Icy Dacer JD 2-A

Legal Research

Sexual Harassment Cases

A.C. No. 5900, April 10, 2019

RE: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST ATTY. CRESENCIO P. CO UNTIAN, JR.

FACTS:
It started with a complaint requesting the Court to investigate the alleged sexual harassments that Atty.
Untian had committed against students of Xavier, particularly Antoinette Toyco, Christina Sagarbarria and Lea
Dal.

The respondent texted Toyco, where he would send romantic messages, poems, love notes and
sweet nothings. Toyco explained that while she was never sexually assaulted, respondent's unwelcome advances
made her feel degraded as she could not easily ignore respondent for fear of reprisal. He also publicly showed a
lewd picture to Sagarbarria in the presence of other students. The incident deeply distressed her to the extent
that she was unable to continue with her Moot Court practice because she became emotional and cried
uncontrollably. And to Dal , she recounted that in one of her recitations during respondent's class, she clarified a
question propounded to her saying "Sir, come again?" Respondent retorted "What? You want me to come
again? I have not come the first time and don't you know that it took me five minutes to come, and you want me
to come again?"

ISSUE: WON respondent’s acts constitute sexual harassments.

RULING: Yes. Respondent’s acts are sexual harassments.

R.A. No. 7877 defines education related sexual harassment as sexual harassment committed by a
teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainer or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral
ascendancy over another in an education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor
from the other, regardless of whether the same is accepted by the object of the act. In particular, it is committed:
a. Against one who is under the care, custody or supervision of the offender; b. Against one whose education,
training, apprenticeship or tutorship is entrusted to the offender; c. When the sexual favor is made a condition to
the giving of a passing grade, or the granting of honors and scholarships or the payment of a stipend, allowance
or other benefits, privileges or considerations; or d. When the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile
or offensive environment for the student, trainee or apprentice.

R.A. No. 7877 does not require that the victim had acceded to the sexual desires of the abuser.
Further, it is not necessary that a demand or request for sexual favor is articulated in a categorical manner as it
may be discerned from the acts of the offender. In addition, sexual harassment is also committed in an
educational environment when the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive
environment. In short, it is not necessary that there was an offer for sex for there to be sexual harassment as a
superior's conduct with sexual underpinnings, which offends the victim or creates a hostile environment would
suffice.

In Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation v. National Labor Relations

Commission, the Court explained that the essence of sexual harassment is not the violation of the victim's
sexuality but the abuse of power by the offender. What the law aims to punish is the undue exercise of power
and authority manifested through sexually charged conduct or one filled with sexual undertones.
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AM. No. P-08-2576, June 02, 2020

ALEJANDRO S. BUÑAG, COMPLAINANT, VS. RAUL T. TOMANAN, RESPONDENT

FACTS:
Spouses Buñag accused Raul of sexually harassing Ivie (Alejandro’s wife) by kissing her hair without
her knowledge or permission and courting her in spite of their marital status and her request for him to stop.
They also accused Raul of taking advantage of Ivie when she was brought to Sheriff Floresil's house. Raul
denied their allegations.

ISSUE: WON Raul is guilty of sexual harassment.

RULING:

Section 3 of the Court's Administrative Matter No. 03-03-13-SC regarding the Rule on Administrative
Procedure in Sexual Harassment Cases and Guidelines on Proper Work Decorum in the Judiciary defines work-
related sexual harassment as those committed by an official or employee in the Judiciary who, having authority,
influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires
any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is
accepted by the latter. Section 4 states that work-related sexual harassment is committed when:
(a) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, reemployment or
continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms,
conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or
classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect said employee. It shall include, but shall not be limited to, the following modes:
1. Physical, such as malicious touching, overt sexual advances, and gestures with lewd insinuation.
2. Verbal, such as requests or demands for sexual favors, and lurid remarks.
3. Use of objects, pictures or graphics, letters or written notes with sexual underpinnings.
4. Other acts analogous to the foregoing.
(b) The above acts would impair the employee's rights or privileges under existing laws; or
(c) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the employee.

Time and again, We have said that no married woman would cry assault, subject herself and her family
to public scrutiny and humiliation, and strain her marriage in order to perpetrate a falsehood.
Raul has miserably failed to conduct himself appropriately. He should not have tried to involve himself
with Ivie, a married woman, especially when he is married himself. To engage in relations outside of marriage
is disgraceful and immoral, especially if one is a member of the judiciary. Moreover, his acts have created an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for Ivie such that she transferred to the MTC.

Unwelcome sexual flirtation; advances, propositions is one of the light offenses involved in sexual
harassment. Also, Raul's act of kissing Ivie's hair qualifies as unwanted touching of Ivie, which is a less grave
offense under Section 53(B)(1). His act of courting her is tantamount to unwelcome advances on Ivie that is a
light offense under Section 53(C)(6).

Raul is guilty of sexual harassment, both as a light offense and as a less grave offense, and simple
misconduct.
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The most serious charge of Raul is the less grave offense of unwanted touching of Ivie's hair while the
light offense of unwelcome advances on Ivie shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Thus, the
maximum penalty of suspension of six months for the less grave offense of sexual harassment should be
imposed upon Raul.

G.R. No. 234624, February 26, 2020

Presidential Broadcast Staff-Radio Television Malacaňang (PBS-RTVM) VS. VERGEL P. TABASA

FACTS:

Sharmile Kaye Angco was seated in a sofa of the Engineering Office. While watching Eat
Bulaga, Tabasa suddenly sat beside her and cornered her. Tabasa tickled her right knee much to her
shock and humiliation. Despite her protestations, Tabasa also held her causing her to hit her left elbow
in the nearby cabinet when she freed herself from Tabasa. She went to the toilet room to cry to her
dismay. Angco then filed an administrative case against him for sexual harassment or grave
misconduct.

ISSUE:

WON Tabasa committed sexual harassment or grave misconduct.

RULING:

It is important to stress that there is playful teasing and hurtful teasing. Despite teasing’s positive
effects to interpersonal relationships, it may not always be perceived favorably. The way a person views
a joke may differ depending on the situation and on how one perceives a tease- a teaser’s intentions and
his/her overall interaction with the teaser. Insensitive jokes or actions could border on harassment, due
to the fact that targets may be unaware of the teaser’s intentions. Therefore, for the protection of all
employees, a line has to be drawn before an innocent action becomes a full-blown harassment.

The touching of the knee was unsolicited and uncalled for and Tabasa does not have any right to
do so. Even if the act was done without malice, it is beyond all bounds of decency and decorum for a
person to touch any body part of another without consent for that matter.

Hence, what Tabasa did is considered a sexual harassment.

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CHILD ABUSE CASES

G.R. No. 235071, January 7, 2019

EVANGELINE PATULOT Y GALIA VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
Evangeline throw a boiling oil to CCC (the mother of minors), and while she dodged, AAA and
BBB (the minors) was also hit by the cooking oil thereby inflicting physical injuries, which acts are inimical
and prejudicial to the child’s normal growth and development.
According to Patulot, she can only be convicted of physical injuries and not child abuse. Citing the
pronouncement in Bongalon v. People, she submits that not every instance of laying hands on a child constitutes
the crime of child abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown to be
intended to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it
be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the RPC. Thus, in the absence of such intention on
the part of Patulot, her true intention being to pour hot oil only on CCC with AAA and BBB being merely
accidentally hit, she cannot be convicted of child abuse.

ISSUE: WON Patulot’s act constituted child abuse.

RULING: Yes. It is child abuse.

Under Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 7610, "child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual
or not, of the child which includes any of the following: (1) psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty,
sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment; (2) any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans
the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being; (3) unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for
survival, such as food and shelter; or (4) failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child
resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.

It is, therefore, clear from the foregoing that when a child is subjected to physical abuse or
injury, the person responsible therefor can be held liable under R.A. No. 7610 by establishing the essential facts.
Here, the prosecution duly proved the following allegations in the Information charging Patulot of child abuse:
(1) the minority of both AAA and BBB; (2) the acts committed by Patulot constituting physical abuse against
AAA and BBB; and (3) the fact that said acts are punishable under R.A. No. 7610. In particular, it was clearly
established that at the time of the incident, AAA and BBB were merely three (3) years old and two (2) months
old, respectively; that Patulot consciously poured hot cooking oil from a casserole on CCC, consequently
injuring AAA and BBB; and that said act constitutes physical abuse specified in Section 3(b)(1) of R.A. No.
7610.

In the instant case, Patulot's criminal intent is not wanting for as she expressly admitted, she
intended on pouring hot cooking oil on CCC. As such, even granting that it was not her intention to harm AAA
and BBB, she was performing an unlawful act when she threw the hot oil from her casserole on CCC. She
cannot, therefore, escape liability from the same in view of the settled doctrine mentioned in Mabunot that a
person incurs criminal liability although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. As
defined in the law, child abuse charged against Patulot is physical abuse of the child, whether the same is
habitual or not. To the Court, her act of pouring hot oil on AAA and BBB falls squarely within this definition.
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Thus, in view of the fact that her acts were proven to constitute child abuse under the pertinent provisions of the
law, she must be held liable therefor.

GR. No. 227363, March 12, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SALVADOR TULAGAN

FACTS:
Sometime in the month of September 2011Tulagan, by means of force, intimidation and with abuse of
superior strength forcibly laid complainant AAA,a 9-year-old minor in a cemented pavement, and did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inserted his finger into the vagina of the said AAA, against her will
and consent. Also in October 8, 2011, he had sexual intercourse with AAA against her will and consent to the
damage and prejudice of said child.
Tulagan claimed that before the alleged incidents occurred, his mother had a misunderstanding with
AAA's grandmother, who later on started spreading rumors that he raped her granddaughter.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tulagan’s acts should be punished under RA 7610.

RULING:
When R.A. No. 7610 or The Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act took effect on June 17, 1992 and its Implementing Rules and Regulation was promulgated
in October 1993, the term "lascivious conduct" was given a specific definition. The Rules and Regulations on
the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases states that "lascivious conduct means the intentional
touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex,
with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person."
In instances where the lascivious conduct committed against a child victim is covered by the definition
under R.A. No. 7610, and the act is likewise covered by sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the
RPC, the offender should be held liable for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. 
In People v. Caoili, If the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the nomenclature of the crime should
be "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610." Pursuant to the second proviso in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the imposable penalty is reclusion
temporal in its medium period.
Under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the proper penalty when sexual intercourse is committed with a
victim who is under 12 years of age or is demented is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to paragraph 1(d), Article
266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, which in turn amended Article
335 of the RPC. Thus:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group,
indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse.
It was held that Tulagan was aptly prosecuted for sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the
RPC in Criminal Case. No. SCC-6210 because it was alleged and proven that AAA was nine (9) years old at the
time he inserted his finger into her vagina. Instead of applying the penalty under Article 266-B of the RPC,
which is prision mayor, the proper penalty should be that provided in Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610,
which is reclusion temporal in its medium period. This is because AAA was below twelve (12) years of age at
the time of the commission of the offense, and that the act of inserting his finger in AAA's private part
undeniably amounted to "lascivious conduct."
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 Hence, the proper nomenclature of the offense should be Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article
266-A of the RPC, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.

G.R. No. 217542, November 21, 2018

CHRISTINE FERNANDEZ Y MEDINA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Fernandez cohabited with two children and their father. During breakfast on November 11, 2011,
BBB said that Fernandez pinched her stomach, crimped her ears with pliers, and hit her back with a bamboo
stick, causing her to vomit blood. Fernandez also ordered her to lie down, then kicked her in the stomach, and
hit her eyes with rubber slippers. Fernandez then dragged her by the hair and spun her around like a helicopter.
On a previous occasion, Fernandez scalded BBB with a cooking pot. AAA also testified that Fernandez beat
him and his older sister. He recounted that Fernandez clipped, pulled, and rotated his right ear with rusty pliers
after he spilled rice by accident. Fernandez also forbade them to cry so he just wiped the blood off his ear with a
handkerchief. She also banged his head on the floor several times, and hit him on the nape and back with a
broom until the broom broke.
Fernandez narrated that the children were arguing and that it was them who inflicted the injuries
on each other.

ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming petitioner's conviction for
two (2) counts of violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610.

RULING: It was proved beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner violated Republic Act No. 7610.
Under Article I, Section 3 of the law, child abuse may be committed through the following:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - (b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the
child which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity
of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment
of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.

Article VI, Section 10(a) of the same law further provides:

Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial
to the Child's Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer
the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.

In Araneta v. People, it was emphasized: “Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the
implementation of a national comprehensive program for the survival of the most vulnerable members of the
population, the Filipino children, in keeping with the Constitutional mandate under Article XV, Section 3,
paragraph 2, that "The State shall defend the right of the children to assistance, including proper care and
nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development." This piece of legislation supplies the inadequacies of existing laws treating
crimes committed against children, namely, the Revised Penal Code and Presidential Decree No. 603 or the
Child and Youth Welfare Code. As a statute that provides for a mechanism for strong deterrence against the
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commission of child abuse and exploitation, the law has stiffer penalties for their commission, and a means by
which child traffickers could easily be prosecuted and penalized. Also, the definition of child abuse is expanded
to encompass not only those specific acts of child abuse under existing laws but includes also "other acts of
neglect, abuse, cruelty or exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to the child's development.”
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE

G.R. No. 230443, April 03, 2019

MARY CHRISTINE C. GO-YU v. ROMEO A. YU

FACTS: They got married on June 11, 1999. Thereafter, they stayed at respondent's family home where
Mary had to contend with the constant meddling of her mother-in-law, as well as the latter's intrusion into their
privacy; when she complained, respondent promised her that they will eventually move out; however, his
promise was never fulfilled; petitioner had to make a lot of adjustments which entailed a lot of sacrifice on her
part.
After their wedding, the parties' sexual activity decreased considerably; petitioner was unable to
conceive and even tried to convince respondent that she undergo in vitro fertilization but the latter refused; as a
result, the parties grew apart as a married couple leading them to live separate lives even though they stay under
the same roof; petitioner was eventually diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was found to
exist before the parties' marriage; and the fact that petitioner is comfortable with her behavior and sees nothing
wrong with it or the need to change renders treatment improbable.
Mary claims to be the person psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations.

ISSUE: WON the case should be granted nullity of marriage on grounds of psychological incapacity.

RULING: The case does not qualify for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, this Court laid down the more
definitive guidelines in the disposition of psychological incapacity cases, viz.:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
(2)  The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged
in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage, In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state.
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In this case, the requisites were not met. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void
marriage. It has always been held that mere irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise
constitute psychological incapacity.

Hence, the petition is denied.

G.R. No. 224638, April 10, 2019

ROLANDO D. CORTEZ vs. LUZ G. CORTEZ

FACTS: They were married on March 5, 1990. Rolando (seaman) filed an Amended Petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of his and Luz’s psychological incapacity.
He alleged that she was introduced to him by the former's brother and the latter's friend. In
February 1990, he was invited to a birthday party of her cousin at the latter's house, and after consuming three
bottles of beer, he became dizzy and passed out. When he woke up, he was already in a room with her and was
clad only in his underwear and they were covered with a blanket. Luz’s brother, a policeman, suddenly entered
the room and said "May nangyari na pala sa inyo, dapat panagutan mo iyan." He then went home to his
mother's house in disbelief. Then, he was forced by respondent's brothers to marry her, so they got married.

ISSUE: WON there exist psychological incapacity on the spouses and that there is nullity of marriage.

RULING: No, there is none.

In Yambao v. Republic of the Phils, Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to
commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential
obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the
procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality.
It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is
essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Katrina S. Tobora-Tionglico, the psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; (b) juridical
antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Here, Luz painted a picture of an initially loving and harmonious relationship that turned sour
after Rolando decided to be with another woman.
In Republic v. Albios, the Court held that: Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and
complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to
regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional
questions. The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way
they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on.
Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship,
money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though
the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not
precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
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They failed to show how personality traits incapacitated him from complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. On the contrary, the report established that because petitioner was forced to marry
respondent without love, he had no intention to do his full obligations as a husband. Mere "difficulty," "refusal,"
or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from
"incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness
Both of them was not shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with their marital
obligations hence, their marriage is valid.
G.R. No. 210766, January 8, 2018
MARIA CONCEPCION N. SINGSON a.k.a. CONCEPCION N. SINGSON vs. BENJAMIN L.
SINGSON

FACTS: On February 27, 2007, Concepcion N. Singson filed a Petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code).
It was alleged therein that on July 6, 1974, Conception and Benjamin were married before the
Rev. Fr. Alfonso L. Casteig at St. Francis Church, Mandaluyong, Rizal; that said marriage produced four
children, all of whom are now of legal age; that when they started living together, petitioner noticed that
respondent was "dishonest, unreasonably extravagant at the expense of the family's welfare, extremely vain
physically and spiritually," and a compulsive gambler; that respondent was immature, and was unable to
perform his paternal duties; that respondent was also irresponsible, an easy-going man, and guilty of infidelity;
that respondent's abnormal behavior made him completely unable to render any help, support, or assistance to
her; and that because she could expect no help or assistance at all from respondent she was compelled to work
doubly hard to support her family as the sole breadwinner.
Conception claims that her husband was confined at Metro Psych Facility, a rehabilitation institution in
Pasig City; and that his attending psychiatrist, Dr. Benita Sta. Ana-Ponio (Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio) diagnosed him
with Pathological Gambling and Personality Disorder which hindered in performing his marital obligations

ISSUE: WON the petition should be granted.

RULING: The Petition will not succeed.

It is axiomatic that the validity of marriage and the unity of the family are enshrined in our
Constitution and statutory laws, hence any doubts attending the same are to be resolved in favor of the
continuance and validity of the marriage and that the burden of proving the nullity of the same rests at all times
upon the petitioner."The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social
institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family. Because of this, the Constitution decrees marriage as
legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.
Petitioner's case will thus be examined in light of the well-entrenched case law rulings
interpreting and construing the quoted Article, to wit: 'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental - not merely physical -
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code,
among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render
help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. In Santos v. CA (Santos), the Court
first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b)
juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even
if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved). The Court laid down more
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definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic of the
Phils. v. CA, [also known as the Molina guidelines].
“Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties or one of them, by
reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing at the time the marriage was celebrated, was
incapacitated to fulfill the obligations of marital life (and thus could not then have validly entered into a
marriage), then we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.”

INFRINGEMENT OF PATENTS/COPYRIGHT

G.R. No. 226727, April 25, 2018

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST and DR. ESTER GARCIA vs
VERONICA M. MASANGKAY and GERTRUDO R. REGONDOLA

FACTS: UE filed a petition seeking reversal of the CA ‘s decision.Veronica M. Masangkay and Gertrudo
R. Regondola were regular faculty members, Associate Professors, and Associate Deans of petitioner University
of the East (UE) - Caloocan Campus. While holding said positions at UE, respondents submitted three (3)
manuals, namely: Mechanics, Statics, and Dynamics, requesting said manuals' temporary adoption as
instructional materials. They represented themselves to be the rightful authors thereof, together with their co-
author, a certain Adelia F. Rocamora . Accompanying said requests are certifications under oath, signed by
respondents, declaring under pain of perjury, and openly certifying that the manuals are entirely original and
free from plagiarism.
After review, UE approved the requests for use of said manuals by students of the College of
Engineering. Thereafter, petitioners received two (2) complaint-letters via electronic mail (e-mail) from a
certain Harry H. Chenoweth and Lucy Singer Block. Chenoweth arid Block's father are authors, respectively, of
three books, namely: Applied Engineering Mechanics, Engineering Mechanics, 2 nd Edition, 1954, and
Engineering Mechanics: Statics & Dynamics, 3rd Edition, 1975. They categorically denied giving respondents
permission to copy, reproduce, imitate, or alter said books, and asked for assistance from UE to stop the alleged
unlawful acts and deal with this academic dishonesty.

ISSUE: WON the petition should be granted.

RULING: Yes. The petition should be granted.

From the books of Singer, 558 sentences/figures were plagiarized and used in the manuals of
Respondents, either verbatim or with modification; while from the book of Jensen-Chenoweth, 52 sentences and
figures were likewise taken and used in Respondents' manuals.
Respondents did not mention, as required in Section 184 of the Intellectual Property Law, the
sources and the names of the authors of the textbooks from where they lifted passages, illustrations, and tables
used in their manuals.
In their request to TEPO for temporary adoption of the manuals, Respondents certified under
oath that the manuals are all original and free from plagiarism. Other investigation, however, shows otherwise.
To this Court, the bulk of the copied text vis-a-vis the said Certification clearly shows wrongful
intent on the part of respondents. As the Court said, “We cannot subscribe to the CA ruling that respondents
were in good faith since, being the principal authors thereof, they had full knowledge as to what they were
including in their written work. In other words, they knew which portions were truly original and which were
not.”
Indeed, rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right to be recognized by law. Within the
context of a termination dispute, waivers are generally looked upon with disfavor and are commonly frowned
upon as contrary to public policy and ineffective to bar claims for the measure of a worker's legal rights. If (a)
Icy Dacer JD 2-A
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there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person; or (b) the terms of the
settlement are unconscionable, and on their face invalid, such quitclaims must be struck down as invalid or
illegal. Thus, not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was
voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be
disowned simply because of a change of mind. 
Based on their actuations subsequent to their termination, it is clear that they were amenable to
UE's decision of terminating their services on the ground of academic dishonesty. 

G.R. No. 174379 August 31, 2016

E.I DUPONT DE NEMOURS AND CO., (assignee of inventors Carino, Duncia and Wong) vs.
DIRECTOR EMMA C. FRANCISCO (in ger capacity as DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE), DIRECTOR EPIFANIO M. VELASCO (in his capacity as
the DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PATENTS, and THERAPHARMA, INC.

FACTS: E.I. Dupont Nemours and Company is an American corporation organized under the laws
of the State of Delaware. It is the assignee of inventors David John Carini, John Jonas Vytautas Duncia, and
Pancras Chor Bun Wong, all citizens of the United States of America. On July 10, 1987, E.I. Dupont Nemours
filed Philippine Patent Application No. 35526 before the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks, and Technology
Transfer. The application was for Angiotensin II Receptor Blocking Imidazole (losartan), an invention related to
the treatment of hypertension and congestive heart failure. 
The patent application was handled by Atty. Nicanor D. Mapili, a local resident agent
who handled a majority of E.I. Dupont Nemours' patent applications in the Philippines from 1972 to 1996.
On December 19, 2000, E.I. Dupont Nemours' new counsel, Ortega, Del Castillo, Bacorro, Odulio, Calma, and
Carbonell, sent the Intellectual Property Office a letter requesting that an office action be issued on Philippine
Patent Application No. 35526. In response, an office action saying that the appointed attorney on record was the
late Atty. Nicanor D. Mapili. The reconstituted documents provided no documents that will show that the
authority to prosecute the instant application is now transferred to the present counsel. No official revocation on
record is available.
E.I. Dupont Nemours then submitted a Power of Attorney executed by Miriam Meconnahey,
authorizing Ortega, Castillo, Del Castillo, Bacorro, Odulio, Calma, and Carbonell to prosecute and handle its
patent applications. On the same day, it also filed a Petition for Revival with Cost of Philippine Patent
Application No. 35526. In its Petition for Revival, E.I. Dupont Nemours argued that its former counsel, Atty.
Mapili, did not inform it about the abandonment of the application, and it was not aware that Atty. Mapili had
already died. Thus, it argued that its Petition for Revival was properly filed under Section 113 of the 1962
Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippines Patent Office in Patent Cases (1962 Revised Rules of Practice).
On April 18, 2002, the Director of Patents denied the Petition for Revival for having been filed
out of time.

ISSUE: WON the patent should be granted.

RULING: No. It should not be granted. A patent is granted to provide rights and protection to the inventor
after an invention is disclosed to the public. It also seeks to restrain and prevent unauthorized persons from
unjustly profiting from a protected invention. However, ideas not covered by a patent are free for the public to
use and exploit. Thus, there are procedural rules on the application and grant of patents established to protect
against any infringement. To balance the public interests involved, failure to comply with strict procedural rules
will result in the failure to obtain a patent.
A patent is a monopoly granted only for specific purposes and objectives. Thus, its procedures
must be complied with to attain its social objective. Any request for leniency in its procedures should be taken
in this context. Petitioner, however, has failed to convince this court that the revival of its patent application
would have a significant impact on the pharmaceutical industry.
Icy Dacer JD 2-A
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Public interest will be prejudiced if, despite petitioner's inexcusable negligence, its Petition for
Revival is granted. Even without a pending patent application and the absence of any exception to extend the
period for revival, petitioner was already threatening to pursue legal action against respondent Therapharma,
Inc. if it continued to develop and market its losartan product, Lifezar. Once petitioner is granted a patent for its
losartan products, Cozaar and Hyzaar, the loss of competition in the market for losartan products may result in
higher prices. For the protection of public interest, Philippine Patent Application No. 35526 should be
considered a forfeited patent application.
Hence, the petition is denied.

G.R. No. 195956    March 11, 2015

ABS-CBN CORPORATION
vs.
FELIPE GOZON, GILBERTO R. DUAVIT, JR., MARISSA L. FLORES, JESSICA A. SORO, GRACE
DELA PENA-REYES, JOHN OLIVER T. MANALASTAS, JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES

FACTS: Overseas Filipino worker Angelo dela Cruz was kidnapped by Iraqi militants and as a condition
for his release, a demand was made for the withdrawal of Filipino troops in Iraq. After negotiations, he was
released by his captors and was scheduled to return to the country in the afternoon of 22 July 2004. Occasioned
by said homecoming and the public interest it generated, both . . . GMA Network, Inc. . . . and ABS made their
respective broadcasts and coverage of the live event.
ABS-CBN "conducted live audio-video coverage of and broadcasted the arrival of Angelo dela
Cruz at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and the subsequent press conference."ABS-CBN
allowed Reuters Television Service (Reuters) to air the footages it had taken earlier under a special embargo
agreement. ABS-CBN alleged that under the special embargo agreement, any of the footages it took would be
for the "use of Reuter’s international subscribers only, and shall be considered and treated by Reuters under
‘embargo’ against use by other subscribers in the Philippines. No other Philippine subscriber of Reuters would
be allowed to use ABS-CBN footage without the latter’s consent."
GMA-7, to which Gozon, Duavit, Jr., Flores, Soho, Dela Peña-Reyes, and Manalastas are
connected, "assigned and stationed news reporters and technical men at the NAIA for its live broadcast and
non-live news coverage of the arrival of dela Cruz." GMA-7 subscribes to both Reuters and Cable News
Network (CNN). It received a live video feed of the coverage of Angelo dela Cruz’s arrival from Reuters.
GMA-7 immediately carried the live news feed in its program "Flash Report," together with its live
broadcast. Allegedly, GMA-7 did not receive any notice or was not aware that Reuters was airing footages of
ABS-CBN.GMA-7’s news control room staff saw neither the "No Access Philippines" notice nor a notice that
the video feed was under embargo in favor of ABS-CBN.

ISSUES: 1. WON there is probable cause to charge respondents with infringement under Republic Act No.
8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code.
2. WON criminal prosecution for infringement of copyrightable material, such as live
rebroadcast, can be negated by good faith.

RULING: There is probable cause that respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas directly committed
copyright infringement of ABS-CBN’s news footage to warrant piercing of the corporate veil. They are
responsible in airing the embargoed Angelo dela Cruz footage. They could have prevented the act of
infringement had they been diligent in their functions as Head of News Operations and Program Manager.
The trial court erred in failing to resume the proceedings after the designated period. The Court
of Appeals erred when it held that Secretary Agra committed errors of jurisdiction despite its own
pronouncement that ABS-CBN is the owner of the copyright on the news footage. News should be
differentiated from expression of the news, particularly when the issue involves rebroadcast of news footage.
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The Court of Appeals also erroneously held that good faith, as. well as lack of knowledge of infringement, is a
defense against criminal prosecution for copyright and neighboring rights infringement. In its current form, the
Intellectual Property Code is malum prohibitum and prescribes a strict liability for copyright infringement.
Good faith, lack of knowledge of the copyright, or lack of intent to infringe is not a defense against copyright
infringement. Copyright, however, is subject to the rules of fair. use and will be judged on a case-to-case basis.
Finding probable cause includes a determination of the defendant's active participation, particularly when the
corporate veil is pierced in cases involving a corporation's criminal liability.
Hence, the Petition is partially GRANTED.