A.C. No.

5162            March 20, 2003

EMILIANO COURT TOWNHOUSES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MICHAEL DIONEDA, respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY to the cause of his client mindful always of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.1 An attorney-at-law must serve his client with competence and diligence at all
times,2 and never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,3 for it is his sworn duty to delay no man for
money or malice and to conduct himself in a proper manner not just to his client, but also to the
court, the legal profession and society at large.

This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by the EMILIANO COURT TOWNHOUSES
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION (ECTHA) against ATTY. MICHAEL DIONEDA.

On 29 September 1997 ECTHA and respondent Dioneda entered into a Retainer’s

Agreement wherein respondent lawyer agreed to handle the case of the complainant against LVF
Realty, Mr. Tinsay and BPI Family Savings Bank by way of filing a Complaint-in-Intervention in the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 4890-V-96, for
P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P1,000.00 as appearance fee per hearing.4 It was further agreed
that respondent lawyer would update the complaint and work on the development of the case.

< ECTHA and Atty. Dioneda entered into a Retainer’s Agreement wherein they agreed to handle the
case of the complainant against LVF Realty, Mr. Tinsay and BPI Family Savings Bank.>

by way of filing a Complaint-in-Intervention in the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
docketed as Civil Case No. 4890-V-96, for P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P1,000.00 as
appearance fee per hearing.4 It was further agreed that respondent lawyer would update the
complaint and work on the development of the case.

>

In its Complaint ECTHA alleged that Atty. Dioneda, after receiving the amount of P20,000.00, did
nothing for the development of the case and to update the complaint on the status of ECTHA’s
intended Complaint-in-Intervention. Due to the insistence of the members of the Association, Mr.
Fernando Garcia, ECTHA President, was compelled to check the records of the case in the Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 75, and secured a certification from the Branch Clerk of Court
dated 5 July 1999 that there was no motion for intervention filed in the case.

<In its Complaint ECTHA alleged that Atty. Dioneda, after receiving the amount of P20,000.00, did
nothing for the development of the case and to update the complaint on the status of ECTHA’s
intended Complaint-in-Intervention>

On behalf of ECTHA Mr. Garcia repeatedly made oral demands for respondent to return the amount
of P20,000.00 because he did not do anything to protect the rights and interests of the Association.
Respondent Dioneda only made oral promises to pay, and in August 1999 he could no longer be
contacted and the personnel in his office simply made excuses to Mr. Garcia.7
< On behalf of ECTHA Mr. Garcia repeatedly made oral demands for respondent to return the
amount of P20,000.00 but Atty. Dioneda only made oral promises to pay, and in August 1999 he
could no longer be contacted and the personnel in his office simply made excuses to Mr. Garcia.>

Through Mr. Garcia ECTHA referred the matter to Atty. Antonio L. Umali, who contacted respondent
by telephone. Still, no response was made by respondent. On 18 August 1999 a letter dated 17
August 1999 was sent to Dioneda, but again there was no response.8

In his Comment filed before this Court, respondent Dioneda admitted that he and ECTHA entered
into a Retainer’s Agreement; however, he averred that the Agreement did not cover only
the Complaint-in-Intervention as adverted to by the complainant. It also included the case before the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) that the complainant filed against the developer
of Emiliano Court Townhouses who refused to release to the members of the ECTHA their
respective Deeds of Sale.

At the time his legal services were engaged, Atty. Dioneda alleged that there was already a decision
in favor of the complainant. Thereafter, respondent entered his appearance and filed a Motion for
Execution with the HLURB. According to respondent Mr. Garcia would go with him and follow up the
issuance of the Writ of Execution with the HLURB National Office. Respondent Dioneda further
alleged that he wanted to pursue the Writ of Execution since he would attach it to the Complaint-in-
Intervention, and that this was explained to the members of ECTHA. Respondent claimed that there
was delay in the filing of the Complaint-in-Intervention because there was delay in the issuance by
the HLURB of the Writ of Execution.

Respondent further averred that Mr. Garcia would call him at his residence and "spew invectives" at
him. There would be no day that Mr. Garcia would not call respondent and hurl expletives at him and
his parents. Respondent denied the allegation that ECTHA had made several demands on him and
that he promised to pay sometime August 1999.

< Respondent denied the allegation that ECTHA had made several demands on him and that he
promised to pay sometime August 1999.>

After receiving the demand letter of ECTHA respondent immediately called up the residence of Mr.
Garcia and informed him that he could get the money and the records of the case at his office.
However, respondent informed ECTHA that a portion of the amount to be returned would be
deducted as a reasonable fee for the efforts exerted by him. According to respondent, no
representative of the complainant showed up at his law office.

Respondent Dioneda denied the charge that he never attended to the case of the complainant and
that he did nothing to protect the interest of its members. He asserted that there was no intention on
his part to defraud them.

The matter was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation. Hearings were set
on at least five (5) separate dates. Despite due notice, respondent never attended the IBP
administrative hearings. Thus the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline allowed the presentation of
complainant’s evidence ex-parte against respondent on the 14 December 2001 hearing.9

On 13 February 2002 the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), through the designated Commissioner, recommended that respondent be found guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Canons 17 and 18.10 The IBP held that
the act of receiving professional fees and thereafter failing to render the corresponding legal service
is a violation of the Canons. The penalty of three (3) months suspension from the practice of law and
an order for Dioneda to return the amount of P20,000.00 to his client in the interest of justice were
recommended. On 29 June 2002, Resolution No. XV-2002-252 was passed by the IBP Board of
Governors adopting and approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.

The sole issue in this case is whether Atty. Dioneda violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Admittedly respondent received the amount of P20,000.00 as
acceptance fee for handling a case to be filed in behalf of ECTHA. Despite receipt of the
aforementioned fee, respondent allegedly failed to render the corresponding legal services to the
complainant.

< Whether or not Atty. Dioneda violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. >

We agree with the Report of IBP Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes as approved and adopted by
the IBP Board of Governors.

The Complaint-in-Intervention was never filed and despite the pronouncement of respondent that he

would return the attorney’s fees to complainant, he never did. The issuance of the Writ of
Execution in the HLURB should never have been a requirement imposed by respondent before a
Complaint-in-Intervention could be filed.

Before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, respondent Dioneda did not attend a single hearing to
defend himself. Despite due notice, he did not attend the hearings scheduled on 19 March, 9 May,
20 June, 8 August and 14 December 2001. The parties were ordered to submit their respective
position papers in the Order of 9 May 2001 of the CBD-IBP. Respondent never complied with the
Order.

Respondent’s lamentable attitude towards his client’s case is clearly evident from his apparent
disinterest in his own case for disbarment. Dioneda never bothered to present evidence in his
defense. He disregarded all notices sent to him by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, which
were personally served at his office address. He never appeared before the Commission despite
several opportunities to do so and explain his side.

It is reasonable to conclude that under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, respondent committed an
infringement of ethical standards. The act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in
handling the case of complainant ECTHA against LVF Realty, Mr. Tinsay and BPI Family Bank and
subsequently failing to render such service is a clear violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Not only that. The acts of inexcusable negligence in legal matters
entrusted to him and disloyalty to his client constitute major breaches of respondent’s oath as a
lawyer.11 These acts that are inimical to his client’s interests render respondent liable.

< It is reasonable to conclude that under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, respondent committed an
infringement of ethical standards. The act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in
handling the case of complainant ECTHA against LVF Realty, Mr. Tinsay and BPI Family Bank and
subsequently failing to render such service is a clear violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The acts of inexcusable negligence in legal matters entrusted to him
and disloyalty to his client constitute major breaches of respondent’s oath as a lawyer.11 These acts
that are inimical to his client’s interests render respondent liable.
>

A member of the legal profession owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in
the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability.12 Public
interest demands that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability to preserve his client’s cause, for
the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves the ends of justice. Verily, the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it the corresponding duties not only to the client but also to the
court, to the bar and to the public. A lawyer’s inability to properly discharge his duty to his client may
also mean a violation of his correlative obligations to the court, to his profession and to the general
public.

The duty of a lawyer to safeguard his client’s interests commences from his retainer until his
effective discharge from the case or the final disposition of the entire subject matter of litigation.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the
duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. The canons of the legal profession require that once an attorney
agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion. Indeed,
respondent neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by failing to file the Complaint-in-
Intervention he undertook to handle, thus making him liable under Rule 18.03 of Canon 18.

In Santos v. Lazaro this Court recognized Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a

basic postulate in legal ethics stating that when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he
will exercise due diligence in protecting his rights.13 The failure to exercise that degree of vigilance
and attention expected of a good father of a family makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed
in him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession,
the courts and society.14

However, the recommended penalty by the IBP is not commensurate to the acts complained of.
Jurisprudence shows that heavier sanctions have been imposed for ethical violations of this nature,
taking into consideration the gravity of the offense and the necessity of preserving the integrity of the
legal profession.

Following the latest rulings of this Court on disciplinary proceedings against erring attorneys, those
found guilty of the same or similar acts were suspended for not less than six (6) months from the
practice of law.

The facts of Sencio v. Calvadores bear a striking similarity to the present case.15 The respondent
lawyer in Sencio did not return the money to the complainant after a demand therefor was made
following his failure to file the case. This Court took to task the respondent’s attitude of not
answering the complaint and in deliberately disregarding the orders and notices of the IBP on many
occasions, holding that this attitude showed a character or disposition which stains the nobility of the
legal profession as he chose not to appear at the scheduled hearings despite due notice and
warnings given.16 The IBP-appointed Commissioner had no other recourse but to receive the
evidence of the complainant ex-parte.17

Accordingly, the respondent in Sencio was found guilty of violation of the lawyer’s oath, malpractice
and gross misconduct, suspended for six (6) months, and ordered to return to his client the amount
of P12,000.00 with interest at 12% per annum from the date of the promulgation of the resolution
until the return of the amount.18

This Court in Garcia v. Manuel suspended the respondent lawyer from the practice of law for six (6)
months and ordered him to render an accounting of all monies he received from the
complainant.19 The counselor-at-law was found guilty of gross misconduct, especially for ineffectively
handling the case of his client and failing to return the money given by that same client.

In Rabanal v. Tugade20 and Galen v. Paguirigan,21 the respondent lawyers who failed to file a brief to

the detriment of their respective clients were suspended by this Court for six (6) months on the first
offense.

The respondent attorney in Aromin v. Boncavil was found to have violated Canons 15, 17 and 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.22 He was suspended for six (6) months and warned that a
repetition of a similar offense would be dealt with more severely.

As to the amount of Atty. Dioneda’s compensation for his legal services, the general rule as to the
conclusiveness of a valid written contract fixing attorney’s fees cannot find application in the case at
bar. This is due largely to the complainant’s request for a full refund of the attorney’s fees given, and
the respondent’s counter-proposal that a portion of the amount be deducted as a reasonable fee for
the efforts exerted by him. In a situation where both parties are deemed to have impliedly
disregarded the contract and placed themselves in the position as though there was no express
stipulation as to the attorney’s fees, the lawyer’s compensation shall be determined on the basis
of quantum meruit.23

Despite this settled principle of law on the compensation of an attorney for legal services, we rule
against respondent lawyer in the present case.

To deserve compensation for his legal services based on quantum meruit, respondent Dioneda must
prove by substantial evidence that he is entitled to a reasonable fee for his efforts in pursuing the
complainant’s case with the Court taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of his
fees.24 However, due to respondent’s conspicuous absence at the administrative hearings for his
disbarment set by the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline on at least five (5) different occasions,
and the apparent lack of findings of fact to support the position of respondent, evidence required to
establish attorney’s fees was never adduced. For having missed several opportunities to present
evidence in his favor without any satisfactory explanation as to his non-appearance, we are
constrained to deny him compensation for his legal services on the basis of quantum meruit due to
the lack of any factual basis to determine the value of his work as complainant’s counsel.

Finally, Rivera v. Corral25 reiterates the purpose of administrative cases against lawyers in this

manner -

The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and
discipline the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by
protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the
legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyer's oath has proven them unfit
to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. A lawyer may be
disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor or
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

It must be stressed that the power to discipline advocates of the law should be exercised with
extreme care, primarily on the notion of preserving the nobility of the law as a profession rather than
on the incidental purpose of vindicating the rights of private parties against erring lawyers. The
indispensable duty of this Court as the guardian of the bench and bar remains that of maintaining the
people’s respect for the rule of law and the efficient administration of justice, while at the same time
restoring the community’s faith in the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Michael Dioneda is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six
(6) months, which shall take effect from the date of notice of receipt of the finality of this Decision,
with a WARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts will merit a more severe penalty, and
is ORDERED to RETURN to complainant Emiliano Court Townhouses Homeowners Association the
amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum
from the date of promulgation of this Decision until the full amount as directed, is returned.

<Therefore, he is suspended from the practice of law for (6) months and ordered to return P20,000
to the petitioner>

< ECTHA and Atty. Dioneda entered into a Retainer’s Agreement wherein they agreed to handle the
case of the complainant against LVF Realty, Mr. Tinsay and BPI Family Savings Bank.>

<In its Complaint ECTHA alleged that Atty. Dioneda, after receiving the amount of P20,000.00, did
nothing for the development of the case and to update the complaint on the status of ECTHA’s
intended Complaint-in-Intervention> < Respondent denied the allegation that ECTHA had made
several demands on him and that he promised to pay sometime August 1999.>

< Whether or not Atty. Dioneda violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. >

< It is reasonable to conclude that under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, respondent committed an
infringement of ethical standards. The act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in
handling the case of complainant ECTHA against LVF Realty, Mr. Tinsay and BPI Family Bank and
subsequently failing to render such service is a clear violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The acts of inexcusable negligence in legal matters entrusted to him
and disloyalty to his client constitute major breaches of respondent’s oath as a lawyer. These acts
that are inimical to his client’s interests render respondent liable.

Let copy of this Decision be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Office of the Bar Confidant, and entered into respondent’s personal records as an attorney and as a
member of the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6591             May 4, 2005

MARISSA L. MACARILAY, complainant,
vs.
FELIX B. SERIÑA, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Failure to render the legal services agreed upon, despite the undisputed receipt of an acceptance
fee, is a clear violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Negligence in attending to the
needs of a client and a deceitful cover-up of such carelessness likewise constitute major breaches of
the lawyer's oath.

The Case

Before us is a verified Complaint1 for "malpractice and/or gross misconduct" against Atty. Felix B.
Seriña, filed by Marissa L. Macarilay with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) on September 22, 2003.

The IBP-CBD, through Director Rogelio A. Vinluan, required respondent to answer the charges.2 It
thereafter held a mandatory conference/hearing on January 13, 2004, during which the parties were
able to enter into a stipulation of facts as well as to present and mark their documentary
evidence.3 After they submitted their respective Position Papers,4 the case was deemed submitted
for resolution.

The investigator of the case, Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr., summarized the antecedents
thus:

"Complainant's version of the facts pertinent to this case is as follows:

"Sometime in year 2000, Complainant and one Jenelyn Balaoro ('Balaoro') bought a lot from
one Albaria Mohammad ('Mohammad'). Complainant and Balaoro, however, could not
register the sale with the Register of Deeds and cause the transfer of the title in their names
because Mohammad failed to surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of title for said lot.
Subsequently, Complainant learned from one Reina Ong ('Ong') that Mohammad had
mortgaged the said lot to a third party. Ong advised Complainant to get a copy of the
mortgage contract and to do this the latter needs to have a contact in the Register of Deeds.
Sometime in January or February 2002, Ong introduced Complainant to one Vic Paule
('Paule'), an employee of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, who advised Complainant to
get a lawyer to handle the case. Complainant allegedly gave Paule P8,000.00 for the help
the latter will give her in securing a copy of the mortgage contract concerned. On March 18,
2002, Complainant, Balaoro and Ong met with Paule at the Star Mall in Mandaluyong and
proceeded to the office of Respondent, the lawyer recommended by Paule. During said
meeting, Complainant consulted Respondent about the problem concerning the transfer of
the subject lot title in her and Balaoro's names and the latter advised that the first thing [they
have to do], is to file an adverse claim with the Register of Deeds. Respondent, however,
required an acceptance fee of P20,000.00 before he could act on the matter. Thus, on the
same day, Complainant issued a check to Respondent for P20,000.00 as payment of the
acceptance fee. Subsequently, Respondent asked Complainant for P3,000.00 as
notarization fee and P5,000.00 as filing fee for the adverse claim. On April 5, 2002,
Complainant and Balaoro went to Respondent's office and paid said amounts. On the same
day, Respondent himself typed the affidavit of adverse claim in the presence of Complainant
and Balaoro and the latter subsequently signed the same. On May 16, 2002, upon
Respondent's advice, Complainant gave Respondent another P20,000.00 in check as filing
fee for the suits to be filed against Mohammad.

"Towards the middle part of the year, Complainant inquired from Respondent about the
status of the case(s) against Mohammad but the latter could not give any further
developments other than that the affidavit of adverse claim had already been filed with the
Register of Deeds. It appears that Respondent was having problems about the fact that
Mohammad's whereabouts are unknown and Respondent was not sure what to do about it.
Subsequently, Complainant received assurance from Respondent that the case against
Mohammad was already filed in court although Respondent could not identify the particular
court except that it was pending in the sala of one Judge Regala. Upon verification with the
courts and the fiscal's office [at] Quezon City, Complainant learned that no case, whether
criminal or civil, was ever filed by Respondent against Mohammad. Complainant then called
Respondent regarding her findings and even suggested service of summons by publication
upon Mohammad, having receiv[ed] advice from one Atty. Noel Sorreda ('Atty. Sorreda') that
such manner of service is appropriate in view of the lack of information regarding
Mohammad's whereabouts. Respondent, however, immediately got angry so Complainant
did not insist on her inquiries and suggestions.

"On March 24, 2003, upon Complainant's request, Atty. Sorreda called Respondent to
inquire about the specific branch where the case against Mohammad was supposedly
pending. Respondent got angry and hung up the phone. Upon learning this, Complainant
authorized Atty. Sorreda to terminate the services of Respondent on her behalf. Atty.
Sorreda called Respondent a second time but was able to talk only with presumably
Respondent's lady-receptionist or secretary whom Atty. Sorreda requested to just relay to
Respondent his message regarding the termination of Respondent's services. On March 26,
2003, Atty. Sorreda, upon Complainant's request, sent a letter to Respondent confirming the
verbal termination of services, and also asking for the turnover of the pertinent documents
that were with Respondent. Subsequently, Complainant herself wrote Respondent a letter
affirming the contents of the earlier letter of Atty. Sorreda. In a letter dated April 4, 2003,
Respondent denied the fact of his termination by Atty. Sorreda and invited Complainant to
his office to talk things over. Complainant responded through Atty. Sorreda in a letter dated
May 16, 2003 by reiterating the termination of Respondent's services and the request for the
turnover of documents. In a letter dated May 23, 2003, Respondent enclosed the documents
requested. Since it appears from the documents turned over that Respondent never filed a
suit against Mohammad, Complainant wrote Respondent demanding the return of the money
she paid for the anticipated legal services Respondent was supposed to render but which
were not actually rendered. Respondent's failure to respond to said letter prompted
Complainant [to] send a follow-up letter dated July 16, 2003. Instead of returning the money,
Respondent wrote Complainant a letter dated July 14, 2003 denying receipt of any amount
from Complainant other than the P20,000.00 acceptance fee and demanding payment of
alleged unpaid attorney's fee of P40,000 and fees for notarial services of P3,000.00 which
Respondent allegedly advanced for Complainant. Thus, Complainant filed the present
administrative case for disciplinary action, likewise praying for the return of the money she
paid for the anticipated legal services Respondent was supposed to render but which were
not actually rendered.

"On the other hand, Respondent's version of the facts pertinent to this case is as follows:
"On March 16, 2002, Complainant, Balaoro and Ong went to Respondent's office during
which Complainant related to Respondent her various problems and cases. Respondent
advised Complainant that the solutions to her problem regarding Mohammad consist of two
(2) phases. The first phase consists of: (1) having the notary public of the deed covering the
sale of the subject property sign the acknowledgment page (since although the said deed
contained the notarial seal of said notary, the latter did not sign the same); (2) preparing a
complaint in court to compel Mohammad to surrender the owner's certificate of title; and (3)
executing an affidavit of adverse claim to cause its inscription on the copy of the said title in
the Registry of Deeds to protect their interest. The second [phase] consists of: (1) filing the
complaint in court to compel Mohammad to surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of title,
to cause the cancellation of said title and the issuance of another title in the names of
Complainant and Balaoro, and to cause the removal from said title of the mortgage lien
thereon in favor of Hernando and Nenita Rosario; and (2) filing of a criminal complaint for
estafa against Mohammad. On the same day, Complainant engaged Respondent to provide
the legal services to pursue the foregoing remedies. The parties' verbal agreement with
respect to Respondent's fees is as follows: (1) payment of acceptance fee of P20,000.00; (2)
payment of attorney's fees of P15,000 after Respondent has accomplished the first [phase]
of the remedies; (3) payment of attorney's fees of P15,000 after Respondent has
accomplished the second [phase] of the remedies; and (4) for hearings/follow-ups, payment
of per appearance fee of P3,000.00. Complainant paid the acceptance fee by issuing
Respondent a check dated March 18, 2002 covering P20,000.00.

"Thereafter, Respondent caused the notary public whose seal appeared on the deed
covering the sale of the subject property to sign the acknowledgment page thereof,
advancing the notarial fee of P3,000.00 which Complainant failed to pay for which reason
said notary did not sign said deed. On April 5, 2002, Complainant and Balaoro went to his
office and signed the affidavit of adverse claim, which Respondent prepared. On the same
date, Respondent requested Complainant and Balaoro to sign the civil complaint and
criminal complaint against Mohammad which Respondent prepared but Complainant and
Balaoro refused to sign because according to the latter two the residence of Mohammad in
said complaints is already wrong since Mohammad's whereabouts are already unknown.
Complainant and Balaoro promised to locate Mohammad's whereabouts and asked
Respondent to wait for such data. Thereafter, Respondent even advised Complainant and
Balaoro to locate Mohammad because resorting to the remedy of complaint and summons
by publication is very expensive and should be resorted to only as a last recourse.
Respondent adds that even as late as January 8, 2003, the civil and criminal complaints
could not be filed because Complainant herself wanted Respondent to amend the pleadings
by including an additional defendant or respondent and increasing the claim, for damages.

"Respondent further claims that he also extensively gave legal advise to Complainant with
respect to the following matters: (1) Complainant's litigation against spouses Casido to
recover her 10% retention in architect's fee; (2) collection of P800,000.00 indebtedness of
one Mrs. Dizon; and (3) recovery of Complainant's investments in her 2001 and 2002 car
transactions.

"Claiming that Complainant did not pay him any amount other than the P20,000.00
acceptance fee, Respondent argues that Complainant still owes him the following amounts:
(1) the P3,000.00 he paid to the notary public to sign the acknowledgment page of the deed
covering the sale of the subject property; (2) the P200 he spent in the notarization,
registration and inscription of the affidavit of adverse claim; (3) the P15,000.00 attorney's
fees agreed upon for accomplishing the first [phase] of Complainant's remedies relative to
her problem with Mohammad; and (4) an additional P40,000.00 for the legal services he
 rendered with respect to Complainant's other problems. Respondent further claims that
Complainant should pay him the costs relative to the filing of this administrative case."5

Report of the Investigating Commissioner

In the investigating commissioner's opinion, respondent had been remiss in attending to the cause of
his client, in violation of Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Regarded
as a mere afterthought was his defense that his failure to file the civil and the criminal complaints
was the fault of complainant. It was noted that if she was indeed responsible for the non-filing of the
complaints, he should have pointed out this fault at the earliest opportunity, which was in his April 4,
2003 letter. The commissioner further opined that this defense had been invoked only in
respondent's letter dated July 14, 2003, after complainant demanded the return of the amounts she
had paid.

While likewise rejecting respondent's claim for unpaid legal fees amounting to P15,000, the
commissioner upheld Balaoro's sworn testimony. It corroborated that of complainant, who had said
that the only agreement between her and respondent was the acceptance fee of P20,000. His claim
of P40,000 as consultation fee for the advice he had allegedly given her concerning other legal
problems was also rejected for lack of evidence.

Commissioner Villadolid then wrote the following recommendation:

"x x x [T]his Commissioner finds that Respondent violated Canons 17 and 18 of the CPR and
recommends a penalty of reprimand or suspension subject to the discretion of the
Commission.

Further, considering that it is established from the records that Respondent received a total
of P48,000.00 from Complainant and that the only legal service rendered by Respondent
consists of the notarization of the deed of sale covering the subject property and the filing of
the adverse claim, this Commissioner believes that P8,000.00 is sufficient compensation for
the services actually rendered and thus recommends that Respondent be ordered to pay
Complainant P40,000.00 by way of restitution to Complainant."6

Acting on the above recommendation, the IBP board of governors approved on July 30, 2004, the
following Resolution:

"RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2004-386

CBD Case No. 03-1141
Marissa L. Macarilay vs.
Atty. Felix B. Seriña

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex 'A'; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and for respondent's violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by his failure to exercise due diligence in protecting and attending to the
interest of complainant after receiving payment for the legal services he was supposed to
render, Atty. Felix B. Seriña is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months and Ordered to Pay complainant P40,000.00 by way of Restitution."7
 The Court's Ruling

We agree with the foregoing Resolution of the IBP board of governors.

Administrative Liability

A lawyer-client relationship is highly fiduciary in nature;8 it is delicate, exacting and confidential.9 It

requires a high standard of conduct and demands utmost fidelity, candor, fairness, and good
faith.10 The legal profession demands vigilance and attention expected of a "good father of a
family."11 Lawyers should adopt the norm expected of people of good intentions. In brief, they must
always be protective of the interests of their clients as good parents would be protective of their own
families.12

Indeed, under their sacred oath, lawyers pledge not to delay any person for money or malice. They
are bound to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and discretion, with all
good fidelity to their clients.13

These duties are further stressed in the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically in the
following pertinent provisions:

"CANON 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients.

"CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession.

xxxxxxxxx

"Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. x x x.

"CANON 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him.

"CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

xxxxxxxxx

"Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

"Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information."

Admittedly, respondent received the amount of P20,000 as acceptance fee for the cases he had
agreed to file on behalf of complainant. Plainly, he was less than candid in his dealings with his
client; he displayed lack of honesty and fidelity to her cause. Sufficiently established were the
following acts: (1) despite his receipt on May 16, 2002, of P20,000 for filing fees, he did not file the
cases he had agreed to handle; (2) he deceived complainant when he lied by saying that a civil
complaint had been filed in the sala of one "Judge Regala" of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City; (3) respondent refused to return the money he had received for the filing fees. These
misrepresentations, lies and lapses constituted a breach of his sworn duty as a lawyer and of the
ethical standards he was required to honor and observe.

Lawyers owe full devotion to the protection of the interests of their clients, as well as warmth and
zeal in the defense of the latter's rights.14 Once they agree to handle a case, lawyers are bound to
give to it their utmost attention, skill and competence, regardless of its significance.15 Public interest
requires that they exert their best efforts and use all their learning and ability in the speedy
prosecution or defense of the client's cause.16 Those who perform that duty with diligence and
candor not only safeguard the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of justice.17 They do
honor to the bar and help maintain the community's respect for the legal profession.18

Moreover, the lawyer-client relationship, being one of confidence, requires lawyers to give the client
timely, adequate and truthful updates on the developments of the case.19 In this manner, the trust
and faith of clients in their counsel would remain unimpaired.

Indeed, respondent neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by failing to file the complaints as he
was supposed to. Unbelievable is his claim that the complaints were ready as early as April 5, 2002,
but that these were not filed anyway because complainant had refused to sign them, absent the
correct address of the defendant (Albaria Mohammad).

First, evidence abound that it was complainant who was insistent that the cases be filed. She
repeatedly inquired about the case, but respondent would not give her any clear answer. Later on,
he lied to her by saying that the complaint was pending in the sala of one Judge Regala. His
deception on top of his failure to file the cases were raised in the letter dated March 26,
2003,20 written by Atty. Noel Sorreda, her new counsel. In his April 4, 2003 reply,21 respondent did
not mention anything about the complaints that had allegedly been prepared as early as April 5,
2002. Commissioner Villadolid aptly observed in his Report:

"x x x The fact that respondent's 4 April 2003 letter-response to said letter, as well as
respondent's subsequent letter dated 23 May 2003, did not contain either gives further
credence to complainant's version of the facts. Notably, it was only in respondent's letter
dated 14 July 2003 that respondent raised such defenses for the first time. Considering that
said 14 July 2003 letter was in response to complainant's 28 June 2003 letter demanding the
return of certain amounts for legal services which complainant believed respondent did not
render, this Commissioner is inclined to believe that such defenses are mere afterthought to
defeat complainant's claim for the return of said amounts."

Were it not for the vigilance of complainant in inquiring about the status of her cases, she would not
have known that the complaints had not been filed at all. Respondent deliberately withheld informing
her of his inaction, notwithstanding her repeated follow-ups. Thus, he is deemed to have wronged
her and effectively betrayed the trust she had placed in him.

Second, his alleged lack of knowledge of the correct address of the defendant is not a hindrance to
the filing of a complaint. Indeed, such address is material to the service of summons22 which,
however, presupposes that a complaint has been properly filed in court. Furthermore, Section 14 of
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court23 provides for remedies when the defendant's address is unknown.
Thus, respondent should have nevertheless filed the complaint, especially because complainant had
already given him payment for the filing fees. His attempt to cover up his negligence by wrongfully
shifting the blame to her cannot be countenanced by this Court.

Finally, respondent should have returned the money to complainant following his failure to file the
cases.24 Where the client gives money to the lawyer for a specific purpose -- such as to file an action
or to appeal an adverse judgment -- the latter should, upon failure to do so, immediately return it to
the former.25 The unjustified withholding of funds belonging to the client warrants the imposition of
disciplinary action against the lawyer.26

It was sufficiently proven that, all in all, complainant had paid respondent P48,000:

"Similarly, a review of the records reveals that contrary to Respondent's claim, in addition to
the P20,000.00 covered by the check dated 18 March 2002 which complainant paid during
the parties' initial meeting, complainant made subsequent payments to respondent. Balaoro
confirms that when she and complainant went back to respondent's office on 5 April 2002,
complainant paid respondent P3,000.00 and P5,000.00 in cash. Another P20,000.00 was
likewise paid to respondent as evidenced by the RCBC check dated 16 May 2002 issued by
complainant to respondent."27

Likewise established was the obvious fact that the only legal service rendered by respondent
consisted of the notarization of the Deed of Sale covering the property purchased by complainant
and the filing of the adverse claim. We agree with Commissioner Villadolid that P8,000 was sufficient
compensation for the services actually rendered. Hence, respondent must return to complainant the
balance of P40,000 plus legal interest.

The failure of respondent to discharge his duty properly constitutes an infringement of ethical
standards and of his oath. Such failure makes him answerable not just to his client, but also to this
Court, to the legal profession, and to the general public.28 The recommended penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for six months is in accordance with jurisprudence.29

WHEREFORE, Atty. Felix B. Seriña is found GUILTY of violating Canons 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of six (6) months, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is further ORDERED to return to
Marissa L. Macarilay, within thirty (30) days from notice, the amount of P40,000, with interest at 6
percent per annum from May 16, 2002, until full payment. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all
courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is instructed to include a copy in
respondent's personal file.

SO ORDERED.