CASE COMPENDIUM

13. . Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi- The right to life definition

 The petitioner, who is a British national, was arrested and detained in the Central Jail,
Tihar under an Order dated 23rd November 1979 issued under section 3 of the
COFEPOSA Act. She preferred a petition in this Court for a writ of habeas corpus
challenging her detention, but by a judgment delivered by this Court on 27th February
1980, her petition was rejected with the result that she continued to remain under
detention in the Tihar Central Jail. Whilst under detention, the petitioner experienced
considerable difficulty in having interview with her lawyer and the members of her
family.
 HELD: We are therefore of view that sub-clause (i) of clause 3(b) regulating the right
of a detenu to have interview with a legal adviser of his choice is violative of Arts. 14
and 21 and must be held to be unconstitutional and void. 

14. . Gauri Shanker v. Union of India

  The petitioners in the different petitions are the legal heirs of 16 statutory tenants" of
residential premises under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, Act 59 of 1958
(hereinafter called 'the Act'). They assail Section 2 sub-section (1) clause (iii) of the
Act, as introduced by Act 18 of 1976 with retrospective affect as ultra vires and
violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The respondents are
Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the landlords of the respective premises.
 HELD : Section 2(1)(iii) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 is not open to attack on
the ground that it is violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 

15. Hussainara Khatoon & Ors. v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar

 A large number of people were behind prison bars for years awaiting trials in court of
law. The offences which some of them were charged were trivial.
 Article 21. free legal aid should be provided. Proper justice should be done. Court laid
down 8 point alternate formula to the conventional ground for granting bail.

16. Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois

  in 1851, the Illinois Central Railroad Company made an offer to the City of
Chicago that in exchange for allowing tracks to be laid along the lake front, the
railroad company would pay for and build a breakwater to protect the harbor.
[2]
 Illinois then officially granted 3 million acres (12,000 km2) of shoreline along Lake
Michigan to create a north-south railroad under the state charter titled "An Act to
Incorporate the Illinois Central Rail Road Company".[3] This charter gave Illinois
Central the authority to "enter upon and take possession of, and use all and singular
any lands, streams and materials of every kind."[4] To further confirm their rights to
this area, the railroad lobbied the state, and in 1869, the State of Illinois passed the
Lake Front Act, granting Illinois Central "appropriation, occupancy, use and control"
of a large portion of the harbor.[4] The legislature's goal in passing the act was to bring
a new train depot, an outer harbor and better parks to the residents of Chicago. The
portion of land stretched from present-day West Randolph Street south to Twelfth
Street, and from South Michigan Avenue east into Lake Michigan. However, due to
political controversy and poor public opinion of the railroad company, the legislature
repealed the Lake Front Act in 1873. Both before and after the repeal, Illinois Central
continued to construct tracks, piers and other facilities along the lake front. This
construction also included filling in several hundred feet into Lake Michigan to
provide land for these new facilities.On March 1, 1883 the Illinois Attorney General
filed suit against Illinois Central in order to stop construction on the land known as
Lake Park.

 HELD: Justice Field expressed the doctrine of public trust as follows:

"It is the settled law of this country that the ownership of and dominion and sovereignty over
lands covered by tide waters, within the limits of the several states, belong to the respective
states within which they are found, with the consequent right to use or dispose of any portion
thereof, when that can be done without substantial impairment of the interest of the public in
the waters, and subject always to the paramount right of congress to control their navigation
so far as may be necessary for the regulation of commerce with foreign nations and among
the states"[

17. Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India and others

 The petitioner, the Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action brought this action to
prohibit and remedy the pollution caused by several chemical industrial plants in
 Bichhri village, Udaipur District, Rajasthan. The Respondents operated heavy
industry plants there, producing chemicals such as oleum (a concentrate form of
sulphuric acid), single super phosphate and the highly toxic "H" acid (the manufacture
of which is banned in western countries). Respondents operated these plants without
permits which caused serious pollution of the environment. 

 HELD-  The court emphasized that the respondents generated this waste without the
requisite clearances/consents/license, did not install appropriate treatment equipment,
did not carry out the Court’s orders, and had persisted in an illegal course of activity.
Sections 3 and 5 of the Environment (Protection) Act 1986 empowered the Central
Government to take necessary measures to protect the environment. Accordingly, the
Central Government would determine the amount of money needed to carry out
remedial measures in this case. Respondents were liable to pay to improve and restore
the environment in this area.

18. J.K. Industries Limited v. Union Of India

 M/s. J.K. Industries Ltd. is a public limited company. It was incorporated in 1951. It
carries on the business of manufacture and sale of automotive tyres, tubes, sugar and
agrigenetics. It has a registered office at Calcutta. It seeks to challenge AS 22 issued
by Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (for short, Institute) which has been
made mandatory for all companies listed in Stock Exchanges in India in preparation
of their accounts for the financial year 2001-02 onwards.

 HELD- the said AS 22 is neither ultra vires nor inconsistent with the provisions of
the Companies Act, including Schedule VI.

20. . J.P. Ravidas v. Navyvak Harijan Uthapan Multi Unit Industrial Coop. Soceity
Ltd.

21. Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary

 The Ministry of Defence, Government of India approved in August 1980 a proposal

forwarded by Army Headquarters (HQ) recommending, inter-alia, the introduction of
155 mm calibre medium gun both towed and self-propelled to meet its defence
operational requirements. On 17 April, 1987, some leading newspapers of our country
gave prominent coverage to a Swedish Radio Broadcast made in the previous day,
broadcasting that bribes had been paid to senior Indian politicians and key Defence
 figures to win the contract awarded by the Government of India to M/s. Before of
Sweden on 24 March, 1986.The Swedish Radio repeated the allegation on 17 April,
1987 claiming that it had documentary proof of the payoffs in four installments to
Indian accounts in Swiss Banks and it had checked with Skandinaviska Enskilds
Banken, the bankers for Before. On 20th April, 1987, the Minister of Defence (Shri
K.C. Pant) made a suo-motu statement on the subject in Lok Sabha stating inter-alia
that on the eve of finalising the contract, in response to a reiteration of Government's
policy and a demand for confirmation, M/s. Before had replied, vide their letter of the
10th March, 1986 that they did not employ any Representative/Agent in India for the
project: However, for administrative services, e.g. hotel bookings, transportation,
forwarding of letters, telexes etc., they use the services of a local firm.

 HELD-  the rest of the alleged illegalities are concerned, we straightaway say that
those grounds are not available for suo moto exercise of power in the light of the well
settled legal principles enunciated by this Court for the exercise of such powers.

22. Kehar Singh v. Union of India.

 On 22 January, 1986 Kehar Singh was convicted of an offence under section 120-

B read with section 302 of the Indian Penal Code in connection with the assassination
of Smt. Indira Gandhi, then Prime Minister of India, on 31 October, 1984 and was
sentenced to death by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi. His appeal
was dismissed by the High Court of Delhi, and his subsequent appeal by special leave
[Criminal Appeal No. 180 of 1987 to this Court was dismissed on 3 August, 1988. A
Review Petition filed thereafter by Kehar Singh was dismissed on 7 September, 1988
and later a writ petition was also dismissed by this Court. On 14 October, 1988 his
son, Rajinder Singh, presented petition to the President of India for the grant of
pardon to Kehar Singh under Art. 72 of the Constitution. In that petition reference was
made to the evidence on the record of the criminal case and it was sought to be
established that PG NO 1107 Kehar Singh was innocent, and that the verdict of the
Courts that Kehar Singh was guilty was erroneous. It was urged that it was a case for
the exercise of clemency. The petition included a prayer that Kehar Singh's
representative may be allowed to see the President in person in order to explain the
case concerning him.
  HELD- In the result, having regard to the view taken by us on the question concerning
the area and scope of the President's power under Article 72 of the Constitution, we
hold that the petition invoking that power shall be deemed to be pending before the
President to be dealt with and disposed of afresh. The sentence of death imposed on
Kehar Singh shall remain in abeyance meanwhile. These Writ Petitions and the
Special Leave Petition are concluded accordingly.

24. L.I.C. of India v. Consumer Education & Research Centre

 Plaintiff had sought certain details of insurance policy from the respondent. Plaintiff
made a framework outline of these policies and submitted to the respondent. These
proposals were subsequently rejected by the respondent. They laid down their own
guidelines for acceptance of these policies.

 HELD- in a contract of insurance the rates of insurance must be totally reasonable, as

should be the premium amount. If both are arbitrary and opposed to public policy then
the whole contract is liable to be set aside. Thus, the defendant’s policy terms were
opposed to public policy altogether, it is constitutionally void by law and thus liable
to be set aside by the High Court.

25. Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta

 The Supreme Court judgment carried out an in-depth analysis of the various
definitions under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 that are consumer, service,
trader, unfair trade practices, etc. It was concluded after examining the case and the
intent of the Act, by a statutory authority or a private builder, was covered under the
act before the amendment of 1993 and therefore the authorities, namely the district
forum, the state Commission and the National Commission were competent to
Entertain complaints by a shopper for any defect or deficiency in respect to
construction activity against a private builder or statutory authority. While analyzing
the meaning of service in the context of the Act it concluded that service of any
description which is made available to the potential users is covered under the Act. It
any control that the definition 'service' conjointly includes facilities available to a
consumer in connection with banking, insurance etc. All such activities are discharged
by the statutory authorities as well as private bodies. The Supreme Court concluded
 that public bodies instead of claiming exclusion should subject themselves to the Act
so that their acts and omission are scrutinized and be accountable for healthy growth
of society. It is now accepted law that even for actual action the State is at risk of
compensate if that action causes loss or injury to a person. Now there is no distinction
between sovereign and non-sovereign functions in determining the liability of the
State because under our constitution sovereignty vests in the people.
 HELD-By holding that the Commission was well inside its rights to damages for
harassment and this has empowered the ordinary citizen. This judgement ought to act
as a deterrent for public authorities to not take the public for granted. It will act as a
check on arbitrary and capricious exercise of powers. By ordering the Lucknow
Development Authority to fix responsibility and recover the compensation from the
defaulting employees the Supreme Court has set standards. It was never more
necessary than today when even social obligations are regulated by grant of statutory
powers. It is, therefore, necessary that the Commission once it's happy that a litigant is
entitled to compensation for harassment or mental agony or oppression, which finding
of course should be recorded fastidiously on material and convincing circumstances
and not gently, then it should further direct the department concerned to pay the
amount to the complainant from the public fund immediately however to recover
identical from those that square measure found liable for such unforgivable behavior
by dividing it proportionately where there are more than one functionaries.
27. M.C Mehta Vs Kamal Nath and Ors

 M. C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath was a landmark case in Indian environmental law. In the

case, the Supreme Court of India held that the public trust doctrine applied in India.
The Indian Express published an article reporting that Span Motels Private Limited,
which owns Span Resorts, had floated another ambitious venture, Span Club. The
family of Indian politician Kamal Nath has direct links with this company.[2] The club
was built after encroaching upon 27.12 bighas of land, including
substantial forestland, in 1990. The land was later regularised and leased out to the
company on 11 April 1994.

The regularisation was done when Nath was Minister of Environment and Forests. This
encroachment led to the swelling of the Beas River, and the swollen river changed its course
and engulfed the Span Club and the adjoining lawns, washing it away. For almost five
months now, the Span Resorts management has been moving bulldozers and earth movers to
turn the course of the Beas for a second time.

A worrying thought was that of the river eating into the mountains, leading to landslides
which were an occasional occurrence in that area. In September, these caused floods in the
Beas and property estimated to be worth Rs. 105 crore was destroyed. 

 HELD-The Indian Express published an article reporting that Span Motels Private

Limited, which owns Span Resorts, had floated another ambitious venture, Span Club.
The family of Indian politician Kamal Nath has direct links with this company.[2] The
club was built after encroaching upon 27.12 bighas of land, including
substantial forestland, in 1990. The land was later regularised and leased out to the
company on 11 April 1994.

The regularisation was done when Nath was Minister of Environment and Forests. This
encroachment led to the swelling of the Beas River, and the swollen river changed its course
and engulfed the Span Club and the adjoining lawns, washing it away. For almost five
months now, the Span Resorts management has been moving bulldozers and earth movers to
turn the course of the Beas for a second time.

A worrying thought was that of the river eating into the mountains, leading to landslides
which were an occasional occurrence in that area. In September, these caused floods in the
Beas and property estimated to be worth Rs. 105 crore was destroyed. 

29. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and Ors.

 M.C. Mehta v. Union of India originated in the aftermath of oleum gas leak from
Shriram Food and Fertilisers Ltd. complex at Delhi. This gas leak occurred soon after
the infamous Bhopal gas leak and created a lot of panic in Delhi. One person died in
the incident and few were hospitalized. The case lays down the principle of absolute
liability and the concept of deep pockets.

HELD-The Supreme Court made the following observation:

Since we are not deciding the question as to whether Shriram is an authority within
the meaning of Article 12 so as to be subjected to the discipline of the fundamental
right under Article 21, we do not think it would be justified in setting up a special
machinery for investigation of the claims for compensation made by those who allege
that they have been the victims of oleum gas escape. But we would direct that Delhi
 Legal Aid and Advice Board to take up the cases of all those who claim to have
suffered on account of oleum gas and to file actions on their behalf in the appropriate
court for claiming compensation against Shriram. Such actions claiming
compensation may be filed by the Delhi Legal Aid and Advice Board within two
months from today and the Delhi Administration is directed to provide the necessary
funds to the Delhi Legal Aid and Advice Board for the purpose of filing and
prosecuting such actions.

33. Nandkishore Ganesh Joshi v. Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Kalyan &

Dombivali\

 The Appellant herein, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Second

Respondent-Municipal Corporation of City of Kalyan and Dombivali (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Corporation') had filed a writ petition before the Bombay High
Court praying for issuance of a writ of or in the nature of mandamus directing the
respondents to ensure that whenever a proposal for grant of approval of the contract in
terms of Section 73 of the Mumbai Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act) is placed before the Standing Committee, the same
should contain the tender forms and other documents submitted by the contractor as
well as other documents, if any, containing the records of negotiations made by the
Commissioner of the Corporation after the tenders are opened or placed before it. The
said writ petition was dismissed by the High Court on an interpretation of clause (c)
of Section 73 of the Act as also the locus of the Appellant.

HELD-The First Respondent is hereby directed to place before the Standing Committee of
the Second Respondent all materials sought for from the Appellant in terms of its resolution
dated 26.4.2001.

The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned directions. In the facts and circumstances of
the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

34. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corp

 Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation was decided in 1985 by the five

Judges Bench of the Supreme Court of India. The Honorable bench consisted of
C.J., Y.V. Chandrachud, J., A.V. Varadarajan, J., O. Chinnappa Reddy, J., S. Murtaza
 Fazal Ali and J., V.D. Tulzapurkar. This case came before the Supreme Court as a
writ petition by persons who live on pavements and in slums in the city of Bombay. It
was prayed by the petitioners to allow them to stay on the pavements against their
order of eviction. .

HELD-The Judgment was delivered by Chief Justice Y.V Chandrachud i.e Yeshwant Vishnu
Chandrachud(16th C.J.I) :-

Some main points include;


o "For the purposes of argument, we will assume the factual correctness of the
premises that if the petitioners are evicted from their dwellings, they will be deprived
of their livelihood. Upon that assumption, the question which we have to consider is
whether the right to life includes the right to livelihood, We see only one answer to
that question, namely, that it does. The sweep of the right to life conferred by Art. 21
is wide and far-reaching... That, which alone makes it possible to live, leave aside
what makes life liveable, must be deemed to be an integral component of the right to
life."[1]
o "Two conclusions emerge from this discussion: one, that the right to life which
is conferred by Art. 21 includes the right to livelihood and two, that it is established
that if the petitioners are evicted from their dwellings, they will be deprived of their
livelihood. But the Constitution does not put an absolute embargo on the deprivation
of life or personal liberty. By Art. 21, such deprivation has to be according to
procedure established by law"
o "In order to minimise the hardship involved in any eviction, we direct that the
slums, wherever situated, will not be removed until one month after the end of the
current monsoon season..."

37. Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. v. Ministry of Environment & Forest & Others

 Orissa Mining Corporation v. Ministry of Environment & Forest & Others is a

landmark decision by the Supreme Court of India, which declared that Gram Sabha
has a role to play in safeguarding the customary and religious rights of the STs and
other Traditional Forest Dwellers (TFDs) like Dangaria Kondha etc. under the Forest
Rights Act.[1] The Apex Court maintained that the decision lies with the locals.[2]
HELD- While disposing of the Writ Petition, the Apex Court, in Para 15 of the Judgement,
observed as follows:

"The blatant disregard displayed by the project proponents with regard to rights of the
tribals and primitive tribal groups dependant on the area for their livelihood, as they have
proceeded to seek clearance is shocking. Primitive Tribal Groups have specifically been
provided for in the Forest Rights Act, 2006 and this case should leave no one in doubt that
they will enjoy full protection of their rights under the law. The narrow definition of the
Project Affected People by the State Government runs contrary to the letter and spirit of the
Forest Rights Act, 2006. Simply because they did not live on the hills does not mean that they
have no rights there. The Forest Rights Act, 2006 specifically provides for such rights but
these were not recognized and were sought to be denied."

38. People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India,

 Starvation deaths had occurred in the state of Rajasthan, despite excess grain being
kept for official times of famine, and various schemes throughout India for food
distribution were also not functioning. In 2001, the People's Union for Civil Liberties
(PUCL) petitioned the court for enforcement of both the food schemes and the
Famine Code, a code permitting the release of grain stocks in times of famine. They
grounded their arguments on the right to food, deriving it from the right to life. 
 HELD-The court ordered that: the Famine Code be implemented for three months;
grain allocation for the food for work scheme be doubled and financial support for
schemes be increased; ration shop licensees must stay open and provide the grain to
families below the poverty line at the set price; publicity be given to the rights of
families below the poverty line to grain; (5) all individuals without means of support
(older persons, widows, disabled adults) are to be granted an Antyodaya Anna
Yozana ration card for free grain; (6) and State governments should progressively
implement the mid-day meal scheme in schools.
 39. PG Gupta v. State of Gujarat
 In these appeals, we are concerned onlywith regard to category Nos. (iii) and
(vi).Admittedly, in the Lower Income GroupHousing Scheme, 396 houses were
constructed at Pahari at Ahmedabad and were allotted to the government employees
on rental basis. Subsequently, the State Government had obtained sanction from the
 Central Government in May 1969 to convert the scheme into hire purchase scheme
and for allotment to the govern-

ment employees on the criteria indicated therein, namely, continuous residence for five years
and also the eligibility criteria excluding the government servants who had already retired
from service. Thereafter on April 17, 197 1, the government passed a resolution converting
200 out of 396 houses for allotment on hire purchase basis. On a further resolution dated June
22, 1972, all the 396 houses were pooled for allotment on hire purchase scheme. 

 HELD-.In these appeals, we are concerned onlywith regard to category Nos. (iii) and
(vi).Admittedly, in the Lower Income GroupHousing Scheme, 396 houses were
constructed at Pahari at Ahmedabad and were allotted to the government employees
on rental basis. Subsequently, the State Government had obtained sanction from the
Central Government in May 1969 to convert the scheme into hire purchase scheme
and for allotment to the govern-

ment employees on the criteria indicated therein, namely, continuous residence for five years
and also the eligibility criteria excluding the government servants who had already retired
from service. Thereafter on April 17, 197 1, the government passed a resolution converting
200 out of 396 houses for allotment on hire purchase basis. On a further resolution dated June
22, 1972, all the 396 houses were pooled for allotment on hire purchase scheme. 

40. R.D. Shetty v. Airport Authority .

 In this case, International Airport Authority of Bombay issued a notice on 3 rd January

1977 for inviting tenders for putting up restaurant at the Airport. But only one notice
was chosen due to its due compliance with the requirements with the terms. The
possession of restaurant was questioned by K.S Irani because of the non compliance
with the requirement of the terms and conditions as respondents instead of having 5
years of experience had 10 years of experience. 

HELD-Soon after the dismissal of obtaining ad-interim injunction, A.S irani filed a writ
petition challenging the decision of 1st respondent in accepting the tender of 4th respondent.
This petition was moved to the single judge bench who after hearing the parties was held
dismissed and was  again appealed before the division bench who also dismissed the appeal
in limine.

Finally, the appellant filed a petition for special leave to appeal the Court, which is the final
hearing by the court. Many issues were raised and discussed. The appeal was dismissed and
the order of the High Court rejecting the writ petition was confirmed.

42. R.R. Verma v. Union of India

43. S.P. Gupta V. Union of India

These writ petitions filed in different High Courts and transferred to this Court
under Article 139 of the Constitution raise issues of great constitutional importance
affecting the independence of the judiciary and they have been argued at great length
before us. 

HELD- These cases have made us think about ourselves and our learned brothers in
the superior judiciary of the country. We are made to realise that we are all mortals
with all the human frailties and that only a few know in this world the truth behind the
following statement of Michel De Montaigne: "Were I not to follow the straight road
for its straightness, I should follow it for having found by experience that in the end it
is commonly the happiest and the most useful track".

44. Samatha v. Arunachal Pradesh

* The said case pertains to a local dispute over leasing of tribal lands to the private
mining industries against the wishes of the tribal community who wanted to regain
control over their lands rather than work as labour force in the mining operations on
their own lands.

* HELD-Some of the salient features of the judgment are as follows:

Firstly, as per the 73rd Amendment Act, 1992, which "...every Gram Sabha shall be
competent to safeguard…..Under clause (m) (ii) the power to prevent alienation of
land in the Scheduled Areas and to take appropriate action to restore any unlawful
alienation of land of a scheduled tribe".

If we examine the areas where the 73rd Amendment is not applicable, there are
corresponding legal provisions such as in Sixth Schedule of the Constitution which
provide a pathway to prevent alienation of land of the tribals.

Secondly, the Court has also stated that minerals are to be exploited by tribals
themselves either individually or through cooperative societies with financial
assistance of the State. Meaning thereby, tribals' have the right to self-determine the
economic development which they would like to undertake. It has also recognized the
right of the tribals to determine the manner of exploitation of natural resources.

Thirdly, in the absence of total prohibition from alienation of land, the Court laid
down certain duties and obligations of the lessee on the ground that when State leases
out the lands in Scheduled Areas to the non-tribals for exploitation of mineral
resources, it transmits the correlative constitutional duties and obligations to protect
the social, economic and educational interest of the tribals. Therefore, as part of the
project expenditure at least 20% of net profits has to be earmarked as permanent fund
for development needs apart from reforestation and maintenance of ecology.

Fourthly, transfer of land in Scheduled Areas by way of lease to non-tribals,

corporation aggregate, etc. stands prohibited to prevent their exploitation in any form.
This order shall ensure that even though a tribal may be lured to deal with his land by
transferring his right to use his land through lease to any other non-tribal for any such
purpose whatsoever, because of this prohibition such dealing may be cancelled.

Fifthly, Transfer of mining lease to non-tribals, company, corporation aggregate or

partnership firm, etc. is unconstitutional, void and inoperative. State instrumentalities
like APMDC (Andhra Pradesh Mineral Development Corporation Ltd.) stand
excluded from prohibition. Every renewal of lease is fresh grant of lease and
therefore, any such renewal stands prohibited.

49. Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India

 The petitioner, Sonowal, is currently the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) Chief
Minister of Assam. He is a former president of the All Assam Students Union, the
largest non-political students’ organisation in the State, which was responsible for
leading the student movement in Assam on the issue of immigrants in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. Sonowal is also a former chairman of the North East Students
Organisation, an umbrella organisation of students’ associations from Assam,
Meghalaya, Manipur, Nagaland, Tripura and Arunachal Pradesh, and was actively
involved in issues concerning the rights of the people of Assam, including the
question of illegal migrants settled in the State. In his public interest litigation (PIL)
petition, Sonowal contended that the IMDT Act was wholly arbitrary and
unreasonable and that it discriminated against citizens in Assam, making it impossible
to detect and deport foreigners from Indian soil. He argued that while the Foreigners
Act, 1946, applied to all foreigners throughout India, the IMDT Act, which was
enacted subsequently with the professed aim of making detection and deportation of
illegal migrants in Assam easier, had failed to meet even the standards prescribed in
the Foreigners Act. 

HELD-In view of the discussion made above, the writ petition succeeds and is
allowed with the following directions : (1) The provisions of the Illegal Migrants
(Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983 and the Illegal Migrants (Determination by
Tribunals) Rules, 1984 are declared to be ultra vires the Constitution of India and are
struck down;

50. Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimala Totame

Respondents filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Bombay High
Court challenging permission to the builders to escalate the rates in respect of construction
permitted on exempted land under the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation)
Act, 1976 (hereinafter 'Act' for short). The respondents made an application (Civil application
No. 5748/89) for amendment of the averments in that writ petition but by order dated 12th of
December, 1988, the High Court rejected the civil application and refused leave to amend. By
a subsequent order dated 16th of December, 1988, in the writ petition, the High Court held:
The Writ Petition as filed does not survive. It has become infructuous by changed
government policy and the resolutions and letters already referred to in our order under the
Civil Application. Hence, the same is dismissed.

 At present we have confined the directions to the State of Maharashtra. Liberty is
given to members of the weaker sections residing in other States, builders and the
respective State Governments to ask for extension of the Code with such
modifications as may be necessary for other parts of the country.

52. Shiv Sagar Tiwari v. Union of India

One of the issues for consideration before this Court in this public interest petition is
the validity of the allotments of 52 shops/stalls made by Smt. Shiela Kaul the then
minister for Housing land Urban development, Government of India.

HELD- After examining all the facts and circumstances of the case and giving our
thoughtful consideration to this aspect. We direct Smt. Shiela Kaul to pay a sum of
Government Exchequer. Since the property with which Smt. Shiela Kaul was dealing
was public property, the Government which is "by the people: has to be compensated.
We further direct Smt. Shiela Kaul to deposit the amount with the Secretary, ministry
of Finance, Government of India within nine months from today. The amount if not
paid, shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue.

53. State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar,

The State of Haryana had filed a Civil Suit through the Superintendent of Police,
Gurgaon, seeking a relief of declaration to the effect that it has acquired the rights
of ownership by way of adverse possession over land measuring 8 biswas comprising
khewat no. 34, khata no.

HELD-In our considered view, there is an urgent need for a fresh look of the entire
law on adverse possession. We recommend the Union of India to immediately
consider and seriously deliberate either abolition of the law of adverse possession and
in the alternate to make suitable amendments in the law of adverse possession. 
 54. State of Karnataka v. H. Ganesh Kamath

The Respondent in Civil Appeal No. 2488 of 1977 had obtained a learner's licence for
driving heavy motor vehicles under the said Rules and had obtained training in Crown
Motor Driving School, Bangalore, which was an Institution recognised by the
Government of Karnataka under rule 30 of the said Rules. He also held a licence to
impart training in driving heavy motor vehicles. After completion of his training he
obtained a certificate from the said driving school and applied on July 22, 1976
through it for a licence to drive heavy motor vehicles. The Respondent in Civil
Appeal No. 2489 of 1977 had applied on July 20, 1976 for a learner's licence to drive
heavy motor vehicles. The Respondent in Civil Appeal No. 2490 of 1977 as also the
Respondent in Civil Appeal No. 2491 of 1977 were both running schools for
imparting training in driving heavy motor vehicles and each held a licence to impart
training in driving heavy motor vehicles and had trained several persons. After
successful completion of their training each of them had applied for a licence for
driving heavy motor vehicles. All the aforesaid applications were rejected by the
Licensing Authority on the ground that the Respondents did not satisfy the
requirements of the impugned sub-rule (2) of rule 5. The respondents thereupon
approached the Karnataka High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
by filing separate writ petitions. The High Court struck down the said sub-rule (2) of
rule 5 on the ground that it was repugnant to the provisions of section 7 of the Act and
allowed the said four writ petitions. The Appellants, who are the State of Karnataka
and the concerned Regional Transport Officers, have filed these appeals by special
leave against the said judgment and order.

HELD-it was submitted that the disqualification for holding or obtaining a driving
licence would include not only disqualifications laid down in the Act but also a
disqualification prescribed by a rule made by virtue of the power conferred by clause
(aa) of section 21 (2). We are unable to accept this submission.

55. State Of Kerala And Another v. Peoples Union For Civil Liberties

The State of Kerala enacted the Kerala Scheduled Tribes (Restriction on Transfer of Lands
and Restoration of Alienated Lands) Act, 1975 (Act No.31 of 1975) (for short `the 1975 Act')
with the object of providing restriction on transfer of land by Members of Scheduled Tribes
in the State of Kerala and for restoration of possession of lands alienated by such members
and for matters connected therewith.

The said Act received the assent of the President of India. It was included in the Ninth
Schedule of the Constitution of India, being item No.150, by the Constitutional
40th Amendment Act. It was published in the Kerala Gazette Extraordinary on 14th
November, 1975. However, only on 24th January, 1986 a Notification was issued bringing
the said Act into force with retrospective effect from 1st January, 1982.

 Kerala Scheduled Tribes (Restriction on Transfer of lands and Restoration of

Alienated Land) Rules, 1986 (1986 Rules) were framed for effective implementation
of the 1975 Act and were published in the Kerala Gazette Extraordinary on 18th
October, 1986.

56. State of Madras v. V.G. Row

The state of Tamil Nadu by passing an ordinance on 10 March 1950 declared

“Peoples Education Society” as unlawful. It was declared unlawful on the grounds
that the society as an association interferes with the administration and maintenance
of law and order and thus constitutes a danger to the public peace. V.G. Rao, the
Chairman of Peoples Education Society, had claimed this action of the state
government to be in violation of his fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)
(C) of the Indian Constitution. It is pertinent to note that while this matter was
pending before the High Court, the State Government brought an amendment in
section 15(1)(b) of Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, as amended by Criminal
Law Madras Amendment Act 1950. 

A three-judge bench of the High court allowed this petition under Article 132 of the
Indian Constitution. Aggrieved by this, the State of Madras has brought an appeal
before the Supreme Court.

HELD-The Court arrived at the conclusion that in agreement with the learned judges
of the High Court, that, having regard to the peculiar features, Section 15(2)(b) of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, as amended by the Criminal Law Amendment
 (Madras) Act, 1950, falls outside the scope of authorised restrictions under clause (4)
of Article 19 and is therefore unconstitutional and void. The appeal thus failed.

57. State of U.P. v. Renusgar Power Co.

HELD-

58. Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar.

The petitioner filed a public interest litigation claim against two iron and steel companies,
because they allegedly created health risks to the public by dumping waste from their
factories into the nearby Bokaro river. The petitioner also claimed that the State Pollution
Control Board had failed to take appropriate measures for preventing this pollution.

As part of his claim, the asked the Curt to take legal action against the company based on the
Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act of 1974 and furthermore requested
permission to collect waste in the form of sludge and slurry by himself as interim relief. The
State Pollution and Control Board claimed that it had sufficiently monitored the quality of
effluent waste entering the river and the respondent companies claimed that they had adhered
to the Board’s instructions concerning the prevention of pollution.

The Court found that the Board had indeed taken effective steps to prevent the waste
discharge from the factories into the river and thus dismissed the petition. Furthermore, it was
held that the petition did not qualify as a public interest litigation, because it was filed by the
petitioner’s own interest in obtaining larger quantities of waste in the form of slurry from one
of the respondent companies from which he started to purchase slurry several years prior to
the petition.

60. Sukhdev and Ors v. Bhagat Ram and Ors.

There are two questions for consideration in these appeals. First, whether an order for
removal from service contrary to regulations framed under the Oil and Natural Gas
Commission Act, 1959; the Industrial Finance Corporation Act, 1948; and the Life Insurance
Corporation Act, 1956 would enable the employees to a declaration against the statutory
corporation of continuance in service or would only give rise to a claim for damages. Second
whether an employee of a statutory corporation is entitled to claim protection of Articles 14
and 16 against the Corporation. In short the question is whether these statutory corporations
are authorities within the meaning of Article 12.

The conclusion of the High Court that the regulations have not the force of law is set aside.
The conclusion of the High Court that Corporation should not be permitted to enforce the
regulations mentioned in Clauses (1) and (4) of Regulation 25 is upheld.

61. Th. Majra Singh v. Oil India Corporation,

The question as to where the plant for filling cylinders with "Liquified Petroleum Gas"
should be located, is the subject-matter of adjudication in this petition. There can be no
dispute with the proposition that this is basically a question which is to be decided by the
respondent-authorities. This Court can only examine as to whether the respondent-authorities
have taken all precautions with a view to see that the laws dealing with environment and
pollution are given due care and attention.

HELD- his petition is, accordingly, disposed of with the following directions;
(i) That the respondent No. 1 would be at liberty to go ahead with the project. It can continue
with the installation of the plant and also put the same into operation.

(ii) That the respondent-authorities would take due precautions, so that pollution is not caused
in the environment.

(iii) The respondent-Corporation would see to it that all along the boundary of the Plant and
also approach roads, at least 4 rows of trees are planted. It would be apt to plant fast growing
trees like poplar eucalyptus. These can be planted at the first stage. Thereafter, other quick
growing trees of thick foliage be also planted.

(iv) That the respondent-authorities would see to it that the industrial affluent such as, solid
waste or in liquid form is not permitted to mix with the natural resources such as, Air and
Water.

(v) It would sec to that temporary shelter such as Khokas etc., do not come into existence in
the area.

(vi) Effort be made to give employment to the residents of locality. They be given preference.

62. Upendra Baxi v. State of Uttar Pradesh

Miss Srivastave has insinuated in paragraph 2 of her affidavit that the present petition has
been filed by Dr. Baxi and Mrs. Latika Sarkar "as a last resort to compel the Government to
leave the present accommodation" and their sole object is to secure that the building where
the Home is located may be vacated by the Government. We are surprised that such a
baseless insinuation should have been made by a responsible person like the Superintendent
of the Home. The suggestion of a collusion between the landlord of the building on the one
hand and Dr. Upendra Baxi and Mrs. Latika Sarkar on the other, is most reprehensible and
we unhesitatingly condemn it in the strongest terms. Dr. Upendra Baxi and Mrs. Latika
Sarkar have filed the petition as a "public interest" litigation with a view to ensuring to the
inmates of the Home the right to live with human dignity enshrined in Article 21 of the
Constitution and what they have stated in their petition and in the subsequent memoranda
filed by them is not only borne out by the report of Shri N.K. Sharma, Chief Judicial
Magistrate made on 18th November, 1980 but also by the subsequent reports. We very much
wish that such an insinuation had not been made by Miss Srivastava.
HELD-We are also not informed as to what steps have been taken by the State Government
to reconstitute the Board of VisitOrs. It is surprising that though the term of the non-official
members of the Board of Visitors has, according to the affidavit of Miss Srivastava, expired,
the meetings of the Board of Visitors are still being held with the same members and the
State Government does not seem to have taken any steps for making appointments of non-
official members so as to regularise the Board of VisitOrs. We hope and trust that the
necessary steps will be taken by the State Government in this behalf before the next hearing
of the writ petition.

63. Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum v. Union of India & Others

This petition - public interest - under Article 32 of the Constitution of India has been filed by
Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum and is directed against the pollution which is being caused
by enormous discharge of untreated effluent by the tanneries and other industries in the State
of Tamil Nadu . It is stated that the tanneries are discharging untreated effluent into
agricultural fields to, road-Sides, Water ways and open lands. The untreated effluent is finally
discharged in river Palar which is the main source of water supply to the residents of the area.
According to the petitioner the entire surface and sub-soil water of river Palar has been
polluted resulting in non availability Potable water to the residents of the area. It is stated that
the tanneries in the State of Tamil Nadu have caused environmental degradation in the area. 

HELD-We have issued comprehensive directions for achieving the end result in this case. It
is not necesary for this Court to monitor these matters any further. we are of the view that the
Madras High Court would be in a better position to monitor these matters hereinafter. We,
therefore, request the Chief Justice of the Madras High Court to constitute a special Bench
"Green bench" to deal with this case and other environmental matters. We make it clear that it
would be open to the Bench to pass any appropriate order/orders keeping in view the
directions issued by us. We may mention that "Green Benches" are already functioning in
Calcutta, Madhya Pradesh and some other High Courts. We Direct the Registry of this Court
to send the records to the registry of the Madras High matter as a petition under Article
226 of the Constitution of India and deal with it in accordance with law and also in terms of
the directions issued by us. We give liberty to the parties to approach the High Court as and
when necessary.