1. In Villavicencio v.

Lukban, 39 Phil 778,

- Facts
Justo Lukban, who was then the Mayor of the City of Manila, ordered the
deportation of 170 prostitutes to Davao. His reason for doing so was to
preserve the morals of the people of Manila. He claimed that the
prostitutes were sent to Davao, purportedly, to work for an haciendero
Feliciano Ynigo. The prostitutes were confined in houses from October 16
to 18 of that year before being boarded, at the dead of night, in two boats
bound for Davao. The women were under the assumption that they were
being transported to another police station while Ynigo, the haciendero
from Davao, had no idea that the women being sent to work for him were
actually prostitutes. The families of the prostitutes came forward to file
charges against Lukban, Anton Hohmann, the Chief of Police, and
Francisco Sales, the Governor of Davao. They prayed for a writ of habeas
corpus to be issued against the respondents to compel them to bring back
the 170 women who were deported to Mindanao against their will. During
the trial, it came out that, indeed, the women were deported without their
consent. In effect, Lukban forcibly assigned them a new domicile. Most of
all, there was no law or order authorizing Lukban's deportation of the 170
prostitutes.
Issue
WoN there is a law that authorizing
Manila Mayor’s action of deporting 170 prostitutes
to Davao
Held There is no law.
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in
conformity with an Act of congress. The Governor-General can order the
eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519
of the Philippine Commission and section 733 of the Revised Ordinances
of the city of Manila provide for the conviction and punishment by a court
of justice of any person who is a common prostitute. Act No. 899
authorizes the return of any citizen of the United States, who may have
been convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and other States
have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of
women convicted of being common prostitutes. Even when the health
authorities compel vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a
leprous person in the Culion leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law
or order. But one can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation,
which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the
chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands
—
and these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are
nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same
constitutional guaranties as are other citizens
—
to change their domicile from Manila to another locality.
On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public
officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels
any person to change his residence.
RPC provides: Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by
regulations of a general character in force in the Philippines who shall
banish any person to a place more than two hundred kilometers distant
from his domicile, except it be by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall
be punished by a fine of not less than three hundred and twenty-five and
not more than three thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. Any public
officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a
general character in force in the Philippines who shall compel any person
to change his domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro
and a fine of not less than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than
six thousand two hundred and fifty
pesetas
. (Art. 211.) We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the
proper prosecuting officers find that any public officer has violated this
provision of law, these prosecutors will institute and press a criminal
prosecution just as vigorously as they have defended the same official in
this action. Nevertheless, that the act may be a crime and that the persons
guilty thereof can be proceeded against, is no bar to the instant
proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a case which will
later be referred to
—
"It would be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application by one
unlawfully confined, to be restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient
answer that the confinement was a crime, and therefore might be
continued indefinitely until the guilty party was tried and punished
therefor by the slow process of criminal procedure." (In the matter of
Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of
habeas corpus
was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left
untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the
individual at liberty.
2.       People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil 515
- FACTS:
Amado HERNANDEZ5 (member of the CPP and President of the Congress of
Labor Organizations) re-filed for bail (previous one denied) for his conviction of
rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and robberies. The prosecution said to
deny this again because the capital punishment may be imposed. The defense
however contends that rebellion cannot be complexed with murder, arson, or
robbery. The information states that the “…murders, arsons and robberies
allegedly perpetrated by the accused “as a necessary means to commit the crime of
rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof.”
ISSUE: W/N rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery.
Held: NO!
RATIO:
Under the allegations of the amended information, the murders, arsons
and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion
allegedly committed by HERNANDEZ, as means “necessary” for the perpetration
of said offense of rebellion and that the crime charged in the amended information
is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder, arsons and robberies. Under Article 1346 and 1357, these five (5) classes
of acts constitute only one offense, and no more, and are, altogether, subject to
only one penalty. One of the means by which rebellion may be committed, in the
words of said Article 135, is by “engaging in war against the forces of the
government” and “committing serious violence” in the prosecution of said “war”.
These expressions imply everything that war connotes. Since Article 135 constitute
only 1 crime, Article 48 doesn’t apply since it requires the commission of at least 2
crimes.
3.       In People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 569
- Facts:
On October 30, 1956, Elias Rodriguez was charged with illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition. The accused filed a motion to quash on the ground that
the crime with which he is charged is already alleged as a component element or
ingredient of the crime of rebellion with which he was charged in Criminal Case
No. 16990 of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Issue:
Whether or not illegal possession of firearm and ammunition is already absorbed in
the crime of rebellion?

Held:
Yes
Ratio:
The Court held that, "any or all of the acts described in Art. 135, when committed
as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends described in Art. 134,
become absorbed in the crime of rebellion, and cannot be regarded or penalized as
distinct crimes in themselves; and cannot be considered as giving rise to a separate
crime that, under Art. 48 of the code, would constitute a complex one with that of
rebellion" (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil., 90; 53 Off. Gaz., 68), the conclusion is
inescapable that the crime with which the accused is charged in the present case is
already absorbed in the rebellion case and so to press it further now would be to
place him in double jeopardy.
4.       In People v. Lobedioro
- FACTS OF THE CASE:
Elias Lovedioro with 3 other companions fatally shot SPO3 Jesus Lucilo while
Lucilo was walking along Burgos St. away from Daraga, Albay Public Market.
The victim died on the same day from massive blood loss. On November 6, 1992,
Elias Lovedioro was then charged of the crime of murder, and subsequently found
guilty. Lovedioro then appealed the decision, contesting the verdict of murder
instead of rebellion. It was confirmed by the prosecution’s principal witness that
Lovedioro was a member of the New People’s Army.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Was the RTC correct in holding Lovedioro liable for the crime of murder, instead
of rebellion?
- Yes. Because, overt acts and purpose are essential components of the crime of
rebellion, with either of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion does not
exist. - Political motive should be established before a person charged with a
common crime- alleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible imposable
penalty- could benefit from the law’s relatively benign attitude towards political
crimes. If no political motive is established or proved, the accused should be
convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion. - In cases of rebellion, motive
relates to the act, and mere membership in an organization dedicated to the
furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself suffice. - The killing of the
victim, as observed by the Solicitor General, offered no contribution to the
achievement of the NPA’s subversive aims, in fact, there were no known acts of
the victim’s that can be considered as offending to the NPA. - Evidence shows that
Lovedioro’s allegation of membership to the N.P.A was conveniently infused to
mitigate the penalty imposable upon him.
HELD:
Finally, treachery was adequately proved in the court below. The attack delivered
by appellant was sudden, and without warning of any kind.41 The killing having
been qualified by treachery, the crime committed is murder under Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, the trial court was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua together with all the accessories provided by law.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court's decision dated
September 14, 1993, sentencing the accused of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED, in
toto.
SO ORDERED.

5.       PEOPLE v ABESAMIS [93 Phil 712 (September 11, 1953)]

- On April 1, 1950, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed with the Court of First
Instance of that province the following information against Eduardo A.
Abesamis:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses EDUARDO A. ABESAMIS, of the
crime of DIRECT BRIBERY, provided for and penalized under article 210, of the
Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 13th day of August, 1947, in the municipality of Echague,
province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused being then the Justice of the Peace of Echague and
Angadanan, Isabela, and as such is a public officer, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, demand and receive from Marciana Sauri the amount
of P1,100, with the agreement that he would dismiss the case for Robbery in Band
with Rape against Emiliano Castillo, son of said Marciana Sauri, which was then
pending in his Court.
"Contrary to law."cralaw virtua1aw library
Dismissed in that court on a motion to quash on the grounds "that the facts alleged
in the information do not sufficiently charge the crime of Direct Bribery," the case
has been appealed to this Court by the Solicitor General.
The information denominates the crime charged as "direct bribery" under article
210 of the Revised Penal Code — presumably under the first and second
paragraphs thereof, which read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 210. Direct Bribery. — Any public officer who shall agree to perform an
act constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his official duties,
in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer,
personnally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not less than the value
of the gift and not more than three times such value, in addition to the penalty
corresponding to the crime agreed upon, if the same shall have been committed.
"If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act
which does not constitute a crime, and the officer executed said act, he shall suffer
the same penalty provided in the preceding paragraph; and if said act shall not have
been accomplished, the officer shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor in its
maximum period and a fine of not less than the value of the gift and not more than
twice such value."cralaw virtua1aw library
The crime charged does not come under the first paragraph. To fall within that
paragraph the act which the public officer has agreed to perform must be criminal.
To dismiss a criminal complaint, as the accused is alleged to have agreed to do in
the present case, does not necessarily constitute a criminal act, for the dismissal
may be proper, there being no allegation to the contrary. (U.S. v. Gacutan, 28 Phil.,
100).
It is possible, under the allegations of the information to regard the crime charged
as falling within the second paragraph of article 210. This paragraph, however,
distinguishes between two cases: one in which the act agreed to be performed has
been executed and one in which the said act has not been accomplished, but there
is telling whether the information is for one or the other. The information is,
therefore, defective in that aspect.
But while the information is insufficient to hold the accused for trial for direct
bribery under the first or second paragraph of article 210, it is a sufficient
indictment for indirect bribery under article 211. And since it is the allegations of
fact rather than the denomination of the offense by the provincial fiscal that
determine the crime charged, the information in the present case may be sustained
as one for indirect bribery under the said article 211 of the Revised Penal Code.
Such being the case, the information in question should not have been dismissed.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is revoked and the case remanded to the court
of origin for further proceedings, with costs against the appellee.
6.       PEOPLE v BAES [68 Phil 203 (May 25, 1939)]
FACTS: Baes, the parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Lumban, Laguna,
charged the accused with an offense against religion for causing the funeral of a
member of the “Church of Christ” to pass through the churchyard fronting the
Roman Catholic Church, belonging to said church and devoted to the religious
worship thereof. The parish priest opposed this, but through force and threats of
physical violence by the accused, was compelled to allow the funeral to pass
through the said churchyard.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act complained of is notoriously offensive to the
religious feelings of the Catholics, thereby violating Article 133 of the RPC.

HELD: The facts alleged in the complaint constitute the offense defined and
penalized in article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, and should the fiscal file an
information alleging the said facts and a trial be thereafter held at which the said
facts should be conclusively established, the court may find the accused guilty of
the offense complained of, or that of coercion, or that of trespass under article 281
of the Revised Penal Code.
Whether or not the act complained of is offensive to the religious feelings of the
Catholics, is a question of fact which must be judged only according to the feelings
of the Catholic and not those of other faithful ones.
Laurel dissent: Offense to religious feelings should not be made to depend upon
the more or less broad or narrow conception of any given particular religion, but
should be gauged having in view the nature of the acts committed and after
scrutiny of all the facts and circumstance which should be viewed through the
mirror of an unbiased judicial criterion. Otherwise, the gravity or leniency of the
offense would hinge on the subjective characterization of the act from the point of
view of a given religious denomination or sect, and in such a case, the application
of the law would be partial and arbitrary, withal, dangerous, especially in a country
said to be "once the scene of religious intolerance and persecution.”

Article 133, RPC:

Offending the religious feelings. – The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon anyone
who, in a place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of any
religious ceremoncy, shall perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the
faithful.
7.       BURGOS v CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP [G.R. No. 64261 (December 26,
1984)]
- FACTS:
l The "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum” newspapers were searched and its
office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other
articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as
well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to
be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of
the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized based on the strength of the two [2]
search warrants issued by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano.
l Petitioners averred that the search warrant should be declared illegal because:
1. The judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the
applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional
provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
2. There are two (2) search warrants issued but pinpointed only one place where
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed.
3. That the articles belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano
and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized although the warrants were
directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. Alone.
4. That real property was seized under the disputed warrants like machinery,
receptacles, instruments, etc.
5. The search warrant was based only on the affidavits of Col. Abadilla’s that they
conducted surveillance of the premises could not have provided sufficient basis for
the finding of a probable cause.
l Respondents insinuates that petitioners are estopped by laches that they only
impugned the search warrant six months later.
ISSUE:
WON there is probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.
HELD:
l NO. The search warrant is in the nature of general warrants.
l Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is
directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication
of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting
affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged
subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice.
l The broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession
or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications
and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a
means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential
Decree 885, as amended ..." is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a
finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as the basis
for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for the respondent
judge to have done so.
8.       STONEHILL v. DIOKNO [20 SCRA 383 (June 19,

Facts:

Upon application of the prosecutors (respondent) several judges (respondent)

issued on different dates a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners (Stonehill
et. al.) and/or corporations of which they were officers to search the persons of the
petitioner and/or premises of their officers warehouses and/or residences and to
seize and take possession of the personal property which is the subject of the
offense, stolen, or embezzled and proceeds of fruits of the offense, or used or
intended to be used or the means of committing the offense, which is described in
the application as violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus and injunction and prayed that, pending final
disposition of the case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against the
prosecutors, their agents and representatives from using the effect seized or any
copies thereof, in the deportation case and that thereafter, a decision be rendered
quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void. For
being violative of the constitution and the Rules of court by: (1) not describing
with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) money not
mentioned in the warrants were seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish
evidence for deportation cases filed against the petitioner; (4) the searches and
seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents paper and cash
money were not delivered to the issuing courts for disposal in accordance with law.

In their answer, the prosecutors (respondent) alleged; (1) search warrants are valid
and issued in accordance with law; (2) defects of said warrants, were cured by
petitioners consent; and (3) in any event the effects are admissible regardless of the
irregularity.
The Court granted the petition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction.
However by a resolution, the writ was partially lifted dissolving insofar as paper
and things seized from the offices of the corporations.

Issues:

1.) Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to assail the legality of
search warrants issued against the corporation of which they were officers.

2.) Whether or not the search warrants issued partakes the nature of a general
search warrants.

3.) Whether or not the seized articles were admissible as evidence regardless of the
illegality of its seizure.

Held:

Officers of certain corporations, from which the documents, papers, things were
seized by means of search warrants, have no cause of action to assail the legality of
the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the
simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate
and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of
shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever
the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a
seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal
and cannot be availed of by third parties.

Officers of certain corporations can not validly object to the use in evidence
against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the
admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to
whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers
in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.

II

The Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate,

namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined
by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall
particularly describe the things to be seized.

Search warrants issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical
person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words,
no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof
with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was
impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of
probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed
specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.

General search warrants are outlawed because the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice
or passion of peace officers.

To prevent the issuance of general warrants this Court deemed it fit to amend
Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court by providing in its counterpart,
under the Revised Rules of Court that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this
qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."

Seizure of books and records showing all business transaction of petitioners

persons, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal contravened
the explicit command of our Bill of Rights - that the things to be seized be
particularly described - as well as tending to defeat its major objective the
elimination of general warrants.

III

Most common law jurisdiction have already given up the Moncado ruling and
eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:

As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such,
which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of
enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against
the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer.
Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that
it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.

The non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit
of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be
sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish
probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the
warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply
with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no
such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is
probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The
only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of
fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is
indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
The Court held that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is
hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of
herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and
void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers
and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made
permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers
and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is
hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for
denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-
nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution,
without special pronouncement as to costs.
9.       US v DE LOS REYES AND ESGUERRA [20 SCRA 383 (November 16,
1911)]
FACTS
Appellant Gabriela Esguerra came to visit Valeriano de los Reyes and his wife at
their home in Manila. On 5 November, while Gabriela was still at de los Reyes’
house, revenue officials went to the house of the accused de los Reyes to search for
opium. De los Reyes refused to let the officials in his house on the ground that,
without search warrant, they were not authorized to search the premises. After a
few moments' conversation, and upon their assertion that they were officers of the
law, while not consenting, he offered no physical resistance to their entry.

While some of the officers were in the house searching for drugs, others were on
the outside watching to see that no one left the house. During the progress of the
search in the front part of the house, one of the officers outside saw the accused
Gabriela throw a package from the window of the kitchen into the grass behind the
house. Upon recovering the package it was found to contained a considerable
quantity of morphine.

Although there is no direct evidence of any kind showing that the accused de los
Reyes had any knowledge of the fact that the Gabriela had possession of the drug,
the trial court convicted Gabriella Esguerra and Valeriano de los Reyes. In its
opinion, the court admitted that the only evidence relative to delos Reyes’
knowledge that the opium was in his house is derived from the fact that he refused
permission to the officials to search his premises, the inference being drawn from
such refusal that the accused had knowledge of the fact that the contraband drug
was located in his house, otherwise he would have offered no objection to the
search.

ISSUE
Whether an accused’s refusal to let the officials without search warrant to search
his house may be a basis of his conviction.

HELD: NO. (court discussed the history of the right against unreasonable search
and seizure)

’every man’s house is his castle,’

But as search-warrants are a species of process exceedingly arbitrary in character,

and which ought not to be resorted to except for very urgent and satisfactory
reasons, the rules of law which pertain to them are of more than ordinary strictness;
and if the party acting under them expects legal protection, it is essential that these
rules be carefully observed. - Judge Cooley.
10.   PEOPLE v BURGOS [144 SCRA 1 (September 4, 1986)]
Facts: According to the government, one Cesar Masamlok surrendered to the
authorities and pointed accused Ruben Burgos as a member of the NPA who
threatened to kill him and his family if he refused to join. The police then formed a
task force to arrest Burgos. They went to Burgos’ residence where they saw him
plowing his field. They arrested him and recovered from his house a caliber .38
revolver buried under the ground. The arrest was made without any warrant or at
least a search warrant. He was also not reminded of his constitutional rights.

However, according to accused Burgos, he was not a member of the NPA.

The gun was actually buried by Masamlok himself a few days before the arrest
without the former’s knowledge since he was not in his house then. It was only his
wife who was present and she was threatened by Masamlok not to report the gun to
the authorities. After his warrantless arrest, he disclosed that he was tortured for
days to admit the ownership of the recovered revolver.

Issues: 1st Issue:

Whether or not the warrantless arrest of Burgos is justified
2nd Issue:
Whether or not the exceptions in arrest with warrant can be liberally construed as
in the case of Burgos’ arrest

Held: 1. No, the warrantless arrest of Burgos is not justified.

2. No, the exceptions must be strictly construed.

Ratio: The warrantless arrest of Ruben Burgos was not justified

We find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers
sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the
process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to
believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that
there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape.
Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown.

The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the verbal report made
by Masamlok who was not required to subscribe his allegations under oath. There
was no compulsion for him to state truthfully his charges under pain of criminal
prosecution. Consequently, the need to go through the process of securing a search
warrant and a warrant of arrest becomes even clearer. The arrest of the accused
while he was plowing his field is illegal. The arrest being unlawful, the search and
seizure which transpired afterwards could not likewise be deemed legal as being
mere incidents to a valid arrest.