CO-OWNERSHIP

ARAMBULO v. NOLASCO
G.R. No. 189420, 26 March 2014

The ruling that alienation is alteration does not mean that a sale of commonly owned
real property is covered by the second paragraph of Article 491, such that if a co-owner
withholds consent to the sale, the courts, upon a showing of a clear prejudice to the common
interest, may, as adequate relief, order the grant of the withheld consent.

Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by
one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only
the rights of the co-owner seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the
property. Co-owners such as respondents have over their part, the right of full and absolute
ownership. Such right is the same as that of individual owners which is not diminished by the
fact that the entire property is co-owned with others. That part which ideally belongs to them,
or their mental portion, may be disposed of as they please, independent of the decision of their
co-owners. The respondents cannot be ordered to sell their portion of the co-owned properties.

PANGANIBAN v. OAMIL
G.R. No. 149313, 22 January 2008

The decision in the action for judicial partition of the subject property, determines
what the husband-seller, and ultimately, buyer, as his successor in interest, is entitled to in the
action for specific performance. As the husband’s successor-in-interest to the property, the
buyer could not acquire any superior right in the property than what the husband-seller is
entitled to or could transfer or alienate after partition. In a contract of sale of co-owned
property, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor
had as co-owner, and the vendee merely steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner. Since
the issue of each of the co-owners’ specific portion in the aggregate property has been laid to
rest in the partition proceeding, the final and executory decision should be conclusive on the
issue of which specific portion of the property became the subject matter of the sale between
the buyer and the husband-seller; that is, the seller, as declared owner of the Canda St.
portion, could have transferred to respondent only that part of the property and not the 21st St.
portion. Although the husband seller was free to sell or transfer his undivided interest to the
respondent, the effect of such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded to him
upon the partition of the property.

EXTRA-ORDINARY DEVELOPMENT v. SAMSON

G.R. No. 191090, 13 October 2014

The sale was valid but only to the extent of the one-half share of the brother’s heirs to
the property. The Civil Code recognizes the absolute right of a co-owner to freely dispose of
his pro indiviso share as well as the fruits and other benefits arising from that share,
independently of the other co-owners. The sale is void with respect to the one-half portion
belonging to the heirs of the sister and the corporation cannot claim good faith as a defense.
Since the corporation’s right to the subject property originated from the brother’s heirs, said
corporation merely stepped into the shoes of the sellers and cannot have a better right than
what the sellers have.

MACTAN CEBU AIR v. HEIRS OF IJORDAN

G.R. No. 173140, 1 January 2016

The conveyance by the seller co-owner of the entire property pursuant to the Deed did
not bind the other co-owners for lack of their consent and authority in his favor. As such, the
Deed had no legal effect as to their shares in the property. But the conveyance by seller co-
owner through the Deed had full force and effect with respect to his share of 1/22 of the entire
property consisting of 546 square meters by virtue of its being a voluntary disposition of
property on his part.

CABRERA v. YSAAC
G.R. No. 166790, 19 November 2014

The object of the sales contract between the parties was a definite portion of a co-
owned parcel of land. At the time of the alleged sale, the entire property was still held in
common. This is evidenced by the original certificate of title, which was under the names of
the lessor and his co-heirs. Prior to partition, a sale of a definite portion of common property
requires the consent of all co-owners because it operates to partition the land with respect to
the co-owner selling his or her share. The co-owner or seller is already marking which portion
should redound to his or her autonomous ownership upon future partition.

VALDES v. RTC
G.R. No. 122749, 31 July 1996

Article 147 is a peculiar kind of co-ownership, it applies when a man and a woman,
suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband
and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term “capacitated” in
the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to
contract marriage. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through
their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. Neither party can dispose or encumber by act inter vivos his or her share in co-
ownership property, without the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation.

UY v. LACSAMANA
G.R. No. 206220, 19 August 2015

The husband failed to prove that he was married to the woman so their property
relations would be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which applies when a couple
living together were not incapacitated from getting married. The provision states that
properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed co-owned unless there is proof to the
contrary. The respondent-wife was able to prove that the subject property is not co-owned but
is paraphernal. The title to the property in the name of “Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy”
was notice to the world, including her heirs and successors-in-interest, that such belonged to
Rosca as her paraphernal property. The words “married to” were merely descriptive of
Rosca’s status at the time the property was registered in her name. Otherwise, if the property
was conjugal, the title to the property should have been in the names of Luis Uy and Petra
Rosca.