COMPARISONS BETWEEN SCHOLASTIC LOGICAL TOOLS

AND MODERN FORMAL LOGIC (1937) 1

Jan Salamucha

A scholastician who takes into his hands for the first time the great first vo-
lume of Principia Mathematica written by Whitehead and Russell, about 700
pages, which is the fullest lecture in modem formal logic, usually asks: What is
all that for? m Is this mathematics rather than logic?... But all that volume,
written mostly in a special symbolic language, is still logic illustrated just with
mathematical examples. The long answer to the question about what logic,
developed in that way, is we can find in the book Russell wrote seven years
earlier (The Principles of Mathematics, Cambridge 1903, vol. 1). Let's cite a
paragraph that is particularly characteristic: "There was, until very lately, a
special difficulty in the principles of mathematics. It seemed plain that
mathematics consists of deductions, and yet the orthodox accounts of deduction
were largely or wholly inapplicable to existing mathematics. Not only the
Aristotelian syllogistic theory, but also the modern doctrines of symbolic logic,
(Russell wrote it in 1903, after the works of De Morgan, Boole, Schr6der, Frege
and Peano - - author's note) were either theoretically inadequate to
mathematical reasoning, or at any rate required such artificial forms of
statement that they could not be practically applied" (p. 4).
Every modem scholastician finds himself in the same, paradoxical and trou-
blesome, situation if he limits himself to traditional logical tools given in hand-
books.
Scholastic logic has undergone changes, but the history of these changes still
needs to be done. On the basis of known material I can boldly say that in the
15th century we were, at least, in the lobby of that great logical edifice, which
was built in the last few years. It shows that the needs were, at that time, great.
But all these works have been mostly forgotten and now we have to get them
out. In that situation it is rather hard to talk, simply, about scholastic logic. We
have to distinguish various phases. Here I will pay attention to its modem
phase.
In every scholastic handbook of logic the material is divided into three parts:
concepts, judgments, and reasoning.

1 "Zestawienie scholastycznych natzesdzilogicznych z nancdziami logistycznymi", in K. Michalski, MyJI

katollcka wobec logiki wsp6tczesnej [Catholic mind in relation to modem logic], Pozna6.

Axiomathes, n. 2, settembre 1993, pp. 210-219.

 COMPARISONSBETWEENSCHOLASTICLOGICAl,TOOLSAND MODERNFORMALLOGIC 211

In the first part (De simplici apprehensione) and in the second one (De iudi-
cio) we have various considerations, mostly psychological and semantical. It is
possible to find some pure logical information there concerning connections
between ranges of concepts and some simple dependencies between sentences
(logical square, conversion, complex sentences). We can find also a lecture
• concerning definitions and classification (De divisione). A paragraph
concerning definitions nearly exclusively talks about real definition and,
mainly, about their classical form (per genus proximum et differentiam
specifcam). Here mention is made that descriptive definitions exist and a small
mention is made of nominal definitions. But the result is that even the
definitions given in that handbook of logic are not contained within the
framework of this lecture regarding definitions.
These first two parts, more than the third one, come from material that we
meet in Middle-Ages logic; they gathered, through the centuries, much
Cartesian or Kantian additions etc. In support of that assertion, I will give one
characteristic example. In all modern handbooks of scholastic logic we can find
the famous principle concerning opposite relation between contents and ranges
of concepts. This principle in its usual simple formulation is false2. We do not
find this principle in Saint Thomas or in any Middle-Ages handbook of logic.
Neither do we find it in the logic of John of Saint Thomas. We do not find it in
any scholasticai or not-scholastical handbook of logic till the end of the 18th
century. It is, probably, one from the 'architectonic' ideas of Kant (that
principle is clearly formulated in the logic published in 1800 by J~ische)3. To
scholastic logic this principle is retrieved for help by card. Mercier4 and from
that moment is repeated in the scholastic handbooks until todays . That means
that it has had place for an uncorrect, pseudo-progressing supplement.
Most important, in the strict logical sense, is part three, regarding reasoning.
In that part, two sections, concerning deduction and induction, are very
precisely distinguished. I omit here, because of some contemporary
methodological streams, the section regarding induction and I will dedicate

2 See F. Graf Hocnsbroech, "Beziehungen zwischcn lnhalt und Umfang van Bcgriffen", Erkenntnis 1931,
231-300.
3 A clear distinction between content and extension of a notion is probably found for the first time in the
logic of Port Royal (comprehension - ~tendus), but there is no mention of the principle yet.
4 It is true that this principle looks like the one given, with unsteady terminology, by G. Sanseverino
(Philosophia Christiana cum antiqua et nova comparata, 3 vols., Heapol, 1862-66) and without any objection
by C. Gutberlet (Lehrbuch der Philosophie, 6 vols., MOnster, 1901-13 (4th ed.)), but we cannot find it in J.
Kleutgen (Die Philosophic der Vorzeit, 2 vols., Innsbmck, 1878), M. Libetatore (Institutiones philosophicae,
3 vols., Prati, 1889), J.J. Urraburu (Compendium philosophiae scholasticae, 5 vols., Madrid, 1902-4), M. De
Maria (Philosophia peripatetico.scholastica ex fontibus Aristotelis at S. Thomae Aquinatis expressa st ad
adoisscentium institutionem accomodata, 2 vols., Romae, 1904 (3rd ¢d.)). T. M. Zigiiara (Summa
phiiosophica in usum scholarum, 3 vols., Parisiis 1926 (17th ed.)); we cannot even find it in J. Geyser. I stress
that I have got exactly in my mind the principle of converse relation between extensions and contents of
notions; some sound opinions, contained in these principle, owing to which this principle is so suggestive, can
be found in the Middle-Age logicians.
5 See Carolns Bayer, Cursus Philosophiae, Parisiis, s.a., vol. 1, 72. He calls that principle lexfimdamsn-
tails.
212 JANSAU~UCHA

myself only to deduction. Besides, the section regarding induction is not

interesting for us here because this section has no counterpart in modem formal
logic and we are interested here in comparisons.
In the scholastic handbooks of logic, the section regarding deduction usually
shows, quite precisely, the Aristotelian syllogistic and, less precisely, the so-cal-
led hypothetical syllogisms. Syllogistic is usually lectured using various
mnemotechnical manners, though the theory of syllogism shows a good way to
illustrate a construction of well axiomatised deduction theory. Hypothetical
syllogisms are presented in such a way that someone must be very patient to
understand them at all. Let's take, for example, the formulation of the so-called
conditional syllogism (Ios Gredt O.S.B., Elementa philosophiae Aristotelico-
Thomisticae, Friburgi Brisgoviae, 1926, vol. I, 67): Si A est, est B; est A, ergo
est B ~ What does all that mean? Are 'A' and 'B' symbols of sentences
(judgments) or symbols of names (concepts)? If they are symbols of sentences,
then what does the term 'A est' mean? m Probably it means that 'A' is true...
But why, in logical formulations, should we leave to readers so many places for
interpretation and teach them in that way to express themselves in a disorderly
manner? And if 'A' and 'B' are symbols of names, then the matter of
correctness of these formulas is very problematic.
In the end, after diligent study of all sections regarding reasoning, all that I
know is several dozen (about thirty) schematic formulas and a very unclear
notion concerning what is deductive reasoning.
Using those tools, it is not worth it to begin to analyse mathematical
reasonings. I won't try it. It is enough here to remember Russell's professional
opinion, quoted at the beginning. If someone distrusts that certificate, then I
advise him to make appropriate trials by himself.
Let's consider how the problem of application of that logic to philosophy
appears.
Scholasticians generally approve the thesis that philosophy is mostly a
deductive science. And, in fact, various simple conclusions can be formulated in
a syllogistic form. But, in more complicated ones, if we want to strictly
formalize them according to schemes known from the handbooks, then we have
to reformulate either the conclusions themselves or deform known schemes and,
in effect, we can easily see the unsuitableness of that logical tool to the subject
material. A modest proof of that can be my logical analysis of the proof 'ex
motu' for the existence of God (Collectanea theologica, 15 (1934), nr. 1-2).
After all, logical tools are more needed in a difficult and complicated proof than
in a simple one.
As a result, more than one scholastic philosopher regards, in the bottom of
his heart, his logic as, at best, a light intellectual training and makes so that his
conclusions does not look at what he knows from logic. And if he has a feeling
of strictness, either natural or formed by various sciences, his conclusions are
correct. But is it always so? After all, scholastic tradition requires something
COMPARISONS BETWEEN SCHOLASTIC LOGICAL TOOLS AND MODERN FORMAL LOGIC 213

more. Ad scientias speculativas artificialis logica est simpliciter necessaria

writes John of St. Thomas (Ars logica, ed. B. Reiser, Taurini, 1930, 252).
The situation is, at least for some people, very paradoxical or rather
dramatic. According to the tradition, we should make a logical testing of one's
philosophical conclusions; it is forbidden to be satisfied with one's natural or
imposed feelings; and, at the same time, the logic given in the handbooks
proves to be clearly useless for these purposes.
Let's suppose now that a self-examining scholastician, who has felt that
paradoxical or dramatical situation, will have the occasion to meet
contemporary modern formal logic; let's see what he can find there.
Modem formal logic is, regarding the content, a counterpart of the part of
our handbooks which considers the problem of deduction. But the material is
here much richer. Instead of several dozen traditional formulas we find three
logically adjusted main sections: theory of propositions, general theory of
individual variables, and theory of relations.
The first section, the so-called theory of propositions, considers the interpro-
positional connections, apart from the content of propositions. Are these con-
nections so complicated that they require so developed a theory? It seems that
they are. To illustrate I will give two examples.
The famous Middle-Ages philosopher and logician William Ockham in his
Summa logicae makes some conclusion according to the following scheme (see
J. Salamucha, "Logika zdafi u Wiihelma Ochama" [William Ockham's
propositional logic], Przeglqd Filozoficzny, 38 (1935), 217):

CKCKpqrKCsNqCtNrCKpts 6

This is a thesis taken from the theory of propositions. On the basis of that
theory, it is quite easy to prove that the above is a false thesis m that conclusion
is incorrect. Maybe, after a more careful analysis without any special logical
tools, it could be easier to see its incorrectness. But it is not so easy, if it is not
seen by so subtle a logician like Wilhelm Ockham. And it is very probable that
such a mistake may not have been made accidentally (see the paper cited above,
222-223).
Here is the second example. Developing the logical analysis of St. Thomas'
proof 'ex motu' for the existence of God, I found that the proof is based on the
following scheme (see Collectanea theologica, 15 (1934), 68, note 13):

CKCNpqKCrCsqCKpNsqCrq 7

It is quite obvious that we can see the correctness of that conclusion, even
without any special logical tools; St. Thomas did not know the theory of

6 (((p ^ q) _..0 ^ (s --- -q) ^ (t -,. -r)) ---((p ^ t) -.,.s) [transl.note: "IN].
7 ((.p....q) ^ ((r---(s---q)) ^ (p^ -s) ---q)) -.--(r -- q) {TN].
214 JAN SALAMUCHA

propositions and, certainly, could not even show the formal scheme above. But
is it possible that everyone can make, with impunity, such complicated proofs?
It is very easy to examine the correctness of that scheme on the ground of the
theory of propositions; whereas the intuitive examination of that scheme could
take much more time and, surely, it could not be so precise.
The counterpart of the theory of propositions in scholastic logic is what is
now called hypothetic syllogisms. But we should rather talk here of little
similarity, if any.
Modem formal logic develops Aristotle's syllogistic in the general theory of
individual variables, and syllogistic is a small part of that theory. And, by the
way, it seems that some syllogistic theses can be recognized as true only if we
introduce some special restrictions (the problem of so-called empty names); I
am not interested here in that particular problem. I want to clarify again the
philosophical usefulness of that developed theory.
In the proof 'ex motu' for the existence of God in Summa contra Gentiles (I,
13), we find the following: "Hoc quod a seipso ponitur moveri, est
primomotum, ergo ad quietem unius partis eius (non) sequitur quies totius".
During the analysis of the manuscripts it had been verified that not all
manuscripts contain in their text the "non'. Did the question arise whether if the
'non' is authentic or not? That problem has been considered by adopting a
logical analysis of the text. That test has been the occasion for long and lively
discussions. Opinions were different and did not reach any ultimate result. One
accused the other of a non-logicality and that was the end 8. By means of
traditional logical tools it would be impossible to solve that subtle textual
difficulty. Whereas by means of the modern logical theory of names it is easy to
show that both versions of the text are, with regard to logic, equal and that one
will be different from the other only by regard to the conclusions.
Let us divide the text m we are going to consider a fragment of it m into
three parts:

1. Hoc quod a seipso ponitur moveri, est primomotum; ergo ad quietem unius
partis eius (non) sequitur quies totius.
2. Si enim, quiescente una parte, alia pars eius moveretur, tunc ipsum totum
non esset primomotum, sed pars eius quae movetur, alia quiescente.
3. Nihil autem quod quiescit, quiescente alio, movetur a seipso. Cuius enim
quies ad quietem sequitur alterius, oportet quod motus ad motum alterius
sequatur; et sic non movetur a se-ipso.

To formalize the conclusions, let us introduce the following abbreviations:

Mxy - - x moves y

8 See Dr. Georg Gnmwald, "Geschichte der Gottesbcweise im Mittclalter", Beitrdge zur Geschichte der
Philosophie des Mittelalters, VI, 3, 136-40.
COMPARISONS BETWEEN SCHOLASTIC LOGICAL TOOLS AND MODERN FORMAL LOGIC 215

Pax u a is a proper part of x

~x)- x is moving.

Using this notation and logical symbolism, the considered text looks as follows
(I introduce two variants for the part 1: variant 1.1 for the text with 'non' and
variant 1.2 for the text without 'non'):

1.1 HxCMxxHabCKPaxPbxNCNtp(a)Nq~(b)
1.2 HxCMxxHabCKPaxPbxCNcp(a)Nq~(b)
2. I'IxC~abKPaxKPbxKNcp(a)q~(b)NMxx
3. HxC~abKPaxKPbxCNcp(a)Ncp(b)NMxx 9J°

Note that thesis 2 is a transposition of thesis 1.2 H and that thesis 3 is the ana -
logical transposition of thesis 1.112. We see that in the variant with 'non' thesis
1.1 expresses one idea, thesis 2 expresses another one and in thesis 3 the author

9 St. Thomas speaks sometimes about the pan.whole relation with regard to motion, and sometimes he
considers motion from the point of view of a part-pail relation and he treats both these ways of expression as
equivalent for the woof; during the formalization I have constantly used, with regard to motion, a part-part
relation.
Io 1.1 Vx(Mxx - - Vab((Pax a Pbx) " * - ( - ¢ p ( a ) --* -q~b))))
1.2 Vx(Mxx ~ Vab((Pax ^ Pbx) ~ (~qu(a)--*-,q~o))))
2. VxOab(Pax ^ (Pbx ^ (-,qu(a)^ q~'b))))-* -Mxx)
3. Vx(3ab(Pax a (PbX ^ (-q~a) -"- -q)(b))))--* ",Mxx) ITN].
n 1.2 l'lxCMxxHabCKPaxPbxCNq~a)N(p(b)
A CCpqCNqNp
A.1 HxCNHabCKPaxPbxCNqa(a)Nq~(b)NMxx (A,I.2)
A.2 HxC~abNCKPaxPbxCNcp(a)Ntp(b)NMxx (A.1)
A.3 l'[xabCNCKPaxPbxCNep(a)Nq)(b)NMxx (A.2)
B CCNCKIxIrsCKpKqNrs
B.I HxabCKPaxKPbxNCNq)(a)Ntp(b)NMxx (B,A.3)
C CCKpKqNCrNstCKpKq Ktst
C1 HxabCKPaxKPbxKNqu(a)tp(b)N Mxx (C,B.D
2 HxC~ab KPaxKPbx KNqD(a)qR'b)NMx x (c.{)

1.2 V x ( M x x --* Vab((Pax ^ Pbx) --- (-qu(a)~ -q~b))))

A Ca- q ) - (-q-- ~p)
A.1 Vx(-Vab((Pax ^ Pbx)--,,(-q~(a)--'--q~a)))-----~Mxx) (An.2)
A.2 Vx(~b(-,(Pax ^ Pbx) -- (~(a) --, -¢p(b)))--. -Mxx) (A.D
A.3 Vxab(-((Pax ^ Pbx) ~ (-qu(a)--~-¢p(b)))--,,-Mxx) (A.2)
B (-((p ^ q) ---br)---~s) --*((p ^ (q ^ -r)) --,-s)
B.1 Vxab(Pax ^ (Pbx ^ -(-,¢l~a)-,, -q~b))) --* -Mxx) (B,A~)
C (p ^ (q ^ - ( r - - -,s)) --* 0 --" (9 ^ (q ^ (r ^ s)) - - 0
CI Vxab(Pax^ (~x ^ (-~a) ^ ~p(b)))----,Mxx) (C,B.I)
2 Vx(3ab(Pax ^ (fox ^ (-,~a) --,-,q@))))--*-,Mxx) (C.I) fiN]
12 1.1 rIxCMxxIIabCKPaxPbxNCNq~(a)Nq)(b)
A CCpqCNqNp
216 JAN SALAMUCHA

returns to the idea expressed in thesis 1.1; in the variant without 'non', in thesis
2 the author unfolds the idea expressed in thesis 1.2 and a new idea begins in
thesis 3. Because theses 2 and 3 are important for all proofs, both variants are
logically equivalent. Only on account of the conjuctions used by the author the
variant without 'non' is more probable, and that variant was accepted in the
Lconian edition m even if it seems that it was accepted mainly for philological
reasons 13.
When we apply to the text the tools used here, the sort of discussions that
took place when only traditional tools were used are excluded. At best we can
discuss the problem of the interpretation of the text, because those difficulties

A.I l'[xCN[labCKPaxPbxNCNq)(a)Ncp(b)NMxx (A,I.I)

A.2 HxCY..abNCKPaxPbx NCNq)(a)Nq~b)NM xx (A.I)
A.3 I'lxabCNCKPax PbxNC'Ncp(a)Nq~o)NMxx (A.2)
B CCNCKpqrsCKpKqNrs
B.I l'lxabCK_PaxKPbxNNCNq3(a)Nq~b)NMxx (B,A.3)
C E~pp
C.I I'[abENNCNq)(a)
Nq)(b)CNq)(a)Nq~o) (C)
O CEpqCCKrKsptCKrKsqt
D.I FixabCKPax KPbxCNqo(a)Nq~b)NMxx (D,C.I,B.I)
3 HxCY,abKPaxKl~xCNcp(a)Nq~o)NMxx (D. 1)

1.1 V x ( M x x - " Vab((Pax A Pbx) --" - ( - q ~ a ) '-'* ~q~'b))))

A (p .--. q) ,-,* ( - q .-,,. -,,p)
A.1 Vx(-Vab((Pax ^ Pox) --*' (-cp(a) - , * q ~ ) ) ) ---*. ~ M x x ) (A,I.1)
A.2 Vx(3ab(-,((Pax ^ Pbx) -4. (-q~(a) -~ -q~b)))) -,,. *,Mxx) (A.I)
A.3 Vxab(-.((Pax ^ Pox) -*" (-,¢p(a) --~ -q~o))) -,. * M x x ) (A.2)
B ( - ( ( p ^ q) "-" r) --~ s) - * ((p A (q ^ *r)) - * s)
B.1 Vxab(Pax A (Pbx ^ -(-~(-,q~(a) .-* -q~(b))))"-', ~ M x x ) (B,A.3)
C ~(~p) -- p
C1 Yab(*(-(~q~a) --," -q~(b))) "*-*(-q~(a) -*, -¢p(b))) (C)
D (p *,. q) -.* (((r A (S A p)) "*" t) "*" ((r ^ (S A q)) --" t))
D.1 Vxab((Pax ^ (Pbx ^ (-,q~(a) ~ -,q~o)))) -*" -,Mxx) (D,C1,BI)
3 Vx(:lab(Pax ^ (Pbx ^ (-q~(a) --*"- q ~ ) ) ) ) ~ -Mxx). (D.1)[~r]
t3 The correctness of the reasoning, a disputable pert of which I discussed above, I showed in the article
"Dow6d 'ex motu' na ismienie Boga. Analiza iogiczna argumentacij ~w. Tomasza z Akwinu", CoUectanea
theologica, 15 (1934), fasc. 1-2, 73-76 [Engl. transl.: "The proof 'ex motu' for the existence of God. Logical
analysis of St. Thomas' argument", New Scholastidsm, 32 (1958), fase. 3, 334-72. TN]. I showed there that
the assumption of St. Thomas is very strong, because it is inferentially equivalent to the assumption:
IIxaCPaxNMxx [Vxa(Pax -* ~Mxx). "IN] (see the paper quoted above, 76, note 23). More intuitive, as it
seems to me, could be the assumption that corresponds to the iaterpretation expressed in thesis 1.2 and thesis
2 apart from thesis 3 (see the peper quoted above, 77), but that assumption is not enough - - we can prove it
by means of the following interpretation, where x and y are real numbers: Mxy - x = y, Pax - a < x, q~(x): it is
easy to see that on this interpretation, the assumptions 1.1, 1.3, 1.4 and the above weaker assumptions (see the
peper quoted above, 74-77) will be true, but the conclusion will be false (75, 3): l'lxCq~(x)ZtKMtxNMtx IV
x(q~(x) -* 3t(Mtx ^ -,Mtx). TN]. It is possible that this weaker assumption has been the cause of various
manuscript variants: people tried, under the influence of the imposed intuitions, to 'improve' the text of St.
Thomas, but using a weaker logical tool they could neither express their intuitions, nor control them. It is very
positive that, after all, they did not deform the text as to its logical aspect.
COMPARISONS BETWEEN SCHOLASTIC LOGICAL TOOLS AND MODERN FORMAL LOGIC 217

always can arise during the formalization of a text more or less precisely given.
Besides it, a mistake can hide inside a 'logical calculus', but that mistake cannot
be the occasion to lasting controversies.
Again it is easy to see a wider competence of modern logical theory of
names than Aristotle's syllogistic.
The third section of mathematical logic is the theory of relations. Various
categories of relations are here distinguished: reflexive ! non reflexive,
symmetric w antisymmetric I non-symmetric, transitive relations, coherent.
Various connections between relations and elements of relations are introduced.
The theory of ordered relations, or logical theory of order [teoria porzqdku],
very important for various sciences, is at last constructed. The scholastic
counterparts of the modern formal theory of relations are considerations
concerning the categories of relations (de praedicamento relationis). Besides, in
scholastic handbooks the section concerning the categories considers various
metaphysical questions rather than strictly logical ones - - this is probably why
father Boyer, in his handbook of logic (1934), included the lecture concerning
the categories in two pages (pp. 86-88). A modest clarification of the
philosophical usefulness of the modern formal theory of relations, particulary
the theory of order, can be found again in my analysis of the proof 'ex motu' for
the existence of God l't.
Finally we should say that mathematical logic is a model of a well axiomati-
sed deductive science. Besides, if we agree with the standpoint, which we can
call exact formalism or methodological nominalism 15, only then, on the basis of
mathematical logic, we acquire an efficient notion of what reasoning is and a
clear comprehension of the role of definitions in deductive systems. That exact
formalism or methodological nominalism is not so strange to the sound
scholastic traditions, as it seems to be. I think that the logic of John of Saint
Thomas is quite close to this standpoint, and card. Cajetanus called his famous
book concerning analogy: De nominum analogia. About concepts St. Thomas
writes (In peri hermeneias, I, c.1, 1.2): "Huiusmodi autem simplices
conceptiones inteUecms sunt, quas primo voces significant". Maybe, in logic,
we can choose only between vague psychologism and exact formalism... It is
obvious that a vague psychologism is completely foreign to Aristotelism and
Thomism.
That balance may seem too critical and annoying and, in the end, dangerous
because people who do not know the problems above considered can, under its

14 By the way, I stress that that work has a laboratory character and is intended for a small circle of
specialists who are interested in these questions; I wanted to develop some logical 'selected" competence and
prove the usefulness of some tools; the purpose of this work is to serve the kind of aims I show here. Perhaps
1 did not clearly show my aim in that work because it was, unfortunately, the occasion for some
misunderstandings, an annoyance to me whose repercussion got through daily and weekly press.
15 See J. ]~ukasiewicz, "Znaczenie analizy logicznej dla poznania" [The meaning of logical analysis for
knowledge],Przeglqd Filozoficzny, 37 (1934), and "Logistyka i filozofia" [Logistic and philosophy], Przeglq
d Filozoficzny, 39 (1936).
218 JAN SAI.AMUOIA

influences, disrespect traditional scholastic logic. We need then some additional

explanations. Our point here is not propaganda or apologetic success; we are he-
re to become familiar with contemporary circumstances, to reflect upon some
problems and, in connection with them, to indicate the right direction of our po-
sitive work. For propaganda or apologetic aims all material should be adjusted
otherwise and some other comparisons should be shown. The balance looks mo-
dest if we compare scholastic logic with a new splendid, evolutionary, or in a
sense, even revolutionary, progressing stage of logic.
On the contrary, that comparison balance will be clearly active if we
compare traditional scholastic logic with modern non-scholastic handbooks of
traditional logic 16. And even more, that balance would look much better if we
had not been influenced by various injurious modern suggestions and if we had
been constantly, without any breaks, displayed with the great Middle-Ages
tradition. And only for that reason, such negative balance was worth to show; to
throw away all injurious loan-words [naleciatogci] and, by means of the
present-day scientific works, continue more intensively the great traditions of
the Middle-Ages.
If anyone will ask me after these words: is a development of modern formal
logic reaching the end? - - because he would think that it is not worthly to be
impressed by things which are now in fleri, I could tell him that it is forbidden
to ask the question above, in relation to any science. The standpoint of any kind
of finitism is, in a science, uncorrect and injurious. A science is not finally
developed till people, who have got energy and who want to think, live.
Catholics admit that reality is infinite, although a created reality is finite - - and
therefore a finite human mind will not get to know it.
The following question would be more correct: is contemporary modern for-
mal logic a sufficient tool for an exact methodical rebuilding of all scholastic
philosophy? I answer that I do not know. It is known that it is enough for
constructing contemporary mathematics; the proof is constituted by the three
volumes of Whitehead and Russell's Principia Mathematica. Difficulties we
meet in that field rather concern just some links and ornaments, the fundamental
construction is already standing. A similar work in the field of philosophy has
still to be done, and for the great width of this work it is obvious that the efforts
of one man, or even the efforts of one entire generation, won't be enough.
Perhaps, for philosophical aims, logic must be developed much more.
Anyway, scholastic philosophy, if it does not want to break off with its many
century traditions, has to assimilate definitive results reached in the field of ma-
thematical logic. Scientific catholic thought, as it was previously shown, always
used the most exact methods. All trials satisfied with affectional, romantic, irra-
tional, methodically minimalistic world outlook were thrown away by Catho-
licism or blamed by the official agencies of the Church. In the present situation
before the Christian philosophy three, and only three, theoretically possible

16 See H. Scholz, GeschichtederLogik, Berlin 1931.

COMPARISONS BETWEEN SCHOLASTIC LOGICAL TOOLS AND MODERN FORMAL LOGIC 219

ways stand: 1. To declare positively the use of modern formal logic in

philosophy and, in that way, to keep traditional claims with maximally exact
tools; 2. To declare against modern formal logic and to stand still on the ground
of traditional logic (But this will mean, at this moment, an abandonment of the
traditional claim for maximally exact tools, because today traditional tools are
only relatively exact); 3. To descend down to irrational-literary grounds, i.e. to
break completely with a many century tradition. I do not see a fourth way.
Unless someone will say that the fourth possible way is a reduction of
philosophical problems, rejecting from philosophy all its deductive parts; but it
would be so radical a revolution that it would be hard to call that philosophy
still a scholastic philosophy.
I do not deny that besides scientific philosophy, people need some popular
philosophy. Obviously, in popularizing work new more exact methods are
completely unnecessary; they can serve, at best, the popularizators for a precise
examination of their popular lectures. It is known that for a positive progress of
philosophy, more than in other sciences, historical investigations are needed.
Historical investigations face a large range of philosophical questions and their
difficulties can fertilize the mind of a philosopher, can sharpen his intuition and
can protect him from repeating mistakes. Besides, many philosophical solutions
can be only genetically or etiologically understood. History has got its own me-
thods and again modern formal logic is here rather useless (apart, of course,
from history of logic, which is impossible to do without knowing modern
formal logic). It is known that in scientific scholastic philosophy there are many
reductive subjects and they cannot be changed by deduction. It is known that in
scholastic philosophy there are many semantic-analytical considerations - - and
here the usefulness of mathematical logic is not too strong, at least as long as
we do not agree with the above mentioned standpoint of methodical nominalism
or exact formalism.
But in scholastic philosophy there are large exact deductive parts. We should
now rebuild and develop these parts by means of new tools, if they should have
scientific value. Without that rebuilding we can earn great ovations from
people, we can even earn approval of specialistic philosophers standing on the
ground of irrationalism, but we will not do scientific scholastic philosophy,
which will be in agreement with the tradition and with the contemporary
methodological requirements. At the end we should add what is important if we
do not consider in due time contemporary tools, because these tools can
become, sometime, a terrible tool of destruction: during a fight, thinking of
changing the old weapons with new ones will be too late, and it will be difficult
to win using the old ones.

[Translated by Ryszard Puciato]