ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

(Mid-Semester Evaluation, Autumn Term, 2020)

ARTICLE: WRIT JURISDICTION: QUO WARRANTO

Submitted By: Pranay Jalan

Reg No. : 17B106
Submitted to: Dr. Girish R.
(Assistant Professor of Law, Gujarat National Law University)

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 GNLU Project* Details and Academic Integrity Form
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Student Name: Pranay Jalan

Registration No. and Semester: 17B106 Semester: Vth
Subject: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Faculty Member: Dr. Girish R.
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PRANAY JALAN (20/10/2020)

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 Acknowledgement

This project has been made possible through the help, support and cooperation of our
Administrative Law Professor Dr. Girish R. Sir. I would like to thank Sir for his valuable
suggestions and guidance throughout the short journey of compiling this project. I would also
like to express my gratitude towards the staff and administration of Gujarat National Law
University without whose cooperation, this project would not have been a success.
Finally, I thank my friends and parents for their motivation as well as guidance.
-Pranay Jalan

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................5
II. ENGLISH ANTECEDENTS OF QUO WARRANTO...............................................6
III. THE WRIT OF QUO WARRANTO..........................................................................8
1. Position in UK.........................................................................................................................8
2. Position in India......................................................................................................................9
(a) Public Office having a substantive character.....................................................................................11
(b) Exceptions to the applicability Quo warranto Rule..........................................................................13
(c) Validity of orders upon removal from the post of authority............................................................14
(d) Locus Standi..........................................................................................................................................15

IV. CONCLUSION.........................................................................................................15
V. ENDNOTES..............................................................................................................17

I. INTRODUCTION

The concept of Writs in India is one of the most popular mechanisms to challenge an
administrative action and obtain redress against the Administration, by seeking the powers of
High Courts and Supreme Court enshrined in the Constitution under Art. 226 and Art. 32,
respectively. In order to provide the safeguards of a judicial review of administrative action,
the Court can issue writs in the nature of prohibition, certiorari, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and mandamus.

As defined by Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative law is the law concerning the powers and
procedures of administrative agencies, and lays a special emphasis on the law governing
judicial review of administrative action. Against this definition, although judicial control by
itself is not an exhaustive means to control the administrative action, its control is bolstered
by parliamentary controls, administrative appeal controls and ombudsman type controls. 1
Even despite the lacunae that might exist in judicial control, nonetheless it manages to play a
significant role.2

The writ of quo warranto or the safeguard against the appointments made to public offices
have been the giving of a chequered English history. To ensure that the position is not
usurped by a despot, the appointment of such a person can be challenged under a writ of quo

1
M.P. Jain & S.N. Jain, Principles of Administrative Law (Vol.I, Lexis Nexis 2011) 6.
2
M.P. Jain & S.N. Jain, Principles of Administrative Law (Vol.I, Lexis Nexis 2011) 9.

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warranto, which strikes at the authority of the person holding the impugned office. 3 The use
of quo warranto has varied over time and it and has been used to consolidate royal power and
dissolve corporate monopolies.4 Initially, what started as a royal weapon against feudal
practices has now culminated into a tool for the common public to challenge the unwarranted
holdings of offices having a greater public interest.

In The University of Mysore v. C.D. Govinda Rao 5, while dealing with the nature of the writ
of quo warranto has expounded on the concept of quo warranto. The current judicial trend in
India recognises the writ of quo warranto as a proceeding which affords a judicial enquiry in
which any person holding an independent substantive public office, or franchise, or liberty, is
called upon to show by what right he holds the said office, franchise or liberty. If the inquiry
leads to the finding that the holder of the office has no valid title to it, the issue of the writ of
quo warranto ousts him from that office. Thus, before a citizen can claim a writ of quo
warranto, he must satisfy the court, inter alia, that the office in question is a public office and
is held by usurper without legal authority.

Taking into consideration the unique nature of quo warranto, this article shall first look into
the ancient antecedents of quo warranto in a 12th century Britian and its evolution thereof,
and subsequently, shall enquire in granular detail the carrying forward of quo warranto in
India and the modern day quo warranto as enshrined in the Constitution of India.

II. ENGLISH ANTECEDENTS OF QUO WARRANTO

The modern day writ of quo warranto finds its roots in a 12th century British Empire under
the reign of King Edward I. It was during a time when the monarchy had lost all control over
the country and a rising aristocrat posed a threat to the Crown. During that period, the
practice of subinfeudation, the practice under the which tenants holding the land under the
king used to carve out new and distinct tenures in turn by letting or sub-letting or alienating
parts of their lands.6 This practice of carving out new tenures and sub-letting posed a threat to
the original title of the lords who had leased out the lands in the first place. This led to a huge
loss of revenue to the barons.7

3
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (discussing quo warranto in general).
4
Edward Jenks, The Prerogative Writs in English Law, 32 YALE L.J. 523, 527 (1923) (discussing the evolution
of prerogative writs in the English system of laws).
5
The University of Mysore v. C.D. Govinda Rao, AIR 1965 SC 491 (India).
6
‘Subinfeudation’ Britannica < https://www.britannica.com/topic/subinfeudation> accessed 18 October 2020.
7
Michael D. Garofalo, ‘QUIA EMPTORES, SUBINFEUDATION, AND THE DECLINE OF FEUDALISM IN

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To remedy this situation, the Crown enacted the Statute of Quia Emptores alongside its
companion, the Statute of Quo warranto. The former statute brought an end to the practice of
alienating the land to other tenants by subinfeudation which could now only be done by
substitution. Under the rule of substitution, a tenant who now leased out his land could not
expect any gains out of it, and all the proceeds directly went to the Lord. At the same time
using the Quo warranto Statute, Edward-I tried to gain access over land in England by
requiring that those Lords in the possession of the land who held jurisdiction over the land,
must prove that their family had been in possession of that land back to the reign of Richard
I.

Thus, under a pre-quo warranto period where there was a lack of power of king was now
replaced royal control over these large baronial tracts of land in such a way that the barons
were no longer willing to fight the king for control. While, the power of the Crown in the
guise of a quo warranto doctrine continued to be weaponised, the enactment of the “London
Quo warranto Judgment Reversal Act 1689”, passed by the Parliament of England ended this
practice and restored the City of London to its ancient Rights and Privileges. Enacted shortly
after the Glorious Revolution, it restored various valuable privileges of the officers,
companies, and corporations of the City of London that had been seized under a writ of quo
warranto by Charles II and James II to augment the royal revenue.

In The King v. Speyer,8 Lord Reading, C. J., also points out that originally a writ of quo
warranto was available only for use by the King against encroachment of royal prerogative or
of rights, franchise or liberties of the Crown but that later it gave place to the practice of
filing information's by the Attorney General on the strength of which the Court enquired into
the authority whereby the respondent held any public position.

Thus, the concept of the writ of quo warranto, for the very first time emerged as a right
available to the common man as against a weapon which was previously used by the Crown
to exert its powers. This right could now be used to challenge the vices of State actions in a
greater public interest.

MEDIEVAL ENGLAND: FEUDALISM, IT IS YOUR COUNT THAT VOTES’, Uni. of North Texas (August
2017) <https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1011861/m2/1/high_res_d/GAROFALO-THESIS-
2017.pdf> last accessed 18 October 2020.
8
The King v. Speyer, (1916) I KB 593 (UK)

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 III. THE WRIT OF QUO WARRANTO

1. Position in UK
As noted by Prof. MP Jain9, despite the impediments served by the Dicean concept of Rule
of Law, Administrative law had started to catch pace in England. It continued to grow mainly
through two channels: judicial creativity and legislation. As regards judicial creativity,
initially the Courts were less inclined to engage themselves in the activities of the
Government, but with time, the intervening circumstances pushed the judges and courts to
play a dynamic role.10

However, post world-war a deep gloom had settled upon Administrative law in England
which pushed it to the lowest ebb at which it had stood for centuries. 11 There was a looming
threat side-by-side on the future of prerogative remedies.

Despite the attempts to create a niche for Administrative law between 1940s and 1960s, it
grew at a scattered and piecemeal fashion.12 The concept of prerogative remedies hit rock
bottom, when Lord Denning confirmed that prerogative remedy in the nature of habeas
corpus was solely sufficient as the other remedies had not been able to catch up with the
developments in law and society. He further added that the existing writs were to be replaced
by declarations and injunctions for negligence. 13 Under such a situation, the concept of
prerogative remedies was slowly withering away, and their place being consumed by a
system of declarations and injunctions.

This did not continue for a prolonged period. In an enquiry by the English Law Commission
in 1969, it recommended that under the cover of an application for “judicial review”, a
litigant should be able to obtain any of the prerogative writ orders, viz. mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, declaration or injunction.14 This recommendation was implemented
and is can still be found to be operative in Rules of the Supreme Court under Order 53(1)15,

9
M.P. Jain & S.N. Jain, Principles of Administrative Law (Vol.I, Lexis Nexis 2011) 19.
10
Id. at 33.
11
Christopher Forsyth & Nitish Upadhyaya, The Development of the Prerogative Remedies in England and
India: The Student Becomes the Master, 23 NLSIR 1, 77-85 (2011).
12
M.P. Jain, supra note 9.
13
Denning, The Discipline of Law 61-62 (1979).
14
M.P. Jain, supra note 9, at 20.
15
‘Rules of the Supreme Court Order 53 rule 1’ Constitutional Law, Administrative Law and Human Rights:
Online Case Book <https://learninglink.oup.com/static/5c0e79ef50eddf00160f35ad/casebook_159.htm>
accessed 20 October 2020.

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whereby an application for an order of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, or an injunction
under section 9 of the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1938
restraining a person from acting in any office in which he is not entitled to act, could be
made.
The aforesaid Act of 1938 was later replaced by Supreme Court Act, 1981. Section 30 of the
1981 Act provides that where any person acts in an office to which he is not entitled and
information previously lay against him, the High Court may restrain him by injunction and
may declare the office to be vacant. The remedy as defined in the 1981 Act applies to
usurpation of any substantive office of public nature and permanent character which is held
under the Crown or which has been created by way of statutory provision or royal charter.16

Thus, while the writ of quo warranto is now colloquially known as an injunction, differing
from its historical antecedent in the terminology used, in essence it bears the same
characteristics of striking at the root of an unauthorised usurpation of public office. In
addition, now the power was wielded in the hands of a common man. The amendment to the
English Rules of the Supreme Court marks a re-birth of prerogative writs in the English
jurisprudence.

2. Position in India
The concept of prerogative writs in India is largely borrowed from the English law. As
observed in the previous section, these writs were born in the procedures adopted by the
medieval English legal system. Given the facts and circumstances, one may be compelled to
think that their presence in India must simply be part of the colonial legacy, imposed by the
British rulers.17

Seervai in his commentary on the Constitution notes that it was inevitable that fundamental
rights would be written into the Constitution given the nature and history of the struggle for
freedom in India. During that period, affording a mere guarantee of fundamental rights would
have been ineffective. What the country needed was a countenance to protect these
fundamental rights adequately, through the means of an effective system of prerogative writs
as it existed in England.18

16
M.P. Jain & S.N. Jain, Principles of Administrative Law (7th edn., Lexis Nexis 2020) 636.

17
Christopher Forsyth & Nitish Upadhyaya, supra note 11, at 78.
18
Id.

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While the remedies were stagnating in the English empire(as mentioned previously),
Dr.Ambedkar along with his fellow drafters were debating on how to best incorporate these
remedies into the Indian Constitution. Thus, the Constitutional arrangement laid down by the
constituent assembly carried forward the spirit of prerogative writs without being a carbon
copy of the English counterpart. K.M. Munshi on Fundamental Rights notes that civil liberties
were effectively protected in England and United States through the means of an independent
judiciary and the prerogative writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari, quo warranto
and prohibition.19

The system of writs laid down thus operated in isolation from the historical aspects and
procedural disabilities which persisted in England. The constituent assembly had laid down
the foundation for a simple system of prerogative remedies in India. In India, the scope of
writs is now widened by the use of the words “in the nature of” both in Article 32 20 as well as
Art.22621 of the Constitution. To equate the scope of power of the High Court under Article
226 with that of the British courts to issue prerogative writs might lead to interpretation that
would result in defeating the scope and purpose of the Article.22

While the constitutional system in India provided for a mechanism of change, a large part of
it has to be attributed to judicial activism. To illustrate with the help of a precedent, the
Supreme Court has previously emphasized that a writ petition ought not to be dismissed
merely because of a technicality or just because a proper relief is not asked for.23

In the present day, the writ of quo warranto as found in the Constitution of India, confers
jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary to control executive action in the matter of making
appointments to public offices against the relevant statutory provisions. It also protects a
citizen from being deprived of public office to which he may have a right. 24 In order to
understand the specific nature of the writ as it stands today, one needs to look precedential
history which has evolved from the time when the concepts of prerogative writs was first
incorporated into the Constitution. The first section will analyse the constituents of a public
office and carve out exceptional cases in which remedy of quo warranto is not available; the

19
Id.
20
INDIA CONST. art. 32
21
INDIA CONST. art. 226
22
M.P. Jain, supra note 9, at 1845.
23
M.P. Jain, supra note 9, at 1846.
24
1 Halsbury’s Laws of India – Administrative Law, (2nd edn. Lexis Nexis 2020) 409.

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second section will look into the effect of the orders made by persons after they are
disqualified; and lastly the third section shall enquire into the locus standi to file a writ of quo
warranto.

(a) Public Office having a substantive character

A writ of quo warranto does not strike at the motives of the appointing authority, but is
issued against the usurper of a public office. 25 Thus, the persons whose appointment to an
office of authority is under question has to satisfy certain criterion as has been laid down by
the Courts in interpreting the constitutional provisions. The necessary ingredients to fulfil the
issue of quo warranto are:

A) The office in question must be a public office

B) The office has been created by law; and
C) The person is not legally qualified to hold the said office

Proceedings under the garb of quo warranto can only be preferred in cases where the office
in question is a public office whether he/she holds it by nomination, appointment or election.
The writ lies only against a public office of substantive character and not a private office. In a
case where the appointment of a person to the managing committee of a school was
challenged, it was held that a writ of quo warranto would not lie against the said office as it
could not be considered to be a public office.26 Similarly, the office of the principal of a
private college has been held to not be a substantive public office for the purposes of quo
warranto, whereas the office of a University Vice-Chancellor is distinguishable from that of
the principal of a private college as the University is a statutory body created by law and is
maintained by public grants. Also, there are strong reasons to treat professorship in a
university a public office just as vice chancellorship is, as both are equally substantive
offices; a university is established by law and functions according to rules and statutes having
the force of law and it is maintained by government grants.27

Where the public office of a substantive character is in question, it is not open to the High
Court to merely reject a plea wherein it cannot be shown that the person holding the office
had acted in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the petitioner and this fact cannot lend

25
P.L. Lakhanpal v. A.N. Ray, AIR 1975 Delhi 66 (India).
26
Niranjan Kumar Goenka v. University of Bihar, Muzaffarpur AIR 1973 Pat 85 (India).
27
Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagat Ram, AIR 1975 SC 1331 (India).

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validity to his appointment. The challenge has to be considered in any case where there is a
breach of statutory provisions in making the appointment, nomination or election.

Previously, the writ of quo warranto has been used against various public offices bearing a
substantive character such as the office of a High Court Judge, Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court as well as Ministers, albeit with different outcomes. In the case of Kumar Prasad v.
Union of India, the Secretary (Law and Justice) of the Mizoram Government was appointed
as a judge of the High Court. In this case, the incumbent clearly did not fulfil the
qualifications prescribed by the Constitution under Art. 217. The Supreme Court, therefore
quashed his appointment on the ground that he was not qualified to be appointed as such.28

A landmark case on a quo warranto challenge to the appointment of the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court can be found in the case of P.L. Lakhanpal v. A.N. Ray.29 This was a time
when the practice of appointing the senior-most judge as the Chief Justice was a long-
standing tradition. Justice A.N. Ray was appointed as the Chief Justice, superseding three
senior colleagues, who resigned thereafter. In its pronouncement, the Supreme Court
dismissed the petition on several grounds. It was of the opinion that a writ of quo warranto
was technical in nature and it lies at the Court’s discretion based on the facts and
circumstances of the case. It observed that even if the writ of quo warranto was issued, it
would have been futile to do so, as Justice Ray could be immediately reappointed, if quo
warranto were issued, for he was by then the senior-most judge of the Court, as the judges
senior to him had already resigned. Thus, it naturally follows from this case that even the
appointment to the substantive office of Chief Justice of India can brought under the ambit of
the safeguards provided by the writ of quo warranto. It is also evident that if a holder of
public office is not initially qualified to hold the office but acquires the requisite
qualifications during the pendency of the writ petition, a writ of quo warranto would not be
sustainable.

The powers of the Court in issuing a writ of quo warranto under Art. 226 can even extend to
the appointment of a Chief Minister, if the appointment is found to be in contravention to the
constitutional mandate. This position is reflected in the views of the Rajasthan High Court in
the case of Purshottam Lal v. State30, that such an appointment where the Chief Minister

28
Kumar Padma Prasad v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 1213 (India).
29
P.L. Lakhanpal v. A.N. Ray, supra note at 25.
30
Purshottam Lal v. State, AIR 1979 Raj 23 (India).

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holds office in violation of the constitutional provisions, any member of the public can make
a plea to the court to set up a writ of quo warranto. However, it is to be noted that the relief
of quo warranto is only available till the point where the usurper continues to hold the
impugned office. In Puranlal v. P.C. Ghosh31, the Council of Ministers had ceased to hold the
office following the President’s proclamation under Art. 356. Quashing the petition, the
Calcutta High Court held that it can only be used to prevent a continued exercise of unlawful
authority and not to vindicate the private rights violated in exercise of the unlawful authority.

It is an established principal that the virtue of the appointing authority cannot be challenged
through a writ of quo warranto.32 The discretion of the Governor to appoint Chief Minister
under Art.164 also cannot be put into question as the same is protected by virtue of Art.361
of the Constitution.

(b) Exceptions to the applicability Quo warranto Rule

It is not the case that a challenge to authority through a writ of quo warranto presents a
blanket opportunity to members of the public. A quo warranto challenge cannot be preferred
to seek the dismissal of a Chief Minister on the grounds of non-performance of constitutional
duty. The office held by Chief Minister is at the pleasure of the Governor, and the Council of
Ministers are collectively responsible to the State Assembly. Thus, it is a matter which
exclusively lies within the purview of the Governor or the Speaker under Art. 164(1) and
Art.164(3), respectively. If disqualification on these grounds are passed by the Court, it
would be encroaching upon the highly-esteemed offices, the rights and privileges of which
are grounded in the Constitution.

The recent judgment delivered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Keisham
Meghachandra Singh v. The Hon’ble Speaker of Manipur33, has yet again reaffirmed the
position that the power of the Courts through a writ of quo warranto has to be exercised
sparingly and only under extra-ordinary circumstances. The Appellant was seeking a remedy
of quo warranto for the disqualification of Manipur MLA Thounaojam Shyamkumar under
the 10th Schedule of the Constitution on grounds of defection. Relying on the reasoning in the
case of Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya 34, the Appellant sought a writ of quo
31
Puranalal v. P.C. Ghosh, AIR 1970 Cal 118 (India).
32
P.L. Lakhanpal v. A.N. Ray, supra note at 25.
33
Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. The Hon’ble Speaker of Manipur, CA NO. 547 OF 2020, SUPREME
COURT (India).
34
Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya, (2007) 4 SCC 270 (India).

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warranto against the defected MLA. In Rajendra Singh Rana35 the Speaker of the Assembly
had failed to decide on a disqualification petition during a period when the legislative
assembly was coming to an end, as no relief could be availed later after the Assembly had
concluded for the season.

Noting that no such circumstances existed in the case of Kesiham Meghachanra, Supreme
Court averred from accepting the reasoning laid down in Rajendra Rana case. Thus, it denied
a remedy of quo warranto and made a direction to the Speaker of the Manipur Assembly to
decide the disqualification petition within a period of four weeks.

(c) Validity of orders upon removal from the post of authority

When the appointment of a person in authority is quashed, a major consideration which arises
is with respect to the validity of the orders made by the person while was in authority, and to
what extent is the order valid after the quashing has taken place. To deal with these
considerations, Supreme Court applies the de facto doctrine. In essence, the acts performed
by officers that are within the scope of the assumed official authority are valid and binding as
if they were acting as officers de jure.36

A distinction exists between a ‘person who holds office under the impression of lawful
authority’ or a ‘defect in title’ and a ‘person who is merely an intruder’ or a ‘usurper’. The
orders made by persons falling under the former category are declared to be valid by virtue of
the de facto doctrine.37

This distinction can be best illustrated by taking the example of two cases. The case of State
of Haryana v. Haryana Co-op. Transport38 pertains to the appointment of a person as the
presiding officer of a labour court. The presiding officer in this case was not qualified under
law to hold office. On appeal, the Supreme Court not only quashed the office but also
invalidated all orders passed by the presiding officer. The Court was of the view that the
person in this case was a usurper as he did not possess the basic qualifications of seven years’
experience required for the post, which strikes at the root of his competence.

35
Id.
36
Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 1473 (India).
37
Id.
38
State of Haryana v. Haryana Co-op. Transport, AIR 1977 SC 237 (India).

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Whereas, in State of UP v. Raffiquddin 39, the appointment of a few munsiffs, although made
by a competent authority was not in accordance with the law. The Supreme Court held that
the judgments and orders passed by them as de facto judges could not be challenged as
invalid. They were not usurpers of office as they were appointed by a competent authority.

Keeping in mind the distinction between the two concepts, the de jure doctrine protects the
interests of the public and necessitates that supremacy of the law be maintained.40

(d) Locus Standi

When compared to the other types of writs except habeas corpus, the writ of quo warranto is
of a peculiar nature. While, other writs require that an application for the writ to be made
only by an aggrieved person, this requirement is waived off while applying for a remedy in
the nature of quo warranto. It exists as a public remedy through which a private citizen can
challenge the appointment to a public office even though his own rights may not be
infringed.41 The previous view of the Rajasthan High Court that a writ of quo warranto can
only be claimed by an aggrieved person is now largely dispensed with but certainly not
abandoned altogether.42

This has only been made possible by a number of judgments, wherein the Supreme Court has
expressed a liberal view of locus standi to be adopted in cases involving public interest. The
view of the Rajasthan High Court in Arun Kumar did not make any reference to the precedent
laid down in the previous cases which had taken a liberal view of locus standi with respect to
quo warranto cases. In this light the view of the Rajasthan High Court holding that “merely
because a substantial question of law of general importance arises does not mean that this
court can adjudicate on the question at the instance of a stranger who in no way is connected
with the dispute” is untenable not only in the context of quo warranto, but also with regards
to other types of writs, given the change in judicial attitude over recent times. With regards to
writs other than quo warranto and habeas corpus, if the person is found to be not merely a
stranger having no right whatsoever to any post or property, he cannot be non-suited on the
ground of his not having the locus standi.43

39
State of UP v. Raffiquddin, AIR 1988 SC 162 (India).
40
P.S. Menon v. State of Kerala, AIR 1970 Ker 165 (India).
41
Karkare v. Shevde, AIR 1952 Nag 330 (India).
42
Arun Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1982 Raj 67 (India).
43
Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal & Ors., (2002) 1 SCC 33 (India).

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 IV. CONCLUSION

In a country like India where nominations, elections and appointments to public offices is
more often than not subjected to issues of transparency and competency, a writ in the nature
of quo warranto shall continue to strike at the root of unauthorised usurpations. The remedy
of this prerogative writ as we know it today has been the result of a chequered history under
the British empire. At the same time, it is commendable that while the concept of writs was
facing a severe stagnation and withering in England, the members of our constituent
assembly were constantly debating to import a system of writs that was devoid of a
chequered history and procedural fallacies. The broad nature of the writs as enshrined in the
Constitution of India, has time and again, enabled a robust judicial system to accommodate
the space carved out while paying due attention to the concept of separation of powers.

Quo Warranto does not prefer one individual or institution over the other, rather, it subjects
the usurper to the rule of law, thereby ensuring that the faith of the public is not intermeddled
behind the veil of an administrative action. While there existed an apprehension at the time of
drafting the Constitution that the jurisdiction of the High Courts would be restricted if the
names of specific writs were to be laid down, it is evident that laying down specific writs has
laid the foundation for a rich precedential history. As long as development outpaces public
policy, the writ of quo warranto or shall remain necessary, albeit powerful, device for
remedying public grievances in the changing political landscape.

15
 V. ENDNOTES
CASE LAWS
 Arun Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1982 Raj 67 (India).
 Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal & Ors., (2002) 1 SCC 33 (India).
 Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 1473 (India).
 Karkare v. Shevde, AIR 1952 Nag 330 (India).
 Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. The Hon’ble Speaker of Manipur, CA NO. 547 OF
2020, SUPREME COURT (India).
 Kumar Padma Prasad v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 1213 (India).
 636.
 Niranjan Kumar Goenka v. University of Bihar, Muzaffarpur AIR 1973 Pat 85
(India).
 P.L. Lakhanpal v. A.N. Ray, AIR 1975 Delhi 66 (India).
 P.L. Lakhanpal v. A.N. Ray, supra note at 25.
 P.L. Lakhanpal v. A.N. Ray, supra note at 25.
 P.S. Menon v. State of Kerala, AIR 1970 Ker 165 (India).
 Puranalal v. P.C. Ghosh, AIR 1970 Cal 118 (India).
 Purshottam Lal v. State, AIR 1979 Raj 23 (India).
 Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya, (2007) 4 SCC 270 (India).
 State of Haryana v. Haryana Co-op. Transport, AIR 1977 SC 237 (India).
 State of UP v. Raffiquddin, AIR 1988 SC 162 (India).
 Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagat Ram, AIR 1975 SC 1331 (India).
 The King v. Speyer, (1916) I KB 593 (UK)
 The University of Mysore v. C.D. Govinda Rao, AIR 1965 SC 491 (India).

BOOKS

 1 Halsbury’s Laws of India – Administrative Law, (2nd edn. Lexis Nexis 2020)
 M.P. Jain & S.N. Jain, Principles of Administrative Law (7th edn., Lexis Nexis 2020)
 M.P. Jain & S.N. Jain, Principles of Administrative Law (Vol.I, Lexis Nexis 2011)

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ARTICLES

 Christopher Forsyth & Nitish Upadhyaya, The Development of the Prerogative

Remedies in England and India: The Student Becomes the Master, 23 NLSIR 1, 77-85
(2011).
 Denning, The Discipline of Law 61-62 (1979).
 Edward Jenks, The Prerogative Writs in English Law, 32 YALE L.J. 523, 527 (1923)
(discussing the evolution of prerogative writs in the English system of laws).

E-RESOURCES
 ‘Rules of the Supreme Court Order 53 rule 1’ Constitutional Law, Administrative
Law and Human Rights: Online Case Book
<https://learninglink.oup.com/static/5c0e79ef50eddf00160f35ad/casebook_159.htm>
accessed 19 October 2020.
 ‘Subinfeudation’ Britannica < https://www.britannica.com/topic/subinfeudation>
accessed 18 October 2020.
 MEDIEVAL ENGLAND: FEUDALISM, IT IS YOUR COUNT THAT VOTES’,
Uni. of North Texas (August 2017) Michael D. Garofalo, ‘QUIA EMPTORES,
SUBINFEUDATION, AND THE DECLINE OF FEUDALISM IN
<https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1011861/m2/1/high_res_d/GAROF
ALO-THESIS-2017.pdf> last accessed 18 October 2020.
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (discussing quo warranto in general).

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

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