TAÑADA VS.

TUVERA

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

ESCOLIN, J.:

FACTS:

Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concerns as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable they must be published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, Lorenzo Tañada, et.al. filed for a writ of
mandamus to compel Juan Tavera, Executive Secretary to President Ferdinand Marcos,
to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations, and
administrative orders.

ISSUE:

Whether the publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute
becomes valid and enforceable.

RULING:
Yes, Article 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear
object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim, ignorantia legis
nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of the CA 638 reads, there shall be published in the
Official Gazette. The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to
be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or general applicability is

indispensable and a requirement of due process. The Court declared that presidential
issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and effect.
 MELITA O. DEL ROSARIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 199930, June 27, 2018

BERSAMIN, J.:

Facts: On October 28, 2004, the Office of the Ombudsman brought a complaint
charging the petitioner with the violation of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713; dishonesty;
grave misconduct; and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for her
failure to file her SALNs for the years 1990 and 1991. On March 11, 2008, the Office of
the Ombudsman criminally charged the petitioner for two violations of R.A. No. 6713.
On November 19, 2008, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the ground of
prescription of the offenses. The MeTC granted the Motion to Quash.

However, the Sandiganbayan overturned the decision and ruled that the eight-year
prescriptive period for violation of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713 commenced to run from
the discovery of the offenses.

Issue: Whether or not the eight-year prescriptive period for violation of Republic Act No.
6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees)
should be reckoned from the filing of the detailed sworn statement of assets, liabilities
and net worth (SALN), or from the discovery of the non-filing thereof.

Ruling: The Sandiganbayan erred in applying the discovery rule to the petitioner's

cases.

As a general rule, prescription begins to run from the date of the commission of the
offense especially if the necessary information based on which the crime could be
discovered is readily available to the public. If the date of the commission of the
violation is not known, it shall be counted form the date of discovery thereof.

In this case, the discovery rule does not apply for the State had no reason not to be
presumed to know of petitioner’s omissions during the eight-year period of prescription
set in Act No. 3326. As such, the offenses could have been known within the eight-year
period starting from the moment of their commission. Indeed, the Office of the
Ombudsman or the CSC, the two agencies of the Government invested with the primary
responsibility of monitoring the compliance with R.A. No. 6713, should have known of
her omissions during the period of prescription.
 Gonzaga vs DavidGR
no. L-14858December 29, 1960

Facts: Mariano Gonzaga, as owner of a cargo truck and passenger bus, registers the
vehicles and pays the first instalment for registration fees due on 1957. To cover the
second instalment for registration fees, he remitted to the provincial treasurer of
Cagayan, by registered mail, the amount of P500.00, under postal money orders.
The postal cancellation mark on the envelope containing the remittance bears the
date August 31, 1957. The registrar of the Motor Vehicle Office ruled that pursuant
to Revised Motor Vehicle Law, the second instalment for registration fees was
payable on or before the last working day of August. The last working day of August
1957 was Friday, August 30, 1957. And consequently, the remittance of Gonzaga
which bears cancellation mark dated August 31, 1957 was made beyond time fixed
by law.

Issue:  Whether or not the remittance for second instalment of registration fees was made beyond
the timefixed by law.
 

Ruling: The Motor Vehicle Office in Cagayan had no office on Saturday, August 31,
1957. However, it was immaterial the last working day contemplated in the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law should not necessarily mean the last working day of Motor
Vehicle Office. The fact that August 31, 1957 was declared a special public holiday
did not have the effect of making the preceding day, August 30, the last day for
paying registration fees without penalty. Moreover, under the said law, for payment of
registration fees by mail, the date of cancellation of the postage stamps of the
envelope containing the remittance is considered the date of application

Yes. Since August 31 was declared a holiday, payment could still be made on the
next day, under Sec. 31 of the Revised Adm. Code. The “last working day in
August’’ for the general public in paying fees is NOT necessarily the same as the
“last working day in August’’ for employees in the Motor Vehicles Office.