Psychol Rec
DOI 10.1007/s40732-015-0148-x
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Blocking in Humans: Logical Reasoning Versus Contingency
Learning
Diana Delgado 1,2
# Association for Behavior Analysis International 2015
Abstract This study compared the occurrence of the
blocking effect when participants had unlimited and limited
time to respond to a causal learning task. In contrast to the
dominant views in human causal learning, the underlying as-
sumption is that blocking can be sufficiently explained by the
same principles that describe conditioning outcomes in ani-
mals, but only when logical reasoning about the experimental
task is impeded. Experiment 1 compares responses to
blocking tests by participants in timed and untimed groups.
As expected, most cases of blocking were observed for par-
ticipants in the timed group. Experiment 2 explores an alter-
native procedure in which all information about stimulus-
outcome associations was simultaneously present. Based on
this information, participants sorted target and control stimuli
according to their predicted of outcomes. Very limited evi-
dence of blocking was observed with this procedure.
Findings are discussed in terms of the interference of rule
generation processes with direct contingency control.
Keywords Blocking . Contingency learning . Logical
reasoning . Causal learning . Pavlovian conditioning .
Interference tasks . Rule generation
The blocking effect occurs when pairings of a stimulus and an
outcome prevent subsequent conditioning of a second stimu-
lus, which is presented simultaneously with the first, and
followed by the same outcome (A+, AX+). This procedure
* Diana Delgado
diana.delgado@konradlorenz.edu.co; dimadel@gmail.com
1
Fundación Universitaria Konrad Lorenz, Cra 9Bis No 62-43,
Bogotá, Colombia
2
Present address: Shellers Bend, # 2, State College, PA 16801, USA
represents a circumstance in which the prediction of an out-
come does not depend solely on contiguity relations between
stimuli; but is also influenced by previously established com-
peting contingencies (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). Dominant
theoretical models of this phenomenon have accounted for
attenuated responses to X when presented alone in terms of
its redundancy in the prediction of the outcome (Rescorla &
Wagner, 1972; Mackintosh, 1975).
Although this effect has been sufficiently demonstrated in
animal experiments, results have not been as consistent with
humans. The most typical procedure in human blocking re-
search consists of an experimental task in which stimuli
(i.e., types of food, drinks, or medicines) are paired with an
outcome (e.g., an illness). Once a history of these pairings has
been established, a novel stimulus is simultaneously presented
with the first stimulus, and both are followed by the occur-
rence of the illness. Blocking is then evaluated by asking
participants to estimate the probability that the second stimu-
lus alone will produce the illness. Because the stimulus–stim-
ulus pairings are easily interpreted in terms of one or two
events causing another event (e.g., consumption of food caus-
ing an illness), this body of research is commonly described in
the literature as human causal learning.
Among the studies of cue competition effects in human
causal learning, those focusing on the blocking effect seem
to have engendered the most notable and impactful amount of
empirical research and theoretical controversies (Delgado &
Medina, 2013). Two main interpretations have accounted for
the variability of research findings regarding the observation
of the blocking effect.
A dominant interpretation with respect to the high variabil-
ity of outcomes in human blocking stresses that human causal
learning cannot be explained by the same set of contingencies
described by Pavlovian animal experiments. This interpreta-
tion is based on findings from a series of research studies that

report greater blocking when the procedures provide specific
information about the predictive function of the target cue X
(De Houwer, Beckers, & Vandorpe, 2005; Shanks, 2010;
Penn & Povinelli, 2007; Vandorpe & De Houwer, 2006).
The blocking effect can be described as an ambiguous cir-
cumstance with respect to the causal function of the stimuli in
producing the outcome. Thus, from a cognitive standpoint,
blocking in humans is more likely when the experimental
preparation provides specific information about the relations
between each of the stimuli and the outcome. A large body of
empirical evidence supports this assertion. Two of the most
common procedures used in these studies are (a) those that
specify that the stimuli in the compound have additive effects
(e.g., Livesey & Boakes, 2004; Lovibond, Been, Mitchell,
Bouton, & Frohardt, 2003) and (b) those that specify a
submaximal intensity in the occurrence of the outcome
(De Houwer, Beckers, & Glautier, 2002; Beckers, De
Houwer, Pineño, & Miller, 2005).
A study by Livesey and Boakes (2004) illustrates the first
case. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to identify
which of a variety of chemicals would make a newly discov-
ered bacteria multiply. In the nonadditive group, presentation
of both single (P) and compound (PQ) stimuli were followed
by a normal effect (+), that is, bacteria increased twice in
number as a reaction to the chemical. By contrast, in the ad-
ditive group, single stimulus presentations were followed by a
normal effect (P+), and compound stimulus presentations
were followed by a strong effect, that is, the number of bac-
teria increased four times as a reaction to the chemical
(PQ++). As expected, the data showed a significant difference
between groups, with higher blocking effects for the additive
group.
In the second commonly used procedure, the intensity of
the outcome is specified. When the magnitude is either un-
specified or maximal—that is, if an illness occurs at its max-
imum possible intensity—the contribution of each stimulus to
the outcome is ambiguous. By contrast, when participants are
told that the outcome of both single and compound stimuli
occur with a submaximal intensity—for example, at 30% of
its maximum potential—the redundant role of the target stim-
ulus is stressed and, thus, blocking is likely to occur.
For example, Beckers et al. (2005) presented fictitious re-
cords of patients who presented an allergic reaction after hav-
ing eaten different foods. For participants in the submaximal
condition the allergic reaction was of moderate strength, while
for the other half it was a strong reaction. During blocking
tests, participants were asked to rate on a scale from 1 to 9
how likely each of the foods was to produce the allergic reac-
tion. As it has been systematically shown, blocking was stron-
ger for the group in the submaximal condition (Lovibond
et al., 2003, Experiment 1; Waldmann & Walker, 2005).
Overall, these findings have led authors to conclude that
blocking results from inferential processes occurring during
Psychol Rec
the task rather than from a weakened conditioning of
the target stimulus produced by the arranged contingen-
cies (De Houwer & Beckers, 2003; Lovibond et al.,
2003).
The opposing view argues that human causal learning is
sufficiently explained by associative processes or by the prin-
ciples that describe stimulus–stimulus contingencies. For ex-
ample, Beckers, Miller, De Houwer, & Urushihara (2006)
demonstrated that equivalent results are obtained when ma-
nipulations similar to those used in human causal learning
tasks are used in studies using animals as subjects.
Furthermore, some studies suggest that reasoning about the
task may actually hinder rather than facilitate conditioning
outcomes. For example, several studies (operant and respon-
dent) have successfully produced conditioning outcomes
when contingency awareness is impeded by superimposing a
masking task or a cognitive interference task on the presenta-
tion of stimulus pairings (see, e.g., Delgado, Medina, & Soto,
2011; Karazinov & Boakes, 2007; Tonneau & González,
2004; Walther & Nagengast, 2006). Restricting time to re-
spond to test trials has also been used to impede reasoning
and verbalizations about the objectives of the task. It is as-
sumed that such time restrictions will impede rule-generation
processes that may interfere with nonverbal control by the
contingencies arranged in the experimental preparation
(Karazinov & Boakes, 2007).
Accounts of blocking effects based on logical reasoning
processes (and not as a result of associative learning process-
es), seem to vastly outnumber those supporting the contingen-
cy learning account, however. In sum, research findings show
that greater blocking is predicted when the experimental task
provides information that disambiguates the contribution of
the target cue on the prediction of the outcome. More specif-
ically, it is argued that manipulations of outcome maximality
and additivity show that logical reasoning and rule based pro-
cesses may be necessary to produce blocking (De Houwer
et al., 2005; Livesey & Boakes, 2004; Vandorpe & De
Houwer, 2006; Vandorpe, De Houwer, & Beckers, 2005).
This interpretation may be questionable, however.
Specifying the environmental elements involved in a contin-
gency relation may produce a higher accuracy in predicting
the occurrence of blocking effects in both animals and
humans. In addition, results from maximality and additivity
studies may be interpreted in terms of differential histories of
responding to the stimuli in the compound either separately
(elemental responding), or as a unique stimulus configuration
(configural responding; Glautier, 2002; Livesey & Boakes,
2004; Melchers, Lachnit, Üngör, & Shanks, 2008).
Elemental responding is associated with increased blocking
effects because it allows for competitor-outcome associations
(A+) to weaken or impede subsequent compound-outcome
associations (AX+), and not because of the reasoning process-
es involved.
Psychol Rec
Ascertaining whether or not deliberate reasoning produces
different blocking outcomes from those observed in the tradi-
tional associative learning literature would entail comparing
the results of procedures that facilitate or impede reasoning
while maintaining unaltered the predictive ambiguity of the
target cue with respect to the outcome. Karazinov and Boakes
(2007), for example, included a time restriction for one of two
groups exposed to a second order conditioning (SOC) proce-
dure and examined if differential outcomes were observed.
The authors found SOC for the group in the time-restricted
condition only.
Contrary to the mainstream view, these authors discuss that
when logical reasoning is obstructed, responding occurs on
the basis of associative learning processes. Similar to what
has been demonstrated by operant learning experiments on
rule-governed behavior (see Catania, 2013), Karazinov and
Boakes (2007) suggested that processes of rule generation
about the operative contingencies may therefore interfere with
direct contingency control.
The blocking procedure may be construed as an ambiguous
situation with respect to the causal role of the target cue in
producing the outcome, wherein deliberate reasoning may act
to modulate the occurrence of blocking effects. More specif-
ically, greater blocking should be expected when reasoning is
impeded. In agreement with Karazinov and Boakes (2007),
the rationale under this assumption is that rule-generation pro-
cesses may prevent behavioral outcomes from undergoing
nonverbal contingency control.
In a recent attempt to further examine this hypothesis,
Delgado (2013) used two different types of questions to in-
duce causal judgments as a result of intuitive reasoning or
logical reasoning (see also García-Retamero & Dieckman,
2006; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000; Tversky & Kahneman,
1983). These terms are often used in the decision-making
literature to describe rule-based (logical reasoning) versus
nonrule-based responding in a decision-making situation
(Kahneman, 2003; Sloman, 1996). While the question that
was oriented toward logical reasoning requested participants
to provide a probability rating of the cue producing the out-
come, the intuitive reasoning question forced a yes/no answer
by asking participants whether the target cue alone would
produce the outcome. Although differences in blocking were
not found, it is possible that the question types did not facili-
tate one or the other type of reasoning as intended. Most likely,
because logical reasoning was not directly obstructed, partic-
ipants responded to both questions analyzing the probabilities
involved given the situation.
The present study attempts to further examine if logical
reasoning with respect to the contingencies presented in the
experimental task hinders or facilitates the occurrence of the
blocking effect. The procedure, which is a variation of the card
game simulation used by Glautier (2002), examines differ-
ences in blocking in a group with a time restriction to respond
to the target cue, and a group without this restriction. In the
first phase of this procedure, a card with background color A
(the competitor cue) is followed by a payoff. In the following
phase, a card with background color A and figure X
(target cue) is also followed by a payoff. In the last phase, a
card with figure X and a neutral background color is
presented, and participants are required to judge whether or
not this card produces a payoff.
In his study, Glautier (2002) argued that presenting target
and competitor cues as part of one same stimulus object may
be associated with a decreased likelihood of blocking, as this
stimulus arrangement favors configural responding. However,
it has been demonstrated that elemental or configural
responding depends on the participants’ history of exposure
to one or the other type (Melchers et al., 2005; Melchers et al.,
2008). Some aspects of the original task were modified in
order to clarify which cues were irrelevant in terms of their
outcomes and which cues produced a payoff.
Experiment 1
Method
Experimental Design and Data Analysis
Most of the experiments conducted in this area evaluate
blocking effects by statistically comparing group average
probability scores of causal attribution for all the relevant
cues. In contrast, we evaluated blocking effects by com-
paring responses to target, competitor, and control cues
from each participant. The traditional blocking procedure
including an intrasubject control condition was used. In the
first phase of this procedure, an event is paired with an
outcome. In the second phase, the same event in combina-
tion with a second event is paired with the outcome. A
novel compound stimulus followed by the outcome serves
as the intrasubject control condition. Data from partici-
pants in both groups (timed and untimed) are presented in
tables showing individual responses to target, competitor
and control stimuli.
Participants
Participants were 26 undergraduate psychology students.
All of them received course credits for volunteering to
participate in the experiment, and they were assigned to
the untimed (n=13) and timed (n=13) groups on the basis
of order of arrival to the laboratory. Informed consent was
obtained from all participants at the beginning of the ex-
perimental sessions. Data from two participants, who did
not complete the experimental task for the timed group,
were not included in the analysis.

Apparatus and Stimuli
The experimental task was presented on IBM-compatible
computers with 17-in. screens. All phases of the experiment
were designed and implemented using the software LabView,
2010 for Windows. The experiment included 14 cards
(7.5×11 cm). Each card included two types of stimuli: a black
figure on the center of the card and a background color.
Seven background colors and seven figures were combined
for a total of 14 cards. Background colors were: A = red,
B = green, D = yellow, E = orange, M = gray with horizontal
stripes, H = purple, and I = checkered gray. Figures were:
N = down arrow, O = clover, P = diamond, Q = heart,
X = crescent, F = circle, and R = two-way vertical arrow.
Throughout this manuscript, each card will be designated
with two letters corresponding to the background color and
the center symbol, respectively (e.g., AO). For the cards asso-
ciated with a payoff, a 7.5×7.5 picture of a bag of money was
presented to the right of each card. The same picture, crossed
off with a diagonal red line, indicated no payoff.
Procedure
Participants were informed that the objective of the study was
to identify how relations among stimuli may characterize
some aspects of human learning. At the start of the experi-
ment, the following instructions were provided on the com-
puter screen:
This is a game of cards. The computer will deal one card
at a time. As you will see, only some of them produce a
payoff. Eventually you may be asked to indicate wheth-
er a card produces a payoff or not. Observe carefully.
You may now begin.
Each training trial consisted on the presentation of a card on
the left side of the screen. After 2 seconds, the picture indicat-
ing payoff or no payoff appeared 6 cm to the right of the card.
Both stimuli remained on the screen for 3 more seconds. The
following trial was preceded by a 1.5 seconds intertrial
interval.
First Training Phase Four cards and their corresponding con-
sequence (payoff/no payoff) were presented four times, in
random order: AN+, EN-, MF-, and MX+. This corresponds
to the first phase of the blocking procedure in which compet-
itor stimuli are presented separately and followed by the out-
come. There are two competitor stimuli in this phase, A and X.
In card AN, A is the background competitor stimulus for the
figure blocking test, and X in card MX is the figure competitor
stimulus for the background blocking test. The function of
figure N is rendered null given that it is presented both with
the outcome in card AN and without the outcome in card EN.
Psychol Rec
Similarly, because a figure stimulus cannot be presented in the
absence of a background, background color M was used as a
neutral cue. It is rendered neutral because it is associated with
the prediction of the outcome in MX+ and with its absence in
MF-.
Once a card completed four presentations, on the fifth trial
a test was presented for that card only. In the test trial, two
buttons labeled BPayoff^ and BNo Payoff^ were shown next to
the card. A correct response was followed by the presentation
of the remaining training trials for the other three cards. An
incorrect response added three extra training trials for that card
and an additional test trial. This correction procedure was
repeated until correct outcomes for all cards were selected.
No other consequences were provided for correct or incorrect
selections.
Second Training Phase The same procedure used in the first
training phase was used to train four additional card–outcome
associations: AO+, BP+, DQ-, and HX+. This phase corre-
sponds to the second phase of the traditional blocking proce-
dure in which the stimulus presented in the first phase
(i.e., competitor stimulus) is now presented simultaneously
with a second stimulus (i.e., the blocking or target stimulus),
and followed with the outcome (payoff). In this phase, AO and
HX are the relevant cards. For the figure blocking test, figure
O is now presented with background color A, which reliably
predicted the outcome in the first training phase. For the back-
ground blocking test, background color H is now presented
with figure cue X, which reliably predicted a payoff in the first
training phase. Card BP+ serves as a control stimulus because
neither of the cues (B or P), were presented previously
in association with a payoff; and DQ- is a filler cue
(see Table 1). For the timed and untimed groups, these training
phases were identical.
Thus, to summarize, the figure blocking procedure includ-
ed AN+ (first training phase) and AO+ trials (second training
phase), where O was the figure target cue and A the compet-
itor cue. The background blocking procedure included MX+
(first training phase) and HX+ trials (second training phase),
where H was the background target cue and X the competitor.
Table 1 Summary of the design
Experimental Stage Compound Cues and Outcomes
Training Phase1 AN+, EN-, MF-, MX+
Training Phase 2 AO+, BP+, DQ-, HX+
Tests MO, HN, BN, MP, IX, AR
Note. The first letter corresponds to the background color of the card and
the second corresponds to its figure. O and H are target cues, A and X are
their corresponding competitors, and BP is the control stimulus. Payoff is
indicated by a (+) sign, and no payoff is indicated by a (-) sign.
Psychol Rec
Tests Prior to the beginning of this phase, the untimed group
received the following instruction on the screen: BYou will
now see a new set of cards. The computer will deal one card
at a time. Please indicate if you think the card pays off or not.
Now, let’s play!^ For the timed group, the following additional
instruction was included: BYou will have 3 seconds to re-
spond. Please observe each card carefully and try to respond
quickly. Now let’s play!^
In this phase target, control, and competitor cues, were
tested, by presenting them with neutral background color M
or with neutral figure N. The card used to evaluate responding
to the figure target cue was MO. Card HN was used to eval-
uate responding to the background target cue. Their corre-
sponding controls were MP and BN, where M and N were
neutral stimuli and P and B were the cues presented as part of
the control compound in Training Phase 2 of the blocking
procedure.
Thus, blocking would occur if (a) a no-payoff response is
predicted in the presence of the card with the target cue and (b)
a payoff response is predicted in the presence of the card with
one of the stimuli of the control compound. Cards IX and AR
were used to evaluate predictions with respect to competitor
cues X and A.
Each card was presented only once to simulate a real card
game. On each trial, a card was presented on the left side of the
screen. Participants were asked to click on one of three buttons
located to the right of the card. Buttons were labeled BPays off,
^ BDoes not payoff,^ or BI don’t know.^ For the timed group,
each test trial was available for 3 seconds. If the participant did
not respond within this time, the trial was presented again at
the end of the randomized sequence. Table 1 shows the exper-
imental phases and the cards presented in each phase.
Results
In accordance with our hypothesis, blocking effects should
occur more consistently in the timed group. That is to say,
with the time restriction impeding reasoning about the causal
relations and probabilities involved in the prediction of a pay-
off, responding should come under the direct control of
Pavlovian contingencies, and blocking should be reliably
observed.
Tables 2 and 3 show responses to target (MO, HN) and
control (BP) cues for the untimed and timed groups, respec-
tively (background cue M and figure N are neutral cues).
Blocking effects were determined on the basis of the case-
by-case comparison of responses to target and control cues.
More specifically, blocking effects are seen when a no-
payoff response is attributed to target cues while a payoff
or a Bdon’t know^ response is attributed to control cues. To
facilitate visual inspection of the data, blocking effects are
indicated by a check mark on the fourth and seventh col-
umns of Tables 2 and 3.
Payoff/no payoff reports for cues O (figure target) and P
(control) show differences in blocking effects between the
timed and untimed groups for responses to the figure target
cue. In the untimed group (n = 11), only one participant
showed blocking of the figure target cue, and three partici-
pants showed blocking of the target background cue. For the
timed group (n=13), blocking of the figure cue was observed
for eight participants, and blocking for the background cue
was observed for six participants. Four participants (3, 7, 8,
and 9 in Table 3) showed blocking for both the figure and the
background cue.
Tables 4 and 5 summarize these data by showing group
differences in blocking effects for figure and background cues,
respectively. Chi-square values were calculated using Fisher’s
exact test to establish if observed differences between groups
were statistically significant. As it is shown in Table 4,
blocking of the figure cue was observed for a higher number
of participants in the timed group (8/13) as compared with the
untimed group (1/11). This difference was statistically signif-
icant, with χ2 =6.99, p=.01. A similar finding was observed
for the background cue. Although this difference was not sta-
tistically significant χ2 =0.90, p=.42, more cases of blocking
of the background target cue were observed in the timed group
(6/13) than in the untimed group (3/11).
By using a correction procedure during Training Phase 1
and 2, we guaranteed that responses to the target stimulus
occurred after participants had successfully acquired compet-
itor–outcome associations. In addition to testing responses to
the target stimuli we also examined the extent to which the
associative strength of the competitors acquired during phase
1 (A+ and X+) and phase 2 (AO+ and HX+) would generalize
to the novel compounds AR and IX in a test trial. For the
untimed group, 9 of 11 participants reported that they were
unsure as to whether or not the novel card AR produced a
payoff, one participant responded that it produced a payoff,
and one participant responded that it did not. With respect to
the IX compound, six participants responded that it produced
a payoff and five responded that they were unsure. For the
timed group, 9 of 13 participants responded they were unsure
about the outcome of card AR, and four responded that the
card did not produce a payoff. For the card IX, seven partic-
ipants responded that it produced a payoff and six participants
were unsure about the outcome.
Discussion
The data presented in Tables 2 and 3 show greater blocking
in the timed group. Approximately half of the participants
of this group showed blocking of the target cues. By con-
trast, only one participant in the untimed group showed
blocking for the target cue O, and three participants
showed blocking for target cue H. These differences sug-
gest that, as expected, when deliberate reasoning about the
 Psychol Rec

Table 2 Blocking/no blocking

effects of figure and background Ppts O (figure P (control Blocking H (background B (control Blocking of
target cues in the untimed group target cue) figure) of figure cue target cue) background) background cue

1 − + ✓ + +
2 + + − + ✓
3 + d/k − d/k ✓
4 + + + +
5 + d/k + +
6 + d/k + d/k
7 + + + +
8 + + + d/k
9 + d/k + +
10 + + + +
11 + + − d/k ✓

Note. Payoff is indicated by a (+) sign, and no payoff is indicated by a (-) sign. The letters d/k indicate that
participants were unsure about the outcome of the card.

task is impeded, responding may be more likely to resem-
ble the patterns observed in animal experiments, that is to
say, behavior may be more likely to fall under the control
of the principles of contingency learning. However, the
fact that half of the participants in the timed group did
not show blocking shows that additional factors are in-
volved in the prediction of responding with respect to com-
pound stimuli. Configural and elemental histories of
responding may constitute one such influential factor.
On the other hand, the lack of negative predictions by con-
trol cards in the figure blocking test (participants in both
groups responded that the control card produced a payoff
and a few of them gave a Bdon’t know^ response) shows that
previous exposure to only one of the elements of the com-
pound (in Training Phase 1) does affect causal judgments of
the cues in the compound. This effect may be explained in
terms of a transfer of associative strength between the previ-
ously exposed cue (competitor), the added element (target),
and the outcome (Rescorla & Colwill, 1983).
In both groups, the number of Bdon’t know^ or uncommit-
ted responses occurred almost exclusively for control cues.
While these responses may constitute evidence of elemental
responding and cognitive reasoning, they may also be indica-
tive of weak associative strength acquired by the cues during
the sequence of training trials. To examine the latter possibility
we contrasted causal judgments of target, competitor, and con-
trol cues, using an alternative procedure. In Experiment 2 all
the information regarding cues and outcomes was simulta-
neously present on the screen. Cards from Training Phases 1
and 2 were presented in a payoff and no payoff box,

Table 3 Blocking/no blocking

effects of figure and background Ppts O (figure P (control Blocking H (background B (control Blocking of
target cues in the timed group target cue) figure) of figure cue target cue) background) background cue

1 − + ✓ + +
2 − d/k ✓ d/k d/k
3 − + ✓ − + ✓
4 + d/k d/k d/k
5 + + + +
6 + d/k − d/k ✓
7 − d/k ✓ − + ✓
8 − d/k ✓ − d/k ✓
9 − + ✓ − d/k ✓
10 + + − d/k ✓
11 − + ✓ + d/k
12 + + + +
13 − d/k ✓ + +

Note. Payoff is indicated by a (+) sign, and no payoff is indicated by a (-) sign. The letters d/k indicate that
participants were unsure about the outcome of the card.
Psychol Rec

Table 4 Frequency distribution of blocking effects for the figure cue in were designed and implemented using the software LabView,
the timed and untimed group
2010 for Windows. The experiment included the same cards
Group Blocking of figure cue No blocking of figure cue Total described in Experiment 1. The size of the cards was adjusted
(2.5×3.5 cm) for this procedure so that all the cards could fit
Untimed 1 10 11 into one screen.
Timed 8 5 13
Total 9 15 24 Procedure
χ =6.99, p=.01.
2
As in Experiment 1, participants were informed that the study
examined some of the circumstances under which human
respectively. Based on this classification, participants were learning occurs. The following instructions were provided
asked to place the unclassified test cards into one of the boxes. on the computer screen:

This is a game of cards. You will notice that some cards

Experiment 2
One of the most widely used procedures to study the acquisi-
tion of contingency relations in humans is the discrete trial
procedure. Even though measures are usually taken to ensure
that the relevant relations are sufficiently trained, in human
experiments there is a chance that factors such as attention,
motivation, or habituation to the conditions of the task inter-
fere with the acquisition of a novel repertoire of arbitrary
relations. By testing an alternative procedure we examined if
differences in blocking were observed when competitor–out-
come and target–outcome associations were simultaneously
available than when presented across a limited sequence of
discrete trials.
Method
Participants
Ten undergraduate students between ages 18 and 30 years
volunteered to participate in this study. All participants re-
ceived bonus points in one of their course assignments upon
completion of the experimental task.
Apparatus and Stimuli
produce a payoff and some cards don’t. Observe care-
fully. On the next screen you will see three boxes labeled
BPayoff,^ BNo Payoff,^ and BI Don’t Know.^ Your job
is to classify the six cards that appear on the top right
corner of the screen into one of the three boxes. You’ll
have to try to identify if the cards produce a pay off or
not. Using the mouse, drag each card into one of the
boxes. When you are ready to begin, click on the button
labeled BStart^ at the bottom of the screen.
There was no time limit to complete the sorting task. Three
boxes were presented on the computer screen. The box labeled
BPayoff^ contained the cards AN, AO, BP, MX, and HX.
These were the same cards shown as producing a payoff dur-
ing Training Phases 1 and 2 in Experiment 1. The cards inside
the BNo Payoff^ box were EN, DQ, and MF. These were the
same cards that resulted in no payoff in Experiment 1
(see Table 1). The cards classified in these two boxes could
not be moved. The cards used for the test phase in Experiment
1 (MO, HN, BN, MP, IX, AR) were presented outside the
boxes and on the top right side of the screen. These cards
could be placed anywhere on the screen using the computer
mouse. A button labeled BDone^ on the top center of the
screen ended the experiment once the participant had reached
a final classification of all test cards.

The experimental task was presented on IBM-compatible Results

computers with 17-in. screens. All phases of the experiment
Table 6 shows classifications of target and control cues ac-
cording to the attributed outcome of the cards. Nine of 10
Table 5 Frequency distribution of blocking effects for the background
cue in the timed and untimed group
participants classified the MO (target) and the MP (control)
card in the Payoff box. Hence, as in the untimed group
Group Blocking of No blocking of Total (Experiment 1), blocking effects were not observed for the
background cue background cue figure target cue in any except one participant. By contrast,
Untimed 3 8 11 only two participants classified the background target cue (H)
Timed 6 7 13
in the Payoff box. One participant classified it in the Don’t
Total 9 15 24
Know box and the seven remaining participants classified it in
the No Payoff box. Differences in responding to target figure
χ2 =0.90, p=.42. and target background cues were statistically significant
 Psychol Rec

Table 6 Blocking effect of target

and background cues after Ppts O (figure P (control Blocking of H (background B (control Blocking of
exposure to the sorting task target cue) figure) figure cue target cue) background) background cue

1 + + − −
2 + + − −
3 + + d/k −
4 + + − + ✓
5 + + − −
6 + + − d/k ✓
7 + + + −
8 + + + +
9 + + − −
10 − d/k ✓ − + ✓

Note. Classification in the Payoff box is indicated by a (+) sign, and classification in the No Payoff box is
indicated by a (-) sign. The letters d/k indicate that participants classified the card in the Don’t Know box.

(McNemar p=.01). However, because most participants also
attributed a negative outcome to the control background cue
(B) and a positive outcome to the control figure cue, blocking
effects were confirmed only in 3 of 10 participants
(see Table 6). No significant differences were found between
blocking of target and background cues (McNemar p=.50).
Overall, most participants attributed a positive outcome to
figure cues (target and control), and a negative outcome to
background cues (target and control).
In this procedure, competitor–outcome associations AN+,
AO+ (for background cues) and MX+, HX+ (for target com-
petitor cues) were apparent as these cards were presented in-
side the Payoff box along with their corresponding target cue
cards (MO and HN). As in Experiment 1, Experiment 2 ex-
amined if participants attributed a positive outcome to novel
compounds AR and IX, which included the competitor cues A
and X. Seven participants classified the novel card AR
(A being the background competitor of the figure target cue)
in the No Payoff box, and three classified it in the Don’t Know
box. By contrast, all participants classified the IX card (figure
competitor of background target cue) in the Payoff box.
Discussion
This procedure produced very weak evidence of blocking.
There was a notable difference however between responses
to figure and background cues. In general, while all figure
cues (target, controls, and competitors) seemed to predict a
payoff, background cues tended to predict no payoff. Hence,
with this procedure, participants seemed to produce a judg-
ment of outcome based on the figure cue and not on the back-
ground cue.
Because figure cues were perceptually more salient than
background cues, participants may have generalized the infor-
mation from the cards where the figure cue produced an out-
come and derived a rule that was applicable to all cards.
According to this interpretation, responding when there is
time to think (even Don’t Know or uncommitted responses)
can be explained in terms of the evaluation of the logical
possibilities implied in the contingencies, rather than in terms
of the strength of the associations.
General Discussion
The purpose of this study was to examine if blocking is atten-
uated by deliberate reasoning in a causal learning task. In
order to do this, causal judgments of target and control cues
in participants who had three seconds to respond to the
blocking test, and in participants who had unlimited time to
respond, were compared. Results show notable differences
between the two groups.
In contrast to Glautier’s (2002) findings, nearly no cases of
blocking for both target cues (figure and background) in the
untimed group were observed. Most participants in this group
associated both cues as well as the control stimuli with a
payoff. In contrast, blocking was observed for two thirds of
the participants in the timed group. These results suggest that
human behavior can be described by the same set of condi-
tioning principles that govern animal behavior, but only when
logical reasoning is impeded or highly limited.
Most uncommitted or Bdon’t know^ responses correspond
to predictions of the outcome of control cues, and the majority
of these responses were given by participants in the timed
group. This may indicate that participants responded separate-
ly to the stimuli in the compound (as they did for the
competitor-target compound), even though they were present-
ed as parts of a single stimulus object. In contrast to target and
competitor cues, neither of the cues in the control card had
been previously associated with the outcome. As a result,
participants did not have enough information on which to base
a causal judgment with respect to the elements of the control
Psychol Rec
compound card. The same occurred for the evaluation of com-
petitor cues with a novel figure or background. A high per-
centage of Bdon’t know^ responses further suggests elemental
responding with respect to each of the stimulus in the card.
These findings show that despite the fact that target and
competitor cues were presented as part of a single stimulus,
participants responded elementally with respect to each of the
cues in the compound. In contrast to most views, though, we
suggest that responding either configurally or elementally
does not necessarily facilitate blocking. What does seem to
account for blocking effects in experimental preparations de-
signed to produce elemental responding (i.e., Beckers et al.,
2005; De Houwer et al., 2005), is that in these procedures, the
arranged contingencies are such that the null contribution of
the target cue is specified.
In order to rule out if Bdon’t know^ responses were due to
insufficient exposure to training trials, we examined responses
to the test cards using a sorting-task procedure. By contrast to
the traditionally used procedures, in this task, information re-
garding the outcomes of the cards was not presented on a trial-
by-trial basis. In this procedure, the cards were classified into
two boxes according to their outcome. Participants in this
group responded differently than those in the former two
groups (Experiment 1). Very few cases of blocking were ob-
served for both target cues (figure and background). Most
participants attributed payoff outcomes to figure cues, and
no payoff outcomes to background cues. Additionally, in con-
trast with the timed and untimed groups, very few cases of
uncommitted responses to the cards were observed.
Most likely, this experimental arrangement is associated
with a higher likelihood of self-generated rules with respect
to the task. Seemingly, these rules produce behavioral out-
comes different from those produced by the temporal associ-
ations involved in discrete trial contingencies. It would be
interesting to examine if limiting the time to sort the test cards
would result in a different pattern of responding as in
Experiment 1. Further research could focus on the comparison
between the sorting task and the discrete trial procedure. On
the other hand, it is possible that the inclusion of two blocking
tests (one for a figure cue and one for a background cue) may
have increased the overall difficulty of the task. Future repli-
cations of present findings should be conducted using one
blocking procedure only.
This study provides empirical evidence contributing to the
discussion of whether or not the principles of classical condi-
tioning that have been established in the animal laboratory, the
blocking effect in particular, are also descriptive of human
behavior under similar circumstances of contingency control.
The effect of verbal processes on nonverbal contingency con-
trol procedures is without doubt crucial in determining the
generality of behavioral processes and outcomes and, in par-
ticular, in furthering our understanding of human behavior in
light of such processes.
To summarize, results showed greater evidence of
blocking for participants exposed to the procedure in which
cognitive reasoning about the task was impeded. This can be
explained in terms of the operation of rule-based processes,
which may in some cases compete with the control exerted by
the contingencies arranged in the experimental task. Thus,
when logical reasoning is taken out of the equation, principles
of contingency learning seem sufficient to describe human
behavior in causal learning tasks.
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