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A China–Russia Condominium over Eurasia

Nadège Rolland

To cite this article: Nadège Rolland (2019) A China–Russia Condominium over Eurasia, Survival,
61:1, 7-22, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2019.1568043

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A China–Russia Condominium
over Eurasia
Nadège Rolland

Despite mounting evidence to the contrary, many Western observers

of Sino-Russian relations dismiss the current level of cooperation and
engagement between the two powers as nothing more than a convenient
façade hiding profound mutual mistrust and suspicions. The long list of
supposedly irreconcilable contradictions separating Beijing and Moscow
includes lingering historical grievances, a glaring demographic imbalance
and a growing power asymmetry that exacerbates Russia’s insecurities.
As its own power declines, Russia is presumed to be bitter and resent-
ful of China’s rising economic, political and military capabilities, and its
increased presence in areas that Moscow still covets as its exclusive sphere
of influence. Surely, a Russia proud of its glorious past must resent being
relegated to the role of little brother by a fast-rising China. Material and
economic interests may currently be pushing Moscow and Beijing into each
other’s arms, but other factors such as prestige and a yawning power dis-
parity will eventually pull them apart. The recent closeness in relations
between the two powers, evident especially since 2014, is therefore widely
assumed to be a marriage of convenience, based on fragile common inter-
ests, that will not last.1
For the moment, however, the evidence points to an increasingly
deep condominium between the two powers. French writer Antoine de

Nadège Rolland is Senior Fellow for Political and Security Affairs at the National Bureau of Asian Research. She
is the author of China’s Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative (National
Bureau of Asian Research, 2017).

Survival | vol. 61 no. 1 | February–March 2019 | pp. 7–22DOI 10.1080/00396338.2019.1568043

8 | Nadège Rolland

Saint-Exupéry said that ‘love does not consist in looking at one another,
but in looking together in the same direction’. China and Russia are cer-
tainly looking together in the same direction with equal yearning towards
Eurasia. Both powers perceive the Western presence on opposite sides of
the Eurasian landmass – US alliances and presence in East Asia for China;
NATO and the European Union’s normative power for Russia – as threat-
ening to contain and ultimately undermine them. Both continental powers
consider Eurasia their strategic backyard, and both have launched ambi-
tious initiatives to strengthen their influence over the region: the Eurasian
Economic Union and the Greater Eurasian Partnership for Russia, the Silk
Road Economic Belt – the land component of the Belt and Road Initiative
– for China. But their common focus does not mean they are necessarily
competing against each other in this vast continental space. Rather, China
and Russia share similar concerns about Eurasia’s political stability and
security, and similar overall objectives regarding what a future regional
order should look like.
Chinese strategists are clear-eyed about Russia’s regional ambitions
and pursuit of prestige, its concerns about China’s strategic intent, and its
uneasiness with the growing power imbalance. At the same time, they are
aware that Beijing’s own regional supremacy cannot be achieved if Russia
is antagonised and stands in the way. Chinese strategists thus advocate
a low-friction path, prudently working on ways to assuage Moscow’s
fears while taking advantage of its current isolation and lack of alternative
options. They hope that a concerted effort might enable the two strategic
partners to avoid the rise of bilateral tensions and discord, while helping
both to achieve their regional objectives. As one top Chinese diplomat
put it, Eurasia is the main region where China must work hand in hand
with Russia to ‘seek convergence and a balance of interests’ and align both
countries’ Eurasian grand strategies.2
Visible between the lines of Chinese assessments, however, is the expec-
tation that the accommodation of Russia’s needs and fears will only be a
transitional phase during which China needs to bide its time: in the long
run, Russia will have become a toothless former superpower, surrendering
the stage for Beijing to fully assert its own influence over Eurasia.
 A China–Russia Condominium over Eurasia | 9

Eurasia’s salience
The Eurasian landmass is the primary focus of regional integration initi-
atives launched by both Russia and China in recent years.3 The Eurasian
Economic Union (EAEU), which emerged first as a customs union in 2011
and then as an economic union in 2015, now includes Armenia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan alongside Russia. Supported since 2012 by a
common supranational institution, the Eurasian Economic Commission,
and a treaty signed in 2014, the EAEU’s primary objective is to create a
single market for goods, services, capital and labour, a first step toward
deeper integration of the post-Soviet space, akin to the European Union.4
With the EAEU integration process already under way, a group of
Russian experts led by Sergei Karaganov gathered under the aegis of the
Valdai Club (most probably on commission from the Russian government)5
to brainstorm about further options for Eurasia’s integration. In April
2015, the group published a report entitled ‘Towards the Great Ocean’ that
advocated the transformation of Eurasia into a Sino-Russian zone of joint
development. During a visit that month to the China Institute of International
Studies (CIIS),6 Karaganov announced that his ‘Greater Eurasia’ plan had
been submitted to Russian President Vladimir Putin.7 He apparently liked
the idea: at the St Petersburg International Economic Forum held in June
2016, Putin proposed building a ‘Greater Eurasian Partnership’ (GEP) that
would include the EAEU and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
countries, in addition to China, India, Pakistan and Iran.
The extension of the new partnership’s geographic scope to a greater
Eurasian region beyond the post-Soviet space reflects the Russian political
establishment’s acknowledgement that in order to bring economic prosper-
ity to the region, a narrowly focused EAEU will probably not be sufficient.
The big Asian economic engines must be engaged.8  The launch of the GEP is
also intended to create the impression that Moscow is still the leading force
driving the region’s integration process, as it increasingly feels the pressure
of another vision for Eurasia’s future: China’s new Silk Road project.
What is now known as the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) was
launched in 2013 by Chinese President Xi Jinping. The BRI comprises two
main parts: the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), stretching from China to
10 | Nadège Rolland

Western Europe, and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road that extends
from China through the Indian Ocean towards the Mediterranean Sea.
Generally perceived as a cross-border infrastructure-development project,
the BRI is in fact a reflection of the Beijing political elite’s vision for a
broader, integrated Eurasian region helmed by China.9 The five main links
promoted by the BRI – policy coordination, infrastructure construction,
unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people exchanges
– serve the ultimate objective of building a ‘community of shared destiny
for mankind’, a phrase that carries a clear revisionist subtext.10 Compared
with the Russian EAEU and GEP, the BRI’s main appeal is the amount
of money Beijing is willing to inject into various projects. The BRI is pre-
sented as inclusive, and the majority of Russia’s closest neighbours have
enthusiastically joined China’s initiative.

Aligning the BRI and the GEP

Two powers vying for the same space with two different projects might
seem like a formula for growing friction and even conflict. In fact, the oppo-
site is happening. Aware of the high risk of geopolitical rivalry, both China
and Russia have demonstrated remarkable consistency in trying to avoid
competition and to develop instead a cooperative framework that allows for
an alignment of their respective flagship Eurasian initiatives.
The first sign of Russia and China’s shared willingness to work hand
in hand came during the Putin–Xi summit in Moscow in May 2015. The
two leaders signed a joint declaration on ‘cooperation in coordinating the
development of the Eurasian Economic Union project and the Silk Road
Economic Belt’, which pledged to strengthen regional economic inte-
gration and ‘safeguard peace and stability on the Eurasian landmass’.11
Investments, transportation-infrastructure development and, over the
long run, a free-trade agreement between the EAEU and China were envi-
sioned as ways to enhance the region’s economic development. A dialogue
platform was also created to look into concrete measures to better merge
the EAEU and the SREB, an idea expressed as duì jiē (对接) – ‘docking’
or ‘joining in’ – in Chinese, and sopryazhenie (сопряжение) – ‘pairing’ or
‘coupling’ – in Russian.
 A China–Russia Condominium over Eurasia | 11

During the Russian leader’s visit to Beijing on 25 June 2016, Xi and Putin
reiterated their commitment to aligning their interests in Eurasia and pro-
moted the idea of building a ‘comprehensive Eurasian partnership on the
basis of openness, transparency and the consideration of other’s benefits
[sic]’.12 In July 2017, the same day Putin and Xi formally agreed to deepen
their bilateral ‘Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Cooperation
Relationship’, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and the Russian Ministry
of Economic Development set up a task force to study the feasibility of a
joint Eurasian Economic Partnership.13 During the ensuing bilateral consul-
tations, Russian and Chinese experts reached a consensus on observing the
principles of ‘sovereign equality and non-interference in internal affairs’,
and respecting each other’s ‘chosen path of development’.14
In addition to presidential meetings and formal joint declarations, both
countries have developed an ‘outstanding mechanism’ for regular con-
sultations that functions at every level, ‘from meetings between heads of
state and government ministers downward’.15 The high-level Sino-Russian
political commitment to cooperate in Eurasia seeps down to both countries’
intellectual elites, which have been mobilised to provide recommenda-
tions on the feasibility of a BRI–GEP integration. For example, the Russian
International Affairs Council is promoting research focused on the GEP,16
while the Chinese government funds a national grant for the project ‘Study
of the Docking Path and the Growing Trends of Belt and Road and Greater
Eurasian Partnership Initiatives’. Both Russian and Chinese analysts tend to
see the two projects’ differences not as irremediable obstacles, but as mutu-
ally complementing and strengthening factors.

Cross-visions
Chinese Russia experts share similarities with Western China experts: they
are language-proficient, and have an in-depth knowledge of the political
system, history and strategic culture of their geographical area of specialisa-
tion. In most cases, they have spent several years locally as students or in a
professional capacity as academics or public servants. When they conduct
research on Russia’s international posture to advise the Chinese political
leadership, they usually revert to the same methodology as the one Western
12 | Nadège Rolland

China experts use to examine China’s foreign policy. That is, they scrutinise
internal debates; pay attention to the leadership’s official rhetoric, statements
and agreements; and read and analyse op-eds and more extensive analyses
by local counterparts they have identified as domestically influential, with
whom they interact on a regular basis during study trips, dialogues and
seminars. They then publish their research findings and analysis, usually
including policy recommendations for China’s decision-makers.
When Chinese experts examine Russian perspectives on Eurasia, they
observe an expressed willingness to find common interests and to work
cooperatively with China. At least in their public commentary, Russian ana-
lysts tend to understand China’s BRI not as a geopolitical grand strategy
but primarily as an economically and domestically oriented project.17 Some
dismiss it as a disparate bundle that lacks a clearly stated goal, performance
criteria or time frame, one that is marred by ‘uncertainty and lack of focus’.
Proponents of this view scoff at geostrategic readings of the BRI that they
believe reflect a lack of understanding of ‘the wide range of opinions and
approaches toward this initiative within China’.18 Other experts believe that
the BRI might prove to be a useful instrument for serving Moscow’s objec-
tives. At a time when Russia faces serious economic difficulties and lacks the
financial power to pursue some of its own priorities, the BRI may be able to
provide support for the development of regional infrastructure, accelerate
Eurasia’s regional integration at lower economic cost for Russia, strengthen
the EAEU’s position as an intermediary between Asia and Europe, and
counterbalance the negative geopolitical implications of economic mega-
blocs such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership.19
These statements suggest that China’s external propaganda campaign,
which portrays the BRI as a generous gift to promote regional economic
prosperity and places the emphasis on benefits for participating countries,
has thus far been effective in shaping Russian perceptions. In this sense,
Russia is no different than Western countries that tend to be oblivious to the
geostrategic nature of the BRI and prefer to focus on the possible avenues
of cooperation with China. Given that Russian experts claim to believe that
there is no well-calculated and informed strategy behind the BRI, it is unsur-
prising that the Kremlin has decided to coordinate its Eurasian efforts with
 A China–Russia Condominium over Eurasia | 13

Beijing. It is, of course, possible that some in Moscow perceive potential risks
from the BRI but see no viable option at present for opposing it. Whatever
the case, Russia seems inclined to play along, at least for now, and China is
doing everything possible to ensure that it continues to do so.
For their part, Chinese experts see Russia’s attempt to promote regional
economic integration via the EAEU as part of a ‘geoeconomic’ strategy that
ultimately aims at restoring the unified economic, political and security
space of the former Soviet Union, albeit in a modern form.20 Russia’s deci-
sion to look to the East is attributed to a series of disappointments with
the West that have accumulated since the end of the Cold War, with the
post-Ukraine sanctions being only the latest iteration.
Moscow’s faith in what the West could bring ‘turned out
to be wishful thinking’, as Russia received ‘no more than Russia seems
lip service while [it] was in extreme economic difficulties’
in the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union.21
inclined to
In addition, according to Chinese officials and analysts, play along
the American post-Cold War charm offensive towards the
CIS was a ‘squeeze strategy’ designed to weaken Russia, while the EU’s
Eastern Partnership programme constituted European encroachment into
the post-Soviet space that did not even involve consultation with Russia.22
The eastward expansions of the EU and NATO represented a mortal danger
to Russia, especially as they attempted to ‘lure, threaten or even interfere in
internal affairs (such as inciting and planning color revolutions)’.23 The 2014
Ukrainian crisis irrevocably pushed Moscow to shift its focus from Greater
Europe to Greater Eurasia.24 But Russia’s turn to the East is not only the
‘inevitable result of the US and EU geopolitical game’;25 it is also the logical
consequence of the gravity shift towards an increasingly politically and eco-
nomically powerful Asia-Pacific, which provides Russia with tremendous
‘cooperation and development opportunities’.26 Seeing both Western hostil-
ity and the rise of Asia as deep and fundamental developments, Chinese
thinkers seem confident that the trends are working in China’s favour.
Chinese experts caution that Moscow could perceive the BRI as poten-
tially damaging to Russia’s interests in its near abroad. They are aware that
the growing Sino-Russian asymmetry of power and influence, especially
14 | Nadège Rolland

visible in Central Asia, may cause some problems for a Russia that clings
jealously to its big-brother status. Jiao Yiqiang, a Central Asia specialist,
underlines in particular Russia’s possible concerns that the BRI could be
used as a tool to help turn China’s economic clout into political influence,
thereby weakening Russia’s position and ultimately subordinating it in
its own traditional sphere of influence: ‘Russia is worried that China will
surpass its influence and thus hinder its status and role as great power.’27
Nevertheless, Jiao insists that Chinese and Russian interests are funda-
mentally similar. Likewise, Yang Lei, the director of the Zhou Enlai School
of Government’s Eurasian Research Center, notes that the consistencies
between the BRI and the GEP are greater than the differences: economi-
cally, both aim at promoting the development of a Eurasian transportation
corridor, leading to integration via infrastructure and trade. Geopolitically,
although some potential conflicts do exist, they are not serious enough to
affect the overall bilateral cooperation in the foreseeable future.  In the long
term, however, ‘when the integration process has reached a certain stage’,
Yang cautions that the ‘issue of limiting Russia’s hegemonic ambitions will
have to be considered’.28
In the end, Chinese analysts argue, the immediate danger for Russia
is not China, but the old international order dominated by Western coun-
tries. Notwithstanding recent shifts in US policy, which some Western
observers see as weakening the existing Western-led order, Chinese ana-
lysts believe that order continues to constitute a common challenge to
both countries and is ‘undoubtedly the biggest obstacle to the rejuvena-
tion of China and Russia’.29 In Eurasia, Moscow and Beijing are keen on
expanding their economic cooperation, seen as a prerequisite for social
and political stability. Ultimately, a ‘safe and stable Central Asia is a
common interest’.30 In the security domain too, both countries can multi-
ply their advantages against a common adversary if they work together
and carry out security cooperation under the GEP framework. Working
together would enable them to ‘jointly safeguard peace and stability’ and
‘curb the [United States’] new interventionism’.31
Chinese assessments of Russia’s motives and insecurities are thus not
dissimilar to Western ones. But where Western analysts usually conclude
 A China–Russia Condominium over Eurasia | 15

that a Sino-Russian collision is inevitable, their Chinese counterparts see

complementarity and opportunities to work together towards the realisa-
tion of shared objectives.

China’s advantage
Aware of Moscow’s sensitivities, China treads carefully. Chinese experts
interpret the GEP as Russia’s struggle to maintain its image as a key stra-
tegic actor in Eurasia, playing the leading role in the region’s integration
process. China nurtures similar ambitions with the BRI, but does not say
so as straightforwardly. Like Moscow, Beijing hopes to see a new Eurasian
order emerge, free of Western influence and integrated to a degree, but
with China, not Russia, at its centre. To preclude a Sino-Russian rivalry,
the Chinese elite are willing to exercise self-restraint, show deference
to Russia’s vision for the region and even let Moscow don the cloak of
Eurasian leadership. What really matters is not the appearance of leader-
ship, but rather the reality of power. Letting Russia take the lead could
actually work to China’s advantage, especially in areas where it is still
weak compared with Russia. The issue of power asymmetry, a critical
element feeding Russia’s insecurity towards China, could be turned into
something that both countries accept, provided they make good use of
their respective strengths.
Chinese thinkers believe that even if Russia is uncomfortable with the
power gap, it does not really have any other viable options but to consolidate
its relationship with Beijing, especially after Western sanctions have ampli-
fied its economic difficulties and reduced its diplomatic space.32 As the BRI
connects Asia with Western Europe, Russia risks being isolated if it does
not cooperate with China on jointly integrating Eurasia.33 Without China,
Moscow’s ‘Look East’ policy would be inconsequential, no concrete progress
having been made with any Asia-Pacific countries other than China. The
deepening of Russia’s cooperation with Beijing is the only real achievement of
its Asia-Pacific diplomacy.34 Moreover, because it is ‘naturally impossible [for
Russia] to rely on its own strength’ to promote the country’s economic revi-
talisation, according to Zhao Chuanjun and Xiao Wenhui, deepening bilateral
cooperation has become an ‘inevitable choice’.35
16 | Nadège Rolland

Asymmetry does not necessarily play to China’s favour in all domains.

China may indeed be stronger than Russia economically and financially,
but it is also in a much weaker position from a diplomatic and security per-
spective. In Central Asia, Chinese analysts recognise that Russia’s overall
influence is still ‘far ahead of China’, as Jiao Yiqiang put it.36 China cannot
rely solely on its own strength to confront all the local problems that the
BRI faces in the region, including ‘complex cultural differences’ and local
security challenges.37 In this regard, the Sino-Russian asymmetry does not
constitute a problem, but rather creates opportunities, first for complemen-
tarity and eventually for rebalancing.
For example, a deeper BRI–GEP alignment would allow China to
benefit from Moscow’s entrenched influence in Russian-speaking coun-
tries, thus helping to improve its own image.38 Central Asian countries’
remaining concerns could be dispelled, causing them to engage more will-
ingly with China as they realise that the BRI and the GEP are effectively
interchangeable.39 The EAEU customs union de facto facilitates custom
procedures and eliminates trade barriers for the BRI too. Russia’s military
presence can provide a security umbrella and help reduce the risks faced
by the BRI in Eurasia.40 Closer BRI–GEP coordination could also mean an
increased role for China in the region’s security, without creating local
alarm. It could even allow China to burnish its ‘responsible big power
image’.41 In addition, growing Sino-Russian security cooperation would
address shared challenges such as opposing the ‘three evil forces’ (terror-
ism, separatism and extremism) and external interference, and preventing
colour revolutions.42
Conversely, China’s BRI can provide investments that neither Russia
nor Central Asian economies can afford.43 Russia’s cooperation with China
will help Moscow not only regain some of its diplomatic space, but also
overcome the economic difficulties caused by Western sanctions.44 Finally,
to alleviate Russia’s possible remaining concerns about China’s economic
dominance, Beijing could make sure that Chinese banks are not the exclu-
sive lenders for BRI projects, but rather work with multilateral financing
platforms such as the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank.45 Ultimately, both countries will benefit as China engages
 A China–Russia Condominium over Eurasia | 17

more with Russia on Eurasian political and strategic issues, and as Russia
improves its economic situation thanks to China’s BRI.46

Traditional geopolitics
The alignment of Russia’s GEP and China’s BRI has implications beyond a
merely tactical division of labour of the sort that can currently be observed
in the post-Soviet space, where Russia dominates the political and security
sphere and China the economic one. Beijing is eager to partner with Russia
in establishing a Sino-Russian condominium over an economically prosper-
ous and politically stable Eurasia because Chinese strategists see this as the
‘starting point of shaping the future world order’.47
Many Chinese experts draw a direct connection between acquiring a dom-
inant position over Eurasia and the reshaping of the world order – a vision
that emanates directly from Mackinder’s and Spykman’s works on geopoli-
tics. Variants of Mackinder’s well-known observation that ‘whoever controls
the world island rules the world’ can, for example, be found in the writ-
ings of Wang Xiaoquan, the secretary-general of the Belt and Road Research
Centre at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He advocates a closer Sino-
Russian partnership over Eurasia, in particular because ‘whoever can guide
the Eurasian process can lead the construction of a new world order’.48 Lei
Jianfeng, a professor at Renmin University School of International Studies,
describes the classic geopolitics theories and draws on the history of the rise
of the British Empire to conclude that maintaining a divided Eurasia is ‘the
essence of the geopolitical strategy’ of the United Kingdom, Europe and the
US. A consolidated China–Russia strategic partnership, on the other hand,
would make it more difficult for the US to divide and rule in Eurasia and
prevent Washington from simply ‘doing whatever it wants’ in the region. Lei
also considers the domination of Eurasia as crucially important in the context
of China’s long-term competition with the American hegemon:

The pre-World War Two power competition model that relied on

military strength to seek hegemony gradually gave way to a contest of
comprehensive national power based on economic strength. The world
is increasingly divided into competitions between the European, the East
18 | Nadège Rolland

Asian, and the North American economic zones. Only by being able to
lead the region’s economic prosperity can we gain the advantage.49

Unspoken here is the idea that as Russia’s power recedes, China will come
to dominate the entire region.
Chinese thinkers then proceed to speculate about the potential effects
of a Sino-Russian condominium over Eurasia on the future reconfiguration
of the main regional actors’ respective positions. For example, Li Ziguo, a
Russia expert at a think tank affiliated with the Chinese ministry of foreign
affairs, believes that if the GEP and the BRI combine their strengths, Eurasia
could not only become a regional bloc that competes with developed econo-
mies, but also increase the rising powers’ ‘economic discursive rights’ in
constructing a new international order.50 Yang Lei also contends that the
alignment of the two initiatives will have a ‘profound impact on the inter-
national relations pattern’ whereby a deeper Eurasian integration under
Sino-Russian co-leadership will eventually persuade the other three major
players in the region – the EU, Japan and India – to shift their focus of coop-
eration.51 In particular, the EU’s cooperation with Russia and China will
expand, as its ‘sense of independence from the U.S. is constantly on the rise’.
EU governments are reluctant to cooperate with Russia’s EAEU because they
do not want to accord it legitimacy and thus strengthen Russia’s position,
but they generally hold favourable views of the BRI and wish to cooper-
ate with China in order to ‘exert an effective influence on the rule-making
process’.52 As the GEP and the BRI further overlap, the argument runs, the
EU will have no choice but to cooperate with both countries. Similarly, as
China and Russia become the main driving forces behind regional integra-
tion, Eurasia will become further separated from the US, and Washington
will have no choice but to ‘seek coexistence’ with them in order to protect its
interests in the region.

* * *

As both China and Russia have turned their attention to Eurasia and
launched elaborate initiatives to expand their influence and reaffirm their
 A China–Russia Condominium over Eurasia | 19

primacy, international observers see the continent emerging once again as a

potential contested zone. They observe that the two countries’ past competi-
tion ended up in a conflict that took three decades to overcome, and assess
that their concomitant new-found appetite for regional leadership could test
the solidity of their partnership and cause an eventual collision. In this view,
the West just needs to sit back patiently, observing the Eurasian chessboard
as it becomes the stage for a contest that inexorably embroils and eventually
hobbles the two rivals.
Such a scenario, however, is not preordained. If the analysis of Chinese
Russia experts is any indication, China and Russia may be able to transform
Eurasia into a joint playground instead of a battlefield. The Chinese lead-
ership is well aware of the possibility that a sensitive and insecure Russia
could overreact to China’s rising influence in what Moscow regards as its
own sphere of influence. In order to preclude conflict, Beijing’s inclination is
therefore to play the cooperative card, persuading the Kremlin that China’s
thrust into Eurasia actually supports Russia’s goals, focusing on common
political, economic and security interests, and letting Moscow claim the role
of ‘Greater Eurasia’ leader if it pleases.
As times goes on, problems might emerge in the Sino-Russian relation-
ship. Russia may eventually realise that China poses a profound threat to its
interests and ambitions and decide to get serious about competition. But it
took the United States nearly a quarter of a century to come to a similar con-
clusion. Over the medium term, a Sino-Russian condominium over Eurasia
will probably continue to take shape.

Notes
1 See, for example, Robert D. Kaplan,
‘The Quiet Rivalry Between China
and Russia’, New York Times, 3
November 2017, https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/11/03/opinion/china-russia-
Sutter (eds), Axis of Authoritarians:
Implications of China–Russia Cooperation
(Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian
Research, 2018).
2 Fu Ying, ‘Are China and Russia

rivalry.html; James B. Steinberg, Partnering to Create an Axis?’, Valdai

‘China–Russia Cooperation: How Club, 19 October 2016, http://valdaiclub.
Should the United States Respond?’, com/a/highlights/are-china-and-russia-
in Richard J. Ellings and Robert partnering-to-create-an-axis/.
20 | Nadège Rolland
3 Mathieu Duchâtel et al., ‘Eurasian
Integration: Caught Between Russia
and China’, ECFR Essay, 7 June
2016, https://www.ecfr.eu/article/
essay_eurasian.
4 The idea can be traced back to
a speech given by Kazakhstani
President Nursultan Nazarbayev
in March 1994 at Moscow State
University. For a detailed update on
the EAEU, see Evgeny Vinokurov,
‘Eurasian Economic Union: Current
State and Preliminary Results’,
Russian Journal of Economics, vol. 3,
2017, pp. 54–70.
5 Marcin Kaczmarski and Witold
Rodkiewicz, ‘Russia’s Greater
Eurasia and China’s New Silk
Road: Adaptation Instead of
Competition’, OSW Commentary,
no. 219, 21 July 2016, https://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
osw-commentary/2016-07-21/
russias-greater-eurasia-and-chinas-
new-silk-road-adaptation.
6 The CIIS is a Beijing-based think tank
affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
7 Li Ziguo, ‘Da Ouya huoban guanxi:
chongsu Ouya xin zhixu’ [Greater
Eurasian Partnership: Reshaping
the Eurasian Order?], Guoji Wenti
Yanjiu [International Studies], vol.
1, 2017. In 2015, close associates of
Putin, such as Sergei Naryshkin and
Igor Sechin, began to use the term
‘Greater Eurasia’. See Kaczmarski and
Rodkiewicz, ‘Russia’s Greater Eurasia
and China’s New Silk Road’.
8 Marcin Kaczmarski, ‘Russian–Chinese
Relations in Eurasia: Harmonization
or Subordination?’, Finnish Institute
of International Affairs Briefing Paper,
no. 238, 4 September 2018, https://
www.fiia.fi/en/publication/russian-
chinese-relations-in-eurasia?read.
9 Nadège Rolland, China’s Eurasian
Century? Political and Strategic
Implications of the Belt and Road
Initiative (Seattle, WA: National
Bureau of Asian Research, 2017).
10 For more details about the community
of shared destiny, see Nadège
Rolland, ‘Beijing’s Vision for a
Reshaped International Order’, China
Brief, vol. 18, no. 3, 26 February
2018, https://jamestown.org/
program/beijings-vision-reshaped-
international-order/.
11 ‘China, Russia Agree to Integrate Belt
Initiative with EAEU Construction’,
Xinhua, 9 May 2015, http://www.
xinhuanet.com/english/2015-
05/09/c_134222936.htm.
12 Ministry of Commerce of the People’s
Republic of China, ‘China and
Russia Sign the Joint Declaration of
Feasible Study on Eurasian Economic
Partnership Agreement’, 6 July
2017, http://english.mofcom.gov.
cn/article/newsrelease/significant-
news/201707/20170702605903.shtml.
13 People’s Republic of China Ministry
of Commerce, ‘China and Russia
Sign the Joint Declaration of Feasible
Study on Eurasian Economic
Partnership Agreement’, 6 July
2017, http://english.mofcom.gov.
cn/article/newsrelease/significant-
news/201707/20170702605903.shtml.
14 Yongquan Li, ‘The Greater Eurasian
Partnership and the Belt and Road
Initiative: Can the Two Be Linked?’,
Journal of Eurasian Studies, vol. 9, no. 2,
July 2018, pp. 94–9.
15 Ibid., p. 98.

16 Yang Lei, ‘Eluosi “Da Ouya” vs
Zhongguo “Yidai Yilu”’ [Russia’s
Greater Eurasia vs China’s Belt and
Road], Ifeng, 28 January 2016, https://
pit.ifeng.com/a/20180126/55485771_0.
shtml?_cpb_xinxiliu_xgtj.
17 ‘Towards the Great Ocean–3: Creating
Central Eurasia’, Valdai Club, June
2015, p. 9, http://valdaiclub.com/
files/17658/.
18 Alexander Gabuev, ‘Belt and Road to
Nowhere’, Carnegie Moscow Center,
24 May 2017, https://carnegie.ru/
commentary/70061. Gabuev is one of
the experts who co-wrote the Valdai
Club report ‘Towards the Great
Ocean’.
19 Ivan Timofeev, Yaroslav Lissovolik
and Ludmila Filippova, ‘Russia’s
Vision of the Belt and Road Initiative:
From the Rivalry of the Great Powers
to Forging a New Cooperation Model
in Eurasia’, China and World Economy,
vol. 25, no. 5, 2017, p. 65.
20 Zhao Chuanjun and Xiao Wenhui,
‘Zhongguo Ying Ruhe Huiying Pujing
de “Da Ouya Huoban Guanxi” Jihua’
[How Should China Respond to
Putin’s ‘Greater Eurasian Partnership’
Plan], Jingji Yanjiu Daokan [Economic
Research Guide], no. 6, 2017.
21 Fu Ying, ‘Are China and Russia
Partnering to Create an Axis?’.
22 Yang Lei, ‘Russia’s Greater Eurasia vs
China’s Belt and Road’.
23 Zhao Chuanjun and Xiao Wenhui,
‘How Should China Respond
to Putin’s “Greater Eurasian
Partnership” Plan?’.
24 Yang Lei, ‘Russia’s Greater Eurasia vs
China’s Belt and Road.’
25 Ibid.
26 Zhao Chuanjun and Xiao Wenhui,
A China–Russia Condominium over Eurasia | 21
‘How Should China Respond
to Putin’s “Greater Eurasian
Partnership” Plan?’.
27 Jiao Yiqiang, ‘You Ren Zhi Fenqi
Dao Hezuo Gongshi’ [From
Cognitive Differences to Cooperation
Consensus], Dangdai Yatai
[Contemporary Asia Pacific], vol.
4, 2018, https://www.ydylcn.com/
zjgd/334409.shtml.
28 Yang Lei, ‘Russia’s Greater Eurasia vs
China’s Belt and Road’.
29 Jiao Yiqiang, ‘From Cognitive
Differences to Cooperation
Consensus’. Indeed, Chinese ana-
lysts do not even mention the Trump
administration, let alone the damage
some Western analysts believe it has
done to the Western-led order. The
strategic competition with the US and
that order is the single most endur-
ing factor, no matter who lives in the
White House.
30 Ibid.
31 Wang Xiaoquan, ‘Ouya Quanmian
Huoban Guanxi Dailai de Lishixing
Jiyu yu Tiaozhan’ [Historic
Opportunities and Challenges
Generated by the Eurasian
Comprehensive Partnership],
Eluosi Xuekan [Russia Journal], no.
20,172, 2017, http://www.cssn.cn/
gjgxx/201710/t20171023_3676627.
shtml.
32 See Li Ziguo, ‘Greater Eurasian
Partnership: Reshaping the Eurasian
Order?’; and Yang Lei, ‘Russia’s
Greater Eurasia vs China’s Belt and
Road’.
33 Wang Xiaoquan, ‘Historic
Opportunities and Challenges’.
34 Yang Lei, ‘Russia’s Greater Eurasia vs
China’s Belt and Road’.
22 | Nadège Rolland
35 Zhao Chuanjun and Xiao Wenhui,
‘How Should China Respond
to Putin’s “Greater Eurasian
Partnership” Plan?’.
36 Jiao Yiqiang, ‘From Cognitive
Differences to Cooperation
Consensus’.
37 Wang Xiaoquan, ‘Historic
Opportunities and Challenges’.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Jiao Yiqiang, ‘From Cognitive
Differences to Cooperation
Consensus’.
41 Wang Xiaoquan, ‘Historic
Opportunities and Challenges’.
42 Li Ziguo, ‘Greater Eurasian
Partnership: Reshaping the Eurasian
Order?’.
43 Jiao Yiqiang, ‘From Cognitive
Differences to Cooperation
Consensus’.
44 Yang Lei, ‘Russia’s Greater Eurasia vs
China’s Belt and Road’.
45 Lei Jianfeng, ‘“Yidai Yilu” yu
Zhongguo de Ouya diquzhuyi’ [‘Belt
and Road’ and China’s Eurasian
Regionalism], Yidai Yilu Bairen Luntan
[Belt and Road Forum], 12 September
2017, http://silkroad.news.cn/zhiku/
mfbg/50144.shtml.
46 Lei Jianfeng, ‘“Belt and Road” and
China’s Eurasian Regionalism’.
47 Li Ziguo, ‘Greater Eurasian
Partnership: Reshaping the Eurasian
Order?’.
48 Wang Xiaoquan, ‘Historic
Opportunities and Challenges’.
49 Lei Jianfeng, ‘“Belt and Road” and
China’s Eurasian Regionalism’.
50 Li Ziguo, ‘Greater Eurasian
Partnership: Reshaping the Eurasian
Order?’.
51 Yang Lei, ‘Russia’s Greater Eurasia vs
China’s Belt and Road’
52 Ibid.