said stations. On the same date, the petitioner sent a letter, through... electronic mail, seeking
reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the list of considered applicants and protesting the
inclusion of applicants who did not pass the prejudicature examination.
The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer, through a letter[3] dated February
3, 2014, that his protest and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en banc. However, its
decision not to include his name in the list of applicants was... upheld due to the JBC's long-
standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts to, among others,
incumbent judges who have served in their current position for at least five years, and since
the petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, he... was excluded from the list.
This caused the petitioner to take recourse to this Court.
In his petition, he argued that: (1) the Constitution already prescribed the qualifications of an
RTC judge, and the JBC could add no more; (2) the JBC's five-year requirement violates the
equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution; and (3) the JBC's five-year...
requirement violates the constitutional provision on Social Justice and Human Rights for
Equal Opportunity of Employment. The petitioner also asserted that the requirement of the
Prejudicature Program mandated by Section 10[4] of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8557[5] should not be merely directory and should be fully implemented. He further alleged
that he has all the qualifications for the position prescribed by the Constitution and by
Congress, since he has already complied with the requirement of 10 years of... practice of
law.
In compliance with the Court's Resolution[6] dated April 22, 2014, the JBC[7] and the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG)[8] separately submitted their Comments. Summing up the
arguments of the JBC and the OSG,... they essentially stated that the petition is procedurally
infirm and that the assailed policy does not violate the equal protection and due process
clauses. They posited that: (1) the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot issue to prevent
the JBC from performing its... principal function under the Constitution to recommend
appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial function; (2) the remedy of mandamus and declaratory relief will not lie because the
petitioner has no clear legal right... that needs to be protected; (3) the equal protection clause
is not violated because the classification of lower court judges who have served at least five
years and those who have served less than five years is valid as it is performance and
experience based; and (4) there is no... violation of due process as the policy is merely
internal in nature.
Issues:
The crux of this petition is whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as
judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is
constitutional.
Ruling:
Ruling of the Court
Procedural Issues:
Before resolving the substantive issues, the Court considers it necessary to first determine
whether or not the action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and declaratory relief
commenced by the petitioner was proper.
One. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The present Rules of Court uses
two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for... certiorari and
prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65."[9] As discussed in the case of Maria
Carolina P. Araullo, etc., et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, etc., et al.,[10] this Court
explained that:
Two. The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC's
policy. The petitioner insisted that mandamus is proper because his right was violated when
he was not included in the list of candidates for the RTC courts he applied for. He said that...
his non-inclusion in the list of candidates for these stations has caused him direct injury.
Three. The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An action for declaratory relief should
be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and
whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or... an ordinance. The
relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity
of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties' rights or duties
thereunder."[16] "[T]he purpose of the action is to... secure an authoritative statement of the
rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, contract, etc., for their guidance in
its enforcement or compliance and not to settle issues arising from its alleged breach."
In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy. Rather, the
petition specifically sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has the right to be
included in the list of applicants although he failed to meet JBC's five-year requirement...
policy. Again, the Court reiterates that no person possesses a legal right under the
Constitution to be included in the list of nominees for vacant judicial positions. The
opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a judicially
enforceable right... that may be properly claimed by any person. The inclusion in the list of
candidates, which is one of the incidents of such appointment, is not a right either. Thus, the
petitioner cannot claim any right that could have been affected by the assailed policy.
Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have
original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are
involved.[18] The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under... the exclusive
jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC pursuant to Section 19[19] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
as amended by R.A.No. 7691.[20]
Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the JBC and in the exercise of its
expanded judicial power, the Court assumes jurisdiction over the present petition. But in any
event, even if the Court will set aside procedural infirmities, the instant petition should... still
be dismissed.
Substantive Issues
As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend appointees to
the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially transmitted to the
President may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus, the JBC
is... burdened with a great responsibility that is imbued with public interest as it determines
the men and women who will sit on the judicial bench. While the 1987 Constitution has
provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from
having its... own set of rules and procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its
mandate.

The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to the JBC's
principal function of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the judiciary for
appointment by the President. However, the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms...
the process that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants' qualifications. In carrying out
its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its
nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications...
required by the Constitution and law for every position. The search for these long held
qualities necessarily requires a degree of flexibility in order to determine who is most fit
among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled license to act in
performing... its duties.

JBC's ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to fill up judicial vacancies in
order to promote an effective and efficient administration of justice. Given this pragmatic
situation, the JBC had to establish a set of uniform criteria in order to ascertain whether an...
applicant meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses the qualities
expected of him and his office. Thus, the adoption of the five-year requirement policy applied
by JBC to the petitioner's case is necessary and incidental to the function conferred by the

Constitution to the JBC. Section 10

SALARIES OF JUDGES ARE SUBJECT TO TAX
it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of
compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are
receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed
after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption
from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission.
With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the imposition of
income tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so violates the Constitution"
in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be declared discarded. The
framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and
unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987
Constitution that they have adopted.
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions
and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their
aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of general
income taxation equitably. [Nitafan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. L-
78780, July 23, 1987]

NITAFAN VS. COMMISSION OF INTERNAL REVENUE

152 SCRA 284 [1987]
FACTS: Petitioners David Nitafan Wenceslao Polo and Maximo Savellano are duly
appointed and qualified Judges of the RTC, NCR Manila. They sought to prohibit and/or VARGAS VS RILLORAZA
perpetually enjoin respondent Commission of Internal Revenue and Finance Office of the SC
from making any deductions of withholding taxes from their salaries. They submit that a tax G.R. No. L-1612 February 26 1948 [Composition of the Supreme Court, ]
withheld from their compensation as judicial officers constitute a decrease or diminution of
their salaries contrary to the provision of Sec.10 of Art.VIII of the Constitution mandating
that "during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. FACTS:
Petitioner assails the validity of Sec. 14 of the The People's Court Act, Commonwealth Act
ISSUE: Is the deduction in the said salaries in violation of Sec.10 of Art.VIII?
682, which provided that the President could designate Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-
HELD: large of First Instance or Cadastral Judges to sit as substitute Justices of the Supreme Court in
YES. The draft proposal of Sec 10 Art VIII reads as "their salary shall not be decreased" and treason cases without them necessarily having to possess the required constitutional
the words "not subjected to income tax" was deleted so as to give substance to equality qualifications of a regular Supreme Court Justice.
among the three branches of government. Thus, the clear intent of the Constitutional
Commission was to delete the proposed express grant of exemption from payment of income
tax to members of the Judiciary. In the course of deliberations, it was made clear that the ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 14 of CA 682 is constitutional
salaries of members of the Judiciary would be subject to general income tax does not fall
within their continuance in office. The court disregarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer that
declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from payment of income tax and
considered such payment as diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office. RULING:
Furthermore, in constructing Sec 10 Art VIII of the 1987 Constitution, it is plain that the
No. Sec. 14 of CA 582 is unconstitutional.
Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justice
and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of the
enactment, of if lower, it would be applicable only to the appointed after its approval. It
would be strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation when Article VIII, sections 4 and 5, of the Constitution do not admit any composition of the
the true intent of the framers was to make the salaries of the Judiciary taxable Supreme Court other than the Chief Justice and Associate Justices therein mentioned
appointed as therein provided. And the infringement is enhanced and aggravated where a
majority of the members of the Court — as in this case — are replaced by judges of first
instance. It is distinctly another Supreme Court in addition to this. And the constitution
provides for only one Supreme Court.
Grounds for disqualification added by section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 to those
already existing at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and continued by it is not only
arbitrary and irrational but positively violative of the organic law.
Constitutional requirement (Art. VIII Sec 5) provides that the members of the Supreme Court
should be appointed by the President with the consent of the CoA, "Unless provided by law"
in Sec 4 cannot be construed to authorize any legislation which would alter the composition
of the Supreme Court, as determined by the Constitution.
However temporary or brief may be the participation of a judge designated under Sec. 14 of
PCA, there is no escaping the fact the he would be participating in the deliberations and acts
of the SC, as the appellate tribunal, and his vote would count as much as that any regular
Justice of the Court. "A temporary member" therefore would be a misnomer, as that position
is not contemplated by the Constitution, where Sec.4 of Art. VIII only provides A Chief
Justice and Associate Justices who have to be thus appointed and confirmed (Sec5).
People vs. Gacott, Jr. G.R. No. 116049, July 13, 1995
Facts: For failure to check the citations of the prosecution, the
order of respondent RTC Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. dismissing a
criminal case was annulled by the SC. The respondent judge was also
sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of P10,000.00 for gross
ignorance of the law. The judgment was made by the Second Division
of the SC.
Issue: Whether or not the Second Division of the SC has the
competence to administratively discipline respondent judge
Held: To support the Court’s ruling, Justice Regalado relied on his
recollection of a conversation with former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion who was the Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission of which Regalado was also a
member.
The very text of the present Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the Constitution
clearly shows that there are actually two situations envisaged therein.
The first clause which states that “the SC en banc shall have the power
to discipline judges of lower courts,” is a declaration of the grant of
that disciplinary power to, and the determination of the procedure in
the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not therein intended
that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided
by the whole Court since it would result in an absurdity.
The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated
therein and is intentionally separated from the first by a comma,
declares on the other hand that the Court en banc can “order their
dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted therein.”
In this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon and
decided by the full Court itself.
Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary
power to the Court en banc, a decision en banc is needed only where
the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or
employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the
suspension of any of them for a period of more than 1 year or a fine
exceeding P10, 000.00 or both.
Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate
in all administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions,
imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue
delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in
administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty of
reprimand would require action by the Court en banc.
Air France v. Rafael Carrascoso + CA (1966) / Sanchez
Facts
Rafael Carrascoso was part of a group of pilgrims leaving for Lourdes. Air France, through
PAL, issued to Carrascoso a first class round trip ticket. From Manila to Bangkok, he traveled
in first class but at Bangkok, the manager of Air France forced him to vacate his seat,
because a "white man" had a "better right" to it. He refused and even had a heated
discussion with the manager but after being pacified by fellow passengers, he reluctantly
gave up the seat.
     Air France asserts that the ticket does not represent the true and complete intent and
agreement of the parties, and that the issuance of a first class ticket did not guarantee a first
class ride (depends upon the availability of seats). CFI and CA disposed of this contention.
Issue and Holding: WON Carrascoso was entitled to the first class seat he claims. YES
Ratio
On CA's decision
Air France charges that CA failed to make complete findings of fact on all issues presented.
SC says that so long as CA's decision contains the facts necessary to warrant its
conclusions, there is nothing wrong in withholding any specific finding of facts with respect to
the evidence for the defense.
On the seat issue
If a first-class ticket holder is not entitled to a corresponding seat, what security can a
passenger have? It's very easy to strike out the stipulations in the ticket and say that there
was a contrary verbal agreement. There was no explanation as to why he was allowed to
take a first class seat before coming to Bangkok if indeed he had no seat or if someone had a
better right to it.
On contract to transport, QD, etc.
This is different in kind and degree from any other contractual obligation because of the
relation which an air carrier sustains with the public. Passengers do not contract merely for
transportation as they have a right to be treated by the employees with kindness, respect,
courtesy, consideration. What happened was a violation of public duty by Air France--a case
of QD, so damages are proper. A case was cited wherein it was said that although the
relation of passenger and carrier is contractual in origin and nature, the act that breaks the K
may be also a tort.
On the issue of award of damages
Air France assails CA's award of moral damages, claiming that since Carrascoso's action is application for a tax treaty relief from the BIR should merely operate to confirm the
based on breach of contract, there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith in order to avail entitlement of the taxpayer to the relief under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.
of said award. While there was no specific mention of "bad faith," it may be drawn from the
facts and circumstances set forth. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by evidence.

Allegations in the complaint on this issue:

1. There was a K to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering the Bangkok-Teheran
leg
2. This K was breached when Air France failed to furnish first class transpo at Bangkok
3. There was bad faith when the manager compelled Carrascoso to leave his seat after
he was already seated and to transfer to the tourist class, thereby making him suffer
inconvenience, embarrassment, humiliation, etc.
bad faith - state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-
interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes

See NCC 21. Upon the provisions of NCC 2219 (10), moral damages are
recoverable. Exemplary damages are well awarded also, since NCC gives the court power to
grant such in K and QK, with the condition that the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v. CIR, 704 SCRA 216 (2013)

ISSUE:  Whether or not Deutsche Bank is no longer entitled to the treaty relief due to failure
to comply with the application first with the BIR. 

FACTS:  Deutsche Bank applied for a tax refund by virtue of the preferential rate of 10%
BPRT provided by the RP-Germany Tax Treaty as it had erroneously paid the regular 15%
rate. When the matter was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals, the tax refund was denied
due to the failure of the taxpayer to file an application with the BIR prior to the availment of
the preferential tax rate under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty. 
DECISION:  Deutsche bank is still entitled. 
RATIO DECIDENDI:  The Court held that the BIR must not impose additional requirements
that would negate the availment of the reliefs provided for under international agreements.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the failure to strictly comply with RMO 1-2000 will not
deprive the taxpayer of the benefits provided under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty for as long
as it possesses all the requirements stated therein. It went on to state that at most, the